Economy

Highlights The FOMC managed to surprise investors at its March meeting after all, … : Everyone knew the Fed wasn’t going to hike rates last Wednesday, but the scope of the downward revision in the median dots was unexpected. … as it turns out that the median FOMC participant sees the pause as a lengthy hiatus: Not only does the median voter expect no rate hikes this year, s/he only expects one more in the entire tightening cycle. Rate-hike expectations have dwindled from three to a lonely one. The motivation for the Fed’s pivot is hardly crystal clear, … : The Fed may have turned more dovish because it fears the U.S. is losing momentum or that key major economies may be on the verge of a recession, it succumbed to pressure from the White House or financial markets, and/or it fears being unable to counter the next downturn. … but it looks to us like it has simply decided it can no longer stomach too-low inflation expectations: The zero lower bound will likely come into play when the next recession arrives, and higher inflation expectations will increase the Fed’s maneuverability by giving it the scope to reduce real rates more easily. Feature Wednesday’s FOMC meeting formalized the Fed’s turn to “patient” monetary policy. The dots revealed that the median FOMC participant’s estimates of the appropriate fed funds rate at year-end 2019 and 2020 are now 50 basis points lower than they were at the December meeting. At that meeting, the median participant expected the fed funds rate would be 2⅞% at the end of 2019, and 3⅛% at the end of 2020; the median participant now sees 2⅜% at the end of this year, the midpoint of the current 2.25 – 2.5% range, with a final hike to 2⅝% sometime in 2020. Uber-dovish St. Louis Fed President Bullard crowed in early January that the committee was starting to see things his way, and it seems that he was right. While presumably only Minneapolis President Kashkari voted with Bullard for no 2019 hikes in December, nine more participants came over to his side in the ensuing three months. The shift on the FOMC can be boiled down as follows: in December, two voters called for no hikes in 2019, and eleven called for a minimum of two hikes; in March, eleven voters called for no hikes, and two called for just two (Chart 1). The migration of nine out of seventeen voters from two or three hikes to zero hikes lopped 50 basis points off the FOMC’s median year-end projections through 2021, and has pushed our equilibrium fed funds rate model even further away from the consensus. What happened, and what does it mean for our S&P 500, Treasury and spread-product views? What Made The Fed More Patient? Our real-time view of the Fed’s turn to patience in early January was that it was a logical response to the sharp, sudden tightening of financial conditions imposed by the fourth-quarter sell-off in stocks and corporate bonds (Chart 2). We didn’t create a regression model to try to put a precise number on what the tightening in financial conditions meant, but it seemed fair to assume that it equated to at least one 25-basis-point hike in the fed funds rate. If that was as conservative an estimate as we thought, the Fed’s only rational course was to step aside, given that the financial markets had already done a quarter or two of its work for it. Chart 2Markets Tightened For The Fed In 4Q Slowing momentum in the rest of the world offered another reason for backing off. Chinese deceleration that began with domestic policymakers’ deleveraging drive has been exacerbated by the ongoing trade spat with the U.S. (Chart 3). Chinese imports are the most direct channel by which China impacts the rest of the world, and global trade has slid as China has decelerated (Chart 4). The first contraction in global export volumes since the global manufacturing slump in early 2016 has dragged on Europe, which took its 2018 cue from a soft China, rather than a robust U.S. Chart 3Deleveraging Started China's Slump ... Chart 4... Which Was Felt Around The World Within the U.S., ongoing data releases have fostered the notion that the Fed can well afford to be patient. Despite booming payroll expansion in December and January, which created 538,000 net new jobs, the unemployment rate ticked up to 4% from 3.7%.1 The data raised the possibility that there may be more labor market slack than previously estimated. Headline inflation is hardly alarming, though core measures that back out oil’s drag are hanging around the Fed’s 2% target (Chart 5). Chart 5Core Inflation Is Near Target, But Oil Has Weighed On Headline Inflation Is The Phillips Curve Dead? Is it possible that the Fed could turn away from rate hikes when the unemployment rate is a tenth of a point above its lowest level since 1969? Does the Fed really think the Phillips Curve is so flat that even 50-year lows in unemployment aren’t going to boost wages? Has it abandoned the idea that inflation and the unemployment rate are inversely related once the economy reaches full employment? We don’t think so; as we argued in our recent Special Report on the Phillips Curve,2 we are convinced that the Fed’s belief in the relationship between unemployment and inflation remains intact. Every mainstream macroeconomic inflation model incorporates an inverse relationship with the unemployment rate. We fully accept that the Phillips Curve is kinked, and that the point where it inflects is dependent on estimates of the unobservable natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU), but the economics profession has no widely accepted model that does not take as given the notion that sub-NAIRU unemployment is inflationary. Until the profession develops an alternative framework that achieves wide acceptance, the Phillips Curve will continue to be a keystone element of central bank policy. The path from higher wages to higher consumer prices may be indirect and uncertain, but the link between the unemployment gap and annual wage gains is alive and well, even in the post-Volcker, low-inflation era (Chart 6). Chart 6Wages Rise When Workers Are Hard To Find What Might The Fed See That We Don’t? We have been, and remain, constructive on the U.S. economy. The delayed December retail sales release was lousy, and the uninspiring advance January figure led the Atlanta Fed to knock nearly 40 basis points off of its estimate of consumption’s contribution to first-quarter GDP, but it seems incompatible with a roaring job market, rising wages, and an elevated household savings rate. First-quarter growth projects to be sickly, but it has been for the last few years, and the Atlanta Fed’s GDP Now model projects that real final domestic demand grew by 1.3%, in spite of the government shutdown. The FOMC seemed to err on the side of caution in trimming its growth estimates by 20 and 10 basis points (“bps”) for 2019 and 2020, respectively, and revising its unemployment rate projections 20 bps higher for both years. The global economy has surely slowed; ex-the U.S., its biggest constituents decelerated for nearly all of 2018, as Chair Powell noted. He also noted, however, that Chinese policy makers have taken several steps to support activity. That will help the rest of the world, including Europe, as an accelerating fiscal and credit impulse boosts Chinese imports (Chart 7). Brexit remains a risk the Fed would be irresponsible not to plan for, but given that a do-over referendum would probably lead to the U.K. remaining in the E.U. (Chart 8), it is a risk that may well not come to pass. Chart 7Chinese Policymakers Want To Boost Growth Chart 8Let's Call The Whole Thing Off We do not think that the Fed changed course based on White House pressure. As we have noted before, White House-Fed conflict is nothing new, and while the Arthur Burns-led Fed knuckled under during Nixon’s re-election campaign, pressure from the Johnson, Reagan and G.H.W. Bush Administrations all came to naught. We also do not think that the Fed took its cue from investors, even if its 2019 policy rate outlook now closely resembles the money market’s (Chart 9). If it is wary of inverting the yield curve, however, it may want to see long yields rise before it hikes again.3 Chart 9Seeing It The Markets' Way (At Least For 2019) Don’t Fence Me In Q: [B]elow-target inflation is a … phenomenon … across advanced economies, and I’d … like to … hear your thoughts about what kind of challenges that poses to policy makers like yourself and the global economy in general. Chair Powell: It’s a major challenge. It’s one of the major challenges of our time, really, to have … downward pressure on inflation[.] It gives central banks less room … to respond to downturns[.] [I]f inflation expectations are below two percent, they’re always going to be pulling inflation down, and we’re going to be paddling upstream and trying to … keep inflation at two percent, which gives us some room to cut, … when it’s time to cut rates when the economy weakens. … It’s … one of the things we’re looking into as part of our strategic monetary policy review this year. The proximity to the zero lower bound calls for more creative thinking about ways we can … uphold the credibility of our inflation target, and … we’re open-minded about ways we can do that. Our best guess is that the Fed has become frustrated by moribund inflation expectations ten years into a recovery. Now that it sees the potential for a recession in the not-so-distant future, it would prefer not to have to confront it with the zero lower interest-rate bound tying one hand behind its back. It would be reasonable if it would also prefer not to have to rely too heavily on asset purchases, given all the headaches that even a modest shrinking of the balance sheet has occasioned. The Fed’s ongoing monetary policy review may therefore turn out to be more than an academic exercise. It might be awfully nice to have strategies aiming to reverse past misses of the inflation objective in place before the next recession arrives. Those strategies would provide the Fed with more flexibility to reduce real interest rates via moves in the fed funds rate. Powell discussed the potential appeal of these sorts of strategies at Stanford University just a week and a half before the FOMC meeting,4 and despite all the times they’ve been bandied about, they just might come to something this time around. Investment Implications The Fed has made a significant pivot since October’s “long way from neutral,” and December’s post-FOMC press conference, when the chair seemed to be disconnected from the markets’ agita. We don’t think a 2019 rate hike is completely out of the question, but there is no doubt that the Fed’s reaction function has changed. We don’t yet see a reason to revise our terminal rate estimate down from 3.25%-3.5%, even if it’s evident that it will take a good bit longer for the Fed to get there than we initially expected. It seems to be more willing to let inflation get ahead of it – it may end up actively encouraging inflation to do so – before it completes its meandering journey to the terminal rate. Allowing the economy to run a little hotter should be equity-friendly. It’s hard to get earnings contraction without a recession, and recessions don’t occur when monetary policy is accommodative. If the Fed requires more evidence of improvement before it resumes hiking rates, the economy and corporate earnings should be able to build up more momentum than they otherwise would. The Fed’s newfound patience should also be spread-product-friendly, as borrowers become better credits as an expansion rolls along. The Treasury outlook is more nuanced. Yields fell as the Fed committed to remaining on hold for longer, but the Fed now seems to have exhausted its capacity for dovish surprises. Short of a recession or near-recession, it’s hard to see how yields can go much lower. Given markets’ seeming conviction that inflation is as dead as a doornail, however, Treasury bond yields may do no more than drift higher at the margin until the Fed’s efforts to put a floor underneath inflation expectations begin to bear some fruit. We still think risk-friendly positioning makes sense, and we reiterate our equity and spread-product overweights, our Treasuries underweight, and our below-benchmark-duration recommendation. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 At the other end of the spectrum, the unemployment rate fell two ticks in February, to 3.8%, despite a meager net increase of 20,000 jobs. Short-term disconnects can be explained by the fact that the unemployment rate (household) and net payrolls additions (business establishments) are calculated from separate surveys, but no one knows exactly how many people who aren’t working are available to work when they decide the time is ripe. 2 Please see the February 26, 2019 U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report, “The Phillips Curve: Science Or Superstition?” Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The Fed may not care a whit about the yield curve, but may simply want to hold its fire until it is convinced that the economy requires less accommodation so as not to overheat, which would get it to the same place: not hiking until long yields begin to price in the potential for overheating. 4 Please see the March 18, 2019 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Kinder, Gentler Central Banking.” Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The correlation between oil and petrocurrencies has deeply weakened in recent years. One of the reasons has been the prominence of new, important producers, notably the U.S. Oil prices should trend towards $75/bbl by year-end. This will favor the NOK, but the CAD and AUD will be held hostage to domestic slowdowns. Sell the CAD/NOK at current levels. Meanwhile, aggressive investors could begin accumulating USD/NOK shorts, given the Fed’s complete volte-face. Both the SNB and the BoE have delivered dovish messages, joining the chorus echoed by other central banks. However, the BoE remains a sideshow until the final chapter of the Brexit imbroglio unfolds. Feature Oil price dynamics have tended to have a profound impact on the trend of petrocurrencies. In theory, rising oil prices allow for increased government spending in oil-producing countries, making room for the resident central bank to tighten monetary policy. This is usually bullish for the currency. An increase in oil prices also implies rising terms of trade, which further increases the fair value of the exchange rate. Balance-of-payments dynamics also tend to improve during oil bull markets. Altogether, these forces combine to be powerful undercurrents for petrocurrencies. In the case of Canada and Norway, petroleum represents around 20% and 60% of total exports. For Saudi Arabia, Iran or Venezuela, this number is much higher than in Norway. It is easy to see why a big fluctuation in the price of oil can have deep repercussions for their external balances. Getting the price of oil right is usually the first step in any petrocurrency forecast. The Outlook For Oil1 Our baseline calls for Brent prices to touch $75/bbl by year-end. Oil demand tends to follow the ebbs and flows of the business cycle, with demand having slowed sharply in the fourth quarter of 2018 (Chart I-1). With over 60% of global petroleum consumed fueling the transportation sector, the slowdown in global trade brought a lot of freighters, bulk ships, large crude carriers and heavy trucks to a halt. If, as we expect, the impact of easier global financial conditions begins to seep into the real economy, these trends should reverse in the second half of the year. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy group estimates that this would translate into a 1.5% increase in oil demand this year. Chinese oil imports have already started accelerating, and should Indian consumption follow suit, this will put a floor under global demand growth (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Global Oil Demand Has Been Weak Chart I-2Oil Demand Green Shoots This increase in oil demand will materialize at a time when OPEC spare capacity is only at 2%. In its most recent meeting, OPEC decided not to extend the window for production cuts beyond May, waiting to see whether the U.S. eases sanctions on either Venezuela, Iran or both. At first blush, this appeared bearish for oil prices. However, the bottom line is that global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of both Venezuelan and Iranian exports. Unplanned outages wiped off about 1.5% of supply in 2018. Lost output from both countries will nudge the oil market dangerously close to a negative supply shock (Chart I-3). Bottom Line: If Venezuelan sanctions continue, we expect the U.S. will likely extend the current waivers to Iranian exports further out into the future. Meanwhile, demonstrated flexibility by OPEC makes it increasingly the fulcrum of the oil market. That said, the balance of risks for oil prices remain to the upside since a miscalculation by both sides is a possibility. The Good Old Days Historically, the above analysis would have been largely sufficient to buy most petrocurrencies, especially given the gaping wedge that has opened vis-à-vis the price of oil (Chart I-4). But the reality is that the landscape for oil production is rapidly shifting, with the U.S. shale revolution grabbing market share from both OPEC and non-OPEC members. Chart I-4Opportunity Or Regime Shift? In 2010, only about 6% of global crude output came from the U.S. Collectively, Canada, Norway and Mexico shared about 10% of the oil market. Meanwhile, OPEC’s market share sat just north of 40%, having largely been stable among constituents like Saudi Arabia, Iran and even Venezuela. Fast forward to today and the U.S. produces almost 15% of global crude, having grabbed market share from both developed and politically-fragile economies (Chart I-5). Chart I-5A New Oil Baron At the same time, the positive correlation between petrocurrencies and oil has been gradually eroded as the U.S. economy has become less and less of an oil importer. Put another way, rising oil prices benefit the U.S. industrial base much more than in the past, while the benefits for countries like Canada and Norway are slowly fading. U.S. shale output in the Big 5 basins rose by about 1.5 million barrels in 2018, close to the equivalent of total Libyan production. Meanwhile, Norwegian production has been falling for a few years.  The reality is that the landscape for oil production is rapidly shifting, with the U.S. shale revolution grabbing market share from both OPEC and non-OPEC members. In statistical terms, petrocurrencies had a near-perfect positive correlation with oil around the time U.S. production was about to take off (Chart I-6). Since then, that correlation has fallen from around 0.8 to around 0.3. At the same time, the DXY dollar index is on its way to becoming positively correlated with oil as the U.S. becomes a net energy exporter. Chart I-6Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies Bottom Line: Both the CAD and NOK remain positively correlated with oil. So do the Russian ruble, and the Colombian and Mexican pesos. That said, a loss of global market share has hurt the oil sensitivity of many petrocurrencies. Transportation bottlenecks for Canadian crude and falling production in Norway are also added negatives. The conclusion is that rising petrodollar reserves have historically been bullish for the currency (Chart I-7) but expect this correlation to be weaker than in the past.  Chart I-7Rising Petrodollar Reserves Will Be Bullish The Fed As A Catalyst The Federal Reserve recently completed the volte-face that it launched at its January FOMC meeting. The dots now forecast no rate hikes in 2019 and only one for 2020. Previously, three hikes were baked in over the forecast period. GDP growth has been downgraded slightly, and CPI forecasts have also been nudged down. Rising petrodollar reserves have historically been bullish for the currency but expect this correlation to be weaker than in the past. The reality is that U.S. growth momentum relative to the rest of the world started slowly rolling over at a time when external demand remained weak.2 Recent data confirm this trend persists: Industrial production peaked last year and continues to decelerate; the NAHB housing market index came in a nudge below expectations; and the U.S. economic surprise index is sitting close to its one-year low of -40. With bond yields having already made a downward adjustment by circa 100 basis points, the valve for financial conditions to get looser could easily be via the U.S. dollar (Chart I-8). We have been selectively playing USD shorts, mostly via the SEK and the euro, as per our March 8th report. Today, we add the Norwegian krone to the list. Chart I-8Bond Yields Down, Dollar Next? Sell CAD/NOK The Norges Bank hiked interest rates to 1% at yesterday’s meeting, which was widely expected, but the hawkish shift took the market by surprise. Governor Øystein Olsen signaled further rate increases later this year, at a time when global central banks are turning dovish. This lit a fire under the Norwegian krone. The 6.60 level for the CAD/NOK has proven to be a formidable resistance since 2015.   The Norwegian economy remains closely tied to oil, with the bottom in oil prices in 2016 having jumpstarted employment growth, business confidence and wage growth. With inflation slightly above the central bank’s target and our expectation for oil prices to grind higher, we agree with the central bank’s assessment that the future path of interest rates is likely higher (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Norwegian Economy Is Faring Well Our recommendation is that NOK long positions should initially be played via selling the CAD, as an indirect way to express USD shorts (Chart I-10). The 6.60 level for the CAD/NOK has proven to be a formidable resistance since 2015, and our intermediate-term indicators suggest the next move is likely lower. Meanwhile, relative economic surprises are moving in favor of Norway, with export growth, retail sales and employment growth all outpacing Canadian data. The discount between Western Canadian Select crude oil and Brent has closed, but our contention is that the delay in Enbridge’s Line 3 replacement will likely push the discount back closer to $20/bbl. Chart I-10Sell USD Via CAD/NOK Over the longer term, both the Canadian and Norwegian housing markets are bubbly, but in the latter it has been concentrated in Oslo, with Bergen and Trondheim having had more muted increases. In Canada, the rise in house prices could rotate to smaller cities, as macro-prudential measures implemented in Toronto and Vancouver nudge investors away from those markets (Chart I-11).  Chart I-11Bubbly Housing In Norway And Canada The Canadian government has decided to provide residents with a potential line of credit in exchange for equity stakes of up to 10% in residential homes. The maximum home value that qualifies for this line of credit has been capped at C$480,000. While this does little to improve the affordability of houses in expensive cities, it almost guarantees that those in competitive markets will be bid up. This will encourage a continued buildup of household leverage. Historically, when the leverage ratio for Canada peaked vis-à-vis the U.S., it was a negative development for the Canadian dollar (Chart I-12).   Chart I-12The CAD Looks Vulnerable Bottom Line: Go short CAD/NOK for a trade, but more aggressive investors should begin accumulating short positions versus the U.S. dollar outright. Hold USD/SEK shorts established a fortnight ago, currently 3% in the money. Housekeeping We are taking profits on our short AUD/CAD position this week, with a 1.4% profit. As highlighted in our March 8th report, the Australian dollar has been severely knocked down, and is becoming more and more immune to bad news. Despite home prices falling by more than 5% year-on-year, worse than during the financial crises, the Aussie was actually up on the week. Meanwhile, Australian exports will be at the top of the list to benefit from China’s reflationary efforts.   Chester Ntonifor,  Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, titled “OPEC 2.0: Oil’s Price Fulcrum,” dated March 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled “Into A Transition Phase,” dated March 8, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The recent data in the U.S. have shown more signs of a slowdown: February industrial production growth missed expectations, coming in at 0.1% month-on-month. Michigan consumer sentiment in March came in higher than expected at 97.8. NAHB housing market index in March came in at 62, below consensus. January factory orders slowed to 0.1% month-on-month.  Philadelphia Fed business outlook came in at 13.7, surprising to the upside. Initial jobless claims in March were 221k, also outperforming analysts’ forecast. The DXY index slumped by 0.8% post-FOMC, and is now slowly recovering on the strong data from the Philly Fed business outlook and initial jobless claims. The Fed left interest rates unchanged on Wednesday, while further signaling that no rate hike is likely through 2019. Moreover, 2019 GDP forecast was downgraded to 2%. The dovish turn by the Fed could weigh on the dollar in the coming weeks. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The recent data in the euro zone have been mostly positive: February consumer price index came in line at 1.5% year-on-year; core consumer price index also stayed at 1% year-on-year. The seasonally-adjusted trade balance in January improved to 17 billion euros. Q4 labor cost fell to 2.3%. ZEW economic sentiment survey came in at -2.5 in March, outperforming the consensus of -18.7. EUR/USD increased by 0.5% this week. The FOMC-led sharp rebound sent EUR/USD to a new week-high of 1.145 on Wednesday. We expect more positive data coming from the euro zone, which will further lift the euro. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 A Contrarian Bet On The Euro - March 1, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have continued to soften: The merchandise trade balance came in at 339 billion yen in February. Total imports contracted by 6.7% year-on-year, while total exports fell by 1.2% year-on-year. Industrial production increased by 0.3% year-on-year in January. Capacity utilization in January fell by 4.7% month-on-month, missing expectations. The leading economic index in January fell to 95.9 from a previous reading of 97.2. USD/JPY slumped by 0.9% this week. Last Friday, the Bank of Japan left its key interest rate unchanged at -0.1%, as wildly expected. The 10-year government bond yield target also stayed unchanged at around 0%. Like many global central banks, the BoJ has been blindsided by the deep external slowdown that is beginning to seep into the domestic economy. Report Links: A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been mostly positive: Average earnings excluding bonuses in January grew in line by 3.4%. ILO unemployment rate in January fell to 3.9%. The retail price index in February stayed in line at 2.5% year-on-year. The February consumer price index increased to 1.9% year-on-year. Retail sales growth in February increased to 4% year-on-year, outperforming expectations.  GBP/USD fell by 1.1% this week, erasing the gains triggered by dollar weakness earlier on Wednesday. The BoE left its interest rate unchanged at 0.75%, and the sterling continues to show more volatility with a delayed Brexit. Report Links: A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have shown the housing market is toppling over: The housing price index in Q4 fell sharply by 5.1% year-on-year. New jobs created in February were 4,600, missing the expectations by 9,400. Moreover, 7,300 full-time employment jobs were lost, while 11,900 positions were created for part-time employment. The unemployment rate in February fell to 4.9%, while the participation rate decreased to 65.6%. AUD/USD appreciated by 0.6% this week. It pulled back a little after reaching a 0.7168 high on Wednesday following the dovish Fed decision. During a speech this week, RBA highlighted the concerns over the ability of households to service their debt. Both external and internal constraints remain headwinds for the Australian dollar. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been weak: Credit card spending growth in February slowed to 6.4% year-on-year. Q4 GDP growth came in at 2.3% year-on-year, underperforming consensus of 2.5%. The current account deficit widened to 3.7% of GDP in Q4. NZD/USD appreciated by 0.5% this week. The Q4 GDP breakdown showed that growth was mainly driven by the rise in service industries. Primary industries, however, fell by 0.8%. Agriculture was down 1.3%, mining was down 1.7%, forestry and logging fell 1.6%, and lastly, the fishing activity was down 0.9% quarter-on-quarter. The Kiwi will benefit from any dollar weakness, but is not our preferred currency. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - November 2, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada continue to paint a mixed picture: January manufacturing shipments increased to 1% month-on-month. Foreign portfolio investment in Canadian securities saw an increase of C$49 billion in January, while Canadian portfolio investment in foreign securities decreased by C$8.4 billion. January wholesale sales growth increased to 0.6% month on month. USD/CAD rebounded overnight after falling sharply on a dovish Fed. CAD finally ended the week flat. On Tuesday, Bill Morneau, the Finance Minister of Canada, unveiled the new federal budget for 2019. It showed several new measures aiming to assist young and senior Canadian citizens, including first-time home buyers. While these measures might appease Canadian millennial voters, they will also result in significant deficits. The deficit projection for the year 2019-2020 widened to $19.8 billion, which could crowd out private spending. Report Links: Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 The trade balance in February came above expectations at 3,125 million CHF. Exports came in at 19,815 million CHF, while imports came in at 16,689 million CHF, respectively. USD/CHF depreciated by 1% this week. The Swiss National Bank left the benchmark sight deposit rate unchanged at -0.75%, as wildly expected. We struggle to see any upside potential for the franc, amid a dovish central bank, an expensive currency and muted inflation. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Waiting For A Real Deal - December 7, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive. The trade balance in February fell to 15.8 billion NOK, from a previous reading of 28.8 billion NOK. USD/NOK fell by 1.3% this week. The Norges Bank raised rates by 25 bps to 1%, in line with expectations, while signaling further rate hikes in the second half of this year. The Norges Bank once again demonstrated to be the most hawkish among G10 members. The bank reiterated that the economy is running at a solid pace and capacity utilization is above normal levels, while inflation keeps navigating above the bank’s target. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 There has been no major data release from Sweden this week. USD/SEK fell by 1.5% this week. Our short USD/SEK position is now 3% in the money since we initiated it 2 weeks ago. As we see more signs of recovery in the euro zone, we expect the exports of Sweden to pick up, which is a tailwind for the Swedish krona. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Dear Client, I had the pleasure of visiting clients in Seattle, Anchorage, and Juneau last week. In this week’s report, I address some of the questions that routinely came up during our meetings. Among other things, the topics discussed include our optimistic global growth outlook, waning dollar bullishness, implications of a more dovish Fed on the business cycle, and where we think equities are headed. Next week we will be publishing our Quarterly Strategy Outlook, which will provide a detailed discussion of our key global macro and investment views. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature Q: You have predicted that global growth will stabilize in the second quarter and then accelerate in the second half of the year. Are you seeing much evidence in support of this view? A: We are seeing signs of green shoots, but they are still fairly tentative. Current activity indicators appear to have stabilized (Chart 1). The global manufacturing PMI edged lower in February, but the services component increased. Consumer confidence has risen, although that may simply reflect the rebound in global equities. Chart 1Global Growth Appears To Have Stabilized The data on international trade has been quite soft. That said, the weekly Harpex shipping index, which measures global container shipping activity, has improved. The Baltic Dry Index has also shown some signs of bottoming (Chart 2). Chart 2Shipping Data Pointing To A Recent Pickup In Global Trade The diffusion index of our global leading economic indicator, which tracks the share of countries with rising LEIs, has also moved higher (Chart 3). It generally leads the global LEI. The fact that global financial conditions have eased significantly since the start of the year is also an encouraging sign. Chart 3The Uptick In The LEI Diffusion Index Suggests Global Growth Will Firm Up Q: What’s your take on the most recent Chinese economic data? A: It has been generally soft, but not abysmal. Manufacturing output continues to decelerate. Retail sales remain lackluster, with auto sales showing little evidence of improvement. Property prices are still rising, but floor space sold has begun to contract. Fixed-asset investment has held up so far this year. However, this is mainly due to a pickup in spending among state-owned companies. Both exports and imports contracted in February. In a rather unusual step, the government announced last week that exports increased by nearly 40% in the first nine days of March compared with the same period last year.1 Electricity production has also apparently rebounded. We would not place a huge weight on these statements, as the data probably has been skewed by the timing of the lunar new year, but it does seem that economic momentum may be starting to turn the corner. We are seeing signs of green shoots, but they are still fairly tentative. There is little doubt that the government is trying to jumpstart growth. Household and business taxes have been cut. The PBOC has reduced reserve requirements by 350 bps over the past year. Interbank rates have dropped. Despite the fact that the February credit data fell short of expectations, the six-month credit impulse has turned decisively higher. The Chinese credit impulse leads imports by about six-to-nine months (Chart 4). This bodes well for global trade in the second half of the year. Chart 4Global Trade Will Benefit From A Chinese Reflationary Impulse Q: Given that Chinese debt levels are already quite high, by how much more can they realistically increase? A: We do not expect credit growth to rise by as much as it did in 2009 or 2016. However, this is because the economy is in better shape, not because there is some intrinsic constraint to increasing debt from current levels. China’s elevated savings rate has kept interest rates well below trend nominal GDP growth, which is the key determinant of debt sustainability (Chart 5).2 As long as the government maintains an implicit guarantee on most local and corporate debt, as it is currently doing, default risk will remain minimal. Chart 5China's High Savings Rate Has Kept Interest Rates Well Below Trend Nominal GDP Growth In any case, given that debt now stands at 240% of GDP, a mere one percentage-point increase in credit growth would still produce a hefty 2.4% of GDP in credit stimulus. In this sense, China may be better off with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio since in steady state this will allow for a larger flow of credit-financed stimulus into the economy. Q: A revival in Chinese growth would presumably help Europe? A: Yes. Our conversations with clients revealed an ongoing negative bias towards Europe among investors (Chart 6). This is echoed in the latest BofA Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey which, for the first time in history, identified “short European equities” as the most crowded trade. Chart 6European Equities: Unloved And Unwanted We think that such deep pessimism about Europe is largely unwarranted. Faster global growth will help the European export sector later this year, while domestic demand will benefit from more accommodative fiscal policy and lower bond yields, especially in Italy. The ECB will not raise rates this year even if growth speeds up, but the market will probably price in a few more rate hikes in 2020 and beyond. This will allow for a modest re-steepening in the yield curves in core European bond markets, which should be positive for long-suffering bank profits. Political risk remains a concern. The Brexit saga has reached the farcical stage where: 1) The U.K. has voted to leave the EU; but 2) Parliament has voted to stay in the EU unless it reaches a satisfactory deal with Brussels; while 3) rejecting the only deal with Brussels that was on offer. Given that most British voters no longer want Brexit (Chart 7), we think that the government will kick the proverbial can down the road until a second referendum is announced or a “soft Brexit” deal is formulated. Either outcome would be welcomed by markets. Chart 7U.K.: In The Case Of A Do-Over, The Remain Side Would Likely Win Q: You seem less bullish on the U.S. dollar than you were last year? A: That is correct. As we discussed last week, the dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of global growth (Chart 8). If global growth strengthens later this year, the trade-weighted dollar will probably weaken. Chart 8The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency Moreover, as this week’s FOMC meeting highlighted, the Fed’s reaction function has shifted in a more dovish direction. The median Fed dot now foresees no rate hikes this year and only one rate hike in 2020. In contrast, the December Summary of Economic Projections envisioned two rate hikes this year and one next year. The dollar is a countercyclical currency, meaning that it tends to move in the opposite direction of global growth. In a far cry from his October “rates are far from neutral” comment, Jay Powell stressed during this week's post-FOMC meeting press conference that the fed funds rate is currently in the “broad range of estimates of neutral.” While we would not rule out the possibility that the FOMC will raise rates at some point later this year, we now expect a more gradual pace of rate tightening than we had earlier envisioned. Q: Does a more dovish Fed imply that the economic expansion has even further to run? A: Yes. Expansions tend to end when monetary policy turns restrictive. We had previously thought that this point could be reached in late-2020, but it is now starting to look as though it will occur later than that. Broadly speaking, we see the Fed tightening cycle unfolding in two stages. In the first stage, which is the one we are in today, the Fed will raise rates in baby steps in response to better-than-expected growth and falling unemployment. In the second stage, the Fed will hike rates more aggressively as inflation starts to accelerate. Risk assets will be able to digest the first stage, but not the second. The good news is that most of our favorite indicators are not yet pointing to a major inflationary upswing (Chart 9): Despite higher tariffs, consumer import price inflation has slowed; core intermediate producer price inflation has decelerated; the prices paid components of the ISM and regional Fed surveys have plunged; inflation surprise indices have rolled over; and both survey and market-based measures of inflation expectations remain below where they were last summer. In keeping with these developments, BCA’s propriety Inflation Pipeline Indicator has fallen to a two-and-a-half-year low. Chart 9No Signs Of An Imminent Major Inflationary Upswing In The U.S. ... Wage growth has accelerated, but productivity growth has increased by even more. Unit labor cost inflation has actually been coming down since the middle of last year. Unit labor costs lead core CPI inflation by about 12 months (Chart 10). This implies that consumer price inflation is unlikely to reach uncomfortably high levels at least until the second half of next year. Chart 10... And Decelerating Unit Labor Costs Will Dampen Inflationary Pressures For The Time Being Beyond then, the risks are high that inflation will move up as the economy continues to overheat. This could force the Fed to start raising rates aggressively late next year, a course of action that will push up the dollar and cause equities and spread product to sell off. The resulting tightening in financial conditions will probably plunge the U.S. and the rest of the world into recession in 2021. Q: So stay overweight stocks for now, but consider selling at some point next year? A: Correct. The MSCI All-Country World Index (ACWI) has risen by over 14% since we upgraded it in December after having moved to the sidelines six months earlier. Given this run-up, we are not as bullish now as we were at the start of the year. Most of our favorite indicators are not yet pointing to a major inflationary upswing. Nevertheless, the path of least resistance for equities remains to the upside. While the forward P/E ratio for the MSCI ACWI has returned to where it was last September, analyst earnings expectations are currently much more conservative: Bottom-up estimates foresee EPS rising by 4.1% in the U.S. and 5.3% in the rest of the world in 2019 (Chart 11). The combination of faster growth, easier financial conditions, and ongoing corporate buybacks implies some upside to those estimates. Chart 11Analyst Expectations Are Quite Muted Moreover, real yields have fallen over the past five months – the 10-year U.S. TIPS yield is 48 basis points below its Q4 average, for example. A simple dividend discount model would suggest that global equities are about 10%-to-15% cheaper than they were prior to last year’s autumn selloff. The path of least resistance for equities remains to the upside. Q: Aren’t you worried that rising labor costs will push down profit margins even if GDP growth accelerates? A: Not really. As noted above, productivity growth has picked up. Whether this is the start of a new trend remains to be seen, but at least for now, it is dampening unit labor costs. Historically, real unit labor costs – nominal unit labor costs divided by the corporate price deflator – have tracked economy-wide profit margins very closely (Chart 12). Chart 12Real U.S. Unit Labor Costs Historically Have Tracked Economy-Wide Profit Margins Very Closely In practice, it is very rare for earnings to contract outside of recessions (Chart 13). This is why recessions and equity bear markets generally overlap (Chart 14). With the next recession still two years away, it is too early to turn defensive. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, the second-to-last year of business-cycle expansions is often the most lucrative for stock market investors. Chart 13Earnings Rarely Contract Outside Of Recessions Chart 14Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Q: What do you recommend in terms of regional equity allocation? A: If global growth accelerates later this year and the dollar weakens, this will create an excellent environment for international stocks – EM and Europe in particular. Investors should prepare to overweight those regions at the expense of the United States (currency unhedged). Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Elaine Chan, “China spreading ‘positive news’ of strong export rebound in early March after February plunge,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2019. 2      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019.   Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights This report presents our framework for estimating Chinese capital outflows on a monthly basis, which investors can use as a real-time indicator to monitor the risk of another serious episode of capital flight. We also provide a monthly estimate of illicit capital outflow, which we find is negatively correlated with “on balance sheet” capital flows. This implies that Chinese residents alternate their use of the two channels in their attempt to move money out of the country. Our monitoring framework suggests that outflow pressure is more likely to ease than intensify if a trade deal is struck over the coming few weeks or months, especially given the rise in CNY-USD since early-November. However, we have identified a low-odds but high-impact scenario in which a shaky trade deal with the U.S. generates an unstable equilibrium that could ultimately escalate into a major Chinese capital outflow event. This could prove to be a highly destabilizing event for investors, and thus bears close monitoring. Feature Fears of a new round of capital outflow from China re-emerged in the second half of 2018 as USD-CNY approached 7, a psychologically important level for many investors (Chart 1). The last episode of significant capital outflows from China occurred in late-2015 following the PBOC’s devaluation of the RMB, and the sharp spike in volatility that resulted had a contagious effect for global financial markets. Chart 1A Near Miss Late Last Year In the very near term, the risk of a similar event appears to be low given the material trade talk-driven decline in USD-CNY that has occurred over the past five months. However, several news reports over the past year concerning the possible risk of another episode of capital flight underscore that China’s cross-border capital flow statistics are misunderstood by financial market participants. This raises the risk that investors either fail to anticipate a capital outflow event in the future or exaggerate the odds of one occurring. In this report we present our framework for estimating Chinese capital outflows on a monthly basis, which investors can use as a real-time indicator to monitor the risk of another serious episode of capital flight. We also adjust the typical measure of short-term capital flow derived from the quarterly balance of payments to account for cross-border RMB settlement, and present an estimate of illicit capital outflow that suggests Chinese residents alternate their use of legal and illegal channels in their attempt to move money out of the country. We then combine these three direct measures of capital flow with two indicators of expected RMB depreciation to further augment our monitoring efforts. We conclude by noting that while outflow pressure is more likely to ease than intensify if a trade deal is struck over the coming few weeks or months, we have identified a low-odds but high-impact scenario in which a shaky trade deal with the U.S. generates an unstable equilibrium that could ultimately escalate into a major Chinese capital outflow event. This scenario is not part of our base case outlook, but could prove to be a highly destabilizing event for investors and thus bears close monitoring. Defining Short-Term Capital Flow From The Balance Of Payments Table 1 presents China’s balance of payments (BOP) for the four quarters ending in Q3 2018, with all items shown on a net basis. The table is organized in a way that provides a helpful refresher on the formulation of the balance of payments, namely that the current account (“CA”, made up of the trade balance and primary & secondary income) plus the sum of the capital account (“KA”), the financial account (“FA”), and a balancing item (referred to as net errors & omissions, “NEO”) is equal to 0, when capital and financial outflows are recorded with a minus sign. Current account surpluses necessarily involve net financial outflows (i.e., investment); whereas current account deficits must be funded by financial inflows (i.e., borrowing). Table 1 highlights that what financial market participants typically refer to as “capital” flows are actually recorded in the financial account of the balance of payments. While derivatives are included in the table for the sake of completion, in practice they are usually quite small (as is the case for the actual “capital” account). Table 1China’s Balance Of Payments The bottom panel of Table 1 indicates that the balance of payments formula can be rearranged so that it represents how many market participants tend to define total and short-term capital outflows from a balance of payments perspective. As we will show in the next section of the report, this re-arrangement of the balance of payments formula is an essential element in building a more frequent proxy of short-term capital flow. We define short-term capital flow from the balance of payments as the combination of portfolio investment, other investment, and net errors & omissions. The bottom panel shows that by adding reserve assets (“RA”) to the current account (“CA”), the right hand side of the BOP equation becomes the sum of direct investment (“DI”), portfolio investment (“PI”), other investment “OI”, and net errors & omissions (“NEO”). Since direct investment tends not to be driven by short-term economic behavior and is normally not influenced by foreign exchange expectations or fluctuations, the formula can be further arranged to isolate short-term capital outflows on the right-hand side: Current Account + Changes in Reserve Assets + Direct Investment ≈ (Portfolio Investment + Other Investment + Net Errors & Omissions)*-1 Or using our line item notation, CA + RA + DI ≈ -PI - OI - NEO The formula above is expressed as an approximation rather than an identity simply because it excludes the capital account (“KA”) and financial derivatives (“FD”). As can be seen in Table 1, the net value of adding the four quarter rolling total of CA + RA + DI to PI + OI + NEO is US$ 3.3 billion; adding KA + FD (-0.35 and -2.95 billion US$, respectively) would result in a value of 0. Chart 2 shows this relationship visually; and highlights that both series are nearly identical. Chart 2Short-Term Capital Flow As Defined By The BOP Building A Better Proxy Of Short-Term Capital Flow The balance of payments approach is a useful starting point for measuring short-term capital flow, but it has two important drawbacks: Timeliness: Balance of payments data are reported in quarterly frequency, and often with a lag. This is inadequate for most investors, particularly when market participants are concerned that a crisis or crisis-like conditions may be emerging. This is the primary disadvantage of the BOP approach. Failure to account for cross-border RMB settlement: The balance of payments approach implicitly assumes that a current account surplus in China will automatically result in the importation of foreign exchange, but this assumption is no longer fully valid. Cross-border RMB settlement now accounts for part of China’s foreign trade settlement, reaching more than 30% during the 2015/2016 period. Compared with its peak level, RMB settlement as a share of total foreign trade has fallen over the past two years, but still accounts for 19% today (Chart 3). To more precisely gauge China’s capital outflows, cross-border RMB settlement should be removed from the current account surplus, because trade payments settled in RMB would not involve the receipt of foreign currency. This offsetting current account discrepancy would still show up in the balance of payments under net errors & omissions, but that would have the effect of distorting our definition of short-term capital flow. Chart 3Analysts Need To Adjust The Current Account For Cross-Border RMB Settlement Chart 4 illustrates the difference between our quarterly definition of short-term capital flow and the series adjusted for cross-border RMB settlement. The chart shows that the two series are quite similar for most of the past decade, with the notable exception of the 2015/2016 period. The adjusted series suggests that the intensity of China’s episode of capital flight did not peak in 2015, but rather late in 2016. This is consistent with domestic commentary at the time,1 and implies that the PBOC faced headwinds in their attempt to stem capital outflows that were even worse than has been generally acknowledged. Chart 4After Adjusting For Cross-Border Settlement, Outflow Intensity Only Peaked In Late-2016 Unfortunately for investors, dealing with the lack of timeliness in the release of China’s balance of payments statistics is a more challenging endeavor. This problem cannot be resolved with simple adjustments to the quarterly data, and instead requires the building of a proxy for short-term capital flow based on the BOP equation but using monthly statistics. Investors can proxy our adjusted quarterly balance of payments-based measure of short-term capital flow on a monthly basis. As we referenced above, the key to constructing a monthly capital flow estimate lies with the re-arrangement of the balance of payments equation such that short-term capital flow is expressed as being approximately equal to the sum of the current account, direct investment, and the change in reserve assets (when outflows of the latter two series are recorded as negative values). Table 2 highlights that high quality monthly series are available to act as proxies for these three balance of payments components, after accounting for cross-border RMB settlement and the following two additional adjustments: Table 2Components Of BCA’s Monthly China Capital Outflow Indicator Services Balance: The trade balance accounts for the vast majority of the current account of most countries, and this is also true in the case of China. An underappreciated fact about China’s trade balance is that it has shrunk considerably over the past several years, due to what is now a sizeable services deficit. Some market commentators who are aware of the services deficit point to it as evidence that China’s net importation of services is laying the groundwork for its “new economy” (via eventual import substitution), but the reality is that travel (i.e. net tourism spending) accounts for over 80% of it (Chart 5). For the purposes of our monthly capital flow proxy, a sizeable services deficit is a complication that must be accounted for, given that China’s monthly trade statistics (and most monthly trade data globally) represent the trade in goods, not the trade in services. Since most of the fluctuations in the trade balance occur due to net trade in goods, we include the history of the quarterly services balance in our monthly indicator as a structural variable, and extend the most recent quarterly value into the current quarter as a simplifying assumption. Currency Valuation Effect on Official Reserves: Foreign exchange reserves in the balance of payments are calculated by the historical cost method, whereas the highly followed monthly official foreign exchange reserve data released by the PBOC is measured using market value. Changes in its balance, in addition to genuine changes in foreign exchange reserve assets, also reflect revaluation effects caused by fluctuations in the foreign exchange market. To dampen these effects, we include foreign exchange reserves in our monthly capital flow proxy in SDR terms rather than in U.S. dollars, rebased to the value of the underlying U.S. dollar series as of December 2018. Chart 5Travel (i.e. Tourism) Accounts For The Majority Of China's Services Deficit Chart 6 presents our quarterly balance of payments-based capital flow measure (adjusted for cross-border capital flow) with our monthly proxy, based on the series shown in Table 2 and the adjustments noted above. Divergences between the series exist in level terms, but panel 2 shows that our monthly proxy does a good job capturing the trend in the quarterly series. The only major exception to this occurred at the beginning of 2016, when our monthly proxy fell sharply relative to the adjusted quarterly BOP version. Chart 6Our Monthly Proxy Captures The Trend In Quarterly Capital Flows This sharp decline is a bit of a mystery; it can be traced to the official reserves series, and either suggests that capital outflow was materially worse in Q4 2015 and Q1 2016 than officially recognized, or that China suffered outsized losses from the risky asset portion of its reserve portfolio during that period. However, the first explanation is at odds with the evidence noted earlier that the intensity of capital flight seems to have peaked in late-2016, and the second explanation is inconsistent with the history of financial market returns over the past decade. We noted in a February 2018 Special Report that risky U.S. assets (almost entirely stocks) accounted for as much as 9.5% of China’s foreign reserve assets in the summer of 2015,2 and it is true that U.S. equity returns were quite negative from December 2015 to February 2016. But this was certainly not the first and only period of extreme U.S. equity market volatility to occur since 2010, raising the question of why this sharp decline in official reserves only occurred in 2015/2016. Future research on the topic of Chinese capital flows will aim to reconcile the difference between our monthly proxy and our adjusted quarterly balance of payments series during this period, but for now we are confident that the former contributes meaningfully to our understanding of the latter, particularly on a rate of change basis. Import Over-Invoicing: A Third Measure Of Short-Term Capital Outflow Investors need to track both legal and illicit capital flows. Our first two measures of short-term capital flow were based on an attempt to track the legally allowable movement of funds out of China. However, illicit capital outflow is an acknowledged problem in China, which tends to occur through the practice of import over-invoicing.3 Chart 7 presents our estimate of import over-invoicing for China, based on a methodology articulated by Global Financial Integrity, a U.S. non-profit organization that provides analysis of illicit financial flows globally (see Appendix A). The chart highlights two important points: Chart 7Illicit Capital Outflows: Another Way That Money Leaves China Illicit outflows have increased significantly over the past 2 years following China’s capital control crackdown, particularly in Q3 2018 following the announcement of the second round of U.S. import tariffs against China. Panel 2 of Chart 7 illustrates that there is a negative correlation between “on balance sheet” capital flows and illicit capital outflows, implying that Chinese residents alternate their use of the two channels in their attempt to move money out of the country. This underscores the importance of monitoring both channels on an ongoing basis. Investment Conclusions Table 3 brings together the three measures of short-term capital flow that we have laid out above, as well as two indicators of expected RMB depreciation (Chart 8): net settlement of foreign exchange by Chinese banks (see Appendix B), and the 3-month moving average of the percent deviation of CNH-USD (offshore RMB) from CNY-USD (onshore RMB). Altogether, the series shown in Table 3 form the basis of our capital outflow monitoring efforts, and we plan on updating these series regularly to gauge whether outflow pressure is increasing. Table 3Dashboard For Monitoring Short-Term Capital Flows Chart 8Two Indicators Capturing Expectations Of Severe RMB Depreciation For now, only our measure of illicit capital outflow is flashing a warning sign, and the timing of the recent spike in the measure appears to be closely connected with the trade war with the U.S. This implies that outflow pressure is more likely to ease if a trade deal is struck over the coming few weeks, as we expect will occur. However, we noted in a March 6 joint Special Report with our Geopolitical Strategy service that a deal with only slight concessions from China may stand on shaky ground and that tariff rollbacks will be limited or non-existent.4 This would ensure elevated policy uncertainty in the aftermath of the agreement and would raise the probability of a relapse into another trade war ahead of the 2020 U.S. election. In this scenario we would be watching the indicators shown in Table 3 closely for signs that increasing pessimism about the long-term state of sino-U.S. relations is causing the capital outflow “dam” built by policymakers following the 2015/2016 episode to buckle. Our monitoring framework suggests that the odds of a major capital flight event are currently low. But a shaky trade deal with the U.S. could change that. It is not part of our base case outlook, but onshore concerns of a renewed trade war with the U.S. next year could theoretically become self-fulfilling, if another major episode of capital flight were to weaken the RMB in a way that could even remotely be construed as a violation of the yuan stability pact that will reportedly be part of any agreement between the U.S. and China. While this would in no way entail a purposeful devaluation by Chinese policymakers to boost trade competitiveness, it could nonetheless provide an excellent excuse for President Trump to reinstate damaging economic pressure on China in the midst of what is likely to be a highly competitive re-election campaign. This could, in turn, produce a feedback effect that magnifies the original desire to move capital out of China, and would likely prove to be a highly destabilizing event for global financial markets. Stay tuned!   Qingyun Xu, CFA, Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com     Appendix A Measuring Import Over-Invoicing In this report we use one of the two methodologies employed by Global Financial Integrity to measure import over-invoicing in China, which compares a country’s reported trade statistics with that of its global trade partners.5 Using the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics data, we deflate Chinese import data measured on a C.I.F. (cost insurance and freight) basis to an F.O.B. (free on board) basis using an assumed freight and insurance factor of 10%. Then, we use Hong Kong re-export data to adjust global exports to China for re-exported trade through Hong Kong. The formula is listed below: Chinese Import Over-invoicing = [(Chinese Imports From The World)/1.1] - Adjusted Global Exports To China   Appendix B The Onshore Market For Foreign Exchange A poorly understood fact about China’s capital/financial account regime is that a material amount of foreign exchange reserves are now held by enterprises and individuals. Most investors are familiar with China’s old foreign exchange settlement policy (established formally in 1993), which prohibited enterprises from retaining foreign currency. Exporters receiving foreign currency as payment for goods and services had to sell all foreign exchange receipts to designed banks, and purchase foreign exchange from these banks when needed to make payments to offshore suppliers. Thus, while this policy was in effect, the PBOC held all China’s foreign exchange reserves and official reserves equaled total reserves. However, since the early-2000s, this policy has been gradually withdrawn. Since its complete abolishment in 2012, foreign exchange retained by enterprises and residents has increased materially. Chart B1 shows the impact of these changes on the bank foreign exchange settlement and sale rates. The settlement rate represents enterprises’ sale of foreign exchange to banks as a share of their total foreign exchange receipts in a given month, while the sale rate represents banks’ sale of foreign exchange to enterprises as a share of enterprises’ total foreign exchange payments. The chart shows that the settlement rate has dramatically dropped since 2012 (from 70% to less than 50%). We can also see there were spikes in the settlement rate and sale rate in August 2015 (in contrary directions) when the PBOC devalued the RMB, implying that the demand for forex and presumably the expectation of further RMB depreciation was severe. Chart B1The Evolution Of China’s Domestic Foreign Exchange Market​​​​​​​   Given this, we view net FX settlement (enterprises’ sale of foreign exchange to banks minus banks’ sale of foreign exchange to enterprises) as a reasonable proxy of expected RMB depreciation, and have included it as part of our capital flow monitoring framework.         1 “China’s capital outflow is still intensifying”, Reuters China Finance and Economics Column, December 19, 2016. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “Demystifying China’s Foreign Assets”, dated February 28, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Import over-invoicing occurs when an importer (in country A) attempts to evade capital controls by colluding with an exporting entity (in country B) to falsify the reported value of goods imported into country A from country B. The importer “overpays” for the goods in question and, usually through an intermediary, moves the surplus funds into the importer’s offshore account. Please see https://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/trade-misinvoicing/ for more information about the mechanics of and motivations behind trade misinvoicing. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, “China-U.S. Trade: A Structural Deal?”, dated March 6, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 “Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148 Developing Countries: 2006-2015”, Global Financial Integrity, January 2019. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Global Spread Product: The current low-volatility backdrop, triggered by more dovish central banks, will be maintained until there is more decisive evidence that global growth is rebounding. That will not occur until the latter half of 2019, thus keeping the window for corporate credit outperformance open for a few more months. Stay overweight global corporates versus governments, favoring the U.S. Canada: Much weaker-than-expected Canadian economic growth has surprised the Bank of Canada. Rate hikes are now off the table for at least the rest of 2019, and possibly longer. Upgrade Canadian government debt to neutral (3 out of 5) in global currency-hedged government bond portfolios. Feature Stick With A Tactical Overweight To Global Corporates We’ve dedicated our last few Weekly Reports to analyzing the outlook for government bond yields in the developed markets (DM), in light of the recent dovish shift in the policy stance of central banks. We concluded that yields had fully discounted a slower global growth backdrop, through lower inflation expectations and the pricing out of future interest rate hikes. Further declines in bond yields would require a deeper deceleration of activity than we are expecting, thus maintaining a below-benchmark medium-term duration stance is appropriate. That dovish shift by policymakers also took away a major roadblock for risk assets, namely the threat of a continued policy-induced rise in global yields at a time of slowing growth. The result has been sharp rallies in global equity and credit markets, with declining volatility (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekSlowing Growth Isn’t Always Bad For Risk Assets We upgraded global corporate debt, and downgraded global government bonds, on a tactical basis back on January 15 of this year.1 Since then, credit spreads have declined substantially across both DM and emerging markets (EM), most notably in Europe (Chart 2). Within our upgrade to overall global credit, we maintained a relative bias towards U.S. corporates versus non-U.S. equivalents, based on our expectation of relatively faster economic growth in the U.S. In our model bond portfolio, that meant moving U.S. corporates to an above-benchmark weighting, while reducing the size of the underweight in EM debt and only raising European credit to a neutral allocation. Looking at the performance of each of the major credit markets in excess return terms (versus duration-matched government bonds) since January 15, currency-hedged into U.S. dollars, there have not been huge differences between U.S. and non-U.S. returns. The exception is European high-yield which had an excess return of 4.4%, but only represents 0.8% of our custom benchmark index for our model portfolio (and where we are not underweight). Excess returns for investment grade and high-yield corporates in the U.S. have averaged 2.3%, compared to 2.2% for EM credit (averaging hard currency sovereign and corporate debt). We see the global “risk-on” dynamic continuing in next few months, fueled by benign monetary policies, thus we are sticking with our current overweight allocation to global corporates. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the decision to upgrade overall global corporate debt versus government bonds has been far more important than adjusting any regional credit allocations. We see that global “risk-on” dynamic continuing in next few months, fueled by benign monetary policies, thus we are sticking with our current allocations to global corporates. Our cue to reverse our tactical overweight stance on corporates will come from the U.S. Any additional spread tightening and easing of overall financial conditions will keep U.S. economic growth above trend and eventually force the Fed to become more hawkish in the second half of 2019. This will turn global monetary policy from a tailwind for corporate credit to a headwind, justifying a downgrade of corporate allocations. In the meantime, we recommend continuing to earn carry in a policy-induced low volatility environment. Bottom Line: The current low-volatility backdrop, triggered by more dovish central banks, will be maintained until there is more decisive evidence that global growth is rebounding. That will not occur until the latter half of 2019, thus keeping the window for corporate credit outperformance open for a few more months. Stay overweight global corporates versus governments, favoring the U.S. Canada: Upgrade To Neutral Canadian government bonds have been clawing back much of the relative underperformance that occurred in 2017 and 2018 while the Bank of Canada (BoC) was delivering multiple rate hikes. The spread between the yields on the Bloomberg Barclays Canada Treasury index and the overall Global Treasury index has narrowed by -40bps since October 2018, after widening 69bps between May 2017 and October 2018 (Chart 3). Expressed as a relative return (duration-matched and currency-hedged into U.S. dollars), Canadian government debt has lagged the Global Treasury index by -232bps since May 2017. Chart 3Canadian Bonds No Longer Underperforming That underperformance was driven by the combination of a strong Canadian economy, accelerating inflation and tightening monetary policy. The year-over-year pace of real GDP growth reached 3.8% in mid-2017 and stayed above-trend for the following year. The unemployment rate fell to 5.8%, while core inflation accelerated back to the midpoint of the BoC’s 1-3% target band, alongside faster wage growth. The BoC – devotees of the Phillips Curve, like virtually every other DM central bank – took the message from the combination of tight labor markets and rising inflation and embarked on the long march away from a near-zero (0.5%) policy rate back in July 2017. Now, after 20 months and 125bps of rate hikes, Canada’s economy is weakening sharply. Real GDP only grew at a paltry 0.4% annualized pace in the 4th quarter of 2018, dragging the year-over-year pace to 1.6%. Inflation has followed suit, with headline CPI inflation falling from an early 2018 peak of 3% to 1.4% and the BOC’s median CPI index now growing at only a 1.8% pace. The most concerning part for the BoC is that the economy could be decelerating this rapidly with a policy rate of only 1.75%, which is well below the central bank’s estimated 2.5-3.5% range for the neutral rate. Our own BoC Monitor has rapidly fallen towards the zero line, indicating no pressure to either tighten or ease monetary policy (Chart 4). The more recent rapid decline in the BoC Monitor has been driven by the inflation-focused components of the indicator, while the growth-focused elements have been steadily drifting lower since that 2017 peak in real GDP growth. Chart 4Is The BoC Done, Well South Of Neutral? The BoC has been stunned by that shockingly weak Q4/2018 growth outturn. In the official policy statement released following the March 6 BoC meeting, the central bank’s Governing Council was forthright about how the growth uncertainty has put future rate hikes in question: “Governing Council judges that the outlook continues to warrant a policy interest rate that is below its neutral range. Given the mixed picture that the data present, it will take time to gauge the persistence of below-potential growth and the implications for the future inflation outlook. With increased uncertainty about the timing of future rate increases, Governing Council will be watching closely developments in household spending, oil markets and global trade policy.” Rising interest rates may be the big reason why growth has slowed so dramatically in Canada. The BoC’s economic projections for 2019 had already factored in some slowing global growth, as well a hit to business confidence and capital spending from global trade conflicts and last year’s decline in energy prices (a big deal for Canada’s huge oil industry). BoC officials, including Governor Stephen Poloz, have noted that a resolution of the U.S.-China trade tensions could therefore be a positive for the Canadian economy by removing a critical drag on Canadian business confidence and export demand. Yet when looking at the contribution to Canadian real GDP growth from the main components, there have been large drags on growth from consumer spending, capital spending and housing (Chart 5). That suggests that there is something more fundamental than just a series of external shocks at work here. Chart 5Broad-Based Weakness In Canadian Domestic Demand A look at the more interest-sensitive components of the Canadian economy suggests that rising interest rates may be a big reason why growth has slowed so dramatically. Consumer Durables Real consumer spending growth has plunged from a 4% pace in 2018 to 1.3% in Q4/2018, driven by a collapse in demand for consumer durables which contracted -1.2% year-over-year terms (Chart 6). Car sales plunged 7.5% on a year-over-year basis in Q4, suggesting that rising interest rates on auto loans may have been a major factor driving the weakness in durables spending. Softer incomes have also played a role, with wage growth rolling over even with the majority of evidence pointing to a very tight Canadian labor market that is getting even tighter (third panel). The fact that the drop was so focused on durables, however, suggests that higher interest rates were the more likely reason for the plunge in overall consumer spending. Chart 6Weak Canadian Consumption Concentrated In Durables Housing The overheated Canadian housing market has endured the double-whammy of rising mortgage interest rates and increasing macro-prudential changes to mortgage lending. House prices in the hottest Toronto and Vancouver markets – which should be most impacted by the changes in mortgage regulations – have stopped increasing, helping bring the growth in national house prices to only 1.9% (Chart 7). Yet the sharp deceleration of mortgage credit growth, alongside a contraction in housing starts and overall residential investment, suggests that higher mortgage rates could be the bigger driver of the housing weakness. Chart 7Some Long-Needed Cooling Of Canadian Housing The BoC has noted that it is difficult to disentangle the impact of regulatory changes in Canadian mortgages from that of rising interest rates. Yet the impact of higher mortgage rates on Canadian consumer spending power can be seen in the rising debt service ratio for Canadian households. As of Q4/2018, Canadians must now pay 14.5% of their household income to service their debts, an 0.53 percentage point increase over the past two years (Chart 8). For highly indebted Canadian households, who have mortgage debt equal to 107% of disposable income, even a modest pickup in mortgage rates can have a big impact on spending power through higher interest costs. Chart 8Leveraged Canadian Consumers Pinched By Higher Rates Does the fact that consumer spending has fallen so rapidly mean that the interest sensitivity of the Canadian economy is far greater than the BoC has assumed? If so, then the neutral range of 2.5-3.5% for the BoC policy rate may be too high, and the central bank could be closer to, if not already at, the end of its hiking cycle. The low level of the household savings rate – currently only 1.1%, a product of the housing bubble and the associated wealth effects on spending activity – makes Canadian consumers even more vulnerable to rate increases that diminish their spending power. For highly indebted Canadian households, even a modest pickup in mortgage rates can have a big impact on spending power through higher interest costs. Capital Spending Canadian companies have seen a steady decline in corporate profit growth over the past couple of years, decelerating from a 23% pace in 2017 to 2% late in 2018 on a top-down basis. Yet even allowing for that, the -8% contraction in year-over-year real non-residential investment spending in Q4/2018 is a shock. Particularly since the BoC’s Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that credit conditions have been easing, and our own Canadian Corporate Health Monitor is flashing that Canadian companies are in solid financial condition (Chart 9). Chart 9An Unusually Sharp Fall In Canadian Capex Business surveys from the BoC and the Conference Board did both show a sharp plunge in confidence and future sales expectations (bottom panel). This suggests that worries about global trade tensions and diminished trade activity may have weighed on Canadian business confidence and capital spending – especially coming alongside a big drop in oil prices as was seen last year, which hinders the ability of Canadian energy producers to ramp up investment. Canadian exports accelerated over the final half of 2018 while business confidence was falling. However, oil prices have now stabilized and, more importantly, Canadian exports accelerated over the final half of 2018 while business confidence was falling (Chart 10). That acceleration was seen for both energy and non-energy exports, but was also heavily concentrated in exports to China, which are now growing 24% on a year-over-year basis (a pace that is wildly at odds with the overall growth in Chinese imports, suggesting that Canadian exporters have increased their market share in China). Chart 10Should Canadian Companies Be Worried About Global Trade? Could higher corporate borrowing rates, rather than worries about plunging export demand, be the true reason why Canadian companies have so drastically cut back on capital spending? It is no surprise that the BoC has chosen to take a pause on its rate hiking cycle, given all those conflicting messages from the Canadian economic data. The growth slump could be related to global trade uncertainty, or regulatory changes in the housing market, or past declines in oil prices, or previous interest rate increases. Or all of the above. The BoC can also take some time before considering its next interest rate move given cooling inflation and wage growth (Chart 11). The central bank has reduced its estimate of the Canadian output gap to -0.5%, based off the downside surprises already seen in Canadian economic growth. A closed output gap, combined with accelerating inflation, was the main argument the BoC had been using to justify its interest rate increases over the past two years. Now, neither of those conditions is currently in place, and the BoC can take its time to assess the underlying trend of economic growth without having to worry about above-target inflation. Chart 11Slowing Inflation = More Dovish BoC The Governing Council next meets in April, when a new Monetary Policy Report and updated economic projections will be published. The 2019 growth and inflation forecasts will surely be downgraded, perhaps heavily as the European Central Bank just did in response to the sharp growth slowdown in Europe – which led to a new round of monetary easing measures. What will be more interesting from the point of view of Canadian bond investors will be the Bank’s assessment of the size of Canada’s output gap, the pace of trend growth and, perhaps, even the appropriate neutral range for the BoC policy rate. The lowering of any of those three elements would be supportive of Canadian bond yields staying lower for longer. We have maintained an underweight in Canadian government bonds since July 2017, based on our view that the BoC would follow in the Fed’s footsteps and attempt to normalize interest rates. A strong economy and rising inflation would allow them to do that. Now, both the Fed and BoC are on hold, with small probabilities of rate cuts now priced into Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves (Chart 12). Chart 12BoC Now Less Likely To Follow The Fed Given the BCA view that Fed rate hikes will resume later this year on the back of a rebound in U.S. and global growth, we had been sticking with the bearish view on Canadian government bonds as well. Yet given the stunning drop in Canadian growth that startled the BoC, the odds now favor the BoC staying on hold for longer, even once the Fed begins to hike again. This would also provide additional easing of Canadian financial conditions through a soft Canadian dollar (bottom two panels). We are upgrading our recommended allocation to Canadian bonds to neutral(3 out of 5) this week from underweight (2 out of 5).  In light of this uncertainty over the BoC’s next move given the weak economy, the underlying rationale for our underweight Canada position is no longer applicable. Thus, we are upgrading our recommended allocation to Canadian bonds to neutral (3 out of 5) this week from underweight (2 out of 5). The excess return of Canadian government bonds versus the Global Treasury index since we went to underweight back in July 2017 was -0.83%, so our bearish recommendation did generate positive alpha. In our model bond portfolio, we are funding that additional Canadian allocation from a reduction of the overweight in Japanese government bonds. We are also closing our tactical trade of being long 10-year Canadian Real Return Bonds versus nominal 10-year government debt, at a loss as 10-year inflation breakevens are now 1.6%, or 16bps below the entry level on our trade (Chart 13). Chart 13Upgrade Canadian Government Bonds To Neutral We will contemplate any additional changes to our Canadian allocation after the releases of the latest BoC Business Outlook Survey and Senior Loan Officer Survey on April 15 and the new BoC Monetary Policy Report and economic projections at the April 24 monetary policy meeting. Bottom Line: Much weaker-than-expected Canadian economic growth has surprised the Bank of Canada. Rate hikes are now off the table for at least the rest of 2019, and possibly longer. Upgrade Canadian government debt to neutral (3 out of 5) in global currency-hedged government bond portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Enough With The Gloom: Upgrade Global Corporates On A Tactical Basis”, dated January 15th 2019, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns