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Economy

The combination of slower global growth, trade protectionism, Italy's budget crisis, and rising Treasury yields have made U.S. equities look increasingly vulnerable to a phase transition. The shift would be from euphoric optimism to a more sober appreciation…
Following up on their phase transitions idea, our Global Investment Strategy team have analyzed the similarities and differences between the five transitions previously described. As far as the similarities are concerned, all five began when stocks were…
Transition Four - 2000. After cutting interest rates three times in the autumn of 1998, the Fed resumed hiking rates, ultimately bringing the fed funds rate to a cycle high of 6.5% in May 2000. The Fed's actions pushed monetary policy into restrictive…
Our Global Investment Strategy team have used “phase transitions” to describe the signals that exist before bear markets hit investor portfolios. These cases are germane because they can help investors take from previous lessons to gauge current market risk. …
Highlights The investors we met with last week were generally optimistic: No one expects a recession before 2020, and none of the investors we spoke with confessed to underweighting equities. Our concerns about inflation are not broadly shared. We encountered a lot of pushback over our sugar-rush view of the stimulus package: Despite its undeniable short-term benefits, we expect the stimulus package will prove self-defeating for the U.S. economy over the intermediate- and long-term horizon. The view that bond yields are capped seems to have become entrenched: Demographics and the capital-lite Internet-era template are powerful long-run drags on bond yields, but we think yields will rise before they fall, if indeed they can fall in the face of gaping deficits. There is plenty of scope for the Fed to surprise investors: Our terminal fed funds rate expectation of 3.5% - 4% makes us a clear outlier. Feature We spent two days last week discussing market views with clients in and around Philadelphia. There is no substitute for face-to-face meetings, and we always benefit from the exchange of ideas, perspectives, and anecdotes. We also find that investors are eager to hear what's on the minds of their peers and competitors, and get a read on BCA clients' sentiment. This week's report is given over to what we saw, said, and heard about the topics we spent the most time discussing. Fiscal Stimulus The investors we met were constructive about the economy. Our view that there will be no U.S. recession before 2020 is squarely consensus, and client questions about the potential for the expansion to stretch into 2021 and beyond outnumbered questions about the factors that could force us to speed up our recession timetable. We were regularly asked to defend our view that the fiscal stimulus package, while boosting growth in 2018 and 2019, will ultimately reduce potential GDP growth in the intermediate and long term. The questions about the stimulus were especially interesting given that the glass-half-empty view has not generated any internal controversy. The tax-cut package has delivered in spades in the short term. S&P 500 earnings per share are growing at better than a 20% clip; CEO confidence is high; and small businesses, per the NFIB survey, are beside themselves with glee (Chart 1). The IMF projects that the stimulus package will deliver fiscal thrust of 0.8% and 0.9% of GDP in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Real GDP growth is likely to hover around 3% this year and next, as opposed to the 2% level that has been the post-crisis rule. Chart 1Small Business Owners Are Giddy GDP growth is simply the sum of growth in the working-age population and gains in productivity. Policymakers are powerless to do anything now about the last three decades' birth rate, and it appears unlikely that immigration will pick up the slack, but a reduced income tax burden may encourage more people to enter the work force, and/or remain in it longer, increasing labor supply. Increases in the capital stock promote productivity gains, as output rises when workers are better equipped. Net-net, lower individual and corporate income-tax rates, and the immediate expensing of corporate investments, are solid supply-side policy that should help nudge trend GDP higher. There is a fly in the ointment, however. Without commensurate cuts in federal spending, the tax cuts are poised to blast the budget deficit to extremely high levels (Chart 2). If Congress doesn't change its spendthrift ways in the next several years, federal debt relative to GDP will break its World War II-mobilization record by 2030 (Chart 3). The adverse consequences would include diverting a greater share of federal revenues to debt service, constraining spending to respond to recessions or natural disasters, crowding out private investment, and reducing national savings.1 Chart 2So Much For Saving For A Rainy Day Chart 3On The Road To Record Indebtedness The relationship between the size of the capital stock and productivity advances is clear, but average productivity growth has been mired below 1% for close to five years despite a bounce in capex (Chart 4). Perhaps the problem recently has been the capital stock's inability to keep up with employment gains - capital per worker has been shrinking for seven years (Chart 5) - but anyone forecasting an investment-driven increase in productivity should be aware that such a forecast swims against the tide. On a peak-to-peak basis, annualized growth in real private nonresidential investment has been soft for 40 years, with the exception of the cycle that encompassed the computing revolution (Chart 6). The ability to expense investments immediately will boost the capital stock, but we're not counting on a sizable effect. Experience suggests that buybacks, which have next to no multiplier effect on the overall economy, will siphon off much of the increased cash flow accruing from the tax cuts. Chart 4Has Productivity Failed To Respond To The Bounce In Capex ... Chart 5Productivity Held Back By Lack Of Investment Chart 6Capex Cycles Ain't What They Used To Be Adaptive Expectations And The Bond Market The investment roadside has grown thick over the last ten years with failed predictions about higher interest rates, and investors have taken notice. Perhaps no view is so widely shared as the notion that Treasury yields are unlikely to go much higher. Fed haters and other wild-eyed prophets of zero-interest-rate-policy and quantitative-easing doom have been roundly discredited. The adaptive expectations hypothesis, which holds that economic actors slowly adjust their expectations of future events based on how they've been surprised by past iterations of those events, supports the idea that ten years of listless inflation have investors geared up for more of the same. There are sound fundamental reasons to expect lower rates in the future.2 Demographics will pressure the size of the labor force, lowering potential growth; new-era services businesses don't need to borrow as much as the manufacturing behemoths of yesteryear; and widening inequality will redirect wealth from consumers to savers. In the long term, the rate-suppressing factors may be able to offset the upward pressure on rates exerted by the ballooning budget deficit. But inflation is likely to be the biggest driver in the near term. We argued last week that the labor market is so tight it squeaks. The headline unemployment rate is at a 50-year low, and "hidden" unemployment - accounting for involuntary part-time workers and discouraged workers who have given up actively looking for work - is back down to its 1999-2000 and 2006-07 lows. The Phillips Curve has been the object of considerable derision since the crisis, but we are fervent believers in the law of supply and demand. When the demand for workers outstrips supply, compensation will rise (Chart 7). Chart 7Employees Are Gaining Bargaining Power We also expect the fiscal stimulus package to push prices higher. Force-feeding stimulus to an economy that's already operating at full capacity is a sure-fire recipe for inflation. The consequences will be unpleasant for bond investors, especially those holding long-dated Treasuries. One can make the case that slowly adapting expectations contributed significantly to both the three-decade Treasury bear market from the fifties to the eighties, and the 35-year bull market ended in July 2016. Investors were insufficiently compensated for inexorably rising inflation throughout the sixties and seventies (Chart 8), then overcompensated for ever-waning inflation after the Volcker Fed broke its back (Chart 9). If our take is correct, the pendulum is poised to swing back to insufficient compensation for a while. Chart 8A Nightmarish Stretch For Bondholders ... Chart 9... Planted The Seeds For A 35-Year Dream Never Forget At The Fed If all of the strategists at BCA submitted a forecast of the terminal fed funds rate in the current cycle, we expect the mean would settle around 3.5%. We are in the more aggressive camp that foresees a 3.5 to 4% range. If our concerns about inflation turn out to be well founded, we think the FOMC will be forced to intensify its rate-hiking campaign to ensure that it keeps the inflation genie from getting out of the bottle. A great deal of blood was spilled in the first three years of Paul Volcker's chairmanship (1979-82), and the Federal Reserve as an institution wants to make sure it wasn't spilled in vain, regardless of any individual voter's qualms about overdoing hikes.3 Updating Fama And French While discussing the value factor and its extended underperformance, some investors questioned the ongoing relevance of Fama and French's book-to-price metric. For companies that operate on the Internet and derive their value from network effects rather than investments in plant, property and equipment, they asked, is book value a truly useful measure? Although we note that virtual value is not an entirely new phenomenon (the dot.com-era darlings' charms didn't always show to best advantage on drab balance sheets), we have some sympathy for this line of reasoning. There is surely scope for book-to-price to make capital-lite companies appear to be more richly valued than they really are. The custom value and growth indexes created by our Equity Trading Strategy colleagues offer a way around the problem. They augment price-to-tangible-book with four additional metrics - trailing P/E, forward P/E, price-to-sales, and price-to-cash-flow - in an attempt to better suss out the presence of value. They also compare individual companies only to companies within their own sector to construct strictly equally sector-weighted indexes. The sector-by-sector construction methodology should help mitigate biases that emerge from balance-sheet differences across industries. Investment Implications The path of the fed funds rate is at the heart of our assessment of when the business cycle and the equity bull market will end. If the Fed maintains its gradual pace through all of 2019, hiking the fed funds rate by 25 basis points every quarter, we estimate that monetary policy will turn restrictive about a year from now. That projection leads us to expect that the expansion will stretch into 2020, and that the equity bull market has another year left to run. If the Fed speeds up its timetable, or spooks markets and drives up long rates by telegraphing a higher terminal rate, we would likely bring forward our expectations for the end of the equity bull market, and the onset of full-on spread widening. If our out-of-consensus take on inflation is proven correct, the Fed will act more hawkishly than markets expect. Treasuries would suffer as markets recalibrated their Fed expectations, especially at the long end. We reiterate our fixed-income and Treasury underweights, and continue to recommend investors maintain below-benchmark-duration positioning. We believe it is very unlikely that developments overseas will deter the Fed from pursuing measures to rein in worryingly high inflation, and caution investors from placing too much stock in the notion of an "EM put." The Fed's mandate is exclusively domestic, and events outside of the United States' borders matter only to the extent that they threaten to impinge on the U.S. economy. Chart 10Half Of The Way To Overweight Finally, we note that it's not all gloom and doom, blood-red CNBC graphics aside. As the S&P 500 declines, its prospective returns rise if we're correct that the bull market has another year left in it. We are buyers of a correction (a 10% peak-to-trough decline), and will return to overweighting U.S. equities if the S&P 500 dips into the 2,600-2,640 range, bounding correction territory and the year-to-date lows (Chart 10). Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the July 2018 Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "U.S. Fiscal Policy: An Unprecedented Macro Experiment," available at www.bcaresearch.com, for a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal stimulus and its effects. 2 Please see the March 13, 2015 Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Seven Structural Reasons For A Lower Neutral Rate In The U.S.," available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Volcker was burned in effigy, the Speaker of the House agitated for his resignation, and aggrieved farmers blockaded the Federal Reserve building with tractors in protest of the Fed's stern anti-inflation policies. A summary of the pressures the Volcker Fed faced can be found in the article, "Volcker's Announcement of Anti-Inflation Measures," available at https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/anti_inflation_measures, accessed October 16, 2018.
Highlights The Fed remains on a tightening course as the U.S. economy has no spare capacity, yet growth in the rest of the world is suffering as EM financial conditions are tightening. It will take more pain for the Fed to capitulate and pause its 25-basis-points-per-quarter hiking campaign. This clash will heighten currency volatility and, as a result, carry trades will suffer. This means the current rebound in EM currencies is to be sold, and the dollar has more upside. China has not been deemed a currency manipulator, hence the RMB could fall more, creating a deflationary shock for the world. Keep an eye on what might become rocky U.S.-EU trade negotiations. Short CAD/NOK. Short GBP/NZD. Feature A significant increase in volatility across markets has been the defining characteristic of the past two weeks. This tumultuous environment is likely to persist as the Federal Reserve is set to tighten policy, and EM financial conditions deteriorate further. While it is true that enough market turbulence could cause the Fed to blink and temporarily pause its tightening cycle, the U.S. central bank has yet to hit this pain threshold. As a result, we expect carry trades and EM currencies to suffer further, even as we established a few hedges last week. The Battle Between The Fed And Global Growth Has Just Begun The Fed is set to increase interest rates further. For now there is little reason for the institution that sets the global risk-free rate to deviate from its current trajectory of increasing interest rates by 25 basis points per quarter. First, capacity utilization in the U.S. keeps increasing, and in fact, the amount of spare capacity in the U.S. economy is at its lowest level since 1989. This kind of capacity pressure has historically been enough to prompt the Fed to keep increasing rates, as it points toward growing inflationary risks (Chart I-1). Chart I-1No Spare Capacity In The U.S. Second, the labor market is currently at full capacity. This week's release of the JOLTS data not only highlighted that U.S. job openings continue to rise and are now well above the number of unemployed workers, but it also showed that the voluntary quit rate is at a 17-year high. U.S. workers are no longer petrified by fear of not finding a job if they were to jettison their current one. This is symptomatic of an economy running beyond full employment. Additionally, as Chart I-2 illustrates, the number of states where the unemployment rate stands below levels consistent with full employment is near a record high. Historically, this indicator has explained the Fed's policy well. Chart I-2The Labor Market And The Fed Third, and obviously a consequence of the previous two points, various components of the ISM survey are pointing toward an acceleration in U.S. core inflation (Chart I-3). This highlights that with the U.S. at full employment, the rise in inflation is giving free reign to the Fed to further lift interest rates. This development explains why Federal Open Market Committee members are much more willing than previously to display hawkish colors. Chart I-3U.S. Inflation Is In An Uptrend The problem for the currency market is that this hawkish Fed is not emerging in a vacuum. Global growth has begun to slow, and in fact is set to slow more. Korean export growth has been decelerating sharply, which historically has been a harbinger for global profit growth and global industrial production (Chart I-4). Chart I-4U.S. Strength Does Not Equate To Global Strength What lies behind this growth slowdown? In our view, two key shocks explain this vulnerability. First, China is deleveraging. Chart I-5 shows that efforts to curtail corporate debt have been bearing fruit. In response to the regulatory and administrative tightening imposed by Beijing, smaller financial institutions are not building up their working capital required to expand their loan book. As a result, the Chinese credit impulse remains weak. The chart does highlight that deleveraging could take a breather in the coming months, in keeping with the change in official rhetoric. However, this pause is likely to be temporary. Do not expect China to push enough stimulus in its economy to cause a sharp rebound in indebtedness and capex. Xi Jinping has not yet abandoned his shadow bank crackdown, which weighs on overall credit expansion. Chart I-5Chinese Policy Tightening In Action Chinese Deleveraging Is Still Worth Monitoring Second, EM liquidity is deteriorating. Chart I-6 illustrates that global reserves growth has moved into negative territory. Historically, this indicates that our EM Financial Conditions Index (FCI) will continue to tighten. Many factors lie behind this deterioration in the EM FCI, among them: the collapse in performance of carry trades;1 the increase in the dollar and in U.S. interest rates that is causing the cost of servicing foreign currency debt to rise; and EM central banks fighting against currency outflows. Chart I-6Global Liquidity Is Tightening, So Are EM FCI This tightening in the EM FCI has important implications for global growth. As Chart I-7 shows, a tightening EM FCI is associated with a slowdown in BCA's Global Nowcast of industrial activity. As such, the tightening in EM financial conditions suggests that global industrial production can slow further. Since intermediate goods constitute 44% of global trade, this also implies that global exports growth could suffer more in the coming quarters. As a result, Europe, Japan and commodity producers remain at risk. The same can be said of EM Asia, which is the corner of the global economy most levered to global trade and global manufacturing. In fact, our Emerging Markets Strategy colleagues are currently reducing their allocation to Asia within EM portfolios.2 Chart I-7Tighter EM Financial Conditions Equal Lower Growth This deterioration in global growth and global trade is deflationary for the global economy. It is also deflationary for the U.S. economy. As we have highlighted in the past, since the U.S. economy is less levered to global trade and global IP than the rest of the world, weakening global growth tends to lift the greenback. Thus, if global goods prices are declining, such a shock can be compounded in the U.S. by a rising dollar. Does this mean the Fed will be forced to stop hiking rates in response to the growing turmoil engulfing the global economy and global financial markets? The Fed feedback loop suggests that if the dollar rises enough, if U.S. spreads widen enough, and if deflationary pressures build enough in response to these shocks, it will back off, as it did in 2016 (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Fed Policy Loop However, the key question is that of the Fed's current pain threshold. We posit that 2018 is not 2016. As Ryan Swift argues in the most recent installment of BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy, the stronger the domestic economy is and the deeper domestic U.S. inflationary pressures are, the more the Fed will tolerate weaker global growth and tighter U.S. financial conditions.3 Currently, the U.S. domestic economy is so strong and so inflationary that despite less supportive U.S. financial conditions, our Fed Monitor still points toward more rate hikes in the coming quarters (Chart I-9). This is in sharp contrast to 2016, when the Fed Monitor highlighted the need for easier policy as U.S deflationary pressures were greater than inflationary ones. Chart I-9The BCA Fed Monitor 2018 Is Not 2016 As a result, we think that before the Fed blinks, the situation around the world will have to get worse. This means investors can expect further strength in the dollar and a further increase in borrowing costs around the world. Moreover, since the increase in U.S. bond yields is dominated by real rates, this means that the global cost of capital will continue its ascent - exactly as global growth is easing. This means financial markets could experience additional pain. In fact, Chart I-10 shows that the global shadow rate is a leading indicator of the currency market's volatility. Since the Fed is raising rates and the European Central Bank is tapering its asset purchases, the global shadow rate has scope to rise further. This points toward a continued increase in FX volatility. Higher FX volatility means that carry trades are likely to deteriorate again.4 If carry trades are to suffer more, this also implies that the current rebound in EM currencies is likely to prove temporary. Moreover, since an unwind in carry trades means that liquidity is leaving high interest rate countries, this also means that the EM FCI is set to tighten further, and global IP could suffer more. Chart I-10Higher Vol Ahead Hence, we recommend investors maintain a defensive stance in their FX exposure, favoring the dollar and the yen over the euro and commodity currencies. To be clear, we bought the NZD last week, but this position is a hedge. China is trying to manage the growth slowdown and is attempting to implement targeted stimulus measures. The risk is real that Beijing over-stimulates, which would cause the USD to weaken. The NZD is the best place to protect investors against this risk. Bottom Line: The Fed will continue to tighten policy as the U.S. economy is running well above capacity, creating domestic inflationary pressures. Meanwhile, EM economies are being hit by the combined assault of Chinese deleveraging and tightening financial conditions. This means the Fed is hiking in an environment of sagging global growth. Since it will take more pain for the Fed to back off, the dollar will rise further and carry trades will bear the brunt of the pain as FX volatility will pick up more. Use any rebound in EM currencies to sell them. Do the same with commodity currencies; AUD/JPY has further downside ahead. Breathe A Sigh Of Relief: China Is Not A Currency Manipulator On Wednesday, the U.S. Treasury published its bi-annual Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States report, better known in the market as the "Currency Manipulator Report." Despite the White House's vociferous pronouncements, the Treasury declined to name China a currency manipulator. This does not mean that it will not in the future, but it does mean that China may be willing to let the RMB weaken a bit further in the coming months to alleviate the pain of the trade war with the U.S. After all, a simple way to nullify the impact of tariffs is to let your currency fall. If Washington is not willing to take up this year's depreciation as a pretext for additional tariffs, then Beijing could just let the markets do its bidding and let the RMB weaken. This is dangerous for the global economy and for commodity prices. A weaker RMB means that the purchasing power of Chinese buyers in international markets will decline. This also means that the volume of Chinese purchases of industrial commodities could suffer. As a result, we continue to recommend investors minimize their exposure to the AUD. Moreover, a weaker RMB could cause fears of competitive devaluation across Asia, which means the Asian currency complex remains at risk. The most interesting piece of news from the report was that China only meets one of the three criteria that must be met to be deemed a currency manipulator: a bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. greater than US$20 billion. The Chinese aggregate current account surplus is well below the 3% of GDP threshold used by the U.S. Treasury, and the Chinese monetary authorities are not intervening in a single direction to depress their currency. But as Table I-1 shows, Japan, Germany and Korea already meet two of the Treasury's three criteria, and are thus ostensibly at an even greater risk of being named currency manipulators than China. However, the U.S. has already concluded a new trade deal with Korea that contains a currency component, and is seeking to do the same with Japan. Table I-1Where Does China Stand On The Treasury's Grid? It is true that naming China a currency manipulator will ultimately be a political decision, and on this front, the outlook is not good for China due to the structural decline in U.S.-China relations. But a chat with Matt Gertken of our Geopolitical Strategy Service reminded us that the EU and the U.S. are beginning to negotiate a trade deal, and Germany's large trade surplus could easily become a target. The U.S. and EU did not conclude the TTIP trade deal, so there is no foundation for the upcoming negotiations as there was with Korea, Canada, and Mexico. This raises the risk that the negotiations could be difficult and that the White House could threaten to implement tariffs against Germany under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 as a lever during the negotiations to get a more favorable deal for the U.S. This also means that heated trade negotiations between Europe and the U.S. could become a source of headline risk in the coming months, especially in the New Year - something the market does not need. Ultimately the U.S.'s main beef is with China and the Trump administration will want Europe's assistance in that quarrel. But Trump may still believe he can use tough tactics with the EU along the way. Bottom Line: China is not a currency manipulator. China could use this lack of designation as an opportunity to let the RMB weaken a bit further in the coming months. Moreover, Germany's large trade surpluses and the impending U.S.-EU trade negotiations suggest that the White House could use the lever of tariffs under section 232. This means that the risk of U.S.-EU trade-war headlines hitting the wire in the winter will be meaningful, though not as consequential as the U.S.-China conflict. This will contribute to higher volatility in the FX market. Sell CAD/NOK A potentially profitable opportunity to sell CAD/NOK has emerged. To begin with, CAD/NOK is an expensive cross, trading 10% above its purchasing-power-parity equilibrium (Chart I-11). While valuations are rarely a good timing tool in the FX markets, the technical picture is also interesting as the Loonie is losing its upward momentum against the Nokkie (Chart I-12). Chart I-11CAD/NOK Is Expensive Chart I-12From A Technical Perspective, CAD/NOK Is Vulnerable Economics point to a favorable picture as well. Now that the Norges Bank has joined the Bank of Canada in increasing rates, peak policy divergence is over. When policy divergences were at their apex, CAD/NOK was not able to break out. With Norway's current account standing at 6.6% of GDP versus -3% for Canada, without the help of policy, the CAD is likely to lose an important support versus the NOK. Moreover, there is scope for upgrading interest rate expectations in Norway relative to Canada. As Chart I-13 illustrates, the Canadian credit impulse has fallen relative to that of Norway, and Canada's employment growth is contracting when compared to the Nordic oil producer. This helps explain why Canadian PMIs are near record lows vis-Ã -vis Norway's, and why Canadian relative LEIs are also plunging to levels only recorded twice over the past 20 years. Chart I-13Canada's Economy Is Underperforming Norway's Additionally, CAD/NOK has historically tracked the performance of both exports and retail sales growth in Canada relative to Norway. Both these indicators have sharply diverged from CAD/NOK, and they suggest this cross could experience significant downside over the coming quarters (Chart I-14). This also further reinforces the idea that the Norwegian output gap may now be closing fast, especially relative to Canada. Chart I-14Economic Indicators Point To CAD/NOK Weaknesses In fact, Norwegian core inflation has also gathered steam, rising at a 2.2% rate, in line with Canada's. Meanwhile, Norwegian house prices are proving sturdier than Canadian real estate prices. This combination of similar inflation, improving growth, and outperforming dwelling prices suggests there is scope for investors to upgrade their assessment of the Norges Bank's policy versus that of the BoC. Finally, CAD/NOK is often affected by the spread between the Canadian Oil Benchmark and Brent (Chart I-15). Currently, the WCS/Brent spread is at a record low and may well rebound a bit. However, BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects Brent prices to rise to US$95/bbl in 2019, with a significant right-tail risk due to supply-curtailment.5 As the bottom panel of Chart I-15 illustrates, the WCS/Brent spread is inversely correlated to aggregate oil prices. Thus, higher Brent prices, especially if caused by supply disruptions, could lead to a continued large discount in the Canadian oil benchmark, and therefore downside risk to CAD/NOK. Chart I-15CAD/NOK Likes Weak Oil Prices This trade is not without risks. CAD/NOK is often positively correlated to the DXY dollar index. This means that this trade is at odds with our USD view. However, in the past five years, CAD/NOK and the DXY have diverged for more than two months more than 10 times. The current domestic fundamentals in Canada relative to Norway suggest that a low-correlation period is likely to emerge. Bottom Line: CAD/NOK is an attractive short. It is expensive and losing momentum exactly as the Canadian economy is falling behind Norway's. As such, investors are likely to upgrade their expectations for the Norges Bank relative to the BoC. This should weigh on CAD/NOK. No Brexit Risk Compensation In GBP; Sell GBP/NZD Six weeks ago, we published a Special Report arguing that while the pound was cheap on a long-term basis, its affordability mostly reflected the expensiveness of the greenback and that actually there was no risk premium embedded in the GBP to compensate investors for Brexit-related uncertainty.6 We argued that because there was a large stock of short bets on the GBP, the pound could rebound on a tactical basis but that such a rebound was likely to prove short-lived as there remained many political hurdles to pass before Brexit uncertainty abated. We thus expected GBP volatility to pick up. Now that the pound has rebounded, where do we stand? The Brexit risk premium remains as absent as it was in early September (Chart I-16). It is also true that the probability of a no-deal Brexit has decreased, which means that long-term investors could benefit from beginning to overweight the pound in their portfolios. However, a political labyrinth remains in front of us, which suggests that GBP volatility is likely to remain elevated, and that the pound could even suffer some tactical downside. Chart I-16No Brexit Risk Premium In GBP We have decided to express this near-term bearish Sterling view by selling GBP/NZD as a way to avoid taking on more dollar risk. First, since November 2016, GBP/NZD has rallied by 20%. Today, long positioning in the pound relative to the Kiwi is toward the top end of the range that has prevailed since 2004 (Chart I-17). This suggests that long bets in the GBP versus the NZD have already been placed. Chart I-17Speculators Are Already Long GBP/NZD Second, the U.K. and New Zealand are two countries where the housing market heavily influences domestic activity. In fact, as Chart I-18 shows, GBP/NZD tends to broadly track U.K. relative to New Zealand house prices. Currently, British residential prices are sharply weakening relative to New Zealand. Previous instances where GBP/NZD strengthened while relative dwelling prices fell were followed by vicious falls in this cross. Chart I-18Relative House Prices Point To A Weaker GBP/NZD... Meanwhile, the U.K. LEI has fallen to its lowest level since 2008 relative to New Zealand's. Moreover, U.K. inflation seems to be rolling over while New Zealand's may be bottoming. This combination suggests that investors expecting more rate hikes from the Bank of England over the coming 12 months but nothing out of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand could be forced to adjust their expectations in a pound-bearish fashion. Finally, over the past four years, GBP/NZD has followed the performance of British relative to Kiwi equities with a roughly one-quarter lag. As Chart I-19 shows, this relationship suggests that GBP/NZD has downside over the remainder of the year. Chart I-19...And So Do Relative Stock Prices Bottom Line: The British pound may be an attractive long-term buy, but the number of political landmines in the Brexit process remains high over the coming four months. As a result, we anticipate volatility in the GBP to remain elevated. Moreover, GBP has had a very nice bull run over the past two months and is now vulnerable to a short-term pullback. In order to avoid taking on more dollar risk, we recommend investors capitalize on the pound's tactical downside by selling GBP/NZD, as economic dynamics point toward a higher kiwi versus the pound. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades", dated December 1, 2017, and the Weekly Report, titled "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth", dated December 15, 2017, both available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "EMs Are In A Bear Market" dated October 18, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Rate Shock", dated October 16, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 to $95/bbl" dated September 20, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Assessing the Geopolitical Risk Premium In the Pound", dated September 7, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: The retail sales control group growth outperformed expectations, coming at 0.5%, while retail sales ex autos growth surprised to the downside, coming in at -0.1%. JOLTS job openings outperformed expectations, coming in at 7.136 million. Moreover, both continuing jobless claims and initial jobless claims surprised positively, coming in at 1.640 million and 210 thousand respectively. DXY has risen by roughly 0.6% this week. We continue to believe that the dollar has cyclical upside; as the fed will likely raise rates more than what is currently discounted by the market. Additionally, slowing global growth and positive momentum should also provide a boon for the dollar. Tactically, however, positioning remains stretched, which means that a short correction is likely. Report Links: In Fall, Leaves Turn Red, The Dollar Turns Green - October 12, 2018 Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus - August 3, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the Euro area has been mixed: Industrial production yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.9%. Moreover, construction output yearly growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at 2.5%. However, core inflation surprised negatively, coming in at 0.9%, while headline inflation was in line with expectations at 2.1%. EUR/USD has fallen by roughly 1% since last week. We expect the euro to have cyclical downside, given that it will be hard for the ECB to raise rates significantly in an environment where emerging markets are suffering. After all, Europe's economy is highly dependent on exports, which means that any hiccup in EM growth reverberates strongly on European inflation dynamics. Report Links: Will Rising Wages Cause An Imminent Change In Policy Direction In Europe And Japan? - October 5, 2018 Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 Time To Pause And Breathe - July 6, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been positive: Capacity Utilization outperformed expectations, coming in at s positive 2.2%. It also increased relative to last month's reading. Moreover, industrial production yearly growth also surprised positively, coming in at 0.2%. Finally, the Tertiary Industry Index month-on-month growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at 0.5%. USD/JPY has been flat this week. We are neutral on USD/JPY on a cyclical basis, given that the tailwinds of rising rate differentials between U.S. and Japan will likely be counteracted by increased volatility, a positive factor for the yen. Investors who wish to hedge their short exposure to Treasurys can do so by shorting EUR/JPY, given that this cross is positively correlated to U.S. bond yields. Report Links: Will Rising Wages Cause An Imminent Change In Policy Direction In Europe And Japan? - October 5, 2018 Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: The yearly growth of average earnings including and excluding bonus outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.7% and 3.1% respectively. However, the claimant count change surprised negatively, coming in at 18.5 thousand. Finally, while the core inflation number of 1.9% outperformed expectations slightly, headline inflation underperformed substantially, coming in at 2.4%. GBP/USD has decreased by roughly 1.5% this week. Overall, we are bearish on the pound in the short-term, given that there is very little geopolitical risk price into this currency at the moment. This means that GBP will be very sensitive to any flare up in Brexit negotiations. We look to bet on renewed Brexit tensions by shorting GBP/NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: The change in employment underperformed expectations, coming in at 5.6 thousand. Moreover, the participation rate also surprised to the downside, coming in at 65.4%. This measure also decreased from last month's number. However, the unemployment rate surprised positively, coming in at 5% and decreasing from the august reading of 5.3%; the labor underutilization measure tracked by the RBA also fell. AUD/USD has been flat this week. Overall, we continue to be bearish on the aussie, as the deleveraging campaign in China will be felt most strongly on China's industrial sector; a sector to which the Australian economy is highly levered, given that its main export is iron ore. Moreover, raising rates in the U.S. will continue to create an environment of volatility, hurting high beta plays like the AUD. Report Links: Policy Divergences Are Still The Name Of The Game - August 14, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD/USD has risen by 0.4% this week. Last week, we bought the kiwi, as a hedge against dollar weakness. While the dollar has gained strength against most other currencies, the NZD has actually appreciated. We are also shorting GBP/NZD this week. This cross has broadly followed relative house price dynamics between U.K. and New Zealand, and the continued relative outperformance of kiwi housing points towards further weakening in GBP/NZD. Moreover, long positioning on this cross remains very high by historical standards, which means that there can significant downside for this cross on a 3 month basis. Report Links: In Fall, Leaves Turn Red, The Dollar Turns Green - October 12, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 USD/CAD has risen by roughly 0.5% this week. This week we are shorting CAD/NOK. This cross is expensive according to our PPP valuations. Moreover, the economic picture is also favorable for the NOK as the policy divergence between Norway and Canada has likely reached its peak. The credit impulse and the growth in employment are both stronger in Norway, while Norway's core inflation is now in line with Canada's. This means that rates in Norway have further upside, given that Canada's hiking cycle is much more advanced than Norway's. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been negative: Producer price inflation underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.6%. Moreover, the trade balance also surprised to the downside, coming in at CHF 2.434 million. EUR/CHF has fallen by 0.7% this week, as the EU leaders have expressed their displeasure towards Italy's new fiscal plan. On a structural basis, we continue to be bearish on the franc, as inflationary pressures continue to be too weak in Switzerland for the SNB to move away from its ultra-dovish monetary policy. That being said, political risks in emanating from Europe could prove to be bearish for this cross on a tactical basis. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has risen by roughly 0.7% this week. The Norwegian krone is our favorite currency within the G10 commodity currencies. Norway is the only commodity currency with a substantial current account surplus. Furthermore, our commodity strategists expect oil to continue to strengthen, even though base metals might suffer in the face of Chinese monetary tightening. This relative outperformance by oil will help oil currencies outperform the NZD and the AUD. We are also shorting CAD/NOK this week, as Norway's economic strength is now matching Canada's. Thus, given that the Norges Bank has kept rates lower the BoC, there is room for rate differentials to move against CAD/NOK now that the Norwegian central bank has begun to lift its policy rate. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 USD/SEK has risen by roughly 0.7% this week. We are bullish on the Swedish krona on a cyclical basis, as rates in Sweden are too low for the current inflationary backdrop. In our view, the Risksbank will have to make sure sooner rather than later that its monetary policy matches the country's economic reality. We are also bearish on EUR/SEK, as current real rate differentials points to weakness for this cross. Furthermore, easing by Chinese monetary authorities could provide further downside to EUR/SEK. After all the SEK is more sensitive to liquidity conditions than the EUR, which means that when liquidity is plentiful, EUR/SEK suffers. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The combination of slower global growth, trade protectionism, Italy's budget crisis, and rising Treasury yields have made U.S. equities increasingly vulnerable to a phase transition from euphoric optimism to a more sober appreciation of the risks facing the global economy. The good news is that the U.S. economy is still quite healthy and none of our recession indicators are flashing red. This suggests that the correction which began last week will be just that, a correction. The bad news is that corrections usually end when investors stop believing that they are witnessing a correction and start thinking that a bear market is afoot. Stock market sentiment is still fairly ebullient, which suggests that it will take more pain to put in a bottom. Investors should anticipate renewed weakness in risk assets over the coming days, but be prepared to increase exposure to global equities if they retreat 9% from current levels. Feature Global Equities: How Low Will They Go? I have been on the road meeting clients this week. Not surprisingly, much of the discussion has focused on what caused last week's stock market sell-off and whether the rebound earlier this week marked the end of the correction. At times like these, I am reminded of Robert Shiller's study of the 1987 stock market crash. Soon after the crash, Shiller sent questionnaires to investors soliciting their views on what caused stocks to swoon. Shiller's assessment downplayed the role of program trading, instead ascribing the crash to investor panic.1 Simply put, Shiller contended that investors were selling because other investors were selling. While I broadly agree with Shiller's conclusion, I think his argument can be enhanced by drawing on a ubiquitous concept in physics: the idea of "phase transitions." Phase Transitions In Financial Markets A phase transition occurs when a substance changes from a solid, liquid, or gas into a different state. For example, water remains a liquid until its temperature either falls below zero degrees Celsius, at which point it becomes a solid (ice), or rises above 100°C, where it turns into gas (steam). The relationship between water and temperature is highly nonlinear. To someone who can only visually observe the contents of a kettle, it is difficult to say if the temperature of the water is 20°C or 80°C. The same principle applies to markets. Sometimes, as economic and financial stresses build, nothing discernible happens until a phase transition is reached, at which point everything goes haywire. Importantly for investors, these phase transitions are surprisingly common and, at least with the benefit of hindsight, are often predictable. The Twilight Zone From Boom To Bust Consider the lead-up to five market crashes in the U.S. over the past 100 years: 1929: The conventional wisdom is that the stock market crash of October 1929 was the first hint that the economy was about to go into a tailspin. But, in fact, automobile, machinery, and steel production were already falling by the summer of 1929 (Chart 1). Automobile output had declined by a third by the time stocks reached their zenith. Investors simply ignored the fact that the economic thermostat was plunging towards zero in those late summer months, setting the stage for a phase transition from boom to bust. Chart 1The Economy Had Started To Deteriorate Before The 1929 Stock Market Crash 1987: It was not so much one single thing that caused the stock market crash on October 19, 1987, but a culmination of things that the market either ignored or downplayed in the months leading up to Black Monday. A rising U.S. trade deficit and a falling dollar raised concerns that the Fed would be forced to expedite the pace of rate hikes. The 10-year Treasury yield increased from 7.1% at the start of 1987 to almost 10% on the eve of the crash (Chart 2). The House of Representatives filed legislation that sought to eliminate the tax benefits of financial mergers. Against a backdrop of increasingly stretched valuations, these developments were enough to bring the temperature of the stock market below zero. Chart 2Treasury Yields Spiked In The Run-Up To The 1987 Crash 1998: Popular lore attributes the 22% plunge in the S&P 500 from July 20 to October 8 to the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), but in fact almost all of the decline in the index occurred before the problems at LTCM surfaced. It was more the steady drip of bad news over the course of 1998 - the spread of the EM crisis from Thailand to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea; the collapse of Hong Kong-based Peregrine Investments Holdings, Asia's largest private investment bank at the time; growing fears that China would devalue its currency; and finally, the Russian sovereign debt default - which caused market sentiment among U.S. investors to turn from euphoric ambivalence to bearish panic (Chart 3). Chart 3Key Events During The Asian Crisis 2000: After cutting interest rates three times in the autumn of 1998, the Fed resumed hiking rates, ultimately bringing the fed funds rate to a cycle high of 6.5% in May 2000. The Fed's actions pushed monetary policy into restrictive territory, weakening the foundation on which the stock market boom had been built. A massive wave of equity issuance from initial and secondary public offerings only made matters worse. Net corporate equity issuance went from -$111 billion in 1998, to $6 billion in 1999, to $153 billion in Q1 of 2000 alone (Chart 4). With the market unable to absorb the increase in the supply of shares, prices began to tumble. Chart 4A Tidal Wave Of Equity Issuance Preceded The 2000 Crash 2008: The stock market crash in the autumn of 2008 did not come out of the blue. U.S. home prices peaked in April 2006 - twenty months before the recession officially began. Delinquency rates on both conventional and nonconventional mortgages had already more than doubled by late-2007 (Chart 5). By then, residential investment had already fallen by 2.5% of GDP from its high in December 2005. Investors may be forgiven for not appreciating the full extent of the mortgage problem. However, it should have been clear, even at the time, that nothing was going to fill the void in aggregate demand that the decline in housing-related spending had opened up. This made a recession highly likely. Chart 5The U.S. Housing Sector Weakened Sharply Prior To The 2008 Crash Corrections Vs. Bear Markets The five sell-offs discussed above share many similarities, along with a number of key differences. As far as the similarities are concerned, all five began when stocks were richly priced and macro fundamentals were starting to look increasingly shaky (Chart 6). Chart 6Bear Markets Tend To Occur When Earnings Disappoint The differences lie mainly in what happened to stocks after the dam burst. In 1987 and 1998, equities quickly bottomed; whereas the initial drop in stocks in 1929, 2000, and 2008 was followed by further declines, morphing into major bear markets. The evolution of the economy distinguishes the two sets of episodes. The 1929, 2000, and 2008 sell-offs foreshadowed significant declines in economic activity and corporate earnings. In contrast, neither the stock market crash in 1987 nor the one in 1998 presaged any imminent economic doom. The latter two episodes were among those "false positives" that had led Paul Samuelson to quip decades earlier that "the stock market had predicted nine out of the last five recessions."2 History suggests that recessions are more likely to occur when the economy is suffering from significant macroeconomic imbalances. Both the 1929 and 2008 crashes were preceded by large increases in leverage (Chart 7). This made the financial system highly vulnerable to economic shocks. History also suggests that recessions are more likely to occur when policymakers lack either the will or the tools to stimulate the economy. The Fed did little to arrest the myriad bank failures in the early 1930s. This negligence allowed the money supply to decline by one-third, which caused deflation to set in. Chart 7Large Increases In Leverage Occurred During The Lead-Up To The 1929 & 2008 Crashes Policymakers were more adept in combating the Great Recession, but were nevertheless constrained by a lack of regulatory authority to handle distressed nonbank financial institutions. The zero lower bound on short-term interest rates also limited the Fed's ability to cut rates by enough to revive growth, a pernicious constraint given Congress' unwillingness to enact a sufficiently large fiscal stimulus program. Both the 1987 and 1998 crashes had the potential to spawn recessions. Fortunately, policymakers were quick to put out the fire. The Federal Reserve eased short-term liquidity conditions by engaging in large-scale open market operations in the hours following the 1987 crash. The Fed also issued a statement affirming "its readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system."3 Likewise, the FOMC's decision to cut rates in the autumn of 1998 helped to temporarily weaken the dollar and give some breathing room to struggling emerging markets. The Fed was slower to cut rates after the stock market fell in March 2000, partly because the economy was more overheated by that point than it was in 1998. In addition, the bubble in stocks was much greater in 2000, as were the economic imbalances created by years of easy financing, chief of which was a massive overhang of capital spending in the tech sector (Chart 8). Chart 8The Dotcom Boom Created A Massive Overhang In Tech Sector Capex Lessons For Today Buying on the dips in the early stages of a bear market is usually a recipe for disaster. Investors who jumped back into the stock market in September 2008 were in for a rude awakening as stocks continued to plummet into October and November. It was only in March 2009, when the first green shoots appeared, that the stock market finally bottomed. In contrast, buying into a correction tends to be a profitable strategy, provided one does so when technical indicators are signaling that a capitulation point has been reached. This brings us to today. The combination of slower global growth, trade protectionism, Italy's budget crisis, and rising Treasury yields have made U.S. equities increasingly vulnerable to a phase transition from euphoric optimism to a more sober appreciation of the risks presently facing the global economy. The good news is that the U.S. economy is still quite healthy and none of our recession indicators are flashing red (Chart 9). As we discussed two weeks ago, aggregate demand continues to benefit from fiscal stimulus, strong credit growth, and a strengthening labor market.4 While bond yields have risen, they are still far from levels that will choke off growth. This suggests that the correction which began last week will be just that, a correction. Chart 9A U.S. Recession Is Not Imminent The bad news is that corrections usually end when investors stop believing that they are witnessing a correction and start thinking that a bear market is afoot. Stock market sentiment is still fairly ebullient, which suggests that it will take more pain to put in a bottom (Chart 10). This message is echoed by our forthcoming MacroQuant model, which is designed to gauge the "internal temperature" of the market. (Chart 11). It is currently pointing to downside risk for the S&P 500 over the next 30 days. Chart 10Stock Market Sentiment Is Still Fairly Elevated Chart 11MacroQuant* Recommends Continued Caution Towards Equities Even EM sentiment has yet to reach bombed-out levels. The latest BofA Merrill Lynch Global Fund Manager Survey showed that managers were slightly net overweight emerging market equities in October. This is a far cry from 2015, when a net 30% of managers were underweight EM stocks. Bottom Line: Investors should anticipate renewed weakness in risk assets over the coming days, but be prepared to increase exposure to global equities if they retreat 9% from current levels. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Robert J. Shiller, "Investor Behavior in the October 1987 Stock Market Crash: Survey Evidence," NBER Working Paper (2446), November 1987. 2 Paul Samuelson, "Science and Stocks," Newsweek, September 19, 1966 (p. 92). 3 Mark Carlson, "A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the Federal Reserve Response," Federal Reserve, 2006. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Next U.S. Recession: Waiting For Godot?" dated October 5, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
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