Economy

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The firming long-term housing demand backdrop, lumber price cost relief, steady new home prices and favorable new home sales expectations, all signal that it is time to buy homebuilders. On the flip side, we do not want to overstay our welcome in the S&P home improvement retail index as a number of leading industry profit indicators have started to wave a yellow flag. Recent Changes Boost the S&P Homebuilding index to overweight today. Trim the S&P Home Improvement Retail index to neutral and lock in gains of 13.3% today. Table 1 Feature Another week, another SPX all-time high. Investors have refocused their attention on the important macro drivers: solid profits, easing fiscal policy, and still-benign monetary policy with the real fed funds rate barely probing 0%. Trade-related rhetoric has taken the back seat as it has now become obvious that the rest of the world will bear the brunt of President Trump's trade escalation. Our EPS growth models are sniffing this out, with the SPX ticking higher, while our global profit model sinking close to nil (Chart 1). Chart 1Ex-U.S. EPS Will Bear The Brunt Of Trade Wars Importantly, we are impressed by how thick-skinned the market has become to negative trade-related news. Putting the looming Chinese tariffs into proper perspective is instructive. Assuming a 25% tariff rate on $250bn worth of Chinese manufactured goods and no relief from the renminbi's steep depreciation since April, results in a "tax" of $63bn. The net new "tax" is actually $53bn as an average 3.8%1 import tariff rate already exists on manufactured goods. The consumer and corporations will bear the brunt of this "tax", so it is worth examining the data on household net worth, consumer incomes, and corporate sales. Federal Reserve data show that household net worth increased by $8.1tn in the past year. BEA data reveal that total wage & salary disbursements increased by $400bn, and BCA's projections call for $600bn increase in SPX sales for 2019 (using IBES data for calendar 2019, Chart 2). In other words, it becomes clear that $53bn in a new tariff "tax" will barely eat into net worth, consumer incomes or corporate revenue flows. In addition, according to the IMF, fiscal easing in 2019 will surpass even this year's fiscal expansion in the U.S. The upshot is that over 1% of GDP in fiscal thrust in 2019 thwarts the specter of tariffs, before the fiscal impulse turns negative starting in 2020 (bottom panel, Chart 2). Meanwhile, following up from last week's report when we posited that the current macro backdrop resembles more the mid-2000s than the late-1990s, we are challenging ourselves and asking what if we are wrong in our assessment. Could we actually be replaying a late-1990s episode instead? Revisiting the late-1990s in more detail is in order, refreshing our memory on the sequence of events that led to the climactic LTCM bailout, and highlighting potential signposts that can be helpful in navigating today's macro and equity market maps. In March 1997 the Fed raised rates and pushed the fed funds rate to 5.5%. In hindsight that was a mistake as the Fed then paused the tightening cycle and watched as the Thai baht began to tumble in late-June 1997, eventually gripping all of the emerging world. True, the U.S. stock market modestly pulled back in October 1997 and the VIX spiked to 38. Then, as equities recovered in Q1/1998 and jumped to fresh all-time highs, suddenly the yield curve inverted in May 1998. Undeterred, the S&P 500 hit another peak in July of 1998 before falling roughly 20% in the subsequent month. Finally, once Russia defaulted and the Fed had to bail out the banks due to the LTCM fiasco, the FOMC, late in the game in September 1998, started to ease monetary policy, and engineered a steepening of the yield curve (Chart 3). Chart 2Trade "Tax" A Drop In The Bucket Chart 3Sequence Of Macro Events Matters The most important signpost from this trip down memory lane is the yield curve. In other words, heed the signal from the bond market: the yield curve inversion correctly predicted a reversal of Fed policy and naturally led the temporary peak in the stock market. Importantly, despite the peak-to-trough near-20% decline in the SPX between July and late-August 1998, if someone had bought the index on Jan 2, 1998 and held through the cathartic LTCM bailout, they remained in the black (bottom panel, Chart 3), and a buy the dip strategy was a winning one. As a last reminder, the SPX jumped another 65% from the August 1998 trough until the March 2000 peak that was preceded, once again, by another yield curve inversion. At the current juncture, were the yield curve to invert we would become overly cautious on the broad equity market as we highlighted in late-June2, and would begin to transition the portfolio away from cyclicals and toward defensives. But, we are not there yet. Thus, we sustain our sanguine broad equity market outlook on a 9-12 month horizon and our SPX target remains 10% higher with EPS doing all the heavy lifting as the multiple moves sideways (for more details, please refer to our April 30th, 2018 Weekly Report titled "Lifting SPX Target"). This week we are taking a deeper dive in housing and housing-related equities and making a subsurface portfolio shift. Look Through The Housing Soft Patch, And... While housing-related data releases have been slightly weaker than anticipated lately, we deem that this softness is transitory as housing market fundamentals rest on solid foundations. On the demand side, first-time home buyers still make only a third of total home sales and the homeownership rate is near generational lows, underscoring that pent up housing demand exists. In fact, the percentage of 18-34 year-olds that live with their parents remains close to 32% a multi-decade high and also represents another source of housing demand that has been dormant because of the Great Recession (Chart 4). Importantly, household formation is still running at a higher clip than housing starts and permits, signaling that the risk of a significant supply/demand imbalance is rising. Historically, this gets resolved via higher prices. Further on the supply side, inventories of existing and new homes for sale remain low and point toward a tight residential housing market (Chart 5). The 98.5% homeowner occupancy rate corroborates the apparent residential real estate market tightness. Chart 4Homeownership Still Well Within Reach Chart 5Positive Housing Demand/Supply Dynamics True, affordability has taken a hit both as a result of rising home price inflation and mortgage rates. But, putting affordability in historical context reveals that homeownership is still well within reach. Were we to exclude that aberration of the post 2007 surge in affordability owing to the collapse in house prices and all-time lows in mortgage rates, affordability is higher than the 1992-2007 range and only lower than the early 1970s. The reason is largely because of still generationally-low interest rates (Chart 5). While a rising interest rate backdrop and sustained house price inflation will continue to dent affordability, as long as job certainty remains intact and wage growth picks up steam as we expect (please see Chart 4 from last week's publication), we doubt that the U.S. housing market will suffer a relapse. ...Boost Homebuilders To Overweight, But... In that light, we recommend augmenting exposure to overweight in the S&P homebuilding index. With the labor market at full employment and unemployment insurance claims on the verge of breaking below the 200K mark, housing starts should regain their footing (Chart 6) and propel homebuilding profits. In addition, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey showed that demand for residential real estate loans ticked higher, while simultaneously bankers remain willing extenders of mortgage credit. The implication is that new home sales will likely reaccelerate in the coming months (third & bottom panels, Chart 7). Chart 6Homebuilders Rest On Solid Foundations Chart 7Lumber Input Cost Relief While galloping lumber prices were previously a key reason for putting the S&P homebuilding index on our high-conviction underweight list, the recent liquidation, down $300/thousand board feet since the mid-May peak, in lumber prices represents a massive input cost relief for homebuilders (second panel, Chart 7). With regard to the relative pricing power front, previous price concessions (new home prices compared with existing home prices) are paying off as new home sales are steadily gaining a larger slice of the overall home sales pie (second & third panels, Chart 8). As input cost relief is slated to kick in during the next few months, especially on the framing lumber front, at a time when new home prices have stabilized, homebuilding sales and profits will likely overwhelm (bottom panel, Chart 8). While the latest NAHB/Wells Fargo National Home Market survey showed some softness on the overall housing market index (HMI), keep in mind that both the HMI and the sales expectations subcomponents of the survey are squarely above the 50 boom/bust line and only slightly below the recent cyclical highs (top and second panels, Chart 9). This healthy housing backdrop is also evident in plentiful construction job openings and expanding national house prices (third & bottom panels, Chart 9). Nevertheless, there are two risks to our upbeat S&P homebuilding view. First, interest rates. At the margin, rising mortgage rates can be a source of deficient housing demand especially for first-time home buyers. However, as mentioned earlier, interest rates are generationally low (middle panel, Chart 10) and the job market remains vibrant which should continue to entice first-time home buyers to make one of the largest purchase decisions of their lifetime. Chart 8Price Hikes Should Stick Chart 9Big Gaps Set To Narrow Chart 10Two Risks: Interest Rates & Wages Second, industry wage inflation. Construction sector wages are climbing rapidly, as much as 150bps faster than overall average hourly earnings (bottom panel, Chart 10). This is another key input cost for homebuilders that could eat into profit margins, especially if new home price inflation does not stick. In sum, a firming long-term housing demand backdrop, lumber price cost relief, steady new home prices and favorable leading indicators of new home sales will more than offset rising interest rates and industry wage inflation. Bottom Line: A playable opportunity has surfaced to ride the S&P homebuilding index higher. Lift exposure to overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME - DHI, LEN, PHM. ...Don't Over Stay Your Welcome In Home Improvement Retailers Nevertheless, we do not want to overstay our welcome on the other residential real estate-levered consumer discretionary subgroup, the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index. We recommend a downgrade to a benchmark allocation for a relative gain of 13.3% since the July 5, 2016 inception. Such a move does not reflect a worsening overall housing view; as we made clear in our analysis above, we remain housing market bulls. Instead, we are concerned that too much euphoria is already priced in HIR equities. Chart 11 shows that fixed residential investment as a percentage of GDP is up 50% from trough to the recent peak (similar to the advance in existing home sales), whereas relative HIR performance is up 170% in the same time frame. Our worry is that optimistic sell side analysts' relative profit forecasts will be hard to attain, let alone surpass (bottom panel, Chart 11). Three main reasons are behind our softening EPS backdrop for home improvement retailers. First, our HIR model has plunged on the back of the wholesale liquidation in lumber prices and rising interest rates (Chart 12). Lumber deflation in particular will prove a profit headwind as building supply Big Box retailers make a set margin on wood products. Chart 11Too Much Euphoria Chart 12Timberrrr! Second, household appliance and furniture & durable selling prices have tentatively crested, and represent another source of profit headaches for HIR (bottom panel, Chart 13). Finally, select industry operating metrics suggest that the easy profits are behind HIR. Not only is our productivity growth proxy (sales per employee) on the verge of deflating, but also an inventory surge has sunk the HIR sales-to-inventories ratio into the contraction zone (second & third panels, Chart 13). But there are still some pockets of strength in the home improvement retailing industry that prevent us from turning outright bearish on the S&P HIR index. Despite the aforementioned easing in appliance and furniture wholesale prices, our HIR implicit price deflator has spiked on a short-term rate of change basis, likely owing to firm demand for remodeling activity. Indeed, the latest NAHB remodeling survey remains perched near record highs. The implication is that the recent lull in industry sales growth may reverse (middle and bottom panels, Chart 14). Importantly, a large driver of the previous cycle's remodeling activity was the availability of HELOCs and the stratospheric rise in Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (popularized by Fed economist Dr. James Kennedy). Now that home equity has nearly doubled to near 60% from the depths of the GFC, there are rising odds that homeowners may begin to tap their rebuilt equity and embark upon more renovations (top & middle panels, Chart 15). Tack on rising disposable incomes (bottom panel, Chart 15) and a buoyant labor market and the outlook for remodeling activity brightens further. Chart 13Operational Trouble Brewing... Chart 14...But Offsets... Chart 15...Exist Netting it out, is it prudent to lock in gains in the S&P HIR index as profit drivers have downshifted at the margin. Bottom Line: Crystalize gains of 13.3% in the S&P HIR index since inception, and downgrade exposure to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Source: The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MANF.SM.FN.ZS?locations=US&name_desc=true 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Has The Reward/Risk Tradeoff Changed?" dated June 25, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Special Report

Highlights Rates are going higher ... : Flight-to-quality episodes aside, the bond bear market that began in July 2016 remains in force. Investors should maintain below-benchmark Treasury duration. ... but that doesn't necessarily spell immediate trouble for stocks: Consistent with our work on the fed funds rate cycle, it appears that the level of rates matters more for equity returns than their direction. Empirical evidence of a rates tipping point is elusive ... : The notion that investors migrate from stocks to bonds at a particular level of rates exerts a powerful intuitive appeal, but the data fail to validate it. ... but a 10-year yield Treasury of 3.75 - 4% might halt the bull market in its tracks: Higher rates reliably slow equities only when they rise enough to slow the economy. We estimate that the pinch point is somewhere in the neighborhood of a 3.75 - 4% 10-year Treasury yield. Feature A share of stock is a pro rata claim on the future earnings of the company that issued it. Holding future earnings constant, the price an investor will be willing to pay for a share is wholly a function of the rate used to discount its earnings back to the present day. The simplicity and ubiquity of this valuation approach suggest that equity returns should be predictably related to moves in interest rates. It may also point the way to a tipping point - either in the level of rates, or the magnitude of their rise - at which capital and savings migrate from stocks to bonds. This Special Report reviews the historical record to see how U.S. equities have interacted with real 10-year Treasury yields. It considers the key variables that would logically seem to bear on equity performance and investors' propensity to rotate between asset classes. We find that the relationship between rates and equity returns is conditional, depending on which crosscurrent dominates in any given episode. We did not uncover any predictable rotation pattern. Do The Math As noted above, valuing a stream of future cash flows is a simple mechanical process once one settles on an appropriate discount rate for converting future dollars to current dollars. According to the security analysis textbooks, then, moves in stock prices are inversely related to changes in interest rates. But the textbooks leave out one key point: changes in interest rates don't occur in a vacuum. When they change, earnings estimates are likely to change, too, most often in the same direction as real rates. To be sure, the denominator discounting future cash flows rises when real rates rise, but the future-earnings numerator most likely rises, too. If real rates are rising, the economy is probably gaining momentum, and earnings estimates should probably be revised higher as well. Conversely, falling rates lead to a higher earnings multiple (ex-the not insignificant animal-spirits wild card), but will regularly be accompanied by downward revisions in future earnings. The net effect is uncertain, and depends on whether the multiple change outweighs the change in earnings or vice versa. Bonds Are A Snap Compared To Stocks It's far simpler to compute the impact on a bond portfolio from a given increase in interest rates because the denominator is the only variable that changes. The future-cash-flows numerator is contractually fixed, and it takes a big shift in the state of the economy to spark an economy-wide change in perceived repayment potential.1 This is why bonds' sensitivity to changes in interest rates can be captured in a single universal metric (duration). Stocks are pulled in so many different directions by factors affecting future cash flows that duration has no equity analogue. Investors should therefore be cautious about pinning too much on interest rates as they relate to equities. Bonds move in fixed orbits around the interest-rate sun, according to strictly ordered rules that establish a very clear cause-and-effect relationship. Equities improvise as they go along, taking their cues from a rotating cast of variables that interact differently over time. Attempts to stretch the concept of interest-rate sensitivity beyond bonds regularly trip up equity investors; we cannot know in advance how rates will come together with the other factors that influence equities. Confounding Intuition, Part 1: Equities Prefer Rising Rates (And Multiples Don't Care) U.S. postwar history makes it clear that equity investors need not run from rising rates. The S&P 500 has fared considerably better when real 10-year yields have risen by at least 100 basis points ("bps") than it has when they've declined by that magnitude (Chart 1), gaining 9.4% and 5%, respectively (Chart 2). Rates do not exhibit any sort of a consistent relationship with either forward (Chart 3) or trailing (Chart 4) S&P 500 multiples, though extremely high and extremely low real yields are both associated with lower trailing P/Es. Negative real yields carry an unwelcome whiff of deflation, and their scatterplot data points tend to cluster at below-the-mean forward and trailing multiples. Chart 1Stocks Actually Do Better When Rates Rise ... Chart 2... Considerably Better When Do Higher Rates Hurt The Economy? Charts 3 and 4 show that both forward and trailing multiples almost always decline when real 10-year Treasury yields cross above 5%. What's bad for multiples isn't necessarily bad for earnings, however, and a 5% real threshold is irrelevant to today's cycle. The steady decline in the average fed funds rate over the last several completed cycles (Chart 5) makes it clear that neutral rate thresholds are not constant across time periods. Assessing interest rates' impact on the economy over time requires a sliding scale. Chart 3Hard To See A Trend Through The Windshield ... Chart 4... Or The Rear-View Mirror Estimates of potential economic growth provide a useful yardstick for measuring the impact of real yields. Comparing real long rates to potential output offers insight into the burden of servicing debt across the economy. If real rates exceed the economy's potential growth rate by a material amount, several marginal borrowers are likely to be gasping for air, and their travails will weigh on the economy. Conversely, servicing debt should be easy when real rates are below potential growth, and investors are more likely to invest, businesses are more likely to expand, and consumers are more likely to spend. Chart 5One Size Does Not Fit All There have been 22 instances in the postwar era when real 10-year Treasury yields have increased by at least 100 bps, and Table 1 lists all of them, grouped by their relationship to real GDP's potential five-year growth rate. There are three possible states for interest rate increases in relation to potential output: starting and ending below trend growth, starting below trend growth and ending above it, and starting and ending above trend. The S&P 500 comfortably tops its overall postwar returns when rates go from Below-to-Below and Below-to-Above, but declines outright when rates start above potential growth and go even higher. Earnings consistently rise when rates start below potential growth, making multiples the swing factor - when they expand, S&P 500 gains tend to be very large (Box 1). Table 1Real Rates Versus Potential GDP Growth Box 1 Decomposing S&P 500 Returns Table 2 details the decomposition of S&P 500 returns during rising real rate episodes occurring after S&P 500 earnings estimates began to be compiled in 1979. Except in the crucible of 2009, when they were flat, forward earnings estimates have always risen when rates rise from a below-trend starting point, putting a tailwind behind the S&P 500 that regularly overcomes the multiple contraction that occurs in half of the Below/Above instances. Multiples are the swing factor; when they expand in conjunction with rising earnings estimates, U.S. equities soar. They always contract when rates go from high to higher, dragging stocks down against a mixed earnings expectations backdrop. The action is consistent with our fed funds rate cycle work: stocks do best when rates are below equilibrium and falling because earnings and multiples expand in tandem in that setting, but they do nearly as well after rate hikes commence, in spite of multiple contraction. Earnings surge when the Fed is confident enough about the economy to embark on a tightening cycle, but has not yet hiked enough to choke off the expansion. Multiple expansion in a majority of the Below/Above instances reveals that investors do not rotate out of equities en masse when rates rise, even by a considerable amount. The rotation story has intuitive appeal, but it doesn't show up in these data. Table 2Decomposition Of S&P 500 Returns During Rising Rate Periods A Little More Slicing And Dicing (Potential GDP Matters) Chart 6Mind The Gap Defining Below-to-Below and Below-to-Above states is easy in hindsight, but an investor cannot know in real time where a rising-rate instance that begins with rates below potential output will end. Earnings rise no matter where rates end relative to potential GDP, but re-rating in Below/Below can flip to de-rating in Below/Above, slamming the brakes on phase gains. The empirical data say investors should lighten up on S&P 500 exposure when real rates cross above real potential GDP. S&P 500 returns trounce their overall postwar gain when rates rise from below potential GDP to potential GDP but lag it once rates cross above potential GDP (Chart 6). Confounding Intuition, Part 2: Institutional Investors Don't Rotate Even if S&P 500 returns fail to demonstrate any consistent relationship with interest rates, one would expect that professional investors' asset-class positioning would. Bonds and stocks are alternatives for one another, and institutional investors presumably shift their allocations in line with the asset classes' relative prospects. We examine Pension Funds', Life Insurers', and Mutual Funds' asset-allocation profiles over time using balance-sheet data from the Federal Reserve's quarterly Flow of Funds report. The data show that asset-allocation decisions are made without apparent regard for relative valuations, at least as proxied by the equity risk premium. Pension funds' steady increase in equity allocations across the '90s appears to have been less a function of rate moves than buying into the bull market (Chart 7). Since the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, bond and equity allocations have mainly reflected the performance tides. The extended trend in pension funds' equity-to-bond allocation ratio suggests that the funds set a long-range goal and grind steadily toward achieving it, regardless of relative valuation movements. It also suggests that the funds may not bother with rebalancing, much less dynamic asset allocation. Life insurers kept their fixed income and equity allocations more or less fixed across the '70s (not shown) and most of the '80s. They then reduced equity exposure for three years after 1987's Black Monday, assiduously built it up across the '90s, and have more or less let it drift since the millennium (Chart 8). The equity risk premium does not appear to have been a consideration. Asset-allocation stasis may simply be a reflection of life insurers' stringent regulatory constraints, but their portfolio managers' limited discretion precludes opportunistic allocation shifts. Mutual fund allocations tend to depend much more on past events than future expectations. Equity holdings peak when the equity risk premium bottoms and bottom when the equity risk premium peaks (Chart 9). The problem is that mutual fund managers are structurally hostage to their investors' whims. They are sorted into narrow silos and then straitjacketed by the rigid allocation rules written into their fund prospectuses. Even if they think asset-class rotation is a great idea, only a tiny minority of fund managers can act upon it. Chart 7Pension Funds Don't Allocate Based On Yields Or The ERP ... Chart 8... While Life Insurers Appear To Allocate In Defiance Of Them Chart 9Mutual Funds##BR##Obey Their Owners ... Confounding Darwin's Intuition: Human Investors Never Learn Chart 10... Who Act On Real Emotion, Not Real Yields Kahneman and Tversky's groundbreaking research into decision-making under uncertainty revealed that our species is wired to make suboptimal investment decisions. Prospect theory, loss aversion and an unhealthy fixation on recent data all encourage retail investors to repeatedly shoot themselves in the foot. When it comes to asset allocation, households appear to focus exclusively on the action in the rear-view mirror (Chart 10). Retail investors as a group rotate between equities and fixed income retroactively, in response to recent past returns, not proactively in response to cues about future relative-return prospects. Investment Implications Despite the compelling intuition that investors should set their course by the interest-rate stars, there is no evidence in the flow of funds data that they have done so in the past. We posit that structural constraints on institutional investors, combined with humans' durable cognitive biases, offer no reason to expect that they will do so in the future. While there may not be any predictable rotation pattern, rising rates have given rise to a predictable performance pattern. Equities reliably perform better when real rates are rising by at least 100 basis points than they do when they're falling. Decomposition of S&P 500 returns indicates that the pattern holds because earnings rise a good bit more in rising-rate periods than multiples decline. And multiples don't always decline when rates rise, anyway; sometimes emotion overrides cash flow discounting mechanics. Investors should lighten up on Treasury allocations, while keeping the exposures they do hold at below-benchmark duration. They should not flee equities, however. Rates have not yet risen enough to cool off the economy in any material way, and we judge that they won't until somewhere around a 3.75% 10-year Treasury yield.2 Tight supplies in labor and goods markets will eventually stoke realized inflation and provoke the Fed into tightening enough to cut off the rally, but it hasn't happened yet, and it is far too early to de-risk portfolios on account of interest rates. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 An unusually large drop in rates may well be associated with economic distress, but default-adjusted bond payment streams are much less variable than near- and intermediate-term earnings estimates. 2 Based on the evolution of the Congressional Budget Office's longer-run estimates of real potential GDP growth, and the trend in our own model of long-term inflation expectations, it appears as if nominal potential GDP growth will be somewhere in the neighborhood of 3.75-4% next year. This is a much lower estimate than one would get from adding the Fed's 2% inflation target to the current rate of GDP growth, but we need to look past the immediate boost of the stimulus package to get a read on its longer-run effects. As with all of the estimates produced by our models, we look to it for a general guide to the future, not a precise point estimate.