Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Economy

Highlights Economy: There is no imminent danger of a significant deterioration in global growth, but the rate of improvement is peaking. The result of the more moderate pace of economic growth and the mounting threat of protectionism is that there is more two way risk in both bond yields and spreads than there has been for some time. Fed: The message from last week's Fed meeting is that the committee recognizes that the outlook for U.S. growth and inflation has improved. Going forward, we anticipate a more hawkish Fed that is somewhat less responsive to tightening financial conditions. This will keep a floor under Treasury yields and impart volatility to credit spreads. Leveraged Loans: Leveraged loans have not yet started to outperform fixed rate junk bonds, but this will change as we approach the end of the credit cycle and loan coupons follow interest rates higher. Feature Yet another down week for risk assets, and all of a sudden 2018 is shaping up to be a pretty miserable year for spread product (Chart 1). High-Yield corporate bonds have underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 29 basis points year-to-date, and investment grade corporates have underperformed by 90 bps. Meanwhile, the sell-off in Treasuries has also paused and the 10-year yield is now 12 bps below its 2018 peak. Chart 1Annual Excess Returns To Credit What exactly is going on? We identify two catalysts for the recent market moves and consider each in turn. Questioning The Synchronized Global Recovery Market moves during the past few weeks have, to some extent, been driven by investors starting to question the sustainability of the so-called "synchronized global recovery". The strong pace of global growth has been a key driver of higher bond yields and risk asset outperformance, and most indicators suggest this trend remains intact. The Global Manufacturing PMI is high compared to recent years, and our PMI diffusion index shows that only 1 out of 36 countries has a PMI below the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 2). Our Global Leading Economic Indicator is similarly elevated, and has a diffusion index that has mostly been in positive territory since mid-2016 (Chart 2, panel 2). But last week we received some evidence that this rapid pace of growth may not persist. Flash PMIs predict that the Eurozone Manufacturing PMI will fall to 56.6 in March, down from a recent peak of 60.6 (Chart 2, panel 3). Similarly, the Japanese PMI is predicted to fall to 53.2 in March, down from a recent peak of 54.8 (Chart 2, bottom panel). There is no Flash PMI data for China, the country with the largest weighting in the Global PMI index, but leading indicators suggest that Chinese PMI will also moderate in the months ahead. This is a risk we have flagged in several recent reports.1 Granted, these are all strong PMI readings that are still well above the 50 boom/bust line, but the pace of improvement has clearly moderated and this sort of marginal change often causes investors to extrapolate weaker growth into the future. This appears to be exactly what is happening. The Global ZEW index, a survey of investors' economic sentiment, fell in March (Chart 3). The BCA Carry Canary Indicator, a composite measure of emerging market currency trades geared to global growth, has also weakened (Chart 3, panel 2). Meanwhile, cyclical equity sectors (excluding technology) have not managed to outperform defensives even as Treasury yields have risen, a break from the prior correlation (Chart 3, panel 3). Of the four market-based indicators that most closely track the 10-year Treasury yield, only our Boom/Bust Indicator is not currently pointing to lower yields in the near-term (Chart 3, bottom panel). As usual, we turn to our 2-Factor Treasury Model to assess the impact of moderating global growth on the 10-year Treasury yield. At present, the model - which is based on the Global Manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar - pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96% (Chart 4). However, if we assume that Flash PMI readings for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan are accurate, and also that PMIs in the rest of the world and dollar sentiment stay flat at current levels, then the fair value reading from our model will drop to 2.85% when the final March PMI data are released next week. This is not far from the current yield level, and could even be an optimistic forecast if the Chinese PMI starts to roll over, as we expect. Chart 2Global Recovery Still Intact Chart 3Global Growth Warning Signs Chart 42-Factor Treasury Model Of course the global economy also has to contend with the possibility of an escalating trade war between the U.S. and China. Markets reacted last week as the U.S. government ramped up the pressure by announcing a 25% tariff on $50-$60 billion worth of trade with China. While the immediate economic impact of these measures is highly uncertain, our Geopolitical strategists view an escalating trade war as a real possibility during the next 1-2 years.2 Bottom Line: There is no imminent danger of a significant deterioration in global growth, but the rate of improvement is peaking. The result of the more moderate pace of economic growth and the mounting threat of protectionism is that there is more two way risk in both bond yields and spreads than there has been for some time. Stay tuned. A Less Supportive Fed Chart 5Fed Versus Market The second catalyst driving bond markets at the current juncture is that the Fed is providing markets with a less accommodative monetary back-drop. Faced with a firmer outlook for U.S. growth and inflation, the Fed is now somewhat less responsive to tighter financial conditions than it has been during the past few years. This hawkishness will put a floor under Treasury yields going forward, and is also the most immediate risk to credit spreads, as we have explained in several recent reports.3 Chart 6The Fed's Phillips Curve Model Case in point, the Fed went ahead with a rate hike at last week's FOMC meeting despite the recent turbulence in financial markets. Not only that, but FOMC participants generally revised up their projections for both economic growth and the fed funds rate. The same number of participants (6) now expect four rate hikes this year as expect three. Last December only four participants expected four or more rate hikes in 2018. Further, the committee's median projection for the fed funds rate at the end of 2019 rose from 2.7% to 2.9%, the median for the end of 2020 rose from 3.1% to 3.4%, and even the median federal funds rate expected to prevail in the longer run rose from 2.8% to 2.9%. The market has moved a long way towards the Fed's dots in recent months, but is still somewhat more pessimistic. The overnight index swap curve is priced for slightly more than three rate hikes in 2018 (including last week's), but is below the Fed's median projection for 2019, 2020 and the longer run (Chart 5). As mentioned above, the Fed also revised up its projections for economic growth and the pace of labor market tightening. The Fed is now looking for an unemployment rate of 3.6% by the end of next year, well below its estimated 4.5% natural rate. At the same time, however, the Fed left its projections for core inflation largely unchanged leaving some to question whether the Fed is re-assessing its commitment to the Phillips curve. In fact, the following question was asked to Chairman Powell at last week's post-meeting press conference:4 Question: Interesting changes in the forecast. A higher growth forecast [...]. Lower unemployment, [...]. And yet, very little change in inflation. What does that say about what you and the Committee believe about the inflation dynamic? Answer: [...] that suggests that the relationship between changes in slack and inflation is not so tight. [...] It has diminished, but it's still there. In other words, the Chairman refused to dismiss the Phillips curve framework altogether but acknowledged that the slope is very flat. The implication is that the labor market will have to run hot for the next couple of years for the Fed to achieve its inflation target. By our assessment, the Fed's projections for the unemployment rate and inflation seem fairly reasonable. Chart 6 shows an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model of core inflation that we re-created from a 2015 Janet Yellen speech.5 Using the Fed's median projections for the unemployment rate, and also holding relative import prices and inflation expectations flat, the model projects that core inflation will rise during the next two years, but will remain slightly below the Fed's target. In other words, the Fed's inflation forecasts seem to agree with the empirical data. In Search Of A More Robust Phillips Curve One of the reasons that the Phillips curve is so flat is that while core PCE inflation includes some prices that respond briskly to labor market slack, it also includes many prices that are less driven by labor slack and more by idiosyncratic factors. The price of imported goods being a prime example. Recent research from the San Francisco Fed splits out those prices that are more sensitive to labor slack - procyclical inflation - from those that are less sensitive to labor slack - acyclical inflation.6 Interestingly, it is the acyclical components that have caused core inflation to run below the Fed's target in recent years, while procyclical inflation has been well above 2% (Chart 7). This framework is helpful because it allows us to estimate a more robust Phillips curve on just the components of inflation that are most sensitive to tightness in the labor market. For example, when we estimate a Phillips curve relationship on just procyclical inflation (excluding housing), the model shows that this component of inflation will rise by 0.18% for every percentage point decline in the unemployment rate. When we estimate the Phillips curve model on overall core PCE we find that a 1 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate only raises core PCE inflation by 0.09%. The top panel of Chart 8 shows that if the unemployment rate follows the path predicted by the Fed, then procyclical inflation (ex. housing) will rise during the next two years, and should stay above the Fed's 2% target. Our own model of housing inflation also shows that its deceleration should reverse in the coming months (Chart 8, panel 2). Chart 7Acyclical Components A Drag On Inflation Chart 8TCore Inflation Will Move Higher As for the acyclical components of inflation, in a prior report we discussed why health care inflation should rise during the next two years, and this has so far been confirmed by strong producer price data (Chart 8, panel 3).7 For the remaining acyclical components, of which 41% are goods and 59% are services, we would expect that at least the goods component will rise in response to the recent acceleration in non-oil import prices (Chart 8, bottom panel). In conclusion, there is reason to expect some upside in each component of core inflation. We anticipate that core inflation will move higher in the coming months and that the Fed will respond with continued gradual rate hikes. Bottom Line: The message from last week's Fed meeting is that the committee recognizes that the outlook for U.S. growth and inflation has improved. Going forward, we anticipate a more hawkish Fed that is somewhat less responsive to tightening financial conditions. This will keep a floor under Treasury yields and impart volatility to credit spreads. Leveraged Loan Update Chart 9Loan Coupons Will Rise We continue to recommend that investors favor floating rate leveraged loans over fixed rate high-yield bonds in their credit portfolios. The two main reasons for this recommendation are that (i) loans will benefit from higher coupons as the Fed lifts rates and LIBOR resets higher and (ii) loans will benefit from higher recoveries than bonds when the next default cycle occurs. However, somewhat puzzlingly, as 3-month LIBOR has increased during the past few years the coupon return on the S&P Leveraged Loan index has not kept pace. In fact, leveraged loans only started to outperform fixed rate junk a couple of months ago (Chart 9). There are two reasons for this. First, many leveraged loans have LIBOR floors at around 1%, so initial increases in LIBOR in 2016 had no impact on leveraged loan coupons. But 3-month LIBOR is now well above 1%, and yet leveraged loan coupons are still not rising. This is because issuers have been aggressively refinancing loans at lower spreads as LIBOR has increased. This spread compression has kept coupon payments low, but history tells us that this dynamic cannot persist. Eventually, as credit spreads stop tightening near the end of the credit cycle, issuers will not be able to reduce their interest costs through refinancing and will be forced to accept higher coupon payments as interest rates rise. Notice that even though the average price on the S&P Leveraged Loan index was higher between 2004 and 2006 than it is today, that did not prevent loan coupons from rising alongside LIBOR, after some initial lag (Chart 9, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Leveraged loans have not yet started to outperform fixed rate junk bonds, but this will change as we approach the end of the credit cycle and loan coupons follow interest rates higher. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://gps.bcaresearch.com/blog/view_blog/460 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Brainard Gives The Green Light", dated March 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 A full transcript of the post-meeting press conference: https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20180321.pdf 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 6 https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el2017-35.pdf 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights After the March FOMC Meeting, market pricing for short-term rates is largely consistent with the Fed's forecasts. For investors and the Fed, the health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes. However, the U.S. / China trade disputes will now take center stage. How can investors prepare for the trough in Citigroup Economic Surprise Index? Investors remain skeptical that the unemployment rate can fall to 3.5% and wonder what pace of monthly payroll growth would be required to get it there. Feature The S&P 500 fell more than 2% last Thursday after President Trump announced a new round of tariffs aimed at China. Treasury yields drifted modestly lower, and the trade weighted dollar fell 1%. Credit spreads widened. The trade tensions and the softer dollar drove gold up by nearly 3%. Meanwhile, another drawdown in oil inventories drove WTI oil nearly 5% higher. The VIX climbed last week, and has more than doubled since the start of the year. The market largely ignored last week's FOMC meeting. Fed Chair Powell stuck to the script at his first post-meeting press conference, but noted that trade was a topic of discussion. The "...For Inflation" section of this week's report provides more detail on Fed's view of the economy and rates. U.S. risk assets also sold off last week as market participants reacted negatively to Trump's political woes and trade policies. BCA's view is that investors should fade the former and focus on the later. We discuss Trump's political situation, as well as the trade tensions in the second section of this week's report ("...For the Next Tweet"). Nearly all the data in last week's sparse economic calendar exceeded expectations. At 1.8%, the Atlanta Fed GDPNow estimate for Q1 finished the week where it started. An unusual run of harsh winter weather in the Northeastern U.S. in March will keep downward pressure on the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index for the next month or so. We provide more detail on the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index and the performance of risk assets as the index rises and falls in the "...For The Washout" section of this week's report. Moreover, in the final section of the report ("...For The Labor Market"), we discuss how the unemployment rate can get to BCA's target of 3.5% in the next 12 months. ... For Inflation As widely expected, the FOMC last week delivered its sixth rate hike of the cycle and Fed members were more optimistic on the economic outlook. However, U.S. trade policy is a cloud over the outlook. The Fed downgraded its assessment of current economic conditions, but upgraded the outlook. The current pace of economic activity was described as "moderate" and opposed to "solid" in the previous FOMC statement. This reflects some disappointing data releases, which is also apparent in the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model forecasting just 1.8% growth in Q1. But the Fed does not expect the softness to persist and noted that "the economic outlook has strengthened" (details below in "...For the Washout"). This was reflected in the updated economic projections. GDP growth forecasts were revised to 2.7% and 2.4% for 2018 and 2019, respectively (Chart 1). That's up from 2.5% and 2.1%, and comfortably above the Fed's 1.8% estimate for potential growth. As a consequence, the Fed expects the unemployment rate to drop to 3.6% in 2019, which would be well below the Fed's revised 4.5% estimate of full employment (details below in "...For the Labor Market"). Despite growth being above-trend and the jobless rate falling far below NAIRU, FOMC participants are not forecasting a major acceleration in inflation. From 1.9% in 2018, core PCE inflation is seen fairly steady at 2.1% in 2019 and 2020. To some degree, the upward pressure on inflation will be mitigated by a higher path for the Fed funds rate. Although the median projection remains for three rate hikes this year, the Fed expects slightly faster rate hikes in 2019 and 2020 (Chart 2). The Fed funds rate is now expected to end 2020 at 3.375%, up from 3.125% expected in December. This will put monetary policy on the tighter side of the Fed's 2.875% estimate of the neutral rate. Chart 1The FOMC'S Latest Forecasts Chart 2Market And The Fed In Agreement On Rates Of course, the path of the Fed funds rate will depend on the degree of slack in the economy and the resulting inflationary pressures. The Fed could be underestimating the inflationary pressures associated with a jobless rate that will be nearly 1% below NAIRU. Alternatively, a rising participation rate could slow the decline in the unemployment rate, or the Fed's estimate of NAIRU could get revised much lower. Finally, while the fiscal stimulus is behind the Fed's more optimistic outlook, U.S. trade policy is a growing downside risk (details below in "...For the Next Tweet"). During his press conference, Fed Chair Powell said that FOMC members were aware of the risk, but it was not incorporated into their forecasts. President Trump announced tariffs on China last week. China may then retaliate with its own tariffs. As we've said before, nobody wins from trade wars. Economic activity will be weaker and prices will be higher. A full blown trade war could jeopardize the Fed's rosy forecasts. Bottom Line: Market pricing for short-term rates is largely consistent with the Fed's forecasts. Therefore, the outcome of last week's FOMC meeting is not very market relevant. Investors are more focused on trade policy for now. ... For The Next Tweet BCA is looking beyond any market volatility induced by President Trump's political scandals.1 The decision to impeach President Trump is a purely political decision that rests with the House of Representatives. Under GOP control, Trump will not likely be impeached if he continues to fire his White House aides or members of his cabinet. That is his purview as President. However, relieving Special Counsel Mueller of his duties would probably be a red line for House Republicans and lead to impeachment. That said, it is very difficult to see the impeachment in the House lead to Trump's removal by the Senate, given his elevated approval ratings among GOP voters (Chart 3). Trump's support with GOP voters, our Geopolitical Strategy service's critical measure of whether Trump can stay in power, is back at 2016 election levels with GOP voters (Chart 3). Furthermore, conviction in the Senate (and removal from office), requires 67 votes. If the Democrats take the House, they are likely to impeach Trump in 2019. But even if the Democrats retake the Senate this fall, they would fall far short of that 67-vote threshold for conviction. For investors and the Fed, the health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes. Equity markets performed well when the economy and earnings backdrop was favorable during presidential scandals in the 1920s and the 1990s. In the early 1970s, amid soaring inflation and the worst recession since the Great Depression, there was a bear market in equities (Chart 4A). Likewise, surges in equity market volatility amid political scandals were related more to economic and financial events than politics (Chart 4B). Chart 4AFor Markets,##BR##Economy Matters More Than Politics Chart 4BMarket Volatility During##BR##U.S. Political Scandals Today's environment - while not as robust as in the 1920s or late 1990s - provides support for higher stock prices, above-trend economic growth, escalating inflation, three more Fed rate hikes this year, and higher Treasury bond yields. Moreover, none of the issues that investors care about (tax cuts, deregulation, lifting of the spending caps, etc.) can be reversed by Trump's impeachment. Even a Democratic wave in this fall's mid-term Congressional elections will not deliver the opposition party a veto-proof majority (Chart 5). Thus, in the current economic cycle, we expect pro-market forces at the legislative and executive branches of government to persist. Chart 5Democrats's Lead in Generic Congressional##BR##Ballot Has Moved Lower This Year However, Trump's political scandals may cost the GOP the House in this fall's mid-term elections. Table 1 and Chart 6 show that political gridlock is not positive for stock prices after controlling for important macro factors.2 The average monthly return on the S&P 500 is considerably higher when the executive and legislative branches are unified. The worst outcome for equity markets, by far, is when the President faces a split legislature. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service noted that while the market has cheered the limited scope of tariffs imposed earlier this month, investors may be underestimating the political shifts that underpinned Trump's move. There is little reason to think that protectionism will fade when Trump leaves office. The Administration's decision late last week to introduce sanctions aimed at China represents another escalation of the trade spat initiated in early March. Increased trade tensions with China represent a near-term risk to the markets.3 However, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team notes that the latest round of tariffs suggests that Trump has made a bid to increase negotiation leverage with China rather than launch a protectionist broadside. This is good news in the short term, relative to the worst fears given Trump's lack of legal/constitutional constraints. But in the long term, Trump's latest move on trade policy support's our view that geopolitical risk is moving to East Asia and the U.S. / China conflict is a high-risk scenario that markets are now going to have to start pricing in.4 Table 1Divided Government Is, In Fact, Bad For Stocks Chart 6A Unified Congress Is A Boon For Stocks Bottom Line: Investors should dismiss the risk of domestic political scandals interrupting the market-friendly policy back drop. However, U.S. / China trade disputes will take center stage. China is motivated to prevent a trade war through significant compromises that Trump can advertise as wins to his audience this November. If Trump accepts these concessions, then the risk of a trade war with China will likely be removed until the next race for President in 2020. ... For The Washout The U.S. economic data have disappointed so far this year, as illustrated by Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 7). The Index peaked at 84.5 in December 2017 and subsequently has moved lower for 64 days. Since early 2011, there were six other episodes when the Surprise Index behaved similarly. These phases lasted an average of 86 days; the median number of days from peak to trough was 66 days. The implication is that the trough in the Citigroup Economic Surprise reading may be a month or two away. However, the relatively low economic expectations at end-2017 suggest that the disappointment may be truncated. On the other hand, the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, along with the lifting of budgetary spending caps in early 2018, have likely raised economists' near-term projections. Chart 7U.S. Financial Markets As Economic Surprise Index Declines The performance of key financial markets and commodities since the Economic Surprise Index crested in December 2017 matches the historical record, with a few notable exceptions (Table 2 and Charts 7 and 8). As the Index rolled over in late 2017, stocks beat bonds, credit outperformed Treasuries and the dollar fell, matching previous episodes. However, counter to the historical trend, gold and oil prices have increased and small caps have underperformed in the past three months. Table 2Financial Market Performance As The Economic Surprise Index Falls Chart 8Economic Surprise Approaching A Turning Point Based on BCA's research,5 tactical investors should add to their risk positions as the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index bottoms and begins to climb. As the Economic Surprise Index rises, stocks beat bonds by an average of 8700 bps and in six of the seven episodes since 2011 (Table 3). Furthermore, the performance of stock-to-bond ratio is better when the Economic Surprise Index is accelerating. Table 3 again shows that all asset classes also perform better when the Index climbs. After briefly moving above zero in early 2017 - indicating that inflation data was stronger than analysts projected - the Citigroup Inflation Surprise index rolled over again (Chart 9, top panel) through year end 2017. Reports on the CPI, PPI and average hourly earnings continued to fall short of consensus forecasts despite tightening of the labor and product markets. The disappointment on price data relative to consensus forecasts is not new. Although there were brief periods when prices exceeded forecasts in 2010 and 2011, the last time that inflation exceeded market consensus in this business cycle was in late 2009 and early 2010. In the last few years of the 2001-2007 economic expansion through early 2009, the price data eclipsed forecasts more than half of the time. During this interval, economists underestimated the impact of surging energy prices on inflation readings. Table 3Financial Market Performance As The Economic Surprise Index Rises Chart 9The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise Moreover, the Citigroup Inflation Surprise index escalated during previous tightening regimes when the economy was at full employment and the Fed funds rate was in accommodative territory (Chart 9). The last time those conditions were in place, which was in 2005, the Fed was wrapping up a rate increase campaign that began in mid-2004. An increase in the Citigroup Inflation Surprise Index also accompanied most of the Fed's rate hikes from mid-1999 through mid-2000. In late 2015, as the current set of rate hikes commenced, the inflation surprise index was on the upswing, the economy was close to full employment and the Fed funds rate was accommodative. Bottom Line: The disappointing run of economic data will not end for another few months. The unusually harsh winter weather in March in the Northeastern exacerbates the situation. However, the weakness in the economic data is not a sign that a recession is at hand. We expect that the inflation surprise index will continue to grind higher, as unemployment dips further into 'excess demand' territory (details below in "...For The Labor Market"). After the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index forms a bottom and starts to rise, history suggests that stocks will beat bonds, investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds will outpace Treasuries, and gold and oil will climb. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds, long credit and underweight duration. ... For The Labor Market BCA expects the unemployment rate to hit 3.5% by late 2018 or early next year, the first time since December 1969. Our base case assumes that the economy will generate 200,000 nonfarm payroll jobs per month and that the labor force participation rate will remain at 63%. The unemployment rate was 4.1% in February 2018 and bottomed at 4.4% in 2006 and 2007; the rate reached a 30-year low at 3.8% in 2000. As noted in the first section of this week's report, at the conclusion of last week's meeting, the FOMC nudged down its view of this year's unemployment rate to 3.8%. The FOMC also slightly adjusted its long-term forecast of the unemployment rate to 4.5%. The implication is that BCA and the FOMC expect the U.S. economy to continue to run below full employment this year. Nonetheless, investors remain skeptical that the unemployment rate can fall to 3.5% and wonder what pace of monthly payroll growth would be required to get it there. In Table 4 we look at various scenarios (monthly increases in payrolls, annual percentage change in participation rate) to show when the unemployment rate will dip below 3.5%. In the past three months, total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 242,000 per month, and in the past year, the average monthly increase was 190,000. The participation rate was 63% in February, little changed from a year ago as an improved labor market offset demographic factors that continue to drive down this rate. Our calculations assume that the labor force will expand by 0.9% per year, matching the growth rate in the past 12 months. Chart 10 shows the history of the unemployment rate and several scenarios in the next two years that assume the participation rate stays at 63%. Table 4Dates When 3.5% Unemployment Rate Threshold Is Reached Chart 10The Unemployment Rate Under Various Monthly Job Count Scenarios Bottom Line: BCA's view is that the FOMC's forecast for the unemployment rate at the end of 2018 (3.8%) is too high and only marginally lower than the current 4.1% rate. This is inconsistent with real GDP growth well in excess of its supply-side potential. The macro backdrop will likely justify the FOMC hiking more quickly than the March 2018 dots forecast. The risks are skewed to the upside. BCA expects the 2/10 Treasury yield curve to steepen through mid-year and then flatten by year-end, spending most of 2018 between 0 and 50 bps. Stay underweight duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Policies Are Stimulative Everywhere But China," dated February 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Year Two: Let The Trade War Begin," dated March 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?," dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "Solid Start," dated January 8, 2018 and "The Revenge Of Animal Spirits," dated October 30, 2017. Both available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Dear Client, I am visiting clients in Asia this week and working on our Quarterly Strategy Outlook, which we will be publishing next week. As such, instead of our Weekly Report, we are sending you this Special Report written by my colleague Mathieu Savary, BCA's Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist. Mathieu discusses the current economic situation in Switzerland. While the Swiss economy has healed, the Swiss franc continues to exert structural deflationary pressures on the country. The SNB will do its utmost to engineer further depreciation in the franc versus the euro, but will lag behind the ECB when it comes time to increase interest rates. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature Switzerland is experiencing a meaningful economic rebound. The Swiss economy is enjoying real and nominal growth of 1% and 1.4%, respectively, and PMIs are hovering near eight-year highs. As a result, after hitting nadirs of -1.4% and -0.95%, headline and core inflation have both recovered and are clocking in at 0.6% and 0.5%, respectively. Moreover, thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, capital has begun to make its way back into the euro. As a result, EUR/CHF has rallied, creating a weaker trade-weighted Swiss franc. This means that while global monetary conditions are beginning to tighten, Swiss monetary conditions have eased in 2017 and 2018. As the Swiss economy improves, will the Swiss National Bank follow in the footsteps of many other major central banks and dial down its accommodative monetary policy? Is it time to sell EUR/CHF? In our view, Swiss domestic economic dynamics remain too fragile to let the Swiss franc appreciate meaningfully. Hence, the SNB will not be able to tighten policy much so long as the European Central Bank keeps rates at current levels. Thus, we would continue to bet on an appreciation of EUR/CHF, punctuated with periodic rallies in the Swiss franc when global volatility occasionally spikes. The Domestic Situation Switzerland's current domestic situation can be traced back to the botched abandonment of the currency peg in 2015. On January 15th, 2015, markets were caught off guard by the sudden removal of the 1.20 floor underpinning EUR/CHF. The SNB provided no forward guidance nor any explanation, and the franc surged 20% against the euro in just one day, tightening monetary conditions severely. Fearing a massive deflationary shock to the Swiss economy, the SNB responded with a large-scale injection of liquidity, expanding its assets from 80% of GDP to more than 120% today, the highest ratio in the G10. To enforce an unofficial floor placed under EUR/CHF of 1.08, Swiss foreign exchange reserves grew rapidly. This expansion in liquidity along with negative policy rates caused 10-year yields to decline to -0.6%. A weak franc and falling yields greatly eased monetary conditions (Chart 1). The current strength in the Swiss economy is a direct response to this extraordinarily accommodative policy setting: In response to loose monetary policy, the velocity of money has accelerated over the past three years, supporting nominal growth (Chart 2); Stronger global growth and a healing banking sector have lifted economic activity in the Eurozone. As a large exporter to both Europe and emerging Asia, Switzerland was a prime beneficiary of this development, providing a tailwind to the SNB's reflationary efforts; Swiss real GDP growth has stabilized and is forecast to accelerate further this year, as highlighted by the vigor of the KOF Composite Leading Indicator (Chart 3); Nominal GDP growth has also picked up due to positive developments in inflation and the reflationary boom of 2017; Improving economic activity has caused the Swiss unemployment rate to decline to 2.9%. Chart 1The SNB Eased Monetary##br## Conditions After January 2015 Chart 2The Velocity Of ##br##Money Has Risen Chart 3Swiss Growth Will ##br##Continue To Recover Based on these improvements, it is natural for investors to question whether the SNB needs to remain an aggressive agent of reflation going forward. However, we do still believe that the Swiss franc will continue to hamper the SNB's ability to tighten policy. Bottom Line: When the SNB scrapped its currency cap against the euro in 2015, the action yielded a near-disastrous outcome for the Swiss economy. However, the Swiss central bank soon eased policy massively in response to this self-inflicted shock, limiting its adverse impact on the Swiss economy and ultimately helping growth recover once global growth rebounded. Now that inflation is also perking back up, the SNB could have to tighten policy. However, the Swiss franc will remain the crucial impediment to doing so. The Swiss Franc Is Still Overvalued Chart 4Basic Balance: Providing Long-Term ##br##Support For The Franc Since Switzerland is a small, open economy - total trade amounts to 118.8% of GDP - the Swiss franc is a powerful determinant of domestic monetary conditions. Last year's 9.7% depreciation of the CHF against the euro and 5.3% decline against its major trading partners allowed the economy to climb out of its deflationary funk. However, the Swiss currency has a secular tendency to appreciate, creating a major problem for the SNB. This currency strength puts downward pressure on inflation and impedes the achievement of inflation targets. Officials are therefore forced to fight off any appreciation in order to stave off disinflationary pressures. While its role as a global safe haven contributes to the natural strength of the franc, several important factors supercharge it: First, the country's consistently low rate of inflation puts upward pressure on the CHF's Purchasing Power Parity fair value. This exacerbates demand for the Swiss franc as a global store of value. This creates a virtuous feedback loop of inflows, a stronger currency, lower inflation, and further inflows. Second, Switzerland sports a large positive net international investment position of 125% of GDP, which generates a net positive international income for Switzerland: 5.3% of GDP annually. Not only does this net positive income generate demand for the franc, but countries with much more international assets than liabilities historically experience appreciating real exchange rates. Third, at 8.5% of GDP, Switzerland has the largest basic balance-of-payments surplus in the G10. It has sported a favorable basic balance vis-à-vis the euro area over the past nine years, generating significant upward pressure on the currency (Chart 4). This basic balance-of-payments advantage is set to remain in place as Switzerland runs a current account surplus, and long-term capital continues to be attracted by Switzerland's low tax rates and investor-friendly climate. Brexit jitters are an additional factor favoring FDI inflows into Switzerland. Fourth, the euro area crisis, its associated double-dip recession and long periods of political risk generated a perception that the euro would break up. This stimulated large capital outflows out of the euro area into stable Switzerland. This created a cyclical boost to the Swiss franc beyond the normal structural positives. The strong upward bias to the CHF is not leaving the SNB unmoved. The Swiss central bank has been vocal in expressing its discontent, arguing that the franc is expensive. However this expensiveness does not seem evident when one looks at EUR/CHF against its Purchasing Power Parity equilibrium (Chart 5). EUR/CHF is only trading at marginal discount to its fair value, implying a small premium for the CHF. The reality is that PPP models do not tell the full story for the franc. When looking at Swiss labor costs, the expensiveness of the Swiss franc becomes obvious (Chart 6). By 2015, Swiss unit labor costs converted into euros had risen by 80% compared to 2000 levels. Even after the recent rally in EUR/CHF, Swiss ULCs are still 60% above their 2000 levels, implying a great loss of competitiveness than that experienced by Italy or France over the same timeframe. The Swiss franc may be attractive as a store of value, but this is now hurting the Swiss economy. Chart 5Modest Apparent Overvaluation##br##On A PPP Basis... Chart 6...But An Evident Overvaluation ##br##On A Labor Costs Basis Bottom Line: Thanks to Switzerland's low inflation, large positive net international investment position and basic balance-of-payments surplus, and its safe-haven status, the Swiss franc has been on an appreciating secular trend. Moreover, this long-term strength has been supercharged by the euro area crisis. The CHF has now made Switzerland uncompetitive. Avoiding The Specter Of Irving Fisher If the CHF is expensive, making the Swiss economy uncompetitive, why does Switzerland still have a trade surplus of 11% of GDP, and why is the Swiss unemployment rate not greater than 2.9%? One side of the answer relates to the behavior of Swiss export prices. When the franc is strong, Swiss exporters cut down the price of their products in order to remain competitive abroad (Chart 7). However, the story does not end there. The flexible nature of the Swiss labor market provides an offset to buffer corporate profitability. According to the World Economic Forum, Switzerland has the most efficient labor market in the world, well ahead of other major continental European economies (Chart 8). Swiss employers therefore hold the upper hand in labor negotiations. Chart 7A Strong Swiss Franc Hurts Selling Prices Chart 8The Swiss Labor Market Is Very Flexible In order to contain labor costs, companies have shifted the composition of the labor force. Full-time employment has been contracting since 2016 while all the jobs created have been part-time positions (Chart 9), resulting in elevated labor underutilization. Additionally, employers have been able to exact important concessions from workers, further depressing wage growth, which has averaged 0.5% per annum over the past three years (Chart 9, bottom panel). Low wage growth and labor underemployment have weighed on inflation through two channels: First, the Phillips curve is alive and well in Switzerland, and the current level of unemployment is consistent with low inflationary pressures (Chart 10). Chart 9The Swiss Job Market Is Weaker Than It Looks Chart 10The Swiss Phillips Curve Is Alive Second, low wage growth has translated into subdued household income gains. But at 216% of disposable income, Swiss households have one of the highest debt levels in the OECD. Without income growth, consumption growth has been limited. Swiss real retail sales have been falling more or less in a straight line since 2014 (Chart 11). In essence, the Swiss economy is experiencing a deflationary adjustment similar to the one undergone by Germany in the wake of the Hartz IV reforms implemented in 2005. These reforms put downward pressure on German wages and domestic demand, and fomented deflationary forces. However, 2005 was another era. The negative impact on German demand was buffeted by the extraordinary strength of the global economy, which boosted German exports. Switzerland does not enjoy this luxury: Since the Great Financial Crisis, global growth has been more muted, and global trade is not expanding anymore (Chart 12). Chart 11Regaining Competitiveness ##br##Is Hurting Domestic Demand Chart 12Germany Had ##br##It Easy Because of this lack of a foreign relief valve, weakness in the domestic economy has had another pernicious impact: Switzerland has not experienced any productivity growth since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 13). As a consequence, the Swiss output gap remains in negative territory, further exacerbating the deflationary pressures created by the expensive Swiss franc (Chart 14). It is unsurprising that despite a massive surge in the central bank's balance sheet, generating inflation remains difficult in Switzerland. Chart 13No Productivity Growth Since 2008 Chart 14Swiss Output Gap Is Negative Finally, even the Swiss price measures theoretically unaffected by the output gap are declining. Owner-occupied home prices are contracting at a pace of 1% per annum (Chart 15). Since 2013, net migration in Switzerland has been declining, weighing on demand for housing. The 2014 referendum to curb immigration, put forward by the right-wing Swiss People's Party, has only added further downward impetus to immigration. Chart 15Real Estate Is Deflationary When deflationary forces are as strong and well-entrenched as they are in Switzerland, and when the economy is burdened by a large debt load - Swiss nonfinancial debt stands at 248% of GDP, the highest in the G10 - a nation runs the risk of entering into the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher in 1933.1 Falling prices can force a liquidation of debt, which forces further contraction in nominal output, forcing more debt liquidation, and so on. Calling a great depression in Switzerland is too radical, but the country could experience a Japanese scenario of many lost decades if inflation does not return. Therefore, it is no wonder that the SNB is obsessed with keeping monetary conditions as accommodative as possible. Since the exchange rate has a disproportionate impact on monetary conditions for economies as open as Switzerland, this means the SNB is likely to continue to target a weaker Swiss franc for longer. Bottom Line: An expensive Swiss franc has not caused the Swiss economy to experience a trade deficit because the Swiss labor market is so flexible. Instead, an expensive CHF has generated acute downward pressures on wages, domestic demand, and prices. This deflationary environment is especially dangerous for Switzerland as its private sector is massively over-indebted, raising the specter of the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher. The SNB will keep fighting these dynamics. What's In Store For The SNB? Chart 16Bern Is Tight-Fisted If Swiss fiscal policy was very easy, monetary policy would not have to be as accommodative. After all, Switzerland has fiscal legroom. Government net debt stands at 23% of GDP, the overall fiscal balance is at zero, and Bern enjoys a small cyclically-adjusted primary surplus of 0.3% of GDP. Moreover, after having purchased massive amounts of euros, the SNB is expecting to generate a profit of CHF54 billion in 2017 in the wake of the rally in EUR/CHF. Each canton is set to receive an additional windfall of CHF1 billion in addition to the normal CHF1 billion dividend they normally receive. The country's conservative fiscal management, however, means that the fiscal spigot will not be opened. The so-called "debt brake" rule introduced in 2003 requires a balanced cyclically-adjusted federal budget on an ex ante basis, and in cases of ex post over- and under-spending, offsetting surpluses and deficits in subsequent years as required. As a result, the IMF forecasts that the fiscal thrust will remain near zero for the coming years (Chart 16). Fiscal policy will therefore not come to the rescue. This means the SNB will want to ease monetary conditions further to push demand and inflation back up. Therefore, the SNB will continue to target a weaker CHF in the coming years. Chart 17The SNB Will Keep Rates Below The ECB... Despite this outcome, life for the SNB is getting easier, and its balance sheet will not expand much further. Euro area growth has been recovering, and European political instability has declined. As a result, the probability of a euro breakup has dropped, and rate of returns in the Eurozone have increased. Consequently, hot money flows into Switzerland have abated and the SNB has not had to increase its sight deposits - a key measure of its involvement in the FX market - to push the Swiss franc down. However, to ensure the CHF enjoys a structural downtrend, the SNB will have to keep interest rates across the yield curve below euro area levels, especially as the Swiss leading economic indicator is currently outpacing that of the Eurozone's, which normally coincides with a weaker EUR/CHF (Chart 17). This does not mean that the SNB will cut rates further. European bond yields are moving up and the ECB is slated to increase rates in the summer of 2019. This means that the SNB will not adjust policy until after the ECB does. Doing otherwise would put upward pressure on the Swiss franc - exactly what the SNB wants to avoid at all costs. The SNB is likely to keep this policy in place until the Swiss franc trades at a significant discount to the euro. In our assessment, this means a EUR/CHF exchange rate of around 1.30. Bottom Line: The various levels of the Swiss government have no inclination to ease fiscal policy. The burden of stimulating growth and inflation will continue to rest squarely on the SNB's shoulders, which means it will keep targeting a lower CHF. Thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, the SNB can curtail its direct involvement in the FX market. However, creating a negative carry against the CHF will remain the main tool in the SNB's arsenal, so Swiss policy rates will lag the euro area. This policy will remain in place until EUR/CHF trades closer to 1.30. Investment Implications At this juncture, the primary trend in EUR/CHF continues to point upward. The ECB is giving firmer signals that its asset purchasing program will end this September. The implementation of this program was associated with massive outflows of long-term capital out of the euro area (Chart 18). Its end is likely to limit outflows to Switzerland. Additionally, lower Swiss interest rates will continue to hurt the trade-weighted Swiss franc. While the primary trend for EUR/CHF points north, we worry that it will not be a one-way street as it was in 2017. As we have highlighted, Switzerland enjoys a large net international investment position, and its incredibly low interest rates have made the Swissie a funding currency. These attributes also make the CHF a safe-haven currency. Therefore, the franc is likely to rally each time global volatility picks up.2 While BCA expects risk assets to continue to appreciate through most of 2018, prices are likely to become more volatile: China is tightening policy and global central banks are progressively removing monetary accommodation in response to a slow return of inflation.3 These bouts of volatility will cause the occasional selloff in EUR/CHF along the way. The surge in the VIX on February 5th of this year provided a good template for the kind of gyrations that EUR/CHF will likely experience. Nonetheless, despite these occasional surges in volatility, we do expect EUR/CHF to end the year closer to 1.30. In fact, the return of volatility will further ensure that the SNB will lag the ECB in tightening policy. Finally, investors looking to buy EUR/CHF but who worry about these occasional bouts of volatility may hedge this trade by buying put options on AUD/CHF. This cross tends to experience more violent selloffs than EUR/CHF when global volatility rises, and it is furiously expensive on a long-term basis (Chart 19). Moreover, the balance-of-payments picture is very attractive for shorting this pair, as Australia runs a current account deficit of 2.3% of GDP, while Switzerland runs a surplus of 10%. Chart 18...But It Will Be Less Active In The FX Market Chart 19Short AUD/CHF As A Hedge Bottom Line: EUR/CHF is likely to appreciate to 1.30 this year as the SNB will lag the ECB when it comes to removing monetary accommodation. This trend is likely to be punctuated by violent selloffs associated with the return of volatility in global financial markets. Buying puts on AUD/CHF is an attractive way to hedge this risk. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com 1 Irving Fisher (1933), “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1933), pp. 337 - 357. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers," dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com; and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Return Of Macro Volatility," dated March 16, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report Feature Switzerland is experiencing a meaningful economic rebound. The Swiss economy is enjoying real and nominal growth of 1% and 1.4%, respectively, and PMIs are hovering near eight-year highs. As a result, after hitting nadirs of -1.4% and -0.95%, headline and core inflation have both recovered and are clocking in at 0.6% and 0.5%, respectively. Moreover, thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, capital has begun to make its way back into the euro. As a result, EUR/CHF has rallied, creating a weaker trade-weighted Swiss franc. This means that while global monetary conditions are beginning to tighten, Swiss monetary conditions have eased in 2017 and 2018. As the Swiss economy improves, will the Swiss National Bank follow in the footsteps of many other major central banks and dial down its accommodative monetary policy? Is it time to sell EUR/CHF? In our view, Swiss domestic economic dynamics remain too fragile to let the Swiss franc appreciate meaningfully. Hence, the SNB will not be able to tighten policy much so long as the European Central Bank keeps rates at current levels. Thus, we would continue to bet on an appreciation of EUR/CHF, punctuated with periodic rallies in the Swiss franc when global volatility occasionally spikes. The Domestic Situation Switzerland's current domestic situation can be traced back to the botched abandonment of the currency peg in 2015. On January 15th, 2015, markets were caught off guard by the sudden removal of the 1.20 floor underpinning EUR/CHF. The SNB provided no forward guidance nor any explanation, and the franc surged 20% against the euro in just one day, tightening monetary conditions severely. Fearing a massive deflationary shock to the Swiss economy, the SNB responded with a large-scale injection of liquidity, expanding its assets from 80% of GDP to more than 120% today, the highest ratio in the G10. To enforce an unofficial floor placed under EUR/CHF of 1.08, Swiss foreign exchange reserves grew rapidly. This expansion in liquidity along with negative policy rates caused 10-year yields to decline to -0.6%. A weak franc and falling yields greatly eased monetary conditions (Chart 1). The current strength in the Swiss economy is a direct response to this extraordinarily accommodative policy setting: In response to loose monetary policy, the velocity of money has accelerated over the past three years, supporting nominal growth (Chart 2); Stronger global growth and a healing banking sector have lifted economic activity in the Eurozone. As a large exporter to both Europe and emerging Asia, Switzerland was a prime beneficiary of this development, providing a tailwind to the SNB's reflationary efforts; Swiss real GDP growth has stabilized and is forecast to accelerate further this year, as highlighted by the vigor of the KOF Composite Leading Indicator (Chart 3); Nominal GDP growth has also picked up due to positive developments in inflation and the reflationary boom of 2017; Improving economic activity has caused the Swiss unemployment rate to decline to 2.9%. Chart 1The SNB Eased Monetary##br## Conditions After January 2015 Chart 2The Velocity Of ##br##Money Has Risen Chart 3Swiss Growth Will ##br##Continue To Recover Based on these improvements, it is natural for investors to question whether the SNB needs to remain an aggressive agent of reflation going forward. However, we do still believe that the Swiss franc will continue to hamper the SNB's ability to tighten policy. Bottom Line: When the SNB scrapped its currency cap against the euro in 2015, the action yielded a near-disastrous outcome for the Swiss economy. However, the Swiss central bank soon eased policy massively in response to this self-inflicted shock, limiting its adverse impact on the Swiss economy and ultimately helping growth recover once global growth rebounded. Now that inflation is also perking back up, the SNB could have to tighten policy. However, the Swiss franc will remain the crucial impediment to doing so. The Swiss Franc Is Still Overvalued Chart 4Basic Balance: Providing Long-Term ##br##Support For The Franc Since Switzerland is a small, open economy - total trade amounts to 118.8% of GDP - the Swiss franc is a powerful determinant of domestic monetary conditions. Last year's 9.7% depreciation of the CHF against the euro and 5.3% decline against its major trading partners allowed the economy to climb out of its deflationary funk. However, the Swiss currency has a secular tendency to appreciate, creating a major problem for the SNB. This currency strength puts downward pressure on inflation and impedes the achievement of inflation targets. Officials are therefore forced to fight off any appreciation in order to stave off disinflationary pressures. While its role as a global safe haven contributes to the natural strength of the franc, several important factors supercharge it: First, the country's consistently low rate of inflation puts upward pressure on the CHF's Purchasing Power Parity fair value. This exacerbates demand for the Swiss franc as a global store of value. This creates a virtuous feedback loop of inflows, a stronger currency, lower inflation, and further inflows. Second, Switzerland sports a large positive net international investment position of 125% of GDP, which generates a net positive international income for Switzerland: 5.3% of GDP annually. Not only does this net positive income generate demand for the franc, but countries with much more international assets than liabilities historically experience appreciating real exchange rates. Third, at 8.5% of GDP, Switzerland has the largest basic balance-of-payments surplus in the G10. It has sported a favorable basic balance vis-à-vis the euro area over the past nine years, generating significant upward pressure on the currency (Chart 4). This basic balance-of-payments advantage is set to remain in place as Switzerland runs a current account surplus, and long-term capital continues to be attracted by Switzerland's low tax rates and investor-friendly climate. Brexit jitters are an additional factor favoring FDI inflows into Switzerland. Fourth, the euro area crisis, its associated double-dip recession and long periods of political risk generated a perception that the euro would break up. This stimulated large capital outflows out of the euro area into stable Switzerland. This created a cyclical boost to the Swiss franc beyond the normal structural positives. The strong upward bias to the CHF is not leaving the SNB unmoved. The Swiss central bank has been vocal in expressing its discontent, arguing that the franc is expensive. However this expensiveness does not seem evident when one looks at EUR/CHF against its Purchasing Power Parity equilibrium (Chart 5). EUR/CHF is only trading at marginal discount to its fair value, implying a small premium for the CHF. The reality is that PPP models do not tell the full story for the franc. When looking at Swiss labor costs, the expensiveness of the Swiss franc becomes obvious (Chart 6). By 2015, Swiss unit labor costs converted into euros had risen by 80% compared to 2000 levels. Even after the recent rally in EUR/CHF, Swiss ULCs are still 60% above their 2000 levels, implying a great loss of competitiveness than that experienced by Italy or France over the same timeframe. The Swiss franc may be attractive as a store of value, but this is now hurting the Swiss economy. Chart 5Modest Apparent Overvaluation##br##On A PPP Basis... Chart 6...But An Evident Overvaluation ##br##On A Labor Costs Basis Bottom Line: Thanks to Switzerland's low inflation, large positive net international investment position and basic balance-of-payments surplus, and its safe-haven status, the Swiss franc has been on an appreciating secular trend. Moreover, this long-term strength has been supercharged by the euro area crisis. The CHF has now made Switzerland uncompetitive. Avoiding The Specter Of Irving Fisher If the CHF is expensive, making the Swiss economy uncompetitive, why does Switzerland still have a trade surplus of 11% of GDP, and why is the Swiss unemployment rate not greater than 2.9%? One side of the answer relates to the behavior of Swiss export prices. When the franc is strong, Swiss exporters cut down the price of their products in order to remain competitive abroad (Chart 7). However, the story does not end there. The flexible nature of the Swiss labor market provides an offset to buffer corporate profitability. According to the World Economic Forum, Switzerland has the most efficient labor market in the world, well ahead of other major continental European economies (Chart 8). Swiss employers therefore hold the upper hand in labor negotiations. Chart 7A Strong Swiss Franc Hurts Selling Prices Chart 8The Swiss Labor Market Is Very Flexible In order to contain labor costs, companies have shifted the composition of the labor force. Full-time employment has been contracting since 2016 while all the jobs created have been part-time positions (Chart 9), resulting in elevated labor underutilization. Additionally, employers have been able to exact important concessions from workers, further depressing wage growth, which has averaged 0.5% per annum over the past three years (Chart 9, bottom panel). Low wage growth and labor underemployment have weighed on inflation through two channels: First, the Phillips curve is alive and well in Switzerland, and the current level of unemployment is consistent with low inflationary pressures (Chart 10). Chart 9The Swiss Job Market Is Weaker Than It Looks Chart 10The Swiss Phillips Curve Is Alive Second, low wage growth has translated into subdued household income gains. But at 216% of disposable income, Swiss households have one of the highest debt levels in the OECD. Without income growth, consumption growth has been limited. Swiss real retail sales have been falling more or less in a straight line since 2014 (Chart 11). In essence, the Swiss economy is experiencing a deflationary adjustment similar to the one undergone by Germany in the wake of the Hartz IV reforms implemented in 2005. These reforms put downward pressure on German wages and domestic demand, and fomented deflationary forces. However, 2005 was another era. The negative impact on German demand was buffeted by the extraordinary strength of the global economy, which boosted German exports. Switzerland does not enjoy this luxury: Since the Great Financial Crisis, global growth has been more muted, and global trade is not expanding anymore (Chart 12). Chart 11Regaining Competitiveness ##br##Is Hurting Domestic Demand Chart 12Germany Had ##br##It Easy Because of this lack of a foreign relief valve, weakness in the domestic economy has had another pernicious impact: Switzerland has not experienced any productivity growth since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 13). As a consequence, the Swiss output gap remains in negative territory, further exacerbating the deflationary pressures created by the expensive Swiss franc (Chart 14). It is unsurprising that despite a massive surge in the central bank's balance sheet, generating inflation remains difficult in Switzerland. Chart 13No Productivity Growth Since 2008 Chart 14Swiss Output Gap Is Negative Finally, even the Swiss price measures theoretically unaffected by the output gap are declining. Owner-occupied home prices are contracting at a pace of 1% per annum (Chart 15). Since 2013, net migration in Switzerland has been declining, weighing on demand for housing. The 2014 referendum to curb immigration, put forward by the right-wing Swiss People's Party, has only added further downward impetus to immigration. Chart 15Real Estate Is Deflationary When deflationary forces are as strong and well-entrenched as they are in Switzerland, and when the economy is burdened by a large debt load - Swiss nonfinancial debt stands at 248% of GDP, the highest in the G10 - a nation runs the risk of entering into the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher in 1933.1 Falling prices can force a liquidation of debt, which forces further contraction in nominal output, forcing more debt liquidation, and so on. Calling a great depression in Switzerland is too radical, but the country could experience a Japanese scenario of many lost decades if inflation does not return. Therefore, it is no wonder that the SNB is obsessed with keeping monetary conditions as accommodative as possible. Since the exchange rate has a disproportionate impact on monetary conditions for economies as open as Switzerland, this means the SNB is likely to continue to target a weaker Swiss franc for longer. Bottom Line: An expensive Swiss franc has not caused the Swiss economy to experience a trade deficit because the Swiss labor market is so flexible. Instead, an expensive CHF has generated acute downward pressures on wages, domestic demand, and prices. This deflationary environment is especially dangerous for Switzerland as its private sector is massively over-indebted, raising the specter of the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher. The SNB will keep fighting these dynamics. What's In Store For The SNB? Chart 16Bern Is Tight-Fisted If Swiss fiscal policy was very easy, monetary policy would not have to be as accommodative. After all, Switzerland has fiscal legroom. Government net debt stands at 23% of GDP, the overall fiscal balance is at zero, and Bern enjoys a small cyclically-adjusted primary surplus of 0.3% of GDP. Moreover, after having purchased massive amounts of euros, the SNB is expecting to generate a profit of CHF54 billion in 2017 in the wake of the rally in EUR/CHF. Each canton is set to receive an additional windfall of CHF1 billion in addition to the normal CHF1 billion dividend they normally receive. The country's conservative fiscal management, however, means that the fiscal spigot will not be opened. The so-called "debt brake" rule introduced in 2003 requires a balanced cyclically-adjusted federal budget on an ex ante basis, and in cases of ex post over- and under-spending, offsetting surpluses and deficits in subsequent years as required. As a result, the IMF forecasts that the fiscal thrust will remain near zero for the coming years (Chart 16). Fiscal policy will therefore not come to the rescue. This means the SNB will want to ease monetary conditions further to push demand and inflation back up. Therefore, the SNB will continue to target a weaker CHF in the coming years. Chart 17The SNB Will Keep Rates Below The ECB... Despite this outcome, life for the SNB is getting easier, and its balance sheet will not expand much further. Euro area growth has been recovering, and European political instability has declined. As a result, the probability of a euro breakup has dropped, and rate of returns in the Eurozone have increased. Consequently, hot money flows into Switzerland have abated and the SNB has not had to increase its sight deposits - a key measure of its involvement in the FX market - to push the Swiss franc down. However, to ensure the CHF enjoys a structural downtrend, the SNB will have to keep interest rates across the yield curve below euro area levels, especially as the Swiss leading economic indicator is currently outpacing that of the Eurozone's, which normally coincides with a weaker EUR/CHF (Chart 17). This does not mean that the SNB will cut rates further. European bond yields are moving up and the ECB is slated to increase rates in the summer of 2019. This means that the SNB will not adjust policy until after the ECB does. Doing otherwise would put upward pressure on the Swiss franc - exactly what the SNB wants to avoid at all costs. The SNB is likely to keep this policy in place until the Swiss franc trades at a significant discount to the euro. In our assessment, this means a EUR/CHF exchange rate of around 1.30. Bottom Line: The various levels of the Swiss government have no inclination to ease fiscal policy. The burden of stimulating growth and inflation will continue to rest squarely on the SNB's shoulders, which means it will keep targeting a lower CHF. Thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, the SNB can curtail its direct involvement in the FX market. However, creating a negative carry against the CHF will remain the main tool in the SNB's arsenal, so Swiss policy rates will lag the euro area. This policy will remain in place until EUR/CHF trades closer to 1.30. Investment Implications At this juncture, the primary trend in EUR/CHF continues to point upward. The ECB is giving firmer signals that its asset purchasing program will end this September. The implementation of this program was associated with massive outflows of long-term capital out of the euro area (Chart 18). Its end is likely to limit outflows to Switzerland. Additionally, lower Swiss interest rates will continue to hurt the trade-weighted Swiss franc. While the primary trend for EUR/CHF points north, we worry that it will not be a one-way street as it was in 2017. As we have highlighted, Switzerland enjoys a large net international investment position, and its incredibly low interest rates have made the Swissie a funding currency. These attributes also make the CHF a safe-haven currency. Therefore, the franc is likely to rally each time global volatility picks up.2 While BCA expects risk assets to continue to appreciate through most of 2018, prices are likely to become more volatile: China is tightening policy and global central banks are progressively removing monetary accommodation in response to a slow return of inflation.3 These bouts of volatility will cause the occasional selloff in EUR/CHF along the way. The surge in the VIX on February 5th of this year provided a good template for the kind of gyrations that EUR/CHF will likely experience. Nonetheless, despite these occasional surges in volatility, we do expect EUR/CHF to end the year closer to 1.30. In fact, the return of volatility will further ensure that the SNB will lag the ECB in tightening policy. Finally, investors looking to buy EUR/CHF but who worry about these occasional bouts of volatility may hedge this trade by buying put options on AUD/CHF. This cross tends to experience more violent selloffs than EUR/CHF when global volatility rises, and it is furiously expensive on a long-term basis (Chart 19). Moreover, the balance-of-payments picture is very attractive for shorting this pair, as Australia runs a current account deficit of 2.3% of GDP, while Switzerland runs a surplus of 10%. Chart 18...But It Will Be Less Active In The FX Market Chart 19Short AUD/CHF As A Hedge Bottom Line: EUR/CHF is likely to appreciate to 1.30 this year as the SNB will lag the ECB when it comes to removing monetary accommodation. This trend is likely to be punctuated by violent selloffs associated with the return of volatility in global financial markets. Buying puts on AUD/CHF is an attractive way to hedge this risk. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com 1 Irving Fisher (1933), “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1933), pp. 337 - 357. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers," dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com; and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Return Of Macro Volatility," dated March 16, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Two big distortions in the euro area economy arose because Germany depressed its wages for a decade, and then Italy failed to fix its broken banks for a decade... ...but both distortions are now correcting. Long-term property investors in Europe should seek out undervalued gems on the Greek islands, Portuguese Atlantic coast, Italy and German second-tier cities. Steer clear of Scandinavia, France and central London. Stay overweight a basket of German real estate stocks. Maintain a long basket of German consumer services versus a short basket of exporters comprising autos, chemicals and industrials. Feature In Germany and Italy, real house prices are at the same level today as they were in 1995 (Chart of the Week). Germany and Italy share another similarity. Through the past two decades, they have delivered their workers the same subpar real wage growth (Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekThe Mirror Image Journeys Of German ##br##And Italian House Prices Chart I-2The Mirror Image Journeys Of ##br##German And Italian Wages However, while the point-to-point growth rates for both house prices and wages look identical, the journeys that Germany and Italy have travelled have been mirror images of one another. Germany's journey has been a decline followed by rapid ascent; Italy's journey has been a rapid ascent followed by decline. These mirror image journeys encapsulate the two big distortions within the euro area economy. The Euro Area's Two Big Distortions The euro area's first distortion arose from Germany's labour market reforms at the start of the millennium. Germany's labour reforms were putatively to boost productivity. In fact, the reforms' main impact was to depress German wages for a decade. The consequent boost in competitiveness caused symmetrical distortions: a bubble in German exports, and an anti-bubble in German household incomes. Before Germany joined the euro, such a distortion would have been impossible. An appreciating deutschemark would have arbitraged away any rise in export competitiveness. But an exchange rate appreciation could no longer happen once Germany was sharing its currency with other economies that were not replicating Germany's wage depression strategy. Hence, German household incomes - and house prices - have been one of Europe's biggest losers in the single currency era. Conversely, Germany's export-oriented companies - and their shareholders - have been amongst the biggest winners (Chart I-3). Just consider, the Siemens dividend is up almost one thousand percent! The euro area's second distortion arose because Italy failed to fix its broken banks for a decade. After a financial crisis such as in 2008, the golden rule is to nurse the financial system back to health as quickly as possible. Which is precisely what all the major economies did. All the major economies, that is, apart from Italy (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Distortion 1: Germany Depressed##br## Its Wages For A Decade Chart I-4Distortion 2: Italy Failed To Fix Its ##br##Broken Banks For A Decade Italy procrastinated because its government is more indebted than other sovereigns and because its dysfunctional banks did not cause an acute domestic crisis. Nevertheless, Italy's reluctance to fix its banks is the central reason for its decade-long economic stagnation, and declining real house prices. The good news is that the euro area's two big distortions are now correcting. Germany is allowing its wages to adjust rapidly upwards. Meanwhile, in the space of just a year, Italy has raised almost €50 billion in equity capital for its banks. Italian bank solvency and loan quality have improved sharply. This raises an interesting question: do the German and Italian housing markets now offer compelling long-term investment opportunities? European Housing Markets: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly Property investments offer income via rents. Over time, these rents should increase in real terms. Items such as a litre of milk or a London commuter train journey do not increase in quality. If anything, the London commuter train journey has decreased in quality! By contrast, accommodation does increase in quality. For example, kitchens and bathrooms, home security, and heating and cooling systems should all get better over time. In essence, the quality of accommodation benefits from productivity improvements, so real rents rise. Of course, such improvements require investment expenditure. But a property investor requires a return on this investment. Therefore, property income - even after expenses - should and does increase in real terms. What about capital values? In the long term, we would expect capital values to have some connection to rising real rents. So if real house prices have not increased over several decades, then it signals a very likely undervaluation. Conversely, if real house prices have increased an implausibly large amount over several decades, then it raises a red flag for a likely overvaluation (Chart I-5, Chart I-6, and Chart I-7). Chart I-5German Real House Prices Are No Higher Than In 1995 Chart I-6Scandinavian Real House Prices Have Trebled Since 1995 Chart I-7Italy, Portugal And Greece Offer Good Opportunities For Property Investors On this evidence, we expect the long-term returns from the housing markets in France, Netherlands, Belgium and Finland to be bad. More worrying, we expect the long-term returns from the housing markets in Sweden and Norway to be ugly. Real house prices have more than trebled since 1995. For this, blame the central banks. In recent years, Sweden's Riksbank and the Norges Bank have had to shadow the ECB's ultra-loose policy to prevent a sharp appreciation of their currencies. The trouble is that ultra-low and negative interest rates have been absurdly inappropriate for the booming Scandinavian economies. So the ECB's policy may indeed have generated credit-fuelled bubbles... albeit in Sweden and Norway. Chart I-8London House Prices Have Rolled Over We are also reluctant to own London property. London house prices have rolled over, and headwinds persist (Chart I-8). Theresa May wants to drag the U.K. out of the EU single market and customs union, which cannot be a good thing for London. On the other hand, if parliament forces May to soften her Brexit stance, it could fracture a precarious truce between hard and soft Brexiters in her cabinet and topple the government. Thereby, it could pave the way for a Jeremy Corbyn led Labour government and the spectre of a high-end 'land value' tax. So where are long-term returns likely to be good? We repeat that where house prices have shown no real increase from 25 years ago, it bodes very well for the long-term investment opportunity. This describes the situation for the housing markets in Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece. To summarise, if you are looking for a long-term investment property in Europe, steer clear of Scandinavia, France and central London. And seek out undervalued gems on the Greek islands, Portuguese Atlantic coast, Italy and German second-tier cities. What Is The Related Opportunity In Equity Markets? Real estate holding and development companies and REITS are the equity market plays on real estate. The trouble is that the stocks are too few and too small for a meaningful investment in Greece, Italy and Portugal. However, in Germany, stay overweight the basket of real estate stocks which we first introduced a few years ago. The basket has outperformed by 50%, but the outperformance isn't over. In Germany, the catch-up of house prices is closely connected to the catch-up of household incomes. As Germany continues to reduce its export-dependence and rebalance its economy towards domestic demand, the catch-up has further to run. Chart I-9German Consumer Services Will ##br##Outperform Consumer Goods It is possible to play this structural theme in the equity market via an overweight in consumer services versus consumer goods. Consumer services tend to have more domestic exposure compared to the consumer goods sector which is dominated by autos. Understandably, during the era of German export-dominance, the German consumer services sector strongly underperformed consumer goods. But in recent years, as the German economy has rebalanced, the tables have turned. German consumer services have been outperforming German consumer goods (Chart I-9). We expect this trend to persist. Our preferred expression is to maintain a long basket of German consumer services versus a short basket of exporters comprising autos, chemicals and industrials. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommendation is a commodity pair-trade: short nickel / long lead. The pair trade's 65-day fractal dimension is at the lower bound which has signalled several reversals in recent years. Set a profit target of 8% with a symmetrical stop-loss. We are also pleased to report that all of the four other open trades are comfortably in profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Dear Clients, This week we are re-publishing an excellent Special Report written by our geopolitical team that appeared in the January 2018 Bank Credit Analyst. The recent removal of term limits on the Chinese presidency, a move that was foreshadowed in the report, has refocused global investor attention on the country's secular outlook. The report explains why the long-run outlook for China hinges on Xi Jinping's willingness to use his immense personal authority and concentration of power for the purposes of good governance and market-oriented economic reform. Without concrete progress, investors will have to decide whether they want to invest in a China that is becoming less economically vibrant as well as more authoritarian. I trust you will find this report insightful. Best regards, Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Report Highlights 2018 is a pivotal year for China, as it will set the trajectory for President Xi Jinping's second term ... and he may not step down in 2022. Poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent threats to China's political stability. The new wave of the anti-corruption campaign is part of Xi's attempt to improve governance and mitigate political risks. Yet without institutional checks and balances, Xi's governance agenda will fail. Without pro-market reforms, investors will face a China that is both more authoritarian and less productive. Feature Hearts rectified, persons were cultivated; persons cultivated, families were regulated; families regulated, states were rightly governed; states rightly governed, the whole world was made tranquil and happy. - Confucius, The Great Learning Comparisons of modern Chinese politics with Confucian notions of political order have become cliché. Nevertheless, there is a distinctly Confucian element to Chinese President Xi Jinping's strategy. Xi's sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which will enter "phase two" in 2018, is essentially an attempt to rectify the hearts and regulate the families of Communist Party officials and civil servants. The same could be said for his use of censorship and strict ideological controls to ensure that the general public remains in line with the regime. Yet Xi is also using positive measures - like pollution curbs, social welfare, and other reforms - to win over hearts and minds. His purpose is ultimately the preservation of the Chinese state - namely, the prevention of a Soviet-style collapse. Only if the regime is stable at home can Xi hope to enhance the state's international security and erode American hegemony in East Asia. This would, from Beijing's vantage, make the whole world more tranquil and happy. Chart 1The New Normal Thus, for investors seeking a better understanding of China in the long run, it is necessary to look at what is happening to its governance as well as to its macroeconomic fundamentals and foreign relations.1 China's greatest vulnerability over the long run is its political system. Because Xi Jinping's willingness to relinquish power is now uncertain, his governance and reform agenda in his second term will have an outsized impact on China's long-run investment outlook. The Danger From Within From 1978-2008, the Communist Party's legitimacy rested on its ability to deliver rising incomes. Since the Great Recession, however, China has entered a "New Normal" of declining potential GDP growth as the society ages and productivity growth converges toward the emerging market average (Chart 1). In this context, Chinese policymakers are deathly afraid of getting caught in the "middle income trap," a loose concept used to explain why some middle-income economies get bogged down in slower growth rates that prevent them from reaching high-income status (Chart 2).2 Such a negative economic outcome would likely prompt a wave of popular discontent, which, in turn, could eventually jeopardize Communist Party rule. The quid pro quo between the Chinese government and its population is that the former delivers rising incomes in exchange for the latter's compliance with authoritarian rule. The party is not blind to the fate of other authoritarian states whose growth trajectory stalled. Chart 2Will China Get Caught In The Middle-Income Trap? The threat of popular unrest in China may seem remote today. The Communist Party is rallying around its leader, Xi Jinping; the economy rebounded from the turmoil of 2015 and its cyclical slowdown in recent months is so far benign; consumer sentiment is extremely buoyant; and the global economic backdrop is bright (Chart 3). Yet these positive political and economic developments are cyclical, whereas the underlying political risks are structural and persistent. China has made massive gains in lifting its population out of poverty, but it is still home to 559 million people, around 40% of the population, living on less than $6 per day, the living standard of Uzbekistan. It will be harder to continue improving these workers' quality of life as trend growth slows and the prospects for export-oriented manufacturing dry up. This is why the Xi administration has recently renewed its attention to poverty alleviation. The government is on target in lifting rural incomes, but behind target in lifting urban incomes, and urban-dwellers are now the majority of the nation (Chart 4). The plight of China's 200-250 million urban migrants, in particular, poses the risk of social discontent. Moreover, while China knows how to alleviate poverty, it has less experiencing coping with the greatest threat to the regime: the rapid growth of the middle class, with its high expectations, demands for meritocracy and social mobility, and potential for unrest if those expectations are spoiled (Chart 5). Chart 3China's Slowdown So Far Benign Chart 4Urban Income Targets At Risk Chart 5The Communist Party's Greatest Challenge Democracy is not necessarily a condition for reaching high-income status, but all of Asia's high-income countries are democracies. A higher level of wealth encourages household autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Today, China has reached the $8,000 GDP per capita range that often accompanies the overthrow of authoritarian regimes.3 The Chinese are above the level of income at which the Taiwanese replaced their military dictatorship in 1987; China's poorest provinces are now above South Korea's level in that same year, when it too cast off the yoke of authoritarianism (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Development Beyond Point At Which##br## Taiwan And Korea Overthrew Dictatorship This is not an argument for democracy in China. We are agnostic about whether China will become democratic in our lifetime. We are making a far more humble point: that political risk will mount as wealth is accumulated by the country's growing middle class. Several emerging markets - including Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil - have witnessed substantial political tumult after their middle class reached half of the population and stalled (Chart 7). China is approaching this point and will eventually face similar challenges. Chart 7Middle Class Growth Troubles Other EMs The comparison reveals that an inflection point exists for a society where the country's political establishment faces difficulties in negotiating the growing demands of a wealthier population. As political scientists have shown empirically, the very norms of society evolve as wealth erodes the pull of Malthusian and traditional cultural variables.4 Political transformation can follow this process, often quite unexpectedly and radically.5 Clearly the Chinese public shows no sign of large-scale, revolutionary sentiment at the moment. And political opposition does not necessarily result in regime change. Nevertheless, it is empirically false that the Chinese people are naturally opposed to democracy or representative government. After all, Sun Yat Sen founded a Republic of China in 1912, well before many western democratic transformations! And more to the point, the best survey evidence shows that the Chinese are culturally most similar to their East Asian neighbors (as well as, surprisingly, the Baltic and eastern European states): this is not a neighborhood that inherently eschews democracy. Remarkably, recent surveys suggest that China's millennial generation, while not wildly enthusiastic about democracy, is nevertheless more enthusiastic than its peers in the western world's liberal democracies (Chart 8)! Chart 8Chinese People Not Less Fond Of Democracy Than Others China is also home to one of the most reliable predictors of political change: inequality. China's economic boom is coincident with the rise of extreme inequalities in income, wealth, region, and social status. True, judging by average household wealth, everyone appears to be a winner; but the average is misleading because it is pulled upward by very high net worth individuals - and China has created 528 billionaires in the past decade alone. Chart 9Inequality: A Severe Problem In China A better measure is the mean-to-median wealth ratio, as it demonstrates the gap that opens up between the average and the typical household. As Chart 9 demonstrates, China is witnessing a sharp increase in inequality relative to its neighbors and peers. More standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, also show very high readings in China. And this trend has combined with social immobility: China has a very high degree of generational earnings elasticity, which is a measure of the responsiveness of one's income to one's parent's income. If elasticity is high, then social outcomes are largely predetermined by family and social mobility is low. On this measure, China is an extreme outlier - comparable to the U.S. and the U.K., which, while very different economies, have suffered recent political shocks as a result of this very predicament (Chart 10). "China does not have voters" unlike the U.S. and U.K., is the instant reply. Yet that statement entails that China has no pressure valve for releasing pent-up frustrations. Any political shock may be more, not less, destabilizing. In the U.S. and the U.K., voters could release their frustrations by electing an anti-establishment president or abrogating a trade relationship with Europe. In China, the only option may be to demand an "exit" from the political system altogether. Chart 10China An Outlier In Inequality And Social Immobility Note that there is already substantial evidence of social unrest in China over the past decade. From 2003 to 2007, China faced a worrisome increase in "mass incidents," at which point the National Bureau of Statistics stopped keeping track. The longer data on "public incidents" suggests that the level of unrest remains elevated, despite improvements under the Xi administration (Chart 11). Broader measures tell a similar story of a country facing severe tensions under the surface. For instance, China's public security spending outstrips its national defense spending (Chart 12). Chart 11Chinese Social Unrest Is Real Chart 12China Spends More On ##br##Domestic Security Than Defense In essence, Chinese political risk is understated. This conclusion may seem counterintuitive, given Xi's remarkable consolidation of power. But is ultimately structural factors, not individual leaders, that will carry the day. The Communist Party is in a good position now, but its leaders are all-too-aware of the volcanic frustrations that could be unleashed should they fail to deliver the "China Dream." This is why so much depends upon Xi's policy agenda in the second half of his term. To that question we will now turn. Bottom Line: The Communist Party is at a cyclical high point of above-trend economic growth and political consolidation under a strongman leader. However, political risk is understated: poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent and the long-term potential growth rate is slowing. If we assume that China is not unique in its historical trajectory, then we can conclude that it is approaching one of the most politically volatile periods in its development. The Governance And Reform Agenda Since coming to office in 2012-13, President Xi has spearheaded an extraordinary anti-corruption campaign and purge of the Communist Party (Chart 13). The campaign has understandably drawn comparisons to Chairman Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Yet these are not entirely fair, as Xi has tried to improve governance as well as eradicate his enemies. As Xi prepares for his "re-election" in March 2018, he has declared that he will expand the anti-corruption campaign further in his second term in office: details are scant, but the gist is that the campaign will branch out from the ruling party to the entire state bureaucracy, on a permanent basis, in the form of a new National Supervision Commission.6 There are three ways in which this agenda could prove positive for China's long-term outlook. First, the regime clearly hopes to convince the public that it is addressing the most burning social grievances. Corruption persistently ranks at the top of the list, insofar as public opinion can be known (Chart 14). Public opinion is hard to measure, but it is clear that consumer sentiment is soaring in the wake of the October party congress (see Chart 3 above). It is also worth noting that the Chinese public's optimism perked up in Xi's first year in office, when the policy agenda on offer was substantially the same and the economy had just experienced a sharp drop in growth rates (Chart 15). Reassuring the public over corruption will improve trust in the regime. Chart 13Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign Chart 14Chinese Public Grievances Second, the anti-corruption campaign feeds into Xi's broader economic reform agenda. Productivity growth is harder to generate as a country's industrialization process matures. With the bulk of the big increases in labor, capital, and land supply now complete in China, the need to improve total factor productivity becomes more pressing (Chart 16). Unlike the early stages of growth, this requires reaching the hard-to-get economic conditions, such as property rights, human capital, financial deepening, entrepreneurship, innovation, education, technology, and social welfare. Chart 15Anti-Corruption Is Popular Chart 16Productivity Requires Institutional Change On this count, the Xi administration's anti-corruption campaign has been a net positive. The most widely accepted corruption indicators suggest that it has made a notable improvement to the country's governance. Yet the country remains far below its competitors in the absolute rankings, notably its most similar neighbor Taiwan (Chart 17 A&B). The institutionalization of the campaign could thus further improve the institutional framework and business environment. Chart 17AAnti-Corruption Campaign Is A Plus ... Chart 17B... But There's A Long Way To Go Third, the anti-corruption campaign can serve as a central government tool in enforcing other economic reforms. Pro-productivity reforms are harder to execute in the context of slowing growth because political resistance increases among established actors fighting to preserve their existing advantages. If the ruling party is to break through these vested interests, it needs a powerful set of tools. Recently, the central government in Beijing has been able to implement policy more effectively on the local level by paving the way through corruption probes that remove personnel and sharpen compliance. Case in point: the use of anti-corruption officials this year gave teeth to environmental inspection teams tasked with trimming overcapacity in the industrial sector (Chart 18). And there are already clear signs that this method will be replicated as financial regulators tackle the shadow banking sector.7 Chart 18Reforms Cut Steel Capacity, ##br##Reduced Need For Scrap These last examples - financial and environmental regulatory tightening - are policy priorities in 2018. The coercive aspect of the corruption probes should ensure that they are more effective than they would otherwise be. And reining in asset bubbles and reducing pollution are clear long-term positives for the regime. Ideally, then, Xi's anti-corruption campaign will deliver three substantial improvements to China's long-term outlook: greater public trust in the government, higher total factor productivity, and reduced systemic risks. The administration hopes that it can mitigate its governance deficit while improving economic sustainability. In this way it can buy both public support and precious time to continue adjusting to the new normal. The danger is that these policies will combine to increase downside risks to growth in the short term.8 Bottom Line: Xi's anti-corruption campaign is being expanded and institutionalized to cover the entire Chinese administrative state. This is a consequential campaign that will take up a large part of Xi's second term. It is the administration's major attempt to mitigate the socio-political challenges that await China as it rises up the income ladder. Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely? The problem, however, is that Xi may merely use the anti-corruption campaign to accrue more power into his hands. As is clear from the above, Xi's governance agenda is far from impartial and professional. The anti-corruption campaign is being used not only to punish corrupt officials but also to achieve various other goals. Xi has even publicly linked the campaign to the downfall of his political rivals.9 In essence, the campaign highlights the core contradiction of the Xi administration: can Xi genuinely improve China's governance by means of the centralization and personalization of power? Over the long haul, the fundamental problem is the absence of checks and balances, i.e. accountability, from Xi's agenda. For instance, the National Supervision Commission will be granted immense powers to investigate and punish malefactors within the state - but who will inspect the inspectors? Xi's other governance reforms suffer the same problem. His attempt to create "rule of law" is lacking the critical ingredients of judicial independence and oversight. The courts are not likely to be able to bring cases against the party, central government, or powerful state-owned firms, and they will not be able to repeal government decisions. Thus, as many commentators have noted, Xi's notion of rule of law is more accurately described as "rule by law": the reformed legal system will in all probability remain an instrument in the hands of the Communist Party. Chart 19China's Governance Still Falls Far Behind Likewise, Xi's attempt to grant the People's Bank of China greater powers of oversight in order to combat systemic financial risk suffers from the fact that the central bank is not independent, and will remain subordinate to the State Council, and hence to the Politburo Standing Committee. This is not even to mention the lamentable fact that Xi's campaign for better governance has so far coincided with extensive repression of civil society, which does not mesh well with the desire to improve human capital and innovation.10 Thus it is of immense importance whether Xi sets up relatively durable anti-corruption, legal, and financial institutions that will maintain their legitimate functions beyond his term and political purposes. Otherwise, his actions will simply illustrate why China's governance indicators lag so far behind its peers in absolute terms. Corruption perceptions may improve further, but there will be virtually no progress in areas like "voice and accountability," "political stability and absence of violence," "rule of law," and "regulatory quality," each of which touches on the Communist Party's weak spots in various ways (Chart 19). Analysis of the Communist Party's shifting leadership characteristics reinforces a pessimistic view of the long run if Xi misses his current opportunity.11 The party's top leadership increasingly consists of career politicians from the poor, heavily populated interior provinces - i.e. the home base of the party. Their educational backgrounds are less scientific, i.e. more susceptible to party ideology. (Indeed, Xi Jinping's top young protégé, Chen Miner, is a propaganda chief.) And their work experience largely consists of ruling China's provinces, where they earned their spurs by crushing rebellions and redistributing funds to placate various interest groups (Chart 20). While one should be careful in drawing conclusions from such general statistics, the contrast with the leadership that oversaw China's boldest reforms in the 1990s is plain. Bottom Line: Xi's reform agenda is contradictory in its attempt to create better governance through centralizing and personalizing power. Unless he creates checks and balances in his reform of China's institutions, he is likely to fall short of long-lasting improvements. The character profiles of China's political elite do not suggest that the party will become more likely to pursue pro-market reforms in Xi's wake. Chart 20China's Leaders Becoming More 'Communist' Over Time Xi Jinping's Choice Xi is the pivotal player because of his rare consolidation of power, and 2018 is the pivotal year. It is pivotal because it will establish the policy trajectory of Xi's second term - which may or may not extend into additional terms after 2022. So far, the world has gained a few key takeaways from Xi's policy blueprint, which he delivered at the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18: Xi has consolidated power: He and his faction reign supreme both within the Communist Party and the broader Chinese state; Xi's policy agenda is broadly continuous: Xi's speech built on his administration's stated aims in the first five years as well as the inherited long-term aims of previous administrations; China is coming out of its shell: In the international realm, Xi sees China "moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind"; The 2022 succession is in doubt: Xi refrained from promoting a successor to the Politburo Standing Committee, the unwritten norm since 1992. Chart 21Market Not Too Worried About##br## Party Congress Outcomes Markets have not reacted overly negatively to these developments (Chart 21), as the latter do not pose an immediate threat to the global rally in risk assets. The reasons are several: Maoism is overrated: While the Communist Party constitution now treats Xi Jinping as the sole peer of the disastrous ruler Mao Zedong, the market does not buy the Maoist rhetoric. Instead, it sees policy continuity, yet with more effective central leadership, which is a plus. Reforms are making gradual progress: Xi is treading carefully, but is still publicly committed to a reform agenda of rebalancing China's economic model toward consumption and services, improving governance and productivity, and maintaining trade openness. Whatever the shortcomings of the first five years, this agenda is at least reformist in intention. China's tactic of "seeking progress while maintaining stability" is certainly more reassuring than "progress at any cost" or "no progress at all"! Trump and Xi are getting along so far: Xi's promises to move China toward center stage threaten to increase geopolitical tensions with the United States in the long run, yet markets are not overly alarmed. China is imposing sanctions on North Korea to help resolve the nuclear missile standoff, negotiating a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea, and promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will marginally add to global development and growth. Trump is hurling threatening words rather than concrete tariffs. 2022 is a long way away: Markets are unconcerned with Xi's decision not to put a clear successor on the Politburo Standing Committee, even though it implies that Xi will not step down at the end of his term in five years. Investors are implicitly approving Xi's strongman behavior while blissfully ignoring the implication that the peaceful transition of power in China could become less secure. Are investors right to be so sanguine? Cyclically, BCA's China Investment Strategy is overweight Chinese investible equities relative to EM and global stocks.12 Geopolitical Strategy also recommends that clients follow this view and overweight China relative to EM. Beyond this 6-12 month period, it depends on how Xi uses his political capital. If Xi is serious about governance and economic reform, then long-term investors should tolerate the other political risks, and the volatility of reforms, and overweight China within their EM portfolio. After all, China's two greatest pro-market reformers, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, were also heavy-handed authoritarians who crushed domestic dissent, clashed with the United States from time to time, and hesitated to relinquish control to their successors. However, if Xi is not serious, then investors with a long time horizon should downgrade China/EM assets - as not only China but the world will have a serious problem on its hands. For Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin always reaffirmed China's pro-market orientation and desire to integrate into the global economic order. If Xi turns his back on this orientation, while imprisoning his rivals for corruption, concentrating power exclusively in his own person, and contesting U.S. leadership in the Asia Pacific, then the long-run outlook for China and the region should darken rather quickly. Domestic institutions will decay and trade and foreign investment will suffer. How and when will investors know the difference? As mentioned, we think 2018 is critical. Xi is flush with political capital and has a positive global economic backdrop. If he does not frontload serious efforts this year then it will become harder to gain traction as time goes by.13 If he demurs, the Chinese political system will not afford another opportunity like this for years to come. The country will approach the 2020s with additional layers of bureaucracy loyal to Xi, but no significant macro adjustments to its governance or productivity. It is not clear how long China's growth rate is sustainable without pro-productivity reforms. It is also not clear that the world will wait five years before responding to a China that, without a new reform push, will appear unabashedly mercantilist, neo-communist, and revisionist. Bottom Line: The long-run investment outlook for China hinges on Xi Jinping's willingness to use his immense personal authority and concentration of power for the purposes of good governance and market-oriented economic reform. Without concrete progress, investors will have to decide whether they want to invest in a China that is becoming less economically vibrant as well as more authoritarian. We think this would be a bad bet. Matt Gertken Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Geopolitical Strategy 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms", dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Chinese policymakers are expressly concerned about the middle-income trap. Please see the World Bank and China's Development Research Center of the State Council, "China 2030: Building A Modern, Harmonious, And Creative Society," 2013, available at www.worldbank.org. Liu He, who is perhaps Xi Jinping's top economic adviser, had a hand in drafting this report and is now a member of the Politburo and shortlisted to take charge of the newly established Financial Stability and Development Commission at the People's Bank of China. 3 Please see Indermit S. Gill and Homi Kharas, "The Middle-Income Trap Turns Ten," World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 7403 (August, 2015), available at www.worldbank.org 4 Please see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 5 For example, the collaps of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, as well as the downfall of communist regimes writ large, were completely unanticipated. 6 Specifically, Xi is creating a National Supervision Commission that will group a range of existing anti-graft watchdogs under its roof at the local, provincial, and central levels of administration, while coordinating with the Communist Party's top anti-graft watchdog. More details are likely to be revealed at the March legislative session, but what matters is that the initiative is a significant attempt to institutionalize the anti-corruption campaign. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 China has recently drafted top anti-graft officials, such as Zhou Liang, from the powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Commission and placed them in the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which is in charge of overseeing banks. Authorities have already imposed fines in nearly 3,000 cases in 2017 affecting various kinds of banks, including state-owned banks. On the broader use of anti-corruption teams for economic policy, please see Barry Naughton, "The General Secretary's Extended Reach: Xi Jinping Combines Economics And Politics," China Leadership Monitor 54 (Fall 2017), available at www.hoover.org. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Gao Shan et al, "China's President Xi Jinping Hits Out at 'Political Conspiracies' in Keynote Speech," Radio Free Asia, January 3, 2017, available at www.rfa.org 10 Xi has cranked up the state's propaganda organs, censorship of the media, public surveillance, and broader ideological and security controls (including an aggressive push for "cyber-sovereignty") to warn the public that there is no alternative to Communist Party rule. This tendency has raised alarms among civil rights defenders, lawyers, NGOs, and the western world to the effect that China's governance is actually regressing despite nominal improvement in standard indicators. This is the opposite of Confucius's bottom-up notion of order. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress", dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Investors should note that, since the publication of this report, BCA's China Investment Strategy service has closed its long MSCI China / short MSCI EM trade. We are now primarily expressing our cyclically positive stance towards Chinese stocks by being long MSCI China ex-technology versus MSCI All Country World (ACW) ex-tech. For more information please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "After The Selloff: A View From China", dated February 15, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 13 Xi faces politically sensitive deadlines in the 2020-22 period: the economic targets in the thirteenth Five Year Plan; the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021; and Xi's possible retirement at the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. At that point he will need to focus on demonstrating the Communist Party's all-around excellence and make careful preparations either to step down or cling to power. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Economy: Some of the economic data that feed into GDP have weakened during the past two months, but the fundamental drivers of economic growth remain strong. We continue to expect GDP growth close to 3% in 2018. Markets & Inflation: Bond yields fell during the past few weeks, but so far there is no suggestion that the bond bear market has been derailed. Expect yields to rise in the coming weeks, driven by higher inflation. State & Local Governments: State & local governments still have work to do to repair their fiscal situations. While this process will lead to continued improvement in municipal bond credit quality, it also means that state & local government spending will not provide a significant boost to economic growth. Money Markets: LIBOR/OIS spread widening does not reflect a re-assessment of credit risk in the financial system, but it does present an opportunity for U.S. investors to increase their returns by investing in foreign bonds. Feature Chart 1Growth Scare 2018? A consensus appears to have formed around the outlook for U.S. economic growth. The expectation is that growth, which was already on a solid footing in late-2017, will kick into an even higher gear this year on the back of more stimulative fiscal policy. In fact, Bloomberg consensus forecasts already called for 2018 U.S. GDP growth of 2.3% last October and have ramped up to 2.78% since then. We think it's safe to say that both investors and the Fed have bought into this view, and this makes it concerning that some data have challenged the prevailing narrative in recent weeks. Specifically, a series of disappointing data releases have caused the Atlanta Fed's GDP tracking estimate for first quarter growth to fall to 1.8% (Chart 1). A month ago this same model was calling for growth of 5.4%! Growth Scare 2018? First, we should note that while the Atlanta Fed's GDP tracking estimate for Q1 has declined, as of last Friday, the New York Fed's similar estimate remains at 2.73% (Chart 1). Further, our simple estimate for U.S. GDP growth derived from labor market data shows that growth is tracking close to 3% so far this year.1 Both our simple measure and the New York Fed's model suggest that U.S. growth is running significantly above its 2.2% average since 2010, while the Atlanta Fed's 1.8% estimate suggests it has fallen below its average post-crisis pace. The weakness in the Atlanta Fed model appears to be driven by some hard data - retail sales, durable goods orders and building permits - that have weakened during the past couple months. In general, we note that these measures are still growing more quickly than they were last year, and that the fundamental factors underpinning each component of growth remain strong. We consider each component of growth in turn. Consumer Spending The biggest reason to be pessimistic about consumer spending growth in the first quarter is that core retail sales have been weak for three months in a row.2 Core retail sales contracted in December and January, and increased by only 0.1% in February. However, taking a step back we see that retail sales accelerated sharply between September and November 2017. Even after the recent weakness, the year-over-year growth rate in core retail sales is still above levels observed throughout most of 2016 and 2017 (Chart 2). But more importantly, the fundamentals underpinning consumer spending remain strong and have not corrected at all during the past three months. Disposable income growth is trending higher and recently received a boost from tax cuts. Employment growth has also been strong - averaging +190k during the past 12 months - despite an already tight labor market. These factors have led to a rising trend in our real consumer spending model (Chart 2, panel 2). Finally, while the savings rate is already low and unlikely to fall further, it is also unlikely to rise significantly while consumer sentiment is elevated. The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index hit 102 in March, its highest reading since 2004 (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2Consumer Spending Chart 3Nonresidential Investment Non-Residential Investment Much like with retail sales, new orders for core durable goods have also contracted in each of the past two months, but the year-over-year growth rate is still high compared to the past few years. Meanwhile, our composite indicator of new orders surveys suggests that the recent decline will quickly reverse (Chart 3). Inventories have also been a drag on GDP growth in recent quarters but, according to our model, should increase going forward (Chart 3, bottom panel). Residential Investment The Atlanta Fed model expects residential investment to contribute negatively to GDP growth in the first quarter. This is largely due to the fact that single family building permits declined in January and February. But once again, so far there is no indication that this downtrend will persist. First, housing inventories continue to contract (Chart 4). Inventories typically increase prior to meaningful downturns in residential investment. Second, while higher mortgage rates have certainly dented housing affordability, homes are still much more affordable than prior to the financial crisis, and so far higher rates have not caused mortgage applications to roll over (Chart 4, panel 2). Household formation, the driver of demand for residential investment, is still in a multi-year uptrend and will continue to rise as long as income growth remains strong (Chart 4, panel 3). Fundamentally, it is difficult to see how residential investment can fall meaningfully when household formation is rising and home inventories are already low. Homebuilders appear to agree with this sentiment and are reporting levels of confidence near all-time highs (Chart 4, bottom panel). Chart 4Residential Investment Chart 5Net Exports Net Exports The Atlanta Fed's model projects that net exports will subtract 0.55% from GDP growth in Q1. This is driven mainly by February's sharp deterioration in the trade balance (Chart 5). While net exports are not the most important driver of U.S. growth, this is one area where that could see more downside in the long-run, depending on how much of the government's anti-trade rhetoric turns into law. In the short-run, dollar depreciation should provide at least some positive offset (Chart 5, bottom panel). Financial Conditions Financial conditions are another important driver of economic growth. A few months ago both the BCA Boom/Bust Indicator and the Financial Conditions component of our Fed Monitor were calling for a sharp acceleration in U.S. GDP. This is no longer the case, and the indicators are now consistent with stable or slightly higher GDP growth (Chart 6). However, we should also note that the Financial Conditions component of our Fed Monitor has not actually tightened. It has merely leveled-off at extremely easy levels (Chart 6, bottom panel). Since it is the change in financial conditions that impacts GDP, the leveling-off is consistent with relatively stable GDP growth. Chart 6Financial Conditions Government Spending In a prior report we noted that the combination of tax cuts and the recent spending bill will add 0.8% to GDP this year and 1.3% in 2019. This is a sharp swing from the -0.5% fiscal impulse that was expected prior to the legislative changes.3 Federal government spending will certainly contribute positively to GDP growth this year. But we expect much less of a growth boost (if any at all) from state & local governments. This is discussed further in the section titled "State & Local Governments Still Cautious" below. Bottom Line: Some of the economic data that feed into GDP have weakened during the past two months, but the fundamental drivers of economic growth remain strong. We continue to expect GDP growth close to 3% in 2018. Bond Market Still Taking Cues From Inflation While the outlook for economic growth is always important, recently bond markets have been more driven by inflation, a topic where there is much less consensus in the investment community. Most recently, the 10-year Treasury has fallen 5 basis points since March 9th, with 4 bps of that decline concentrated in the inflation component. The 10-year real yield has fallen by only a single basis point. As we explained in a recent report, the first stage of the cyclical bond bear market is being driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations.4 The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 2.08% and we think it will eventually settle into a range between 2.3% and 2.5%. The decline in the TIPS breakeven rate of the past few weeks is partly explained by a drop in oil prices, but we note that broader commodity indexes have not rolled over (Chart 7). This suggests that weakness in the oil price is not evidence of a broader demand shock and should prove transitory. But even more importantly, the actual inflation data are starting to rebound. Last week's CPI release showed that the 12-month rate of change in core CPI ticked up slightly to 1.85%, but also that the annualized 3-month rate of change jumped sharply above 3% (Chart 8). Further, shelter - the largest component of core inflation - had been trending lower during the past couple years, but leading indicators now suggest a reversal. The rental vacancy rate fell in the fourth quarter of last year for the first time since Q2 2016 (Chart 8, panel 3), and the rate of appreciation in home prices has accelerated (Chart 8, bottom panel). The biggest near-term risk to the bond bear market is that investor over-optimism with regards to the growth outlook leads to a period of negative data surprises. We have previously noted a strong correlation between whether the economic surprise index is above or below zero and whether bond yields rose or fell during the preceding month.5 We also created a model to get a sense of the surprise index's average pace of mean reversion (Chart 9). At the moment, our model forecasts that the surprise index will be close to +20 one month from now. So for now there is no imminent signal that the bond bear market will be derailed, but we will closely monitor data surprises to see if that message changes. Chart 7Breakevens Still Trending Higher Chart 8Inflation Coming Back Chart 9Data Surprises Are Mean Reverting Bottom Line: Bond yields fell during the past few weeks, but so far there is no suggestion that the bond bear market has been derailed. Expect yields to rise in the coming weeks, driven by higher inflation. State & Local Governments Still Cautious As was stated earlier, state & local governments are unlikely to follow the example of the federal government when it comes to spending. In fact, state governments have once again started to raise taxes and reduce budgets. Data for the 2018 fiscal year are shown in Chart 10, and the message is that states have enacted significant revenue increases compared to prior years, and more states are once again raising taxes than are cutting taxes. Further, the National Association of State Budget Officers has noted that of the states that have already announced their 2019 budgets, most have called for another year of slow spending growth and a few states are actually penciling-in declines in general fund spending.6 This should not be too surprising, even nine years into the economic recovery state & local governments are still barely bringing in enough revenue to cover their interest expenses (Chart 11), though they have made considerable progress re-building rainy day fund balances (Chart 12). As for the implications for municipal bond investors, as long as governments maintain focus on improving their fiscal situations than the outlook for credit quality will continue to improve. Our Municipal Health Monitor is still deep in "improving health" territory, a signal that is consistent with ratings upgrades outpacing downgrades for the time being (Chart 13). Chart 10State & Local Government Spending Chart 11Not Much Revenue Buffer Chart 12Rainy Day Funds Rebuilt Chart 13Muni Credit Quality Is Strong Bottom Line: State & local governments still have work to do to repair their fiscal situations. While this process will lead to continued improvement in municipal bond credit quality, it also means that state & local government spending will not provide a significant boost to economic growth. Wider LIBOR/OIS Spread An Opportunity For U.S. Investors Chart 14LIBOR / OIS Spread Widening Explained One trend that has caught investors' attention in recent weeks is the impressive widening in the spread between LIBOR (the cost of unsecured U.S. dollar financing for banks) and the overnight index swap (OIS) rate (the purest measure of the market's fed funds rate expectations). Traditionally, we think of the LIBOR/OIS spread as a measure of credit risk in the financial system. This is because LIBOR is an unsecured agreement between two banks, therefore in theory, it embeds some risk that the counterparty bank will default. But it's important to note that the LIBOR/OIS spread can also rise for idiosyncratic reasons related to the supply and demand for U.S. dollars. For example, when U.S. dollars are scarce, investors are willing to pay more to acquire them and this pressures the USD LIBOR rate higher relative to the OIS rate. In a completely efficient market, competition would then entice counterparties to offer lower LIBOR rates until they eventually only reflect the perceived credit risk of the banking system. However, there is a strong case to be made that strict post-crisis regulations, by making it costly for banks to hold low-margin assets on their balance sheets, have made the market less efficient at arbitraging movements in the LIBOR/OIS spread. This appears to be what is going on at the moment. In recent weeks a confluence of idiosyncratic events have led to both a lower supply and higher demand for U.S. dollars. First, the U.S. government raised the debt ceiling until 2019. The Treasury department is therefore using this breathing room to re-build its cash balance. It accomplishes this by issuing T-bills. As more T-bills are issued U.S. dollars are drained from the market, putting upward pressure on LIBOR. Notice that the spread between the 3-month T-bill rate and the 3-month OIS rate is widening in concert with the LIBOR/OIS spread (Chart 14). Second, companies' new ability to repatriate cash that had been held overseas has a similar impact on LIBOR. That overseas cash had been a source of demand in money markets, but it is now being re-deployed in the form of increased dividends or share buybacks (Chart 14, bottom panel). This is akin to draining U.S. dollars out of the market. Third, the Fed continues to shrink its balance sheet. As this process plays out the Treasury will have to ramp up its issuance, some of which will come in the form of T-bills that will drain even more U.S. dollars out of the market. Going forward, the Treasury department will eventually re-build its cash balance to a level it deems acceptable. This will cause T-bill issuance to taper off, though it will still remain quite strong due to rising deficits and the run-off of the Fed's balance sheet. Similarly, the one-time effect of corporate repatriation will ease over time, though companies may also be less enticed to hold overseas cash balances in the future. All in all, we would expect the widening in LIBOR/OIS to ease in the coming months, but it may take a very long time before it returns to its prior lows, if it gets there at all. A large enough easing of bank capital requirements would likely cause the LIBOR/OIS spread to return to its recent lows, but this does not appear to be an imminent risk. Then, to complicate matters even further, we also have to reckon with the fact that LIBOR is being phased out during the next few years. In fact, the Fed will start publishing its Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) next month. The SOFR rate will eventually replace LIBOR as the U.S. dollar benchmark for financial contracts, and over time more and more instruments will be tied to SOFR and fewer will be tied to LIBOR. We also would not rule out the possibility that SOFR replaces the fed funds rate as the Fed's target policy rate at some point down the road. The Implication For U.S. Investors Chart 15An Opportunity For U.S. Investors A wider LIBOR/OIS spread has one very important implication for U.S. investors. U.S. investors can take advantage of the scarcity of U.S. dollars in the financial system by swapping their dollars for foreign currencies over short time horizons. In other words, a U.S. fixed income investor can invest in a 10-year foreign government bond, and then increase the received yield by hedging the currency risk. For example, a U.S. investor can receive a yield of 3.3% on a 10-year German bund if they hedge the currency risk on a 3-month horizon. This is a greater yield than they would earn on a 10-year U.S. Treasury note. Without the wider LIBOR/OIS spread the hedged yield would not be nearly as high. If we assume the LIBOR/OIS spread is zero, then the hedged yield on a 10-year German bund falls to 2.80%. Chart 15 shows that as the return from currency hedging increases, U.S. investors earn more from hedged positions in foreign bonds than in domestic bonds. A wider LIBOR/OIS spread gives U.S. investors an extra incentive to put on these global trades. Bottom Line: LIBOR/OIS spread widening does not reflect a re-assessment of credit risk in the financial system, but it does present an opportunity for U.S. investors to increase their returns by investing in foreign bonds. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 For further details on this estimate please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Brainard Gives The Green Light", dated March 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Core retail sales exclude building materials, auto dealers and gas stations. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "How Much Higher For Yields?", dated October 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 http://budgetblog.nasbo.org/budgetblogs/blogs/brian-sigritz/2018/01/12/governors-begin-releasing-fiscal-2019-budget-propo?CLK=7543618f-810a-4ac4-90e2-01a4b310c649 Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Consumer spending is well supported despite weak readings on household purchases in early 2018. The recent rollover in M&A activity does not signal a top in equity markets nor warns that a recession looms. Although the labor market is tight in many areas, labor costs are not poised to blast off, but neither will they roll over. Feature Investors began to worry last week about a slowing U.S. economy sending prices of risk assets and Treasury yields lower. The threat of a wider trade spat with China was also a concern, along with the latest round of political intrigue at the White House. Oil fell more than 1% on supply concerns. While the U.S. economic surprise index moved lower since the start of the year, BCA's view is that the U.S. economy is poised to grow well above potential in the first half of the year. Consumer spending is well supported despite weak readings on household purchases in early 2018. The FOMC will provide a new set of economic forecasts and dot plots at this week's meeting. BCA expects the Fed to raise rates this week and three additional times this year. Although the labor market is tight in many areas, labor costs are not poised to blast off, but neither will they roll over. According to our U.S. Equity Strategy service's "buy the dip" cycle-on-cycle analysis, a retest of the recent equity lows typically occurs in the first month following the initial shock, suggesting that the S&P 500 is already out of the woods.1 The return of vol may keep a lid on the SPX for a while longer, but our strategy since February 8 is to buy the dips as we do not foresee an end to the business cycle in 2018. Moreover, the recent weakness in M&A activity is not a sign that the bull market is finished. Despite the dip below 2.90% last week, BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy services pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96%.2 Assuming a 3% terminal fed funds rate, our U.S. Bond Strategy team expects the 10-year Treasury yield to peak somewhere between 3.08% and 3.59%.3 Too Cold? Chart 1Weak February Retail Sales At Odds##BR##With Strong Consumers Fundamentals The Tax Cut and Jobs Act put extra cash into consumers' pockets and helped to lift consumer confidence to a cycle high. Household net worth is at a record level, the labor market is strong and wage growth is accelerating, albeit modestly at this point in the cycle. Despite the favorable backdrop, consumers are on the sidelines in early 2018 (Chart 1). Moreover, early March's unusually harsh winter weather in the Northeastern U.S. may prolong consumers' malaise for another month. The retail sales control group, which feeds into GDP calculations, rose a scant 0.1% m/m in February. The reading was well below the consensus of a 0.5% m/m gain. Headline retail sales dipped by 0.1%, well short of expectations (+0.4%). Auto sales (-0.9%) declined for the fourth month in a row in February. It is clear that the surge in auto sales in the wake of last fall's hurricanes pulled up demand. The weakness in February's spending was broadly based, with 7 of 13 major retail sales categories showing month-over-month declines. However, the recent weakness in consumer outlay masks the robust activity in the past 12 months. Overall retail sales are up a solid 4.1% from a year ago, while sales in the retail control group rose by 4.3%. In addition, sales are higher in 12 of the 13 main categories in the past year, led by non-store retailers (+10.1%), miscellaneous store retailers (+7.5%), clothing (+4.9%) and building materials (+4.6%). As a result of the tepid consumer spending readings in early 2018, the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model has projected Q1 real GDP growth of just 1.8%, adjusted downward from 2.5% on March 9 (Chart 2). At the start of this month, the Atlanta Fed pegged Q1 GDP at 3.5%. Accordingly, some investors are concerned that household spending is nearing a peak and a recession may be imminent. We see it differently. BCA's stance is that consumer spending should continue to grow by at least 2% in 2018. U.S. consumer health has improved markedly in the past year, driving BCA's Consumer Health Indicator into positive territory (Chart 3). Higher equity prices, a stout labor market and an acceleration in real incomes are behind the improvement. Consumer spending growth tends to accelerate when the Health Indicator is rising. The improvement supports BCA's view of a stronger U.S. economy alongside a global synchronized recovery, at least in the next 12 months. Chart 2Q1 GDP Estimates Have Moved Sharply Lower Chart 3The Consumer Is In Good Shape Household net worth in 2017Q4 was at a record high, the result of stable house prices and frothy equity markets, according to the latest Flow of Funds data for 2017Q4 (Chart 4). Moreover, the composition of households' balance sheet is less alarming today than at prior peaks, because equities and real estate relative to household income or total assets are more reasonable. Furthermore, debt levels are tamer today than in 2006. Households may be less vulnerable to unexpected shocks (Chart 4 again) in light of their more resilient balance sheets. BCA's view is that financial vulnerabilities from the household sector are well contained. Household borrowing is increasing modestly at an annual pace of 4%, in sharp contrast with a 12% rate in the middle of the first decade of the 2000s. A broad measure of household solvency, such as the household debt-to-income ratio, is within the range of the past few years and back to pre-recessionary readings. Furthermore, liquidity buffers (liquid assets-to-liabilities) are almost as high as the levels that preceded the equity market boom/bust in 1999-2000 (Chart 5). Chart 4Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Chart 5Household Sector Buffers Are Solid Nevertheless, risks may dampen the pace of consumer spending. Debt-to-income ratios have bottomed for the cycle (Chart 5 again) and banks are tightening their lending standards. The result is that consumer delinquency rates are on the upswing, notably in credit cards and autos (Chart 6). Moreover, the personal savings rate cannot sustainably remain around its recovery low of 3.2% (Chart 7, last panel). Chart 6Consumer Loan Metrics Chart 7Key Supports For Consumer##BR##Spending Remain In Place At 2.8%, annual wage compensation growth remains sluggish and far from the 3-4% rate per year that the Fed stated would be consistent with an economy closer to 2% inflation (Chart 7, panel 4). Moreover, households are still unlikely to binge on more debt to smooth out their expenditures as they did in the middle years of the first decade of the 2000s. A further acceleration in consumer spending would occur only alongside steady improvement in the labor market and improving household confidence on future employment and income gains. Bottom Line: Consumers' good mood and healthy balance sheets have not translated into firmer spending growth so far in 2018. Nonetheless, even with below-average consumer spending, the U.S. economy is expanding above the Fed's estimate of potential GDP, the labor market is tightening and inflation is grinding higher. The Fed remains on track to hike rates four times this year. The outlook for the U.S. consumer remains bright because of solid fundamental tailwinds such as strong employment growth, stable disposable incomes, frothy household net worth and buoyant confidence. Consumer headwinds to monitor are households' historically low saving rates, still tepid wage inflation and escalating delinquency rates. Too Hot? U.S. merger and acquisition (M&A) volume peaked along with U.S. equity prices in the late 1990s and in 2007. Some investors are concerned that the recent rollover in deal volume is a signal that a recession or an equity market top is nigh. Deal volume in dollars and relative to market cap peaked in 1999, again in 2007, and more recently in mid-2015, before a 13% pullback in the S&P 500 in late 2015 and early 2016. Since then, merger activity has moved lower. The decline in corporate combinations accompanied a sizeable rally in equity markets and robust U.S. and global economies. Although not shown on the chart, deal volume surpassed its late 1980s' pinnacle in 1995, five years before equity markets reached record highs in 2000. The recent peak in corporate takeovers (July 2017) relative to GDP matched those prior highs, but remained below the 1999, 2007 and 2015 tops as a percentage of market cap. Furthermore, last summer's zenith in global or cross-border M&A, a better indicator of market zest than U.S.-only activity, did not eclipse the peaks in 2007. Even at last summer's high, measured against both global GDP and market cap, worldwide corporate combinations remained below their 2015 top and well below their 2007 peak. At just 6.5% in early 2017, the GDP-based metric was significantly under the 2007Q3 pinnacle of 10%. That said, it is difficult to analyze this in context as the time series does not reach back to the late 1990s, which were boom years for M&A. Moreover, Phase I of the Fed funds rate cycle4 (the Fed is tightening, but policy is still accommodative) supports accelerating M&A activity (Chart 8A). Corporate combinations also climb during Phase II (Fed tightening, but policy is restrictive). However, M&A activity peaked at the end of Phase II in 2000 and 2007 (Chart 8B). BCA's view is that we will remain in Phase I until at least the end of 2018 and that Phase II may not be over until the end of 2019 or later. Chart 8AM&A Activity In Phase I Of The Fed Cycle... Chart 8BM&A Activity In Phase II Of The Fed Cycle... Bottom Line: The recent rollover in M&A activity does not signal a top in equity markets nor warn that a recession looms. Overall net equity withdrawal (which includes the net impact of IPOs, share buybacks and M&A) is not out of line with previous economic expansions (Chart 9). Stay overweight stocks versus bonds as the U.S. economic expansions becomes a decade-long phenomenon. Chart 9Comparison Of Corporate Outlays Across Four Economic Expansion Phases Just Right Wage inflation remains in a gradual upward trend, accelerating just enough to nudge up price inflation and prompt the Fed to hike rates four times this year. Although the labor market is tight in many areas, labor costs are not poised to blast off, but neither will they roll over. However, the January reading (+2.8 yoy) on average hourly earnings (AHE) stoked fears of the former, while the February reading (+2.6%) raised concerns of the latter. Chart 10 confirms that most measures of labor market slack have returned to normal. Moreover, the latest soundings on the job market from the National Federation of Independent Business suggest that small business owners have the most job openings in at least 18 years (Chart 11, panel 1). In addition, key concerns have shifted to the quality of the job applicants (panel 2) and the cost of labor (panel 3), away from taxes and over-regulation. Chart 10Labor Market Slack##BR##Is Disappearing Chart 11Hiring And Labor Costs A##BR##Key Concern For Small Businesses Those concerns were underscored in the Federal Reserve's January and February Beige books. Table 1 shows industries with labor shortages; in the year ended February, the gain in average hourly earnings in all but 3 of the industries was faster than average. Moreover, in all but 1 of these categories, labor market conditions are now the tightest since before the onset of the 2007-2009 recession. A recent Fed study5 examines the labor shortages in the manufacturing sector in more detail. The Beige Books noted that many businesses are having trouble finding low-skilled (and to a lesser extent, middle-skilled) workers, with a few mentions of the challenges of finding/retaining highly skilled employees, especially in STEM job functions. Chart 12 shows the wage gains for supervisory staff, a proxy for skilled (panel 1) and non-supervisory employees, and an imperfect proxy for low-skilled workers (panel 2). Both metrics are rising, but the skilled worker proxy accelerated more than the low-skilled metric. Moreover, at 3.1%, the latest reading on supervisory employees is nearly double the pace of non-supervisory personnel. The Atlanta Fed's Wage Tracker provides another lens on wage gains by skill level. Chart 13 shows that wage inflation among skilled positions is running well above average. Raises among mid- and low-skilled labor lag far behind. Notably, wages in all three have rolled over since late 2016. Table 1Labor "Shortages" Identified##BR##In The Beige Book Chart 12Supervisory Vs. Production##BR##Wage Inflation Chart 13Wage Inflation##BR##By Skill-Level Chart 14 argues that slightly faster compensation growth is imminent. The top panel shows that more than 80% of U.S. states register unemployment below the Fed's estimate of full employment. In the past, rates over 60% have been associated with wage pressures. The percentage climbed above 60% in January. The bottom panel of Chart 14 demonstrates the relationship between state unemployment rates and wage gains in each state. Chart 1480%+ Of States Have Unemployment Rates Below NAIRU Bottom Line: The labor market is back to normal, but is not overly tight, as shown in Chart 10. Wages and employment costs are in an uptrend, yet firms are still reluctant to give large pay increases to their labor force. That said, against the backdrop of fiscal stimulus, real GDP growth will remain well above potential, which means that the unemployment rate is headed to 3½% or even below. At some point, the labor market will overheat. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Reflective Or Restrictive", published March 12, 2018. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "From Headwinds To Tailwinds", published March 6, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", published February 20, 2018. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Lingering In The Policy Sweet Spot," September 26, 2016 and "Stocks And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," December 23, 2013. Both available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/evaluating-labor-shortages-in-manufacturing-20180309.htm
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Synchronized global growth, a soft U.S. dollar, our resurgent Boom/Bust Indicator and avoidance of a Chinese economic hard landing, are all signaling that it still pays to overweight cyclicals at the expense of defensives. Economically hyper-sensitive transports also benefit from synchronous global growth and capex. We expect a rerating phase in the coming months. Within transports, we reiterate our overweight stance in the key railroads sub-index as enticing macro tailwinds along with firming operating metrics underscore that profits will exit deflation in calendar 2018. Recent Changes There are no portfolio changes this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 continued to consolidate last week, still digesting the early February tremor. Policy uncertainty is slowly returning and sustained Administration reshufflings are becoming slightly unnerving (bottom panel, Chart 1). Nevertheless, the dual themes of synchronized global growth and budding evidence of coordinated tightening in global monetary policy, i.e. rising interest rate backdrop, continue to dominate and remain intact. Importantly in the U.S., the latest non-farm payrolls (NFP) report was a goldilocks one. Month-over-month NFPs surpassed the 300K hurdle for the first time since late-2014, on an as-reported-basis, while wage inflation settled back down. The middle panel of Chart 2 shows that both in the 1980s and 1990s expansions, NFPs were growing briskly, easily clearing the 300K mark. The 2000s was the "jobless recovery" expansion and likely the exception to the rule. In all three business cycle expansions wage growth touched the 4%/annum rate before the recession hit. The yield curve slope also supports this empirical evidence, forecasting that wage inflation will likely attain 4%/annum before this cycle ends (wages shown inverted, Chart 3). Chart 1Watch Policy Uncertainty Chart 2Goldilocks NFP Report... Chart 3...But Wage Growth Pickup Looms One key element in the current cycle is that the government is easing fiscal policy to the point where both NFPs and wages will likely surge in the coming months as the fiscal thrust gains steam, likely extending the business cycle. This is an inherently inflationary environment, especially when the economy is at full employment and the Fed in slow and steady tightening mode. Last autumn, we showed that the SPX performs well in times of easy fiscal and tight money iterations, rising on average 16.7% with these episodes, lasting on average 16 months (Table 2).1 The latest flagship BCA monthly publication forecasts that the current fiscal impulse will last at least until year-end 2019, contributing positively to real GDP growth. Thus, if history at least rhymes, SPX returns will be positive and likely significant for the next couple of years (Chart 4). With regard to the composition of the equity market's return, we reiterate our view - backed by empirical evidence - that EPS will do the heavy lifting whereas the forward P/E multiple will continue to drift sideways to lower.2 Not only will rising fiscal deficits cause the Fed to remain vigilant and continue to raise interest rates and weigh on the equity market multiple (Chart 5), but also heightened volatility will likely suppress the forward P/E multiple. Table 2SPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Chart 4Stimulative Fiscal Policy##br## Extends The Business Cycle... Chart 5...But Weighs On ##br##The Multiple This week we revisit our cyclical versus defensive portfolio bent and update the key transportation overweight view. Cyclicals Thrive When Global Growth Is Alive And Well... While retaliatory tariff wars are dominating the media headlines, global growth is still resilient. Our view remains that the odds of a generalized trade war engulfing the globe are low, and in that light we reiterate our cyclical over defensive portfolio positioning, in place since early October.3 Global growth is firing on all cylinders. Our Global Trade Indicator is probing levels last hit in 2008, underscoring that cyclicals will continue to have the upper hand versus defensives (Chart 6). Synonymous with global growth is the softness in the U.S. dollar. In fact, the two are in a self-feeding loop where synchronized global growth pushes the greenback lower, which in turn fuels further global output growth. Tack on the rising likelihood that the trade-weighted dollar has crested from a structural perspective, according to the 16-year peak-to-peak cycle4 (Chart 7) and the news is great for cyclicals versus defensives (Chart 8). Chart 6Global Trade Is Alright Chart 7Dollar The Great Reflator... Chart 8...Is A Boon For Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Related to the greenback's likely secular peak is the booming commodity complex, as the two are nearly perfectly inversely correlated. Commodity exposure is running very high in the deep cyclical sectors and thus any sustained commodity price inflation gains will continue to underpin the cyclicals/defensives share price ratio. BCA's Boom/Bust Indicator (BBI) corroborates this upbeat message for cyclicals versus defensives. The BBI is on the verge of hitting an all-time high and, while this could serve as a contrary signal, there are high odds of a breakout in the coming months if synchronized global growth stays intact as BCA expects, rekindling cyclicals/defensives share prices (Chart 9). Finally, if China avoids a hard landing, and barring an EM accident, the cyclicals/defensives ratio will remain upbeat. Chart 10 shows that China's LEI is recovering smartly from the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession trough, and the roaring Chinese stock market - the ultimate leading indicator - confirms that the path of least resistance for the U.S. cyclicals/defensive share price ratio is higher still. Chart 9Boom/Bust indicator Is Flashing Green Chart 10China Is Also Stealthily Firming Bottom Line: Stick with a cyclical over defensive portfolio bent. ...As Do Transports, Thus... Transportation stocks have taken a breather recently on the back of escalating global trade war fears. But, we are looking through this soft-patch and reiterate our barbell portfolio approach: overweight the global growth-levered railroads and air freight & logistics stocks at the expense of airlines that are bogged down by rising capacity and deflating airfare prices (Chart 11). Leading indicators of transportation activity are all flashing green. Transportation relative share prices and manufacturing export expectations are joined at the hip, and the current message is to expect a reacceleration in the former (top panel, Chart 12). Similarly, capital expenditures, one of the key themes we are exploring this year, are as good as they can be according to the regional Fed surveys, and signal that transportation profits will rev up in the coming months (middle panel, Chart 12). The possibility of an infrastructure bill becoming law later this year or in 2019 would also represent a tailwind for transportation EPS. Not only is U.S. trade activity humming, but also global trade remains on a solid footing. The global manufacturing PMI is resilient and sustaining recent gains, suggesting that global export volumes will resume their ascent. This global manufacturing euphoria is welcome news for extremely economically sensitive transportation profits (Chart 13). All of this heralds an enticing transportation services end-demand outlook. In fact, industry pricing power is gaining steam of late and confirms that relative EPS will continue to expand (Chart 12). Under such a backdrop, a rerating phase looms in still depressed relative valuations (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 11Stick With Transports Exposure Chart 12Domestic... Chart 13...And Global Growth/Capex Beneficiary ...Stay On Board The Rails Railroad stocks have worked off the overbought conditions prevalent all of last year, and momentum is now back at zero. In addition, forward EPS have spiked, eliminating the valuation premium and now the rails are trading on par with the SPX on a forward P/E basis (Chart 14). The track is now clear and more gains are in store for relative share prices in the coming quarters. Despite trade war jitters, we are looking through the recent turbulence. If the synchronized global growth phase endures, as we expect, then rail profits will remain on track. In fact, BCA's measure of global industrial production (hard economic data) is confirming the euphoric message from the global manufacturing PMI (soft economic data) and suggests that rails profits will overwhelm (Chart 15). Our S&P rails profit model also corroborates this positive global trade message and forecasts that rail profit deflation will end in 2018 (bottom panel, Chart 15). Beyond these macro tailwinds, operating industry metrics also point to a profit resurgence this year. Importantly, our rails profit margin proxy (pricing power versus employment additions) has recently reaccelerated both because selling prices are expanding at a healthy clip and due to labor restraint (second panel, Chart 15). Demand for rail hauling remains upbeat and our rail diffusion indicator has surged to a level last seen in 2009, signaling that there is a broad based firming in rail carload shipments (second panel, Chart 16). Chart 14Unwound Both Overbought Conditions And Overvaluation Chart 15EPS On Track To Outperform Chart 16Intermodal Resilience The significant intermodal segment that comprises roughly half of all shipments is on the cusp of a breakout. The retail sales-to-inventories ratio is probing multi-year highs on the back of the increase in the consumer confidence impulse and both are harbingers of a reacceleration in intermodal shipments (Chart 16). Coal is another significant category that takes up just under a fifth of rail carload volumes and bears close attention. While natural gas prices have fallen near the lower part of the trading range in place since mid-2016 and momentum is back at neutral, any spike in nat gas prices will boost the allure of coal as a competing fuel for energy generation (middle panel, Chart 17). Keep in mind that coal usage is highly correlated with electricity demand and the industrial business cycle, and the current ISM manufacturing survey message is upbeat for coal demand. Tack on the whittling down in coal inventories at utilities and there is scope for a tick up in coal demand (third panel, Chart 18). Finally, the export relief valve has reopened for coal with the aid of the depreciating U.S. dollar, and momentum in net exports has soared to all-time highs, even surpassing the mid-1982 peak (bottom panel, Chart 18). Chart 17Key Coal Shipments Underpin Selling Prices Chart 18Upbeat Leading Indicators Of Coal Demand All of this suggests that coal shipments will make a comeback later in 2018, and continue to underpin industry pricing power, which in turn boost rail profit prospects (bottom panel, Chart 17). Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the broad S&P transportation index, and especially the heavyweight S&P railroads sub-index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?" dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "EPS And 'Nothing Else Matters'," dated December 18, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives," dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Euro's Tricky Spot," dated February 2, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth. Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert).