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Highlights A major investment theme for the coming years will be the resynchronization of developed economy monetary policies. Expect substantial further convergence between U.S. T-bond yields and both German bund yields and Swedish bond yields. This yield convergence necessarily supports the currency crosses EUR/USD and SEK/USD. Underweight U.K. consumer services versus the FTSE100. Overweight German consumer services versus the DAX. The September 24 German election and October 1 proposed referendum on Catalan independence are not major catalysts for the financial markets. Feature A major investment theme for the coming years will be the resynchronization of developed economy monetary policies. As monetary policy resynchronizes, it will become clear that the extreme desynchronization of monetary policies over the past few years was the great anomaly (Chart of the Week and Chart I-2). This anomaly reached its peak in 2014 when policies at the ECB and the Federal Reserve moved in diametrically opposite directions. The ECB signalled the start of its quantitative easing just as the Fed began to end its own. Chart of the WeekThe Desynchronization Of Monetary##br## Policy Was An Anomaly Chart I-2The Desynchronization Of Monetary##br## Policy Was An Anomaly Why Did Monetary Policy Desynchronize? The extreme desynchronization of monetary policy would not have happened if it was just about economics. On the basis of the hard economic data, the ECB could have emulated the unconventional policies of the Fed, BoJ and BoE years before it eventually did in 2015. If it had, ECB policy would have been much more synchronized with the other major central banks. However, unconventional monetary policy wasn't, and isn't, just about economics. The ECB faced, and still faces, much tougher political and technical hurdles than other central banks. The euro area does not have one government, it has 19. The ECB had to convince sceptical core euro area governments that zero and negative interest rate policy and bond buying were not just a bailout for the periphery, especially with the euro debt crisis so fresh in the mind. Likewise, the euro area does not have one sovereign bond, it has 19. To design and implement an asset purchase program in the euro area is much more complicated than in the U.S., Japan or the U.K. But by mid-2014 it had become clear that each wave of unconventional monetary easing - through its impact on exchange rates - had allowed other major economies to 'steal' some inflation from the euro area (Chart I-3). With the ECB still undershooting its inflation mandate, it was becoming a dereliction of duty for the ECB not to do what the Fed, BoJ and BoE had already done several years earlier. As the saying goes, it is better for a reputation to fail conventionally, than to succeed unconventionally. Chart I-3Currency Depreciations "Steal" Inflation From Other Economies Why Will Monetary Policy Resynchronize? Three years and several trillion euros later, the ECB can feel it has had a fair crack at unconventional easing (Chart I-4). At the same time, the central bank must contend with fresh political and technical hurdles. How many more German bunds can it realistically buy without irking Germany's policymakers? Chart I-4The ECB Has Had A Fair Crack At QE The ECB is also aware that ultra-loose monetary policy - by compressing banks' net interest margins - endangers banks' fragile profitability. This impairs the bank credit channel which is the mainstay of private sector credit intermediation in the euro area.1 Meanwhile, the euro area's configuration of solid economic growth, solid job growth and subdued inflation is common to most large developed economies (the exception is the U.K. which we explain below). Putting all of this together, the theme for the coming years has to be monetary policy resynchronization, one way or the other. One way is that the more hawkish central banks will become less hawkish, as subdued inflation limits the scope for monetary policy tightening. The other way is that the more dovish central banks will become less dovish as the benefits of ultra-accommodation diminish and the costs rise. Or, both ways will happen together. Nowhere are negative bond yields more absurd and more inappropriate than in Sweden (Chart I-5). In just three years the economy has grown 12% and house prices have surged 50%. Furthermore, unlike in other parts of Europe, the housing market in Sweden did not suffer a meaningful setback in either 2008 or 2011. Yet Sweden's negative interest rate policy means that it stills pays people to borrow and further bid up house prices. If anywhere is at risk of a bubble from ultra-accommodative monetary policy, Sweden must be it. For bond yield spreads and currencies - which are relative trades - it doesn't really matter how the resynchronization of monetary policies occurs. We expect substantial further convergence between U.S. T-bond yields and both German bund yields and Swedish bond yields. And this yield convergence necessarily supports the currency crosses EUR/USD and SEK/USD (Chart I-6). Chart 5A Negative Bond Yield ##br##In Sweden Is Absurd Chart I-6If The Swedish Bond Yield Shortfall ##br##Compresses, The Krona Will Rally The Myth Of The Beneficial Currency Devaluation Sharp depreciations in a currency result in an economy 'stealing' inflation from its major trading partners. Chart I-7 and Chart I-8 suggest that absent the post Brexit vote slump in the pound, the gap between U.K. and euro area inflation would be almost 1% less than it is. Chart I-7The Weaker Pound Lifted ##br##U.K. Headline Inflation... Chart I-8...And U.K. ##br##Core Inflation So the Brexit vote explains why the U.K. is one of the few major economies where inflation is running well north of 2%. Unfortunately for U.K. households, nominal wage inflation has not followed price inflation higher. Which means that the pound's weakness has choked households' real incomes. Against this, textbook economic theory says that a currency devaluation should make a country's exports more competitive and thereby boost the net export contribution to economic growth. But in the textbook the only thing that is supposed to change is the exchange rate. The textbook assumes that the country's trading framework with its partners remains unchanged. In the case of the U.K. leaving the EU, this assumption clearly does not apply, mitigating the concept of the 'beneficial currency devaluation'. A lot of the benefits of the textbook devaluation come because firms can trade in markets that were previously unprofitable to them. This process requires investment - for example, in marketing and distribution. If Brexit means that many of those markets are no longer available, or come with tariffs, then firms will hold off making the necessary investments - unless the currency devaluation is massive. But in this case, the corresponding surge in inflation and choke on households' real incomes would also be massive. We also hear the myth of the beneficial currency devaluation applied to the weaker members of the euro area. As in, why don't these countries just break free from the euro, and devalue their way to prosperity? The simple answer is that if they left the euro, they would also risk losing access to the largest single market in the world - defeating the whole purpose of the beneficial currency devaluation! A Tale Of Two Consumers Chart I-9A Good Pair Trade: Long German Consumer ##br##Services, Short U.K. Consumer Services For the time being, hawkish comments from the BoE have given the pound a boost. But U.K. consumer spending now faces one of two headwinds. If the BoE follows through with a rate hike, household borrowing is likely to fade as a driver of spending. Alternatively, if the BoE backs off from its threat, the pound will once again weaken, push up inflation and weigh on real incomes. So for the time being, stay underweight U.K. consumer services versus the FTSE100. In Germany, the opposite logic applies. Stay overweight German consumer services versus the DAX. Euro strength helps German consumers in as much as it reduces the prices of imported food and energy. But for German exporters, the strong euro hurts the translation of their multi-currency international profits back into local currency terms. A good pair trade is to be long German consumer services, short U.K. consumer services (Chart I-9). Finally, regarding two upcoming political events - the September 24 German election and the October 1 proposed referendum on Catalan independence, we do not see either as a major catalyst for the financial markets. In the case of the German election, it is because no likely outcome is especially malign (or benign). In the case of the Catalan referendum, it is because it will be hard to draw any meaningful conclusion from the result, given that Madrid has ruled the referendum illegal - and many 'unionists' are unlikely to participate. Please note that there is no Weekly Report scheduled for next week as I will be at our New York Conference. I hope to see some of you there. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In the euro area, small and medium sized companies tend to access credit through banks rather than through the bond market. Fractal Trading Model This week, we note an excessive underperformance of U.K. personal and household goods (dominated by BAT, Unilever, Reckitt Benckiser) versus U.K. food and beverages (dominated by Diageo and Associated British Foods). Go long U.K. personal and household goods versus U.K. food and beverages with a profit target / stop loss of 4.5%. In other trades, short nickel / long silver hit its 8% profit target, while short MSCI China / long MSCI EM hit its 2.5% stop loss. This leaves three open trades. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Duration: The bond market is quick to react to any signs that inflation might put in a bottom, but Treasuries are still not priced for a resumption of inflation's modest cyclical uptrend. Remain at below-benchmark duration and short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract. Fed Balance Sheet: The Fed will announce the run-off of its balance sheet at tomorrow's FOMC meeting. This decision has implications for Treasury issuance and how monetary policy will be conducted in the future, but we do not envision a large impact on yields. Investors should remain focussed on changes in the expected path of the fed funds rate to assess the outlook for Treasury yields. Feature Yields bounced back strongly last week, driven by a combination of easing flight-to-safety flows and a reasonably strong August CPI report. Even so, the bond market remains priced for an environment where inflation will never return to the Fed's 2% target, no matter the pace of economic growth. It should therefore not be shocking that yields are quick to spring higher on any evidence that core inflation might re-gain its cyclical uptrend (Chart 1). As we have previously written,1 we anticipate that core inflation will soon respond to above-trend growth and resume its modest cyclical uptrend. It is therefore worth considering whether last week's August CPI report represents a step in that direction or whether it should be written off as an outlier. After digging into the report's details we conclude that while it was probably stronger than we should expect going forward, it also suggests that core inflation is poised to put in a bottom. A Bottom In Core Inflation? Month-over-month core CPI increased 0.248% in August, an annualized pace of 3.02%, and the annualized 3-month rate of change rose back above the 12-month growth rate (Chart 2). This often signals a near-term trend reversal. Chart 1Very Sensitive To Inflation Chart 2Core Inflation By Major Component Shelter inflation jumped higher in August from 3.18% year-over-year to 3.30%. But our model suggests that this uptrend will not persist (Chart 2, panel 2). Notably, the increase in shelter inflation was concentrated in the Houston/Galveston/Brazoria area and as such reflects the one-off impact of Hurricane Harvey. The bottom line is that the positive August number should be considered an outlier. The underlying trend remains one of decelerating shelter inflation. Chart 3Ignore CPI Medical Care In contrast, year-over-year core goods prices decelerated in August, but this deceleration is equally unsustainable. The recent depreciation of the U.S. dollar and surge in non-oil import prices suggest that core goods inflation is poised to increase (Chart 2, panel 3). We expect accelerating core goods prices to offset decelerating shelter prices during the next few months. In the longer-run, neither shelter nor core goods will be sustainable drivers of inflation. Shelter has already rolled over, and core goods inflation will do the same once the dollar reverses its downtrend. For overall core inflation to sustainably return to the Fed's 2% target, core services inflation (excluding shelter and medical care) must be the main source of price pressure. Historically, this component of inflation is the most tightly linked to wage growth (Chart 2, bottom panel), and it has fallen precipitously so far this year. In August, however, year-over-year core services inflation (excluding shelter and medical care) ticked higher from 1.18% to 1.40%. While this is a positive sign, we will need to see further strength in this component to be certain that the downtrend in core inflation has turned. Some pundits have pointed to the steep decline in medical care CPI inflation as an additional deflationary force, but this is a red herring (Chart 3). In the CPI basket, medical care includes only consumers' out of pocket healthcare expenses. It does not include spending by the government on households' behalf, which is included in the Fed's target PCE inflation measure. Unlike CPI medical care, PCE medical care inflation has seen only a mild downturn and should move higher in August based on the most recent PPI numbers (Chart 3, panel 3). The bottom line is that the downtrend in CPI medical care inflation represents nothing more than a convergence between CPI and PCE inflation. Since the Fed targets PCE inflation, falling CPI medical care inflation can be safely ignored. The Fed's Reaction The Fed has already sent a strong signal that there will be no rate hike at this week's meeting, but that it will announce the run-off of its balance sheet (see next section). Our view has been that if inflation shows some signs of rebounding, the Fed will deliver another rate hike in December. The market appears to have taken a similar view and, on the strength of last week's CPI report, is now discounting a 51% chance of another rate hike this year. Last week's CPI report was probably strong enough to ensure that the median FOMC forecast will still call for one more hike this year when the revised forecasts are released tomorrow. However, we suspect that stronger inflation will need to persist for the next few months in order for that hike to be delivered on time. The reading from our Fed Monitor2 underscores how close a call another rate hike is at the moment (Chart 4). The monitor remains in "tighter money required" territory, but only faintly so. Notably, the economic growth and financial conditions components of the monitor both suggest that higher rates are required, but the inflation component remains below zero. This supports the notion that any sign of stronger inflation makes the case for further rate hikes a slam dunk. Chart 4A Close Call For The Fed Bottom Line: The bond market is quick to react to any signs that inflation might put in a bottom, but Treasuries are still not priced for a resumption of inflation's modest cyclical uptrend. Remain at below-benchmark duration and short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract. Five Questions About The Fed's Balance Sheet As was mentioned above, the Fed appears set to announce that it will cease the reinvestment of its bond holdings, meaning that its balance sheet will finally start to shrink. In all likelihood this announcement will come in tomorrow's FOMC statement. To recap, here is what we already know about how the plan will proceed: The Fed will cease the reinvestment of Treasuries and MBS at the same time. For the first three months the Fed will allow a maximum of $6 billion in Treasuries and $4 billion in MBS to run off each month. These caps will increase in steps of $6 billion and $4 billion, respectively, every three months until they level off at $30 billion per month for Treasuries and $20 billion per month for MBS. Question 1: How Long Will It Take? To answer this question we must first recall that the Fed does not target a specific level of assets on its balance sheet. Rather, it is the amount of bank reserves in the system (a liability on the Fed's balance sheet) that is the crucial variable for the economy. Bank reserves are the single biggest liability on the Fed's balance sheet, but the amount of currency in circulation is the second biggest. As of last Wednesday, bank reserves totaled $2.4 trillion and currency in circulation totaled $1.6 trillion. The amount of currency in circulation also increases as the economy grows. This means that during normal times the Fed must increase its asset holdings in line with the amount of outstanding currency just to keep the level of bank reserves constant. In other words, even if the Fed allows bank reserves to fall all the way to zero, it will still carry a larger balance sheet than it did prior to the start of QE because of the rising amount of currency in circulation. We have received no official guidance on the level of bank reserves the Fed will target for the end of the run-off process. However, New York Fed President William Dudley recently recommended that this level should be higher than during the pre-QE period. Together, as a rough starting point, we have suggested that the necessary amount of excess reserves could be in a range of $400 billion to $1 trillion. Coupled with uncertainty about the likely growth in other factors, such as currency outstanding, this implies a normalized balance sheet size of, perhaps, $2.4 trillion to $3.5 trillion in the early 2020s.3 In our estimates we have assumed that bank reserves will level-off once they reach $650 billion, considerably above levels maintained prior to the financial crisis. Bank reserves averaged $20 billion between 2000 and 2007. There are two main reasons why the Fed will favor a higher level of reserves. The first was also stated in President Dudley's speech: Having managed the System Open Market Account during the financial crisis - a period during which the demand for reserves was very volatile - I very much favor a floor-type system. It is much easier to manage on a day-to-day basis. A "floor system" means that the Fed controls the overnight rate by paying interest on excess reserves and conducting reverse repos with the securities on its balance sheet. This is the system currently in use, and it requires a glut of reserves in the banking system. Prior to the financial crisis, the Fed used a "corridor system" to control interest rates. This system required the Fed to transact in the interbank market to manage interest rates, and it required a dearth of reserves.4 The second reason is that the demand for safe short-maturity investment vehicles has been steadily increasing for at least the past fifteen years, largely due to rising cash balances on corporate balance sheets. Prior to the financial crisis this demand was intermediated through the repo market, but now that repo has mostly gone away, that cash is sitting on deposit at the Fed in the form of reserves (Chart 5). With all this demand, if the Fed tries to remove too many reserves from the banking system it could have difficulty keeping a floor under interest rates. That is, unless some other investment vehicle is supplied to mop up the rising demand for safety. In this regard, T-bills would be the most likely candidate, and fortunately, with T-bills at multi-decade lows as a percentage of the outstanding funding mix (Chart 6), there is ample room for the Treasury to increase bill supply. In short, the secular uptrend in demand for safe short-maturity financial assets means that going forward either: (i) the Fed will have to maintain a greater level of reserves in the banking system, (ii) the Treasury will have to increase the supply of T-bills, or (iii) some combination of the two. With all that in mind, let's answer the initial question of how long the Fed will allow its balance sheet to shrink. Our projections are shown in Chart 7, and make the following assumptions: Chart 5Rising Demand For Safe Short-Dated Assets Chart 6T-Bill Issuance Has Room To Rise Chart 7Fed Balance Sheet Projections Balance sheet run-off begins October 1, 2017 Bank reserves level-off at $650 billion. At that point, the Fed will continue to allow MBS to run off its balance sheet, but will start buying Treasuries to keep reserves stable. MBS will run off at a pace of $15 billion per month, before considering the caps.5 Currency in circulation will grow at a pace of 4.5% per year. Under these assumptions, we estimate that bank reserves will reach the target level of $650 billion in June 2021. At that point, the Fed's securities holdings will total $2.9 trillion - down from the current $4.3 trillion - and the Fed will have to start buying Treasuries to keep reserves stable and compensate for the continued run-off of MBS. Question 2: What Does This Mean For Bond Supply? To compensate for balance sheet run-off, The Treasury will have to increase issuance by $217 billion in 2018, $249 billion in 2019 and $182 billion in 2020 (Chart 8). Then, in 2021 and beyond, the Fed will once again start removing Treasury supply from the market as it stabilizes reserve balances. We estimate that an extra $150 billion of MBS supply will also hit the market in 2018, but we will save a discussion of the impact on MBS spreads for a future report. Chart 8Fed Starts Buying Again In 2021 The form in which this extra issuance will reach the marketplace is a question for the Treasury department. Officially, the Treasury has said: Treasury will likely respond to the additional borrowing needs associated with SOMA redemptions by increasing both Treasury bill and Treasury nominal coupon auction sizes, beginning with bills and then coupons, as appropriate.6 But the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee has recommended both that the Treasury increase the proportion of T-bills in its funding mix and increase the size of future coupon auctions, starting as early as next quarter. We expect these recommendations will be heeded. Question 3: Who Will Buy All These Bonds? A full breakdown of Treasury demand from different financial market actors is beyond the scope of this report. However, there is one sector that will need to greatly increase its holdings of Treasury securities as reserves are drained. That is the banking sector. The relatively new Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) mandates that banks hold high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) in an amount sufficient to cover net cash outflows during a stressed 30-day period. HQLAs consist of Level 1 assets and Level 2 assets. Level 1 assets are bank reserves and Treasury securities, Level 2 assets are other riskier securities such as Agency MBS. A haircut is applied to level 2 assets for the purposes of calculating HQLA. Based on disclosures from the eight U.S. Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), we calculate that HQLAs total about $2.4 trillion from those 8 banks alone (Table 1). If we assume that required HQLAs increase at a pace of about 4% per year (in line with expected growth in deposits), then that represents close to $100 billion of baseline Treasury demand next year and in 2019. This demand will also have to increase to compensate for the draining of reserves from the system (Chart 9). Table 1Liquidity Coverage Ratios For The 8 U.S. SIFIs Chart 9Bank Balance Sheets Loaded With Reserves At least at present, the eight largest U.S. banks do not have much of a buffer above the 100% mandated LCR. This means they will have to be active buyers of securities in order to compensate for lost reserves and keep their ratios stable. Question 4: What Will Be The Market Impact? It has been our long-standing view that the bulk of the impact on Treasury yields from Federal Reserve asset purchases can be attributed to signaling about the future path of short rates. In fact, throughout the entire QE period, there remained a strong positive correlation between long-maturity real Treasury yields and the number of rate hikes expected during the next 24 months (Chart 10). Chart 10Real Yields Driven By Rate Expectations Even theoretically, as Michael Woodford explained in his seminal Jackson Hole address from 2012,7 there is little reason to expect that central bank asset purchases exert an impact on bond yields beyond signaling about the future path of interest rates: In the representative-household theory, the market price of any asset should be determined by the present value of the random returns to which it is a claim, [...]. Insofar as a mere re-shuffling of assets between the central bank and the private sector should not change the real quantity of resources available for consumption in each state of the world, [...] the market price of one unit of a given asset should not change [...]. A more thorough empirical examination also suggests that the "signaling channel" explains most of the reaction in long-maturity Treasury yields to announcements about Fed asset purchases. We looked at a sample of dates where the Fed either made or teased an announcement related to its asset purchases, and then looked at how different financial markets reacted to those announcements. Chart 11 shows changes in the 10-year Treasury yield on the days in our sample versus changes in our 24-month fed funds discounter - the expected number of rate hikes during the next 24 months as discounted in the overnight index swap (OIS) curve. The chart shows a very strong linear relationship between changes in the 10-year Treasury yield and in expected rate hikes on those days. Chart 1110-Year Treasury Yield Vs. 24-Month Fed Funds Disc Chart 12 uses the same sample of dates, but this time looks at the change in the 10-year Treasury yield versus the change in the 10-year OIS rate. The pay-off on overnight index swaps is directly tied to the level of the fed funds rate. Therefore, if Fed asset purchases exert some impact on Treasuries above and beyond sending a signal about the future path of the fed funds rate, we should expect that impact to show up in Treasury yields but not in OIS rates. However, Chart 12 shows that changes in the 10-year Treasury yield and in the 10-year OIS rate remained tightly linked throughout our sample. Chart 1210-Year Treasury Yield Vs. 10-Year OIS Rate* Following Announcements Related##br## To Federal Reserve Asset Purchases Why is it important that the impact of Fed asset purchases on Treasury yields was mostly about signaling? It is because the Fed is following a "subordination strategy" with respect to the wind-down of its balance sheet. It plans to provide us with the schedule of balance sheet run-off in advance, and then leave that schedule un-touched regardless of economic developments. Put differently, it will respond to deteriorating economic conditions by cutting the fed funds rate before it alters the pace of balance sheet run off. In essence, the link between the Fed's balance sheet and signals about the path of the fed funds rate has been severed. As long as the "subordination strategy" is strictly enforced, we should not expect much of an impact on long-maturity Treasury yields from the unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. Question 5: Are There Any Other Potential Market Impacts? Where Fed asset purchases essentially removed Treasuries (and MBS) from the market and replaced them with bank reserves (cash), the running down of the Fed's balance sheet will reverse this swap. Supplying securities into the market and removing cash. Some have argued that this removal of cash could lead to an appreciation of the U.S. dollar. In particular, Zoltan Pozsar of Credit Suisse has observed a correlation between U.S. bank reserves and FX basis swap spreads.8 There is also a strong correlation between FX swap spreads and the U.S. dollar (Chart 13). Chart 13Basis Swaps, Reserves And The Dollar One possible chain of events is that as the Fed drains cash from the market, there will be less liquidity in the FX swap market. Basis swap spreads will widen as a result, and this will cause the dollar to appreciate. In this framework, the unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet will put upward pressure on the U.S. dollar. However, it is also possible that the chain of causation runs in the other direction. The BIS has proposed a model9 where a stronger dollar weakens the capital positions of bank balance sheets. This causes them to back away from providing liquidity to the FX swap market, leading to wider basis swap spreads. In this model, a strong dollar leads to wider basis swap spreads and not the reverse. If this is the correct direction of causation, then we should not expect any impact on the dollar from the unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. At the moment it is impossible to tell which of the above two theories are correct. All we can do is monitor the correlation between reserves, FX basis swap spreads and the dollar going forward. Bottom Line: The Fed will announce the run-off of its balance sheet at tomorrow's FOMC meeting. This decision has implications for Treasury issuance and how monetary policy will be conducted in the future, but we do not envision a large impact on yields. Investors should remain focussed on changes in the expected path of the fed funds rate to assess the outlook for Treasury yields. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Open Mouth Operations", dated September 2, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For further details on the monitor please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads", dated March 14, 017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2017/dud170907 4 For a detailed description of the differences between a floor and corridor system please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For simplicity we assume a constant pace of $1 billion MBS refinancing every month. This is somewhat below recent averages to account for the likelihood that interest rates will rise. 6 https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/current_PolicyPressRelease.aspx 7 http://www.columbia.edu/~mw2230/JHole2012final.pdf 8 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/04/13/2187317/where-would-you-prefer-your-balance-sheet-banks-or-the-federal-reserve/ 9 http://www.bis.org/publ/work592.pdf Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Fed vs. BoE: U.S. inflation data is stabilizing, while financial conditions continue to ease. The market is underestimating the potential for the Fed to hike rates again, perhaps as soon as December. At the same time, markets have priced in too many rate hikes in the U.K., with the Bank of England's growth and inflation forecasts unlikely to be realized. USTs vs. Gilts: Maintain an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration tilt, while keeping an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries and a neutral bias towards Gilts. Look to upgrade Gilts on any additional spread widening versus Treasuries or core Europe. Duration Checklists: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop for growth, inflation and investor risk appetite remains bearish for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure to both markets on a medium-term basis. Feature Inflation: Waking Up In The U.S., Peaking Out In The U.K. The bull market in risk assets remains powerful. Investors have shrugged off the worries about U.S. hurricanes and geopolitical tensions and have returned to focusing on the global growth and inflation backdrop. The fact that the S&P 500 could close at a new all-time high just above 2500 last Friday, shortly after another North Korean missile launch and a terrorist attack on the London Underground, speaks volumes about the renewed confidence (or is it hubris?) of investors. For bond markets, two events stood out - the firming read on August U.S. CPI inflation data and the surprisingly hawkish commentary from the Bank of England (BoE). We advise that investors pay more attention to the former and fade the latter. The U.S. inflation data is far more important, as it showed a decent rise in core inflation after five months of very weak prints (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekUSTs At Risk From A Rebound In Inflation A rebound in inflation is critical to our call for U.S. bond yields to rise over the next 6-12 months, as it would bring Fed rate hikes back into play. Right now, there is still a significant gap between market expectations for the fed funds rate by the end of 2018 and the current FOMC projection ("dot"). If the latest inflation data is the beginning of a sustained period of faster monthly price increases, then there is room for investors to reprice their expectations for both inflation and the funds rate (bottom two panels). There is a risk that the median FOMC rate projection for next year comes down a bit when the new "dots" are released after this week's FOMC meeting. Although with market-based inflation expectations firming, and survey-based measures holding steady near the Fed's 2% target amid easing financial conditions, the FOMC may choose to hold steady and wait to see if the August inflation data is the beginning of a trend - especially with the Fed set to announce the timing and details of the reduction of its balance sheet at this week's meeting. Downgrading interest rate expectations while also starting the unwind of the balance sheet could send a confusing message to markets. At the same time, any shift to a more hawkish or less dovish message from the Fed would be taken negatively by the Treasury market. The experience of Gilts last week is a warning sign about how unprepared investors are for a change in tone from central bankers. The language in the statement released after last week's BoE Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting suggested that a rate hike may come within the next few months if U.K. economic growth evolves along the lines of the MPC's forecasts. That was enough to trigger a bear-flattening move in the Gilt curve, with the markets quickly pricing in one full additional rate hike by the BoE over the next year (Chart 2, second panel). A similar move could happen if the Fed were to send any new hawkish signals, although that is unlikely to occur at this week's FOMC meeting. We see a greater potential for the Fed's forecasts to be realized than the BoE's over the next year. Financial conditions have eased and leading indicators are still pointing to a reacceleration in U.S. growth in the coming months. The impact of the hurricanes in Texas and Florida will be a drag on growth in the 3rd quarter of this year, but this will not be enough to materially impact the Fed's growth forecasts for 2018. Meanwhile, the inflationary backdrop for the U.S. may finally be bottoming out, for a few reasons: 1. Our CPI diffusion index rising back above the 50 line in August (Chart 3, top panel), although additional gains will be necessary to herald a more sustained rise in core inflation. Chart 2Markets Have Bet Heavily##BR##On Central Bank Inaction Chart 3U.S. Inflation##BR##Stabilizing? 2. The U.S. labor market continues to tighten, with the gap between the "jobs plentiful" minus "jobs hard to get" indices from the Conference Board's consumer confidence survey widening to the widest level since 2001 (2nd panel), putting upward pressure on wage growth. 3. One of the biggest sources of the surprising downturn in core inflation seen in 2017, the plunge in wireless phone prices back in the spring, has fully stabilized (3rd panel). That decline alone represented a drag on the rate of inflation for core CPI services (excluding shelter) of 1.2 percentage points (bottom panel), and on overall core CPI inflation of around 35bps - ½ of the total decline in core CPI inflation since January. As the impact of that collapse in wireless charges falls out of the inflation data in the coming months, the drag on core CPI will fade. There is now a much better chance for the Fed's inflation forecasts to be realized next year, especially once the impact of a weaker dollar (and higher energy prices) is taken into account. While some of the doves on the FOMC may downgrade their inflation forecasts this week, a major reduction is unlikely in the absence of signs of a weakening U.S. labor market or renewed strength in the U.S. dollar. The U.S. backdrop contrasts sharply with what is going on in the U.K. While the labor market is even tighter there than in the U.S., the current upturn in U.K. inflation has also occurred alongside a sharp depreciation of the Pound since the 2016 Brexit vote (Chart 4). The currency has stabilized over the course of this year, with the year-over-year change in the BoE's trade-weighted index now nearly flat (bottom panel). Against this backdrop, inflation is more likely to peak out than reaccelerate from current levels. A similar argument can be made for the U.K. economy. Leading economic indicators have rolled over, while actual real GDP growth has decelerated (Chart 5, 3rd panel). Consumer confidence has steadily declined as the currency-driven inflation increase has eroded real income growth. This has created a very odd divergence between falling confidence and an increased market expectation for BoE rate hikes over the next year, which typically move in unison (bottom panel). Add in the ongoing uncertainties over Brexit that continue to weigh on business confidence and investment spending, and it is far more likely that the U.K. economy will lag versus the BoE's forecasts. Chart 4Currency Impact On U.K. Inflation Is Fading Chart 5Why Should The BoE Hike? For now, we are maintaining our recommended neutral allocation on Gilts in our model bond portfolio. Although we would view any additional widening in yield spreads between Gilts and U.S. Treasuries and core European yields as an opportunity to move to overweight. Simply put, the odds are far greater that the Fed's economic and inflation forecasts for the next year will be realized than those of the BoE, suggesting that there is more upside risk for yields in Treasuries than Gilts. Bottom Line: U.S. inflation data is stabilizing, while financial conditions continue to ease. The market is underestimating the potential for the Fed to hike rates again, perhaps as soon as December. At the same time, markets have priced in too many rate hikes in the U.K., with the Bank of England's growth and inflation forecasts unlikely to be realized. Maintain an overall below-benchmark portfolio duration tilt, while keeping an underweight stance on U.S. Treasuries and a neutral bias towards Gilts. Look to upgrade Gilts on any additional spread widening versus Treasuries or core Europe. Duration Checklist Update Back in February of this year, we introduced a list of indicators we need to monitor to determine if our recommended defensive duration stance on U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds was still warranted.1 These "Duration Checklists" combined data on overall global growth, as well as U.S. and Euro Area economic activity, inflation, investor risk-seeking behavior and technical positioning on government bonds. At the time, the Checklists were almost unanimous in pointing to a period of rising bond yields based on an improving growth profile and slowly rising inflation pressures. We updated the Checklists in May and, for the most part, the majority of the indicators were still flagging more upward pressures on yields, although some series on global growth and inflation had softened.2 With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that these factors - especially the pullback in U.S. inflation pressures - were enough to trigger a significant bond rally. With the U.S. inflation downdraft now in the process of stabilizing, as discussed earlier, this is now a good opportunity to revisit our Duration Checklists to assess the current backdrop for bond yields. The broad conclusion is that the majority of the indicators are still pointing to higher bond yields in the months ahead (Table 1). Table 1A Bearish Message From Our Duration Checklists Global economic activity indicators are mixed, but may be bottoming. The global leading economic indicator (LEI) continues to rise, heralding a continuation of the current economic uptrend (Chart 6). The breadth of that advance, however, is fading with our LEI diffusion index having fallen below the 50 line, meaning that there are more countries with a falling LEI. The global ZEW indicator of investor sentiment is also trending downward, another factor weighing on yields. The near-term dynamics on growth are starting to shift more bearishly for bonds, however, with the global data surprise index rising and the latest read on our Global Credit Impulse indicator ticking upward. We are giving a "check" to 3 of the 5 global growth elements in our Duration Checklists (LEI, data surprises, Credit Impulse), which represents a bond-bearish shift from the last update of the Checklists in May when only the LEI warranted a "check". Domestic economic growth in the U.S. and Euro Area is solid. Manufacturing PMIs in both the U.S. (the ISM index) and Europe are rising, as is consumer and business confidence (Charts 7 & 8). The latter is not surprising given the strong growth in corporate profits on both sides of the Atlantic that our models expect will continue. This bodes well for future growth momentum, as firms will not be forced to retrench on hiring and investment spending to protect profitability. We are giving a "check" to all domestic growth components of our Duration Checklists, highlighting that the economic backdrop remains bond bearish. Chart 6Yields Are Exposed To##BR##Improving Global Growth Chart 7A Solid U.S.##BR##Economic Expansion Chart 8European Growth Momentum##BR##Is Bearish For Bunds Realized inflation has dipped, but the worst looks to be over. In our Checklists, we include measures on energy prices, labor market tightness and wage inflation as the primary inflation indicators to monitor. On that front, the story still looks fairly benign for U.S. inflation given the dip in wage inflation measures like Average Hourly Earnings growth and the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker (Chart 9). The unemployment gap (unemployment rate vs. NAIRU) is still negative, and other wage measures like the wage & salaries component Employment Cost Index are steadily expanding, suggesting that the underlying wage dynamics in the U.S. may not be as slow as indicated by Average Hourly Earnings. In the Euro Area, wage growth has accelerated above 2%, occurring alongside a grinding increase in core inflation and an unemployment gap that is almost fully closed (Chart 10). Meanwhile, the downward momentum in the growth of energy prices - denominated in both dollars and euros - has bottomed out after the sharp decline since the beginning of the year, although the rebound has been tepid so far (top panel of Charts 9 & 10). Chart 9Not Much Inflationary##BR##Pressures On UST Yields Chart 10Core Inflation & Wages Are##BR##Grinding Higher In Europe The most significant divergences between the regions exist within the inflation elements of our Checklists. For wage growth, we are giving an "x" to the U.S. but a "check" to Europe. For the unemployment gap, we are giving a "check" to both regions. For energy prices, however, we are not giving any indication (a "?") until we see more decisive evidence of a sustained acceleration that is pressuring headline inflation rates even higher. Both the Fed and ECB are biased to remove monetary accommodation. The Fed is in the midst of a rate-hiking cycle that began in late 2015, and is now about to begin the long process of shrinking its swollen balance sheet. The ECB has been slowly preparing the market for a shift to a slower pace of asset purchases, although rate hikes are still at least a couple of years away. For both central banks, we are giving a "check" for having a more hawkish/less dovish policy bias that is not bullish for bonds. Investors remain in risk-seeking mode. The way that we interpret investor risk aversion in the Checklists is if growth-sensitive risk assets like equities and corporate credit are rallying, then this is bearish for government bonds. The logic here is that private investor demand for Treasuries and Bunds is diminished when risk assets are rallying, as long as equities are not stretched to a point where the risks of a correction are elevated (i.e. indices trading 10% above their 200-day moving average). Also, the easing of financial conditions stemming from rallying stock and credit markets is a boost to growth that central banks will likely respond to by becoming less accommodative. From that perspective, the persistent bull markets in equities and corporate credit on both sides of the Atlantic are bearish for Treasuries (Chart 11) and Bunds (Chart 12). With stocks not looking stretched versus the medium-term trend and with volatility remaining low, all the related elements of our Checklists earn a "check". Chart 11Still A Pro-Risk Bias##BR##Among U.S. Investors Chart 12Still A Pro-Risk Bias##BR##Among Euro Area Investors Bond yields do not look stretched to the upside from a technical perspective. The Treasury sell-off from the 2017 peak back in March has pushed the 10-year yield back below its 200-day moving average, while also boosting the 6-month total return into positive territory (Chart 13). There is also a persistent net long position in 10-year Treasury futures (bottom panel). Add it all up and the technical backdrop for Treasuries is stretched in a way pointing to greater near-term risks of higher yields. In Europe, momentum measures all look neutral (Chart 14) and are no impediment to rising yields. We give all technical elements of our Duration Checklists a "check". Chart 13UST Rally Since March##BR##Is Looking Stretched Chart 14Neutral Technical##BR##Backdrop For Bunds Net-net, the Checklists show that the majority of indicators are still pointing to a bond-bearish backdrop. The only bond-bullish factors are the soft inflation readings in the U.S. although that may be in the process of shifting, as discussed earlier. There is not a major difference in the number of checkmarks for both the U.S. and Euro Area Checklists, thus we see no reason to favor either market from a relative perspective - there is pressure for both Treasury and Bund yields to rise. Thus, we are maintaining our recommended below-benchmark medium-term duration stance in both the U.S. and core Europe within hedged global bond portfolios. Chart 15UST Yields Have More Near-Term Upside From a shorter-term tactical perspective, however, we see more upside for Treasury yields vs Bunds with U.S. economic data surprising to the upside at a faster pace than in Europe (Chart 15). Throw in the potential for U.S. inflation to also rise above depressed expectations and a wider Treasury-Bund spread - a trade that we currently have in our Tactical Overlay portfolio and which goes against the tightening currently priced into the forwards - is the more likely outcome in the next few months. Bottom Line: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop for growth, inflation and investor risk appetite remains bearish for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure to both markets on a medium-term basis. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds", dated February 15th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Fade The "Trump Fade"", dated May 23rd 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Finally, an upside surprise on inflation. Recent significant developments reinforce BCA's bullish view on crude oil. Investors should consider the Monthly Report on personal income and spending, and not the quarterly GDP data, to gauge hurricanes' impact on economy. While the Fed will consider impact of Harvey and Irma, policy will ultimately be made on health of underlying economy. Feature Chart 1Rally For Risk Assets##BR##A Week Before The FOMC Risk assets and oil prices rose last week along with Treasury yields ahead of this week's FOMC meeting. Both the S&P 500 and the Dow hit new highs last week as the dollar moved lower. The stock-to-bond ratio also climbed, approaching the highs it reached earlier this year (Chart 1). All of this occurred amid an absence of any meaningful news on corporate earnings, aside from Apple's launch of the latest iPhone. Q3 earnings season is still a month away. Our base case projects stocks outperforming cash and bonds over the next 6-12 months, but in early September we recommended that clients be prudent, pare back any overweight positions and hold some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. The most significant movement in assets prices last week came in the U.S. Treasury market. Aided by hints of some progress on tax cuts in Washington less damage than initially feared from Hurricane Irma's impact on Florida, and despite another rocket launch by North Korea, the 10-year Treasury yield moved from near 2.0% in the first week of September to 2.20% on September 15. BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service notes1 that bond markets are priced as though the link between growth and inflation is broken. We expect they will be proven wrong as inflation regains its uptrend during the next few months. Finally A Surprise On Inflation Chart 2Does One Month Make A Trend? After five months of downside surprises, U.S. core CPI met expectations in August. It is still too soon say that this is enough for the Fed to raise rates again this year. To get a better sense of the underlying trends, we like to break core CPI into three sub-groups: shelter, core goods and core services ex-shelter and medical care. Shelter, which accounts for over 40% of core CPI, rose 0.4% m/m in August. This was the biggest contributor to core CPI during the month. Our shelter model suggests that this strength is unlikely to persist. On the flip-side, core goods prices (25% of core CPI) fell 0.1% m/m. Given the weakness in the dollar, core goods prices should soon begin to rise. To some degree, a slowdown in shelter and a pick-up in core goods could offset each other over the coming months (Chart 2). Therefore, a sustained pick-up in overall core inflation requires an upturn in core services ex-shelter and medical. This sub-component of core CPI is the most tightly correlated with wage inflation. There was a slight tick higher in annual core services ex-shelter and medical inflation in August. However, it is still near a 25-year low of just 1.1%. Bottom Line: Following five months of persistent downside surprises, the 0.2% m/m increase in core CPI during August was a welcomed change for the Fed. However, one month does not make a trend and Fed will need to see more evidence of inflation turning the corner before raising interest rates again. Any rise in oil prices would also give inflation a lift, although it would affect the headline more than the core inflation rate. Bullish Oil Supply And Demand Recent significant developments reinforce BCA's bullish view on crude oil. The International Energy Agency (IEA) revised its forecasts for global oil demand. Oil consumption will be 100,000 bpd higher this year than the IEA's previous projection. Furthermore, renewed turmoil in Libya curbed production by 300,000 bpd from a 4-year high of more than 1 million bpd. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service states that while predicting OPEC compliance is tricky, little to no cheating will occur. At worst, Saudi Arabia will step in and curtail production if Libya and/or Iraq begins to pump oil above quota. Finally, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) in the U.S. lowered its estimated shale oil output by 200,000 bpd for this year's third quarter. The decreased estimation confirms BCA's assertion that the EIA has overestimated the pace of the shale production response during 2017. Chart 3Drawdown In Global Oil##BR##Inventories Is Underway Taken together, these factors will help to improve the global net demand/supply balance by 600,000 bpd, if the current situation remains unchanged. As a result, global oil inventories will continue to be drawn down (Chart 3). Severe weather in the U.S. has temporarily distorted the energy markets. Crack spreads have widened in the U.S. as product inventories have declined along with Brent - WTI spreads. Nonetheless, BCA's commodity strategists remain bullish on crude oil, forecasting a rise in WTI to over $55/bbl and Brent to $60/bbl by year-end. Looking to next year, crude prices could go higher with an extension of the OPEC/Russian production cuts beyond March 2018 and continued strong growth in global oil demand. A sudden jump in the U.S. dollar could risk BCA's bullish view. Bottom Line: There is a disagreement between the market's view of the fundamentals of the global oil balance, which is guided by the EIA data, and BCA's view that is driven by the OPEC 2.0 framework.2 Oil prices could spike higher if the market adheres to the OPEC framework. BCA's Equity Trading Strategy service recommends an overweight to the S&P 500 Energy Sector and initiated an overweight in the Oil and Gas Refining and Marketing sub-group on September 11, 2017.3 Hurricane Redux Turning to the U.S. hurricane destruction, history shows that natural disasters have only a passing effect on the U.S. economy, the financial markets and the Fed.4 Ultimately, the macro environment in place before the storm will reassert itself. Nonetheless, it may be a few months before investors determine the long-term impact of the storms on Houston, Florida and nearby southern states. The U.S. data gathering agencies (BEA, BLS and Census) have processes to ensure that the storm's sway is reflected in the economic data. In the past, all three have produced post-disaster evaluations and will likely release the same type of information in the months ahead. Most of the storms' effects will be felt in the September data, but have already affected the initial claims data for the last week in August and the first week of September. The storms will also buffet the Q3 GDP (due out in late October). However, GDP data may not provide a comprehensive picture; GDP is not directly affected by natural disaster losses involving property, plants, equipment and structures. However, GDP can take a direct hit from the loss of productive capacity linked to a storm. The BEA notes that "while GDP may be affected by the actions that consumers, businesses, and governments take in response to a disaster, these responses are generally not separately identifiable, and they may be spread out over a long period of time." Investors should consider the monthly report on personal income and spending, and even more, the regional accounts by state, and not the quarterly GDP data, for details on the storms' economic fallout. Only hurricanes Katrina and Rita warranted a mention in the Q3 2005 GDP release, and none of the other major storms since that time have been noted by the agency. On the other hand, the personal income and spending reports released after all the major hurricanes since 2005 have provided key specifics on incomes. For example, the BEA stated that "work interruptions" linked to Hurricane Sandy reduced wages by $18 billion in October 2012 when the storm hit the northeastern U.S. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) also tends to note a storm's influence on other primary income categories including personal rental incomes, proprietors' incomes, and other current transfer receipts (i.e. insurance payments received). Table 1Total Federal Spending And Total Economic Damage For Selected Hurricanes, 2000 To 2015 A 2016 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report found that federal spending after major hurricanes can add as much as 0.6% to GDP growth (Table 1). CBO notes that most of the economic impact is in the first year after a storm, with most of those expenditures helping victims to obtain food and shelter, fund search and rescue operations, and protect critical infrastructure. Federal outlays for public infrastructure occur after the first year and provide a much smaller lift to GDP (Chart 4). Chart 4Federal Government Outlays For Hurricane Relief The severe weather in the U.S. has raised the odds that the Trump administration and Congress will make progress on fiscal policy this fall. We think that the outlines of a tax bill will emerge in the next month or so, and while the probability of passing legislation this year is still low, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service expects the market to react when it sees the bill. The implication for investors is that the President Trump trades (Chart 5) that have unwound since the start of the year may soon become profitable again. The recent agreement between Trump and the Democrats to extend the debt ceiling and avoid a government shutdown support our stance. Chart 5Trump Trades Making A Comeback? Bottom Line: The hurricanes may have a bearing on the economic data for the next few months. Investors should closely monitor the input data to GDP, but not GDP itself. However, we do not anticipate that any economic disruptions from the storms will have a meaningful influence on near-term Fed monetary policy. Disasters And The Fed The hurricanes will probably play a supporting role in the Fed's outlook on the economy, inflation and labor market at this week's meeting. The FOMC statement will mention the storms and Fed Chair Yellen may include them in her opening remarks. Moreover, the news conference will provide another opportunity to discuss the issue. For example, the FOMC statement released in mid-December 2012, six weeks after Sandy, stated that "economic activity and employment have continued to expand at a moderate pace in recent months, apart from weather-related disruptions". Fed staff noted that manufacturing production was held down by Sandy and that household spending, notably vehicle sales, declined in October due to the storm (Table 2). Similarly, the wrath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was noted in FOMC statements and minutes in the fall and early winter of 2005. For example, in the statement released at the meeting after Katrina hit in August 2005, the FOMC observed: "The widespread devastation in the Gulf region, the associated dislocation of economic activity, and the boost to energy prices imply that spending, production, and employment will be set back in the near term." Fed policymakers made similar observations in the aftermath of other natural and man-made disasters in the past 25 years (Table 2). Table 2FOMC Reaction To Disasters, Natural And Man Made Bottom Line: Fed officials will consider the disruptions to the economy and economic data caused by Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, but ultimately make policy decisions based on the underlying strength of the economy, labor market and inflation. FOMC Preview The FOMC will initiate shrinking its balance sheet at this week's meeting, but neither BCA nor the market anticipate that the Fed will bump up rates. Moreover, the Fed will need more evidence that inflation, inflation expectations and/or inflation surprise has turned higher before resuming its rate hike regime. Furthermore, there is still a significant disconnect between the market and the Fed concerning rates for the next 12 months, and how that gap closes could be crucial for the financial markets, especially the bond market. At 43 basis points, the gap between the June dot plots and the market on the Fed funds rate in the next 12 months remains near its widest level of the year. The market is currently predicting only 30 bps in increases in the next 12 months. However, an uptick in inflation could quickly change that view (Chart 6). Despite the disagreement on rates, the Fed and the market are mostly aligned on the economy, the labor market and inflation, at least in 2017. For the first time, the FOMC will provide projections for 2020 at this week's meeting. At 4.4% in August, the unemployment rate is a mere tenth above the Fed's end-2017 forecast, but it is 0.2% below the central bank's latest estimate of full employment (4.6%). The Fed's measure of full employment has declined in recent years and we would not be shocked to see a drop again this week. The consensus outlook for the unemployment rate matches the Fed's path through the end of 2018 (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Chart 6Big Disagreement Between The Fed ##br##And The Market On Rates Chart 7The Fed Vs. The Market Chart 8The FOMC's "Long Run"##BR##Forecasts Since 2012 The economy is on pace this year to grow at the Fed's 2.2% projection but is running above the FOMCs long-run calculation of 1.8%, which is the low point since the Fed started publishing these long-run projections in 2009. The consensus forecast for GDP in 2018 and 2019 is slightly above the upper end of the Fed's range set in June (Chart 7 and Chart 8). The Fed and the market are relatively close on inflation this year, but there is still a wide gap in 2018 and beyond. In June, the Fed lowered its inflation forecast for 2017 to 1.6% from 1.9% in March. PCE inflation is at only 1.4% (year-to-date in 2017), so there is not much disagreement in this regard. The market does not agree with the Fed's view that inflation will return to 2.0%, and this is a key reason why the 10-year Treasury yield recently touched a new post-election low at 2.0%, although geopolitical tensions also played a role. The central bank's view of inflation in the long run has not deviated from 2.0% since 2012. Bloomberg consensus estimates for core inflation for this year and next are below the low end of the Fed's forecast range (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Market participants and some Fed officials are still concerned that the traditional Phillips curve model may be broken and that inflation may never accelerate even with an unemployment rate that is below the Fed's estimate of full employment. (Please see a BCA Special Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?").5 Who Will Be The Next Fed Chair? As some investors consider the Fed's next policy move, others are taking a longer view and thinking about Fed Chair Yellen's replacement. Yellen's term as Chair will end in February 2018, and the markets have not yet shown any concerns about her potential replacement. Until last month, the frontrunner to replace Yellen was Gary Cohn, the Chairman of President Trump's National Economic Committee; his appointment would conform to some historical precedents but violate others.6 Several new names have emerged as possible Fed nominees as Cohn fell out of favor in the White House in early September. Kevin Warsh, Glen Hubbard and John Taylor, are all high-profile economists with links to the GOP, but Warsh stands out because he served on Trump's Strategic and Policy forum before it disbanded in August, and was a Fed Governor in the early 2000s (Table 3). Hubbard, who is currently an academic, was President George W. Bush's chief economist. However, he has not worked with Trump and has no Fed experience. John Taylor is well known in monetary policy circles, but has no Fed or government background, nor has he served with Trump. Taylor advocates for rules-based monetary policy.7 Another possible name, Larry Lindsey, an advisor to George W. Bush's campaign in 2000, a Fed Governor in the 1990s, and worked in the Reagan White House but he has no connection to Trump. He has recently spoken in favor of the House tax plan. Table 3Characteristics Of Fed Chairs Since 1970 The other two names under consideration - Richard Davis and John Allison - may have difficulty winning confirmations by the Senate. Both men were CEOs at major banks although neither have directly served Trump, nor been at the Fed or in government. Allison, a former president of the Libertarian Cato Institute, has argued that the Fed should be abolished and blamed the Fed for the financial crisis. The timing of Trump's announcement on Yellen's replacement may be critical. As a reminder, names floated by the Obama White House in the summer of 2013 were mainly rejected by the markets. Yellen's official announcement came in early October 2013. In August 2009, President Obama reappointed Bernanke for a second four-year term. Bernanke was initially nominated to be Fed Chair by George W. Bush in October 2005. If the appointment comes in October and the nominee is perceived to be hawkish, the risk is that markets may begin to price in the regime change sometime in the next few months. As we noted in the sections above, there is already a wide discrepancy between the Fed and the market over the pace and timing of rate hikes in the coming year. BCA's fair value model for the 10-year Treasury yield (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) currently places fair value at 2.67%.8 Moreover, our 3-factor version of the model (which includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index), puts fair value slightly higher at 2.68%. Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Bottom Line: Markets will be increasingly concerned in the next six weeks about the next Fed Chair and his or her policies. While the reappointment of Fed Chair Yellen for another term would please the markets, several other possible successors would not. We anticipate that the President will make a choice within the next month. Taking a longer view, the next Fed chair will oversee the policy response to the next recession and its aftermath. Investors should understand how the next Chair views the Fed's role in the business cycle. Economy Focus: Some Good News From The Quarterly Services Survey Even with the increasingly dominant role of the service sector's contribution to the economy (~69% of GDP), most of the high-frequency data are related to the manufacturing sector (~12% of GDP) (Chart 9, top panel). However, the Quarterly Services Survey (QSS), initiated in 2003-2004 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), measures the services sector of the economy, including companies of all sizes (small- and medium-sized). It produces the most timely revenue data, on a quarterly basis, within the flourishing service sector. The dataset is used primarily by the BEA to estimate a more accurate picture of the national accounts, notably personal consumption and the intellectual property segment of private fixed investment. The survey is also essential for FOMC policymakers as it is very useful to track current economic performance. Even more, during the financial crisis, the BEA "aggressively responded to policymakers' needs for data on financial services". The QSS is a significant source of revisions to real GDP, as about 42% of the quarterly estimates of PCE for services is now based on QSS data. The "key services statistics" include information services; health care services; professional, scientific, and technical services; administrative and support and waste management and remediation services (Chart 9). For the first half of 2017, upward revisions to second and third estimates to real GDP stemmed from revisions to PCE services and nonresidential fixed investment, namely: health care services, financial & insurance services and intellectual property products (specifically software) and other services accounted for by cellular telephone services. The most recent QSS for 2017Q2 showed U.S. selected services total revenue rising by 3.2% over the last quarter and 6.2% over the last four quarters (in nominal terms and non-seasonally adjusted data only available). The strongest growth came from revenues of Other Services (9.4% QoQ% and 18.4% YoY) followed by Arts, Entertainment & Recreation and Administration, Support & Waste Management. Sales in Finance & Insurance and Health Care & Social Assistance, which make up about 50% of total service revenues, are advancing at a sturdy pace, as is revenue in Information services (Chart 9). Chart 9Growth For Service Sector##BR##Industries Is Broad-Based Chart 10QSS Survey Heralds Some##BR##Upward Revision To Real GDP Bottom Line: Given that the majority of service industries from the QSS sample survey continue to show upward momentum, perhaps we will see some upward revision to real consumer spending for services for the third estimate of real GDP next week (Chart 10). We continue to expect U.S. GDP growth to match or exceed the Fed's modest target for 2017. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Open Mouth Operations", published September 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Hurricane Recovery Obscures OPEC 2.0's Forward Guidance", published September 14, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Still Goldilocks", published September 11, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Shelter From The Storm", published September 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?", published August 31, 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration", published July 17, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Trump And The Fed", published March 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "The Cyclical Sweet Spot Rolls On", published September 5, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Dear Client, We are sending you a Special Report prepared by my colleague Matt Gertken, associate vice president of our Geopolitical Strategy team. This report focuses on the upcoming 19th Party congress and discusses its implications on China’s economic and political outlook, as well as its impact on financial markets. I trust you will find this report insightful. Best regards, Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy Highlights The Communist Party will hold its nineteenth National Congress on Oct. 18. This is the "midterm election" for President Xi Jinping, whose political capital will be replenished; Recent Chinese leaders have a greater impact in their second term than their first; Base case: Xi consolidates power while preserving a balance on the Politburo Standing Committee; Stay long Chinese equities versus emerging market peers. Feature China's Communist Party will hold the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18-25. This is a critical "midterm" leadership reshuffle that will also mark the halfway point of General Secretary Xi Jinping's term in office. Investors around the world will watch closely to see what insight can be gained about the political trajectory of the world's second-largest economy. This report serves as a "primer" for readers to understand the party congress and its investment takeaways. Why Is The Party Congress Important? Because it rotates China's political leaders! Chart 1So Long To The 18th Central Committee In a political system without popular representation, the rotation of personnel according to promotion and retirement is the only way to rejuvenate the policy process. The average rate of turnover on the Communist Party's Central Committee at each five-year congress has been 62%, which is a remarkably high rate (Chart 1). It reveals an underrated dynamism in Chinese politics. This leadership rotation also allows the top leader (Xi Jinping) to consolidate power by putting his supporters into key positions. This in turn alters the policymaking environment and the way in which China formulates policies and responds to external events. China has a "parallel" political system in which the ruling Communist Party operates alongside (and above) the state. Xi Jinping is "General Secretary" of the party, president of the People's Republic of China, and (not least) chairman of the Central Military Commission. The party maintains supremacy by independently controlling the state and the army. Since fall 2016, Xi has been dubbed the "core" of the Communist Party, putting him on a par with previous core leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.1 The party's nearly 90 million members convene large congresses of about 2,000 members every five years to select the membership of the key decision-making bodies (Diagram 1), a practice known as "intra-party democracy."2 The key body is the Central Committee, which consists of about 200 full members and another 100-some alternative members. The Central Committee then "elects" the General Secretary, Political Bureau (a.k.a. "Politburo," the top 25 or so leaders) and Politburo Standing Committee (the "PSC," the top five-to-nine leaders) - though in reality the Politburo and the PSC are chosen through intense negotiations among the incumbent PSC and former leaders. Diagram 1National Party Congress Of The Communist Party Of China The handful of men on the PSC are the chief decision-makers in China, often in league with the broader Politburo (and former PSC members who exercise some power through the back door). Most of the key personnel decisions will have been made before the Central Committee votes.3 Hence the current top leaders have a chance to put their loyalists and supporters in key positions, potentially improving the implementation of their agenda. The outgoing eighteenth Central Committee will meet for its last session on October 11, and then the nineteenth party congress will meet on October 18 to elect a new Central Committee. It will in turn ratify the new Politburo and PSC. At the beginning of the party congress, Xi Jinping will deliver a keynote political report on the state of the party and nation, reviewing the progress of the past five years and mapping out a vision for the next five. The party congress will also amend the Communist Party constitution.4 By the end of the week, the members of the new PSC will step out to meet the press together for the first time. Only later will the party's key decisions be incorporated by the state, i.e. China's central government, including key personnel appointments and policy initiatives. This will occur when the legislature, the National People's Congress ("NPC," not to be confused with party congress), convenes at its annual "Two Sessions" in early March 2018. Chart 2Bold Action Can Follow Midterm Congresses Any NPC session following a five-year party congress carries more weight than usual not only because it approves of the party congress's leadership decisions but also because it kicks off major new policy initiatives. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji was appointed to launch the "assault stage" of President Jiang Zemin's reforms of state-owned enterprise at the NPC in March 1998 (Chart 2). Similarly, Hu Jintao's Premier Wen Jiabao launched extensive administrative reforms at the NPC meeting in early 2008.5 How does a "midterm" party congress differ from others? Typically, in even-numbered years, the top two leaders change over, as with Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in 2012. These transitions are highly significant as they mark a leadership succession, a transfer of power to a new general secretary in a heavily centralized, authoritarian system that does not have a codified succession process. By contrast, in odd-numbered years like 2017, the Communist Party promotes, demotes, and retires a large number of other top leaders. Thus Xi Jinping's place is assured, and Li Keqiang's place is probably assured as well, but most likely the other five members of the PSC will be gone.6 This year's transition is also significant because the total turnover on the Central Committee is expected to be higher than usual (perhaps 70%) as a result of President Xi's aggressive anti-corruption campaign and other factors (see Chart 1 above).7 Leaders often spend the bulk of their first five years consolidating power and the second five years pushing forward their true policy agenda. Even President Hu Jintao, who failed to see his preferred social safety-net policies fully implemented, had a vastly more influential second term than first term in office: the 2007-12 period saw the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package to thwart the Global Recession. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not normally become "lame ducks" toward the end of their last term: Deng Xiaoping recommitted the country to pro-market reforms in 1992, after having stepped down as general secretary, while Jiang Zemin reached the height of his power at the end of his term in 2002, when he chose to hang onto the position of top military leader for two extra years. Many observers suspect that Xi Jinping will hold onto power beyond 2022. Bottom Line: The National Party Congress coincides with a sweeping rotation of the Chinese political elites, which is a critical way of ensuring that China, unlike a monarchy or personalized "dictatorship," has an orderly way of updating its policy-makers and (hopefully) policies. Midterm reshuffles allow top leaders to promote supporters and re-energize the implementation of their policy agenda. The past two Chinese leaders were more consequential in their second term than their first. How Is The Nineteenth Congress Unique? Chart 3Xi Jinping's Generation Taking Command The most important change this year is the passing of a generation.8 China's political elites are classified into "leadership generations," with Mao Zedong symbolizing the first generation, Deng Xiaoping the second, Jiang Zemin the third, Hu Jintao the fourth, and Xi Jinping the fifth generation. The current reshuffle will see the following generational trends: The End of the Jiang Zemin Era: The key figures retiring on the PSC are those who were born before 1950 and put in place by Jiang Zemin. Thus in a very real sense, Jiang Zemin's influence is coming to a close (Chart 3).9 This generational shift is likely to force the retirement of 11 of the 25-member Politburo, and five of the seven PSC members (Table 1), as well as other major figures, such as the long-serving central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Table 1Chinese Leaders Set To Retire On Politburo And Politburo Standing Committee Jiang-era leaders are defined by certain characteristics that are now fading. As Chart 4 demonstrates, these leaders came of age in the early, idealistic days of the Revolution, leading them to have a conservative streak in ideological matters. Yet they are well-known pragmatists in economic matters. They studied engineering and natural sciences in answer to the call for the young to develop the country's heavy industry. They tended to hail from capitalist-leaning coastal provinces, and often gained first-hand experience operating China's state-owned enterprises. This last point became especially important when they pioneered pro-market corporate reforms in the 1990s. By contrast, fewer of them served as government ministers on the State Council (China's cabinet) than subsequent generations. Chart 4Leadership Characteristics Of The Politburo Standing Committee The Middle of the Hu Jintao Era: The passing of Jiang's cohort will necessarily give his successor Hu Jintao's cohort a boost in relative influence at the top levels. Hu's generation is marked by leaders who studied the "soft sciences" (like law and economics). Several of them (including Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao) have links with the politically liberal wing of the party. They have far less experience in the military or state-owned business, but are more likely to have governing experience in the central government and especially the provinces (Chart 4 above). This includes the interior provinces from which they often hail. They are thus highly attuned to the problem of maintaining social stability, arguably to the neglect of economic dynamism. Hu Jintao's influence may be underrated. Xi's administration has shown important continuities with Hu's, and Hu's followers are well positioned in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the provincial governments (though not the current PSC). If Xi does not take decisive moves to replace some of Hu's acolytes on the PSC at the coming party congress, then Hu's men will likely outnumber Xi's on the PSC as they graduate up the ladder from the Politburo.10 A strong showing by Hu's faction could affect China's policy priorities, given that Xi showed different preferences from Hu in the first few years of his rule (Table 2). However, the factions do not maintain consistent policy platforms. The bottom line is that Hu's faction could act as more or less of a constraint on Xi regardless of what policies the latter pursues. Table 2Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents The True Beginning of the Xi Jinping Era: Xi's generation has yet to reveal its full character - the demographics of the new Central Committee will help determine it. So far it is a continuation of the trends above: more likely than not to come from interior than coastal provinces, to have studied the humanities, to have governed in the provinces or central ministries, and to lack military or business experience (Chart 4 above). The coming reshuffle could initiate a change in some of these trends, given some of Xi's revealed preferences, but that will not become clear until this fall.11 Xi is not stereotypical when it comes to China's political cycles: he consolidated power rapidly in his first term.12 The question, then, is whether Xi can continue to accrue power at the party congress, or whether his second term will become complicated by an infusion of Hu Jintao supporters into top party posts. Thus the success of Hu's supporters (particularly on the PSC) is the critical moving part that could determine the political constraints on Xi Jinping from 2017-22. Will Xi be able to arrange a favorable power-sharing agreement? Or will he go further and try to remove this political constraint entirely, even at the risk of political instability? The above points raise two critical questions: Will Chinese politics become more institutionalized? Investors should expect China to maintain a stridently informal political system. Rules and norms can and will be bent, but key principles will be upheld. In other words, the goal posts can be moved, but not too far. Going beyond certain limits would be destabilizing for China's political, institutional, and factional balances, and so far Xi has exhibited poise and the desire to maintain stability that is characteristic of post-1978 Chinese leaders.13 We think there is a low probability that Xi will overthrow all the norms of leadership selection and overturn the balance of power on the Politburo and PSC. If he does, it will raise alarms that he is setting up a new "cult of personality" like Mao, which could cause domestic economic and market instability. Rather, we expect him to modify the rules to maintain control of the PSC without excluding Hu Jintao's faction from power. Will Xi initiate the succession process for 2022? Some commentators suspect that Xi will use the party congress to pave the way for him to cling to power beyond 2022. Clearly Xi could retain the top military post and stay within recent precedent. But any hints at altering recent succession patterns, despite the fact that they are informal, are dangerous for investors in the long run because they raise deep uncertainty about the range of possibilities and political conflicts that could occur upon the actual change of power in 2022. Nevertheless, bear in mind the following points: The question of succession will not be resolved this October. If Xi plans to hang on beyond 2022, then he will continue amassing power and positioning loyalists over the next five years so that he will have full institutional support at the critical moment in 2022 - like Jiang Zemin did when he chose to hang onto the military chairmanship from 2002-04. Thus while Xi may lay some groundwork that makes political observers uneasy, the question will not be resolved either way this fall. Xi's tenure will be an ongoing topic for investors to monitor. Xi is already set to be the most powerful Chinese leader well into the 2020s. Xi's anti-corruption campaign is remarkable evidence of his strength as a ruler. Significantly, this campaign has focused on rooting out Jiang Zemin's influence. Yet Jiang stepped down way back in 2004! In other words, Jiang wielded massive influence between 2004 and 2017. Indeed, Xi's boldest move this year so far was to remove Sun Zhengcai, a Jiang acolyte. It stands to reason that, even if Hu Jintao's faction pulls off a relative victory this year, Xi Jinping's faction will likely be well positioned for a victory in 2022. And if Hu loses out this year, Xi's followers will be better positioned in 2027, as well as 2022. In short, market participants are unlikely to be able to tell the difference this October between (1) Xi getting a boost of political capital for his second term and (2) Xi getting such a big boost that he is on track to overstay his second term.14 Xi might intend to become a dictator and cling to power for longer, but all the market will know for certain is that he has maintained control of the PSC and his general policy framework will be more or less continuous, which is likely a relief in the near term. Finally, investors may not initially care if Xi seizes additional power at the expense of party norms and the succession process. A-shares sold off, but H-shares rallied, when Jiang Zemin decided not to step down entirely in 2002 (Chart 5). Russian stocks and the RUB/USD only fleetingly sold off when Vladimir Putin made clear his intention to return to the presidency yet again in 2011 (Chart 6). Chart 5Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Chart 6Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency While it is impossible to know whether markets will cheer any signs of "Papa Xi" doing away with term limits, it is bad for China's governance in the long run if Xi does not clearly begin grooming a successor with this fall's promotions. An heir-apparent for 2022 would reduce the risks of disruptive power-struggle and would impose a personal deadline on Xi Jinping's reform agenda. That is, a deadline above and beyond the 2020 deadline in the 13th Five Year Plan and the 2021 deadline for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party's founding. That reform agenda, in turn, is essential for improving China's long-term productivity.15 Bottom Line: The Chinese political system is informal, which means that rules and norms can be bent without altering the underlying principles of balance among the key factions and stability of the regime and society as a whole. Our baseline scenario is a market-positive one: that Xi Jinping will win a victory at the party congress, but that he will not overthrow Hu Jintao's followers and abandon the "collective leadership" model, since that would destroy the overall balance of power and heighten domestic political risks. If Xi loses out to the Hu faction, then we would expect Chinese and China-exposed risk assets to sell off, at least initially. If Xi romps to total victory, excluding Hu's clique from power, we would fade any market rally. Such a development would heighten political risks for the foreseeable future. Investment Conclusions The prospect of a Xi-dominated, yet stable, PSC in China is promising because it suggests that China will have at least a marginally improved policy framework for managing the immense challenges it faces. On the economic front, the loss of the demographic dividend threatens to make China old before it gets rich (Chart 7). Xi will need a unified party, as well as loyal supporters in key posts, if he is to re-energize his productivity-enhancing reforms. On the socio-political front, China's intensifying focus on domestic security is symbolized by draconian media censorship ahead of the party congress and, more broadly, a faster rate of spending on public security than national defense in recent years (Chart 8). Such trends suggest that policy makers are concerned about public support. Income inequality and regional disparities are burning issues in an authoritarian country with a larger and more connected middle class and an incipient civil rights movement. Chart 7Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Chart 8Social Stability A Major Concern In China In terms of the likely economic and market response, we have highlighted in the past that larger macro-economic trends tend to swamp any effects of China's five-year party congresses. There is no observable correlation between these events and the deviations of China's nominal GDP, credit, or fixed investment from long-term averages going back to 1992 (Chart 9). Chart 9No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses Moreover, China only has two midterm party congresses to compare to today's party congress, and both occurred in the thick of global financial crises (1997, 2007). This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about any impact on Chinese risk assets. A-shares were mostly flat after the 1997 congress but fell after 2007, while H-shares broadly fell after both meetings, as one might expect given the crises raging around them (Chart 10 A&B). Chart 10AChinese Stocks Were Flat Or Down ... Chart 10B... After Past Midterm Party Congresses H-shares, being highly responsive to global financial market turmoil, fell relative to emerging market (EM) equities as well in 1997 and 2007. A-shares were more insulated and outperformed EM stocks during the 1997 crisis, though not in the 2007 crisis (Chart 11 A&B). What is clear - for Chinese domestic investors - is that A-shares outperformed H-shares after the party congresses in 1997 and 2007 (Chart 12). Chart 11AChinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chart 11B...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis Chart 12A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses This fall, it would not be surprising to see Chinese and global risk-on attitudes prevail in the immediate aftermath of China's party congress: in the broadest sense, the meeting represents a political recapitalization for the Xi administration. Moreover, the backdrop is positive: global and Chinese growth are on a synchronized upswing, Chinese industrial profits have improved, the Fed is on hold, and China's growth risks and capital outflow pressures have diminished.16 This suggests a marginal positive impact for H-shares as well as A-shares. However, Chinese stocks are no longer trading at a discount relative to peers. Moreover, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy believes that the Xi administration's reform reboot will likely bring tougher financial and environmental regulation that will slow credit growth and cut into corporate profits.17 It also seems likely that 2018 will see the dollar stage a comeback as inflation recovers and the Fed resumes hiking rates.18 For all these reasons, we recommend staying long Chinese stocks relative to EM, on the basis that China's reform efforts will be positive for China's productivity outlook but negative for commodities and EM in 2018. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, and Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao, are the two leaders who did not obtain "core" status. 2 The current norms developed mostly in the 1980s and have evolved since. The list of candidates is mostly pre-arranged by the top leaders. The party congress then votes on which candidates to include, leaving a remainder of about 10% who do not take seats in the Central Committee. 3 Nevertheless, the Central Committee could produce a few surprises. It is almost inevitable that a few major personalities will fail to get promoted into key positions, while others will be catapulted to higher places. There will also be some tea leaves to read about the share of negative votes or abstentions and the implications for different candidates. 4 The political report is filled with arcane Communist Party jargon but is very important. It is a consensus document that takes multiple committees a year or more to draft, though Xi Jinping will give the finishing touches. It will cover a comprehensive range of policies and will be scrutinized closely by experts for slight changes of terminology, emphasis, or omission. Key things to watch for are whether Xi adds or removes entire sections; whether he alters developmental goals outlined in previous administrations; and whether he inserts new concepts or revises party ideology to make way for contentious reforms. As for the party's constitution, the main question of any change is whether Xi's leadership philosophy is incorporated into the Communist Party's guiding thought, and if so, whether Xi's name is explicitly attached to it. The latter in particular would be a sign that Xi's political capital within the party is massive. For additional commentary, please see Alice Miller, "How To Read Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress Political Report," China Leadership Monitor 53 (2017), available at www.hoover.org. 5 For the "assault stage" of reform, see Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life And Legacy Of Jiang Zemin (NY: Crown, 2004). Jiang had first targeted SOE reform in 1996 in a speech, he launched the policy itself at the party congress in September 1997, and the state began to implement it at the NPC in March 1998. For Hu Jintao's and Wen Jiabao's administrative reforms after the seventeenth party congress, see Willy Wo Lap Lam, "Beijing Unveils Plan For Super Ministries," China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2008. These reforms, which were only part of the overall agenda after the congress, included restructuring the State Council, empowering the National Development and Reform Commission, and setting up "Super-Ministries" to streamline cabinet-level functions. 6 Rumor has it that Xi will keep his anti-corruption chief, Wang Qishan, on the PSC beyond the 69-year mandatory retirement age, and that he could even replace Premier Li Keqiang. We do not expect either to happen, but both are well within the realm of political possibility - particularly retaining Wang. 7 For this estimate, please see Cheng Li, Chinese Politics In The Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2016), chapter 9. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Traces of Jiang's power will persist here and there, especially if Wang Qishan remains on the PSC, but the overall effect will be a diminishment of this powerful leadership cohort. Symbolically, just as Deng Xiaoping's death loomed over the fifteenth party congress in 1997, Jiang's impending death will loom over the nineteenth party congress today. 10 Indeed judging solely by the cyclical rotation of Chinese leaders according to generation and faction, Hu Jintao's acolytes are favored to outnumber Jiang Zemin's and Xi Jinping's in the 2017 reshuffle. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. However, Xi's effectiveness and good luck since coming to power lead us to believe that he will secure his followers on the PSC and Politburo this year: please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For example, Xi Jinping's recent promotions have re-emphasized SOE managers and his policies have supported large "state champion" SOEs. Please see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, "The rise of state-owned enterprise executives in China's provincial leadership," Brookings, February 22, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 12 He came to the top office at a time of significant public dissatisfaction (2012), which meant that he received a kind of "mandate" to make big changes. His faction dominated the PSC, and his sweeping anti-corruption campaign purged the party and state of formidable rivals. In the fall of 2016 he clinched his status as the "core" of the party. 13 As to specific rules, no one should be surprised if they are altered. Take the age limit, which is hotly debated: Jiang Zemin introduced a hard age limit into the PSC in 1997, specifically in a way that prevented the promotion of a heavy-hitting politician, Qiao Shi, while allowing Jiang to continue in power. Now, assume Xi alters the rules to preserve Wang Qishan: this would not necessarily mean that Xi plans to overstay his term limits, though some observers will take it that way. For market participants, the important point is that slight tweaks to informal rules are unlikely to have a big market impact. Consider that Wang has overseen a massive crackdown on corruption, helping clean up the party's image, and is known to be competent in financial regulation as well. If he is retained, will the market really protest? We doubt it. Having said that, we expect him to retire according to the existing rule of thumb. 14 The exception to this statement is if Xi reforms Communist Party political institutions, as some commentators suspect he might, in order to allow the Central Committee to elect the Politburo and PSC directly from its members, thus expanding "intra-party democracy" while also giving Xi a higher likelihood of staying in power. Please see Bo Zhiyue, "Commentary: Sweeping Reforms Expected At Party Congress, But Will Xi Jinping Get All He Wants?" Channel News Asia, August 20, 2017, available at www.channelnewsasia.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013; and Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Please also see BCA China Investment Strategy, "Understanding China's Master Plan," dated November 20, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China: Earnings Scorecard And Market Tea Leaves," dated September 7, 2017, and "Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows And The RMB Internationalization Process," dated August 24, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations," dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. For the reform agenda, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Bank Showdown," dated September 8, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights U.S. product inventories - particularly gasoline and distillates - will show sharp declines over the balance of September, as refining capacity continues to trail demand in the wake of Hurricane Harvey. U.S. crude inventories will accumulate as refineries slowly come back on line. This will keep the Brent vs. WTI spreads and crack spreads elevated, as refiners outside the U.S. Gulf scramble for crude (Chart of the Week).1 Global product storage facilities will be drained to more normal levels responding to this imbalance. It is understandable that the significance of the increased frequency of messaging from OPEC 2.0's leadership re its willingness to extend production cuts beyond March 2018 would be secondary to hurricane recovery. Nonetheless, we advise investors to stay focused on OPEC 2.0's evolution, particularly next year, as it develops a modus operandi for providing forward guidance to markets and investors. Energy: Overweight. Brent futures are backwardated to January 2018, reflecting a tight market as refiners, particularly in Europe, scramble for barrels to meet U.S. and Latin American product demand. We remain long Brent and WTI $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl call spreads in Dec/17, which are up 183.8% and 30.2%, respectively, since inception. Base Metals: Neutral. Our tactical COMEX copper short initiated last week is up 3.4%. Precious Metals: Neutral. The Dec/17 COMEX Gold contract gapped lower earlier in the week, as a strengthening USD, and a 15 - 0 vote Monday by the UN Security Council to adopt sanctions proposed by the U.S. against N. Korea took some of the luster off the metal. Our long strategic portfolio hedge is up 8.0% since it was initiated May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grains appear to be finding support around current levels. We are bearish, but do not advise shorting the complex, especially with erratic weather as a backdrop. Feature Chart of the WeekBrent - WTI Spread,##BR##Cracks Reflect Refining Scramble The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, the putative leaders of what we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, are taking every opportunity to signal their willingness to consider an extension of their production-cutting agreement beyond March 2018, when it is scheduled to expire.2 We believe this to be part and parcel of an evolving forward guidance strategy, which KSA and Russia will deploy to signal their production intentions over the near term. This is consistent with our view such a strategy is necessary to keep the producer coalition durable, and to work out an even larger plan to begin messaging firms and institutions allocating capital to oil and natural gas markets globally. This is critical for KSA, which will be looking to IPO Saudi ARAMCO next year, and Russia, which is preparing for elections in March and still relies heavily on hydrocarbon exports to fund its government.3 The last thing either needs is out-of-control oil production tanking the market, as it almost did at the beginning of 2016. Other members of the OPEC 2.0 coalition seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) - e.g., Gulf Arab producers and non-OPEC states like Mexico and Kazakhstan - benefit from an oil-production-management framework as well. The significance of OPEC 2.0's emerging forward guidance strategy could be lost amid the devastation of hurricanes Harvey and Irma, which is understandable. But it will be critical to understanding the coalition's strategy regarding how it intends to manage its own production, now that U.S. shale is the marginal barrel in the world, even after Hurricane Harvey disrupted production and refining in Texas, and U.S. crude and product exports from the Gulf. Thus far, OPEC 2.0 continues to deliver on its production cuts, and global demand - which we expect will dip by less than 1mm b/d over the next few weeks due to the hurricanes - remains strong. In a month or two, we expect hurricane recovery efforts will restore lost refining capacity and product demand. As rebuilding goes into high gear, we expect product demand to get a significant boost. OPEC 2.0 Maintains Discipline We will be updating our oil supply/demand balances next week, but so far it appears KSA and Russia are honoring their commitments to restrain production. This allows them to maintain credibility with their respective OPEC and non-OPEC allies within OPEC 2.0, and with the market in general (Chart 2). KSA, in particular, has led the way among OPEC members of the coalition, according to a tally done by S&P Global's Platts, which put KSA's average crude oil production over the January - August 2017 period at 9.97mm b/d vs. its quota of 10.06mm b/d. This is up slightly over the 9.93mm b/d average production for January - June 2017 reported by JODI. KSA's August production reported in the September OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report was 9.95mm b/d. For the January - August 2017 period, Russia's total crude and liquids production averaged 11.22mm b/d, according to U.S. EIA estimates. For the May - August period, it averaged 11.16mm b/d, putting total output 300k b/d below its October 2016 level, against which OPEC 2.0 benchmarks. Russia committed to reducing output by 300k b/d under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement as part of an overall effort to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market to end-March 2018. Russia's crude oil production averaged 10.38mm b/d over the January - June 2017 period, according to JODI data, vs. an October level of 10.51mm b/d. For 2Q17, Russia's average production reported to JODI was 10.31mm b/d, or 200k b/d below its Oct/16 output. Overall OPEC compliance of members with quotas was 112% of agreed volumes last month, meaning OPEC members with quotas under the OPEC 2.0 Agreement are producing 630k b/d below agreed volumes, according to Platts.4 Seven of the OPEC states still covered by the Agreement are producing below quota. Iraq leads in over-production at 4.46mm b/d on average in the January - August period, or 82k b/d over quota. Overall, however, production discipline is holding (Chart 3, panel 2). Chart 2KSA, Russia Leading##BR##OPEC 2.0 By Example Chart 3Production Discipline, Strong Demand##BR##Will Continue To Support Prices Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0's forward guidance to markets, firms and institutions allocating capital in the energy sector has featured frequent re-statements of the coalition's leaders' willingness to extend their production cuts if inventories have not drawn sufficiently by March 2018, when their Agreement is due to expire. We believe this reflects the desire of OPEC 2.0's leadership to maintain the coalition as a long-term production-coordinating body. This will allow the major oil producing nations to communicate production plans and allay investor fears of out-of-control production in the future. Global Demand Will Remain Strong We have noted repeatedly global economic growth has been firing on all cylinders, which will keep global oil demand robust for at least the balance of 2017, and likely into 2018 (Chart 3, panel 3). This is particularly evident in global trade data, which we also will be updating next week.5 Global economic data continue to support this thesis: All 46 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year, the first time this has happened since 2007, according to BCA's Global Investment Strategy (GIS).6 In addition, BCA's Global Investment Strategy notes U.S. growth projections have been broadly stable, but these likely will be revised higher. The easing in U.S. financial conditions since the start of the year should boost real GDP growth over the next few quarters, which, along with the expected boost to product demand coming on the back of hurricane-recovery efforts, will continue to be bullish for refined product demand. Global Product Inventory Draws Will Accelerate OPEC 2.0's efforts to draw global inventories - particularly in the OECD - received an unexpected assist from hurricanes Harvey and Irma. We expect the trend of drawdowns seen over the past few months to accelerate (Chart 4). This will return global product inventories to more normal levels, and, with crude oil inventories accumulating, favor refiners as they scramble to meet demand. Our colleagues at BCA's Energy Sector Strategy upgraded U.S. refiners last week to overweight in line with their view Harvey has the "potential to finally normalize bloated refined product inventories. Over two weeks since the hurricane made landfall, the industry still has 1.0 MMb/d of refining capacity shut down (5 refineries), 2.15 MMb/d of capacity not operating but working on restarting operations (6 refineries), and 1.4 MMb/d of capacity operating below full capacity (5 refineries). Over the past 16 days, at least 55 million barrels of refined product have not been generated, which will result in increased crude inventories and shrinking refined product inventories, benefitting refiners" (Chart 5).7 Chart 4OECD Oil Inventory Declines Will Accelerate Chart 5Refinery Outages From Harvey Persist Over the short term, Brent crude - and related streams pricing off Brent - and products will remain bid, keeping refiner crack spreads elevated, as operations return to normal, and Florida emerges from the economic damage and dislocations caused by Irma. Typically, product demand falls immediately after severe storms, and recovers as rebuilding begins and progresses. We will be updating our balances model next week to reflect the effects of hurricanes and the continued indications of strong global growth. Bottom Line: Demand for refined products will dip slightly - likely less than 1% of global demand - as hurricane-ravaged markets recover. As rebuilding progresses, product demand likely will be boosted. This will drain OECD product inventories in the short term, providing an unexpected assist to OPEC 2.0's efforts to bring global stocks down to five-year average levels. This evolution will favor refiners, as well. OPEC 2.0's forward guidance to markets continues to evolve. In recent weeks, it has featured frequent re-statements of the coalition's leaders' willingness to extend their production cuts if inventories have not drawn sufficiently by March 2018. We believe this messaging is designed to allay fears of another production-free-for-all of the sort that threatened to take global benchmark crude oil prices below $20/bbl last year. It is too early to expect OPEC 2.0 will replace the original OPEC Cartel. But, we believe KSA and Russia are signaling their common desire to make OPEC 2.0 a durable feature of budgeting and investment considerations over the medium term. Actions speak louder than words, in this regard. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 A "crack spread" refers to the difference in refined-product prices and crude oil prices. It takes its name from the "cracking" long-chain hydrocarbon bonds in crude oil required to produce refined products like gasoline and diesel fuel. The Brent - WTI spread is the price difference in USD/barrel ($/bbl) between the global benchmark crudes. 2 Please see, for example, "Saudi Arabia Says It's Open to Another OPEC Cuts Extension," updated on bloomberg.com September 11, 2017; "Saudi, UAE agree extension of oil cuts may be considered - statement," published on the same day on reuters.com's U.K. service; and "Russia's Novak says to consider extension of oil cut deal if glut persists" published on reuters.com September 6, 20107. We have repeated noted markets are looking for OPEC 2.0 to provide forward guidance, if the principals to the deal intend to maintain a durable coalition. Please see, e.g., "KSA's Tactics Advance OPEC 2.0's Agenda," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report August 10, 2017, and available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 The U.S. CIA estimates Russia exported 5.1mm b/d of crude oil in 2016, roughly half of crude production. This squares with exports reported by the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI), a transnational agency headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Last year, Russia also exported 223 billion cubic meters of natural gas. KSA exported 7.65mm b/d of crude oil last year, according to JODI, or close to 75% of KSA's production. 4 Please see S&P Global Platts OPEC Guide published September 7, 2017, online. 5 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Trade And Commodity Data Point To Higher Inflation," published on July 27, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Central Bank Showdown," published on September 8, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report "Rebalancing Recommendations," published on September 13, 2017. It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Special Report Highlights The Communist Party will hold its nineteenth National Congress on Oct. 18. This is the "midterm election" for President Xi Jinping, whose political capital will be replenished; Recent Chinese leaders have a greater impact in their second term than their first; Base case: Xi consolidates power while preserving a balance on the Politburo Standing Committee; Stay long Chinese equities versus emerging market peers. Feature China's Communist Party will hold the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18-25. This is a critical "midterm" leadership reshuffle that will also mark the halfway point of General Secretary Xi Jinping's term in office. Investors around the world will watch closely to see what insight can be gained about the political trajectory of the world's second-largest economy. This report serves as a "primer" for readers to understand the party congress and its investment takeaways. Why Is The Party Congress Important? Because it rotates China's political leaders! Chart 1So Long To The 18th Central Committee In a political system without popular representation, the rotation of personnel according to promotion and retirement is the only way to rejuvenate the policy process. The average rate of turnover on the Communist Party's Central Committee at each five-year congress has been 62%, which is a remarkably high rate (Chart 1). It reveals an underrated dynamism in Chinese politics. This leadership rotation also allows the top leader (Xi Jinping) to consolidate power by putting his supporters into key positions. This in turn alters the policymaking environment and the way in which China formulates policies and responds to external events. China has a "parallel" political system in which the ruling Communist Party operates alongside (and above) the state. Xi Jinping is "General Secretary" of the party, president of the People's Republic of China, and (not least) chairman of the Central Military Commission. The party maintains supremacy by independently controlling the state and the army. Since fall 2016, Xi has been dubbed the "core" of the Communist Party, putting him on a par with previous core leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin.1 The party's nearly 90 million members convene large congresses of about 2,000 members every five years to select the membership of the key decision-making bodies (Diagram 1), a practice known as "intra-party democracy."2 The key body is the Central Committee, which consists of about 200 full members and another 100-some alternative members. The Central Committee then "elects" the General Secretary, Political Bureau (a.k.a. "Politburo," the top 25 or so leaders) and Politburo Standing Committee (the "PSC," the top five-to-nine leaders) - though in reality the Politburo and the PSC are chosen through intense negotiations among the incumbent PSC and former leaders. Diagram 1National Party Congress Of The Communist Party Of China The handful of men on the PSC are the chief decision-makers in China, often in league with the broader Politburo (and former PSC members who exercise some power through the back door). Most of the key personnel decisions will have been made before the Central Committee votes.3 Hence the current top leaders have a chance to put their loyalists and supporters in key positions, potentially improving the implementation of their agenda. The outgoing eighteenth Central Committee will meet for its last session on October 11, and then the nineteenth party congress will meet on October 18 to elect a new Central Committee. It will in turn ratify the new Politburo and PSC. At the beginning of the party congress, Xi Jinping will deliver a keynote political report on the state of the party and nation, reviewing the progress of the past five years and mapping out a vision for the next five. The party congress will also amend the Communist Party constitution.4 By the end of the week, the members of the new PSC will step out to meet the press together for the first time. Only later will the party's key decisions be incorporated by the state, i.e. China's central government, including key personnel appointments and policy initiatives. This will occur when the legislature, the National People's Congress ("NPC," not to be confused with party congress), convenes at its annual "Two Sessions" in early March 2018. Chart 2Bold Action Can Follow Midterm Congresses Any NPC session following a five-year party congress carries more weight than usual not only because it approves of the party congress's leadership decisions but also because it kicks off major new policy initiatives. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji was appointed to launch the "assault stage" of President Jiang Zemin's reforms of state-owned enterprise at the NPC in March 1998 (Chart 2). Similarly, Hu Jintao's Premier Wen Jiabao launched extensive administrative reforms at the NPC meeting in early 2008.5 How does a "midterm" party congress differ from others? Typically, in even-numbered years, the top two leaders change over, as with Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang in 2012. These transitions are highly significant as they mark a leadership succession, a transfer of power to a new general secretary in a heavily centralized, authoritarian system that does not have a codified succession process. By contrast, in odd-numbered years like 2017, the Communist Party promotes, demotes, and retires a large number of other top leaders. Thus Xi Jinping's place is assured, and Li Keqiang's place is probably assured as well, but most likely the other five members of the PSC will be gone.6 This year's transition is also significant because the total turnover on the Central Committee is expected to be higher than usual (perhaps 70%) as a result of President Xi's aggressive anti-corruption campaign and other factors (see Chart 1 above).7 Leaders often spend the bulk of their first five years consolidating power and the second five years pushing forward their true policy agenda. Even President Hu Jintao, who failed to see his preferred social safety-net policies fully implemented, had a vastly more influential second term than first term in office: the 2007-12 period saw the 4 trillion RMB stimulus package to thwart the Global Recession. Moreover, Chinese leaders do not normally become "lame ducks" toward the end of their last term: Deng Xiaoping recommitted the country to pro-market reforms in 1992, after having stepped down as general secretary, while Jiang Zemin reached the height of his power at the end of his term in 2002, when he chose to hang onto the position of top military leader for two extra years. Many observers suspect that Xi Jinping will hold onto power beyond 2022. Bottom Line: The National Party Congress coincides with a sweeping rotation of the Chinese political elites, which is a critical way of ensuring that China, unlike a monarchy or personalized "dictatorship," has an orderly way of updating its policy-makers and (hopefully) policies. Midterm reshuffles allow top leaders to promote supporters and re-energize the implementation of their policy agenda. The past two Chinese leaders were more consequential in their second term than their first. How Is The Nineteenth Congress Unique? Chart 3Xi Jinping's Generation Taking Command The most important change this year is the passing of a generation.8 China's political elites are classified into "leadership generations," with Mao Zedong symbolizing the first generation, Deng Xiaoping the second, Jiang Zemin the third, Hu Jintao the fourth, and Xi Jinping the fifth generation. The current reshuffle will see the following generational trends: The End of the Jiang Zemin Era: The key figures retiring on the PSC are those who were born before 1950 and put in place by Jiang Zemin. Thus in a very real sense, Jiang Zemin's influence is coming to a close (Chart 3).9 This generational shift is likely to force the retirement of 11 of the 25-member Politburo, and five of the seven PSC members (Table 1), as well as other major figures, such as the long-serving central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Table 1Chinese Leaders Set To Retire On Politburo And Politburo Standing Committee Jiang-era leaders are defined by certain characteristics that are now fading. As Chart 4 demonstrates, these leaders came of age in the early, idealistic days of the Revolution, leading them to have a conservative streak in ideological matters. Yet they are well-known pragmatists in economic matters. They studied engineering and natural sciences in answer to the call for the young to develop the country's heavy industry. They tended to hail from capitalist-leaning coastal provinces, and often gained first-hand experience operating China's state-owned enterprises. This last point became especially important when they pioneered pro-market corporate reforms in the 1990s. By contrast, fewer of them served as government ministers on the State Council (China's cabinet) than subsequent generations. Chart 4Leadership Characteristics Of The Politburo Standing Committee The Middle of the Hu Jintao Era: The passing of Jiang's cohort will necessarily give his successor Hu Jintao's cohort a boost in relative influence at the top levels. Hu's generation is marked by leaders who studied the "soft sciences" (like law and economics). Several of them (including Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao) have links with the politically liberal wing of the party. They have far less experience in the military or state-owned business, but are more likely to have governing experience in the central government and especially the provinces (Chart 4 above). This includes the interior provinces from which they often hail. They are thus highly attuned to the problem of maintaining social stability, arguably to the neglect of economic dynamism. Hu Jintao's influence may be underrated. Xi's administration has shown important continuities with Hu's, and Hu's followers are well positioned in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the provincial governments (though not the current PSC). If Xi does not take decisive moves to replace some of Hu's acolytes on the PSC at the coming party congress, then Hu's men will likely outnumber Xi's on the PSC as they graduate up the ladder from the Politburo.10 A strong showing by Hu's faction could affect China's policy priorities, given that Xi showed different preferences from Hu in the first few years of his rule (Table 2). However, the factions do not maintain consistent policy platforms. The bottom line is that Hu's faction could act as more or less of a constraint on Xi regardless of what policies the latter pursues. Table 2Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents The True Beginning of the Xi Jinping Era: Xi's generation has yet to reveal its full character - the demographics of the new Central Committee will help determine it. So far it is a continuation of the trends above: more likely than not to come from interior than coastal provinces, to have studied the humanities, to have governed in the provinces or central ministries, and to lack military or business experience (Chart 4 above). The coming reshuffle could initiate a change in some of these trends, given some of Xi's revealed preferences, but that will not become clear until this fall.11 Xi is not stereotypical when it comes to China's political cycles: he consolidated power rapidly in his first term.12 The question, then, is whether Xi can continue to accrue power at the party congress, or whether his second term will become complicated by an infusion of Hu Jintao supporters into top party posts. Thus the success of Hu's supporters (particularly on the PSC) is the critical moving part that could determine the political constraints on Xi Jinping from 2017-22. Will Xi be able to arrange a favorable power-sharing agreement? Or will he go further and try to remove this political constraint entirely, even at the risk of political instability? The above points raise two critical questions: Will Chinese politics become more institutionalized? Investors should expect China to maintain a stridently informal political system. Rules and norms can and will be bent, but key principles will be upheld. In other words, the goal posts can be moved, but not too far. Going beyond certain limits would be destabilizing for China's political, institutional, and factional balances, and so far Xi has exhibited poise and the desire to maintain stability that is characteristic of post-1978 Chinese leaders.13 We think there is a low probability that Xi will overthrow all the norms of leadership selection and overturn the balance of power on the Politburo and PSC. If he does, it will raise alarms that he is setting up a new "cult of personality" like Mao, which could cause domestic economic and market instability. Rather, we expect him to modify the rules to maintain control of the PSC without excluding Hu Jintao's faction from power. Will Xi initiate the succession process for 2022? Some commentators suspect that Xi will use the party congress to pave the way for him to cling to power beyond 2022. Clearly Xi could retain the top military post and stay within recent precedent. But any hints at altering recent succession patterns, despite the fact that they are informal, are dangerous for investors in the long run because they raise deep uncertainty about the range of possibilities and political conflicts that could occur upon the actual change of power in 2022. Nevertheless, bear in mind the following points: The question of succession will not be resolved this October. If Xi plans to hang on beyond 2022, then he will continue amassing power and positioning loyalists over the next five years so that he will have full institutional support at the critical moment in 2022 - like Jiang Zemin did when he chose to hang onto the military chairmanship from 2002-04. Thus while Xi may lay some groundwork that makes political observers uneasy, the question will not be resolved either way this fall. Xi's tenure will be an ongoing topic for investors to monitor. Xi is already set to be the most powerful Chinese leader well into the 2020s. Xi's anti-corruption campaign is remarkable evidence of his strength as a ruler. Significantly, this campaign has focused on rooting out Jiang Zemin's influence. Yet Jiang stepped down way back in 2004! In other words, Jiang wielded massive influence between 2004 and 2017. Indeed, Xi's boldest move this year so far was to remove Sun Zhengcai, a Jiang acolyte. It stands to reason that, even if Hu Jintao's faction pulls off a relative victory this year, Xi Jinping's faction will likely be well positioned for a victory in 2022. And if Hu loses out this year, Xi's followers will be better positioned in 2027, as well as 2022. In short, market participants are unlikely to be able to tell the difference this October between (1) Xi getting a boost of political capital for his second term and (2) Xi getting such a big boost that he is on track to overstay his second term.14 Xi might intend to become a dictator and cling to power for longer, but all the market will know for certain is that he has maintained control of the PSC and his general policy framework will be more or less continuous, which is likely a relief in the near term. Finally, investors may not initially care if Xi seizes additional power at the expense of party norms and the succession process. A-shares sold off, but H-shares rallied, when Jiang Zemin decided not to step down entirely in 2002 (Chart 5). Russian stocks and the RUB/USD only fleetingly sold off when Vladimir Putin made clear his intention to return to the presidency yet again in 2011 (Chart 6). Chart 5Foreign Investors Cheered Jiang's Clinging To Power Chart 6Russian Investors Cheered Putin's Second Presidency While it is impossible to know whether markets will cheer any signs of "Papa Xi" doing away with term limits, it is bad for China's governance in the long run if Xi does not clearly begin grooming a successor with this fall's promotions. An heir-apparent for 2022 would reduce the risks of disruptive power-struggle and would impose a personal deadline on Xi Jinping's reform agenda. That is, a deadline above and beyond the 2020 deadline in the 13th Five Year Plan and the 2021 deadline for the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party's founding. That reform agenda, in turn, is essential for improving China's long-term productivity.15 Bottom Line: The Chinese political system is informal, which means that rules and norms can be bent without altering the underlying principles of balance among the key factions and stability of the regime and society as a whole. Our baseline scenario is a market-positive one: that Xi Jinping will win a victory at the party congress, but that he will not overthrow Hu Jintao's followers and abandon the "collective leadership" model, since that would destroy the overall balance of power and heighten domestic political risks. If Xi loses out to the Hu faction, then we would expect Chinese and China-exposed risk assets to sell off, at least initially. If Xi romps to total victory, excluding Hu's clique from power, we would fade any market rally. Such a development would heighten political risks for the foreseeable future. Investment Conclusions The prospect of a Xi-dominated, yet stable, PSC in China is promising because it suggests that China will have at least a marginally improved policy framework for managing the immense challenges it faces. On the economic front, the loss of the demographic dividend threatens to make China old before it gets rich (Chart 7). Xi will need a unified party, as well as loyal supporters in key posts, if he is to re-energize his productivity-enhancing reforms. On the socio-political front, China's intensifying focus on domestic security is symbolized by draconian media censorship ahead of the party congress and, more broadly, a faster rate of spending on public security than national defense in recent years (Chart 8). Such trends suggest that policy makers are concerned about public support. Income inequality and regional disparities are burning issues in an authoritarian country with a larger and more connected middle class and an incipient civil rights movement. Chart 7Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth China's Demographic Challenge Chart 8Social Stability A Major Concern In China In terms of the likely economic and market response, we have highlighted in the past that larger macro-economic trends tend to swamp any effects of China's five-year party congresses. There is no observable correlation between these events and the deviations of China's nominal GDP, credit, or fixed investment from long-term averages going back to 1992 (Chart 9). Chart 9No Clear Policy Impact From Past Party Congresses Moreover, China only has two midterm party congresses to compare to today's party congress, and both occurred in the thick of global financial crises (1997, 2007). This makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about any impact on Chinese risk assets. A-shares were mostly flat after the 1997 congress but fell after 2007, while H-shares broadly fell after both meetings, as one might expect given the crises raging around them (Chart 10 A&B). Chart 10AChinese Stocks Were Flat Or Down ... Chart 10B... After Past Midterm Party Congresses H-shares, being highly responsive to global financial market turmoil, fell relative to emerging market (EM) equities as well in 1997 and 2007. A-shares were more insulated and outperformed EM stocks during the 1997 crisis, though not in the 2007 crisis (Chart 11 A&B). What is clear - for Chinese domestic investors - is that A-shares outperformed H-shares after the party congresses in 1997 and 2007 (Chart 12). Chart 11AChinese Stocks Sold Off In Relative Terms... Chart 11B...Except A-Shares During The Asian Crisis Chart 12A-Shares Outperformed H-Shares After Midterm Congresses This fall, it would not be surprising to see Chinese and global risk-on attitudes prevail in the immediate aftermath of China's party congress: in the broadest sense, the meeting represents a political recapitalization for the Xi administration. Moreover, the backdrop is positive: global and Chinese growth are on a synchronized upswing, Chinese industrial profits have improved, the Fed is on hold, and China's growth risks and capital outflow pressures have diminished.16 This suggests a marginal positive impact for H-shares as well as A-shares. However, Chinese stocks are no longer trading at a discount relative to peers. Moreover, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy believes that the Xi administration's reform reboot will likely bring tougher financial and environmental regulation that will slow credit growth and cut into corporate profits.17 It also seems likely that 2018 will see the dollar stage a comeback as inflation recovers and the Fed resumes hiking rates.18 For all these reasons, we recommend staying long Chinese stocks relative to EM, on the basis that China's reform efforts will be positive for China's productivity outlook but negative for commodities and EM in 2018. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Mao's successor Hua Guofeng, and Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao, are the two leaders who did not obtain "core" status. 2 The current norms developed mostly in the 1980s and have evolved since. The list of candidates is mostly pre-arranged by the top leaders. The party congress then votes on which candidates to include, leaving a remainder of about 10% who do not take seats in the Central Committee. 3 Nevertheless, the Central Committee could produce a few surprises. It is almost inevitable that a few major personalities will fail to get promoted into key positions, while others will be catapulted to higher places. There will also be some tea leaves to read about the share of negative votes or abstentions and the implications for different candidates. 4 The political report is filled with arcane Communist Party jargon but is very important. It is a consensus document that takes multiple committees a year or more to draft, though Xi Jinping will give the finishing touches. It will cover a comprehensive range of policies and will be scrutinized closely by experts for slight changes of terminology, emphasis, or omission. Key things to watch for are whether Xi adds or removes entire sections; whether he alters developmental goals outlined in previous administrations; and whether he inserts new concepts or revises party ideology to make way for contentious reforms. As for the party's constitution, the main question of any change is whether Xi's leadership philosophy is incorporated into the Communist Party's guiding thought, and if so, whether Xi's name is explicitly attached to it. The latter in particular would be a sign that Xi's political capital within the party is massive. For additional commentary, please see Alice Miller, "How To Read Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress Political Report," China Leadership Monitor 53 (2017), available at www.hoover.org. 5 For the "assault stage" of reform, see Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life And Legacy Of Jiang Zemin (NY: Crown, 2004). Jiang had first targeted SOE reform in 1996 in a speech, he launched the policy itself at the party congress in September 1997, and the state began to implement it at the NPC in March 1998. For Hu Jintao's and Wen Jiabao's administrative reforms after the seventeenth party congress, see Willy Wo Lap Lam, "Beijing Unveils Plan For Super Ministries," China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 4, 2008. These reforms, which were only part of the overall agenda after the congress, included restructuring the State Council, empowering the National Development and Reform Commission, and setting up "Super-Ministries" to streamline cabinet-level functions. 6 Rumor has it that Xi will keep his anti-corruption chief, Wang Qishan, on the PSC beyond the 69-year mandatory retirement age, and that he could even replace Premier Li Keqiang. We do not expect either to happen, but both are well within the realm of political possibility - particularly retaining Wang. 7 For this estimate, please see Cheng Li, Chinese Politics In The Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2016), chapter 9. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Traces of Jiang's power will persist here and there, especially if Wang Qishan remains on the PSC, but the overall effect will be a diminishment of this powerful leadership cohort. Symbolically, just as Deng Xiaoping's death loomed over the fifteenth party congress in 1997, Jiang's impending death will loom over the nineteenth party congress today. 10 Indeed judging solely by the cyclical rotation of Chinese leaders according to generation and faction, Hu Jintao's acolytes are favored to outnumber Jiang Zemin's and Xi Jinping's in the 2017 reshuffle. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. However, Xi's effectiveness and good luck since coming to power lead us to believe that he will secure his followers on the PSC and Politburo this year: please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook 2017, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For example, Xi Jinping's recent promotions have re-emphasized SOE managers and his policies have supported large "state champion" SOEs. Please see Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, "The rise of state-owned enterprise executives in China's provincial leadership," Brookings, February 22, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu. 12 He came to the top office at a time of significant public dissatisfaction (2012), which meant that he received a kind of "mandate" to make big changes. His faction dominated the PSC, and his sweeping anti-corruption campaign purged the party and state of formidable rivals. In the fall of 2016 he clinched his status as the "core" of the party. 13 As to specific rules, no one should be surprised if they are altered. Take the age limit, which is hotly debated: Jiang Zemin introduced a hard age limit into the PSC in 1997, specifically in a way that prevented the promotion of a heavy-hitting politician, Qiao Shi, while allowing Jiang to continue in power. Now, assume Xi alters the rules to preserve Wang Qishan: this would not necessarily mean that Xi plans to overstay his term limits, though some observers will take it that way. For market participants, the important point is that slight tweaks to informal rules are unlikely to have a big market impact. Consider that Wang has overseen a massive crackdown on corruption, helping clean up the party's image, and is known to be competent in financial regulation as well. If he is retained, will the market really protest? We doubt it. Having said that, we expect him to retire according to the existing rule of thumb. 14 The exception to this statement is if Xi reforms Communist Party political institutions, as some commentators suspect he might, in order to allow the Central Committee to elect the Politburo and PSC directly from its members, thus expanding "intra-party democracy" while also giving Xi a higher likelihood of staying in power. Please see Bo Zhiyue, "Commentary: Sweeping Reforms Expected At Party Congress, But Will Xi Jinping Get All He Wants?" Channel News Asia, August 20, 2017, available at www.channelnewsasia.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," in "The Great Risk Rotation - December 2013," dated December 11, 2013; and Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Please also see BCA China Investment Strategy, "Understanding China's Master Plan," dated November 20, 2013, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "China: Earnings Scorecard And Market Tea Leaves," dated September 7, 2017, and "Monitoring Chinese Capital Outflows And The RMB Internationalization Process," dated August 24, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Closer Look At Chinese Equity Valuations," dated August 31, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. For the reform agenda, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Central Bank Showdown," dated September 8, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Highlights We estimate total Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) investment will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020. The size of BRI investments is about 47 times smaller than China's annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Therefore, a slump in domestic capital spending in China will fully offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets from BRI. Investors should consider buying these bourses in sell-off. On a positive note, BRI leads to improved global capital allocation, allows China to export its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, and boosts recipient countries' demand for Chinese exports. Feature China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative (BRI) is on an accelerating path (Chart I-1), with total investment expected to rise from US$120 billion to about US$170 billion over the next three years. Chart I-1Accelerating BRI Investment From China The BRI has been one of the central government's main priorities since late 2013. The primary objectives of the BRI are: To export China's excess capacity in heavy industries and construction to other countries - i.e., build infrastructure in other countries; To expand the country's international influence via a grand plan of funding investments into the 69 countries along the Belt and the Road (B&R) (Chart I-2); To build transportation and communication networks as well as energy supply to facilitate trade and provide China access to other regions, especially Europe and Africa; To facilitate the internationalization of the RMB; To speed up the development of China's poor (and sometimes restive) central and western regions, namely by turning them into economic hubs between coastal China and the BRI countries in the rest of Asia; To boost China's strategic position in central, south, and southeast Asia through security linkages arising from BRI cooperation, as well as from assets (like ports) that could provide military as well as commercial uses in the long run. From a cyclical investment perspective, the pertinent questions for investors are: How big is the current scale of BRI investment, and where is the funding coming from? Will rising BRI investment be able to offset the negative impact from a potential slowdown in Chinese capex spending? Which frontier markets will benefit most from Chinese BRI investment? Chart I-2The Belt And Road Program China's BRI: Scale And Funding Scale China has been implementing its strategic BRI since 2013. To date it has invested in 69 B&R countries through two major approaches: infrastructure project contracts and outward direct investment (ODI). The first approach - investment through projects - is the main mechanism of BRI implementation. BRI projects center on infrastructure development in recipient countries, encompassing construction of transportation (railways, highways, subways, and bridges), energy (power plants and pipelines) and telecommunication infrastructure. The cumulative size of the signed contracts with B&R countries over the past three years is US$383 billion, of which US$182 billion of projects are already completed. However, the value of newly signed contracts in a year does not equal the actual project investment occurred in that year, as generally these contracts will take several years to be implemented and completed. Table I-1 shows our projection of Chinese BRI project investment over the years of 2017-2020, which will reach US$168 billion in 2020. This projection is based on two assumptions: an average three-year investing and implementation period for BRI projects from the date of signing the contract to the commercial operation date (COD) of the project, and an average annual growth rate of 10% for the total value of the annual newly signed contracts over the next three years. Table I-1Projection Of Chinese BRI Project Investment Over The Years 2017-2020 The basis for the first assumption is that the majority of the completed BRI projects were by and large finished within three years, and most of the existing and future BRI projects are also expected to be completed within a three-year period.1 The second assumption of the 10% future growth rate is reasonable, given the 13.5% average annual growth rate for the past two years, but from a low base. These large-scale infrastructure projects were led mainly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and often in the form of BOTs (Build-Operate Transfers), Design-Build-Operate (DBOs), BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfers), BOO (Build-Own-Operate) and other types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). After a Chinese SOE successfully wins a bid on an infrastructure project in a hosting country, the company will typically seek financing from a Chinese source to fund the project, and then execute construction of the project. After the completion of the project, depending on the terms pre-specified in the contract, the company will operate the project for a number of years, which will generate revenues as returns for the company. The second approach - investing into the recipient countries through ODI - is insignificant, with an amount of US$14.5 billion last year. This was only 12% of BRI project investment, and only 8.5% of China's total ODI. Chinese ODI has so far been mainly focused on tertiary industries, particularly in developed countries that can educate China in technology, management, innovation and branding. Besides, most of the Chinese ODI has been in the form of cross-border M&A purchases by Chinese firms, with only a small portion of the ODI targeted at green-field projects, which do not lead to an increase in demand for commodities and capital goods. Therefore, in this report we will only focus on the analysis of project investment as a proxy of Chinese BRI investment, as opposed to ODI. The focal point of this analysis is to gauge the demand outlook for commodities and capital goods originating from BRI. The Sources Of Chinese Funding The projected US$120 billion to US$170 billion BRI investment every year seems affordable for China. This is small in comparison to about US$3-3.5 trillion of new money origination, or about US$3 trillion of bank and shadow-bank credit (excluding borrowing by central and local governments) annually in the past two years. The financing sources for China's BRI investment include China's two policy banks (China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), two newly established funding sources (Silk Road Fund and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank), Chinese commercial banks, and other financial institutions/funds. Table I-2 shows our estimate of the breakdown of BRI funding in 2016. Table I-2BRI Funding Sources In 2016 China Development Bank (CDB): As the country's largest development bank, the CDB has total assets of US$2.1 trillion, translating into more than US$350 billion of potential BRI projects over the next 10 years, which could well result in US$35 billion in funding annually from the CDB. The Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM): The EXIM holds an outstanding balance of over 1,000 BRI projects, and has also set up a special lending scheme worth US$19.5 billion over the next three years. This will increase EXIM's BRI lending from last year's US$5 billion to at least US$6.5 billion per year. Silk Road Fund (SRF): The Chinese government launched the SRF in late 2014 with initial funding of US$40 billion to directly support the BRI mission. This year, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged a funding boost to the SRF with an extra 100 billion yuan (US$15 billion). Therefore, SRF funding to BRI projects over the next three years will be higher than the US$6 billion recorded last year. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): The AIIB was established in October 2014 and started lending in January 2016. It only invested US$1.7 billion in loans for nine BRI projects last year. The BRI funding from the AIIB is set to accelerate as the number of member countries has significantly expanded from an original 57 to 80 currently. Chinese commercial banks: Chinese domestic commercial banks, the largest source of BRI funding, have been driving BRI investment momentum. Chinese commercial banks currently fund about 62% of BRI investment and the main financiers are Bank of China (BoC) and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). After lending about US$60 billion over the past two years, the BOC plans to provide US$40 billion this year. The ICBC has 412 BRI projects in its pipeline, involving a total investment of US$337 billion over the next 10 years, which will likely result in an annual US$34 billion in BRI investment. The China Construction Bank (CCB) also has over 180 BRI projects in its pipeline, worth a total investment of US$90 billion over the next five to 10 years. Only three commercial banks will likely fund US$80 billion of BRI projects over the next three years. A few more words about the currency used in BRI funding. The U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB will be the two main currencies employed in BRI funding. Chinese companies can get loans denominated either in RMBs or in USDs from domestic commercial banks/policy banks/special funds/multilateral international banks to buy machinery and equipment (ME) from China. For some PPP projects that involve non-Chinese companies or governments (i.e. those of recipient countries), the local presence can use either USD loans or their central bank's Chinese RMB reserves from the currency swap deal made with China's central bank. China has long looked to recycle its large current account surpluses by pursuing investments in hard assets (land, commodities, infrastructure, etc.) across the world, to mitigate its structural habit of building up large foreign exchange reserves that are mostly invested in low-interest-bearing American government securities. Risky but profitable BRI infrastructure projects are a continuation of this trend. China had so far signed bilateral currency swap agreements worth an aggregate of more than 1 trillion yuan (US$150 billion) with 22 countries or regions along the B&R. The establishment of cross-border RMB payment, clearing and settlement has been gaining momentum, and the use of RMB has been expanding gradually in global trade and investment, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks. Bottom Line: We estimate total BRI investment with Chinese financing will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020, and Chinese financial institutions will be capable of funding it. Can BRI Offset A Slowdown In China's Capex? From a global investors' perspective, a pertinent question around the BRI program is whether the BRI-funded capital spending can offset the potential slowdown in China's domestic investment expenditure. This is essential to gauge the demand outlook for industrial commodities and capital goods worldwide. Our short answer is not likely. Table I-3 reveals that in 2016, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in China was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics to be at RMB 32 trillion, or $4.8 trillion. Table I-3China's GFCF* Vs. China's BRI Investment Expenditures Meantime, China-funded BRI investment expenditure amounted to US$102 billion in 2016. In a nutshell, last year GFCF in China was about 47 times larger than BRI investment expenditures. The question is how much of a drop in mainland GFCF would need to take place to offset the projected BRI investment. The latter will likely amount to US$139 billion in 2018, US$153 billion in 2019 and US$168 billion in 2020. Provided estimated sizes of Chinese GFCF in 2017 are RMB 33.5 trillion (US$4.9 trillion), it would take only 0.4% contraction in GFCF in 2018, 0.3% in 2019 and 2020 to completely offset the rise in BRI-related investment expenditure (Table 3). Chart I-3Record Low Credit Growth... We derive these results by comparing the expected absolute change in BRI capital spending expenditures with the size of China's GFCF. The expected increases in BRI in 2018, 2019 and 2020 are US$20 billion, US$14 billion and US$15 billion. Given the starting point of GFCF in 2017 was US$4.9 trillion, it will take only about 0.4% of decline in $4.9 trillion to offset the $20 billion rise in BRI. In the same way, we estimated that it would take only an annual 0.3% contraction in nominal GFCF in China to completely offset the rise in BRI capital spending in both 2019 and 2020. To be sure, we are not certain that the GFCF will contract in each of the next three years. Yet, odds of such shrinkage in one of these years are substantial. As always, investors face uncertainty, and they need to make assessments. Is an annual 0.4% decline in China's GFCF likely in 2018? In our opinion, it is quite likely, based on our money and credit growth, as illustrated in Chart I-3. Importantly, interest rates in China continue to drift higher. A higher cost of borrowing and regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking will lead to a meaningful deterioration in China's credit origination. The latter will weigh on investment expenditures. The basis is that the overwhelming portion of GFCF is funded by credit to public and private debtors, and aggregate credit growth has already relapsed. Chart I-4 and Chart I-5 demonstrate that money and credit impulses lead several high-frequency economic variables that tend to correlate with capital expenditure cycles. Chart I-4Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... Chart I-5...Slowing Capital Expenditure Therefore, we conclude that meaningful weakness in the GFCF is quite likely in 2018, and that it will spill out to 2019 if the government does not counteract it with major stimulus. By and large, odds are that a slump in domestic capital spending in China offset the rise in BRI-related capital expenditures. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has written substantively on motives surrounding China's capital spending and how it is set to slow, and we will not cover these topics. Some reasons why investment spending is bound to slow include: considerable credit excesses/high indebtedness of companies; misallocation of capital and resultant weak cash flow position of companies; non-performing assets on banks' and other creditors' balance sheets and their weak liquidity position. To be sure, investors often ask whether or not material weakness in mainland growth will lead the authorities to stimulate. Odds are they will. Yet, before the slowdown becomes visible in economic numbers, financial markets will likely sell-off. In brief, policymakers are currently tightening and will be late to reverse their policies. Finally, should one compare the entire GFCF, or only part of it? There is a dearth of data to analyze various types of capital spending. In a nutshell, Chart I-6 reveals that installation accounts for roughly 70% of investment, while purchases of equipment account for the remaining 18%. Therefore, we guess the composition of BRI projects will be similar to structure of investment spending in China, and hence it makes sense to use overall GFCF as a comparative benchmark. In addition, the GFCF data is a better measure for Chinese capital spending over Chinese fixed asset investment (FAI) data, as the FAI number includes land values, which have risen significantly over the years and already account for about half of the FAI (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chart I-7GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI Bottom Line: While it is hard to forecast and time exact dynamics over the next several years, odds are that the next 12-24 months will turn out to be a period of a slump in China's capital spending. This will more than offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Implication For Frontier Markets The BRI, which currently covers 69 countries, will keep expanding its coverage for the foreseeable future. Insofar as it is a way for China to create new markets for its exports, Beijing has no reason to exclude any country. In practice, however, certain countries will receive greater dedication, for the simple reason that their development fits into China's political, military and strategic interests as well as economic interests. As most of the investments are infrastructure-focused, aiming to improve transportation, energy and telecommunication connectivity as well as special economic zones, the recipient countries, especially underdeveloped frontier markets, will benefit considerably from China's BRI. Table I-4 shows that Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets, as the planned BRI investment in those countries amounts to a significant amount of their GDP. Chart I-8 also shows that, in terms of current account deficit coverage by the Chinese BRI funding, the three countries that stand to benefit most are also Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana. Table I-1The B&R Countries That Benefit From ##br##China's BRI Investment (Ranged From High-To-Low) Chart I-8Chinese BRI Funding's Impact On ##br##External Account Of B&R Countries Of these, clearly Pakistan and Kazakhstan have the advantage of attracting China's strategic as well as economic interest: Kazakhstan offers China greater access into Central Asia and broader Eurasia; Pakistan is a large-population market that offers a means of accessing the Indian Ocean without the geopolitical complications of Southeast and East Asia. These states also neighbor China's restive Xinjiang, where Beijing hopes economic development can discourage separatist and terrorist activities. Pakistan Pakistan is a key prospect for China's exports in of itself, and in the long run offers a maritime waystation and an energy transit hub separate from China's other supply lines. For China, it is a critical alternative to Myanmar and the Malacca Strait. In April 2015, China announced a remarkable US$46.4 billion CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) investment plan in Pakistan, equal to 16.4% of Pakistani GDP. It is expected to be implemented over five years. In particular, the planned US$33.2 billion energy investment will increase Pakistan's existing power capacity by 70% from 2017 to 2023. On the whole, China's CPEC plan will be significantly positive to economic development in Pakistan in the long run, but in the near term it is still not enough to boost the nation's competitiveness (Chart I-9A, top panel). Chart I-9AOur Calls Have Been Correct Chart I-9BTop 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most ##br##From Chinese BRI Investment Also, as about 40% of the investment has already been invested over the previous two years, odds are that China's CPEC investment will go slower and smaller this year and over the next few years. BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service's recent tactical bearish call on Pakistani stocks has been correct, with a 25% decline in the MSCI Pakistan Index in U.S. dollar terms since our recommendation in March (Chart I-9B, top panel).2 We remain tactically cautious for now. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is a key transit corridor for Chinese goods to enter Europe and the Middle East. In June 2017, Chinese and Kazakh enterprises and financial institutions signed at least 24 deals worth more than US$8 billion. China's BRI investment in Kazakhstan facilitated the country's accelerated economic growth (Chart I-9A, middle panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service reiterates its positive view on Kazakhstan equities because of a recuperating economy, considerable fiscal stimulus and rising Chinese BRI investment (Chart I-9B, middle panel).3 Ghana Ghana is not strategic for China (it is a minor supplier of oil). Instead, it illustrates the fact that BRI is not always relevant to China's strategic or geopolitical interests. Sometimes it is simply about China's need to invest its surplus U.S. liquidity into hard assets around the world. Of course, Ghana itself will benefit considerably from the committed US$19 billion BRI investment, which was announced only a few months ago. This is a huge amount for the country, equaling 45% of Ghana's 2016 GDP. This massive fresh investment will boost Ghana's economic growth in both the near and long term (Chart I-9A, bottom panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service upgraded its stance on the Ghanaian equity market from negative to neutral in absolute terms at the end of July, and we also recommended overweighting the bourse relative to the broader MSCI EM universe (Chart I-9B, bottom panel).4 Our positive view on Ghana remains unchanged for now and we are looking to establish a long position in the absolute terms in this bourse amid a potential EM-wide sell-off. Other Macro Ramifications Industrial goods and commodities/materials are vulnerable. BRI will not change the fact that a potential relapse in capital spending in China will lead to diminishing growth in commodities demand. If there is a massive slowdown in property market like China experienced in 2015, which is very likely due to lingering excesses, Chinese commodity and industrial goods demand could even contract (Chart I-10). Notably, mainland's imports of base metals have been flat since 2010, and imports of capital goods shank in 2015 even though GDP and GFCF growth were positive (Chart I-11). The point is that there could be another cyclical contraction in Chinese imports of commodities and industrial goods, even if headline GDP and GFCF do not contract. Chart I-10Chinese Capital Goods Imports Could Contract Again Chart I-11Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further As China accounts for 50% of global demand of industrial metals and it imports about US$ 589 billion of industrial goods and materials annually, either decelerating growth or outright demand contraction will be negative news for global commodities markets and industrial goods producers. China's Exports Have A Brighter Outlook China's machinery and equipment (ME) exports account for 47% of total exports, and 9% of its GDP (Table I-5). The BRI investment will boost Chinese ME exports directly through large infrastructure projects. Table I-5Structure Of Chinese Exports (2016) Meantime, robust income growth in the recipient countries will boost their demand for household goods (Chart I-12). China has a very strong competitive advantage in white and consumer goods production, especially in low-price segments that are popular in developing economies. Therefore, not only is China exporting its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, but the BRI is also boosting recipient countries' demand for Chinese household and other goods exports. Adding up dozens of countries like Ghana can result in a meaningful augmentation in China's customer base. Notably, Chinese total exports have exhibited signs of improvement as Chinese ME exports and exports to the major B&R countries have contributed to a rising share of total Chinese exports since 2015 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of ##br##Capital And Consumer Goods Chart I-13Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports ##br##Due To Rising BRI Investment BRI Leads To Improved Global Capital Allocation BRI is one of a very few global initiatives that improves the quality of global capital allocation. Therefore, it is bullish for global growth from a structural perspective. By shifting capital spending from a country that has already invested a lot in the past 20 years (China) to the ones that have been massively underinvested, BRI boosts the marginal productivity of capital. One billion dollars invested in the underinvested recipient countries will generate more benefits than the same amount invested in China. Risks To BRI Projects Notable deterioration in the health of Chinese banks may meaningfully curtail BRI funding, as Chinese non-policy banks will likely need to provide 60% of BRI projects' funding. Political stability/changes in destination countries: As most infrastructure projects have been authorized by the top government and need their cooperation, any changes in the recipient countries' governments or regimes may slow down or deter BRI projects. China already has a checkered past with developing countries where it has invested heavily. This is because of its employment of Chinese instead of local labor, its pursuit of flagship projects seen as benefiting elites rather than commoners, its allegedly corrupt ties with ruling parties, and perceived exploitation of natural resources to the neglect of the home nation. As China's involvement grows, local politics will be more difficult to manage, requiring China to suffer occasional losses due to political reversals or to defend its assets through aggressive economic sanctions, or even expeditionary force. For now, as there are no clear signs that any these risks are imminent, we remain positive on the further implementation of China's BRI program. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China has long been known to use three-year periods - as distinct from its better known "five year plans" - for major domestic initiatives. In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission re-emphasized three-year planning periods for "continuous, rolling" implementation. 2 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand", published March 13, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Kazakhstan: A Touch Less Dependent On Oil Prices", published March 28, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Ghana: Sailing On Chinese Winds", published July 31, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com.
Feature The Brazilian economy is finally improving following a devastating depression of about 3 years, where real GDP dropped by a whopping 7.4%. Does the current economic revival warrant a bullish stance on its financial markets? If the global risk-on trade persists among EM risk assets and commodities and there are no domestic political blunders in Brazil, the country's financial markets will continue to rally as economic growth improves. If the EM and commodities rallies wane and an EM risk-off cycle develops, Brazilian risk assets will sell off, regardless of domestic economic recovery. Provided economies around the world have become interconnected, it is often difficult to separate global economic and financial market impact from domestic economic dynamics. Yet, it is possible to do so in Brazil in the latest cycle. Chart I-1 demonstrates that the Brazilian real bottomed with iron ore prices on December 21, 2015 - not with the bottom in the Brazilian economy in early Q1 2017 (Chart I-1, bottom panel). In turn, the currency's rally amid the collapse in domestic demand has led to a material drop in inflation and allowed the central bank to cut interest rates aggressively. The exchange rate is the main variable driving financial markets in many developing countries, including Brazil. In these countries, it is the exchange rate that causes swings in interest rate expectations, not the other way around. Furthermore, other important variables that led to the bottom in iron ore prices and the BRL were the Chinese manufacturing PMI and money growth, both of which bottomed in the second half of 2015 (Chart I-2). Chart 1BRL Correlates With Commodities ##br##Not Domestic Demand Chart 2Chinese Data Led##br## The Bottom In BRL In short, economic recovery arrived much later in Brazil, and so far it has been exceptionally tame and tentative (Chart I-3). Brazil's domestic demand performance has in no way justified the rally in its financial markets since January 2016. If anything, it is the opposite: the domestic economic recovery emerged too late, and has been extremely subdued compared with the sizable gains in share prices. For example, banks' EPS bottomed only in May 2017, while their share prices troughed in January 2016 (Chart I-4). Similarly, Brazil's fiscal outlook and debt profile has continued to deteriorate, even though the country's sovereign spreads have tightened substantially (Chart I-5). Chart 3Brazil: Economic Recovery Is Exceptionally Tame Chart 4Brazil: Bank Share Prices And EPS Chart 5Brazil's Fiscal And Debt Profiles Have Deteriorated Hence, one can safely argue that economic growth and domestic fundamentals were not the basis behind why Brazilian financial markets found a bottom and rallied starting January 2016. Rather, the critical driving force has been commodities prices, China, the U.S. dollar and global risk appetite. This is consistent with the defining features of bull and bear markets: In a bull market, liquidity lifts all boats, and all flaws are overlooked or discharged while minor positives are magnified by the market. In a bear market, even marginal negatives are overblown, and the market punishes severely for minor missteps. In short, global risk assets have been in a genuine bull market since early 2016, and that has overridden Brazil's poor domestic fundamentals. Going forward, we recommend avoiding Brazilian risk assets - not because we do not expect an economic recovery in Brazil to progress, but because our view on China's impact on commodities and the potential U.S. dollar rebound will curb overall risk appetite toward EM. We discussed this EM/China/commodities outlook at length in last week's report.1 Timing a shift in financial market regimes is always a difficult task, but our sense is that a top in EM risk assets will likely occur between now and the end of October, as China's Communist party Congress reiterates its focus on containing financial risk and leverage, as well as the authorities' marginal tolerance for slightly slower growth. Furthermore, our broad money (M3) impulse for China suggests an imminent relapse in Goldman Sach's current economic activity indicator for the mainland economy (Chart I-6). Our assumption is that commodities prices will drop due to potential weakness in China, and that the U.S. dollar and U.S. bond yields are oversold and will recover, respectively. Altogether, these views warrant a cautious stance on EM currencies. The real has historically been correlated with commodities prices, and this positive correlation will likely continue. As and when the Brazilian currency resumes its depreciation, the risk-on trade in Brazilian equities and credit markets will end. As for Brazilian financial markets, a few relationships are worth highlighting: Since early this year, iron ore prices have been inversely correlated with Chinese money market rates (Chart I-7). A possible explanation is that iron ore and other commodities prices trading on Chinese exchanges have been driven by meaningful speculative buying that negatively correlates with borrowing costs on the mainland. Chart 6China's Growth Is Set To Slow Chart 7Iron Ore Prices Are Vulnerable Given the latest relapse in Brazil's nominal GDP growth, the pace of amelioration in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions could stall (Chart I-8). In turn, Brazilian banks' share prices seem to move inversely with the rate of change in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions (Chart I-9A & Chart I-9B). If these relationships hold, we might be close to a peak in Brazilian bank share prices. Chart 8Brazil: Is The Improvement In NPL Cycle Over? Chart 9ABrazil: NPL Cycles and Bank Stocks Chart 9BBrazil: Provisions Cycles And Bank Stocks Finally, the pace of economic recovery will likely disappoint because the Brazilian economy is facing numerous headwinds: High borrowing costs - the real prime lending rate is 12.5% and the policy rate in the real terms is 6.8%, while public banks' lending rates are set to rise due to the TJLP reform that will remove the government budget's subsidy for borrowers. With 50% of outstanding credit being earmarked credit (previously subsidized by the government and provided by public banks), the impact on economic activity will be non-trivial; Lower government spending, as 2018 government expenditure growth cannot exceed the 2017 June headline inflation rate of 3%. Besides, the fiscal balance is so disastrous that risks to taxes are to the upside, not downside. Furthermore, the recently augmented 2017 year-end fiscal primary deficit target of BRL 159 billion is smaller than the deficit of BRL 182 billion for the past 12 months. This entails government spending cuts are likely this year, which will weigh on growth. The Brazilian exchange rate is not cheap. The nation needs a cheaper currency to reflate its economy. Lingering political uncertainty amid the corruption scandals and upcoming presidential elections in fall 2018 will continue to weigh on capital spending and employment, which have not yet recovered. Bottom Line: Our overarching negative view on EM, China and commodities heralds staying cautious on Brazil's financial markets despite the early signs of domestic economic recovery. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Copper Versus Money/Credit In China - Which One Is Right?", dated September 6,. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Bonds As A Safe Haven: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. ECB: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Canada: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Stay underweight Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Feature Fade The Doomsday Trade Investors have had a lot of depressing news to process over the past several weeks. From threats of nuclear war with North Korea, to fears of a U.S. government shutdown over the debt ceiling, to the potential of Biblical flooding from hurricanes in Texas and Florida, the environment has not been conducive to risk-taking. This has triggered a flight into safe-haven assets like gold and U.S. Treasuries as investors have looked to protect portfolios from "existential" risks (Chart of the Week). Yet despite this rapid run-up in the value of save-havens, risky assets like equities and corporate credit have performed relatively well since the most recent peak in bond yields in early July (Table 1). Chart of the WeekFalling Yields Reflect Save Haven Demand,##BR##Not Slower Growth Table 1Changes In Risk Assets Since##BR##U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th This move toward safety and risk aversion has widened the disconnect between global bond yields and economic fundamentals - specifically, growth momentum and central bank guidance - to extreme levels. Investors are now underestimating the potential for additional rate hikes in the U.S. in 2018, and are not fully appreciating the likelihood that the European Central Bank (ECB) will slow the pace of its asset purchases next year. Investors plowing money into government bonds now can only be rewarded if global monetary policy was set to ease, which would only be the case if global growth was slowing. That is not happening right now, even in the U.S. where the most apocalyptic headlines have been occurring. While the impact of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma will likely weigh on U.S. growth in the next few months, the underlying trend remains one of steady above-potential growth that is boosting both corporate profits and household incomes. More globally, depressed investor sentiment, indicated by measures such as the global ZEW survey, has helped drive bond yields lower despite the steady upturn in leading economic indicators (Chart 2). When looking at indicators of actual economic activity, like manufacturing PMIs, the growth story looks far stronger. As a sign of how much this "sentiment versus reality" divergence has distorted bond yields, look no further than our own valuation model for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield. This model, which only uses the global manufacturing PMI and sentiment towards the U.S. dollar as inputs, indicates that the current "fair value" of the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.67%, nearly 60bps higher than market levels seen as this publication went to press (Chart 3). This is a level of overvaluation that even exceeds the extreme levels seen after the U.K. Brexit vote in July of 2016. Chart 2Bond Investors Are##BR##Ignoring Strong Growth Chart 3U.S. Treasuries Are##BR##Now Extremely Overvalued In Table 2, we present a decomposition of the 10-year yield changes in the major Developed Markets since that recent peak in U.S. Treasury yields on July 7th. As can be seen in the first two columns of the table, yields declined everywhere but Canada where the central bank has been hiking interest rates (as we discuss later in this report). Yet the vast majority of the yield decline has come from falling real yields and not lower inflation expectations. This has also occurred via a bull-flattening move in government bond yield curves (again, ex-Canada where the curve has bear-flattened), which suggests it is risk-aversion that has driven yields lower. Table 2Developed Market Bond Yield Changes Since U.S. Treasury Yields Peaked On July 7th The relative lack of movement in inflation expectations is a bit surprising given how strongly global oil prices have risen, denominated in any currency (see the final column of Table 2). When plotting the Brent oil price (in local currency terms) vs. the 10-year market-based inflation expectations (from inflation-linked bonds or CPI swaps), some notable divergences stand out. Inflation expectations in the U.S., U.K., Australia and even Japan look around 10-20bps too low relative to where they were the last time oil prices were at current levels (Charts 4 & 5). Meanwhile, inflation expectations are largely in lines with levels implied by oil and currency levels in the Euro Area and Canada. Most importantly, expectations are depressed in all countries, largely because actual inflation has stayed stubbornly low. Chart 4Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (1) Chart 5Inflation Expectations Vs. Oil Prices (2) The lack of realized inflation in places with allegedly "full employment" economies like the U.S. has led to questions over the usefulness of frameworks like the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) in predicting inflation. A reduced link between the NAIRU and inflation does appear in many countries, but not necessarily in all countries when viewed in aggregate. Chart 6The NAIRU Concept Is Not Dead Yet In Chart 6, we present an indicator that shows the percentage of OECD economies (34 in total) that have an unemployment rate below the NAIRU rate. Currently, there are 67% of the countries in this list with unemployment rates under the OECD estimate of NAIRU, which is back to levels seen before the 2009 Great Recession. During that pre-crisis period, global inflation rates were accelerating for both goods and services inflation (bottom two panels). While the correlation between this global NAIRU indicator and realized inflation rates declined in the years after the recession, the linkages have improved over the past couple of years. This may be a sign that there is a "global NAIRU level" (or global output gap) that is more important in determining global inflation rates than individual country NAIRU measures. Or put more simply, investors are downplaying the NAIRU concept just at the time when it could be expected to strengthen. If that were the case, inflation expectations around the world would be too low, although it will take some evidence of faster realized inflation (especially in the U.S. and Europe) before the markets begin to discount that in bond yields. In the meantime, markets have become even too pessimistic on growth prospects and the implications for bond yields. Investors have driven down rate hike expectations in the U.S. and U.K. (and, to a lesser extent, the Euro Area) during this latest bond market rally, dragging longer-term bond yields down with them (Chart 7). Yet growth in the developing world is showing little signs of slowing down outside of the U.K., with leading economic indicators still pointing to a continued steady expansion (Chart 8). Even if central bankers are starting to question how fast their economies can grow before inflation pressures pick up in a meaningful way, they are unlikely to stand by and see faster growth prints without responding with less stimulative monetary policies. Chart 7Not Much Tightening Priced##BR##(Except For Canada)... Chart 8...Despite Improving Growth##BR##In Most Countries Net-net, bond markets are now discounting too pessimistic of an outcome for both global growth and inflation. We continue to see more upside risks for global yields on a 6-12 month horizon, although it will take some signs of faster global inflation (not just growth) before bond yields respond. Bottom Line: Global bond yields have been driven lower by safe haven buying, despite ample evidence of faster global growth and central bankers that are still biased to shift to a less easy policy stance. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields over the next 6-12 months from these current depressed levels. September ECB Meeting: All Systems Go For A 2018 Taper Last week's ECB meeting provided no changes on interest rates or the size of asset purchases, but plenty of clues on the central bank's next move. A reduction in the size of the ECB's asset purchase program in 2018, to be announced next month, is now highly probable - even with a strengthening euro. The ECB's GDP forecast for 2017 was revised higher from the June forecasts (2.2% vs. 1.9%), while the projections for 2018 (1.8%) and 2019 (1.7%) were unchanged. Meanwhile, the inflation forecast for 2017 was left unchanged at 1.5% and the forecasts for the next two years were only revised slightly lower (2018: 1.2% vs. 1.3%, 2019: 1.5% vs. 1.6%). The fact that the 14% rise in euro versus the U.S. dollar seen so far in 2017 was not enough to move the needle much on the ECB's projections speaks volumes about the central bank's confidence in the current European economic expansion, as well as its comfort level with the rising currency. That makes sense when looking at the euro rally more broadly, as the currency has only gone up 6% in trade-weighted terms year-to-date. Simply put, the ECB does not yet seem overly worried that the strengthening euro represent a serious threat to the economy that could cause a more prolonged medium-term undershoot in Euro Area inflation. ECB President Mario Draghi did make references to currency volatility as being something that should be closely monitored with regards to the growth and inflation outlook. Right now, the realized volatility of the euro has been quite subdued, even as the currency has steadily appreciated (Chart 9). At the same time, our Months-to-Hike indicator has also fallen as the market has pulled forward the date of the next ECB rate hike. That hike is still not expected until late 2019 - pricing that we agree with. However, the fact that the euro can appreciate with such low volatility alongside a slightly-more-hawkish repricing of ECB rate expectations suggests that the market thinks that a move towards reduced monetary stimulus in the Euro Area is credible. That will remain true until the rising euro starts to become a meaningful drag on the economy or inflation, which is not evident in the broad Euro Area data at the moment (Chart 10). Chart 9A "Credibly Hawkish" ECB? Chart 10No Impact (Yet) From A Stronger Euro Draghi did note that the "bulk of decisions" regarding the ECB's asset purchase program would likely take place in October. That means a reduction in the size of the monthly purchases starting in January of next year, but without any changes in short-term interest rates (the ECB reiterated that rates will stay at current levels until after the end of the asset purchase program). Nonetheless, the ECB is incrementally moving towards a less accommodative policy stance that will continue to put upward pressure on the euro and, eventually, trigger a move toward higher longer-term Euro Area bond yields. Bottom Line: The ECB is giving strong indications that a decision on tapering its asset purchase program will be made next month. With the Euro Area economy growing at a solid pace, and with inflation creeping higher, a reduction in the pace of bond buying in 2018 is highly probable. Maintain an underweight medium-term stance on Euro Area government debt. Bank Of Canada: Shock Hawks The Bank of Canada (BoC) continues to confound investors with a surprisingly hawkish policy bias. Another 25bp rate hike was delivered at last week's monetary policy meeting, a move that was not fully discounted by the market, bringing the BoC Overnight Rate up to 1%. The Bank cited the impressive strength of the Canadian economy, as well as the more synchronous global expansion that was supporting higher industrial commodity prices, as reasons for the rate hike. With Canadian real GDP growth surging to a 3.7% year-over-year pace in the 2nd quarter, in a broad-based fashion across all components, perhaps policymakers can be forgiven for feeling that interest rate settings are still too stimulative for an economy with a potential growth rate of only 1.4% (the most recent BoC estimate). In the statement announcing the rate hike, it was noted that the level of Canadian GDP was now higher than the BoC had been expecting after the last Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) published in July. The BoC was already projecting that the output gap in Canada would be closed by the end of 2017. Thus, a higher realized level of GDP suggests an output gap that will be closed even sooner than the BoC was forecasting. This alone would be enough to move sooner on rate hikes for a central bank that focuses so much on its own measures of the output gap when making inflation projections. However, at the moment, there is not much inflation for the central bank to worry about. Chart 11The Great White North Headline CPI inflation sits at 1.2%, well below the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target band, while the various measures of core inflation that the BoC monitors are between 1.3% and 1.7%. Annual wage growth accelerated to the faster growth rate of the year in August, but still only sits at 1.7% even with the unemployment rate now down to a nine-year low of 6.2%. Meanwhile, the Canadian dollar has appreciated 13% vs. the U.S. dollar, and 10% on a trade-weighted basis, since bottoming out in early May. This move has been supported by growth and interest rate differentials that favor Canada. This is especially true versus the U.S. where the 2-year gap between Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates is now positive at +21bps - the highest level since January 2015 (Chart 11). The BoC acknowledged this in last week's policy statement, suggesting acceptance of a strong loonie as a reflection of a robust Canadian economy that requires higher interest rates. The strength in the Canadian dollar will likely weigh on import price inflation in the coming months, and act as a drag on overall inflation. This will not trigger any move by the BoC to back off from its hawkishness unless there is also some weakness in the Canadian economic data. For a central bank that focuses so much on the output gap in its assessment of its own policy stance, the inflationary impact from a booming economy will far outweigh the disinflationary effects of a stronger currency. It remains to be seen if the BoC will be proven right on delivering actual rate hikes with inflation well below target. This is a problem that many central banks are facing at the moment, but the robust Canadian economy is forcing the BoC's hand. An appreciating currency may limit the number of rate hikes that the BoC eventually undertakes, but given its own assessment that that terminal interest rate is around 3%, there are plenty of additional hikes that the BoC can deliver before getting anywhere close to "neutral". The key risk will come from the spillover effects on the overheated Canadian housing market from the interest rate increases. Already, house prices are coming off the boil in the most overheated markets like Toronto, where median home values are down 20% since April due to regulatory changes aimed at reducing leveraged speculation in Canadian housing. It remains to be seen how much the BoC hikes will exacerbate the latest downturn in house price inflation and, potentially, have spillover effects on consumer confidence given high levels of household indebtedness. For now, we do not recommend fighting the BoC, with Canadian leading economic indicators still accelerating and the BoC's own business surveys showing that the economy is likely to remain strong. While there are already 50bps of rate hikes priced next twelve months, this would only take the Overnight Rate to 1.5% - still a stimulative level in the eyes of the central bank. This could also create additional strength in the loonie, although that impact should be lessened if the Fed comes back into play and delivers additional rate hikes in 2018, as we expect. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance on Canadian government bonds, with yields likely to surpass the relatively modest increases currently priced into the forwards (Chart 12, top panel). We also continue to advise an underweight allocation to Canadian government bonds in hedged global fixed income portfolios (middle panel). We also are staying with our winning Canadian trades in our Tactical Overlay portfolio, where are positioned for wider Canada-U.S. bond spreads and a flatter Canadian yield curve (Chart 13). Chart 12Stay Underweight##BR##Canadian Government Bonds Chart 13Sticking With Our Tactical##BR##Canadian Bond Trades Bottom Line: The Bank of Canada will continue to deliver on rate hikes without decisive signs that the current booming Canadian economy is slowing down, which leading indicators do not suggest is imminent. Maintain an underweight stance on Canadian government debt, with a curve flattening bias. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns