Economy

Highlights Markets have gone too far in pricing out the Republican's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections. A bill that at least cuts taxes should be forming by year end. The risk is that continued political turbulence, now including the possibility of impeachment, distracts Congress and delays or completely derails tax reform plans. Fortunately for the major global equity markets, corporate profits are providing solid support. We expect U.S. EPS growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at just under 20%. The projected profit acceleration is even more impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. Corporations are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end that will favor the latter two bourses in local currency terms. EPS growth will fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017, but what is more important for equity indexes is the direction of 12-month forward EPS expectations, which remain in an uptrend. The positive earnings backdrop means that stocks will outperform bonds for the remainder of the year even if Congress fails to pass any market-friendly legislation. The FOMC is "looking through" the recent soft economic data and slower inflation, and remains on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year. The impact of the Fed's balance sheet runoff on the Treasury market will be limited by several factors, but a shrinking balance sheet and Fed rate hikes will force bond yields to rise faster than is currently discounted. Policy divergence will push the dollar higher. The traditional relationship between the euro/USD and short-term yield differentials should re-establish following the French election. The euro could reach parity before the next move is done. "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Chinese growth has slowed but the authorities are easing policy, which will stabilize growth and support base metals. That said, we remain more upbeat on oil prices than base metals. Feature Investors have soured on the prospects for U.S. tax reform in recent weeks, but the latest travails in Washington inflicted only fleeting damage on U.S. and global bourses. The S&P 500 appears to have broken above the 2400 technical barrier as we go to press. Market expectations for a more tepid Fed rate hike cycle, lower Treasury yields and related dollar softness undoubtedly provided some support. But, more importantly, corporate profits are positively surprising in the major economies and this is not just an energy story. The good news on company earnings should continue to drive stock prices higher this year in absolute terms and relative to bond prices. It is a tougher call on the dollar and the direction of bond yields. We remain short duration and long the dollar, but much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and fiscal policy. A Death Knell For U.S. Tax Reform? Chart I-1 highlights that the market now sees almost a zero chance that the Republicans will ever be able to deliver any meaningful tax cuts or infrastructure spending. Many believe that mushrooming political scandals encumbering President Trump will distract the GOP and delay or derail tax reform. Indeed, impeachment proceedings would be a major distraction, although this outcome would not necessarily lead to an equity bear market. The historical record shows that the economy is much more important than politics for financial markets. BCA's geopolitical strategists looked at three presidential impeachments, covering the Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974) and the President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999).1 Watergate was the only episode that coincided with a bear market, but it is difficult to pin the market downturn on Nixon's impeachment since the U.S. economy entered one of the worst post-war recessions in 1973 that was driven by tight Fed policy and an oil shock. Impeachment would require that Trump loses support among the Republican base, which so far has not happened. The President still commands the support of 84% of Republican voters (Chart I-2). Investors should monitor this support level as an indicator of the President's political capital and the risk of impeachment. Chart I-1Fading Hopes For Tax Reform We believe that markets have gone too far in pricing out Trump's market-friendly policy agenda. The President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections, and tax reform and deregulation are two key areas where the President and congressional Republicans see eye to eye. The odds are good that an agreement to cut taxes will be formed by year end. Congressional leaders want tax reform to be revenue neutral, but finding sufficient areas to cut spending will be extremely difficult. They may simply require that tax cuts are paid for in a 10-year window. This makes it possible to lower taxes upfront and promise non-specific spending cuts and revenue raising measures down the road. Or, Congress may pass tax reform that is not revenue neutral through the reconciliation process, which would require that tax cuts sunset at some point in the future. Tax cuts would give stocks a temporary boost either way but, as we discuss below, it may be better for corporate profits in the medium term if Congress fails to deliver any fiscal stimulus. Profits, Beats And Misses While economists fret over the soft U.S. economic data so far this year, profit growth is quietly accelerating in the background (Chart I-3). On a 4-quarter moving total basis, S&P 500 earnings-per-share were up by more than 13% in the first quarter (84% reporting). We expect growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at about 18%, before moderating in 2018. Profit growth is accelerating outside of the energy sector. The projected acceleration in EPS growth is equally impressive in the Eurozone and Japan. The favorable profit picture in the major economies reflects two key factors. First, profits are rebounding from a poor showing in 2015/16, when EPS was dragged down by the collapse in oil prices and a global manufacturing recession. Oil prices have since rebounded and global industrial production is recovering as expected (Chart I-4). Our short-term forecasting models for real GDP, based on a mixture of hard data and surveys, continue to flag a pickup in economic growth in the major economies (Chart I-5). Chart I-3Top-Down Profit Projection Chart I-4EPS Highly Correlated With Industrial Production Chart I-5GDP Growth Poised To Accelerate The U.S. model's forecast paints an overly rosy picture, but it does support our view that Q1 softness in the hard data reflected temporary factors that will give way to a robust rebound in the second and third quarters. The Eurozone economy is really humming at the moment, as highlighted by our model and recent readings from the IFO and purchasing managers' surveys. Indeed, these indicators are consistent with real GDP growth of nearly 3%! Our GDP models are also constructive for Japan and the U.K., although not nearly as robust as in the U.S. and Eurozone. Chart I-6Profit Margins On The Rise Second, the corporate sectors in the major economies are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. This is the case even in the U.S., where labor market slack has largely been absorbed. Indeed, margins rose in Q1 2017 for the third quarter in a row (Chart I-6). Our indicators suggest that the corporate sector has gained some pricing power at a time when wage gains are taking a breather.2 The hiatus of wage pressure may not last long, and we expect the "mean reversion" in profit margins to resume next year. But for now, our short-term EPS growth model remains upbeat for the next 3-6 months (not shown). Profit margins are also on the rise in Japan and the Eurozone. Margins in the latter appear to have the most upside potential of the three major markets, given the fact that current levels are still depressed by historical standards, and that there remains plenty of slack in the European labor market. We are not incorporating any margin expansion in Japan because they are already very high. Nonetheless, we do not expect any "mean reversion" in margins over the next year either, because the business sector is going to great lengths to avoid any increase in the wage bill despite an extremely tight labor market. U.S. EPS growth is well ahead of both Japan and the Eurozone at the moment, but we expect some "catch up" by year end: The U.S. is further ahead in the global profit mini recovery and year-ago EPS comparisons will become more difficult by the end of the year. The drag on corporate profits in 2017 from previous dollar strength will be larger than the currency drag in the Eurozone according to our models, assuming no change in trade-weighted exchange rates in the forecast period (Chart I-7). The pass-through of past yen movements will be a net boost to EPS growth for Japanese companies this year.3 Currency shifts would favor the Japanese and the Eurozone markets versus the U.S. even more if the dollar experiences another upleg. We expect the dollar to appreciate by 10% in trade-weighted terms. A 10% broad-based dollar appreciation would trim EPS growth by 2½ percentage points, although most of this would occur in 2018 due to lags (Chart I-8). Eurozone and Japanese EPS growth would receive a lift of 2 and ½ percentage points, respectively, as their currencies depreciate versus the dollar. Chart I-7Currency Impact On EPS Growth Chart I-8A 10% Dollar Rise Would Trim Profits Finally, the fact that profits in Japan and the Eurozone are more leveraged to overall economic growth than in the U.S. gives the former two markets the edge as global industrial production continues to recover this year and into 2018. Japanese and Eurozone equity market indexes also have a higher beta with respect to the global equity index. The implication is that we remain overweight these two markets relative to the U.S. on a currency hedged basis. Lofty Expectations Even though the message from our EPS models is upbeat, our forecasts still fall short of bottom-up estimates for 2017. Is this a risk for the equity market, especially in the U.S. where valuations are stretched? Investors are well aware that bottom-up estimates are perennially optimistic. Table I-1 compares the beginning-of-year EPS growth estimate with the actual end-of-year outcome for 2007-2016. Not surprisingly, bottom-up analysts massively missed the mark in the recession. But even outside of 2008, analysts significantly over-estimated earnings in seven out of nine years. Despite this, the S&P 500 rose sharply in most cases. One exception was 2015, when the S&P 500 fell by 0.7%. Plunging oil and material prices contributed to an EPS growth "miss" of seven percentage points. Chart I-9 highlights that the level of the 12-month forward EPS estimate fell that year, unlike in the other years since the Great Recession. Valuations are more demanding today than in the past, but the message is that attaining bottom-up EPS year-end estimates is less important for the broad market than the trend in 12-month forward estimates (which remains up at the moment). Chart I-9S&P 500 Follows ##br##12-month Forward EPS The bottom line is that the backdrop is constructive for equities even if the Republicans are unable to push through any fiscal stimulus. In fact, it may be better for the stock market in the medium term if the GOP fails to pass any meaningful legislation. The U.S. economy does not need any demand stimulus at the moment (although measures to boost the supply side of the economy would help lift profits over the long term). The current long-in-the-tooth U.S. expansion is likely to stretch further in the absence of stimulus, extending the moderate growth/low inflation/low interest rate backdrop that has been positive for risk assets in recent years. The Fed's Balance Sheet: It's Diet Time The minutes from the May FOMC meeting reiterated that policymakers plan to begin scaling back on reinvesting the proceeds of its maturing securities of Treasurys and MBS by the end of the year. The Fed is leaning toward a gradual tapering of reinvestment in order to avoid shocking the bond market. Still, investors are rightly concerned about the potential impact of the balance sheet runoff, especially given that memories of the 2013 "taper tantrum" are still fresh. Chart I-10 presents a forecast for the flow of Treasurys available to the private sector, taking into consideration the supply that is absorbed by foreign official institutions and by the Fed. The bottom panel shows a similar calculation for the aggregate supply of government bonds from the U.S., Japan, the Eurozone and the U.K. While the supply of Treasurys has been positive since 2012, the net flow has been negative for these four economies as a whole because of aggressive quantitative easing programs. This year will see the largest contraction in the supply of government bonds available to the private sector, at US$800 billion. The flow will become less negative in 2018 even if the Fed were to keep its balance sheet unchanged (mostly due to assumed ECB tapering). If the Fed goes ahead with its balance sheet reduction plan, the net supply of government bonds from the major economies will move slightly into positive territory for the first time since 2014. There is disagreement among academics about whether quantitative easing (QE) directly depressed bond yields by restricting the supply of high-quality fixed income assets, or whether the impact on yields was solely via the "signaling effect" for the path of future short rates. Either way, balance sheet runoff will likely have some impact on bond yields. A good starting point is to employ an empirical estimate of the impact of QE. The IMF has modeled long-term Treasury yields based on a number of economic and financial variables and the stock of assets held by the Fed as a share of GDP. Just for exposition purposes, let us take an extreme example and assume that the Fed simply terminates all re-investment as of January 2018 (i.e. the runoff is not tapered). In this case, the amount of bank reserves held at the Fed would likely evaporate by 2021. This represents a contraction of roughly 10 percentage points of GDP (Chart I-11). Applying the IMF interest rate model's coefficient of -0.09, it implies that long-term Treasury yields and mortgage rates would rise by 90 basis points from the "portfolio balance" effect alone. Chart I-11Fed Balance Sheet Runoff Scenario However, it is more complicated than that. The impact on yields is likely to be tempered by two factors: The balance sheet may never fully revert to historic norms relative to GDP. Some academic experts are recommending that the Fed maintain a fairly large balance sheet by historical standards because of the need in financial markets for short-term, risk-free assets that would diminish if there are fewer excess bank reserves available. Banks, for example, are required by regulators to hold more high-quality assets than they did in the pre-Lehman years. As the FOMC dials back monetary stimulus it will be concerned with overall monetary conditions, including short-term rates, long-term rates and the dollar. If long-term rates and/or the dollar rise too quickly, policymakers will moderate the pace of rate hikes and use forward guidance to talk down the long end of the curve so as to avoid allowing financial conditions to tighten too quickly. Thus, the path of short-term rates is dependent on the dollar and the reaction of the long end of the curve. It is difficult to estimate how it will shake out, but a recent report from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City estimated that a $675 billion reduction in the size of the Fed's balance sheet is equivalent to a 25 basis point increase in the fed funds rate (although the authors admit that the confidence band around this estimate is extremely wide).4 We expect that the impact of runoff alone will be much less than the 90 basis point estimate discussed above. Still, the combination of balance sheet shrinkage and Fed rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Fed Outlook: Mostly About Inflation The May FOMC minutes confirmed that the FOMC is "looking through" the soft economic data in the first quarter, chalking it up to temporary factors such as shifts in inventories. They are also inclined to believe that the moderation in core CPI inflation in recent months is temporary. The message is that policymakers remain on track to deliver two more rate hikes this year, in line with the 'dot plot' forecast. The market is pricing almost a 100% chance of a June rate hike. However, less than two full rate hikes are expected over the next year, which is far too benign in our view. Investors have been quick to conclude that recent economic data have convinced Fed officials to shift from a "gradual" pace of rate hikes to a "glacial" pace. Treasurys rallied on this shift in Fed expectations and a decline in long-term inflation expectations. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has dropped to about 1.8%, the lowest level since before the U.S. election. This appears to us that the bond market over-reacted to the drop in core CPI inflation from 2.2% in February to 1.9% in April. The evolution of actual inflation will be critical to the outlook for the Fed and Treasury yields in the coming months. Our U.S. fixed-income strategists have simulated a traditional Phillips Curve model of inflation (Chart I-12).5 The model projects that core PCE inflation will reach 2.1% by December, even assuming no change in the unemployment rate or the trade-weighted dollar. Inflation ends the year not far below the 2% target even in an alternative scenario in which we assume that the dollar appreciates and that the full-employment level of unemployment is lower than the Fed currently assumes. Chart I-12U.S. Inflation Should End Year At 2% Thus, the trend in inflation should reinforce the FOMC's bias to keep tightening policy, forcing the bond market to reassess the pace of rate hikes discounted in the curve. That said, if we are wrong and inflation does not trend higher in the next 3-4 months, then it is the FOMC that will be forced to reassess and our short duration recommendation will probably not pan out on a six month horizon. Longer-term, last month's Special Report highlighted that we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 20, builds on that theme with a look at the impact of technological progress on equilibrium bond yields. With respect to credit spreads, the state of nonfinancial corporate sector balance sheets and the overall stance of monetary policy will continue to be the main drivers of the credit cycle. If unwinding the balance sheet leads to a premature tightening of financial conditions, then the Fed will proceed more slowly on rate hikes. The crucial indicator to watch is core PCE inflation. Credit spreads will remain fairly well contained until core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target. At that point, the pace of monetary normalization will ramp up, putting spreads at risk of widening. Stay overweight corporate bonds within fixed income portfolios for now. While the Fed's balance sheet reduction by itself may not have a big impact on the dollar, we still believe the currency has more upside because of the divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) on the other. The BoJ will hold the 10-year JGB near to zero for quite some time. The ECB will also not be in a position to tighten policy for an extended period, outside of removing negative short rates and tapering QE purchases a bit further in 2018. The euro has appreciated versus the dollar even as two-year real interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the dollar since the end of March. This divergence probably reflects euro short-covering following the market-friendly French election outcome. Next up are the two rounds of French legislative elections in June. Polls support the view that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Republicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature. Such an election outcome would make possible the passage of genuine structural reforms that would suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive. Investors may be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus. In the meantime, we do not see any risk factors emanating from the Eurozone that could upset the global equity applecart in the near term. Moreover, the traditional relationship between the euro/USD exchange rate and 2-year real yield differentials should now re-establish. The implication is that the euro could reach parity before the next move is done. Dr. Copper? The recent setback in the commodity pits has added to investor angst regarding global growth momentum. The LMEX base metals index is up almost 25% on a year-ago basis, but has fallen by 5% since February (Chart I-13). From their respective peaks earlier this year, zinc and copper are down about 7-10%, nickel has dropped by 18% and iron ore has lost almost half of its value. Is the venerable "Dr. Copper" sending an important warning about world growth? Chart I-13What Are Commodities Telling Us? Some of our global leading economic indicators have edged lower this year, as we have discussed in previous reports. Nonetheless, the decline in base metals prices likely has more to do with other factors, such as an unwinding of the surge in speculative demand that immediately followed the U.S. election last autumn. Speculators may be disappointed by the lack of progress on Republican promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. The main story for base metals demand and prices, however, is the Chinese real estate sector. China accounts for roughly 50% of world consumption for each of the major metals. The Chinese authorities are trying to cool the property market and transition to a more consumer spending-oriented economy, thereby reducing the dependence on exports, capital spending and real estate as growth drivers. Fiscal policy tightened last year and new regulations were introduced to limit housing speculation. The effect of policy tightening can be seen in our Credit and Fiscal Spending Impulse indicator, which has been softening since mid-2016 (Chart I-14). The economy held up well last year, but the policy adjustment resulted in a peaking of the PMI at year-end. Growth in housing starts also appears to be rolling over. Both the PMI and housing starts are correlated with commodity prices. The good news is that BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not expect a major downshift in Chinese real GDP growth this year, which means that commodity import demand should rebound: The authorities wish to slow credit growth, but there is no incentive for the authorities to crunch the economy given that consumer price inflation is still low and the surge in producer price inflation appears to have peaked. Monetary conditions have tightened a little in recent months, but overall conditions are not restrictive. Both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up noticeably this year (Chart I-15). Finally, the PBoC re-started its Medium-Term Lending Facility and recently made the largest one-day cash injection into the financial system in nearly four months. Chart I-14China Is The Main Story ##br##For Base Metals Demand Chart I-15Direct Fiscal Spending And ##br##Infrastructure Have Picked Up Recently Export growth will continue to accelerate based on our model (not shown). The upturn in the profit cycle and firming output prices should boost capital spending. Robust demand will ensure that housing construction will continue to grow at a healthy pace. Households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high last quarter. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but this will not short-circuit the recovery in housing construction. Fading fears about a China meltdown may give commodities a lift later this year. Our commodity strategists are particularly positive on crude oil, as extended production cuts from OPEC and Russia outweigh the impact of surging shale production, allowing bloated inventories to moderate. In contrast, the backdrop is fairly benign for base metals. Our commodity strategists do not see the conditions for a major bull or bear phase on a 6-12 month horizon. Within commodity portfolios, they recommend a benchmark allocation to base metals, an underweight in agricultural products and an overweight in oil. From a broader perspective, our key message is that "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Investment Conclusions: Accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a healthy tailwind and suggests that stocks could perform well under a couple of different scenarios in the second half of 2017. If the rebound in U.S. economic growth from the poor first quarter is unimpressive and it appears that Congress will be sidetracked by political turmoil in the White House, then the S&P 500 should benefit from the 'goldilocks' combination of healthy profit growth, low bond yields, an accommodative Fed and a soft dollar. If, instead, U.S. growth rebounds strongly and Congress makes progress on the broad outline of a tax reform bill over the summer months, then stocks should benefit from the prospect of stronger growth in 2018. Rising bond yields and a firmer dollar would provide some offset for stocks, but would not derail the equity bull market as long as inflation remains below the Fed's target. Our model suggests that U.S. inflation will remain below-target for the next several months, but could be near 2% by year end. This scenario would set the stage for a more aggressive Fed in 2018, a surge in the dollar and possibly a bear market in risk assets next year. We are therefore comfortable in predicting that the stock-to-bond total return ratio will continue to rise for at least the remainder of this year. The tough part relates to bond yields and the dollar, since the above two scenarios have very different implications for these two asset classes. Our base case is closer to the second scenario, such that we remain below benchmark in duration and long the dollar. That said, much depends on the evolution of U.S. core inflation and U.S. politics. Both are particularly difficult to forecast. A failure for core PCE inflation to pick up in the next 3-4 months and/or continuing political scandals in Washington would force us to reconsider our asset allocation. Of course, there are other risks to consider, including growing mercantilism in the U.S., Sino-American tensions and North Korea. At the top of the list are China and Italy. (1) China China remains our geopolitical strategists' top pick as the catalyst most likely to scuttle our upbeat view on global risk assets in 2017.6 Our base case assumption is that policymakers will not enact wide-scale financial sector reform, which would entail a surge in realized non-performing loans and bankruptcies and defaults, ahead of the Fall Party Congress. The regulatory crackdown so far seems merely to keep the financial sector in check for a while. The government has already stepped back somewhat in the face of the liquidity squeeze, and fiscal policy has been loosened (as mentioned above). All of the key Communist Party statements have emphasized that stability remains a priority. Nonetheless, it may be difficult for the authorities to manage the deleveraging process given nose-bleed levels of private-sector leverage. Politicians could misjudge the fragility of the financial system and investors might front-run the reform process, sending asset prices down well in advance of policy implementation. (2) Italy We have flagged the next Italian election as a key risk for markets because of polls showing that voters have become disillusioned with the euro. It appeared that an election would not take place until 2018, and we have downplayed European elections as a risk factor for 2017. However, the 5-Star Movement has now backed a proportional electoral system, which raises the chances of an autumn election in Italy. This would obviously spark turbulence in financial markets in the months leading up to the event. Turning to emerging markets, the pickup in global growth and a modest bounce in commodity prices would support this asset class. However, our view that the dollar is headed higher on the back of Fed rate hikes keeps us from getting too excited about EM stocks, bonds or currencies. Our other recommendations include the following: Within global government bond portfolios, overweight JGBs and underweight Treasurys. Gilts and core Eurozone bonds are at benchmark. Underweight the periphery of Europe. Overweight European and Japanese equities versus the U.S. on a currency-hedged basis. Overweight the dollar versus the other major currencies. Overweight small caps stocks versus large in the U.S. market. Stay exposed to oil-related assets, and favor oil to base metals within commodity portfolios. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst May 31, 2017 Next Report: June 29, 2017 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Overview," April 017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3 Currency shifts affect earnings with a lag, which in captured by our models. 4 Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy Under Balance Sheet Adjustments. The Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith. May 10, 2017. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers," dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets ," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com II. Is Slow Productivity Growth Good Or Bad For Bonds? This month's Special Report was written by Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist for BCA's Global Investment Strategy Service. The report is a companion piece to last month's Special Report, which argued that some of the structural factors that have depressed global interest rates are at an inflection point. These factors include demographic trends and the integration of China's massive labor supply into the global economy. Peter's report focuses on technology's impact on bond yields. He presents the non-consensus view that slow productivity growth likely depresses interest rates at the outset, but will lead to higher rates later on. Not only could sluggish productivity growth lead to higher inflation, it could also deplete national savings. Both factors would be bond bearish, reinforcing the other factors discussed in last month's Special Report. I trust that you will find the report as insightful and educational as I did. Mark McClellan Productivity growth has declined in most countries. This appears to be a structural problem that will remain with us for years to come. In theory, slower productivity growth should reduce the neutral rate of interest, benefiting bonds in the process. In reality, countries with chronically low productivity growth typically have higher interest rates than faster growing economies. The passage of time helps account for this seeming paradox: Slower productivity growth tends to depress interest rates at the outset, but leads to higher rates later on. The U.S. has reached an inflection point where weak productivity growth is starting to push up both the neutral real rate and inflation. Other countries will follow. The implication for investors is that government bond yields have begun a long-term secular uptrend. The market is not at all prepared for this. Slow Productivity Growth: A Structural Problem Productivity growth has fallen sharply in most developed and emerging economies (Chart II-1). As we argued in "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," there is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.1 Yes, the unmeasured utility accruing from free internet services is large, but so was the unmeasured utility from antibiotics, indoor plumbing, and air conditioning. No one has offered a convincing explanation for why the well-known problems with productivity calculations suddenly worsened about 12 years ago. If mismeasurement is not responsible for the productivity slowdown, what is? Cyclical factors have undoubtedly played a role. In particular, lackluster investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock (Chart II-2). This means that today's workers have not benefited from the improvement in the quality and quantity of capital to the same extent as previous generations. Chart II-2The Great Recession Hit ##br##Capital Stock Accumulation However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. These include: Waning gains from the IT revolution. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. The rising share of value added coming from software relative to hardware has also contributed to the decline in productivity growth. Chart II-3 shows that productivity gains in the latter category have been much smaller than in the former. Slower human capital accumulation. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart II-4). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics and science, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart II-5). Test scores tend to be much lower in countries with rapidly growing populations (Chart II-6). Consequently, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart II-3The Shift Towards Software ##br##Has Dampened IT Productivity Gains Decreased creative destruction. The birth rate of new firms in the U.S. has fallen by half since the late 1970s and is now barely above the death rate (Chart II-7). In addition, many firms in advanced economies are failing to replicate the best practices of industry leaders. The OECD reckons that this has been a key reason for the productivity slowdown.2 Chart II-7Secular Decline In U.S. Firm Births Productivity Growth And Interest Rates Investors typically assume that long-term interest rates will converge to nominal GDP growth. All things equal, this implies that faster productivity growth should lead to higher interest rates. Most economic models share this assumption - they predict that an acceleration in productivity growth will raise the rate of return on capital and incentivize households to save less in anticipation of faster income gains.3 Both factors should cause interest rates to rise. The problem is that these theories do not accord with the data. Chart II-8 shows that interest rates are far higher in regions such as Africa and Latin America, which have historically suffered from chronically weak productivity growth. In contrast, rates are lower in regions such as East Asia, which have experienced rapid productivity growth. One sees the same negative correlation between interest rates and productivity growth over time in developed economies. In the U.S., for example, interest rates rose rapidly during the 1970s, a decade when productivity growth fell sharply (Chart II-9). Chart II-9U.S. Interest Rates Soared In The ##br##1970s While Productivity Swooned Two Reasons Why Slower Productivity Growth May Lead To Higher Interest Rates There are two main reasons why slower productivity growth may lead to higher nominal interest rates over time: Slower productivity growth may eventually lead to higher inflation; Slower productivity growth may deplete national savings, thereby raising the neutral real rate of interest. We discuss each reason in turn. Reason #1: Slower Productivity Growth May Fuel Inflation Most economists agree that chronically weak productivity growth tends to be associated with higher inflation. Even Janet Yellen acknowledged as much, noting in a 2005 speech that "the evidence suggests that the predominant medium-term effect of a slowdown in trend productivity growth would likely be higher inflation."4 In theory, the causation between productivity and inflation can run in either direction: Weak productivity gains can fuel inflation while high inflation can, in turn, undermine growth. With respect to the latter, economists have focused on three channels: First, higher inflation may make it difficult for firms to distinguish between relative and absolute price shocks, leading to suboptimal resource allocation. Second, higher inflation may stymie capital accumulation because investors typically pay capital gains taxes even when the increase in asset values is entirely due to inflation. Third, high inflation may cause households and firms to waste time and effort on economizing their cash holdings. There are also several ways in which slower productivity growth can lead to higher inflation. For example, sluggish productivity growth may increase the likelihood that a country will be forced to inflate its way out of any debt problems. In addition, central banks may fail to recognize structural declines in productivity growth in real time, leading them to keep interest rates too low in the errant belief that weak GDP growth is due to inadequate demand when, in fact, it is due to insufficient supply. There is strong evidence that this happened in the U.S. in the 1970s. Chart II-10 shows that the Fed consistently overestimated the size of the output gap during that period. Chart II-10The Fed Continuously Overstated The ##br##Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Reason #2: Slower Productivity Growth May Deplete National Savings, Leading To A Higher Neutral Real Rate Imagine that you have a career where your real income is projected to grow by 2% per year, but then something auspicious happens that leads you to revise your expected annual income growth to 20%. How do you react? If you are like most people, your initial inclination might be to celebrate by purchasing a new car or treating yourself to a lavish vacation. As such, your saving rate is likely to fall at the outset. However, as the income gains pile up, you might find yourself running out of stuff to buy, resulting in a higher saving rate. This is particularly likely to be true if you grew up poor and have not yet acquired a taste for conspicuous consumption. Now consider the opposite case: One where you realize that your income will slowly contract over time as your skills become increasingly obsolete. The logic above suggests that your immediate reaction will be to hunker down and spend less - in other words, your saving rate will rise. However, as time goes by and the roof needs to be changed and the kids sent off to college, you may find it hard to pay the bills - your saving rate will then fall. The same reasoning applies to economy-wide productivity growth. When productivity growth increases, household savings are likely to decline as consumers spend more in anticipation of higher incomes. Meanwhile, investment is likely to rise as firms move swiftly to expand capacity to meet rising demand for their products. The combination of falling savings and rising investment will cause real rates to increase. As time goes by, however, it may become increasingly difficult for the economy to generate enough incremental demand to keep up with rising productive capacity. At that point, real rates will begin falling. The historic evidence is consistent with the notion that higher productivity growth causes savings to fall at the outset, but rise later on. Chart II-11 shows that East Asian economies all had rapid growth rates before they had high saving rates. China is a particularly telling example. Chinese productivity growth took off in the early 1990s. Inflation accelerated over the subsequent years, while the country flirted with current account deficits - both telltale signs of excess demand. It was not until a decade later that the saving rate took off, pushing the current account into a large surplus, even though investment was also rising at the time (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Asian Tigers: Growth Took Off First, ##br##Followed By Higher Savings Chart II-12China: Productivity Growth Accelerated, ##br##Then Savings Rate Took Off Today, Chinese deposit rates are near rock-bottom levels, and yet the household sector continues to save like crazy. This will change over time. The working-age population has peaked (Chart II-13). As millions of Chinese workers retire and begin to dissave, aggregate household savings will fall. Meanwhile, Chinese youth today have no direct memory of the hardships that their parents endured. As happened in Korea and Japan, the flowering of a consumer culture will help bring down the saving rate. Meanwhile, sluggish income growth in the developed world will make it difficult for households to save much. Population aging will only exacerbate this effect. As my colleague Mark McClellan pointed out in last month's edition of the Bank Credit Analyst, elderly people in advanced economies consume more than any other age cohort once government spending for medical care on their behalf is taken into account (Chart II-14).5 Our estimates suggest that population aging will reduce the household saving rate by five percentage points in the U.S. over the next 15 years (Chart II-15). The saving rate could fall as much as ten points in Germany, leading to the evaporation of the country's mighty current account surplus. As saving rates around the world begin to fall, real interest rates will rise. Chart II-13China's Very High Rate Of National Savings ##br##Will Face Pressure From Demographics Chart II-15Aging Will Reduce ##br##Aggregate Savings The Two Reasons Reinforce Each Other The discussion above has focused on two reasons why chronically low productivity growth could lead to higher interest rates: 1) weak productivity growth could fuel inflation; and 2) weak productivity growth could deplete national savings, leading to higher real rates. There is an important synergy between these two reasons. Suppose, for example, that weak productivity growth does eventually raise the neutral real rate. Since central banks cannot measure the neutral rate directly and monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, it is possible that actual rates will end up below the neutral rate. This would cause the economy to overheat, resulting in higher inflation. Thus, if the first reason proves to be true, it is more likely that the second reason will prove to be true as well. The Technological Wildcard So far, we have discussed productivity growth in very generic terms - as basically anything that raises output-per-hour. In reality, the source of productivity gains can have a strong bearing on interest rates. Economists describe innovations that raise the demand for labor relative to capital goods as being "capital saving." Paul David and Gavin Wright have argued that the widespread adoption of electrically-powered processes in the early 20th century serves as "a textbook illustration of capital-saving technological growth."6 They note that "Electrification saved fixed capital by eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed." In contrast, recent technological innovations have tended to be more of the "labor saving" than "capital saving" variety. Robotics and AI come to mind, but so do more mundane advances such as containerization. Marc Levinson has contended that the widespread adoption of "The Box" in the 1970s completely revolutionized international trade. Nowadays, huge cranes move containers off ships and place them onto waiting trucks or trains. Thus, the days when thousands of longshoremen toiled in the great ports of Baltimore and Long Beach are gone.7 If technological progress is driven by labor-saving innovations, real wages will tend to grow more slowly than overall productivity (Chart II-16). In fact, if technological change is sufficiently biased in favour of capital (i.e., if it is extremely "labor saving"), real wages may actually decline in absolute terms (Chart II-17). Owners of capital tend to be wealthier than workers. Since richer people save more of their income than poorer people, the shift in income towards the former will depress aggregate demand (Chart II-18). This will result in a lower neutral rate. Chart II-16U.S.: Real Wages Have Been ##br##Lagging Productivity Gains Chart II-18Savings Heavily Skewed ##br##Towards Top Earners It is difficult to know if the forces described above will dissipate over time. Productivity growth is largely a function of technological change. We like to think that we are living in an era of unprecedented technological upheavals, but if productivity growth has slowed, it is likely that the pace of technological innovation has also diminished. If so, the impact that technological change is having on such things as the distribution of income and global savings - and by extension on interest rates - could become more muted. To use an analogy, the music might remain the same, but the volume from the speakers could still drop. Capital In A Knowledge-Based Economy Chart II-19Falling Capital Goods Prices Have Allowed ##br##Companies To Slash Capex Budgets Labor-saving technological change has not been the only force pushing down interest rates. Modern economies are transitioning away from producing goods towards producing knowledge. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have thrived without having to undertake massive amounts of capital spending. This has left them with billions of dollars in cash on their balance sheets. The price of capital goods has also tumbled over the past three decades, allowing companies to cut their capex budgets (Chart II-19). In addition, technological advances have facilitated the emergence of "winner-take-all" industries where scale and network effects allow just a few companies to rule the roost (Chart II-20). Such market structures exacerbate inequality by shifting income into the hands of a few successful entrepreneurs and business executives. As noted above, this leads to higher aggregate savings. Market structures of this sort could also lead to less aggregate investment because low profitability tends to constrain capital spending by second- or third-tier firms, while the worry that expanding capacity will erode profit margins tends to constrain spending by winning companies. The combination of higher savings and decreased investment results in a lower neutral rate. As with labor-saving technological change, it is difficult to know how these forces will evolve over time. The growth of winner-take-all industries has benefited greatly from globalization. Globalization, however, may be running out of steam. Tariffs are already extremely low in most countries, while the gains from further breaking down the global supply chain are reaching diminishing returns (Chart II-21). Perhaps more importantly, political pressures for greater income distribution, trade protectionism, and stronger anti-trust measures are likely to intensify. If that happens, it may be enough to reverse some of the downward pressure on the neutral rate. Chart II-21The Low-Hanging Fruits Of ##br##Globalization Have Been Picked Investment Conclusions Is slow productivity growth good or bad for bonds? The answer is both: Slow productivity growth is likely to depress interest rates at the outset, but is liable to lead to higher rates later on. The U.S. has likely reached the inflection point where slow productivity is going from being a boon to a bane for bonds. Chart II-22 shows that the U.S. output gap would be over 8% of GDP had potential GDP grown at the pace the IMF projected back in 2008. Instead, it is close to zero and will likely turn negative if growth remains over 2% over the next few quarters. Other countries are likely to follow in the footsteps of the U.S. Chart II-22Output Gap Has Narrowed ##br##Thanks To Lower Potential Growth To be clear, productivity is just one of several factors affecting interest rates - demographics, globalization, and political decisions being others. However, as we argued in our latest Strategy Outlook, these forces are also shifting in a more inflationary direction.8 As such, fixed-income investors with long-term horizons should pare back duration risk and increase allocations to inflation-linked securities. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal,"The Best versus the Rest: The Global Productivity Slowdown, Divergence across Firms and the Role of Public Policy," OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 5 (November 2016). 3 Consider the widely-used Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. All things equal, an increase in g will result in a higher equilibrium real interest rate. The same is true in the Ramsey model, which goes a step further and endogenizes the saving rate within a fully specified utility-maximization framework. In this model, consumption growth is pinned down by the so-called Euler equation. Assuming that utility can be described by a constant relative risk aversion utility function, the Euler equation states that consumption will grow at (r-d)/h where d is the rate at which households discount future consumption and h is a measure of the degree to which households want to smooth consumption over time. In a steady state, consumption increases at the same rate as GDP, n+g. Rearranging the terms yields: r=(n+g)h+d. Notice that both models provide a mechanism by which a higher g can decrease r. In the Solow model, this comes from thinking about the saving rate not as an exogenous variable, but as something that can be influenced by the growth rate of the economy. In particular, if s rises in response to a higher g, r could fall. Likewise, in the Ramsey model, a higher g could make households more willing to forgo consumption today in return for higher consumption tomorrow (equivalent to a decrease in the rate of time preference, d). This, too, would translate into a lower neutral rate. 4 Janet L. Yellen, "The U.S. Economic Outlook," Presentation to the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research, February 11, 2005. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Beware Inflection Points In The Secular Drivers Of Global Bonds," April 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Paul A. David, and Gavin Wright,"General Purpose Technologies And Surges In Productivity: Historical Reflections On the Future Of The ICT Revolution," January 2012. 7 Marc Levinson, "The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger," Princeton University Press, 2006. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts The breakout in the S&P 500 above 2400 in May has further stretched valuation metrics. Measures such as the Shiller P/E and price/book are elevated relative to past equity cycles. The price/sales ratio is in a steep rise too. However, our U.S. Composite valuation metric, which takes into consideration 11 different measures of value, is still a little below the one sigma level that marks significant overvaluation. This is because our composite indicator includes valuation measures that take into account the low level of interest rates. Of course, these measures will not look as favorable when rates finally rise. Technically, the U.S. equity market has upward momentum. Our Equity Monetary Indicator has remained around the zero line, meaning that it is not particularly bullish or bearish at the moment. Our Speculation Index is high, pointing to froth in the market. The high level of our Composite Sentiment Index and low level of the VIX speaks to the level of investor complacency. The U.S. net revisions ratio jumped higher this month, and it is bullish that the earnings surprise index advanced again. Our U.S. Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator continues to send a positive message for the S&P 500, although it is now so elevated that it suggests that there could be little "dry powder" left to buy the market. This indicator tracks flows, and thus provides information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The widening gap between the U.S. WTP and that of Japan and Europe highlights that recent flows have favored the U.S. market relative to the other two. Looking forward, this means that there is more "dry powder" available to buy the Japanese and European markets. A rise in the WTPs for these two markets in the coming months would signal that a rotation into Europe and Japan is taking place. It is disconcerting that our Europe WTP suffered a pull-back over the past month. Nonetheless, we believe that accelerating corporate profit growth in the major advanced economies provides a strong tailwind and suggests that stocks remain in a window in which they will outperform bonds. U.S. bond valuation is hovering close to fair value. However, we believe that fair value itself is moving higher as we have reached an inflection point in some of the structural forces that have depressed bond yields. We also believe that the combination of Fed balance sheet shrinkage and rate hikes will lead to higher bond yields than are currently discounted in the market. Technically, our composite indicator has touched the zero line, clearing the way for the next leg of the bond bear market. The dollar is very expensive on a PPP basis, although it is less so by other measures. Technically, the dollar has shifted down this year, crossing the 200-day moving average. That said, according to our dollar technical indicator, overbought conditions have been totally worked off, suggesting that the currency is clear to move higher if Fed rate expectations shift up as we expect. Moreover, we believe that policy divergence in the overall monetary policy stance between the U.S. on one side and the ECB and BoJ on the other will push the dollar higher. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights EM EPS has recovered, supporting the current rally. However, forward-looking indicators portend a reversal and potential renewed contraction in EM EPS. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team has a more pessimistic outlook than the BCA house view, which is upbeat on the prospects for China's capex growth and commodity prices. The ongoing liquidity tightening in China amid lingering credit excesses is bound to produce major negative growth surprises. The authorities will reverse the ongoing monetary tightening only if the pain on the ground becomes visible or the economic data deteriorates significantly. Financial markets will sell off considerably in advance. In Chile, take profits on the receiving 3-year swap rate trade; stay neutral on this bourse within an EM equity portfolio. Feature EM Profit Recovery: How Enduring? EM equities have not only advanced in absolute terms but have also outperformed developed market (DM) share prices considerably since early this year. This outperformance has been rationalized by a recovery in EM earnings per share (EPS). Indeed, EM EPS has revived briskly in recent months (Chart I-1A). Chart I-1AEM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (I) Chart I-1BEM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (II) For this rally to continue, EM EPS would need to continue to expand further. We do not expect this. On the contrary, our bet is that EM EPS growth will slow considerably later this year and most likely contract in early 2018. Our basis is that the growth (first derivative) and impulse (second derivative) of EM & Chinese narrow money (M1) has in the past led their respective profit cycle (Chart I-1A and Chart I-1B). If these relationships hold and EM EPS growth dwindles later this year, EM share prices should begin to sense it now, and start falling back very soon. Interestingly, EM EPS net revisions have failed to rise above the zero line despite the recent rebound in profits (Chart I-2, top panel). This is in contrast to DM EPS net revisions, which have surged well above zero (Chart I-2, middle panel). As a result, recent EM relative outperformance against their DM peers has occurred despite the drop in relative net EPS revisions (Chart I-2, bottom panel). This presages EM equity analysts are not revising upward their forward estimates for EM EPS, despite the ongoing rally in share prices. This is extremely puzzling (and rare) and may be a reflection of recent weakness in commodities prices - or the fact that expectations for EM EPS growth were already elevated. We do not place much emphasis on analysts' EPS revisions because the latter swing with stock prices - they have zero forecasting power for share prices. We highlight this fact simply to counter the common market narrative that EM corporate earnings growth expectations are improving, driving EM bourses higher. Bottom Line: EM EPS has recovered, supporting the current rally. However, forward-looking indicators portend a reversal and potential renewed contraction in EM EPS nine months ahead. Importantly, EM equity prices relative to DM shares are at a major technical juncture (Chart I-3). A decisive breakout would be a very bullish technical signal, whereas a failure to break out would be an important warning sign. We continue to bet on the latter. Chart I-2EPS Net Revisions: EM And DM Chart I-3Relative Equity Performance: EM Versus DM China's Credit Cycle And Commodities Redux Our overarching theme has been and remains that China is tightening liquidity amid a lingering credit bubble. This cannot end well for financial markets that are exposed China's growth. Here we revisit our rationale for a credit slowdown in China and its impact on EM. Chinese interest rates have risen dramatically since last November across the entire yield curve. The 3-month interbank rate and AA- on-shore corporate bond yields both have risen by about 200 basis points since November 1, 2016. Monetary policy works with a time lag, and higher interest rates warrant a slowdown in credit growth (Chart I-4). In turn, it takes only a deceleration in credit growth for the credit impulse - the second derivative of outstanding credit - to turn negative. The falling credit and fiscal impulse will consequently lead to a relapse in Chinese import volumes and EM EPS (Chart 5), in turn weighing on commodity prices and non-commodity producing countries like Korea and partially Taiwan. Mainland import volumes contracted mildly in the second half of 2015, as demonstrated in Chart I-5. De facto, from the perspective of the rest of the world, China was in mild recession in late 2015. Not surprisingly, global risk assets in general, and particularly those exposed to China, tumbled. Chart I-4China: Higher Rates Point To##br## Negative Credit Impulse Chart I-5China's Credit Impulse Heralds ##br##Slowdown In Its Imports We expect China import volumes to shrink again by the end of this year or early next. Some sort of replay of 2015 is a real possibility. The broad-based yet mild selloff in commodities since early this year (Chart I-6) amid weakness in the U.S. dollar exchange rate gives us confidence in our view. Chart I-6ABroad-Based Selloff In Commodities (I) Chart I-6BBroad-Based Selloff In Commodities (II) Our colleagues at BCA have attributed the selloff in commodities this year to deleveraging in China's shadow banking system, and to traders worldwide closing their long positions. They expect an improving commodities supply-demand balance to support prices going forward. It makes sense to us to explain the selloff in commodities as having been caused by deleveraging in China's shadow banking system. Yet to be consistent, we should also acknowledge that the rally in commodities last year was to a large extent driven by the same forces in reverse: non-commercial buyers (investors) buying commodities both in China and elsewhere. In short, this signifies there was little improvement in worldwide commodities demand last year. In 2016, rising commodities prices provided a significant boost to commodity-producing countries and underlying corporate profits - and ultimately EM risk assets. The drop in commodities prices this year, if sustained, should lead to the opposite dynamic: income/profits among commodities countries/companies will drop. As such, falling commodities prices amid diminishing investor demand for commodities is bearish for EM risk assets. Where we differ from the majority of our colleagues at BCA is that we expect Chinese credit growth to decelerate, thereby weighing on its capital spending and depressing demand for commodities (please refer to Chart I-5). We have written extensively1 on this topic and will not fully rehash our view that China's annual credit growth will decelerate from the current 12% to somewhere around 8% in the next 12-18 months. In short, China's corporate and household credit-to-GDP ratio cannot rise indefinitely from an already high level of 225% of GDP. Credit growth will likely downshift to a level of sustainable nominal GDP growth, which is probably around 8%. Our main disagreement with our colleagues on structural issues is as follows: we believe China's credit excesses are not a natural outcome of the nation's high savings rate but rather the outcome of a speculative credit boom driven by high-risk behavior among creditors and debtors.2 Tightening liquidity amid such speculative excesses creates a very bearish backdrop for risk assets exposed to China's credit cycle. The bullish camp on China has recently pointed to a strong recovery in mainland nominal GDP growth, which in their view suggests that double-digit credit growth in China is not excessive (Chart I-7). However, such a surge in nominal GDP growth has been due to the GDP deflator rising from zero in the fourth quarter of 2015 to 5% in the first quarter of this year. Importantly, the swings in the GDP deflator almost perfectly correlate with the fluctuation in commodities prices (Chart I-8). This proves how much China's economy is exposed to commodities cycles and how much of nominal GDP swings are stipulated by resource price swings. Chart I-7China: Credit And ##br##Nominal GDP Growth Chart I-8China's GDP Deflator Is Very Sensitive##br## To Commodities Prices As commodities prices decline, China's GDP deflator, producer prices and nominal GDP growth will all dwindle. Thereby, China's underlying steady state nominal GDP growth is probably around 8% at best (5.5-6% real growth), with inflation of 2-2.5% (assuming flat commodities prices). If this is indeed the case, corporate and household credit growth of 12% entails a further build-up of leverage and an escalating non-public credit-to-GDP ratio, which already stands at 225% of GDP: corporate debt is 180% and household debt is at 45% of GDP. Bank loans account for 70%, while shadow (non-bank) funding channels (corporate bonds, trust products, entrusted loans, and banker's acceptance) constitute 30% of outstanding non-public credit or 65% of GDP. Both are growing at an annual rate of 11-12.5% (Chart I-9). On the whole, the share of shadow banking is non-trivial and its current growth pace is unsustainable amid ongoing regulatory tightening and rising interest rates. Furthermore, banks are themselves exposed to shadow banking as their claims on non-depository financial institutions have risen exponentially from RMB 3 trillion to RMB 27 trillion over the past five years. In regard to non-standard credit assets,3 our estimates are that banks' off-balance-sheet exposure is RMB 10 trillion compared with RMB 18.3 trillion of their balance-sheet non-standard credit assets. The off-balance-sheet credit exposure to non-standard credit assets is much larger for medium and small banks than the largest five (Table I-1). We discussed these issues in greater detail in our June 15, 2016 Special Report titled "Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow". Chart I-9Bank Loans And Non-Bank (Shadow) Credit Growth With banks being forced by regulators to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, their capital adequacy ratios will drop and their ability to sustain double-digit credit growth will be curtailed. Chart I-10Stay With Short Small / Long Large ##br##Banks Equity Trade The risks to medium and small banks is greater than to the large five banks. That is why we reiterate our recommendation from October 26, 2016 to short small banks versus large ones (Chart I-10). As a final note, we are often asked whether the government will provide a bail out if things deteriorate. Yes, we concur that policymakers will step in and backstop a financial system to preclude a systemic crisis. However, they are tightening now, and like the rest of us have little visibility. The authorities will meaningfully reverse the ongoing monetary tightening only if the pain on ground becomes visible or economic data deteriorate considerably. Financial markets will sell off materially in advance. Bottom Line: Investors should not be long China-plays, commodities and EM risk assets when mainland policy tightening is occurring amid lingering speculative credit excesses. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategy For Chilean Markets We recommended receiving 3-year swap rates on November 2, 2016 and this position has panned out with rates dropping by 30 basis points. We now recommend booking profits. The following has led us to conclude that the risk-reward profile of this position is no longer attractive: The improvement in narrow money (M1) growth points in a bottom in the economic activity indicator (Chart II-1). Mining production plunged amid the strikes in the world's largest copper producer Codelco (Chart II-2, top panel) and manufacturing production has also been contracting (Chart II-2, bottom panel). A period of improvement in mining and manufacturing output from a very low base is likely. Chart II-1Book Profits On Receiving ##br##3-Year Swap Rate Position Chart II-2Chile: Money And Economic##br## Activity Are Bottoming Out This will ameliorate overall business conditions and cause the central bank, at least for the time being, to halt the easing cycle. The pace of expansion in employment, wage growth, and consumer credit remains decent (Chart II-3). This will put a floor under household spending growth for now. Odds are that copper prices will decline meaningfully in the next nine months or so, which will cause the Chilean peso to depreciate. Although a depreciating currency will not to lead to materially higher interest rates in Chile, it will limit downside in local rate expectations. Finally, local 3-year swap rates and their spread over U.S. 3-year bond yields are extremely low from a historical perspective (Chart II-4). At this point, there is little value left in Chilean local rates. Chart II-3Chile's Mining And Manufacturing ##br##A Period Of Stabilization Ahead Chart II-4Chile: Consumer Spending##br## Is Holding Up Investment Conclusions Chart II-5Chilean Local Rates Spreads Over ##br##U.S. Treasurys: Not Much Value Left We do not expect the central bank to hike but the downside in local rates is limited for the time being. Take profits on the receiving 3-year swap rate trade. As to equities, the outlook for relative performance is balanced; we continue recommending a benchmark weight in Chile for dedicated EM equity portfolios. For absolute return investors, the risk-reward profile is not attractive because our profit margin proxy points to a relapse in corporate earnings (Chart II-5). Unit labor costs are rising faster than the core inflation rate, producing a profit margin squeeze (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Finally, we continue shorting the peso versus the U.S. dollar as a bet on lower copper prices. 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016 and "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports titled, "The Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings?", dated March 23, 2017, "Do Credit Bubbles Originate From High National Savings?", dated January 18, 2017, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016 and "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB", dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Non-standard credit assets are banks' claims on corporates that are not classified as loans. For more details please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Chinese Banks' Ominous Shadow", dated June 15, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Reflation Trade: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. New Zealand: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean government bond market. Feature "I know it makes no difference to what you're going through; but I see the tip of the iceberg, and I worry about you." - Rush Is The Liquidity Party Starting To Wind Down? Global financial markets continue to enjoy the "sweet spot" of a solidly expanding global economy, but without enough inflation pressure to force central banks to slam on the monetary brakes. That backdrop is starting to change, though. Odds are rising that the European Central Bank (ECB) will begin tapering its bond buying next year, with some hints of that possibly being announced as soon as next week's monetary policy meeting. At the same time, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) - faced with the operational constraints of buying an ever-increasing share of Japanese financial assets - is focused on targeting long-term interest rates rather than increasing liquidity. Even the Federal Reserve is now talking about reducing its massive balance sheet later this year. The liquidity tailwind to global growth and risk assets is now at risk of becoming a headwind. Already, the growth rate of the major central bank balance sheets has rolled over and is on course to decelerate further over the next year (Chart of the Week). Importantly, this downshift in global liquidity momentum is happening as signs of slowing growth have appeared in some major economies like China and the U.S. (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekLiquidity Tailwind To Risk##BR##Assets Is Fading Chart 2Growth Momentum##BR##Already Starting To Cool Off We remain concerned that the Chinese economy will see a policy-induced deceleration in the 2nd half of the year. However, we still expect the U.S. to rebound after the soft patch of growth in the first quarter, and we see nothing in the Euro Area data to suggest that the current solid expansion is at risk of fading quickly. This should allow inflation expectations to drift upward toward the central bank targets given the apparent lack of spare capacity on both sides of the Atlantic (Chart 3). Chart 3Fed & ECB Facing##BR##Economic Capacity Constraints We still expect the Fed to deliver another two rate hikes before year-end and the ECB to begin its exit strategy from the current extraordinary monetary policies by slowing the pace of asset purchases starting early next year. For now, the backdrop will remain supportive for the outperformance of growth-sensitive assets like corporate credit and equities over government bonds in the U.S. and Europe over the balance of 2017. However, the early signals sent by "leading leading" indicators such as our Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index (Chart 2, top panel) suggests that liquidity and growth trends will become far more challenging for the markets in 2018. Bottom Line: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. Maintain a below-benchmark duration exposure and an overweight allocation to corporate debt in global fixed income portfolios. New Zealand: Safety From A Global Bond Apocalypse? A growing number of the world's most wealthiest (and, arguably, most paranoid) people are reportedly buying real estate in New Zealand as a safe haven place to live if modern civilization collapses.1 While the immediate need for taking such precautions can be debated, there is sound logic in treating New Zealand as a location far removed from the current geopolitical and socio-economic problems of the world. We now see a case for treating New Zealand bonds as a potential "safe haven" market for global fixed income investors. The Economic Backdrop Has Become More Muddled We have been running a SHORT position in New Zealand (paying 12-month OIS rates) in our Tactical Overlay portfolio since last November. Our view then was that the New Zealand economy would surprise to the upside in 2017 and inflation was likely to start drifting upward. This would pressure the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to raise the Official Cash Rate (OCR) from the highly accommodative level of 1.75%. So far, that expectation has not panned out as the RBNZ has held rates steady amid a more uncertain outlook for the New Zealand economy. Growth indicators have been a bit mixed over the past few months, but the current uptick in the manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) is pointing to real GDP expanding around 3% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 4). If maintained for the full year, this would be slightly above the RBNZ's estimate of potential growth at 2.8%. There are some downside risks, however, given that consumer and business confidence are both below previous cyclical peaks and fiscal policy is expected to be mildly restrictive in 2017 (bottom three panels). The housing market remains a key cyclical wild card. Residential construction has been a significant source of growth over the past few years, driven by a surge in net immigration into New Zealand and declining interest rates (Chart 5). However, the RBNZ is projecting immigration inflows to slow from the current high level, largely due to improving labor market conditions in the developed economies (most notably, Australia, which is the largest source of New Zealand immigrants). Chart 4Stable NZ Growth...For Now Chart 5NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out Slower immigration would reduce the demand for New Zealand housing at a time when mortgage rates have already been rising off the record lows seen in 2016 (bottom panel). This has occurred without any rate hikes from the RBNZ, as rising global bond yields have put upward pressure on New Zealand bank funding costs, which have been passed through to higher mortgage rates. The RBNZ is currently projecting growth in house prices to slow sharply from last year's robust 15% pace to just 5% in 2017. The main drivers are higher borrowing costs and the ongoing impact of macro-prudential regulations against high loan-to-value ratio mortgage lending. Importantly, slower housing activity will not only have a direct impact on GDP growth through softer construction, but will also indirectly dampen consumer spending growth via wealth effects. Yet even with this expected drag on growth from housing, the New Zealand economy is still expected to face capacity constraints over the rest of the year. Higher Uncertainty Over Price Pressures Both the RBNZ and the International Monetary Fund estimate that the output gap has fully closed and is projected to move into positive territory this year (Chart 6). At the same time, the current unemployment rate of 4.9% is below the OECD's estimate of the full employment level and the RBNZ projects a further decline in joblessness in 2017 (third panel). Despite this evidence of the economy reaching capacity constraints, both wage growth and price inflation remain subdued and inflation expectations remain well-anchored around 2% - the midpoint of the RBNZ's 1-3% target range. Wage costs are particularly depressed, growing only 1% on a year-over-year basis in Q1. This may be related to the rise in the labor force participation rate - up to an all-time high of 70.6% in Q1 from a cyclical low of 68.2% at the end of 2015 - that has increased the available supply of labor. The most recent headline inflation print for Q1 was quite strong, taking the year-over-year growth rate up to 2.2%. Yet in the RBNZ's April Monetary Policy Statement (MPS), the central bank took a surprisingly dovish tone, citing uncertainty over the true degree of slack in the economy and downside risks to growth that would prevent a further acceleration of inflation.2 The RBNZ now forecasts inflation to not rise above 2.2% this year and to fall back to 1.1% in both 2018, led by a sharp decline in growth for tradeables, mostly energy and food inflation (Chart 7). Importantly, this forecast includes the recent decline in the trade-weighted New Zealand Dollar (NZD). Non-tradeables inflation is also expected to stabilize on the back of slower housing-related items in the consumer price index. Chart 6RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... Chart 7...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools A Weaker Case For Tighter Monetary Policy The official RBNZ projection is that the OCR will stay unchanged at 1.75% until September 2019. The market expectation priced into the NZD OIS curve calls for 27bps of hikes over the next twelve months (Chart 8). Our New Zealand Central Bank Monitor has been suggesting the need for tighter monetary policy since mid-2016, but appears to be rolling over (2nd panel). The diminished rate hike expectations have coincided with a decline in the NZD and a sharp underperformance of New Zealand equities. The markets are giving a consistent signal on softening growth prospects in New Zealand, confirming the central bank's more recent dovish turn. Chart 8Market Expectations Of##BR##RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Given the newfound uncertainties over the New Zealand growth and inflation outlook, the case for owning New Zealand interest rate exposure has grown a little bit stronger. Admittedly, we do not envision a major pullback in growth, and inflation may not fall by as much as the RBNZ is expecting given how little spare capacity there appears to be in the economy. Yet there is now just enough uncertainty to keep the central bank on hold for longer than expected, as was noted in the "scenario analysis" section of the April MPS.3 The RBNZ noted that if the level of spare capacity is smaller than currently assumed, then the latest growth forecast will result in inflation eventually moving to 2.0% in 2018 and 2.3% in 2019, resulting in the OCR needing to rise to 2.25% in two years. Alternatively, if housing demand slows even faster than current projections, inflation would be below the 2% target during the next two years and the OCR would need to fall to 1.25% by the end of 2018. Our takeaway from this is that, even in the more positive scenario, interest rates are not expected to rise by much more than the markets are currently discounting. Position For Tighter New Zealand Spreads Versus Treasuries & Bunds The economic risks in New Zealand now appear evenly balanced. This argues for stable monetary policy and diminished bond volatility. Current market forwards for both government bonds and NZD swaps shows that very little movement in interest rates is expected over the next year (Chart 9). We generally agree with this pricing, although the uncertainty over the degree of spare capacity, and underlying inflation pressures, make a directional view on interest rates or the shape of the yield curve an unattractive risk proposition. A more interesting opportunity presents itself in looking at spread trades between New Zealand government bonds versus other developed market sovereign debt. The yield betas for New Zealand versus the U.S. and Germany have fallen steadily over the past year (Chart 10), indicating that New Zealand bonds can be more insulated from the rise in yields that we expect for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds over the latter half of 2017. Given the competitively high yields on offer in New Zealand, even on a currency-hedged basis (bottom panel), we see a case for going long New Zealand interest rate exposure versus U.S. and Germany. Chart 9Higher NZ Bond Yields##BR##Priced Into Forwards Chart 10NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta##BR##With Higher Hedged Yields At current yield levels, going long New Zealand versus Germany looks more compelling relative to spread compression trades versus U.S. Treasuries. We see strong potential for New Zealand-Germany spreads to tighten faster than the forwards over the next six months (Chart 11), largely through rising German yields as the ECB signals that a tapering of bond purchases is set to begin next year. The downside potential for New Zealand-U.S. spread compression looks less likely from current tight levels, although if Treasury yields rise by as much as we expect in the coming months, some spread tightening should occur here, as well. Chart 11Go Long 5Yr NZ Bonds Vs##BR##USTs and German OBLs Based on our analysis, we are closing our current NZD rates trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio with a tiny profit of +3bps , and entering two new trades: long 5-year NZD government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries, on a currency-hedged basis; and long 5yr NZD government bonds versus 5-year German government debt, on a currency-unhedged basis.4 We are choosing to hedge the currency exposure back into USD for the former given the view of BCA's currency strategists that the EUR/USD exchange rate is now stretched too far to the upside and is at risk of declining as the Fed delivers on additional rate hikes in the coming months.5 In other words, we see a greater potential for a decline in NZD/USD than NZD/EUR in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation, in contrast to the strong likelihood of additional Fed rate hikes and an ECB taper announcement in the next few months. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: A Bad Moon Rising For Bond Yields Chart 12Markets Not Worried##BR##About The New President The new South Korean president, Moon Jae-In was elected on May 9th, ending a year of political turmoil after the previous president's scandal and impeachment. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy view Moon and his Democratic Party as a major shift to the political left.6 The new president's policy agenda is aimed at economic stimulus for the working class alongside reforms of the country's chaebol industrial giants. Korean financial markets have greeted the election result positively, with the benchmark KOSPI equity index up 2.7%, and the Korean won up 1% versus the U.S. dollar, from the pre-election levels on May 8th. (Chart 12). This is consistent with past market behavior, as the won tends to be less reactive toward domestic events (i.e. after the previous president's impeachment, the won actually strengthened) and more sensitive to international uncertainties (i.e. North Korea-U.S. military tensions, as occurred in mid-March). Korean interest rates, however, have shown little response to the change in leadership in Seoul, with bond yields unchanged since the election. We see this as presenting an opportunity for fixed income investors. Clearly, the new regime in Seoul represents a real change for the Korean people, but it also represents a potential shift in the economic backdrop - namely, through an expected large fiscal stimulus from the new government - that will impart a steepening bias to the Korean interest rate curve. A Sluggish Economy Greets The New President While the steady, if unspectacular, pace of global growth in the past few years has been enough to absorb spare capacity in many countries, South Korea's sub-par economic performance has left the country with a widening output gap (Chart 13). Policymakers are well aware that consumer spending, which contributes about 60% of GDP, has been steadily weakening alongside slowing credit growth. Chart 13Sluggish Growth In South Korea The new government will attempt to boost domestic consumption, and thus overall growth, by increasing social welfare spending. Moon's economic agenda calls for raising the minimum wage by 55% by 2020, increasing subsidies for education costs and parental leave, and doubling the basic pension payment for the elderly regardless of their income level. It might prove to be very effective in the short term at boosting consumer spending, but this may not prove to be a sustainable driver of growth in South Korea, where the marginal swings in the economy have historically been driven more by exports. Youth joblessness is another problem that Moon will attempt to tackle with his ambitious economic program. While the labor market may appear healthy, with an overall unemployment rate of only 3.7%, the situation is far more challenging for young adults in South Korea - the jobless rate for those aged 20-29 is 11.3%. One of the reasons for such a high unemployment rate among young South Koreans is that university graduates, of which there are many in this highly-educated nation, expect (and look for) high-paying jobs, but cannot find enough of them.7 The labor market has become more competitive in recent years as weak economic growth has limited the ability of private sector, especially large corporations, to hire as much. To solve this problem, the new government has promised to create 810,000 jobs in the public sector. Creating public sector jobs may temporarily solve the high unemployment rate, but in the long run, this will also cause larger fiscal burdens for taxpayers. Position For A Steeper South Korean Yield Curve Headline CPI inflation in South Korea is currently hovering around the 2% target of the Bank of Korea (BoK), while core CPI growth is lower at 1.3%. The BoK has maintain the policy rate at 1.25% since June 2016, with a bias towards additional easing given the lack of sustained inflationary pressure amid weak domestic demand. The BoK did sound a slightly more upbeat tone on the economy at last week's monetary policy meeting, led by the spillover effects from improving global growth rather than a more bullish expectation on the Korean consumer. Importantly, the central bank still expects inflation pressures to remain subdued - no surprise given the large output gap. The BoK did note that it is monitoring several factors in judging future policy decisions: the pace of rate hikes by the Fed, trends in global trade, geopolitical tensions, the pace of household debt accumulation and "the directions of the new government's fiscal policies." The latter may end up being the most important factor, as President Moon is proposing an increase in government spending equal to 0.7% of GDP - an amount equal to ½ of the estimated output gap coming after a 2016 budget surplus of 1% of GDP. This increase in fiscal spending could directly drive up the longer-end of Korean yield curve, as this would result in a narrower budget surpluses and greater KGB issuance. At the same time, the lack of domestic inflation pressures, even with the fiscal stimulus, will keep the BoK on an easing bias that will keep short dated yields well anchored. Therefore, we see the potential for the Korean yield curve to eventually steepen and break the downward-sloping trendline in place since 2014 (Chart 14). We recommend positioning for this move by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the Korean yield curve. Admittedly, this trade is more structural than tactical in nature, as the Moon stimulus policies will take time to unfold. Importantly, a flattening of the 2-year/10-year KGB curve is currently priced into the forwards, meaning that positioning now for a steepener does not incur negative carry (Chart 15). Chart 14More Fiscal Stimulus =##BR##Steeper Korea Curve Chart 15Enter A 2Yr/10Yr##BR##Korean Bond Curve Steepener Also, Korean 10-year bond yields are currently exhibiting a strong correlation to similar maturity U.S. Treasuries with a yield beta around 1.0 (bottom panel). Given our view that longer-dated U.S. yields have upside risk from both additional Fed rate increases and higher U.S. inflation expectations, that high yield beta suggests that the Korean yield curve could suffer some of the same cyclical bear-steepening pressures that we expect for U.S. Treasuries in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end curve of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean bond curve. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/29/silicon-valley-new-zealand-apocalypse-escape 2 The central bank noted that its "suite" of output gap estimates, using varying methodologies, have an unusually wide range at the moment between -1.5% and +2%. 3 http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-statement 4 These trades can be done using interest rate swaps as well (receiving NZD rates vs paying USD & EUR rates), as swap spreads are expected to remain broadly stable in all three regions. 5 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets" dated May 24 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 According to the OECD, Korea's college enrollment rate was a whopping 87% as recently as 2014. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will deliver two rate hikes between now and the end of the year and will also begin the process of winding down its balance sheet. The market is only priced for 36 bps of rate hikes this year. Maintain below-benchmark duration. Economy: Weakness in Q1 GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories. Both of these components are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. Inflation: The Fed is content to rely on Phillips Curve inflation forecasts, and does not need to see actual inflation rise in order to lift rates. However, if inflation does not rebound as expected, the Fed will become increasingly concerned about falling inflation expectations and could adopt a more dovish reaction function later this summer. We think inflation will be strong enough to avoid this outcome. Financial Conditions: The Fed strongly believes that financial conditions lead economic growth. Absent any major changes in the economic data, the pace of rate hikes will be determined by the Fed's targeting of financial conditions. Feature The market-implied probability of a June rate hike jumped sharply during the past two weeks (Chart 1), and stood at 81% as of last Friday's close. In all likelihood the fourth rate hike of the cycle, and the third in the past six months, will occur at the next FOMC meeting on June 14. In our view, the Fed will deliver two 25 basis point rate hikes between now and the end of the year and will also begin the process of winding down its balance sheet (see Box). With the market only priced for 36 bps of rate hikes during that timeframe, we continue to advocate a below-benchmark duration stance. Chart 1Still On For June The minutes from the May FOMC meeting, released last week, suggest that most Fed policymakers still maintain a forecast for two more hikes this year. The minutes also provide some useful insight about how FOMC participants think about the economy and what developments could cause their forecasts to change. This week we take a look at what the Fed believes, and consider whether those beliefs are well founded. Box Balance Sheet Strategy Revealed We wrote about the potential impact of the Fed’s balance sheet policy in last week’s report (please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers”, dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com), but provide a brief update this week because of new information gained from the May FOMC minutes. Previously, it was unknown whether the Fed would cease the reinvestment of its securities holdings all at once, or whether it would “taper” the reinvestment by gradually increasing the amount of securities it allowed to run off. We now know that “nearly all policymakers expressed a favorable view” of a tapering strategy where the Fed will set a series of gradually increasing caps on the total amount of securities it allows to run off its balance sheet. The plan calls for the caps to be raised every three months, according to a schedule that will be set in advance. The only reason for this plan to not function smoothly would be if market participants start to view the reinvestment caps as an additional policy tool that the Fed will vary according to economic conditions. This would risk taking the focus off the fed funds rate as the main policy tool, and would make it difficult for the market to interpret the overall stance of monetary policy. The minutes show that the Fed plans to avoid this messy outcome by setting a fixed schedule for changing the reinvestment caps. If the market believes that the Fed will stick to this schedule, then the plan should work fine. The May minutes also showed that “nearly all policymakers” thought that it would be appropriate to begin the reinvestment process this year, as long as economic conditions do not deteriorate. While we still lack some important details, such as the Fed’s target for the ultimate level of reserves in the banking system, we now think it is very likely that these details will emerge at either the June or September FOMC meeting and that balance sheet run off will begin following either the September or December meeting. What The Fed Believes: Weak Q1 Growth Is Transitory Although the incoming data showed that aggregate spending in the first quarter had been weaker than participants had expected, they viewed the slowing as likely to be transitory.1 Even after last week's slight upward revision, at 1.2%, first quarter GDP growth came in well below its post-crisis average (Chart 2). However, a quick look at the major components of GDP reveals that the weakness was concentrated in consumer spending and the change in private inventories (Chart 2, bottom two panels). Growth contributions from residential and non-residential investment were actually considerably above their post-crisis averages, and the contributions from net exports and government spending were in-line with theirs (Chart 3). Chart 2The Consumer Was A Drag In Q1 Chart 3Investment Is A Bright Spot We know from history that large changes in inventories tend to mean-revert fairly quickly. In fact, we can model the inventory component of GDP growth based on the lagged change in inventories and the Backlog of Orders component of the ISM Manufacturing survey (Chart 4). Both of these factors suggest that inventories will bounce back strongly next quarter. In fact, the ISM survey shows the largest backlog of manufacturing orders since 2014. Likewise, weakness in consumer spending is unlikely to persist. The fundamental drivers of consumer spending all continue to paint a positive picture (Chart 5). Chart 4Big Backlog Of Orders Chart 5Consumer Spending Drivers: Part I Consumer confidence has hardly given back any of its post-election gains (Chart 5, panel 1). Personal income growth is already on the upswing, and income expectations point to further acceleration (Chart 5, panel 2). Employment is still growing at a reasonably robust pace, and the mild slowdown since early 2015 has been offset by stronger wage growth (Chart 5, bottom panel). Longer-run drivers of consumer spending are also solid. Households continue to accumulate wealth, and household leverage has returned to late 1990s levels. In other words, household balance sheets are the healthiest they have been since prior to the housing bubble (Chart 6). More broadly, indicators of overall GDP growth are also pointing toward an acceleration (Chart 7). The ISM Non-Manufacturing index increased to 57.5 in April from 55.2 in March, and the BCA Beige Book Monitor - an indicator based on the occurrence of certain keywords in the Fed's Beige Book2 - has gone vertical. It would be unusual for GDP growth to diverge from these two indicators for a prolonged period of time. Chart 6Consumer Spending Drivers: Part II Chart 7Overall Growth Indicators Bottom Line: Weakness in Q1 GDP was concentrated in consumer spending and inventories. Both of these components are likely to strengthen in the months ahead. The Fed is probably correct that weak Q1 growth will prove transitory. Recent Weak Inflation Readings Are Also Transitory Overall, most participants viewed the recent softer inflation data as primarily reflecting transitory factors, but a few expressed concern that progress toward the Committee's objective may have slowed.3 We dealt with the inflation outlook in last week's report,4 through the lens of our Phillips Curve inflation model. To recap, using our model we found it very difficult to craft a realistic set of economic assumptions that resulted in year-over-year core PCE inflation below 1.88% by the end of the year. In our base case economic scenario the model projects that core inflation will reach 2.11%. Because our model is based on one that Janet Yellen referred to in a 2015 speech,5 we assumed that the Fed would reach a similar conclusion with regards to the inflation outlook. Although it must be said that the May FOMC meeting occurred prior to the disappointing April CPI release, it is notable that the minutes from the May meeting say that only "one member view[ed] further progress of inflation toward the 2 percent objective as necessary before taking another step to remove policy accommodation." In other words, almost all Fed members are content to rely on Phillips Curve style inflation models, which suggest that inflation will rise in the near future, and are putting less weight on the current low level of actual inflation. Of course, that dynamic could change relatively quickly. Chart 8 shows the track record of our Phillips Curve model, and we can see that it is not unusual for large residuals - on the order of 0.5% - to persist for significant periods of time. This means that even if all of our forecasts of the independent variables in the model turn out to be correct, there is still a chance that actual inflation will not keep pace with the model. In light of current circumstances, one period in particular stands out. The period from late-1993 to mid-1994, denoted by the shaded region in Chart 8. Chart 8The Fed Still Believes In The Phillips Curve In that episode the fair value from our model suggested that inflation should trend higher. Instead, inflation fell quite sharply. Eventually the model's fair value also moved lower, driven by a declining contribution from the model's lagged inflation term,6 and also by falling inflation expectations. In our view, this latter point is particularly important. In 1993-94, the failure of inflation to keep pace with Phillips Curve forecasts eventually caused market participants to lose faith and revise their inflation expectations lower. In a worst case scenario, a large decline in inflation expectations can feed on itself, leading to a deflationary spiral from which the Fed would have difficulty escaping. Chart 9Inflation Expectations Are ##br##Tough To Measure The Fed is very worried about falling (or more specifically "un-anchored") inflation expectations. In her aforementioned 2015 speech,7 Chair Yellen cautioned that temporary fluctuations in import prices or resource utilization could lead to permanent changes in inflation if they also caused inflation expectations to shift. Also, the longer the Fed misses its inflation target, the more likely it is that inflation expectations will become un-tethered. This is a very real risk. For now, the FOMC continues to view inflation expectations as well anchored, although the May minutes showed that "some participants" expressed concern that "the public's longer-term inflation expectations may have fallen somewhat." One problem is that there is no perfect way to measure inflation expectations (Chart 9). Market-based measures of inflation compensation are well below levels that have been consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target in the past (Chart 9, panel 1), but these measures are volatile and are often driven by market-specific factors unrelated to inflation expectations. Meantime, the inflation expectations of professional forecasters have been quite stable (Chart 9, panel 2), while the message from consumer inflation expectations is mixed (Chart 9, bottom panel). The University of Michigan consumer survey shows inflation expectations near an all-time low, but the New York Fed's survey shows them in an uptrend. In any event, the strong correlation between consumer inflation expectations and gasoline prices makes them questionable at best. Bottom Line: The Fed is content to rely on Phillips Curve inflation forecasts, and does not need to see actual inflation rise in order to lift rates. However, if inflation does not rebound as expected, the Fed will become increasingly concerned about falling inflation expectations and could adopt a more dovish reaction function later this summer. We think inflation will be strong enough to avoid this outcome and that the Fed is still on track for two more rate hikes this year. Financial Conditions Are Crucial [Some participants] noted variously that the decline in longer-term interest rates and the modest depreciation of the dollar over the intermeeting period would provide some stimulus to aggregate demand, that the Committee's recent policy actions had not resulted in a tightening of financial conditions, or that some of the decline in longer-term yields reflected investors' perceptions of diminished odds of significant fiscal stimulus and an increase in some geopolitical and foreign political risks.8 The above passage shows that the Fed believes that financial conditions lead growth, a result we have also shown in prior reports (Chart 10).9 In this context, the Fed would expect financial conditions to tighten as it lifts rates, eventually causing economic growth to moderate. If financial conditions fail to tighten it would suggest that monetary policy needs to become more restrictive, and vice-versa. Financial conditions tightened dramatically following the December 2015 rate hike (Chart 11) and the ensuing growth slowdown caused the Fed to postpone the next rate hike for 12 months. Then, financial conditions were relatively unchanged following the December 2016 rate hike, and this allowed the Fed to deliver another hike in March. The large easing in financial conditions since the March hike is telling the Fed that it needs to step up its pace. Chart 10The Fed Believes That Financial Conditions Lead Growth Chart 11A Big Easing Since March Ultimately, the Fed still needs inflation to increase. This means that it does not want financial conditions to tighten too much, and would likely prefer to keep the Chicago Fed's Adjusted Financial Conditions index below the zero line (Chart 11, top panel). A negative reading from the adjusted index signals that financial conditions are easy relative to the strength of the economy. That is, they should be sufficiently accommodative to allow the economic recovery to continue and cause inflation to rise. At the same time, levels that are deep in accommodative territory signal that the Fed can move more rapidly. Bottom Line: The Fed strongly believes that financial conditions lead economic growth. Absent any major changes in the economic data, the pace of rate hikes will be determined by the Fed's targeting of financial conditions. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 2 For further details on the BCA Beige Book Monitor please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers", dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 6 One of the independent variables in our model is a 12-month lag of the year-over-year change in core PCE inflation. The lagged inflation variable pressures the model's fair value toward the level of actual inflation. If no other variables change, then over time the lagged inflation variable will ensure that the model fair value converges toward actual inflation. 7 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 8 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee May 2-3, 2017. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20170503.pdf 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads", dated March 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Downgrade communications equipment stocks to underweight. All three end-markets are weak and signal that profits will continue to surprise to the downside. Continue to avoid the electrical components & equipment index. Deficient demand warns that the profit down cycle is far from over. Recent Changes S&P Communications Equipment - Downgrade to underweight. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature Equities broke out to new highs last week. The minutes from the latest FOMC meeting implied that it would take considerable economic strength for the Fed to tighten more than markets currently forecast. A reactive rather than proactive Fed raises the odds that the equity overshoot will persist, because it means monetary conditions will still support profits. A good part of this year's market advance has been concentrated in a small number of stocks, but that belies the breadth of the profit recovery. Net analyst earnings revisions have hit their highest level since the initial post-GFC surge. The number of S&P industry groups with rising earnings estimates has climbed above 80%, reflecting broad-based earnings upgrades. Such widespread participation is consistent with ongoing upward revisions to 12-month forward earnings estimates (Chart 1). Evidence of a healthy earnings recovery is supported by our own Indicators. Of our ten sector pricing power gauges, seven are in positive territory. On a more granular basis, the majority of our 64 industry group pricing power proxies is also rising. This reflects increased global business activity and U.S. dollar depreciation. In terms of costs, six out of ten wage inflation proxies are decelerating, and more than 50% of our industry labor expense gauges are falling. As a result, seven out of ten of our broad sector profit margin proxies are in positive territory, i.e. pricing power is rising at a faster pace than wage inflation. Of the three in negative territory, two are easing in intensity, i.e. margin pressures are diminishing. These profit trends will support stocks, at least until they generate economic overheating and by extension, a more restrictive Fed. Thus, the good news for bulls is that financial conditions will remain sufficiently easy to sustain a durable profit recovery (see Chart 1 from last week's Report), so much so that investors are lengthening their time horizons. Evidence of the first synchronized global expansion in years and the ability of regional economies to bounce back from a headline risk, such as Brexit, have boosted conviction in the sustainability and strength of long-term earnings growth: analyst 5-year earnings growth forecasts are being steadily upgraded. History shows that as long as economic tail risk remains on the back burner, then valuations can camp out in overshoot territory, as occurred in the second half of the 1990s (Chart 2). To be sure, nosebleed valuation levels underscore that the rally is in a high risk phase and virtually guarantee paltry long-term returns. Still, timing pullbacks is notoriously difficult. We follow a checklist of five reliable indicators that should provide a helpful timing tool. Emerging market currencies have weakened prior to or coincident with U.S. stock market corrections (Chart 3). Exchange rate depreciation in these high beta economies is emblematic of growth disappointment, fears of capital flight and/or risk aversion. At the moment, our proxy of EM currencies is accelerating. Chart 1Buoyant Breadth Bodes Well Chart 2Long-Term Profit Conviction Is Driving Multiples Chart 34/5 Lights Flash Green Corporate bond spreads, both in the U.S. and emerging markets, have also widened coincident with, or in advance of, meaningful equity setbacks (Chart 3). So far, spreads remain tight in both regions, suggesting minimal concerns about debt servicing capabilities. In addition, bullish individual investor sentiment has also eclipsed the 60% zone in advance of the two largest post-GFC drawdowns. Individual investors are currently upbeat, but are not yet frothing bulls, according to the latest survey data (Chart 3). Of the five checklist items, the behavior of the yield curve is the most disconcerting. The curve has narrowed considerably in recent weeks, and is closing in on the pre-U.S. election lows as inflation expectations recede (Chart 3). If real long-term yields do not soon advance and confirm the profit/economic recovery narrative, then the odds of an imminent corrective phase will ratchet higher. In sum, the overshoot should remain intact for a while longer. But we continue to recommend a barbell portfolio rather than one with excessive beta, favoring select defensives and early cyclical sectors such as consumer discretionary and financials given the lack of economic confirmation from the bond market. This week we highlight two exceptions to the generally bullish profit backdrop, which reinforces that selectivity remains critical to portfolio construction. A Weak Signal From Communications Equipment: Downgrade To Underweight Communications equipment stocks have diverged negatively from the broad tech sector and have also trailed the broad market. Instead, this small corner of the tech industry moves with the ebb and flow of telecom carrier stocks - a key end-market, with a slight lag (top panel, Chart 4). The latest signal from telecom services stocks is bearish, and we recommend a downgrade to a below-benchmark allocation in the S&P communications equipment group. While the share price ratio has lost ground and valuations look compelling (Chart 4), the risks of further near-term losses and a longer-term value trap remain high. Technical conditions are still far from previously extreme washed out levels. In fact, the overbought conditions' unwind is recent and there is ample downside left before a full capitulation materializes (middle panel, Chart 4). Worryingly, all three key communications equipment end-markets point to additional weakness in the coming months. Telecom carrier outlays have hit a wall. Telecom providers are at each other's throats and a full blown price war has engulfed the industry. This is outright deflationary, and telecom services pricing power has contracted at a double-digit rate during the past three months (bottom panel, Chart 5). In the absence of revenue growth, telecom capex is unlikely to reaccelerate. U.S. telecom facilities construction and communications equipment new order growth move in lockstep (second panel, Chart 5). Both have collapsed on a short-term rate of change basis, warning that communications equipment demand is soggy. Tack on the quickest industry inventory accumulation since 2011 (third panel, Chart 5), a soft order backlog (not shown), and the industry sales growth outlook has darkened even further. Overall corporate outlays are also soft. While a capex upcycle looms and some capital will inevitably flow to the communication equipment industry (middle panel, Chart 6), anemic C&I loan growth (an excellent proxy for broad corporate health, not shown) is a yellow flag. Chart 4Value Trap Chart 5Weak Telecom Segment Capex... Chart 6...Aggravates The Sales Risk Moreover, enterprise spending has not been concentrated on communications equipment gear for years, as the industry has been unable to gain any share of total corporate investment. The implication is that any business sector uptick is unlikely to match the pressure stemming from the telecom services sector. The government segment represents another source of drag. True, a global move away from austerity is a plus, but delays/uncertainty with regard to U.S. fiscal policy is a sizeable offset. In fact, U.S. government spending as a percentage of output is in decline (not shown) and the Trump administration's strict budget control warns that the government's purse strings will remain tight for some time. Finally, export markets are unlikely to offset domestic cooling. While the cheapened U.S. dollar should boost U.S. communication equipment manufacturers' competitiveness, China's global networking ascendancy and Europe's recent V-shaped export recovery suggest that U.S. gear providers are losing market share (Chart 7). All of this paints a grim picture for communications equipment sales. As such, cyclically stretched operating margins are at risk (Chart 8). Industry productivity growth has crested, and is likely to recede because slowing new orders and rising inventories imply reduced output. The implication will be profit margin pressure and a return on equity squeeze (middle panel, Chart 8). While the industry constantly realigns headcount to the challenging operating environment, a sustainable profit turnaround requires a demand driven rebound. Chart 7U.S. Manufacturers Are Losing Market Share Chart 8Beware A Margin Squeeze Meanwhile, industry specific forces will also contribute to margin pressure. Five years ago, Cisco's CEO dismissed the nascent virtual networking threat. However, today, virtual networking is a deflationary reality. Such intense deflationary pressure is a clear profit negative and warns that relative EPS are headed south (Chart 8). Bottom Line: The S&P communications equipment index is breaking down. Trim exposure to below benchmark. The ticker symbols for this index are: BLBG: S5COMM - CSCO, HRS, MSI, JNPR, FFIV. Electrical Components & Equipment Are Out Of Power The niche S&P electrical components & equipment (ECE) industrials sub-index has marked time since our late-November downgrade to underweight. Our bearish thesis remains intact. Cyclical momentum has sputtered after the relative share price ratio failed to sustain its post-U.S. election euphoria. Valuations remain dear, with the forward P/E ratio trading at a 15% premium to the broad market (bottom panel, Chart 9). If profits continue to disappoint, as we expect, then a de-rating phase is inevitable. ECE companies garner roughly half of their sales from abroad. Thus, the U.S. dollar's fluctuations are inversely correlated with relative share prices. Delayed translation effects from the U.S. dollar's large run-up last year should continue to weigh on profits, and offset the European and emerging market economic recoveries. Worrisomely, there is a wide gap between relative performance and the greenback. If history rhymes, then a convergence phase is likely with the relative share price ratio deflating closer to the level predicted by the U.S. dollar (currency shown inverted, top panel, Chart 9). Domestically, news is equally grim. Investment spending on electrical equipment remains moribund: outlays are contracting in absolute terms and continue to trail overall investment. Historically, the industry's new orders-to-inventories ratio has been closely correlated with relative outlays and the current message is bleak (bottom panel, Chart 10). Chart 9No Reasons To Pay For Premium Valuations Chart 10No Reasons To Pay For Premium Valuations Importantly, the surge in ECE inventory growth and deceleration in backlog growth point to pricing power pressure in the coming months. Chart 11 shows that a rising wage bill and anemic pricing power have squeezed our industry margin proxy. In terms of industry productivity, gains have given way to losses, according to our gauge. This suggests that profits will continue to languish (middle panel, Chart 10). Tack on the slump in weekly hours worked, and there is cause to doubt recent sell side analyst optimism (bottom panel, Chart 11). A demand-driven increase in revenues/backlogs is needed to reverse the industry's profit fortunes. However, our relative EPS model is forecasting the opposite: profits will continue to underwhelm and trail the broad market into the back half of the year (Chart 12). Chart 11Lean Against Analysts' Exuberance Chart 12EPS Model Says Sell Against this backdrop, we remain reluctant to pay a premium valuation to own an industry with an uncertain, at best, earnings profile. Bottom Line: While we are neutral on the broad industrials sector, we continue to recommend underweight exposure in the S&P electrical components & equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ELCO - EMR, ETN, ROK, AME, AYI. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights Business capital spending is still trending up, adding another layer of support for the U.S. economy in the next 6-12 months. Profit growth has accelerated at a faster pace than our top-down model had projected and we expect growth to accelerate further into year end. We estimate that the delayed pass-through of previous dollar strength will remain a slight drag on U.S. EPS growth over rest of 2017. Our tactical view on gold remains bearish, but the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy service sees strategic value in gold as a hedge. Feature The S&P 500 is attempting to break through the 2400 barrier as we go to press. This is impressive given that the flagging relative performance of infrastructure stocks and highly-taxed companies suggests that investors have given up hope of ever seeing significant tax cuts, infrastructure spending and incentives for capital spending. As we discuss below, disappointment on the policy front has thankfully been offset by solid corporate earnings figures. We believe that investors have gone too far in pricing out tax reform. True, the growing number of White House scandals will serve to delay the GOP's market-friendly policy agenda. Nonetheless, the President desperately needs a win ahead of mid-term elections, and tax reform and deregulation are two key areas where the President and congressional Republicans are on the same page. Capital spending is the part of the economy that could benefit the most from tax reform. Surprising Support From Capex Business capital spending is still trending up, adding another layer of support for the U.S. economy in the next 6-12 months. The post-election rollover in C&I loan growth worried investors that rising rates and election-related uncertainty had cut the flow of credit to the business sector, thus putting capex at risk (Chart 1, top panel). That concern was overdone, as we pointed out in a recent report.1 Business expenditures on plant, equipment and software were a surprising source of strength in first-quarter GDP, and bank lending has stabilized in the past six weeks. The FOMC minutes of the May 2-3 meeting noted that "financing conditions for large nonfinancial firms stayed accommodative." The minutes also stated that, while there was weaker demand for C&I loans in April, the weakness "pertained to customers' reduced needs for financing." The reduced need likely reflected a preference to issue corporate bonds. Chart 1Outlook For Capex Looks Solid Our BCA Capex indicator for business investment points to solid business spending in the next few quarters. (Chart 1, bottom panel) Our past research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles only get underway when businesses see evidence that consumer final demand is on the upswing. While consumer expenditures were quite soft (+0.3% annualized gain) in Q1, our view is that the weakness was transitory.2 This view was confirmed by the FOMC minutes. A rebound in consumer spending in the second quarter will boost CEO confidence that increased capital spending will be justified in terms of future sales. Our base case is that at least some tax cuts will be enacted by year end, but the risk is that political turmoil further delays a fiscal package or even totally derails the GOP legislative agenda. This scenario would be negative for stocks temporarily, but could end up being positive over the medium term by extending the expansion in the economy and corporate profits. U.S. Profits, Beats And Misses Profit growth has accelerated at a faster pace than our top-down model had projected earlier this year (Chart 2). On a 4-quarter moving total basis, S&P 500 earnings-per-share were up by more than 13% in the first quarter (84% reporting). We expect growth to accelerate further into year end, peaking at just under 20%, before moderating in 2018. The favorable profit picture reflects two key factors. First, profits are rebounding from a poor showing in 2016, when EPS was dragged down by the collapse in oil prices and a global manufacturing recession. Oil prices have since rebounded and global industrial production is recovering as expected (Chart 3). Earnings are of course leveraged to corporate sales, helping to explain why profits are highly correlated with industrial production in the major countries. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service estimates that operating leverage for the S&P 500 is 1.4x.3 Chart 2Impact Of Stronger Dollar Is Fading Chart 3IP On The Rebound Globally Second, the corporate sectors in the major economies are still in a sweet spot in which the top line is growing but there is no major wage cost pressure evident yet. This is the case even in the U.S., where labor market slack has largely been absorbed. Indeed, margins rose in Q1 2017 for the third quarter in a row. Our indicators suggest that the corporate sector has gained some pricing power at a time when wage gains are taking a breather.4 The hiatus of wage pressure may not last long, but for now our short-term EPS growth model remains upbeat for the next 3-6 months (not shown). What About The Dollar? We estimate that the delayed pass-through of previous dollar strength will remain a slight drag on U.S. EPS growth of about one percentage point for the remainder of this year, assuming no change in the dollar from today's level (Chart 2, second and third panels). However, our base case remains that the dollar will appreciate by another 10% in trade-weighted terms. A 10% appreciation would trim EPS growth by roughly 2½ percentage points, although most of this would occur in 2018 due to lagged effects. The key point is that another upleg in the dollar, on its own, should not provide a major headwind for the stock market. Indeed, the dollar would only be rising in the context of robust U.S. economic growth and an expanding corporate top line. Even though the message from our EPS model is upbeat, it still falls short of bottom-up estimates for 2017. Is this a risk for the equity market, especially since valuations are stretched? Investors are well aware that bottom-up estimates are perennially optimistic. Table 1 compares the beginning-of-year EPS growth estimate with the actual end-of-year outcome for 2007-2016. Not surprisingly, bottom-up analysts massively missed the mark in 2008, which was a recession year. But even outside of the recession, analysts significantly over-estimated earnings in seven out of nine years. Despite this, the S&P 500 rose sharply in most cases. One exception was 2015, when the S&P 500 fell by 0.7%. Plunging oil and material prices contributed to an EPS growth "miss" of seven percentage points. Chart 4 highlights that the level of the 12-month forward EPS estimate fell that year, unlike in the other years considered. Valuations are more demanding today than in the past, but the message is that attaining bottom-up EPS year-end estimates is less important for the broad market than the direction of 12-month forward estimates (which remains up at the moment). Table 1Bottom Up Estimates Are##BR##Always Too Optimistic Chart 4Oil Related##BR##Dip In 2015 The bottom line is that the backdrop is constructive for equities even if the Republicans are unable to push through any fiscal stimulus. In fact, it may be better for the stock market in the medium term if the GOP fails to pass any meaningful legislation. The U.S. economy does not need any demand stimulus at the moment (although measures to boost the supply side of the economy would help lift profits over the long term). The current long-in-the-tooth expansion is likely to stretch further in the absence of stimulus, extending the moderate growth/low inflation/low interest rate backdrop that has been positive for risk assets in recent years. Gold Update Our tactical view on gold remains bearish, but the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy service sees strategic value in gold as a hedge against rising inflation and inflation expectations, geopolitical risk and increased equity volatility.5 Chart 5A shows that the price of gold in real terms is still very expensive. On a nominal basis, gold is at the top end of a trading channel that it has been in since early 2012 (Chart 5B). There has been a big gap between the model value and the actual price of gold for the past three years. The real price of gold remains elevated despite the fact that inflation has been well contained.6 Chart 5AModel Suggests Gold Is Overvalued Chart 5BIn A Downward Channel Since 2012 Our 6-12 month view on gold is that it will take its cues from Fed policy and policy expectations. The Fed is not behind the curve on inflation, and inflation expectations and measured inflation remain low. Our CPI and PCE models (Chart 6) show only a modest acceleration in inflation by year end, just enough to keep the Fed on track this year as it begins to shrink its balance sheet and raise rates two more times. Thus, we do not see a great need to hold gold as a hedge against inflation over the next year. Nonetheless, for those investors concerned about a pullback that turns into a correction or a bear market, we mention that gold has a 33% weight in our Protector Portfolio.7 Chart 6Core Inflation To Stay Near##BR##Fed's Target This Year Bottom Line: Gold is expensive in real terms relative to a set of fundamentals that have explained its real price since 1970. However, the yellow metal may have value on a strategic basis or as part of a portfolio designed to protect against falling equity prices. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Earnings Rebound Will Earn Some Respect", April 10, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Growth, Inflation And The Fed", May 8, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Operating Leverage To The Rescue?," published April 17, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Spring Snapback?," published April 24, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Go Long Gold As A Strategic Portfolio Hedge," published May 4, 2017. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Gold: The Asset Allocation Dilemma," published August 1, 2011. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Still Awaiting The Next Pullback," published May 15, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights On the European side, the key risk to our bullish DXY stance is that European growth is strong, the labor market seems to be tightening, and core CPI has perked up. These risks are real but mitigated by budding signs that European growth is at its best, by the abundance of hidden labor market slack, and by the high chance that the CPI spike was transitory. On the U.S. side of the ledger, the key risks are that wages do not pick up, that credit growth continues to act as a break on activity, and that political risks hamper fiscal dynamics. All would mean a more dovish Fed than we anticipate. These risks are mitigated by the fact that hidden U.S. labor market slack is only now low enough for wages to improve, credit looks set to turn around as financial conditions are supportive, and fiscal policy should surprise to the upside. USD/NOK has upside as Norway experiences declining inflation. Go long CAD/NOK. Feature Last week, we augmented our cyclically dollar bullish view by removing our tactical bearish bias on the USD. In our eyes, the market is underestimating the capacity of the Fed to increase rates and is also overestimating the economic impact of the fiasco surrounding Trump's alleged relationship with Russia. Despite our high conviction view that the dollar can rally 10% or more from current levels, we cannot be blind to the key risks surrounding it. This week, we explore where our stance on Europe and the Fed can go wrong. ECB Tapering = Upcoming Tightening Campaign? The key risk to our negative euro stance is the ECB. The market has moved to discount the first rate hike in Europe to happen in barely two years, an event we judge highly unlikely. However, if the market is right that a tapering of asset purchases in 2018 and a potential increase in the rates on deposit facilities to 0% are the opening salvos of an imminent campaign to push up the repo rate, the EUR/USD rally is only in its early days. Here are the key factors that would support this bullish euro view: The European economy is in a major economic upswing. Not only have PMIs surged, the IFO has hit an all-time high (Chart I-1). If this pace of growth can be maintained for an extended period of time, the European output gap will close faster than we anticipate, providing a stronger basis for the ECB to nudge all rates higher. The euro area labor market is tightening. Euro area unemployment rate is at 9.5%, only 0.7% above the OECD's estimate for NAIRU (Chart I-2). Thus, it would paint a picture where there is little slack in the economy at large and in the labor market in particular. In this environment, a continuation of the elevated growth currently experienced by the euro area could boost wages. Core inflation has picked up to 1.2% (Chart I-3). The ECB has historically displayed a tight reaction function to inflation. In the past, headline CPI mattered, but since Mario Draghi took the helm of this institution, the focus has switched to underlying pricing pressures. Thus, if euro area core inflation continues to move up, especially as U.S. core PCE inflation has weakened to 1.6%, the market will be vindicated and the euro could rebound on a more hawkish ECB. Chart I-1Europe Is Booming Chart I-2Low Labor Market Slack In Europe Chart I-3That Should Help The ECB To Hike Why Are These Factors Risks And Not Base Cases? To begin with, these factors have been discounted by the markets, a fact highlighted by the 42-month fall in the month-to-hike for the ECB since July 2016 to 24 months today. Also, as the European surprise index has outperformed the U.S. one, EUR/USD has rallied by 6%. In the process, investors have switched from being massively short the euro to being the most aggressively long in three years (Chart I-4). Risk-reversals in EUR/USD options are also at elevated levels, highlighting the potentially too-bullish disposition of investors toward the euro. On the growth front, some factors suggest that European growth may soon peak. The large improvement in the amount of industrial activity and capacity utilization in Europe relative to the U.S. was reflective of the big easing in monetary conditions that followed the collapse of the euro after 2014. But, as Chart I-5 illustrates, European industrial production needed a falling euro to beat that of the U.S., soon after the euro stabilized, the growth outperformance began to recede and is now near inexistent based on this metric. Thus, the euro rebound removes one of the key factors that supported the European economy in the first place. Chart I-4Investors Have Discounted##br## The Good News In Europe Chart I-5Europe's Growth Outperformance ##br##Was Because Of Policy Additionally, some economic data are showing disturbing signs. While Germany's IFO stands at a record high, Belgian business confidence has rolled over. In fact, export orders have been particularly weak (Chart I-6). This is of importance as Belgium has long been a logistical center for the euro area, and is a small open economy deeply integrated in the European economic infrastructure. This, therefore, portends to emerging risks to the whole euro area. Monetary dynamics too raise questions. European business confidence, a key piece of soft data that has underpinned investors increased bullishness on the euro is led by dynamics in M1 money supply. The roll over in M1 implies that business conditions in Europe are slowly passing their best period (Chart I-7). If euro area growth peaks, this also raises concerns about the state of the labor market. This is especially worrisome as we think the unemployment gap based on the OECD's estimate of NAIRU misses key elements of the European labor market slack. As we wrote last week, the key problem in Europe is labor underutilization; hidden labor market slack remains a serious concern.1 With workers in irregular contracts being a key source of job creation since the end of the 2013 recession, there are plenty of workers willing to change jobs without the incentive of a higher pay, limiting the upside in wages. Without wage growth, it will be difficult for European core inflation to continue its uptrend, especially as there are many signs that the rebound that has excited investors' imagination may have been a transitory event. Worryingly for euro bulls, our Core CPI A/D line for Europe, which tends to lead core CPI itself, rolled over last year and points to lower core CPI.2 Industrial good prices excluding energy have also been weakening for 15 months now, suggesting this inflation rebound may be an aberration (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Where Belgium Goes, ##br##So Does Europe Chart I-7Money Trends Point To A Deceleration##br## In European Soft Data Chart I-8Europe Core CPI ##br##Will Roll Over Bottom Line: Investors have become very bullish of the euro based on the fact that the economy has been very strong, the European headline unemployment rate is moving closer to NAIRU, and core inflation has perked up; raising the specter of high rates sooner than we anticipate. These economic developments need to be monitored closely, but the growth impulse in Europe is likely to soon deteriorate, broader measures of labor market slack in the euro area are far from being at full employment, and the tick up in core inflation is likely to prove to have been only a temporary blip. These forces should weigh on the euro for the rest of 2017. Maybe The Fed Will Not Tighten That Much? Meanwhile, in the U.S., investors only expect three rate hikes over the next 24 months. Markets have begun doubting the fed's capacity or resolve to hike interest rates as aggressively as we envision. A slew of disappointing data and political developments have cemented this opinion among investors. Among the most crucial factors are the following: Chart I-9Disappointing U.S. Wages Wage growth in the U.S. remains poor, especially as per average hourly earnings which are still only growing at a disappointing 2.3% rate (Chart I-9). This raises the specter that consumption will remain tepid and that inflationary dynamics will never take hold in the U.S. This risk is perceived as especially salient as core inflation and core PCE have slowed below the 2% objective of the FOMC. Slowing credit growth has also garnered a lot of attention among the public. Credit is the life blood of the economy, and this slowdown has prompted many investors to begin questioning whether or not the U.S. economy would ever be able to take off. This compounded worries around the perennially weak Q1 GDP growth. Finally, the myriad of scandals surrounding Trump and his dealings with Russia have raised much questions about his ability to ever implement fiscal stimulus. Moreover, the punitive terms associated with the repeal of Obamacare and the implementation of the American Health Care Act (AHCA) - which according to the CBO could leave as many as 23 million individuals without health insurance by 2023 and cause sharp increases in insurance premia - may dull any growth boosting impact of potential tax cuts. Thus, the political backdrop may prompt the Fed to be easier than was anticipated as recently as December 2016. Why Are These Factors Risks And Not Base Cases? To begin with, BCA still hold the view that wages in the U.S. are set to accelerate in the coming quarters. The Phillips Curve continues to be a reality, as the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker still display a tight relationship with the unemployment gap (Chart I-10). Moreover, it is often argued that the problem with today's labor market is that much of the job creation is happening in low-skilled positions. This is true, but historically, low-skilled jobs have tended to experience the most upward pressures when the job market tightens significantly. Instead, the key anchor on average hourly earnings has been the hidden labor market slack. However, today, the U-6 unemployment rate is finally ticking at 8.6%, levels where in previous cycles wage growth accelerated (Chart I-11). A rebound in GDP growth, as highlighted by the Atlanta Fed growth forecast of 4.1% in Q2, would accentuate pressures on the labor market and help realized the underlying wage pressures resulting from the current readings of the U6 unemployment rate. Chart I-10The Phillips Curve: It's Alive Chart I-11U.S. Wages Will Pick Up What could support growth? Let's begin with the credit dynamics. As we have argued, credit growth is a lagging indicator of economic activity. The improvement in the ISM through 2016 and early 2017 continues to point to a rebound in C&I loans in the U.S. (Chart I-12). Moreover, aggregate bank credit in the U.S. is already re-accelerating, suggesting that credit will once again add to economic activity, and will stop subtracting from it (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Credit Lags, And It Will Pick Up Chart I-13Momentum In U.S. Loans Is Turning Up Another positive for the U.S. economy has been the substantial easing in financial conditions resulting from the fall in the dollar and bond yields since the beginning of 2017. This easing should help economic activity over the course of the next quarters (Chart I-14). In its most recent minutes, the Fed has alluded to these forces. The fall in the dollar is already showing signs of helping. The ISM export orders index is currently ticking near 60, suggesting that the fall in the USD has had a stimulative impact on the U.S economy (Chart I-15). This is especially salient when contrasted with the euro area industrial production dynamics described above. Chart I-14U.S. Financial Conditions Will Help Growth Chart I-15The Dollar's Easing Is Evident Finally, when it comes to fiscal policy, our Geopolitical Strategy team remains adamant that tax cuts will materialize in the coming quarters. It is becoming imperative for congressional Republicans to achieve this as Trump's popularity remains dismal at the national level, which could prompt a serious electoral rout in the 2018 mid-term elections (Chart I-16). This means that fiscal easing is likely to come through, which should have an impact on asset prices and the dollar: The DXY is back to pre-election levels and the relative performance of stocks most sensitive to changes in tax policy is back to January 2016 levels. These price trends indicate that investors have massively curtailed their expectations for governmental support to growth. Chart I-16If Tax Cuts Don't Pass, Republicans Are Heading For A Huge Defeat In 2018 Moreover, the current format of the AHCA is unlikely to make it through the more moderate U.S. Senate. The loss of coverage and the insurance premia increases implied by the current plan are likely to be electoral poison in 2018, something well understood by key GOP policymakers. An AHCA still up in the air does not preclude tax cuts either. The budget deficit hole created by unfunded tax cuts will likely be patched through aggressive growth assumptions, the magic of dynamic scoring. The recently revealed Trump budget proposal itself is also unlikely to see the light of day in its current form and will evolve toward something more supportive of growth as time and negotiations pass. Bottom Line: Investors have massively curtailed their expectations of Fed tightening over the next two years. This view has been based on the lack of wage acceleration in the U.S., the poor credit growth numbers, and the uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy. These are still important risks to our bullish stance. However, we remain optimist because wage growth is only set to increase now, credit is a lagging indicator that looks about to pick up anew, financial conditions should help future U.S. economic activity, and the potential for tax cuts is far from dead. Stay long DXY. Norway's Passing Inflation Problem It was not long ago when the Norges Bank was facing the daunting task of kick starting a Norwegian economy ravaged by the collapse in oil prices while trying to contain the high inflation brought upon by the sell-off in the krone. However, following the stabilization of the NOK, this dilemma has dissipated as multiple measures of inflation have plunged. The Norges Bank is now free to maintain its dovish bias as the economy remains tired and will require easy monetary to recover going forward. Based on the effect of currency moves, inflation might reach a bottom at the beginning of next year, but it will likely stay below the central bank's target of 2.5 % for the foreseeable future (Chart I-17). Indeed, in spite of the rebound in oil prices, employment is contracting, the output gap is large, and wage growth remains deeply negative (Chart I-18). The Norges Bank is sympathetic to this view, acknowledging in its most recent monetary policy statement that inflation will hover in a 1-2% range in the coming years. Chart I-17A Stable NOK Will Keep Inflation Subdued Chart I-18No Domestic Inflationary Pressures In Norway Lastly, Norway's bubbly real estate market, the last obstacle to the Norges Bank dovish bias, is finally slowing down. Thanks to changes in regulation on residential mortgage lending at the start of the year, banks are tightening lending standards to households, a precursor to a cooling housing market (Chart I-19). With a Fed looking to increase rates, the real rate differential between the U.S. and Norway should move in favor of USD/NOK. Yet, could rising oil prices deepen the USD/NOK weakness? This seems doubtful as USD/NOK continues to be more correlated with real rate differentials than with the price of oil (Chart I-20). Nevertheless, the outlook of the krone against the AUD and the NZD is much more promising: Chart I-19No Need To Raise Rates To Curb Housing Prices Chart I-20Real Rates Matter More Than Oil Yesterday, OPEC Russia agreed to maintain their production cuts in place for the next nine months. This deal should keep the oil market in a deficit, pushing oil prices up and providing a tailwind to the NOK against non-oil commodity currencies. Chart I-21CAD/NOK: A Call On The U.S. Dollar On the other hand, the outlook for industrial metals and other commodities, which are more sensitive to the Chinese economy, continues to be worrying. Monetary conditions are still tightening in China and multiple economic activity indicators have disappointed to the downside. While base metals have already fallen considerably, we believe that additional weakness in the Chinese economy will trigger a selloff in EM assets, bringing the NZD and the AUD down with them. Finally, it may be time to sell the NOK against the CAD. The Bank of Canada struck a hawkish tone on Wednesday, stating that the Canadian economy's adjustment to lower oil prices is largely complete and that consumer spending should be supported by an improving labor market. This change in rhetoric should set the stage for a rally in CAD/NOK. Moreover, our Intermediate-Term Timing Model shows that this cross is 7% cheap, and our bullish USD view implies an outperformance of the loonie versus the krone given the tight correlation between CAD/NOK and the DXY (Chart I-21). Bottom Line: Outperformance of oil in the commodity space will help the krone outpace non-oil commodity currencies. However, the Norges Bank is likely to keep a dovish bias, which should make it difficult for the NOK to rally durably against a cheap U.S. dollar. Go long CAD/NOK. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Achilles Heel Of Commodity Currencies", dated May 5, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The greenback suffered some losses following the release of Fed minutes. Puzzlingly, the rhetoric was not dovish, as markets and news outlets confirmed the prospect for a June rate hike. The result was a dollar selloff and a drop in yields. This easing in financial conditions created an additional fillip for the S&P as it traded at a record high, the opposite of what is expected with a looming rate hike. As new home sales contracted on a monthly basis and the manufacturing PMI disappointed, the U.S. soft patch continues. Nevertheless, our base case remains on par with the Fed's: the weakness in data is temporary and the Fed will hike more than the markets expect. We are already seeing this as continuing and initial jobless claims beat expectations at 1.923 million, and 234,000 respectively, and the greenback has found a footing at the 97.1 level. As this scenario further unfolds, gold will retreat as real returns increase, and the greenback will gain upward momentum. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro area continues to surprise with better than expected data: German IFO: Overall Business Climate came in at 114.6 - levels last seen in 1970; Expectations came in better than expected at 106.5; and the Current Assessment also beat expectations of 121.2, coming in at 123.2. Euro area Manufacturing PMI is at 57 for May, beating expectations of 56.5, and the Composite measure also recorded an outperformance, coming in at 56.8. On the consumer side, German Gfk Consumer Confidence Survey came in at 10.4, beating expectations of 10.2. While the euro to be overvalued on short-term metrics, and the euro area is structurally weaker than the U.S., weaker data needs to be seen for the markets to see a correction. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data has been negative in Japan: Manufacturing PMI decreased to 52 in May from 52.7 in April. Exports growth decreased to 7.5%, from 12% the month before and underperforming expectations. Japan's all industry activity Index also underperformed expectations, contracting by 0.6% MoM. We continue to believe that Japanese economic activity will ultimately be determined by the exchange rate. The yen has appreciated since this the start of the year, therefore it is understandable that inflation and economic activity have been subdued. Taking this into account, the BoJ will continue to target a yield of 0% in JGB's, and thus the yen should suffer on a cyclical basis given that real rates differentials with the U.S. will continue to widen. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent British data has been mixed: GDP growth underperformed, coming in at 2%, decreasing from last quarter and underperforming expectations, mostly reflecting poor trade numbers. Meanwhile total business investment grew by 0.8%, outperforming expectations. We are not positive on the pound against the dollar, given that near 1.3 the pound is no longer a bargain tactically. On the other hand we expect more upside against the euro. Powerful inflationary pressures are building in the U.K., and governor Carney, previously concerned about the effects of Brexit in the economy, might be more inclined now to deal with inflation as the U.K. has proved resilient. This will put upward pressure in British rates vis-à-vis European rates. Additionally EUR/GBP has reached overbought levels, indicating it might be a good time to short this cross. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 As the greenback's descent slowed down, so did the Aussie's ascent. The underlying motives for strength in the antipodean currency are misplaced. As data remains unpromising, this week followed through with further disappointments as overall construction work done contracted by 7.2% on an annual basis, with the engineering component contracting by 13%. Research by the RBA illustrates that construction work has a very close relationship with the national accounts of Australia. This could result in a slowdown in the economy - something which the RBA cannot afford amidst flailing inflationary pressures. On a more optimistic note, the commodity selloff is taking a breather. Most crucially for the AUD, iron ore futures have remained flat for almost a month after a 30% depreciation, and natural gas has been flat for almost a month. These developments have limited the AUD's downside for now. However, looming EM risks and the potential resumption of the dollar bull market represent very real risks for the AUD going forward. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi has appreciated by about 1.5% against the dollar this week. Additionally, recent data has been positive: Visitor Arrivals yearly growth skyrocketed to 21.5% on April. The trade balance outperformed expectations coming in at -3.48 Billion The kiwi economy continues to surge, with 7% growth in nominal GDP and retail sales growth at decade-highs. Additionally, dairy prices continue to surge, and are now growing at a 60% YoY pace. For this reason we are bearish on AUD/NZD, as the Australian economy is not only in a more precarious state, but is also more sensitive to the Chinese industrial cycle. Meanwhile, we continue to be bearish on NZD/USD, as a negative view on EM assets necessarily entails a bearish view on the kiwi. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Following on from the dollar's weakness, the CAD displayed further strength after the BoC's decision statement. While keeping rates unchanged, the bank highlighted that "recent economic data have been encouraging" and that "consumer spending and the housing sector continue to be robust on the back of an improving labor market". Furthermore, the Bank more or less expects these supports to growth to "strengthen and broaden over the projection horizon". While wholesale sales increased by less than expected at 0.9%, the BoC also expects that the "very strong growth in the first quarter will be followed by some moderation in the second quarter". This is likely to keep market expectations anchored and the CAD's value intact. Additionally, oil should pare recent weaknesses as OPEC follows through on its cuts. The CAD is therefore likely to see some strength against other commodity currencies. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF has continued to depreciate after coming close to reaching 1.1. We continue to be negative on this cross, as the Euro is likely to have limited upside from current levels. The ECB is unlikely to hike rates any time soon, as wage pressures outside of Germany continue to be muted. Furthermore, this is not likely to change any time soon, as the labor market of the periphery continues to be very rigid. Meanwhile, the SNB is likely to take off the floor from this cross next year, as core inflation and retail sales growth have both returned to positive territory. We will continue to monitor the rhetoric by the SNB to have a more clear understanding of when the removal of the floor might occur. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The krone has rallied this week, thanks to the rise in oil prices. However real rate differentials should continue to move in favor of USD/NOK. While the fed is likely to hike more than what is currently anticipated in the OIS curve, the Norges Bank will stay dovish, given that the Norwegian economy is still too weak to sustain a rise in interest rates. Furthermore, macro prudential measures seem to be helping the Norges bank to slow down the housing market. The NOK is also likely to have downside against the CAD. The dollar bull market should help this cross rally, given the tight correlation between CAD/NOK and the DXY. Furthermore the BoC has struck a more hawkish tone as of late, which should further increase the difference between interest rate expectations in these two countries. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Positive data emerged from Sweden this week as consumer confidence picked up to 105.9 from 103.7, beating expectation of a decline to 103.6. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate remains on a structural downtrend, coming in at 6.6% according to Statistics Sweden. In terms of crosses, USD/SEK continues to weaken due to the greenback's instability. EUR/SEK has topped out and is also showing some weakness. Against commodity currencies, the movement is mixed. The SEK has shown the most strength against the AUD, while CAD/SEK and NZD/SEK have been flat, and NOK/SEK has seen considerable strength on the back of robust oil prices. We can see the SEK being weak against oil-based currencies as we expect OPEC to remain focused on cutting global oil inventories, while AUD/SEK could see further downside due to poor fundamentals in Australia. Report Links: Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights Fiscal policy is likely to be eased modestly in most advanced economies over the next two years. The U.S. Congress will ultimately cut taxes, although the size of the cuts will be far smaller than what President Trump has proposed. Ironically, fiscal stimulus is coming to America just when the economy has reached full employment. The market is pricing in too little Fed tightening over the remainder of the year. The dollar's swoon is ending. Go short EUR/USD with a target of parity by the end of the year. Feature Fiscal Thrust Around The World In its latest Fiscal Monitor, the IMF estimated that advanced economies eased fiscal policy by 0.2% of GDP in 2016, reversing a five-year streak of fiscal tightening (Chart 1). The Fund expects a further 0.1% of GDP of easing in 2017, followed by a neutral stance in 2018. In the EM universe, the IMF foresees a fiscal thrust1 of -0.2% of GDP in 2017 and -0.4% of GDP in 2018. Chart 1IMF Expects Modest Fiscal Easing In Advanced Economies, Further Tightening In EM Averages can disguise a lot of variation across countries (Charts 2). Comparing 2018 with 2016, the IMF expects Canada and the U.S. to experience a positive fiscal thrust of 0.7% of GDP and 0.4% of GDP, respectively. The fiscal thrust is projected to be -0.2% of GDP in the euro area, -1% of GDP in the U.K., and -0.5% of GDP in Japan. Among the larger advanced economies, Australia is expected to experience the largest degree of fiscal tightening, with a fiscal thrust of -1.2% of GDP. Across the EM universe, most of the fiscal tightening is projected to occur among oil producers. The IMF expects oil-exporting economies to collectively reduce their fiscal deficits by US$150 billion between 2016 and 2018. Political considerations require that the IMF give considerable weight to the stated objectives of governments when formulating fiscal projections. In reality, governments often struggle to meet their budget targets. Consequently, the Fund has typically overestimated the degree of fiscal consolidation that ends up happening (Chart 3). As such, our own projections foresee somewhat less fiscal tightening - and in some countries, a fair bit of fiscal easing - than the IMF projects. In particular: Chart 2Countries Will Follow Different Fiscal Paths Chart 3IMF Forecasts Tend To Overestimate Extent Of Fiscal Consolidation We do not expect much more incremental fiscal tightening out of the euro area. Thanks to a slew of austerity measures, the euro area's structural primary budget balance went from a deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 2010 to a surplus of 1.0% of GDP in 2014. It has remained close to those levels ever since. Now that a primary surplus has already been achieved and interest rates and bond spreads have fallen to exceptionally low levels, the need for further belt tightening has abated. That's the good news. The bad news is that high government debt levels in many European economies rule out any major new stimulus programs (Chart 4). The U.K. will slow the pace of fiscal consolidation. The U.K.'s structural primary budget deficit fell from a peak of 7.1% of GDP in 2009 to 1.3% of GDP in 2016. The IMF expects the primary balance to move into a surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 2019. We think that's unlikely. The Conservatives are under intense pressure to keep the economy afloat during Brexit negotiations. Prime Minister Theresa May has indicated she will delay eradicating the budget deficit until the middle of the next decade, having previously promised a 2020 target date. Japan has limited scope to further tighten fiscal policy. Japan's structural primary budget deficit reached 6.9% of GDP in 2010. The IMF expects it to reach 3.7% this year and fall further to 2% in 2020, provided the government goes forward with raising the VAT from 8% to 10%. We are skeptical that Japan's economy will be strong enough to allow the government to raise taxes. However, even if it is, this will only be because the Bank of Japan gooses growth by keeping long-term yields pinned to zero, thereby allowing the yen to depreciate further. China is making a structural transition to large budget deficits. The IMF estimates that China's structural primary budget balance deteriorated from a surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2014 to a deficit of 2.8% of GDP in 2016. The increase in the fiscal deficit cannot be explained by the reclassification of off-budget spending as on-budget, since the IMF's "augmented" fiscal balance - which attempts to control for such statistical issues - deteriorated by roughly the same amount (Chart 5). Part of the erosion in China's fiscal balance stemmed from the global manufacturing slowdown in 2015-2016, which hit tax receipts and necessitated a healthy dose of fiscal stimulus. However, there is more to the story than that. As we controversially argued in "China Needs More Debt," now that China is no longer in a position to run gargantuan current account surpluses, large fiscal deficits will be necessary to absorb excess private-sector savings.2 The government's desire to rein in credit growth will only add to the impetus to find new sources of aggregate demand. The era of red ink has begun. Chart 4Government Debt Levels Outside Of Germany Are Still High Chart 5China's Fiscal Deficit Has Been Increasing The U.S. Congress will ultimately cut taxes, although the size of the cuts will be far smaller than what President Trump has ambitiously proposed. After a wave of euphoria following the presidential election, the market has largely priced out meaningful fiscal stimulus. This can be seen in the flagging relative performance of infrastructure stocks and highly-taxed companies, as well as in the sharp decline in inflation expectations (Chart 6). We think this pessimism is overdone. Donald Trump desperately needs a "win," and cutting taxes is one key area where the President and Congress both see eye to eye. Trump's falling poll numbers have heightened the risk that the Republicans will lose control of the House of Representatives next November (Chart 7). This makes passing a tax bill before the midterm elections all the more urgent. The main questions surround the scale and scope of any tax cuts, and just as critically, how they are paid for. We discuss these issues next. Chart 6Markets Have Priced Out Meaningful Fiscal Stimulus Chart 7Challenging Outlook For Republicans In 2018 Trump's Budget Proposal: Fake Math Chart 8Trump In Wonderland? If the definition of a good leader is one who underpromises and overdelivers, then President Trump's budget proposal left much to be desired. Trump's plan assumes that U.S. growth will reach 3% over the next ten years. Even in the unlikely event that the economy manages to avert a recession over this period, such a growth rate would be a remarkable feat. After all, growth has averaged only 2.1% since 2009. And keep in mind that the unemployment rate has fallen from 10% to 4.4% over this interval, consistent with potential GDP growth of only 1.4%. The slow pace of capital accumulation following the Great Recession undoubtedly hurt the supply side of the economy, but it would take a phenomenal - and rather implausible - acceleration in potential GDP growth to justify Trump's 3% target. Many of the other assumptions in Trump's blueprint are no less dubious (Chart 8). Despite projecting much slower growth, the Federal Reserve expects short-term rates to rise to 3% in 2019. In contrast, the Trump administration sees rates increasing to only 2.4%, an assumption that perhaps not coincidentally helps reduce projected debt-servicing costs. Most flagrantly, the plan assumes no decline in the revenue-to-GDP ratio, even though the basis for faster growth largely rests on the assumption of steep tax cuts. When pressed on the issue, officials from the Office of Management and Budget sheepishly noted that there would be offsetting limits on tax deductions, which would have the effect of broadening the tax base. However, no specific information was given on what these would entail. Many theories have been offered as to why Trump offered such an outlandish budget plan. Was he trying to appease conservatives in Congress? Perhaps this was just a sly attempt to gain leverage in future budget negotiations? Our theory is simpler: Trump promised an economic boom during the election campaign, while assuring voters that his tax cuts would more than pay for themselves. Hell would need to freeze over before he released a plan that did not share these assumptions. Congress Will Decide So where do we go from here? The specifics of Trump's plan are irrelevant. Congress will rewrite the budget from scratch. Major spending cuts will be scrapped. So will the onerous cuts to insurance subsidies and Medicaid in the House version of the health care bill. The Senate will ditch those. In contrast, Trump's tax cuts will be preserved, albeit on a smaller scale than envisioned in his budget proposal. Granted, congressional leaders have said they want tax reform to be revenue neutral, meaning that any tax cuts would need to be offset by other revenue-raising measures. That is easier said than done, however. The three main ways that House Republicans have offered to pay for corporate and personal tax cuts - introducing a border adjustment tax, eliminating the deductibility of business interest payments, and jettisoning the deduction for state and local income taxes for individuals - all face severe resistance from vested interests. In Washington, where there is a will there is usually a dishonest way. Budget forecasts are typically made over a 10-year window. Thus, it is possible to lower taxes upfront and promise spending cuts and ill-defined revenue raising measures in the tail end of the budget window. Such a strategy would generate a positive fiscal thrust early on, while leaving the door open for Congress to dump any future spending reduction or revenue measures before they are actually implemented. Add to that the tax revenue that is projected to pour in from supply-side reforms, and the stage is set for a dollop of fiscal easing starting in early 2018. How likely is it that Republicans will pursue such a strategy? Very likely. As evidence, look no further than the fact that White House budget director Mick Mulvaney floated the idea on Wednesday of extending the 10-year budget scoring window to 20 years. Investment Conclusions Chart 9Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well An obsessive focus on fiscal austerity hamstrung the recovery in many countries following the Great Recession. The irony is that fiscal stimulus is coming to America just when the economy has reached full employment. This means that much of the increase in aggregate demand arising from a more expansionary fiscal stance will be reflected in higher inflation rather than faster growth. This does not represent a major threat to risk assets now, but could later next year. Despite all the obituaries that have been written for the death of the Phillips curve, the data show that it is alive and well (Chart 9). Higher inflation will allow the Fed to raise rates once per quarter. The market is not prepared for this. Investors currently expect only 45 basis points in rate hikes over the coming 12 months. That is far too low. On the other side of the Atlantic, the ECB's months-to-hike measure has plummeted from 65 months in July 2016 to only 24 months today (Chart 10). Real rates are projected to be a mere 14 basis points higher in the U.S. than in the euro area in five years' time (Chart 11). Chart 10The Big Shift In Market Sentiment Towards ECB Policy Chart 11The Vanishing Transatlantic Bond Spread Poor demographics and high private-sector debt levels imply that the neutral rate of interest is lower in the euro area than in the U.S. And while the euro area may not be tightening fiscal policy any longer, the fact that its structural primary budget balance is 2.6% of GDP larger than America's means that the euro area's overall fiscal stance will contribute less to aggregate demand than in the U.S. This will force the ECB to keep rates lower for longer, causing the euro to weaken. Chart 12Widening Real Rate Differentials ##br##Support The Dollar Chart 13Speculators Are Long The Euro For ##br##The First Time In Three Years Incredibly, two-year real interest rate differentials between the euro area and the U.S. have widened by 41 basis points in favor of the latter since the end of March, even though EUR/USD has actually rallied over this period (Chart 12). We think this divergence has occurred because investors have been busy covering the euro hedges that they put on in the lead up to the French elections. However, now that net long speculative positions in the euro have risen to a three-year high - having been deeply short just a few weeks ago - the speculative demand for euros will subside (Chart 13). With all this in mind, we are going short EUR/USD today with a year-end target of parity and a stop-loss of 1.14. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 The fiscal thrust is defined as the change in the structural primary budget balance from one year to the next. As a convention, we define a positive thrust as loosening in fiscal policy (i.e., a lower fiscal balance). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem?" dated February 24, 2017, and "China Needs More Debt," dated May 20, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Brazilian President Michel Temer has been accused of crimes much worse than what got his predecessor impeached; Further instability is likely, with low probability that Temer's impeachment would restart reforms; Only a technocratic government, or brand new election, could produce a market-friendly outcome. Odds are that Brazil's public debt load will continue to escalate, and that in two years or so the debt-to-GDP ratio will spiral out of control. Without structural reforms and higher commodities prices, Brazilian financial markets are looking into the abyss. Stay put on Brazilian financial markets. Feature Investors cheered the impeachment of Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff, bidding up Brazilian assets for over a year despite the challenging macroeconomic context. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services have repeatedly cautioned investors not to buy the hype. Brazil was already "priced for political perfection" on May 12, 2016 when Rousseff was removed from office to face trial by the senate over fiscal accounting irregularities.1 And yet, the political context has been far from perfect. As we wrote last May: "It is highly unlikely that the political dysfunction within Brazil's political class will end with a Temer administration, at least not anytime soon." The latest corruption revelations have directly implicated acting president Michel Temer of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) as well as Senator Aecio Neves, the leader of centrist and investor-friendly Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and a key Temer ally in Congress. The market has placed a massive bullish bet in the abilities of the tentative Temer-Neves (PMDB-PSDB) entente cordiale to push through largely unpopular fiscal reforms through Congress. These reforms, none of which have passed yet (!), are now likely to stall until either an early election is called (best case scenario) or until the current government's mandate expires in October 2018. We have expected Brazil's political rally to dissipate. As we argued in 2016, without a new election, the interim government has no mandate for painful structural reforms. We are sticking to this view today. What Is Going On In Brazil? According to revelations in the Brazilian press, President Temer was caught in an audio recording asking the chairman of JBS Group - the world's largest meatpacker - to continue making payments to the former President of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Cunha, who was jailed for corruption in 2016. Cunha, a former Temer ally and member of PMDB, was indicted in the large scale "Operation Car Wash" corruption scandal involving the state-owned oil company Petrobras. The payments by JBS were allegedly meant to ensure that Cunha did not spill the beans on his co-conspirators. Cunha had previously disclosed that he possessed compromising information about several senior politicians linked to the Petrobras scandal. JBS Chairman Joesley Batista, himself under investigation, recorded a conversation with Temer on March 7 as part of his plea bargain negotiations with law enforcement officials. According to press reports, Temer asked Batista to continue payments to ensure Cunha's silence. As part of the same investigation, Senator Aecio Neves - the darling of the Brazilian investment community who narrowly lost the presidential election to Rousseff in 2014 - was filmed soliciting two million reals ($638,000) from Batista. This is not his first brush with the law, Neves was also under corruption investigation when he was the governor of the state of Minas Gerais. Neves's apartment has since been raided by the police as the corruption probe against Brazilian politicians reaches a fever pitch. How serious are the charges against the Temer and his ruling coalition? They are deadly serious. As an aside, we have been puzzled that investors have never posed the following question: how was it possible that the entire political and especially congressional system is so corrupt but Temer - the long-serving head of the largest party in the congress and one of the most shrewd politicians in Brazil - has not been involved in this corruption scheme. President Dilma Rousseff, former leader of the left-wing Workers Party (PT) and successor to President Inácio "Lula" da Silva, was impeached and removed from power for a lot less. There was never any actual evidence that Rousseff was personally involved in Operation Car Wash, at least at the time of her impeachment. In fact, the strongest legal case against Rousseff was that she failed to uphold the so-called Fiscal Responsibility Law. Essentially, Rousseff was impeached and removed from power because she stimulated the economy for political gain. A charge that practically every president in Brazil's history has been guilty of (if not every leader in the world!). Temer and Neves are accused of much greater crimes. If the reporting of the Brazilian press is accurate, Neves personally profited and continues to profit from Operation Car Wash. And Temer is then directly involved, to this day, in obstruction of justice and witness intimidation. These are not crimes by association or mere technicalities resulting from politically charged fiscal profligacy. Rather, they are serious crimes that could end with lengthy jail terms, let alone removal from power. Rousseff claimed that her removal from power was a coup d'état. She was correct to characterize it as such. Unlike in the U.S., where a president removed from power is replaced with the vice president from the same party, in Brazil vice presidents are often appointed from a coalition partner. As such, Vice President Temer replaced Rousseff and proceeded to alter Brazilian policy in a dramatic fashion. He abandoned the PMDB legislative alliance with left-wing PT, turned to the centrist PSDB for votes in Congress and proceeded to enact orthodox, conservative, supply-side reforms. While these are absolutely the reforms that Brazil needs, we never accepted the view that they are reforms that Brazilians want. In fact, Rousseff won the 2014 election against Neves, with Temer as her running mate, by campaigning on a populist platform against precisely these types of supply-side reforms. Bottom Line: We hate to tell our clients "we told you so," but Temer's 180-degree turn in policy was never going to work. Not without an election that bolsters his political mandate to enact painful structural reforms. We also cautioned our clients that corruption in Brazilian Congress was endemic and severe and would therefore not magically disappear with Rousseff's removal from power. As such, "impeachment was no panacea,"2 especially not when many members of Congress voting against Dilma were under investigation for corruption themselves! The high level of corruption is not because of a moral failing particular to Brazilian mentality. Rather, corruption is a feature of Brazil's fractured and regionalized politics that depend on side-payments and pork barreling to grease the wheels of legislative process. Rousseff's crimes appear paltry when compared to the (yet unproven) allegations against Temer and Neves. J-Curve Of Structural Reforms Amidst the 2016 political crisis, we argued that the only positive outcome for Brazilian politics and markets in the long-term would be a new election (Figure I-1).3 Why? Because we understood how painful fiscal reforms would have to be to deal with Brazil's disastrous fiscal position (Chart I-1). Without a new election, the interim Temer administration would not have the political capital to enact painful reforms. Figure I-1Brazil: Our Take On Possible Political Scenarios ##br##Before Former President Rousseff Was Impeached Chart I-1Brazil's Fiscal Position The market has disagreed with us for a full year now. However, the rally based on political hopes was always unsustainable. First, investors have misunderstood the nature of political corruption in Brazilian politics and just how intrinsic the problem has been. In retrospect, Rousseff may have been the least corrupt major politician in Brazil! Second, investors have ignored the message of our J-Curve of structural reforms (Diagram I-1). Diagram I-1Structural Reforms Are Painful: ##br##Stylized Representation Reform is always and everywhere painful, otherwise it would be the form. Every government pursuing reforms has to get through the "danger zone" on our J-curve of structural reform. As reforms are passed and enacted, they begin to "bite." This is when the protests against reforms mount and the government loses its political capital. If the policymakers in charge of the reform effort are already starting with low political capital - as the Temer and his congressional coalition most certainly did in August 2016 - than the "danger zone" is essentially insurmountable. We have disagreed with the market as it has confused Rousseff's removal from power with widespread support for reforms that amount to economic austerity. As we often repeated in client meetings, "a vote for impeachment is not a vote for austerity." With general election only roughly one year away in October 2018, we doubted that the Temer administration would have the political capital to push through such reforms. After all, every government wants to be reelected and pursuing painful reforms ahead of the elections is not feasible election winning strategy. What has the Temer coalition managed to do thus far? It must have done a lot, given the positive market performance over the past 12 months? False. The market has rallied despite remarkably shoddy evidence of actual reforms. As we predicted in our analyses throughout 2016, the post-Rousseff Brazilian policymakers have been dogged by lack of political capital. Out of five major reform efforts, only two have passed - oil-auction legislation (Production Sharing Agreement Bill) and a fiscal-spending cap. We do not wish to claim that the latter is insignificant but as we discuss below they are insufficient to stabilize Brazil's public debt load. The main three reform efforts that would have significant long-term effect on Brazil's fiscal sustainability - social security reform, labor reform, and tax reform - have stalled and are now likely to fail (Table I-1). Table I-1President Temer's Proposed Structural Reforms & Their Status Brazilian Senator Ricardo Ferraço, of the centrist PSDB, in charge of drafting the labor reform report for the Senate, has already canceled the work on the proposal. Ferraço issued a statement that said, "the institutional crisis we are facing is devastating and we need to prioritize finding a solution. Everything else is secondary now." This is a major blow against labor reforms, which already passed the lower house in April. We suspect that it will largely be impossible to restart and, more importantly, pass the reforms without an election that gives a new government a political mandate. Alternatively, a technocratic government led by technocrats without political ambitions, could try to enact reforms until the next election. Without a new election or a technocratic government, members of centrist PSDB and center-left PMDB will start to distance themselves from the allegedly corrupt Temer administration. It makes no political sense for Congressmen like Ferraço to sacrifice their own political capital on the cross of austerity just a year from the start of the electoral campaign in the summer of 2018. Bottom Line: The results made clear by Figure I-1 are not surprising and were eminently forecastable. However, the market ignored the structural realities of Brazilian politics, as well as the theoretical foundation of successful structural reforms, and charged ahead regardless. Without fiscal reforms outlined in Table I-1, however, Brazil will likely end up in a debt trap very soon. A Perilous Fiscal Situation Brazil's fiscal position and public debt remain on an unsustainable trajectory. In fact, there has been limited fiscal improvement compared to what financial markets have priced in. In particular: The constitutional amendment by Brazilian President Michel Temer's government that introduced a cap on government spending was a dilution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law adopted in 2000 which stipulated that the government had to run primary fiscal surpluses. Capping government expenditure growth to the inflation rate de facto represents a relaxation of structural fiscal policy. Under the new fiscal rules, the government is targeting not the primary fiscal deficit (and, by extension, public debt), but only government expenditures. This implies that in a case where government revenues fall short of projections, the government is not obliged to rein in spending. On the whole, Temer's government has relaxed rather than tightened structural fiscal rules. While this makes sense because the economy is in a depression and needs fiscal relief, it has been bad news for government creditors. As a final point, the former President Dilma Rousseff was impeached for violating this exact same law that the current government has now relaxed. The fiscal balance has stabilized around 9% of GDP in the past year, but this has been due to one-off temporary measures. With nominal GDP growth at around 5%, the bulk of the 16% rise in collected income taxes from a year ago came from one-off measures such as the repayment of funds by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to the government, taxes on foreign asset repatriation and other temporary actions (Chart I-2). In short, Temer's government has resorted to one-off measures to improve the country's fiscal position. Unless the economy and tax collection recover strongly in the next 12 months, Brazil's fiscal position will worsen substantially, and public debt servicing will become unsustainable. Furthermore, the federal government's transfers to states have surged as the latter are facing their own fiscal crises due to revenue shortfalls. Local governments are reluctant to curb spending amid the ongoing depression, and will continue to pressure the federal government for more transfers. This will worsen public debt dynamics. Importantly, the social security deficit, presently at 2.4% of GDP, will continue to escalate without meaningful reforms (Chart I-3). According to IMF estimates,4 the social security deficit will reach 14% of GDP by 2021 if no reforms are implemented. This is assuming robust economic recovery this year and solid growth in the years ahead. Given social security reforms are unlikely to occur and economic growth will continue to underwhelm amid heightened political uncertainty, odds are that the impact of the social security deficit on the public debt dynamics will be worse than the IMF projections suggest. Moreover, the gap between local currency interest rates and nominal GDP growth remains extremely wide (Chart I-4). To offset this, the government has to run primary surpluses. The primary deficit is currently 2.3% of GDP. Chart I-2Income Tax Collection Has Been ##br##Boosted By One-Off Measures Chart I-3Brazil's Social Security System ##br##Is On Unsustainable Track Chart I-4An Untenable Gap That said, tightening fiscal policy amid the ongoing economic depression is politically suicidal. Finally, our public debt simulation suggests that unless economic growth recovers strongly, Brazil's public debt-to-GDP ratio will rise above 90% of GDP by the end of 2019 - in both our baseline and most pessimistic scenarios. Notably, our baseline scenario assumes nominal GDP growth of 5.5% in 2017, and 7% in both 2018 and 2019 (Table I-2). These are not bearish assumptions, but and could prove optimistic given the escalating political crisis. This debt simulation assumes that interest rates will stay above 10%, but it also assumes no bailout for public banks and state-owned companies, or a rise in transfers to state governments. Table I-2Brazil: Public Debt Sustainability Scenarios 2017-2019 Bottom Line: Odds are that Brazil's public debt load will continue to escalate, and that in two years or so the debt-to-GDP ratio will spiral out of control. The Economy, Corporate Profits And Markets There has been no recovery in either the economy or corporate profits (excluding commodities companies). Brazilian share prices have rallied massively in the past 17 months, yet profits in companies leveraged to the domestic business cycle have continued to shrink. Specifically, EPS for consumer staples companies and banks have dropped a lot in local currency terms, despite the equity market rally (Chart I-5). It is normal that share prices lead profits by six to 12 months, but the current rally in Brazil is already 16 months old. In short, the discrepancy between share prices and EPS is unprecedented and unsustainable. Ongoing profit weakness is consistent with a lack of recovery in domestic demand, which is corroborated by the macro data: retail sales volumes, manufacturing production and capital goods imports have not grown at all; their pace of contraction has simply moderated (Chart I-6). Chart I-5No Recovery In Corporate Profits ##br##In Non-Commodities Sectors Chart I-6No Recovery In Economy In Brazil, key to its financial markets is the exchange rate. If and when the currency appreciates, interest rates will decline and share prices will rally and the economy will eventually revive - and vice versa. In turn, the exchange rate is driven not by the interest rate differential versus the U.S., as shown in Chart I-7, but by commodities prices, with which it strongly correlates (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Interest Rate Differential And ##br##Exchange Rate: No Correlation Chart I-8BRL Is Sensitive To Commodities Prices BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team believes commodities prices have peaked and will decline in the months ahead. This, along with renewed political turmoil, warrants a bearish stance on the Brazilian currency. While the central bank has large foreign currency reserves and could sell U.S. dollars to support the real, this cannot preclude a selloff in the nation's financial markets. Selling foreign currency by a central bank entails withdrawing local currency from the banking system, tighter local liquidity and higher interest rates. Hence, a central bank can defend the exchange rate from depreciation if it tolerates higher interbank rates. Higher interest rates will, however, be devastating for Brazil. If the central bank of Brazil, having used its international reserves to defend the currency, decides to inject local currency liquidity into the system to bring down local rates, the outcome will be currency depreciation. In a nutshell, a central bank cannot control both the exchange rate and local interest rates if the nation has an open capital account structure. Remarkably, Chart I-9 contends that in Brazil, the exchange rate correlates with central bank lending to commercial banks. If the central bank lends to commercial banks, the currency depreciates, and vice versa. Facing the choice between currency depreciation and higher local rates, the Brazilian central bank will choose the former because of its perilous public debt situation as well as the imperative of a revival in credit growth. Hence, the Brazilian central bank is unlikely to defend the currency on a sustainable basis. If the currency depreciates, local bonds, sovereign and corporate U.S. dollar credit and share prices will sell off too. Bottom Line: Without structural reforms and higher commodities prices, Brazilian financial markets are looking into the abyss. Investment Recommendations Politics has fueled the rally in Brazilian assets since early 2016, and now politics taketh away. With the political tailwinds reversing, investors will have nothing left to base their decisions on but the terrible macroeconomic picture. We maintain our bearish stance on Brazilian financial markets: We continue to short the BRL versus both the U.S. dollar and the Mexican peso. The real is not cheap at all while the peso offers good value (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Central Bank's Liquidity Provision ##br##To Banks Vs. Exchange Rate Chart I-10BRL Is Not Cheap, MXN Is Dedicated EM equity and credit investors should continue underweighting Brazil in their respective portfolios. Finally, local rates will be under upward pressure as the currency depreciates. We remain offside this market. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Santiago E. Gomez, Consulting Editor santiago@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Brazil: Priced For Political Perfection," dated May 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Brazil: Impeachment Is No Panacea," dated April 26, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Brazil's Political Honeymoon Is Over," dated August 18, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Cuevas et al., IMF Working Paper: Fiscal Challenges of Population Aging in Brazil, March 2017