Economy
Highlights U.S. growth will remain firm over the next 12 months, but then will begin to slow from its above-trend pace as the economy runs out of spare capacity. Fiscal stimulus, by the time it is enacted, may simply end up pushing up wages, interest rates, and the dollar, rather than boosting corporate profits. While the U.S. is not at an imminent risk of a recession, the historic record suggests that recessions are more likely to occur when an economy has achieved full employment. Equity investors should favor Europe and Japan, two places where central banks are in no hurry to raise rates, profit margins still have room to expand, and valuations are reasonably favorable. Feature The Rusty Lining The U.S. economy is approaching full employment. The headline unemployment rate has fallen to 4.7%, close to most estimates of NAIRU. Broader measures of labor market slack, which incorporate marginally-attached and involuntary part-time workers, are also approaching pre-recession levels (Chart 1). Consistent with this observation, the job openings rate in the JOLT survey, the share of households reporting that jobs are "plentiful" versus "hard to get" in the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence survey, and the share of small businesses reporting difficulty in finding suitably qualified workers in the NFIB survey are near 2007 levels (Chart 2). Chart 1U.S. Labor Market: Not Much Slack Left Chart 2Most Labor Market Survey Measures ##br## Now Consistent With Full Employment It is obviously good news that most people in the U.S. who want to work are able to find jobs. However, at the risk of sounding like spoilsports, we see three risks associated with this development. First, and most obviously, the fact that the U.S. economy is close to full employment means that it will not be able to grow at an above-trend pace for much longer. Second, efforts by the Trump administration to lift aggregate demand with fiscal stimulus may prove to be counterproductive: Rather than boosting GDP growth, the stimulus may simply lead to higher wage inflation and a stronger dollar. This could hurt corporate profits. Third, there is compelling evidence that the risks of a recession rise as an economy approaches full employment and begins to overheat. We discuss all three issues in turn. Weak Supply Will Limit Growth One of the more striking aspects of the U.S. economic recovery is that the output gap - the difference between what an economy is capable of producing and what it actually is producing - has nearly disappeared even though GDP growth has been rather lackluster. This has occurred for one simple reason: Potential GDP growth has been extremely weak. Chart 3 shows that the slowdown in potential GDP growth has been a global phenomenon. In every major economy, the output gap would be larger today than in 2008 if potential GDP had grown at the rate that the IMF forecasted back then. Chart 3AWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Chart 3BWeak Supply Growth Has Narrowed Output Gaps Many commentators are hopeful that the combination of sizeable tax cuts and President Trump's pledge to reduce red tape will lead to a marked acceleration in potential U.S. GDP growth. There is some validity to this view. Statutory corporate tax rates in the U.S. are among the highest in the OECD, while the Code of Federal Regulations is 178,000 pages long, eight times the size that it was in 1960 (Chart 4). Still, we are skeptical that the economic benefits of slashing corporate taxes and cutting red tape would be as great as some pundits are touting. If one includes the various loopholes and deductions that companies can avail themselves of, effective corporate tax rates in the U.S. are not particularly high compared with those of other countries.1 Cutting corporate taxes may also do precious little to lift investment spending, given that U.S. companies are already flush with cash and have access to plenty of cheap financing. While the regulatory burden on U.S. businesses has increased somewhat over the past seven years, it is still quite low compared to other major economies according to the World Bank's Doing Business report (Chart 5). And many of the regulations that businesses routinely complain about serve a useful purpose, particularly in the areas of health, clean air and water, and financial stability. Consistent with the analysis above, there is little evidence that Reagan's tax cuts and deregulation initiatives had much effect on productivity growth in the 1980s (Chart 6). Meanwhile, Trump's efforts to crack down on illegal immigration will reduce labor force growth, curbing potential GDP growth in the process. Trade protectionism will also dent productivity in some sectors of the economy. The bottom line is that potential growth is unlikely to rise much above 2% for the foreseeable future. Chart 4There Are Prolific Writers In The U.S. Administration Chart 5Regulatory Burden In The U.S. Is Relatively Low Chart 6The Reagan Years Were No Boon For U.S. Productivity Flagging Fiscal Multipliers As we discussed last week, market participants may be overestimating the extent to which fiscal policy will be eased over the next two years.2 Suppose, however, that the optimists are right; suppose Donald Trump is able to fully deliver on his campaign pledge to raise infrastructure spending and slash taxes. Let us also suppose that, contrary to our expectations, lower personal and corporate tax rates do prompt households to significantly boost spending, while incentivizing firms to increase capital expenditures. What then? The answer is that this still may not translate into significantly faster economic growth. The reason is straightforward: When the output gap is small, an increase in aggregate demand will largely translate into higher inflation rather than increased output. An overheated economy, in turn, will drive up real interest rates, leading to less spending on rate-sensitive goods such as consumer durables, housing, and business equipment. In addition, higher interest rates will cause the dollar to strengthen, swelling imports and reducing exports. This "crowding out" effect will reduce the net effect of fiscal stimulus on growth. The empirical evidence bears this out. Table 1 shows the fiscal multipliers are much smaller when an economy is close to full employment. Table 1The Effect Of A $1 Increase In Fiscal Spending On Aggregate Demand The implication is that Trump's fiscal stimulus plan, by the time it is enacted, may simply end up lifting interest rates, the dollar, and wages, without delivering much acceleration in real business sales. Again, this is not just a theoretical possibility. Chart 7 shows that the ratio of corporate profits-to-GDP has tended to decline when the unemployment rate has fallen below its full employment level. This suggests that the re-acceleration in earnings growth that began last summer could run out of steam later this year. Chart 7The Effects Of Full Employment Recession Risks Are Slowly Rising Business cycle recoveries may not die of old age. However, as anyone who's been around long enough knows, old age isn't exactly conducive to good health either. Chart 8 shows that there is a positive correlation between the degree of labor market slack and the length of time until the next recession. This implies that recessions are more likely to occur when an economy approaches full employment. In fact, outside of the 1982 recession, which in many respects was just a continuation of the 1980 recession, there has never been a case in the post-war era where a recession began at a time when the unemployment rate was above its full employment level. Formal econometric analysis bears this out: According to our calculations, the U.S. has had nearly a 31% chance of falling into recession over the subsequent 12-month period when the economy was at or above full employment, compared with only an 8% chance at all other times.3 Part of the relationship between economic slack and recession risk can be explained by the fact that the unemployment rate is mean reverting. Thus, when the unemployment rate is very low, it is more likely to go up than down. And history suggests that even a slight rise in the unemployment rate is a powerful harbinger of recession. In fact, Chart 9 shows that there has never been a case where the unemployment rate has risen more than one third of a percentage point without the U.S. falling into a recession. Chart 8U.S.: A Tighter Labor Market Means We Are Getting Closer To The Next Recession Chart 9Even A Small Increase In The Unemployment Rate Warns Of A Recession When Animal Spirits Bite Back Mean reversion, however, is only part of the story. As Hyman Minsky famously noted, stability begets instability. By this, he meant that good economic times tend to encourage excessive risk taking, and this sows the seeds of a future crisis. The good news is that the U.S. does not currently suffer from any major economic imbalances. Perhaps it was the severity of the crisis; perhaps it was the lackluster recovery; but whatever the reason, animal spirits have been slow to return this time around. Sure, stocks have soared thanks to ultra-low interest rates, but both business and residential investment remain subdued (Chart 10). Nevertheless, signs of excess are starting to appear in places. Corporations may have been restrained in their capital spending plans, but that did not stop them from piling on new debt to finance share buybacks, and mergers and acquisitions (Chart 11). As a result, our Corporate Health Monitor has been in deteriorating territory since the second half of 2013 (Chart 12). Chart 10Business And Residential Investment Remain Subdued Chart 11Companies Have Been Piling On New Debt Chart 12U.S. Corporate Health Keeps Deteriorating Policy risks have also increased. These include the possibility of a global trade war, rising support for anti-establishment parties in Europe, and a pronounced slowdown in China that precipitates mass capital flight and a sharp depreciation of the RMB. Complicating matters is the fact that policy rates remain quite low across all major economies, which limits the ability of central banks to respond to another economic downturn. Investment Conclusions Chart 13More Optimism About The ##br##Longevity Of The Business Cycle Fears of secular stagnation, which were all the rage just 12 months ago, have given way to unbridled confidence about the future. Investors now dismiss the exact same things they once feared from Donald Trump, even though Trump the President has proven to be little different from Trump the Candidate. Among participants in the New York Fed's Survey of Primary Dealers who assign a non-zero probability that rates will fall back to zero at some point over the next three years, the median respondent expects that it would take 27 months to reach this sorry state of affairs, up from 11 months in April 2016 (Chart 13).4 If one uses this as proxy for when investors believe the next recession will roll around, it implies that market participants now believe that the recovery will last more than twice as long as they thought last summer. We agree that U.S. growth is likely to remain firm over the next 12 months. As we argued last October in a report entitled "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," the U.S. economy has a lot of momentum behind it.5 As such, we continue to expect Treasury yields to rise and the dollar to appreciate over the next 12 months. Nevertheless, we are cognizant that much can go wrong with this assessment. Chart 14 shows that most of the recent better-than-expected data has been confined to survey measures of economic activity - what economists call "soft data." The so-called "hard data" has been mediocre. This is not a major red flag, as the hard data often lags the survey results, but it does underscore the fragile nature of the recovery. Chart 14Survey Measures Have Improved More Than The Hard Data All this puts U.S. stocks in a difficult position. If growth does end up disappointing, equities will suffer. However, if growth remains strong, bond yields are likely to rise further, taking the dollar up with them. Meanwhile, a tight labor market will increasingly put upward pressure on real wages, hurting corporate profit margins in the process. With that in mind, investors should overweight equity markets in Europe and Japan, two places where central banks are in no hurry to raise rates, profit margins still have room to expand, and valuations are more favorable. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate was 39.2% while the GDP-weighted average rate in the OECD excluding the U.S. was 29.6% (based on 2010 data). Meanwhile, the U.S. effective tax stood at 27.1% versus the 27.7% average of its OECD peers (based on 2008 data). Studies conducted before the Great Recession also show that the U.S. effective rate is about the same as the GDP-weighted average rate of other major countries. For further details, please see Jane G. Gravelle, "International Corporate Tax Rate Comparisons and Policy Implications," Congressional Research Service (January 6, 2014). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Speed Bumps For The Global Reflation Trade," dated January 27, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The probability of a U.S. recession occurring within the next 12 months is calculated by employing a simple logistic model using data from 1960 to the present. The dependent variable (Y) is assigned the value "1" during months when a recession occurs over the subsequent 12-month period, or "0" otherwise. An independent variable (X) is assigned the value "1" when the economy is at full employment, or "0" otherwise. Assuming full employment is reached when the unemployment rate is at least 25 bps lower than the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, the resulting probabilities for a recession within the next year are as follows: P(Y=1 given that X=1) = 31%; P(Y=1 given that X=0) = 8%; P(Y=1 given that X=1 or given that X=0) = 17%. In a nutshell, the probability of a recession occurring increases by 23 percentage points (from 8% to 31%) once full employment is reached. 4 In both the April 2016 and December 2016 surveys, all but one respondent indicated that there was a non-zero chance that rates will fall to zero over the relevant forecast horizon. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Better U.S. Economic Data Will Cause The Dollar To Strengthen," dated October 14, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights In line with our House view, we expect the USD will weaken near term, and are recommending a tactical long gold position if the metal trades to $1,180/oz. Longer term, the Trump administration's presumed fiscal-policy goals - e.g., lighter regulation, lower taxes - will be hitting an economy at or near full employment, and will run smack up against deflationary pressures if a border-adjusted tax (BAT) scheme is implemented. Expect higher volatility. Energy: Overweight. Fundamentals continue to point toward global oil storage drawing by ~ 300mm bbl by 3Q17. Brent was backwardated going to press in the Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 spread, while WTI is in contango.1 Our WTI backwardation trade (long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18) stopped out at -$0.05/bbl. Markets appear reluctant to take 2018 prices below 2017 levels, but we still like the position and will look to put it on again. Base Metals: Neutral. A weaker USD and marginally softer real rates will support base metals short term. We remain neutral. Precious Metals: Neutral. We are going tactically long gold, and are bracing for more ambiguity in U.S. fiscal-policy. This will keep the Fed on hold till 2H17. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grains and beans will remain under pressure with Argentine growing conditions improving. High stocks-to-use levels will remain a headwind. Feature Gold prices will get a short-term bounce from financial markets' recalibration of when fiscal stimulus in the U.S. actually will start contributing to growth. With nothing for the Fed to react to in terms of fiscal policy other than sundry indications the Trump administration favors lighter regulation, lower taxes and higher infrastructure spending, we believe the U.S. central bank will remain on the sidelines until mid-year before it starts guiding toward a rate hike. In the meantime, synchronized global growth (Chart of the Week) will continue to fan medium-term inflation expectations (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekSynchronized Global Growth... Chart 2...Is Lifting Inflation Expectations At this point in the cycle, it is unlikely the Fed or other systematically important central banks will tighten policy to arrest the emerging growth. Besides, the U.S. central bank is, for all intents and purposes, on hold until it sees the outlines of the fiscal policy to be proposed by the Trump administration, which has indicated strong preferences for lighter regulation, lower taxes and infrastructure spending. The market is putting the odds of a Fed rate hike by March at just over 20% (Chart 3). The odds of seeing a hike by June, on the other hand, increase to 64%. Chart 3Fed Most Likely On Hold Until June Given the constraints on the Fed for now, and indications of synchronized global growth, we expect some inflation pickup near term. This will lower real rates and weaken the USD over the short term, which will, in turn, support gold prices. Given this expectation, we are recommending a tactical long gold position if the spot contract trades to $1,180/oz. Because this is a tactical position, we will use a 5% stop-loss. Ambiguous Inflation Signals For 1H17, we expect inflation and inflation expectations to remain buoyant, given the synchronized global upturn we are seeing and the prospect - and so far it is only a prospect - for stimulative fiscal policy in the U.S. All else equal, with the U.S. labor market at or close to full employment, and the Trump administration signaling its desire for stimulative fiscal policy, we would be inclined to look for inflation hedges within commodities that are highly sensitive to rising inflation. The top candidates here would be gold and oil (WTI, in particular). But all else is not equal. President Trump and officials within the administration have floated the idea of a border-adjusted tax (BAT) scheme, which would tax imports into the U.S. and subsidize U.S. exports, and replace the existing corporate income tax. Our House view on the BAT is it has a 50% chance of becoming law. Even so, we believe there is a greater-than-50% chance apparel and energy products would be exempt from a BAT, if it became the law of the land, but we obviously cannot be sure this will occur. The first-round effects of a BAT would be felt domestically. U.S. inflation and inflation expectations would increase after it is rolled out, as prices on taxed imports rose by the inverse of (1 - Tax Rate). As an indication, a 10% BAT would lift domestic prices of taxed items by ~ 11%. If the BAT were extended to oil, the domestic price lift there would incentivize higher domestic oil production, which also would find its way to export markets. Taken together, these domestic effects arising from the imposition of a BAT would cause the U.S. trade deficit to contract, which would rally the USD, in addition to lifting domestic inflation. As we noted last week, even under the assumption a somewhat watered down version of a BAT is passed, our colleagues at BCA's Global Investment Strategy service anticipate the USD would rally another 10%.2 The second-round effects on the back of such an increase in the USD would be felt globally, particularly in oil markets and EM economies. In addition to the broad trade-weighted dollar rallying by 10%, we expected a 5% rise in the greenback prior to the discussion of the BAT. So, overall, we'd expect a 15% appreciation in toto following the implementation of a BAT in the U.S. This would stifle EM commodity demand, particularly for oil and base metals, given the stronger USD would make these commodities more expensive in local-currency terms ex U.S. In addition, it would encourage higher commodity production in the U.S. (if a BAT were to be imposed on oil imports) and ex U.S., where local-currency drilling costs once again would fall, leading to increased supplies at the margin. The possibility of deflationary blowback to the U.S. is high in this scenario. Positioning In Ambiguous Markets Investors seeking to profit from rising inflation, which we would expect in the U.S. in the first round of adjustment to a BAT, or to hedge against it often turn to commodities expecting they will rally as inflation increases. They typically do this via index exposure or individual commodity exposure, e.g., going long gold or oil. In the current environment, we believe gold offers the best commodity alternative for participating in a rising inflation environment, or hedging against it, which is why we recommend a tactical long position if the market corrects to $1,180/oz. We compared the one-year return performance of gold and oil as inflation hedges by regressing annual returns of both commodities against annual core PCE and the broad trade-weighted USD returns (Chart 4).3 The R2 goodness-of-fit statistics for both were extremely close - 0.88 (oil) vs. 0.85 (gold), indicating core PCE and USD returns do a good job of explaining oil and gold returns. However, the volatility of the gold regression (its standard error) was half that of the oil regression (0.06 vs. 0.12), indicating gold's relationship is more stable vis-à-vis core PCE inflation and the USD (i.e., subject to less dispersion). This would indicate returns for an inflation hedge using gold would be less volatile than a hedge employing oil futures.4 These tests indicate both gold and oil are well suited to hedging inflation, and that gold hedges will perform as well as an oil hedge with far less volatility in the returns. Longer term, we're concerned with the second-round effects attending a stronger USD on the back of the BAT discussed above - i.e., lower commodity demand and higher commodity supply. Over the medium to longer term, the above dynamic suggests oil and gold volatility will increase (Chart 5). Chart 4Gold Hedges Inflation And USD Risk ##br##As Well As Oil, With Lower Volatility Chart 5Oil And Gold Vol Likely Rise Besides being an inflation hedge, gold, unlike oil, also functions as a store of value. In the event of deflationary blowback arising from the imposition of a BAT, we believe gold also would hedge investor portfolios against the possibility of currency debasement. That is to say, it would hold its value while central banks and governments rolled out fiscal and monetary policy responses to deflation. It is worthwhile recalling nominal gold prices held fairly steady during the Great Depression, while real gold prices appreciated. We believe the optimal vehicle for such a hedge would be call options, but we await clarity the likelihood of a BAT and its provisions before recommending such a position. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Backwardation and contango are terms describing the shape of commodity forward curves. When a curve is backwardated, prompt-delivery prices (e.g., oil delivered next week) exceed deferred-delivery prices (e.g., oil delivered next year), indicating supplies are tight. A contango curve describes a market in which deferred-delivery prices exceed prompt-delivery prices, which indicates supplies are relatively more abundant. 2 We discussed the implications of a possible border-adjusted tax scheme in last week's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, in an article entitled "Taking A Bat To Commodities", dated January 26, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. See also BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Special Report entitled "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017" dated January 20, 2017, which examined the BAT in depth, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 We ran a simple regression of the percent returns of gold and oil against core PCE and USD annual returns over the 2001 - 2016 interval to assess the performance of each as inflation hedges. By using one-year returns, we were able to regress stationary variables and use an AR(1) model. 4 Along similar lines, the sum of squared residuals for the oil returns was almost 4x that of the gold returns, indicating far less dispersion in the errors and a tighter fit with gold vs. core PCE once again. The Durbin-Watson statistic measuring the degree of autocorrelation in the errors is was slightly > 2.0 for the gold regression, for the oil regression the DW statistic was < 2.0. This suggests the gold regression is better behaved in that the error terms more closely conform to the assumptions for them in the type of regression we're running. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017
Highlights Three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors appear complacent. Foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks has reached a new record high. Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares. Feature Taiwan's economy and financial markets have shown remarkable resilience of late. Last week's advance GDP release confirmed that the Taiwanese economy continued to accelerate in the final quarter of the year. The Taiwanese dollar (TWD) is among the few currencies that have strengthened since early last year, not only in trade-weighted terms but also against the mighty greenback. Taiwanese stocks have been a bright spot in the emerging market universe, which has been plagued with structural challenges and political instability in recent years. Taiwan's remarkable strength of late is notwithstanding the sudden deterioration in its relationship with mainland China since the DPP party regained power last year, and more recently brewing trade tensions among the major global economies kicked off by the Trump Administration. This highlights the growing disconnect between Taiwan's macro outlook and its financial asset performance, offering a particularly poor risk-return profile. We remain underweight Taiwan among the greater China bourses, and recommend a short position in the TSE versus Chinese H shares. Macro Risks Are Rising... In a nutshell, three emerging macro factors bode poorly for Taiwan's growth outlook and asset prices. First, Taiwan is among the most open economies in the world, and will suffer disportionally in any disruption in global trade (Chart 1). Although having fallen sharply since the global financial crisis, exports of goods and services still account for over 60% of Taiwan's GDP, among the highest of the major economies. Therefore, Taiwan's growth outlook is almost completely dictated by global demand, making it particualrly vulnerable at times of rising global uncertainty. Indeed, Taiwan's growth acceleration since mid-last year has been entirely driven by a synchronized acceleration in overseas demand. Both China and the U.S. have been strengthening, which will likely continue to support Taiwan's growth outlook in the near term.1 However, the strength in the Taiwanese currency is worrisome, as the exchange rate has historically been tightly correlated with overseas new orders and domestic producer prices. Chart 2 shows that the strong TWD has the potential to lead to a sudden deterioration in deflation as well as new export orders. Chart 1Taiwanese Growth: All About Exports Chart 2TWD Strength Is A Headwind For Exports Second, the cross-strait relationship has already deteriorated notably, and a vicious feedback loop appears to be developing. On the one hand, the Chinese authorities are worried that incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen will not uphold the "1992 Consensus" that forms the foundation of cross-straight integration,2 and will step up efforts to contain her "pro-independence" initiatives. On the other hand, the Taiwanese government, faced with increasing pressure from the mainland, feels the urge to reach out to a broader global audience, which in turn may be perceived by Beijing as provocative. President Tsai's controversial phone call with Donald Trump, her stop-over visit to the U.S. en route to South America and the attendance of the government's delegation to President Trump's inauguration have only further reinforced Beijing's suspicion - and propelled forward a self-feeding negative dynamic in the cross-strait relationship that is difficult to reverse. The consequence of a military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan is unimaginably costly, and still extremely unlikely. However, the economic ties between the two will continue to cool. A telltale sign is that number of mainland Chinese visitors to Taiwan has already dropped precipitously since early last year, causing visible stress in Taiwan's tourism industry (Chart 3). Furthermore, exports to China account for over 40% of total Taiwanese exports, far higher than to any other market, and its trade surplus with China accounts for 5% of Taiwanese GDP - both of which are at risk should cross-strait tensions continue to rise (Chart 4). Moreover, the deteriorating relationship with the mainland is also hurting domestic confidence. Chart 5 shows that Taiwanese consumer confidence has historically been tightly linked with stock market performance, but a widening gap has developed since early last year when stocks began to rebound but confidence continued to weaken, which we suspect is to some extent attributable to the DPP party's dealings with the mainland. Weakening confidence bodes poorly for consumption, making the economy even more vulnerable to external shocks. Chart 3Cross - Strait Relationship ##br##Has Cooled Sharply Chart 4China Trade ##br##Is Crucial For Taiwan Chart 5Cooling China - ties##br## Also Hurts Domestic Confidence Finally, tensions between China and the U.S. are bound to rise under President Trump, and Taiwan may fall victim to the "clash of the Titans." Trump has openly questioned the "One China" policy that fundamentally underpins the Sino-U.S. relationship. John Bolton, a top adviser to President Trump, has even recommended positioning U.S. troops in Taiwan to counter the mainland. It is likely that Trump is using the "Taiwan card" as a bargaining chip to win concessions from China on trade-related issues.3 However, these remarks are dangerously provocative. Any miscalculation could lead to a drastic escalation in tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and the Taiwanese economy will suffer profoundly. Even if trade tensions are contained between China and the U.S., Taiwan will also suffer because it is a critical part of the highly complex and integrated supply chain in the global technology and electronics industries. It is premature and overly alarmist to predict any "war-like" scenario, but stakes are exceedingly high for Taiwan, and any move in this direction should be monitored extremely carefully. ...But Investors Appear Complacent Despite the worrying economic and geopolitical backdrop, global investors still appear comfortable in Taiwanese stocks. Foreign capital has continued to flock to Taiwan, despite gloomy sentiment among global investors on emerging markets overall. Net foreign purchases of Taiwanese stocks, historically tightly linked with fund flows to U.S. emerging market mutual funds, have rebounded sharply, while EM mutual fund sales have weakened, a rare divergence historically (Chart 6). Cumulative foreign net purchases of Taiwanese stocks have pushed foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks to 37%, a new all-time high (Chart 7). Foreign fund flows have been a key reason behind the relative strength of both Taiwanese stocks and its exchange rate of late. Chart 6Diverging Fund Flows To EM And Taiwan Chart 7Rising Foreign Ownership In Taiwanese Stocks Granted, Taiwan's macroeconomic conditions are largely stable, characterized by its massive current account surplus, small fiscal deficit and low government debt - which make it stand out in an otherwise perilous, crisis-prone EM world. However, we suspect large foreign flows to Taiwan in recent years are also due to the tech-heavy nature of its stock market. Chart 8 shows the relative performance of global tech stocks bear a strong resemblance to Taiwan's relative performance against the EM benchmark after the global financial crisis. In other words, investors are largely attracted to the Taiwanese market as a way to play the global tech rally rather than because of any specific macro factors unique to Taiwan. This also means that investors could be blindsided by any escalation of trade or geopolitical tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the large percentage of foreign ownership in Taiwanese stocks risks a disorderly unwinding and sudden exodus - and an ensuing sharp spike in volatility. The last episode of military tension between Taiwan and the mainland in the mid-1990s offers the only precedent in terms of how financial markets might respond. China reacted to the U.S. visit of Taiwan's then President Lee-Teng-hui with aggressive saber-rattling by mobilizing troops and firing missiles, which led to the "third Taiwan Strait Crisis" (Chart 9). Even though the crisis officially lasted from July 1995 to March 1996, Taiwanese stocks tumbled well in advance when the tensions first began to emerge. In fact, the crisis itself, and the resolution of it, marked the bottom in Taiwanese stock prices. Chart 8Taiwanese Stocks As A Tech Play Chart 9The Last Episode Of Cross - Strait Tension Long H Shares, Short Taiwan Taiwanese stocks are the most vulnerable bourse in the Greater China region. A short position of the TSE versus Chinese H shares offers an attractive risk-return profile. Chinese stocks have long been punished by various macro concerns, and are likely under-owned by global investors. Investor sentiment on Taiwan, on the other hand, appear to be unduly complacent, and Taiwanese stocks have likely been overweighted and over-owned. Chinese stocks are much less exposed to global trade than their Taiwanese counterparts. Even though tech stocks are the largest sectors for both markets, the largest Chinese tech companies such as Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu are mainly software and service providers, and derive the majority of their revenue from the domestic market.4 In contrast, Taiwanese tech companies, also the largest constituents in the Taiwanese index, such as TSMC, Hon Hai and Largan, are all hardware producers, and are overwhelmingly dependent on the global market, making them more vulnerable to any disruption in global trade flows. Valuations of Taiwanese stocks are not particularly demanding by global comparison, but they are trading at a premium to their mainland peers (Chart 10, bottom panel). Moreover, the recent improvement in Taiwanese earnings will be tested, given the strength of the TWD and deterioration in terms of trade (Chart 11). Historically, Taiwanese earnings have been highly cyclical and prone to sharp swings, led by global business cycles. Technically speaking, the multi-year underperformance of Chinese investable shares against the Taiwanese market has become very advanced and appears to have formed an enduring bottom (Chart 10, top panel). Chart 10Chinese H Shares Vs Taiwanese Stocks: ##br##Valuation And Technical Perspective Chart 11Taiwanese Earnings Improvement##br## Will Be Tested Bottom Line: Remain cautious on Taiwanese stocks. Short the TSE versus Chinese investable shares as a trade. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The "1992 Consensus" refers to the outcome of a meeting in 1992 between China and Taiwan's then ruling party KMT. The terms means that both sides recognize there is only one "China": both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China, but both sides agree to interpret the meaning of that one China according to their own definition. 3,4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Dealing With The Trump Wildcard," dated January 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Empirical evidence shows the clear existence of 'mini-cycles' - with the credit impulse and bond yield cycles 'out of phase' with each other by about 6 months. The credit impulse mini-cycle rolled over in October, suggesting that the bond yield mini-cycle will roll over in April. The bond yield mini-cycle is also approaching a technical limit. Hence, on a 3-month horizon, lean against the rise in bond yields and bank equities. And underweight the bank-heavy Italian MIB and Spanish IBEX versus the Eurostoxx600. Feature The euro area's flash GDP print for Q4 confirms that the single-currency bloc has been one of the world's top-performing major economies through recent quarters. Furthermore, the latest inflation data confirm that euro area inflation is no different to other major economies when compared on an apples for apples basis - supporting our argument last week in Fake News In Europe.1 Having said that, the economy's latest 'mini-upswing' is likely approaching its end. And according to our framework, the euro area might not be alone in this experience. Mini-Cycles Everywhere Empirically, the economy exhibits very clear 'mini-cycles' whose upswings and downswings last 6-12 months. These economic mini-cycles overlay the much longer business cycle which lasts multiple years. Compelling evidence for these 6-12 month mini-cycles is everywhere. Just look at the credit impulse, the bond yield, commodity price inflation, or perhaps most fundamentally, GDP growth rates (Chart of the Week and Chart I-2, Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart of the WeekThe 6-Month Credit Impulse Rolled Over In October Chart I-2Mini-Cycles In The Bond Yield Chart I-3Mini-Cycles In Commodity Price Inflation Chart I-4Mini-Cycles In 6-Month GDP Growth But bear in mind that to see any cycle it is crucial to focus on the right periodicity. If you look at a clock pendulum once every second, you will not see its cycle. The pendulum will appear motionless. Only when you look at the pendulum once every half-second will you see its regular cycle. Likewise, to see the economic mini-cycles you need to look at rates of change not over a year but over a half-year. The Economy: A Naturally-Oscillating System The economy's clear mini-cycles are the hallmark of any system that possesses two characteristics: Internal regulating feedback. Time delays in the system response to the feedback. As a familiar example, think of the thermostat that controls the central heating in your home. If there is a delay in the thermostat's response to a temperature setting of 20 degrees, the thermostat will switch the heating on and off slightly late. Which will cause the temperature to oscillate perpetually between 19 and 21 degrees, rather than to stay at a constant 20 degrees. A better example is the cruise control on your car. In the internal regulating feedback: the speed regulates the gas pedal; the gas pedal regulates the gasoline flow; the gasoline flow regulates the engine; and the engine regulates the speed. Assuming this internal regulating feedback works instantaneously from start to finish, the car will cruise at a constant 60 mph. But if there are delays in the system response, the speed will oscillate between, say, 58 mph and 62 mph. Now let's translate this to the economy with the following equivalences (Figure I-1): Speed = GDP growth data Gas pedal = Bond yield Gasoline flow = Credit flow Engine = Economy Figure I-1Internal Regulating Feedback + Time Delays = Mini-Cycles In the economy's internal regulating feedback: the GDP growth data regulates the bond yield; the bond yield regulates the credit flow; the credit flow regulates the economy; and the economy regulates the GDP growth data. But just like the cruise control, if there are delays in the system response, the economy will exhibit oscillations. Crucially, there are delays in the economic system response. For a change in the bond yield to register with households and firms and fully impact credit flows, it clearly takes time - empirically in the range of 3-9 months. The credit flows do not generate instantaneous economic activity either. Fully spending the credit flows takes time - again empirically in the range of 3-9 months. Once you accept these assumptions of internal regulating feedback combined with clear delays in economic response, the economy has to be a naturally-oscillating system. For those who are mathematically inclined, Box I-1 shows how to derive the differential equation of the economic mini-cycle using first principles. Box I-1The Mathematics Of Mini-Cycles From Theory To Practice So much for the elegant theory, does it actually work? The real economy is complicated by other factors which can stretch and distort the theory. Specifically, aggressive and experimental policy from central banks can cause bond yields to overshoot or undershoot fundamentals. Financial or political shocks can depress animal spirits or, as we have just seen, make them euphoric. A flight to or from safety can distort both bond yields and short-term economic activity. These distortive overlays can shorten or extend the amplitude and/or duration of a mini-cycle. So each mini-cycle is slightly different in size and length from its predecessor. The distortions also explain how a mini-upswing or mini-downswing can become amplified into a boom or recession. The analogy would be a car's cruise control trying to slow the speed to 60 mph whilst also coping with a very steep hill and gale-force headwind. Quite likely, the speed would slow to well below 60 mph. For the past 10 years, aggressive monetary policy shifts, financial shocks and political shocks have been a regular distortive feature of the economic landscape. Yet Chart I-5 clearly shows that 6-12 month mini-upswings and mini-downswings have existed with remarkable consistency and durability through the whole period. Chart I-5The Credit Impulse And Bond Yield Cycles Are 'Out Of Phase' By About 6 Months The empirical evidence shows the clear existence of mini-cycles - with the credit impulse and bond yield cycles 'out of phase' by about 6 months, exactly in line with theory. What Does This Mean For European Investors? The credit impulse mini-cycle rolled over in October. Using the average 6-month lag, this means that the bond yield mini-cycle should roll over in April. However, the current cycle could have a slightly shorter lag or a slightly longer lag than the average cycle. So today, we are delighted to introduce a new piece of proprietary analysis. For the bond yield itself, we can independently assess the extent of groupthink in its recent trend, and how close that is to its limit. Previously, we have done this using its 65-day (3-month) fractal dimension.2 But given that mini-cycle upswings and downswings average 6 months, it is more logical to use a 130-day (6-month) fractal dimension. As readers can see in Chart I-6, this indicator has an excellent track-record in identifying mini-cycle turning points. And it is now signalling that the current trend is reaching its technical limit. Chart I-6A Near-Perfect Indicator For Bond Market Turning Points Bottom Line: On a 3-month horizon, lean against the rise in bond yields3 and bank equities. And underweight the financial-heavy Italian MIB and Spanish IBEX versus the Eurostoxx600. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Published on January 26, 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The Use And Abuse Of Liquidity", June 9, 2016 available at eis.bcaresearch.com 3 The house view is tactically below benchmark duration Fractal Trading Model* Pleasingly, both of our most recent trades: short MIB/long Hang Seng and long NOK/RUB hit their profit targets in classic liquidity triggered trend-reversals. This week's trade is to go short Basic Materials equities. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-7 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Duration: Rising political tensions in the U.S. will not offset the cyclical upward momentum in global growth, which is supported by accelerating corporate profits. Bond yields are unlikely to fall much in the near term, despite significant bearish investor duration positioning. Shift back to a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance and position for bear-steepening of yield curves. Country Allocation: Downgrade U.S. Treasuries to underweight (2 of 5) in global hedged bond portfolios. Corporates: A better global growth outlook should continue to support U.S. corporate debt markets, despite tight valuations and a strong U.S. dollar. Upgrade allocations to U.S. Investment Grade to above-benchmark (4 of 5) and U.S. High-Yield to neutral (3 of 5), at the expense of U.S. Treasuries. Favor the higher quality tiers (i.e. above Caa) in U.S. junk. Feature Optimism reigns supreme in the markets at the moment, particularly in the U.S. where bullish investors traded in their "Make America Great Again" hats for "Dow 20,000" ballcaps last week. The string of better-than-expected economic data across the world is continuing - a fact confirmed by the latest corporate profit releases showing that an earnings recovery was already underway before Donald Trump's election victory. We have been looking for a meaningful pullback in government bond yields, and a widening of credit spreads, before returning to a below-benchmark portfolio duration stance and raising corporate allocations. That opportunity may not come to pass as economic data remains solid and leading indicators are accelerating. With no major inflation hiccups likely in the near-term to force the major central banks to rapidly shift to a more hawkish stance, and with equity markets remaining supported by accelerating earnings growth, the current "sweet spot" for risk can continue. Return expectations must be tempered, though, as much of the recent growth improvements is already reflected in bond and equity valuations. Any sign that the optimism shown in confidence surveys is not translating into improving hard economic data could trigger an equity market correction and a risk-off move to lower government bond yields and wider credit spreads. Given our view that global growth will be faster than consensus expectations in 2017, however, we think that a pro-risk overshoot phase is more likely than a risk-off correction in the near term. Any upset in equity markets would represent a medium-term opportunity to increase credit risk and reduce duration. This week, we are adapting a more pro-growth, pro-risk stance in our recommended portfolio allocations this week, making the following changes: Reduce overall portfolio duration to below-benchmark Reduce U.S. Treasury exposure to below-benchmark (2 of 5) Upgrade U.S. Investment Grade corporate exposure to above-benchmark (4 of 5) Upgrade U.S. High-Yield corporate exposure to neutral (3 of 5), favoring B- & Ba-rated names Importantly, we are maintaining our current allocations to Euro Area corporates (above-benchmark) and Emerging Market sovereign and corporate debt (neutral for both), given that we see more potential for upside surprises in the U.S. economy relative to the rest of the world. Duration: Re-Establish A Cyclical Below-Benchmark Stance We moved to a neutral stance on our overall duration recommendation back on December 6th, which we viewed as a tactical profit-taking exercise on our previous successful bearish bond call dating back to last July.1 Our view at the time was that global bonds were still in a cyclical bear phase, led by rising inflation expectations and better economic growth prospects in the developed world (especially in the U.S.). Given the extreme bearish positioning in government bond markets, at a time of oversold momentum, our stated plan of attack was to look to move back to a below-benchmark stance after a meaningful pullback in yields. The likely trigger for that move was expected to be some disappointment on actual economic data, especially given the heightened growth expectations in the U.S. after Trump's electoral victory. Global economic data continues to trend in a positive direction, however, which is preventing any pullback in bond yields despite a deeply oversold market (Chart of the Week). The Citigroup Data Surprise index for the major developed economies is at the highest levels since early 2014. The Global ZEW indicator, one of our favorites, is at the highest level since mid-2015. The global leading economic indicator from the OECD is back to levels last seen in 2013, suggesting that the positive growth momentum can continue to put upward pressure on real bond yields. There are few signs of disappointment at the country level, with the Purchasing Managers Indices for all major developed markets, as well as for China, all pointing to expanding global activity (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekYields Supported By Faster Growth Chart 2A Broad Based Upturn It will be interesting to see if this uptrend can withstand the "bull in the China shop" approach of the new Trump administration with regards to U.S. trade policy. Already, in just the first week of his presidency, Trump has aggressively pushed to implement much of his protectionist campaign promises, like pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pushing to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement and threatening the imposition of tariffs or border taxes in an effort to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. Global confidence surveys will be critical to monitor in the next month or two for any sign that Trump uncertainty is having a detrimental effect on business optimism outside the U.S. Importantly, the starting point is strong, with both consumer and business confidence measures in Europe and China rising steadily, as are net earnings revisions for global equities (Chart 3). A combination of improving economic sentiment, confirmed by stronger corporate profits, may be enough for the global economy to withstand the shifting plate tectonics of U.S. economic policy. In the U.S. itself, the GDP report released last week showed that 2016 ended on a soft note, with annualized growth of only 1.9% in the 4th quarter. However, a sector-by-sector forecast for U.S. GDP presented last month by our colleagues at BCA U.S. Bond Strategy shows that there is upside risk for most major elements of the U.S. economy (Chart 4).2 Rising consumer confidence amid a tight labor market should help boost consumption, while the large drag from inventory destocking seen last year will not be repeated in 2017. Chart 3An Improving Corporate Profit Backdrop Chart 4Upside Risks For U.S. Growth The wild cards for U.S. growth will come from all the sectors most impacted by potential policies from the Trump administration: business investment, government spending and net exports. Trump has been going full steam ahead with his protectionist leanings in his initial days in office, but how much he can quickly implement remains to be seen. For now, the U.S. dollar is not rising rapidly enough to generate much of a drag on U.S. GDP growth, unlike the 2014/15 surge in the greenback (see the bottom panel of Chart 4). More importantly, the improving trend in U.S. corporate profit growth and post-election surge in business confidence should support faster growth in U.S. capital spending, which is already showing signs of perking up a bit (Chart 5). As we discussed in a Weekly Report earlier this month, the bigger upside surprise for the U.S. economy this year will come from capital spending, not government spending, as Trump will have a much easier time passing pro-growth corporate tax cuts than getting his infrastructure spending program green-lighted quickly through the U.S. Congress.3 U.S. growth will be much faster than the Fed's current forecast of 2.1%, which will embolden the Fed to deliver on additional rate hikes later this year. The Fed will likely want to see some sign of clarity on the fiscal policy outlook before contemplating the next rate hike, and we are not expecting a rapid acceleration of U.S. inflation in the next few months that would force to Fed to act more quickly. The next rate hike will come at the June FOMC meeting, with the Fed delivering at least the 50bps of rate hikes by year-end currently discounted in the market, and possibly the full 75bps of hikes shown in the latest FOMC projections if the economy delivers faster growth in 2017, as we expect. When looking at the other major bond yields in the "Big-4" developed markets, all elements of valuation have repriced higher (Chart 6): Chart 5U.S. Corporate Profits & Confidence Are Stronger, Capex Is Next Chart 6All Yield Components Are Rising Central bank policy rate expectations have shifted away from cuts in the Euro Area, Japan and the U.K., with a small hike from the Bank of England now discounted in the U.K. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve; Term premiums have risen from the mid-2016 lows, but remain negative in the countries where central banks are still actively engaging in asset purchase programs; Inflation expectations are well off the 2016 lows in all markets, but with higher levels in the U.K. and U.S. We see much higher upside risks for growth and inflation, and tighter monetary policy, in the U.S. and U.K. than the Euro Area or Japan. To reflect this in our model portfolio, we are downgrading our U.S. country allocation to below-benchmark (2 of 5) this week, while maintaining our underweight in the U.K. (also 2 of 5). We are keeping the Euro Area at above-benchmark (4 of 5) and Japan at benchmark (3 of 5). Government bond yield curves should see mild steepening pressure from rising inflation expectations before central banks are forced to turn more hawkish. We are focusing our decision to reduce overall portfolio duration more at the longer end of yield curves, especially in the U.S. and U.K. (Chart 7). A large headwind to any significant move higher in bond yields remains investor positioning, with only the "active client" portion of the JP Morgan duration survey showing a flip back to a net long duration stance in recent weeks (Chart 8). A full unwind of the large short positions in government bond markets is unlikely in the absence of much weaker economic data or a big correction in equity markets. The latter is impossible to time, but nothing that we are seeing in the forward-looking data is pointing to an imminent slowing of economic growth. Thus, we are choosing to shift back to our desired strategic below-benchmark duration stance this week. Chart 7Rising Inflation = Steeper Yield Curves Chart 8Large Short Positions Still An Issue Bottom Line: Rising political tensions in the U.S. will not offset the cyclical upward momentum in global growth and inflation. Bond yields are unlikely to fall much in the near term, despite significant bearish investor duration positioning. Shift back to a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance and position for bear-steepening of yield curves. Downgrade U.S. Treasuries to underweight (2 of 5) in global hedged bond portfolios. Corporate Bonds: A Cyclical Upgrade In The U.S., Despite Tight Valuations Global corporate debt has enjoyed solid relative performance versus government bonds over the past several months, driven by the improvements in economic growth and earnings. Credit spreads have narrowed in response, for both Investment Grade and High-Yield. In the Euro Area, the U.K. and Japan, central bank asset purchases of corporate bonds have also helped to keep spreads tight and help support the overall positive backdrop for credit markets. High levels of corporate leverage remain an issue, especially in the U.S., but an improving profit backdrop and faster nominal GDP growth will help paper over problems associated with high company debt. In the U.S., the items in our "Corporate Checklist" are providing a generally positive signal (Chart 9): Our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) is starting to signal a slight improvement in corporate credit metrics after several years of deterioration; Bank lending standards are no longer tightening, according to the Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey, after a brief period of more stringent standards in 2015 & 2016; Bank equities are outperforming the overall market, which in the past has been a positive signal for credit availability and corporate debt performance; Monetary conditions are still only just neutral, even with the U.S. dollar at very expensive levels. The monetary backdrop could become a concern later on in the year if Fed rate hikes lead to another period of rapid U.S. dollar appreciation. Until then, the more positive backdrop for profits will continue to boost balance sheet health, resulting in reduced equilibrium risk premiums (i.e. spreads) on corporate bonds. Already, U.S. corporate debt has priced in the better news (Chart 10). In High-Yield, the massive rally in energy-related names after the recovery in oil prices last year (top panel) has driven the spread on the Energy sub-component of the Barclays Bloomberg benchmark index back to levels last seen when oil was at $100/bbl ... even though the price of oil is still in the low $50s! Meanwhile, junk spreads ex-energy now reflect the benign macro volatility environment, as proxied by the VIX index (middle panel). Chart 9A Better Fundamental Backdrop Chart 10Corporate Valuations Are Not Cheap... In Investment Grade, spreads have also tightened alongside falling volatility, although spreads are still somewhat higher than during the previous period when the VIX was this low back in 2014 (bottom panel), suggesting that spreads could compress even further if the macro backdrop stays benign. We have maintained a generally cautious stance on U.S. corporate credit for much of the past year, given the combination of poor corporate health, contracting profits and slowly tightening monetary conditions. Now that the backdrop has changed, the case for upgrading U.S. corporates versus U.S. Treasuries is more compelling. This is especially so given the improvement in global economic growth momentum, which usually correlates with periods of positive excess returns for both Investment Grade and High-Yield versus Treasuries (Chart 11). Given our more optimistic tone on global economic growth, led by the potential for upside surprises in the U.S., this week we are upgrading our recommended stance on U.S. Investment Grade corporates to above-benchmark (4 of 5) and U.S. High-Yield to at-benchmark (3 of 5). Within High-Yield, we are focusing our exposure on the high-to-middle quality tiers, as both B-rated and Ba-rated spreads look far more attractive than Caa-rated debt. That can be seen in Chart 12, which shows the option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the overall U.S. High-Yield index and the three main credit tier buckets, divided by the 12-month trailing volatility of excess returns for each grouping. These "vol-adjusted" spreads are at the long-run median level for B-rated and Ba-rated debt, while Caa-rated bonds (which are dominated by the now-expensive debt of energy-related companies) offers poor value relative to their volatility. Chart 11...But The Growth Outlook Remains Supportive Chart 12Avoid The Lower Credit Tiers In U.S. Junk Differentiating within the credit tiers is important, as the overall U.S. High-Yield spread is not particularly cheap once expected default losses are taken into account (Chart 13). If U.S. economic growth surprises to the upside, as we expect, then the default outlook will look better and High-Yield spreads will look more attractive. For this reason, we would look to shift to an above-benchmark stance on any risk-off correction in global equities or corporates. With the business cycle improving, buying any dips in U.S. corporate credit markets should pay off in 2017. One final point: we have had a long-standing recommendation to overweight Euro Area Investment Grade corporate debt versus U.S. equivalents. That view was based on the underlying support for Euro Area corporates from ECB purchases, coming at a time when Euro Area balance sheets were improving in absolute terms, and relative to the U.S., as shown by our Euro Area Corporate Health Monitor (Chart 14). However, with our U.S. CHM now showing some modest improvement, and with U.S. likely to show more upside growth surprises in 2017, we are not upgrading Euro Area debt from the current above-benchmark (4 of 5) ranking, even as we boost our U.S. corporate allocation. Chart 13Expect Carry-Like Returns, Given Tight Spreads Chart 14A Bullish Case For Both U.S. and Euro Area IG Bottom Line: A better global growth outlook should continue to support U.S. corporate debt markets, despite tight valuations and a strong U.S. dollar. Upgrade allocations to U.S. Investment Grade to above-benchmark (4 of 5) and U.S. High-Yield to neutral (3 of 5), at the expense of U.S. Treasuries. Favor the higher quality tiers (i.e. above Caa) in U.S. junk. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Bond Vigilantes Take A Break For The Holidays", dated December 6, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "A "Post-Truth" Economic Upturn?", dated January 17, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Duration: Treasuries are now slightly expensive relative to global growth indicators, and the global economic recovery appears sustainable. Despite lingering concerns about policy uncertainty and bearish bond positioning, we recommend shifting back to a below-benchmark duration stance. Spread Product: The combination of an improving global growth back-drop and still-accommodative Fed policy will be positive for spread product. As such, we increase our allocation to investment grade corporate bonds - and spread product more generally - from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). We also upgrade high-yield bonds from underweight (2 out of 5) to neutral (3 out of 5). Economy: U.S. GDP growth will be solidly above trend in 2017, driven in large part by accelerating consumer spending. Feature The divergence in economic growth between the U.S. and the rest of the world has been one of our key investment themes for much of the past two years. All else equal, the greater the divergence in growth between the U.S. and the rest of the world, the more the U.S. dollar comes under upward pressure. A strengthening dollar limits how far the Fed can lift rates and caps the upside in long-dated yields. In fact, in a report published last October titled "Dollar Watching: An Update"1 we wrote: Our continued expectation that the Fed will lift rates in December leads us to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration and a neutral allocation to spread product until a December rate hike has been fully discounted by the market. Beyond December, our investment strategy will depend largely on how the dollar responds to an upward re-rating of rate expectations. Strong dollar appreciation would likely cause us to reverse our below-benchmark duration stance and become even more cautious on spread product. Conversely, a tame dollar could mean that the sell-off in bonds and rally in spreads have further to run. With the December rate hike now in the rearview mirror, global growth divergences do not appear to be a strong headwind for bond yields. In fact, the trade-weighted dollar has flattened off since the Fed lifted rates and bullish sentiment toward the dollar has plunged even though rate hike expectations remain elevated (Chart 1). This suggests that the dollar is so far not having much of an impact on the U.S. growth outlook or the expected path of monetary policy. Digging a little deeper, it appears we are witnessing a synchronized upturn in global growth led by the manufacturing sector (Chart 2). The Global Manufacturing PMI is in a clear uptrend, while the diffusion index suggests the improvement is broad based. Similarly, our Global Leading Economic Indicator is once again expanding, while its diffusion index is holding steady above the 50% line. Chart 1Dollar Sentiment: A Key Indicator Chart 2Synchronized Global Recovery Although the extremely high level of economic policy uncertainty increases the odds of a near-term selloff in risk assets and related flight-to-quality into Treasury securities, the strength of the global growth impulse and sustainability of the U.S. economic recovery (see section titled "U.S. Economy: A Healthy Consumer Leads The Way" below) means we would view any risk-off episode as an opportunity to reduce portfolio duration and increase exposure to spread product. As such, given our 6-12 month investment horizon and the inherent difficulty in forecasting near-term market riot points, this week we begin the process of shifting our portfolio in this direction. Specifically, we move from an "At Benchmark" back to a "Below Benchmark" duration stance and we also upgrade spread product from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5), while downgrading Treasuries from neutral (3 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5). Within spread product we upgrade investment grade corporates from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5) and upgrade high-yield from underweight (2 out of 5) to neutral (3 out of 5). We expand on the rationale for each move below. Portfolio Duration Chart 3Treasuries Now Expensive Two weeks ago,2 we detailed our bearish 6-12 month outlook for U.S. bonds, while also pointing to three factors that had so far prevented us from adopting a below-benchmark duration stance. The three factors were: (i) valuation, (ii) economic policy uncertainty and (iii) sentiment & positioning. Factor 1: Valuation Two weeks ago the 10-year Treasury yield was trading 9 basis points cheap on our 2-factor model based on Global PMI and bullish dollar sentiment. Since then, bullish sentiment has declined and Flash3 PMI readings from the U.S., Eurozone and Japan were all strong. If we assume that final PMIs from these regions are in line with the Flash numbers and that the PMIs from all other countries remain flat, then we calculate that the 10-year Treasury yield is actually 4 basis points expensive relative to fair value (Chart 3). In short, valuation argues even more in favor of reducing portfolio duration than it did two weeks ago. Factor 2: Uncertainty Economic policy uncertainty remains elevated and, unusually, has de-coupled from surveys of consumer and business confidence (Chart 4). Certainly, there is a risk that confidence measures relapse in the near-term if it appears as though some of the new President's promises related to tax cuts and deregulation will not be delivered. However, this risk needs to be weighed against the bond-bearish combination of protectionism and fiscal stimulus favored by the new administration, especially at a time when the economy is close to full employment. Factor 3: Sentiment & Positioning Bond sentiment and positioning remain decidedly bearish according to our Bond Sentiment Indicator and net speculative positioning in Treasury futures, although the J.P. Morgan client survey shows that clients' duration positioning is close to neutral (Chart 5). It is likely that some further capitulation of short positions is necessary before Treasury yields can move decisively higher. However, these shifts in positioning can occur very quickly and given the reading from our valuation model we feel that now is the appropriate time to reduce duration exposure. Chart 4Elevated Uncertainty Remains A Near-Term Risk... Chart 5...As Does Bearish Positioning Bottom Line: Treasuries are now slightly expensive relative to global growth indicators, and the global economic recovery appears sustainable. Despite lingering concerns about policy uncertainty and bearish bond positioning, we recommend shifting back to a below-benchmark duration stance. Spread Product In last week's report,4 we explored the performance of spread product throughout the four phases of the Fed cycle (Chart 6), which are defined as follows: Chart 6Stylized Fed Cycle Phase I represents the early stage of the withdrawal of monetary stimulus. This phase begins with the first hike of a new tightening cycle and ends when the fed funds rate crosses above its equilibrium level. Phase II represents the late stage of the tightening cycle, when the Fed hikes its target rate above equilibrium in an effort to slow the economy. Phase III represents the early stage of the easing cycle. It begins with the first rate cut from the peak and lasts until the Fed cuts its target rate below equilibrium. Phase IV represents the late stage of the easing cycle. It encompasses both the period when the fed funds rate descends to its cycle trough and the subsequent adjustment period when the Fed remains on hold in an effort to kick start an economic recovery. Based on the fact that core PCE inflation remains below the Fed's target and the view that its uptrend will proceed only gradually, we concluded that we are presently in Phase I of the Fed cycle and would probably remain there for the balance of the year. Historically, spread product has performed well in Phase I of the Fed cycle, with only Phase IV producing higher average monthly excess returns. However, the Fed cycle is only part of the story. Our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) - a composite measure of balance sheet health for the nonfinancial corporate sector - has been in "deteriorating health" territory since late 2013. Historically, this measure has an excellent track record of flagging periods of spread widening (Chart 7). Chart 7The Corporate Health Monitor And Credit Spreads To augment our analysis, this week we re-examine average monthly excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds in the four phases of the Fed cycle but this time we also split each phase into periods of improving and deteriorating corporate health (Table 1). Table 1Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Given Reading From ##br##BCA Corporate Health Monitor And The Phase Of The Fed Cycle (July 1989 To Present) Table 1 shows there have been 14 months since 1989 when Phase I of the Fed cycle coincided with deteriorating corporate health, according to the CHM. Conversely, Phase I of the Fed cycle coincided with improving corporate health in 25 months. However, 13 of the 14 months when Phase I of the Fed cycle coincided with deteriorating corporate health are the most recent 13 months. In other words, the current combination of tightening (but still-supportive) monetary policy and weak corporate balance sheets is unprecedented. The other factor we have not yet considered is valuation, as measured by the starting level of corporate spreads. In Table 2 we present average monthly excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds split by both the phase of the Fed cycle and the investment grade corporate option-adjusted spread. At present, the average option-adjusted spread for the Bloomberg Barclays investment grade corporate index is 120 bps. Table 2Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Given Previous Month Option-Adjusted Spread** ##br##And The Phase Of The Fed Cycle (July 1989 To Present) In Table 2 we observe that usually spreads are much lower in Phase I of the Fed cycle, typically between 50 bps and 100 bps, and that periods when spreads are above 100 bps generally coincide with higher excess returns. However, we must also recall that corporate health is typically still improving in Phase I of the Fed cycle, so today's higher spread levels might be justified by worse credit quality. Chart 8Value Is Stretched In Junk It goes without saying that the unusual combination of deteriorating corporate health and still-supportive Fed policy is a complicated environment for credit investors to navigate. Our view is that accommodative Fed policy will prevent material spread widening, at least until inflation breaks above the Fed's target and we shift into Phase II of the Fed cycle, but it is also probably not reasonable to expect spreads to tighten much further from current levels. We are looking for low, but positive, excess returns from spread product, consistent with the available carry. Bottom Line: The combination of an improving global growth back-drop and still-accommodative Fed policy will be positive for spread product. As such, we increase our allocation to investment grade corporate bonds - and spread product more generally - from neutral (3 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). We also upgrade our allocation to high-yield bonds from underweight (2 out of 5) to neutral (3 out of 5). We retain only a neutral allocation to high-yield due to the longer-run risks posed by poor corporate health, and tight valuations for high-yield bonds (Chart 8). U.S. Economy: A Healthy Consumer Leads The Way U.S. GDP growth decelerated to 1.9% in Q4 from 3.5% in Q3. Growth in consumer spending slowed to 2.5% from 3.0%, while fixed investment spending picked up to 4.2% from 0.1%. The headline 1.9% GDP print also includes a -1.7% contribution from net exports and +1.0% contribution from inventories. Taking a step back from the quarterly data, we see that the growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers - a measure of growth that strips out the volatile trade and inventory components - has clearly shifted into a higher range during the past couple of years (Chart 9). Further, leading indicators for each individual component of growth all suggest that further acceleration is in store (Chart 10). Chart 9Growth Finds A Higher Gear Chart 10Contributions To GDP Growth But crucially, it is the fundamental drivers underpinning the outlook for consumer spending that lead us to believe that U.S. economic growth will maintain an above-trend pace throughout 2017. As was observed by our U.S. Investment Strategy service in a recent report,5 income growth - the main driver of consumption trends - appears poised to accelerate, driven by accelerating wage growth that is starting to kick in now that the economy has finally reached full employment (Chart 11). The boost in consumer confidence could also lead to a lower savings rate, further increasing the impact on spending (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 11Consumer Spending = Income + Confidence Bottom Line: A healthy consumer is the back bone of the U.S. economy, and elevated consumer demand will also lend support to corporate fixed investment and the housing market. We expect that U.S. growth will be solidly above trend in 2017. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: An Update", dated October 25, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Is It Time To Cut Duration?", dated January 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The flash estimate is typically based on approximately 85%-90% of total PMI survey responses each month and is designed to provide an accurate advance indication of the final PMI data. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S. Consumer: The Comeback Kid", dated January 16, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Table 1Recommended Allocation The Reflation Trade Continues It is wrong to think that the recent rally in risk assets is mainly due to the election of President Donald Trump. Yes, since November 8, U.S. equities have risen by 7% and global equities by 3%. But the rally began as long ago as February last year, and since then U.S. and global equities have risen by 25% and 20% respectively. A more useful narrative is that the U.S. went through a "mini-recession" in late 2015/early 2016 (as indicated by the manufacturing ISM and credit spreads, Chart 1). Since then, assets have moved as they typically do in the first year of a cyclical recovery: small caps, cyclicals and value stocks have outperformed, bond yields risen, and equity multiples expanded in anticipation of a recovery in earnings. Expectations of Trump's fiscal stimulus and deregulation merely gave that momentum an extra boost. Our view is that global economic growth is likely to continue to accelerate. With the U.S. now at full employment, wage growth should rise further (Chart 2). Trump's policies are igniting animal spirits among companies, whose capex intentions have jumped sharply (Chart 3). U.S. real GDP growth this year could be 2.5-3%, somewhat above the consensus forecast of 2.3%. Meanwhile, Europe is growing above trend, and China will continue for a while longer to see the effects from last year's massive monetary stimulus (Chart 4). Chart 1One Year On From A Mini Recession Chart 2Wage Growth Is Set To Accelerate Chart 3Comapanies' Animal Spirits On The Rise Chart 4China's Reflation Still Coming Through In the short term, a correction is possible: the rally looks technically over-extended, and investors have begun to notice that in addition to "good Trump" (tax cuts, deregulation and infrastructure spending), there is also a "bad Trump" (market unfriendly measures such as immigration control, confrontation with China, and arbitrary interference in companies' investment decisions). But, on a 12-month view, our expectations of accelerating growth and only a moderate rise in inflation imply that the "sweet spot" for risk assets will continue, and so we maintain the overweight on equities and underweight on bonds we instituted in late November. What could end the reflation trade? The main risks we see (and the reasons we don't think they are serious enough to derail the rally for now) are: Extreme moves by the new U.S. administration. The biggest risk is a confrontation with China over trade. Our view is that Trump will use the threat of recognizing Taiwan to force concessions out of China. A precedent is the way the U.S. handled its trade deficit with Japan in the 1980s (note that new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer was deputy USTR at the time). China is unlikely to accept significant currency appreciation, understanding how this caused a bubble in Japan. But it might agree to voluntary export restrictions, to increasing investment in the U.S., opening the Chinese market more to foreign companies, and to stimulating domestic consumption, as Japan did in the 1980s (Chart 5). This may even chime with how Xi Jinping wants to reform the economy, though missteps by the U.S. could force him into a nationalistic position. Fiscal policy fails. The details of tax cuts are complex: alongside lowering the headline rate of corporate tax to 15% or 20%, for example, Republicans are discussing a border-adjustment tax, one-year depreciation, and an end of the tax offset for interest payments. Infrastructure spending won't happen quickly either, not least since it is disliked by Republican fiscal hawks (who are much less averse to tax cuts). BCA's geopolitical strategists, however, believe that Trump will able to get a program of personal and corporate tax cuts through Congress by August. Economic (and earnings) growth stumble. While corporate and consumer sentiment have picked up recently, hard data has not yet. U.S. 4Q GDP growth of only 1.9%, for example, was disappointing. Earnings growth will need to recover this year to justify elevated multiples. EPS growth for the S&P500 stocks in Q4 2016 looks to have been around 4% YoY according to FactSet. Stocks might fall if earnings do not come in somewhere close to the 12% that the bottom-up consensus forecasts for 2017. Inflation risks rise, triggering the Fed and the European Central Bank to rush to tighten monetary policy. Core U.S. PCE inflation, at 1.7% YoY, is not far below the Fed's 2% target and inflation could accelerate as fiscal policy stimulates an economy where slack has already disappeared. However, it is likely to take some time for inflation expectations to rise, and over the past few months core PCE inflation has, if anything, slowed (Chart 6). We expect the Fed to raise rates three times this year (compared to market expectations of twice) but not to move faster than that. German inflation, at 1.9% YoY, is starting to get uncomfortably high too, but the ECB will probably continue to set policy with more focus on the periphery, especially Italy. Chart 5When U.S. Pushed Japan In The 1980's Chart 6Inflation Has Been Slow To Pick Up Equities: We prefer U.S. equities over European ones in common currency terms. This is partly because we expect further U.S. dollar appreciation. But we also remained concerned about the structural weakness in the European banking system, and by the higher volatility of eurozone equities. Moreover, European earnings will not be boosted by currency depreciation as much as will Japanese earnings, since the euro has hardly weakened on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 7). We continue to like Japanese equities (with a currency hedge). The Bank of Japan remains committed to an overshoot of its 2% inflation target, which should weaken the yen and boost earnings. We are underweight Emerging Market equities: structural vulnerabilities remain, and the inverse correlation with the U.S. dollar is intact. Chart 7Euro Hasn't Weakened Much Fixed Income: For now, U.S. 10-year Treasury bonds are at around fair value. But we expect the yield to rise moderately further, as growth and inflation pick up, to about 3% by year-end. Yields on eurozone government bonds will also rise, but not by as much. This means that global sovereigns could produce a YoY negative return for the first time since 1994. In the U.S. we continue to prefer TIPS over nominal bonds: inflation expectations are still 30-40 bps below a normalized level (Chart 8). With risk assets likely to outperform, we recommend exposure to spread product, but find investment grade bonds more attractively valued than high-yield. Currencies: Short term, the dollar has probably overshot and could correct. But growth and interest rate differentials (Chart 9) suggest that the dollar will appreciate further until such time as Europe and Japan can contemplate raising rates. Additionally, if the proposal of a border-adjustment tax looks like becoming reality, the dollar could appreciate sharply: a BAT of 20% would theoretically be offset by a 25% rise in the dollar. The yen is likely to depreciate further (perhaps back to JPY125 against the dollar) as the Bank of Japan successfully maintains its target of a 0% 10-year government bond yield. The euro will fall by less, especially if the market begins to worry about ECB tapering in the face of rising inflation. Chart 8TIPS Have Further to Go Room To Rise Chart 9Interest Rate Differentials Suggest Stronger Dollar Commodities: The supply/demand picture for industrial metals looks roughly balanced for the year, with Chinese demand likely to remain robust, suppliers more disciplined, but the stronger dollar acting as a headwind. In the oil market, Saudi Arabia and Russia seem to be sticking to their commitment to cut supply, but U.S. shale oil producers are filling the gap, with the rig count up 23% in Q4 over the previous quarter. We continue to expect crude oil to average US$55 a barrel for the next two years. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)