Economy

Special Report

Dear client, We have received several questions about a potential U.S. border tax adjustment. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President of BCA's Global Investment Strategy service addresses this issue in the attached Special Report titled, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017". Peter analyses the economic and financial market implications of the plan and concludes it is likely to be an additional support to the dollar bull market should it be implemented in full. We trust you will find this report very interesting and relevant. As always, please do not hesitate if you have further questions. Best regards, Lenka Martinek Highlights House Republicans are pushing for a radical overhaul of the existing tax code, including adding a "border adjustment" mechanism that would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. Despite President Trump's apparent mixed feelings about border taxation, we see a 50% chance that some version of the proposal will be implemented. This is a higher probability than the market currently is discounting. The trade-weighted dollar will rally by another 5% even in the absence of any tax changes, but could rise by 15% if the border adjustment tax is introduced. If the latter were to happen, it would take some time for the dollar to rise to its new equilibrium level. This, in conjunction with sticky import and export prices, would likely lead to a temporary narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit. Such an outcome could prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. Investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. A stronger dollar will push down commodity prices and hurt external borrowers with dollar-denominated loans. A protectionist backlash against the U.S. might ensue. We are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32%, and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Feature Making The Tax Code Great Again? Republicans in Congress are proposing an ambitious revamp of the tax code. A central element of their plan is the replacement of the existing corporate income tax with a so-called "destination-based cash flow tax." Key features of this plan include: Cutting the current federal corporate tax from a top rate of 35% to 20%. Allowing businesses to depreciate capital expenditures immediately, rather than writing them off over many years. Disallowing businesses from deducting interest expenses when calculating their tax bills. Moving to a system of territorial taxation, meaning that taxes would only be assessed on the value added of goods consumed in the United States. Since not all goods that are produced in the U.S. are consumed in the U.S., and not all goods that are consumed in the U.S. are produced in the U.S., a destination-based system requires what is known as a "border adjustment." Such an adjustment would tax the value added of imports and rebate the value added of exports at an equivalent rate. While border adjustments are routinely used in other settings - most notably by countries that have VATs - their application to corporate income taxes is a novel idea. As such, it is not surprising that the proposal has generated significant confusion among investors. With that in mind, we offer our thoughts on the matter using a Q&A format. Q: How exactly would a border adjustment on corporate income taxes work? A: Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred in the U.S.). Table 1 offers a simplified example to illustrate this point. Consider three types of companies: 1) A purely domestic producer whose revenues and costs are realized at home; 2) An exporter whose revenues are entirely derived from abroad but whose costs are all incurred in the U.S.; 3) An importer whose revenues are completely generated in the U.S. but whose costs are all incurred abroad. Suppose that all three companies have revenues of $100 and costs of $60 - implying $40 in pre-tax profits - and face a corporate tax rate of 20%. Before the border adjustment, each company would pay a tax of $8 ($40 times 0.2). The border adjustment is zero for the domestic producer. However, it would impose an additional tax of $12 on the importer ($60 times 0.2), while giving the exporter a rebate of $20 ($100 times 0.2). In the end, the importer and exporter face final tax bills of $20 and -$12, respectively, while the domestic producer continues to pay $8. Note that this conforms with the tax paid on domestic revenues minus domestic costs (for the domestic producer, domestic revenue minus domestic cost is equal to $40; for the exporter it is equal to -$60; and for the importer, it is equal to $100). Q: A tax on imports and a subsidy on exports? Sounds like massive protectionism! A: That depends on the extent to which the dollar appreciates. As Table 1 shows, if the dollar appreciates by 1/(1-tax rate) = 1/(1-0.2) = 25%, there would be no impact on the trade balance or on the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy. This is because the stronger dollar would nullify the subsidy on exports, while reducing import costs by precisely the amount necessary to restore importers' after-tax profits to their original level. Q: This seems like splitting hairs. If a country imposes a 20% tax on imports, most people would still regard this as a protectionist act, even if a currency appreciation offsets the impact. A: That's why a corresponding export subsidy is necessary. That may sound strange since export subsidies are also seen as protectionist measures, but consider the following: Imagine that the government only taxes imports. A tax on imports would curb import demand, implying less demand for foreign currency. This would push up the value of the dollar, leading to lower import prices. How high would the dollar go? Suppose it rose so much that the decline in import prices exactly offset the tariff, thereby restoring import volumes (and importer profits) back to their original level. Is that a stable equilibrium? The answer is no because a stronger dollar would also reduce the demand for U.S. exports, causing the trade deficit to swell. Thus, for the trade balance to remain unchanged, the dollar would have to rise only part of the way, leaving importers worse off than before the tariff was introduced. Such a policy would be protectionist because it would favor U.S.-based companies that produce for the domestic market over foreign exporters. Only in the case where importers are subject to a tax and exporters receive a subsidy will the dollar strengthen to the point that neither exports nor imports change. Intuitively, this is because an export subsidy indirectly benefits importers by pushing up the value of the dollar, while directly benefiting exporters by offsetting the effect of a stronger dollar on profits. Q: If there is no change in the trade balance, what is the advantage of border-adjusting the corporate income tax? A: Contrary to Donald Trump's assertion that border adjustments are "too complicated," their chief advantage is their simplicity. Accurately assessing taxes on worldwide income is hard. Companies routinely engage in practices that purposely lower taxable profits. In particular, importers may overstate the value of their imports and exporters may understate the value of their exports. In a world where many companies have overseas subsidiaries, such "transfer pricing" machinations are easy to pull off. Border adjustments eliminate such incentives in one fell swoop. Recall that with a border adjustment, taxes are assessed on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs - both of which the IRS has the means to monitor. Yes, a U.S. company that overstates imports will be able to report a lower gross profit to the IRS, but now it will be on the hook for a higher import tax. What it puts in one pocket it takes from the other. Likewise, an exporter that understates its overseas sales will end up with a lower gross profit, but will now receive a smaller subsidy. Q: And I suppose that because the U.S. imports more than it exports, the border adjustment will end up raising additional revenues? A: That is correct. The annual U.S. trade deficit currently stands at $500 billion. A border adjustment tax rate of 20% would thus raise $100 billion in additional revenue. Given that the corporate income tax brings in about $350 billion, this would allow corporate taxes to be substantially cut without any loss in overall revenue. And this calculation excludes any indirect revenue that would accrue to the Treasury from reducing the incentive for U.S. companies to engage in profit-shifting behavior. Keep in mind, however, that the revenue boost from the border adjustment will decline if the U.S. trade deficit narrows over time. To the extent that the U.S. must finance its trade deficit through the sale of assets such as stocks, bonds, and property, it is possible that foreigners will one day decide to swap all these assets in exchange for U.S. goods. This would lead to an improvement in the U.S. trade balance. Indeed, to the extent that the U.S. is a net debtor to the rest of the world, it is possible that the average future U.S. trade balance will be positive. If that were to happen, the government would lose revenue from the border adjustment over the long haul. Meanwhile, a 25% appreciation in the greenback would reduce the dollar value of the assets that Americans hold abroad, without much of a corresponding decline in U.S. external liabilities. A reasonable estimate is that this would impose a paper loss on the U.S. of about 13% of GDP.1 Q: Ouch! But this assumes that a 20% border adjustment tax will lead to a 25% appreciation in the dollar. That is a mighty big can opener your fellow economists are assuming! What's to say this actually happens? A: Good point. Less than 10% of the turnover in the global foreign exchange market is directly related to the cross-border trade in goods and services. The rest represents financial market transactions. There are many things that can influence the value of the dollar beside trade flows. For example, suppose the government introduces a border adjustment tax, but the Federal Reserve fails to raise rates sufficiently fast in response to rising inflation stemming from a narrowing trade deficit. In that case, U.S. real rates could actually decline, leading to a weaker dollar. Our sense is that this won't happen, but the point is that there is no automatic link between a border tax and the dollar. Much depends on how the Fed responds and the underlying economic conditions. And even if the Fed does hike rates to keep the economy from overheating, two important forces will limit the extent of any dollar appreciation: First, questions about the timing and magnitude of the border adjustment tax - including the possibility that such a measure could be reversed by a future Congress - are likely to lead to only a partial appreciation in the dollar. Second, other central banks - particularly in emerging markets - are liable to take steps to limit the dollar's ascent so as not to place too great a burden on borrowers with dollar-denominated debt. Q: So what happens to countries with hard currency pegs to the dollar? Borrowers with dollar-denominated loans will be spared, but won't these countries end up suffering due to a sharp loss of competitiveness against other economies that have more flexible currencies? A: Correct. It is damned if you do, damned if you don't. Assuming that countries with exchange rate pegs to the dollar are strong enough to fend off a speculative attack, they will still need to engineer an equivalent real depreciation of their currencies via a decline in their nominal wages relative to U.S. wages - what economists call an "internal devaluation." That could impose a deflationary impulse on those economies. Q: You're losing me. A: Think about an extreme case - one where all countries have currency pegs to the dollar. How would the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax work then? The answer is that initially, a tax on U.S. imports, combined with a subsidy on U.S. exports, would lead to a smaller trade deficit. This would cause the U.S. economy to overheat, putting upward pressure on prices and wages. By definition, an improving trade balance in the U.S. implies a worsening trade balance in the rest of the world. This would sap demand in other countries, putting downward pressure on prices and wages abroad. The adjustment will be complete only after relative wages have shifted enough to restore the U.S. trade balance to its original level. The important point is that in a world where some countries have flexible exchange rates while others have fixed exchange rates or dirty floats, the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax will come through some combination of a stronger nominal dollar, higher U.S. inflation, and lower inflation abroad. Q: Bullish for the dollar, but bearish for U.S. bonds, correct? A: Precisely. The degree to which bond yields adjust around the world depends on the extent to which nominal exchange rates and domestic prices are sticky. If exchange rates are slow to change, more of the adjustment has to occur through higher inflation in the U.S. and lower inflation everywhere else. But even if nominal exchange rates adjust quickly, sticky goods prices would still push up U.S. bond yields. To see this point, consider what would happen if the dollar appreciated by 25% in response to the introduction of a border adjustment tax, but neither import prices nor export prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) changed. If that were to happen, the profit margins of U.S. importers would tumble because they would now have to pay an import tax but would not benefit from lower import prices. Meanwhile, the margins of U.S. exporters would soar as export prices stayed firm and they received a subsidy from the government. The result would be less imports and more exports, and hence, an improved trade balance. This would raise U.S. aggregate demand and put upward pressure on inflation and Treasury yields. Considering that 97% of U.S. exports and 93% of U.S. imports are denominated in dollars, such an outcome is hardly far-fetched. The bottom line is that in the "real world," the introduction of a border adjustment tax would cause Treasurys to sell off and the dollar to rally. Q: What sort of numbers are we talking about? A: Assuming a 20% border tax is introduced, a reasonable guess is that the trade-weighted dollar would rise by 10% over a 12-month period above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. This would imply 15% upside from current levels. The 10-year Treasury yield would probably rise to about 3%. Q: It still puzzles me how you can claim that bond yields will rise if the dollar strengthens. Wouldn't a stronger dollar normally lead to lower bond yields? A: Your premise is wrong. It is not the stronger dollar that leads to higher bond yields. It is a third factor - namely the improvement in the trade balance arising from the decision to tax imports and subsidize exports - that causes both the dollar and bond yields to rise. This is similar to what happens when the government loosens fiscal policy. Mind you, at some point the positive correlation between the dollar and bond yields could break down. If the dollar rises too much, emerging markets will crumble under the stress. This will trigger safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, leading to a stronger dollar and lower yields. Such an outcome is not our base case, but it cannot be dismissed. Q: Got it. Presuming that the global economy holds up, it sounds like a border tax would be great news for Boeing, but bad news for Walmart? A: Yes, but there are two important qualifications to consider. First, it is possible that the dollar overshoots its new long-term equilibrium level, so that the pain to Boeing from the appreciation of the greenback ends up outweighing the benefits from the export subsidy it receives. Second, given the potential economic and financial dislocations from the shift to a destination-based tax system, there is likely to be some delay between when the tax bill is signed into law and when it is implemented. And even once implementation begins, the adjustment in tax rates may be phased in only gradually. Since the dollar will rise in anticipation of all this, it is possible that exporters will actually suffer initially, while importers receive a temporary boost to profits. Nevertheless, we think that investors will see through the near-term hit to exporter margins and focus on the medium-term gains. As such, equity investors should maintain a preference for exporting companies over those that heavily rely on imports (Chart 1). Q: This assumes that the market has not fully priced in this outcome already. What are the chances that this border adjustment tax proposal actually sees the light of day? A: The border tax idea originated in the House of Representatives and has its strongest support there. There might be more opposition in the Senate, but this could be overcome if enough Democrats with protectionist leanings can be found. President Trump panned the idea in an interview with the Wall Street Journal earlier this week.2 He noted that "Anytime I hear about border adjustment, I don't love it... because usually it means we're going to get adjusted into a bad deal. That's what happens." Trump's comments suggest he may not fully understand how border adjustments work. This implies that he might be persuaded to go along with the idea if Republican legislators are able to reach a "great deal" on adjustments in his eyes, whatever that means. Subjectively, we would assign 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. This might entail excluding certain types of imports from a border tax if they are consumed disproportionately by the poor or represent an important input for U.S. manufacturing firms. Apparel and energy products would probably be on that list. It might also entail reducing the border adjustment tax to a lower level, say 10%, as Tom Barrack, head of Donald Trump's inaugural committee, has suggested. It is hard to know how much of this is already reflected in asset prices. The dollar fell after the WSJ article was published, but that may have had less to do with border adjustments and more to do with Trump's comment that he prefers a weaker dollar - an unprecedented statement for a U.S. president. Goldman Sachs' securities group has constructed two baskets using firm-level data, one comprised of "destination tax winners" and the other of "destination tax losers."3 The loser basket actually outperformed in the immediate aftermath of the election. While the relative performance of the winner basket has recovered more recently, it still remains below where it was last April (Chart 2). The limited reaction to the prospect of a border adjustment tax has been echoed in the fact that market expectations of the future volatility of the dollar has not changed much since the election, despite the possibility that the coming legislative debate could lead to wild swings in the greenback (Chart 3). Chart 3Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated On balance, we conclude that investors are understating the likelihood of even a watered down border adjustment tax being introduced as part of a comprehensive tax reform program. This is broadly consistent with our client discussions, which have revealed that most investors - with a few notable exceptions - are only vaguely aware of the issue. Q: Won't the WTO rule against a border adjustment tax? That could explain why investors are discounting it. A: Yes, it probably will. The WTO permits border adjustments in the case of "indirect" taxes such VATs, but not in the case of direct taxes such as income or corporate profit taxes. Granted, the U.S. has brushed off WTO decisions in the past, such as when it ignored the trade body's ruling that U.S. laws restricting internet gambling contravened the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Considering that Donald Trump threatened to pull the U.S. out of the WTO during the election campaign, such an outcome cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the border tax issue, even the Trump administration is likely to think twice about running afoul of WTO rules. Nevertheless, it might be possible to modify the border adjustment proposal to make it WTO-compliant. The distinction between direct and indirect taxes is one of those things self-styled experts like to pretend is important, but is not. It does not really matter whether a tax is levied on the sale of a good or service, or whether it is levied on income. In the end, someone has to pay the tax - be it a worker or a shareholder. The adoption by the U.S. of a border-adjusted destination tax would move the global economy in the direction of greater harmonization, not away from it. As noted at the outset, most other countries border adjust their value-added taxes. They do this so that their VATs mirror a consumption tax, as Table 2 illustrates with a simple example. Conceptually, a corporate cash flow tax coupled with a payroll tax functions in much the same way as a VAT (bottom part of Table 2). The U.S. already has both a corporate income and a payroll tax, so it is not that far away from having a VAT. All that is missing is a few tweaks to depreciation rules and the addition of the border adjustment. Yes, the dollar would strengthen if that were to happen, but this would put the greenback on par with other currencies. Chart 4 shows that the U.S. has run a trade deficit with the rest of the G7 since 1990, despite the fact that the dollar has traded on average 9% below its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over this period. One of the reasons this has occurred is that other G7 economies have a VAT, whereas the U.S. does not (Chart 5). This has kept the dollar weaker than it otherwise would have been. Chart 4The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason Q: Okay, let's wrap this up. What are the main investment implications I should take away from this? A: Our main takeaway is that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. adopts a destination-based tax system. This suggests that the risks to the dollar are to the upside, as are the risks to U.S. Treasury yields. Global investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. The implications for global equities are more nuanced. It may take some time for the dollar to adjust to the border tax. This, combined with the fact that import and export prices tend to be sticky in the short run, implies that the U.S. trade deficit will decline, boosting U.S. aggregate demand in the process. While that is potentially good news for U.S. corporate profits, the benefits will be curtailed by the fact that the U.S. economy is approaching full employment. This means that any further stimulus could simply result in higher real wages for workers without any offsetting increase in unit sales for U.S. companies. A shrinking U.S. trade deficit will diminish America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." This is problematic for export-dependent emerging markets. While a border adjustment may be justifiable on economic grounds, politically, it could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war. This could sour sentiment towards EM stocks. To make matters worse, a stronger dollar would harm emerging markets with high levels of dollar-denominated debt such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Chile, while also weighing on commodity prices. We recommend that investors underweight EM stocks relative to their DM counterparts. With these considerations in mind, we are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32% and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 U.S. external assets amount to 133% of GDP, while foreign liabilities stand at 175% of GDP. About 68% of U.S. external assets are denominated in foreign currency, compared with only 16% of external liabilities. Thus, the paper loss to the U.S. from a 25% appreciation in the dollar would be (175*0.16-133*0.68)*(1-1/1.25) = 12.5% of GDP. 2 Please see "Donald Trump Warns On House Republican Tax Plan," The Wall Street Journal, dated January 16, 2017, available at www.wsj.com. 3 The Bloomberg tickers for these baskets are GSCBDTW1 and GSCBDTL1. For more information, please see "US Daily: What Policy Changes Is The Equity Market Expecting?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research, dated January 11, 2017.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Media stocks are poised to challenge previous relative performance highs as sales growth reaccelerates. Stay overweight. The materials sector has lagged behind the commodity price rally, a sign of underlying weakness rather than latent strength. Chemicals overcapacity will remain a headwind until U.S. competitiveness improves. Stay clear. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Feature The broad market has been very strong since the November election. While advance/decline lines have firmed, participation in the rally has been uneven and may be fraying around the edges. For example, the number of groups trading above their 40-week moving average has been diverging negatively from the broad market in the last few months, suggesting diminishing breadth (Chart 1). In fact, the industrials (I) and financials (F) sectors have carried the market since November. Other deep cyclical sectors, such as energy, materials and tech, have mostly matched market performance. The 'IF' rally is based on an expected upgrade to the economic growth plane that matches the surge in various sentiment gauges. If validation does not occur, then the IF rally will become iffy indeed, unless sector breadth improves. Last week we showed that market cap-to-GDP was so far above its long-term average that even if nominal growth boomed at 8% per annum for the next five years this valuation ratio would still not have normalized. That valuation backdrop may not upend additional short-term market momentum, but it is a true measure of just how bullish sentiment has become and should be a critical input to the portfolio construction process, because of its warning about divergences from fundamental supports. Another unconventional sentiment gauge is observed from sub-surface market patterns. Chart 1 shows that the number of defensive groups with a positive 52-week rate of change, in relative terms, is in freefall, plunged to virtually nil. In the last two decades, investors eschewing capital preservation and non-cyclical sectors so aggressively has typically preceded major market peaks (Chart 1). The steep drop in the put/call ratio confirms that euphoria and greed are trumping mistrust and fear. The put/call ratio has recently bounced, but is well below levels that signal investors are accumulating significant portfolio protection. The Fed's tightening bias, contracting U.S. dollar-based financial liquidity amid the strong U.S. dollar all threaten to keep a lid on corporate sector sales prospects. As such, we remain biased toward non-cyclical and consumer sectors, even excluding fiscal policy uncertainty. Chart 2 shows that these areas are in a base-building phase, in relative terms, following their post-election drubbing. We expect momentum to steadily build toward sustained outperformance by midyear. Conversely, a reversal in the 'IF' sectors already appears to be developing, while other capital spending-dependent sectors are unable to gain momentum (Chart 3). This week we highlight both a winning group and an area we expect to disappoint. Chart 1The Rally Is Fraying Around The Edges Chart 2Defensive Base-Building? Chart 3Cyclical Sector Distribution New Highs Ahead For Media While the consumer discretionary sector has a poor track record during Fed tightening cycles, the S&P media sub-component can buck this trend. Media stocks outperformed in the second half of the 1990s and also trended higher in the 1980s while the Fed was tightening. The key was the U.S. dollar (Chart 4). As long as the dollar was strong, media companies sustained a profit advantage over the rest of the corporate sector owing to limited external exposure. A replay is currently playing out, and has the potential to persist for at least the next few quarters based on upbeat cyclical indicators. Media sales growth is in recovery mode. Consumers have significantly boosted spending on media services, as measured by personal consumption expenditures data (Chart 5). Pricing power has surged in response to demand strength (Chart 5, bottom panel). In turn, strong demand is boosting measures of productivity: our proxy for sales/employment is accelerating toward the double-digit growth zone (Chart 5). Productivity is diverging positively from relative forward earnings expectations, implying there is room for a re-rating. As long as the U.S. economy is growing, media companies should be able to garner an increasing share of consumer wallets. Chart 6 shows that real spending on media services has been in a steady uptrend for well over a decade, reflecting its ability to continually innovate, only pausing during recessions when consumers are forced to retrench. Typically, a rise in spending pulls up pricing power (Chart 6). Chart 4Media Stocks Like Dollar Strength Chart 5Sales Are Set To Accelerate Chart 6Secular Strength All of this has spurred a recovery in media cash flow growth (Chart 7, top panel). Relative performance and cash flow move hand-in-hand. Rising cash flows also imply that the media sector can further reduce shares outstanding through buybacks and/or M&A activity (Chart 7), bolstering ROE. The S&P movies & entertainment index has been one of the driving forces behind the broader media index recovery. We upgraded the former to overweight after the vicious selloff related to Disney's ESPN woes and the takeover saga at Viacom had pushed the index to an undervalued extreme. While slightly early, this upgrade is now paying off (Chart 8). The expectations hurdle remains surmountable. Both forward earnings and sales growth estimates are deeply negative (Chart 8), reflecting the well-known cooling in cable subscriber growth. But even here, there is room for potential upside surprises. Consumer spending on recreation has been growing at a low single-digit clip, but the surge in consumer confidence, courtesy of rising wage growth and a positive wealth effect from rising real estate and financial asset prices, should support increased discretionary consumer spending. The message from the jump in the ISM services index is bullish for recreation spending (Chart 9, second panel). Chart 7Shareholder-Friendly Chart 8Cheap With Low Expectations Chart 9Still Early In The Recovery In turn, faster spending would support ongoing pricing power gains (Chart 9). The industry is already sporting one of the most robust selling price increases of all that we track, as advertising rate inflation is growing anew. Importantly, real outlays on cable services have recovered after a steep decline (Chart 9), suggesting that the drag from disappointing cable subscriber growth and cord cutting may be easing. Less churn implies more pricing power. Content cost inflation also remains under wraps. The implication is that the fundamental forces to propel a retest of previous relative performance highs are in place. Technical conditions are also sending a bullish signal. Cyclical momentum, as measured by the 52-week rate of change, is on the cusp of breaking into positive territory (Chart 9), while the share price ratio has already crossed decisively above key resistance at its 40-week moving average. A dual breakout would confirm a new bull trend. Bottom Line: Media stocks have good odds of retesting previous relative performance highs as discretionary consumer spending perks up. Stay overweight the overall media group, and the S&P movies and entertainment index in particular. Chemical Stocks: A Toxic Portfolio Blend The commodity price recovery has not carried over into the S&P materials sector, as relative performance has been moving laterally for much of the last twelve months. Rather than view this as an opportunity to play catch up, the more likely outcome is that the sector has missed its chance to outperform. In fact, downside risks have intensified. The strong U.S. dollar will exact a toll on U.S. exporters, particularly if emerging markets and China do not experience accelerating final demand. While there has been a massive amount of stimulus in China over the past 18 months, the thrust of that impulse is fading. Fiscal spending growth has dropped sharply and the authorities trying to cool rampant real estate speculation. The yield curve remains flat (Chart 10), as local funding costs rise on the back of the authorities attempt to mitigate capital outflows, and loan demand remains weak. Persistent weakness in the Chinese currency may reflect a lack of confidence in local returns, i.e. sub-par growth. All of that argues against expecting a major impetus to raw materials demand, at a time when the materials sector total wage bill is inflating more aggressively. Our Cyclical Macro Indicator for the materials sector is hitting new lows (Chart 10), heralding earnings underperformance, underscoring that below-benchmark allocations remain appropriate. The S&P chemicals group represents for than 70% of the overall materials market cap. It has underperformed since its peak and our underweight call in 2014, pulled lower by the soaring U.S. dollar and sagging industry productivity (Chart 11). Net earnings revisions have been consistently revised lower over the past few years, and are unlikely to recover without a reflationary push (global real yields are shown inverted, second panel, Chart 11) that revives chemical final demand. Analysts have latched on to the firming in global purchasing manager survey sentiment, aggressively pushing up sales growth expectations in recent months (Chart 12). Clearly, manufacturing sector expansion is expected to reverse the contraction in chemical output growth (Chart 12). Chart 10Higher PMIs Are Not Enough Chart 11Higher Yields Are A Bad Omen Chart 12Expectations Are Inflated However, this may be yet another case of analysts chronically overestimating the industry's earnings power. Global manufacturing improvement seems likely to accrue mostly to firms outside the U.S. Chart 13 shows that chemicals relative performance is heavily influenced by the U.S. dollar. Valuations and sentiment are tightly linked with chemical export growth (Chart 13), as the latter represent 14% of total U.S. exports. The U.S. dollar surge is diverting orders away from U.S. manufacturers: German chemical new orders have surged, and the IFO survey of chemical industry executives signals optimism about the future (Chart 14). Chart 13The Dollar Is Hurting The U.S. ... Chart 14... But Helping Foreign Competitors U.S. executives appear to be equally confident, but that optimism is misplaced. The American Chemical Council expects U.S. chemical exports to increase 7% a year through 2021. Over $170B is expected to be invested in U.S. chemical manufacturing capacity, representing nearly 25% of the total industry size, which is anticipated to boost the chemical trade surplus to new records. So far, roughly $76B of projects has either been completed or is under construction. If these planned projects all come to fruition, our concern is that new capacity will be idle rather than productive. The industry is in the crosshairs of anti-globalization and protectionism, and a strong U.S. dollar and rising domestic cost structures threaten to reduce competitiveness. Chemical imports are a fairly large portion of sales, rendering profitability vulnerable should an import-tax ever be introduced. From a cyclical standpoint, deflationary pressures are already very acute. Chemical capacity is growing much faster than production, warning that pricing power will be under significant pressure (Chart 15). Many chemical products are destined for interest rate-sensitive end markets such as autos, underscoring that a Fed tightening cycle is a headwind. While capacity expansion was planned when interest rates and feedstock costs were expected to remain at rock bottom levels for the foreseeable future, this is no longer the case. Chemical companies can either use natural gas (ethane) or oil (naphtha) as a primary feedstock. U.S. production is largely ethane-based, while global capacity is geared to naphtha. Rising U.S. natural gas prices are undermining the U.S. input cost advantage (Chart 16). Chart 15Persistent Deflation Pressures Chart 16U.S. Cost Structures Are Unattractive Increased capacity has also put significant upward pressure on wage costs, as our proxy for the total wage bill is rising at a high single-digit rate (Chart 16). With capital spending slated to stay robust in the coming years, it will likely continue to take a larger share of sales, impairing profit margins. While the planned merger between heavyweights Dow Chemical and Dupont may eventually help to rationalize costs, this is a necessary but not sufficient step in the face of a loss of global market share. Without accelerating sales, U.S. chemical makers will be hard pressed to improve productivity sufficiently to reverse the slide in relative forward earnings estimates. Bottom Line: The S&P materials sector hasn't been able to outperform during a period of improving global manufacturing activity, raising doubts about its performance potential when global output growth inevitably slows. Part of this reflects the challenging outlook for the sector heavyweight chemicals index, and we recommend staying underweight both. The symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CHEM - APD, ARG, CF, DOW, EMN, ECL, DD, FMC, IFF, LYB, MON, MOS, PPG, PX, SHW. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps. Favor growth over value (downgrade alert).

Special Report

Highlights House Republicans are pushing for a radical overhaul of the existing tax code, including adding a "border adjustment" mechanism that would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. Despite President Trump's apparent mixed feelings about border taxation, we see a 50% chance that some version of the proposal will be implemented. This is a higher probability than the market currently is discounting. The trade-weighted dollar will rally by another 5% even in the absence of any tax changes, but could rise by 15% if the border adjustment tax is introduced. If the latter were to happen, it would take some time for the dollar to rise to its new equilibrium level. This, in conjunction with sticky import and export prices, would likely lead to a temporary narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit. Such an outcome could prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. Investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. A stronger dollar will push down commodity prices and hurt external borrowers with dollar-denominated loans. A protectionist backlash against the U.S. might ensue. We are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32%, and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Feature Making The Tax Code Great Again? Republicans in Congress are proposing an ambitious revamp of the tax code. A central element of their plan is the replacement of the existing corporate income tax with a so-called "destination-based cash flow tax." Key features of this plan include: Cutting the current federal corporate tax from a top rate of 35% to 20%. Allowing businesses to depreciate capital expenditures immediately, rather than writing them off over many years. Disallowing businesses from deducting interest expenses when calculating their tax bills. Moving to a system of territorial taxation, meaning that taxes would only be assessed on the value added of goods consumed in the United States. Since not all goods that are produced in the U.S. are consumed in the U.S., and not all goods that are consumed in the U.S. are produced in the U.S., a destination-based system requires what is known as a "border adjustment." Such an adjustment would tax the value added of imports and rebate the value added of exports at an equivalent rate. While border adjustments are routinely used in other settings - most notably by countries that have VATs - their application to corporate income taxes is a novel idea. As such, it is not surprising that the proposal has generated significant confusion among investors. With that in mind, we offer our thoughts on the matter using a Q&A format. Q: How exactly would a border adjustment on corporate income taxes work? A: Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred in the U.S.). Table 1 offers a simplified example to illustrate this point. Consider three types of companies: 1) A purely domestic producer whose revenues and costs are realized at home; 2) An exporter whose revenues are entirely derived from abroad but whose costs are all incurred in the U.S.; 3) An importer whose revenues are completely generated in the U.S. but whose costs are all incurred abroad. Suppose that all three companies have revenues of $100 and costs of $60 - implying $40 in pre-tax profits - and face a corporate tax rate of 20%. Before the border adjustment, each company would pay a tax of $8 ($40 times 0.2). The border adjustment is zero for the domestic producer. However, it would impose an additional tax of $12 on the importer ($60 times 0.2), while giving the exporter a rebate of $20 ($100 times 0.2). In the end, the importer and exporter face final tax bills of $20 and -$12, respectively, while the domestic producer continues to pay $8. Note that this conforms with the tax paid on domestic revenues minus domestic costs (for the domestic producer, domestic revenue minus domestic cost is equal to $40; for the exporter it is equal to -$60; and for the importer, it is equal to $100). Q: A tax on imports and a subsidy on exports? Sounds like massive protectionism! A: That depends on the extent to which the dollar appreciates. As Table 1 shows, if the dollar appreciates by 1/(1-tax rate) = 1/(1-0.2) = 25%, there would be no impact on the trade balance or on the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy. This is because the stronger dollar would nullify the subsidy on exports, while reducing import costs by precisely the amount necessary to restore importers' after-tax profits to their original level. Q: This seems like splitting hairs. If a country imposes a 20% tax on imports, most people would still regard this as a protectionist act, even if a currency appreciation offsets the impact. A: That's why a corresponding export subsidy is necessary. That may sound strange since export subsidies are also seen as protectionist measures, but consider the following: Imagine that the government only taxes imports. A tax on imports would curb import demand, implying less demand for foreign currency. This would push up the value of the dollar, leading to lower import prices. How high would the dollar go? Suppose it rose so much that the decline in import prices exactly offset the tariff, thereby restoring import volumes (and importer profits) back to their original level. Is that a stable equilibrium? The answer is no because a stronger dollar would also reduce the demand for U.S. exports, causing the trade deficit to swell. Thus, for the trade balance to remain unchanged, the dollar would have to rise only part of the way, leaving importers worse off than before the tariff was introduced. Such a policy would be protectionist because it would favor U.S.-based companies that produce for the domestic market over foreign exporters. Only in the case where importers are subject to a tax and exporters receive a subsidy will the dollar strengthen to the point that neither exports nor imports change. Intuitively, this is because an export subsidy indirectly benefits importers by pushing up the value of the dollar, while directly benefiting exporters by offsetting the effect of a stronger dollar on profits. Q: If there is no change in the trade balance, what is the advantage of border-adjusting the corporate income tax? A: Contrary to Donald Trump's assertion that border adjustments are "too complicated," their chief advantage is their simplicity. Accurately assessing taxes on worldwide income is hard. Companies routinely engage in practices that purposely lower taxable profits. In particular, importers may overstate the value of their imports and exporters may understate the value of their exports. In a world where many companies have overseas subsidiaries, such "transfer pricing" machinations are easy to pull off. Border adjustments eliminate such incentives in one fell swoop. Recall that with a border adjustment, taxes are assessed on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs - both of which the IRS has the means to monitor. Yes, a U.S. company that overstates imports will be able to report a lower gross profit to the IRS, but now it will be on the hook for a higher import tax. What it puts in one pocket it takes from the other. Likewise, an exporter that understates its overseas sales will end up with a lower gross profit, but will now receive a smaller subsidy. Q: And I suppose that because the U.S. imports more than it exports, the border adjustment will end up raising additional revenues? A: That is correct. The annual U.S. trade deficit currently stands at $500 billion. A border adjustment tax rate of 20% would thus raise $100 billion in additional revenue. Given that the corporate income tax brings in about $350 billion, this would allow corporate taxes to be substantially cut without any loss in overall revenue. And this calculation excludes any indirect revenue that would accrue to the Treasury from reducing the incentive for U.S. companies to engage in profit-shifting behavior. Keep in mind, however, that the revenue boost from the border adjustment will decline if the U.S. trade deficit narrows over time. To the extent that the U.S. must finance its trade deficit through the sale of assets such as stocks, bonds, and property, it is possible that foreigners will one day decide to swap all these assets in exchange for U.S. goods. This would lead to an improvement in the U.S. trade balance. Indeed, to the extent that the U.S. is a net debtor to the rest of the world, it is possible that the average future U.S. trade balance will be positive. If that were to happen, the government would lose revenue from the border adjustment over the long haul. Meanwhile, a 25% appreciation in the greenback would reduce the dollar value of the assets that Americans hold abroad, without much of a corresponding decline in U.S. external liabilities. A reasonable estimate is that this would impose a paper loss on the U.S. of about 13% of GDP.1 Q: Ouch! But this assumes that a 20% border adjustment tax will lead to a 25% appreciation in the dollar. That is a mighty big can opener your fellow economists are assuming! What's to say this actually happens? A: Good point. Less than 10% of the turnover in the global foreign exchange market is directly related to the cross-border trade in goods and services. The rest represents financial market transactions. There are many things that can influence the value of the dollar beside trade flows. For example, suppose the government introduces a border adjustment tax, but the Federal Reserve fails to raise rates sufficiently fast in response to rising inflation stemming from a narrowing trade deficit. In that case, U.S. real rates could actually decline, leading to a weaker dollar. Our sense is that this won't happen, but the point is that there is no automatic link between a border tax and the dollar. Much depends on how the Fed responds and the underlying economic conditions. And even if the Fed does hike rates to keep the economy from overheating, two important forces will limit the extent of any dollar appreciation: First, questions about the timing and magnitude of the border adjustment tax - including the possibility that such a measure could be reversed by a future Congress - are likely to lead to only a partial appreciation in the dollar. Second, other central banks - particularly in emerging markets - are liable to take steps to limit the dollar's ascent so as not to place too great a burden on borrowers with dollar-denominated debt. Q: So what happens to countries with hard currency pegs to the dollar? Borrowers with dollar-denominated loans will be spared, but won't these countries end up suffering due to a sharp loss of competitiveness against other economies that have more flexible currencies? A: Correct. It is damned if you do, damned if you don't. Assuming that countries with exchange rate pegs to the dollar are strong enough to fend off a speculative attack, they will still need to engineer an equivalent real depreciation of their currencies via a decline in their nominal wages relative to U.S. wages - what economists call an "internal devaluation." That could impose a deflationary impulse on those economies. Q: You're losing me. A: Think about an extreme case - one where all countries have currency pegs to the dollar. How would the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax work then? The answer is that initially, a tax on U.S. imports, combined with a subsidy on U.S. exports, would lead to a smaller trade deficit. This would cause the U.S. economy to overheat, putting upward pressure on prices and wages. By definition, an improving trade balance in the U.S. implies a worsening trade balance in the rest of the world. This would sap demand in other countries, putting downward pressure on prices and wages abroad. The adjustment will be complete only after relative wages have shifted enough to restore the U.S. trade balance to its original level. The important point is that in a world where some countries have flexible exchange rates while others have fixed exchange rates or dirty floats, the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax will come through some combination of a stronger nominal dollar, higher U.S. inflation, and lower inflation abroad. Q: Bullish for the dollar, but bearish for U.S. bonds, correct? A: Precisely. The degree to which bond yields adjust around the world depends on the extent to which nominal exchange rates and domestic prices are sticky. If exchange rates are slow to change, more of the adjustment has to occur through higher inflation in the U.S. and lower inflation everywhere else. But even if nominal exchange rates adjust quickly, sticky goods prices would still push up U.S. bond yields. To see this point, consider what would happen if the dollar appreciated by 25% in response to the introduction of a border adjustment tax, but neither import prices nor export prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) changed. If that were to happen, the profit margins of U.S. importers would tumble because they would now have to pay an import tax but would not benefit from lower import prices. Meanwhile, the margins of U.S. exporters would soar as export prices stayed firm and they received a subsidy from the government. The result would be less imports and more exports, and hence, an improved trade balance. This would raise U.S. aggregate demand and put upward pressure on inflation and Treasury yields. Considering that 97% of U.S. exports and 93% of U.S. imports are denominated in dollars, such an outcome is hardly far-fetched. The bottom line is that in the "real world," the introduction of a border adjustment tax would cause Treasurys to sell off and the dollar to rally. Q: What sort of numbers are we talking about? A: Assuming a 20% border tax is introduced, a reasonable guess is that the trade-weighted dollar would rise by 10% over a 12-month period above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. This would imply 15% upside from current levels. The 10-year Treasury yield would probably rise to about 3%. Q: It still puzzles me how you can claim that bond yields will rise if the dollar strengthens. Wouldn't a stronger dollar normally lead to lower bond yields? A: Your premise is wrong. It is not the stronger dollar that leads to higher bond yields. It is a third factor - namely the improvement in the trade balance arising from the decision to tax imports and subsidize exports - that causes both the dollar and bond yields to rise. This is similar to what happens when the government loosens fiscal policy. Mind you, at some point the positive correlation between the dollar and bond yields could break down. If the dollar rises too much, emerging markets will crumble under the stress. This will trigger safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, leading to a stronger dollar and lower yields. Such an outcome is not our base case, but it cannot be dismissed. Q: Got it. Presuming that the global economy holds up, it sounds like a border tax would be great news for Boeing, but bad news for Walmart? A: Yes, but there are two important qualifications to consider. First, it is possible that the dollar overshoots its new long-term equilibrium level, so that the pain to Boeing from the appreciation of the greenback ends up outweighing the benefits from the export subsidy it receives. Second, given the potential economic and financial dislocations from the shift to a destination-based tax system, there is likely to be some delay between when the tax bill is signed into law and when it is implemented. And even once implementation begins, the adjustment in tax rates may be phased in only gradually. Since the dollar will rise in anticipation of all this, it is possible that exporters will actually suffer initially, while importers receive a temporary boost to profits. Nevertheless, we think that investors will see through the near-term hit to exporter margins and focus on the medium-term gains. As such, equity investors should maintain a preference for exporting companies over those that heavily rely on imports (Chart 1). Q: This assumes that the market has not fully priced in this outcome already. What are the chances that this border adjustment tax proposal actually sees the light of day? A: The border tax idea originated in the House of Representatives and has its strongest support there. There might be more opposition in the Senate, but this could be overcome if enough Democrats with protectionist leanings can be found. President Trump panned the idea in an interview with the Wall Street Journal earlier this week.2 He noted that "Anytime I hear about border adjustment, I don't love it... because usually it means we're going to get adjusted into a bad deal. That's what happens." Trump's comments suggest he may not fully understand how border adjustments work. This implies that he might be persuaded to go along with the idea if Republican legislators are able to reach a "great deal" on adjustments in his eyes, whatever that means. Subjectively, we would assign 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. This might entail excluding certain types of imports from a border tax if they are consumed disproportionately by the poor or represent an important input for U.S. manufacturing firms. Apparel and energy products would probably be on that list. It might also entail reducing the border adjustment tax to a lower level, say 10%, as Tom Barrack, head of Donald Trump's inaugural committee, has suggested. It is hard to know how much of this is already reflected in asset prices. The dollar fell after the WSJ article was published, but that may have had less to do with border adjustments and more to do with Trump's comment that he prefers a weaker dollar - an unprecedented statement for a U.S. president. Goldman Sachs' securities group has constructed two baskets using firm-level data, one comprised of "destination tax winners" and the other of "destination tax losers."3 The loser basket actually outperformed in the immediate aftermath of the election. While the relative performance of the winner basket has recovered more recently, it still remains below where it was last April (Chart 2). The limited reaction to the prospect of a border adjustment tax has been echoed in the fact that market expectations of the future volatility of the dollar has not changed much since the election, despite the possibility that the coming legislative debate could lead to wild swings in the greenback (Chart 3). Chart 3Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated On balance, we conclude that investors are understating the likelihood of even a watered down border adjustment tax being introduced as part of a comprehensive tax reform program. This is broadly consistent with our client discussions, which have revealed that most investors - with a few notable exceptions - are only vaguely aware of the issue. Q: Won't the WTO rule against a border adjustment tax? That could explain why investors are discounting it. A: Yes, it probably will. The WTO permits border adjustments in the case of "indirect" taxes such VATs, but not in the case of direct taxes such as income or corporate profit taxes. Granted, the U.S. has brushed off WTO decisions in the past, such as when it ignored the trade body's ruling that U.S. laws restricting internet gambling contravened the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Considering that Donald Trump threatened to pull the U.S. out of the WTO during the election campaign, such an outcome cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the border tax issue, even the Trump administration is likely to think twice about running afoul of WTO rules. Nevertheless, it might be possible to modify the border adjustment proposal to make it WTO-compliant. The distinction between direct and indirect taxes is one of those things self-styled experts like to pretend is important, but is not. It does not really matter whether a tax is levied on the sale of a good or service, or whether it is levied on income. In the end, someone has to pay the tax - be it a worker or a shareholder. The adoption by the U.S. of a border-adjusted destination tax would move the global economy in the direction of greater harmonization, not away from it. As noted at the outset, most other countries border adjust their value-added taxes. They do this so that their VATs mirror a consumption tax, as Table 2 illustrates with a simple example. Conceptually, a corporate cash flow tax coupled with a payroll tax functions in much the same way as a VAT (bottom part of Table 2). The U.S. already has both a corporate income and a payroll tax, so it is not that far away from having a VAT. All that is missing is a few tweaks to depreciation rules and the addition of the border adjustment. Yes, the dollar would strengthen if that were to happen, but this would put the greenback on par with other currencies. Chart 4 shows that the U.S. has run a trade deficit with the rest of the G7 since 1990, despite the fact that the dollar has traded on average 9% below its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over this period. One of the reasons this has occurred is that other G7 economies have a VAT, whereas the U.S. does not (Chart 5). This has kept the dollar weaker than it otherwise would have been. Chart 4The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason Q: Okay, let's wrap this up. What are the main investment implications I should take away from this? A: Our main takeaway is that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. adopts a destination-based tax system. This suggests that the risks to the dollar are to the upside, as are the risks to U.S. Treasury yields. Global investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. The implications for global equities are more nuanced. It may take some time for the dollar to adjust to the border tax. This, combined with the fact that import and export prices tend to be sticky in the short run, implies that the U.S. trade deficit will decline, boosting U.S. aggregate demand in the process. While that is potentially good news for U.S. corporate profits, the benefits will be curtailed by the fact that the U.S. economy is approaching full employment. This means that any further stimulus could simply result in higher real wages for workers without any offsetting increase in unit sales for U.S. companies. A shrinking U.S. trade deficit will diminish America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." This is problematic for export-dependent emerging markets. While a border adjustment may be justifiable on economic grounds, politically, it could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war. This could sour sentiment towards EM stocks. To make matters worse, a stronger dollar would harm emerging markets with high levels of dollar-denominated debt such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Chile, while also weighing on commodity prices. We recommend that investors underweight EM stocks relative to their DM counterparts. With these considerations in mind, we are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32% and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 U.S. external assets amount to 133% of GDP, while foreign liabilities stand at 175% of GDP. About 68% of U.S. external assets are denominated in foreign currency, compared with only 16% of external liabilities. Thus, the paper loss to the U.S. from a 25% appreciation in the dollar would be (175*0.16-133*0.68)*(1-1/1.25) = 12.5% of GDP. 2 Please see "Donald Trump Warns On House Republican Tax Plan," The Wall Street Journal, dated January 16, 2017, available at www.wsj.com. 3 The Bloomberg tickers for these baskets are GSCBDTW1 and GSCBDTL1. For more information, please see "US Daily: What Policy Changes Is The Equity Market Expecting?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research, dated January 11, 2017.

Special Report

Feature Which of the following activities requires more brainpower: beating a grandmaster at chess, or cleaning the table underneath the chessboard? The answer is cleaning the table. This explains why Artificial Intelligence (AI) can now trounce the best human chess player, but no AI can (yet) reliably pick up the chessboard and dust underneath it. The cognitive scientist Steven Pinker points out that the human mind can understand quantum physics, send a rocket to the moon and decode the genome, but reverse-engineering simple human movements involves a mind-boggling complexity. "The hard problems are easy and the easy problems are hard." AI researchers call this Moravec's Paradox:1 the counterintuitive result that much less computing power is required for advanced problem solving than for simple sensorimotor skills.2 Feature ChartCooks, Waitresses And Bartenders Is The Fastest Growing Employment Sector Pay Deflation For The Many... The hard problems that are easy for AI are those that require the application of complex algorithms and pattern recognition to large quantities of data - such as beating a grandmaster at chess. Or a job such as calculating a credit score or insurance premium, translating a report from English to Mandarin Chinese, or managing a stock portfolio. The easy problems that are hard for AI are those that require the replication of human movement in everyday tasks. Jobs such as cleaning, gardening, or cooking. Therefore: "As the new generation of intelligent devices appears, it will be the stock analysts who are in danger of being replaced by machines... (Cleaners), gardeners, and cooks are secure in their jobs for decades to come." For societies and economies, Moravec's Paradox generates a chilling deflationary headwind. Many of the jobs that AI will destroy - like credit scoring, language translation, or managing a stock portfolio - are regarded as skilled, and require years of advanced education and training. They have limited human competition, and are well-paid. Conversely, many of the jobs that AI cannot (yet) destroy - like cleaning, gardening or cooking - are relatively unskilled. They have unlimited human competition, and are low-paid. ...Pay Inflation For The Tiny Few As well as sensorimotor skills, humans still beat AI in three other fields: creativity, innovation, and complex communication. As Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee3 observe in The Second Machine Age: "Computers are still machines for generating answers, not posing interesting new questions... We've never seen a truly creative machine, or an entrepreneurial one, or an innovative one." Hence, these are the skills you should encourage your children to acquire as their defence against AI. Moreover, the leaders in these fields - the very best entrepreneurs, innovators and communicators as well as top sportsmen and musicians - now find themselves in a particularly strong position. This is because a second powerful dynamic is at play. As we showed in the first Special Report in this series The Superstar Economy,4 the internet allows the very best entrepreneurs, innovators and communicators to sell their services to an effectively unlimited audience. And social media, as a large-scale validation system, reinforces the winner-takes-all dynamic. Therefore, as the proliferation and power of the internet and social media have increased dramatically, so too have both the earnings growth rate and the longevity of the superstars - exaggerating the skew in the Pareto distribution of incomes. Simply put, the superstars in sensorimotor skills, creativity, innovation, and complex communication will continue to see very strong pay inflation (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The Cost Of Living Extremely Well Continues To Rise Unabated The Hollowing Out Of The Middle Class Sadly, only a tiny fraction of the population can become superstars. As AI takes over mid-skill knowledge work, the vast majority of displaced workers start going after jobs lower on the skills and wage ladder. As these jobs also have lower security, this keeps a lid on credit growth, because without income security, households are less willing to borrow and banks are less willing to lend. The result is that the on-going Second Machine Age - the ushering in of Artificial Intelligence - is hollowing out the middle class. Contrast this with the First Machine Age - the ushering in of 'Artificial Strength'. The steam engine replaced muscle power, both human and animal. Thereby, it destroyed mostly low-skill work and effectively created the middle class. But does the evidence support the narrative for the Second Machine Age? The answer is yes. The changing sectoral profile of the jobs market through 1997-2017 is almost identical to the changing profile of output, as captured by GVA.5 Which means that job destruction and creation has kept relative productivity between sectors broadly unchanged through the past 20 years (Tables I-1-I-5). In other words, human jobs have disappeared where AI can do them better. And they have gone to where AI cannot do them better, because the jobs involve some degree of sensorimotor or communication skill. Table I-1U.K. Jobs Have Gone To Where Machines Cannot (Yet) Beat Humans Table I-2The U.K. Value Added Profile Is Similar To The Jobs Profile Table I-3U.S. Jobs Have Gone... Table I-4...To Where Machines Cannot (Yet) Beat Humans Table I-5The U.S. Value Added Profile Is Similar To The Jobs Profile U.S. data provides fascinating sub-sector detail. The employment sub-sectors that have grown the most are relatively low-income but which require sensorimotor skills: Food Services and Drinking Places - cooks, waitresses and bartenders - and Social Services, followed by communication-dependent Education Services (Feature Chart). And now comes the bombshell. A separate study by Ball State University carried out an attribution analysis of the 6 million U.S. manufacturing destroyed through 2000-20106 (Table I-6). The study's salutary conclusion was that only 13% of the job losses resulted from trade, and almost 90% resulted from productivity improvements - in other words, because AI can do the jobs better than humans. Table I-6Only 13% Of Manufacturing Job Losses Are Due To Trade It follows that short of reversing the advance of technology, no amount of "Take Back Control", "Build A Wall" or "Make America Great Again" can change the powerful wind of change in the employment market. The Implications Of The Superstar Economy In terms of implications for policymakers and investors, all of the conclusions in the original Special Report The Superstar Economy remain valid, so we will reiterate them. Bear in mind that we originally wrote these on March 24, 2016. Several of the predictions have already proved eerily prescient. Headline and aggregate-economy statistics such as GDP and income are no longer representative statistics for the living standards of the vast majority of the population. Therefore, politicians will need to pay close attention to the underlying distribution of these statistics. But as many politicians seem blissfully unaware of the extreme skews in the Pareto distribution, we can expect a higher frequency of shocks at the ballot box. If economic growth is mostly happening at the top-end of the Pareto distribution, the vast majority of incomes will be stagnating or declining.7 So we can expect structurally weak private sector credit growth. Lacking rampant house price inflation or confidence in income growth, households and firms will be unwilling to borrow, and banks will be unwilling to lend. Hence, the opportunities to own bank equities will be limited to short-term tactical timeframes. If economic growth is mostly happening at the top-end of the Pareto distribution, and credit growth is weak, we can expect a continued absence of generalised price inflation. Monetary policymakers need to immediately discard discredited concepts such as the Phillips curve relationship between headline growth, unemployment and the inflation rate. But as many of these conventionally-trained economists will find it difficult to change their thinking, we can expect a higher frequency of policy errors. Interest rates and bond yields will remain structurally depressed. Bond yields will move cyclically, but there will be no persistent uptrend. A long sequence of rate hikes anywhere will be unsustainable. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Named after the roboticist Hans Moravec 2 Evolutionary biology provides a good explanation for Moravec's Paradox. The part of the brain - the cerebellum - that is responsible for sensorimotor skills has experienced much more evolution and development compared with the part of the brain - the neocortex - that is responsible for problem-solving. It follows that AI requires exponentially greater computational resources to replicate even low-level sensorimotor skills than it does to replicate problem-solving. 3 Andrew McAfee spoke at our 2015 New York Conference. 4 Published on March 24, 2016 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 5 Gross Value Added 6 The Myth and the Reality of Manufacturing in America by Michael J. Hicks and Srikant Devaraj, June 2015 Ball State University Center for Business and Economic Research. 7 Please also see Chart 10 in the Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Low Rates Forever", dated March 4, 2016 available at gis.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Deflation has decisively ended, and the economy is making a gradual transition towards inflation. The upshot is that growth is reviving rapidly in nominal terms. It is unrealistic to expect exports to be a main growth driver for the Chinese economy in the post-crisis world - even without protectionist pressures from President-elect Trump. The "Trump" wildcard serves as a wake-up call for Chinese policymakers to further focus on supporting domestic demand. There is a strengthening case for cyclical improvement in manufacturing investment. This further limits downside risk and sets the stage for potential positive surprises in the coming months. Feature Investors will be paying close attention to President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration speech this coming Friday, which may allow for a clearer understanding of his world view and economic policies, as well as their global implications. The inauguration will overshadow China's key economic statistics to be released later this week, and which we expect to show that the Chinese economy has picked up sequentially. As political uncertainty will stay elevated and deserves close monitoring going forward, it is equally important to keep in mind the economic big picture. In the next two months, China's economic data will once again be heavily distorted by the Chinese New Year holiday, making it more difficult to detect genuine growth trends. In last week's report, we laid out our view on China's growth and policy outlook for 2017.1 This week, we offer a reality check and our take on some key cyclical issues. Watch For Inflation Surprises The biggest change in China's macro condition in the past year, in our view, has been the sharp turnaround in producer prices. Rising PPI has lifted corporate pricing power, reduced real interest rates and eased financial stress in some heavy industries, the weakest link in the corporate sector - all of which are important reasons behind China's growth improvement of late. Looking forward, we expect inflation will remain well behaved. Improving producer prices is to a large extent attributable to RMB depreciation, which has already begun to crest. The trade-weighted RMB's depreciation has halted, and it is unrealistic to expect it to continue to depreciate at an ever-accelerating pace (Chart 1). This should cap the upside of PPI inflation. The headline consumer price index (CPI), the broader inflation measure, was fairly stable throughout last year's roller coaster ride in PPI (Chart 2). Moreover, the fluctuation in headline CPI was mainly attributable to food prices, which have been noisy due to seasonal factors and unexpected supply-demand disruptions, but have been largely trendless in recent years. There is no case for a food-induced inflation outbreak. Chart 1PPI Inflation Is Peaking Chart 2No Case For Food Inflation More fundamentally, although the Chinese economy has strengthened, it is still operating below potential. Historically, runaway inflation has always occurred when the economy overheated, which is far from the current situation (Chart 3). Without a strong growth rebound, it is difficult to expect genuine inflationary pressures. In short, the current environment is best characterized as "easing deflation" rather than "rising inflation," and our base case remains that inflationary pressures will stay at bay. Nonetheless, it is important to note that strong deflationary pressures have prevailed since the global financial crisis, which has led to major adjustments in the world economy. In China's case, for example, capital spending has slowed sharply. Meanwhile, cutting excess capacity has been an explicit policy priority, which, together with strengthening demand may lead to a quick rise in prices. Last year's sharp rebound in steel, thermal coal and some other raw materials prices provided clear evidence of this. Indeed, several factors warn against being overly complacent about the inflation outlook. For producers, the improvement in pricing power appears rather broad based, as both industrial firms and the service sector have been reporting rising levels in their respective output prices. In other words, rising prices are not just contained in resource sectors associated with global commodities prices and Chinese capacity cuts. For consumers, inflation expectations have begun to rise (Chart 4). Consumers' inflation expectations may be just a response to changes in prices rather than a leading indicator for future price moves. However, there has been a significant pickup in confidence on future income growth, which is likely a reflection of a tighter labor market and rising wages. If this trend holds, it would make it a lot easier for producers to pass through rising input costs to end users. Chart 3Inflation Vs Economic Overheating Chart 4Inflation Expectations Are On The Rise Overall, it is premature to worry about an inflation outbreak, and we do not consider inflation as a major policy constraint for the People's Bank of China. However, it appears that deflation has decisively ended, and the economy is making a gradual transition towards inflation. The upshot is that growth is reviving rapidly in nominal terms, supercharged by both improvement in real activity and a rising GDP deflator. Nominal GDP may reclaim a double-digit annual pace in the coming quarters. Exports: Why Has The Historical Correlation Broken Down? China's latest export numbers continued to disappoint, falling by 6.1% in dollar terms from a year ago. Part of the decline is due to falling prices measured in dollar terms; exports in volume terms are considerably stronger. Nonetheless, the export sector has been a chronic underperformer in the Chinese economy in recent years. Historically, China's export sector performance was highly predictable based on some key domestic and global variables - this correlation has clearly broken down since 2015 (Chart 5). If the historical correlation still held, export growth should have rebounded sharply. Many have viewed the divergence as a sign that Chinese exporters have lost competitiveness, which does not seem credible, as Chinese exports have continued to gain global market share. In our view, the chronic disappointment of the Chinese export sector's performance is due to several factors. First, the global financial crisis was a watershed event that marked structural breaks in economic correlations. Since then, consumers in the developed world have been focusing on deleveraging and fixing their balance sheets, and therefore the growth recovery has not led to a corresponding increase in demand - and imports for - consumer goods. Second, protectionist pressures have been on the rise since the global financial crisis, as all countries have tried to protect domestic producers in the face of weak final demand. Anti-dumping measures initiated by World Trade Organization member countries have increased notably in recent years, a growing share of which have been targeted at Chinese exporters (Chart 6). The high profile anti-dumping measures adopted by the Obama administration against Chinese tire and steel products have caused significant damage to Chinese producers and exporters.2 Chart 5Exports Have Disappointed Chart 6Protectionism Is Already On The Rise Finally, Chinese export numbers have been distorted by disguised capital flows driven by speculation on the RMB exchange rate. The sharp swings in Chinese exports to Hong Kong since the global financial crisis can be viewed as proxy for shifting expectations on the yuan (Chart 7). Immediately after the global financial crisis, the RMB was widely expected to rise against the dollar, leading to a massive surge in Chinese sales to Hong Kong as exporters overstated export revenues to bring more foreign currencies onshore. The tide completely reversed in early 2014 when the RMB began to drop against the greenback. Exporters may have been underreporting overseas sales so they could park part of their foreign revenues offshore in anticipation of a weaker RMB, weighing on overall export sector performance. Whatever the reason, the important point here is that it is unrealistic to expect exports to be a main growth driver for the Chinese economy in the post-crisis world - even without protectionist pressures from President-elect Trump. In recent years the Chinese authorities systematically overestimated the vigor of global demand, and export sector performance almost always lagged the government's annual targets, which contributed to chronic growth disappointments. In this regard, the "Trump" wildcard serves as a wake-up call for Chinese policymakers to further focus on supporting domestic demand. Has Investment Bottomed? With exports chronically disappointing, domestic capital spending holds the key for economic growth. Policy driven investment on infrastructure construction has held up strongly since 2013, while private sector investment mainly in the mining and manufacturing sectors has downshifted sharply. Looking forward, infrastructure spending will likely remain buoyant, supported by both public budgetary sources and public-private-partnerships (PPPs).3 What's changing is that capital spending in the manufacturing sector may have bottomed from a cyclical point of view. Inventory destocking in the manufacturing sector has become very advanced. Improving new orders and rising producer prices should lead to a restocking cycle. There has been a notable improvement in corporate sector profitability and confidence of late, which has historically led capital spending in the manufacturing sector (Chart 8). Consistently, the latest credit numbers show a significant pickup in medium- and long-term loans by the corporate sector, which are typically used to finance investment spending rather than replenish working capital. Chart 7Hong Kong Trade And The RMB Chart 8Manufacturing Capex Has Bottomed The long-term outlook for Chinese private capital spending hinges critically on structural reforms on many fronts. As far as the corporate sector is concerned, it is widely recognized that China's overall tax burden is not high by global standards, but is primarily shouldered by the corporate sector rather than households, and a rebalancing is long overdue. The government under incumbent Premier Li Keqiang has been focusing on reducing administrative red tape and mandatary employee benefits provided by employers as ways to cut corporate sector costs. If the Chinese authorities can implement reforms despite the populist resistance to shifting some of the tax burden from the corporate sector to households, it could further boost corporate profitability and revive animal spirits among Chinese entrepreneurs, leading to another round of investment boom. Any tax reform measures in this direction should be viewed as a major positive development. For now, we see a strengthening case for cyclical improvement in manufacturing investment, after decelerating for over six years. The current sub-par "new normal" growth trajectory rules out a sharp revival in capex, but the marginal change in "second derivatives" is still important as it diminishes a chronic growth headwind. This further limits downside risk and sets the stage for potential positive surprises in the coming months. Stay tuned. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1, 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China-U.S. Trade Relations: The Big Picture," dated November 17, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Trump's protectionism supercharges our theme of Sino-American tensions. China is at a stark disadvantage to the U.S. in a trade war. China cannot give concessions easily; it may batten down the hatches. Remain short RMB; but go long "One China," i.e. mainland stocks versus Taiwan/Hong Kong. Feature "Life's short span forbids us to enter on far reaching hopes." - Horace, Odes "Of course, you know, this means war." - Bugs Bunny, Looney Tunes President-elect Trump has said he will not designate China a "currency manipulator" on the first day of his presidency, contrary to what he promised during the campaign. Is this a sign that Trump is "normalizing" after the wild threats of his campaign? What are the real risks of a U.S.-China "trade war"? How should investors prepare? Trade War Is More Likely Than You Think BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has long cautioned investors that geopolitical tensions in East Asia were severely underestimated by the market.1 In 2013, we argued that a Sino-American military conflict was more likely than most of our clients dared to think.2 And over the past several years, in one-on-one conversations and in presentations at numerous conferences, we have stressed that tensions in East Asia could imperil the largest trade relationship. Why so alarmist? We have always based our analysis on three key pillars: Multipolarity: With the U.S. in a relative decline, containing China's rise has become a national security issue. The U.S. "Grand Strategy" operates under the imperative that no regional power is allowed to become a regional hegemon, as that would be a stepping stone to global competition. "Pivot" To Asia: The U.S. geopolitical deleveraging from the Middle East was from the start designed to free up more U.S. resources for Asia. While the Obama Administration pursued the pivot cautiously, it was putting the infrastructure in place for a confrontation with China. Regional dynamics: China is surrounded by neighbors that are cautious about Beijing's intentions for geographic, historical, and strategic reasons. They have therefore sought to balance their increasing economic addiction to China with deeper military and political links to the U.S. Chart 1China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Trump's victory has made markets considerably less oblivious to the risks we have stressed to clients for the past five years. The idea that a trade war might erupt is now widely discussed. And Trump's repeated statements about Taiwan, North Korea, and the South China Sea have awoken some investors to the reality that a trade conflict could spill over into strategic areas, and vice versa. Nevertheless, judging by the ebullient market reaction relative to previous U.S. presidential transitions, most investors think that cool heads will inevitably prevail. They may be right, but from where we sit it is premature - and imprudent - to bet on it. Make no mistake, China, not NAFTA, will suffer the brunt of Trump's efforts to fulfill his protectionist campaign promises (Chart 1). We see 70% odds that a "crisis event" will affect U.S.-China trade patterns in a significant way over the next four years. How Did We Get Here? The Global Financial Crisis caused a sharp break in Sino-American relations: It interrupted the economic symbiosis between China and American households refused to keep re-leveraging, forcing China to become more internally driven economy (Chart 2). With final demand in the U.S. declining, China decided to re-leverage with credit, injecting its existing overproduction and overcapacity with steroids. But this only accelerated China's capture of global export market share, while supercharging the deflationary global effects (Chart 3). On top of its credit policies, China has struggled to internationalize the RMB. So now, it is not only still washing the world with its industrial overcapacity but also inadvertently - or not so innocently - reducing the prices of its goods with the weakening of its currency (Chart 4). Chart 2U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died Chart 3China's Historic Export Grab Chart 4China Still Exporting Deflation U.S.-China trade disputes have a long history. China's WTO entrance was agreed only with the stipulation that China be treated as a "non-market economy" for 15 years. Punitive trade bills almost passed through Congress in 2005 and 2010-11, for instance, but were held back at the last minute.3 Since 2009, in particular, protectionist policies have emerged. President Obama began his term with an unprecedented use of the authority under Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act to punish China for "market distorting" exports of car tires, and with protectionist "Buy America" provisions in his economic stimulus package. After that, a sequence of tit-for-tat punitive measures took place affecting a range of goods on both sides, attempted Chinese investments in the U.S., and American companies operating in China. China's meteoric rise, surging trade surpluses with the U.S., and the rapid loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs was the main cause of tension (Chart 5). Americans benefited from China's rise, namely from cheaper goods and lower interest rates, but it caused significant economic dislocations.4 Meanwhile Chinese protectionism discouraged American elites that had endorsed China's rise on the hopes of gradually unfolding market access. Amid the heightened political risks of the global recession and its aftermath, China intensified intellectual property theft, non-tariff barriers, indigenous innovation policies, and cyber-attacks.5 The saving grace, for markets, was that the aforementioned tensions always remained within bounds. The WTO was a mutually recognized adjudicator. Also, the rival American and Chinese commercial authorities played a slow, step-by-step, predictable game, with the punitive measures being mostly proportional. When pressures flared in the U.S., the executive branch stayed Congress's hand; meanwhile China's government could steamroll any internal opposition to its trade policies. No more. Hillary Clinton might have helped contain trade tensions, but the outlook has darkened irrespective of Trump. Notably, American multinational corporations have increasingly decried Chinese protectionism and lobbied for the U.S. government to help persuade China to give them greater market access and a better legal-regulatory climate (Chart 6). As the Obama administration exited the stage in December 2016, the U.S., Japan and others refused to accept China's "market economy" status despite the fifteen-year deadline coming due. This means the U.S. and its allies explicitly wanted to reserve the power to impose anti-dumping duties more easily on China, which is what "Non-Market Economy" status entails (Chart 7).6 China considers this delay an outright violation of U.S. commitments under WTO. Chart 5A Tale Of Two Manufacturers Chart 6American Business Under Pressure In China Chart 7China's Non-Market Status A Liability Further, Clinton had promised to create a special prosecutor for trade disputes and to triple the number of enforcement officers. More broadly, she wanted to continue Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy that had roiled U.S.-China strategic relations. Bottom Line: U.S.-China trade relations had already turned sour as a result of the divergence of interests following the Global Financial Crisis. China has emerged as a trade juggernaut and the U.S. corporate and political establishments have become far more anxious about it recently. Now Trump has supercharged the situation. Will Trump "Normalize" In Office? With Trump, the U.S. is likely to undergo a "regime change" in terms of how trade policy is conducted - the only question is how long-lasting it will be. U.S. presidents have very few constraints on trade and foreign policy (Table 1). Ignore Trump's statements and look at his team: Incoming Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, National Trade Council chief Peter Navarro, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.7 This group, especially Navarro, is stridently hawkish on China and appears ready to bring the full weight of the United States' economic and strategic advantages to the table in order to negotiate a new framework of relations. Table 1Trump Is Not Constrained On Trade Policy The model is the renegotiation of trade relations with an ascendant Japan in the 1980s. And China looks ripe for a crackdown by this yardstick. The penetration of Chinese exports meet or exceed Japan's position at its peak in the 1980s (Chart 8). Meanwhile the RMB has not appreciated nearly as much as the yen had done by this time (Chart 9). Ultimately the two resolved their differences because Japan acceded to major U.S. demands, strengthening its currency after the 1985 Plaza Accord and accelerating financial liberalization. It helped that the two were staunch allies without genuine security tensions (unlike the U.S. and China today). Chart 8China Has Gotten Away ##br##With More Than Japan Did Chart 9Reagan Forced Faster ##br##Appreciation On Japanese Yen From the Trump administration's point of view, the standard trade remedies have failed given that U.S. trade deficits have deteriorated all along. True, China has made considerable structural adjustments in recent years (Chart 10). But relative to the U.S., China has not really changed its ways. In fact, the current account surplus, which has collapsed from 10% to around 2% since 2008, is now roughly equal to the trade surplus with the United States (Chart 11). Chart 10China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way Chart 11China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable Therefore we do not put much stock in Trump's claim that he will not call China a currency manipulator on day one - this does not signal a "normalization" or softening of Trump's protectionist line. There was always a technical issue with this pledge that made the timing awkward.8 The manipulator charge will remain a Sword of Damocles hanging over China this year and next, but it is also only one tool in Trump's toolkit - and not the most intimidating one either (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Calling China A Currency Manipulator: The Process At a minimum, Trump could easily do what Obama did in February 2009 on tires - simply approve recommendations from his own Treasury Department for tariffs on specific goods. At a more aggressive level, he has the example of Richard Nixon before him. Nixon imposed a 10% surcharge on all dutiable goods in 1971. We would not put it beyond Trump to take arbitrary actions within the four-year term if international economic conflicts heat up dramatically. (We will be especially leery in the lead-up to the 2018 or 2020 elections if Trump's touted deal-making is not going his way.) Congress is not likely to prove a major constraint, at least not at first. Trump's election is a strong signal that the U.S. populace wants more protectionist policies. Congressional Republicans are limited, given the laws empowering the president on trade, and they will face the reality that his electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. Democrats, in these and other competitive states, have to perform verbal gymnastics to oppose Trump's positions on trade that substantially echo their own. And as mentioned, U.S. multinationals are not likely to "domesticate" Trump - rather, they will lobby for relative moderation or tactfulness within his general framework. Bottom Line: Trump is relatively unconstrained on trade policy. We expect his administration to begin with a "shot across the bow" in the first 100 days - a mostly but not entirely symbolic punitive measure against China - and then to seek high-level negotiations toward a framework for the administration's relations with China over the next four years. We expect the initial shot to rattle markets, then for a calming period to ensue, which will give a false sense of security. But given the lack of constraints on Trump, we are not optimistic. What Are China's Options? In a trade war with the U.S., China is outgunned on every front. Its economy is far more vulnerable to a disruption of exports to the U.S. than vice versa (Chart 12). It does not have ready alternatives to the U.S., given that U.S. imports of Chinese goods are roughly equal to Japanese, South Korean, German, Vietnamese and British imports combined. And China is most competitive in goods that the U.S. can easily source elsewhere (Chart 13). Chart 12The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War Chart 13The U.S. Can Find Substitutes For China Yes, China can disrupt the supply chain for the iPhone, but no, the Trump administration is not going to confuse Apple's interests with what it views as the "National Interest." Certainly China will favor non-American companies - Airbus over Boeing, etc - but the U.S. growth model is not reliant on exports, so it is not clear that the Trump administration will heed Boeing's cries about long-term competitiveness. The states most exposed to Chinese retaliation - Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Louisiana, and South Carolina - will not harm his electoral base. His Midwestern Rust Belt states could suffer, according to some research, but voters there may approve of his protectionist measures and Trump's other economic policies may blunt the short-term impact of Chinese retaliation.9 Looking at major Chinese export categories to the U.S., like textiles, electrical machinery, and equipment, suggests that 30 million Chinese jobs could be affected - perhaps ten times as many as the comparable U.S. jobs at risk from Chinese retaliation (far more than proportional given population). There is one factor that stands in China's favor. The history of trade wars says something different than the raw balance of trade. Like all wars, trade wars seek political ends, and a government's internal unity and resilience can be critical to its ability to bear out the worst.10 Politically, it is not clear that the U.S. has a better stomach for a full trade war than China: The U.S. remains divided - Polarization will worsen under Trump given his low approval ratings, low favorability, narrow popular victory margin, and controversial policy inclinations. Though China-bashing and economic patriotism can win some support, and we do not expect Congress or the corporate lobby to prevent Trump from launching a trade crusade if he wishes, nevertheless we see a fair chance that Trump would lose credibility and be forced to moderate his stance once negative trade consequences began to be felt at home. China is relatively unified - Xi has set himself up to be the "core" of power in the Communist Party in anticipation of worsening domestic conditions.11 It is worth remembering that the original use of the "core leader" moniker emerged in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown when the Western world imposed sanctions on a newly liberalized China and it was forced to retreat into its shell from 1989-1992 (Chart 14). China's leadership wants to make the country less dependent on the U.S., and more autarkic, but is having difficulty imposing austere changes on itself. Trump may hasten the reforms while giving Chinese leaders a convenient "foreign devil" to distract the populace from the pain of restructuring. Chart 14China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 The above should not suggest that China wants a trade war, however. Trump is threatening to kick the export leg out from under its growth model at a time when the other leg - investment - stands at risk from domestic credit excesses.12 But the recent case study of Russia and economic sanctions is instructive. President Vladimir Putin used sanctions to blame all of the economic ills that befell Russia on the West, even though the Kremlin was often at fault. That policy largely worked. Bottom Line: China stands to suffer the most economically in a trade war with the United States. Chinese policymakers may therefore choose to ride out the economic costs of a trade war while blaming the U.S. for the pain. But closing its economy today would derail global growth and cause a dramatic spike in geopolitical risk, unlike in 1989. Strategic Spillover Trump's approach is likely to increase geopolitical risk because he wants to use the strategic disagreements plaguing Sino-American relations as leverage to get concessions on trade. The three hot spots are: Taiwan - Tensions with Taiwan spiked when Trump revealed that his administration considers the "One China" policy to be up for negotiation. China has engaged in serious saber-rattling in response, both around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. By linking trade disputes with Taiwan, Trump likely made it harder for Xi to compromise on the former without looking weak on the latter. Trump's negotiating style may work in business, but will not work with China on Taiwan, which is a matter of sovereignty and a clear red line. North Korea - Trump has said North Korea will not manage to test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which it is preparing to do. He is threatening to hold China to account for not curbing the North's violations of UN resolutions on nuclear proliferation and missile development. This would likely mean an expansion of the practice adopted under Obama of sanctioning Chinese entities for dealing with North Korean partners. This situation would likely shake up markets that have normally been able to ignore North Korea. South China Sea - Trump has repeatedly signaled that China has militarized the South China Sea, and his incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that China be deprived of access, a policy that would trigger a shooting war if operationalized. Persistent tensions here are unlikely to go away anytime soon and could spark a diplomatic crisis or naval conflict (if not with the U.S. then with regional players like Vietnam). Thus Trump's administration is likely to make serious demands on China regarding its strategic situation and national security even while demanding an overhaul of trade policies that will force difficult economic reforms on China. Bottom Line: China's political strengths at home make it unlikely to compromise on Trump's major strategic demands. Contrary to adding leverage in trade negotiations - where the U.S. already has the upper hand - using these issues as negotiating tools is likely to cause China to fear for its security and thus become more defiant. Risks To The View The risk to this view would be that the U.S. and China manage to negotiate a new framework and actually improve relations, with the U.S. giving more respect to China's legitimate rights and regional initiatives in exchange for Chinese concessions. But is China capable of conceding significantly on Trump's major demands? RMB appreciation? No. Many commentators have pointed out that Trump's view of the RMB is outdated - the PBoC is now propping it up, not suppressing it. The driver of RMB weakness is China's excessive monetary and credit expansion, weakening productivity growth, domestic investors' desires to move capital out, corporate deleveraging, the need for stimulus, tightening Fed policy, and rising geopolitical risks. While it is possible that the PBoC will defend the RMB to the hilt, the near-term path of least resistance is down, and that sets China on a collision course with the Trump administration. Market access and dumping? Yes. Trump complains that China taxes U.S. imports unfairly and dumps goods into the American market, killing jobs. To appease the U.S., China could take concrete steps to remove non-tariff barriers and open wider investment avenues for U.S. businesses - it has recently suggested it might do so.13 Less likely, it could accelerate overcapacity cuts and reduce subsidies to state-owned enterprises. These moves would fit with its avowed reform goals and strengthen Chinese self-sufficiency in the long run, and Xi's administration likely has the power to do them. China could also improve intellectual property protections and declare a ceasefire on cyber-attacks on companies. All of this is possible, but clearly extremely difficult to achieve. Strategic concerns? Maybe. It is conceivable but unlikely that China could de-escalate matters in the South China Sea and agree to a "freedom of navigation" guarantee for the United States, which is not a party to the territorial disputes. A significant compromise on North Korea would be even less likely, since China is unwilling to move beyond the usual, ineffective management and impose real hardship on the regime for its violations of UN resolutions and improving nuclear and missile capabilities. One impetus for China to concede on these points is that it is fearful of creating instability in a politically sensitive year in which it will oversee a major five-year leadership rotation at its National Party Congress. Trump may deliberately threaten to disrupt the transition in order to extract concessions. Bottom Line: We operate on a constraint-based methodology: Trump has very few constraints on trade policy, China has major constraints on making these concessions, so there is no basis for assuming that the two countries will skip conflict and go directly to a new level of cooperation. Investment Recommendations We remain short the RMB. The currency has fallen by 5.62% since we initiated this trade. The trade itself has suffered a bit since the end of last year as a result of the PBoC's efforts to fight speculation. But monetary expansion sans productivity improvements continues apace in China, and we expect USD strength to persist, so we think there is room for the RMB to fall further. In the near term, however, the USD could experience further pullback as investors start pricing the negatives of the Trump administration. Therefore we are closing our long USD/EUR trade for a 4.55% gain. We remain somewhat positive on China relative to EM - because of the relative unity and centralization of its government and financial resources at its disposal - but we would not recommend investing in Chinese assets in the absolute due to the heightened internal and external risks outlined above. Hence we propose going long the "One China" policy, i.e. long Chinese mainland stocks versus Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chart 15). This enables us to play the fact that mainland valuations are depressed while the global trend of de-globalization and the conflicts within Greater China and with the U.S. are likely to increase uncertainties about Hong Kong and Taiwan. These two are particularly vulnerable to tighter regulations or sanctions from Beijing. Yan Wang, Senior Vice-President at BCA's China Investment Strategy, argues that while there is no case for a clear directional move in Chinese stocks - especially given the ongoing tightening of policies on the property sector - nevertheless they should be favored relative to global equities, given that growth is improving, fiscal policy will remain accommodative, and valuations are depressed (Chart 16).14 Meanwhile our negative outlook on China in absolute terms supports a globally negative outlook on cyclical equities relative to defensives. Cyclicals move with EM in general and China in particular. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President in charge of U.S. Equity Strategy, notes that EM performance does not warrant the sharp rise in U.S. cyclicals versus defensives, nor that in globally oriented versus domestically oriented stocks (Chart 17).15 This creates the opportunity for a tactical short. Chart 15Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chart 16China Trades With Cyclicals Chart 17Go Long The 'One China Policy' Finally, we caution investors about investing in companies with major exposure to China (Table 2). We would recommend that clients short a "China, Inc" Index of the top 20 S&P 500 stocks exposed to trade with China relative to the rest of S&P 500. The "China, Inc" stocks have been outperforming the market for a while (Chart 18). We fear that China may retaliate against some of these firms as the trade war with the U.S. heats up. Table 2'China, Inc.' May Suffer From Trade War Chart 18Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kurri, Research Analyst 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Imad Moosa, The U.S.-China Trade Dispute: Facts, Figures And Myths (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012). 4 For prominent research on this topic, please see David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning From Labor-Market Adjustment To Large Changes In Trade," Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016), pp. 205-40, available at www.annualreviews.org; Autor et al., "Foreign Competition And Domestic Innovation: Evidence From U.S. Patents," NBER Working Paper No. 22879, December 2016, available at www.nber.org. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Scholars have shown that countries granting China market economy status have subsequently initiated fewer antidumping cases against it. Please see Francisco Urdinez and Gilmar Masiero, "China And The WTO: Will The Market Economy Status Make Any Difference After 2016?" The Chinese Economy 48:2 (2015), pp. 155-172. Technically speaking, the difference in duty rates can be substantial between market and non-market economies; please see the U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S.-China Trade: Eliminating Nonmarket Economy Methodology Would Lower Antidumping Duties For Some Chinese Companies," GAO-06-231, January 2006, available at www.gao.gov. 7 Ross has criticized China more heavily since joining Trump; Navarro is the author of Death By China: Confronting The Dragon, A Global Call To Action (Pearson, 2011); together they criticized China in a paper for Trump's campaign, "Scoring The Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, & Energy Policy Impacts," dated September 29, 2016, available at assets.donaldjtrump.com. Lighthizer worked on Ronald Reagan's Treasury Department's team that engaged in the tough trade negotiations with Japan in the mid-1980s. 8 The existing statutory procedure, now enshrined in Title VII of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, involves the Treasury Department making semi-annual assessments and potentially initiating bilateral or multilateral negotiations. According to the more or less standard time frame since 1988, any charges of currency manipulation would occur in the April report at earliest, and more likely in the October report or thereafter. For Trump to have designated China a manipulator on day one, he would either have had to issue a simple statement of intent or an executive directive that bypassed the formal foreign exchange review process. 9 Please see Andy Kiersz, "Here's Every State's Biggest International Trading Partner," Business Insider, October 20, 2016, available at www.businessinsider.com. See also Marcus Noland et al, "Assessing Trade Agendas In The US Presidential Campaign," Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-6, dated September 2016, available at piie.com. 10 Serbia "defeated" the much larger Austria-Habsburg in their "Pig War" in the early 1900s, while Ireland won most of its key demands from England despite losing the "Economic War" of the 1930s. Russia's attempts over the past decade to bully Ukraine into submission have not succeeded in achieving Russia's political aims. In each of these cases, a far greater economic disparity existed than currently exists between the U.S. and China, and yet even then the weaker country's popular support, and the willingness of neighbors to exploit the new trade opportunities that opened up, enabled the weaker country to win the political clash of wills. 11 Please see "China: Xi Is A "Core" Leader... So What?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "China unveils new plan to further open economy to foreign investment," Reuters, January 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 14 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 High-Conviction Calls," dated January 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Global Growth: If global demand follows the recent improvements seen in economic sentiment, growth will surprise positively relatively to expectations in 2017. With global inflation also likely to continue drifting higher over the course of the year, the medium-term bearish implications for bonds are clear. Duration Technicals: Government bond markets remain technically stretched, as the bearish positioning from late 2016 is still intact. Combined with price momentum measures that have barely corrected from oversold extremes, yields are not quite ready to resume their ascent. It is too soon to reduce portfolio duration exposure to position for the higher yields that we expect this year. Canada: The Canadian economy has shown clear signs of improvement of late. This trend can continue in the first half of 2017, thus we are closing our short Canadian corporates/long Canadian provincial debt trade and entering a new position - shorting Canadian 10-year government bonds versus 10-year U.S. Treasuries. Feature Chart of the Week Post-Truth: relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief. - Oxford Dictionary Oxford voted that term, "post-truth", as the 2016 international word of the year. That is not a surprise, as the two dominant news stories of the past twelve months, Brexit and Trump, represented triumphs of hot emotional arguments over cold hard facts. Pessimists may argue that what we are currently seeing in the U.S. is a "post-truth" economic upturn, where confidence is soaring in expectation of the potential positive impact from Donald Trump's proposed pro-business agenda, but without a corresponding boost in actual growth. Financial markets appear to have already discounted a more rapid pace of growth, as evidenced by the surge in government bond yields in November/December and sharp outperformance of economically-sensitive asset classes like equities and high-yield (Chart of the Week). We do expect growth to deliver some upside surprises in 2017, putting additional upward pressure on government bond yields and downward pressure on credit spreads. In the meantime, however, markets need to consolidate the recent moves while the hard economic data catches up to booming sentiment. This leads us to maintain a cautious tactical investment stance, both towards duration exposure and credit allocations, while looking for more attractive levels to position for the improving global growth dynamic in 2017 by re-establishing below-benchmark duration positions and increasing corporate bond exposure. Real Growth Or Fake News? In our previous Weekly Report, we discussed how improving U.S. business confidence within the corporate sector could lead to a revival of capital spending after three years of decline.1 Not all of this is attributable to the "Trump effect", though. Global leading economic indicators were already starting to tick upward even before the U.S. election, while actual data in the major economies was surprising to the upside. This suggests that some pickup in global growth is likely in the next few quarters which would put additional upward pressure on the real component of government bond yields (Chart 2). Growth forecasts remain subdued, however, even with the recent bump in sentiment. The Bloomberg consensus expectation for real global GDP growth in 2017 is 3.2%. The International Monetary Fund is slightly more optimistic, projecting growth of 3.4% in 2017 but with only 2.3% growth in the U.S. (this is an updated forecast released yesterday, so after the U.S. election). Central bank growth forecasts at the country level are also relatively downbeat; for example, the Fed is expecting U.S. growth of only 2.1% in 2017 while the European Central Bank (ECB) is projecting Euro Area growth of 1.7%. Given the relatively high level of uncertainty over the potential effects of the incoming Trump administration's economic agenda, it is no surprise that professional forecasters are being cautious as they wait for the details to unfold. Yet while improving sentiment among consumers and businesses does not guarantee a faster pace of economic growth in the absence of rising household incomes and healthier corporate profits. However, greater confidence (i.e. "animal spirits") is often a prerequisite before a cyclical upturn can blossom, turning "post-truth" sentiment into a true recovery. Looking at the data among the major economic regions shows that, if the confidence indicators are to be believed, then global growth could deliver some upside surprises this year: United States: Consumer confidence is soaring, with the Conference Board measure reaching an 8-year high at the end of 2016. The December reading for U.S. National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) survey released last week showed a similar spike in confidence among U.S. small businesses, with capital expenditures, hiring plans and overall optimism returning to levels not seen since before the Great Recession (Chart 3). This is a similar move to the strong confidence data for corporate CEOs that we presented in last week's report. Chart 2A Cyclical Upturn In Growth & Yields Chart 3U.S. Economic Confidence Improving Euro Area: Euro Area sentiment measures, such as the European Commission confidence surveys or the widely-followed German IFO and ZEW indices, hooked upward at the end of 2016 (Chart 4). Both household and business confidence improved, underscoring how the current cyclical upturn in the Euro Area is broad-based. Japan: While Japan should not be expected to be a major contributor to overall global growth given its well-known structural economic impediments (contracting population, weak productivity, high government debt, etc), the most recent data does show a slight uptick in consumer confidence, business confidence and the Japan leading economic indicator (Chart 5). Chart 4A Solid Uptick In Euro Area Confidence Chart 5Japanese Sentiment Inching Higher Chart 6Upside Risks For Chinese Growth? China: Both consumer and business confidence have improved alongside the cyclical Chinese recovery seen in 2016, but this has not been enough to boost consensus forecasts for Chinese growth this year. Importantly, this creates the possibility of an upside growth surprise as both the OECD leading indicator for China and the proprietary GDP growth model from our colleagues at BCA China Investment Strategy are calling for faster growth in 2017 (Chart 6).2 A potential increase in trade or even military tensions between China and the U.S. is a potential risk to this sunny scenario but, given what we know now about the underlying economy, China looks poised to deliver another year of solid growth. The data does show that the improvement in economic sentiment goes beyond what is happening in the U.S. Some of that could be the spillover effect from greater optimism on the Trump-fueled U.S. economy to the rest of the world. The synchronized uptick in global leading economic indicators, however, suggests that there is more going on than a simple post-election hope that Trump can deliver faster U.S. growth. A genuine synchronized global upturn is underway, which is not "fake news" (which we expect will be the Oxford word of the year in 2017!) Bottom Line: If global demand follows the improvements seen in economic sentiment, growth will surprise positively relative to expectations. With global inflation also likely to continue drifting higher over the course of 2017, the bearish implications for bonds are clear. Bond Market Technicals Have Not Moved Much Normally, such a growing body of evidence pointing to improving global economic sentiment would be a bearish development for bond prices. Fixed income markets have already moved very rapidly, however, to discount a more optimistic outlook for growth. The rise in yields over the final two months of 2016 has left the major sovereign bond markets in a highly stretched position. This was one of the reasons we shifted our recommended duration stance from below-benchmark to neutral in early December.3 Looking at technical indicators such as the deviation of 10-year government bond yields from their 200-day moving averages, or momentum measures such as the 26-week total return for the sovereign bond indices, show that bonds remain deeply oversold in the main "G-4" markets: the U.S. (Chart 7), Germany (Chart 8), the U.K. (Chart 9) and Japan (Chart 10). Chart 7UST Technicals: Stretched Chart 8German Bund Technicals: Stretched Chart 9U.K. Gilt Technicals: Stretched Chart 10JGB Technicals: Stretched In the case of U.S. Treasuries, indicators of market positioning suggest that most traders have not unwound their bearish bets. The Commitment of Traders report shows that speculators currently have the largest net short position in Treasury futures in the history of the data. Meanwhile, the Market Vane index of Treasury sentiment has bounced slightly off the recent lows, but remains at generally downbeat levels (Chart 11) - and still above the levels that heralded prior peaks in yields in 2010, 2013 & 2015. Only the JPMorgan duration survey has shown a closing of net short positions for the more "active" trader base, but not for the overall set of bond investors. We will continue to monitor these positioning and momentum indicators in the weeks ahead to assess when the oversold market conditions have unwound enough to justify a shift back to a below-benchmark duration stance. For now, keep portfolio duration exposure at benchmark. Bottom Line: Government bond markets remain technically stretched, as the bearish positioning from late 2016 is still intact. Combined with price momentum measures that have barely corrected from oversold extremes, yields are not quite ready to resume their ascent. It is too soon to reduce portfolio duration exposure to position for the higher yields that we expect this year. Encouraging Signs From Canada Last October, this publication laid out a sobering view on the Canadian economy.4 Softening exports were a concern, especially in the non-commodity related sectors and even with a weaker Canadian dollar. Growth in corporate capital spending growth was still contracting, constrained by tight lending conditions. Moreover, household consumption appeared at risk, given the depressed labor force participation rate and low wage increases. This view led us to adopt: a neutral stance - but with a positive bias - on Canadian bonds versus global hedged benchmarks; a slightly more dovish view then the consensus on the next monetary policy move by the Bank of Canada (BoC), not discarding the possibility of a rate cut in 2017 and; a short position on Canadian corporates versus Canadian provincial government debt. Since then, however, the Canadian economic cycle has taken a positive turn. The euphoria surrounding Trump's economic plan for Canada's largest trading partner has definitely prompted some of the improvements. The enthusiasm towards possible pro-business American economic policies seems to have seeped into Canadian business owners' mindset as well (Chart 12). Chart 11UST Positioning Still Very Short Chart 12Trump Is Also Influencing Canada's Mood But there is more to it than that. First, employment data have firmed up. The net change in Canadian employment has been positive in each of the last five months, increasing on average by a robust 47.5k. The previously declining labor force participation rate has stabilized, posting a 65.8% reading in December versus the July low of 65.3%. Plus, more jobs have been created in the private sector versus the public sector and in more stable "regular" employment rather than self-employment (Chart 13). Second, the business sector's mood has brightened. According to the BoC's Winter Business Outlook Survey, sales expectations, investment plans and employment intentions are all recovering.5 More striking, firms' pricing power has jumped higher; prices of products and services sold are expected to increase substantially in the next twelve months (Chart 14, top panel). Better pricing power should help Canadian corporate profits, going forward. Chart 13Employment Firming up Chart 14A Business Cycle Reversal? Chart 15Exports Perking Up This, combined with better credit conditions, could potentially turn the Canadian economic cycle around. Real capital expenditure has been the big missing ingredient to a healthy economic expansion in the last few years. This is about to change as the BoC's Senior Loan Officer survey shows that Canadian bank lending conditions re-entered "easing" territory in Q4 2016 (Chart 14, bottom panel).6 Looser credit conditions usually lead to faster loan growth and stronger investment spending. Third, better sentiment globally, and especially in the U.S., has lifted demand for Canadian products, with growth for both commodity and non-commodity-related exports showing improvement in the last quarter of 2016. While higher commodity prices have certainly boosted commodity-related exports, improving U.S. consumer confidence suggests that Canadian goods exports numbers will perk up in the coming months (Chart 15). Fourth, Canadian housing prices could still grind higher for a while longer and a broad retrenchment in the construction sector might be avoided again in 2017. Granted, the backdrop remains quite risky given high prices and soaring household debt levels. According to the BoC, about 15% of high loan-to-income mortgages issued in 2016 would have been ineligible under the new regulatory framework for allowable mortgage lending.7 Hence, the construction sector will face some headwinds going forward as some new mortgage loans will be harder to come by, on the margin. However, it is not a given either that housing affordability (or lack thereof) has reached peak levels yet (Chart 16).8 Lately, the housing market has held up relatively well, despite the regulatory tightening measures put in place to reduce the systemic risks from overvalued Canadian real estate. New house prices grew at a 3% year-over-year rate in December - the fastest pace in four years - while housing starts have averaged 198k in the last twelve months, surpassing the levels seen during the previous three years. In sum, the Canadian economy has performed better than we previously expected. As such, we remain open to the idea that it could continue in that vein over at least the first half of 2017. That said, our optimism remains guarded. The health of the Canadian non-financial, non-energy corporate sector has been deteriorating over the last two years, limiting the potential for the kind of revival of animal spirits that we are seeing in the U.S. Plus, the cyclical data for Alberta - Canada's fourth most important province - remains moribund. A more robust expansion in that province would be necessary to solidify our conviction level towards the strength of the overall economy. Chart 16Not That Unaffordable Chart 17No Inflation On The Horizon Canada remains fragile; consumer indebtedness levels are elevated by international standards. Accordingly, this economy remains a hiccup away from disappointing in the event of an external shock. A global equity market correction, softer oil prices, a reversal in the latest Chinese reflationary push, a Trump geopolitical blunder and/or a move toward more trade protectionism in the U.S. (especially concerning NAFTA9) could negatively impact Canada at any moment - and in a much bigger fashion compared to most other developed economies. As such, the BoC will be prudent and probably stay on hold in 2017. Inflationary pressures are simply not strong enough to justify turning hawkish. Unemployment at 6.9% remains close to half a percentage point away from full employment levels.10 Our Canadian weekly earnings diffusion index is pointing to lower wage pressures, as well (Chart 17). The 30% probability of a rate hike by year-end currently discounted in the OIS market could easily be priced out if inflation remains subdued. Nonetheless, we have to acknowledge the improving backdrop in our portfolio recommendations: we are choosing to close our trade, shorting Canadian corporates versus Canadian provincial debt, at a loss of -53bps. The defensive characteristics of that trade, which also incurs negative carry, now appear less appealing, especially considering the global "risk on" environment currently in place. For now, we are maintaining our neutral stance on Canadian bonds in our global model portfolio, with Canada unlikely to see the same degree of upside inflation pressures that we expect in the other developed economies. However, we are opening a tactical trade, shorting Canadian government bonds versus U.S. Treasuries at the 10-year maturity. From a historical stand point, Canadian yields are very low compared to the U.S., offering an interesting entry point. In addition, the Canada-U.S. employment ratio and the price ratio of Brent oil to lumber - which have been broadly correlated to the Canada-U.S. spread over the years - are both hooking up, pointing to a wider Canada-U.S. spread and representing an interesting macro signal (Chart 18). U.S. inflation prospects add to this trade's attractiveness. Our colleagues at BCA U.S. Investment Strategy recently made a compelling case for U.S. inflation not being a major threat in 2017 after assessing the prospects for the main components of U.S. core PCE inflation (shelter, core goods and core services).11 Core PCE should converge on the Fed's target of 2% in the second half of 2017, but an inflation overshoot beyond that is not the base case (Chart 19). That could allow Canadian bonds yields to catch up to higher U.S. yields, especially if the oversold conditions in the U.S. Treasury market described earlier persist. Chart 18Go Short Canadian Bonds Versus U.S. Treasuries Chart 19Only A Mild Uptrend Is Likely In 2017 Bottom Line: The Canadian economy has shown clear signs of improvement of late. This trend can continue in the first half of 2017, thus we are closing our short Canadian corporates/long Canadian provincial debt trade and entering a new position - shorting Canadian 10-year government bonds versus 10-year U.S. Treasuries. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "4 Big Questions For Bond Markets In 2017", dated January 10, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard", dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Bond Vigilantes Take A Break For The Holidays", dated December 6, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Bond Bear Phase Continues", dated October 11, 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 5 http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2017/01/bos-winter-2016-17/ 6 http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/slos-winter2016.pdf 7 http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/12/fsr-december-2016/ 8 A description of the Bank of Canada Housing Affordability Index can be found at http://credit.bankofcanada.ca/financialindicators/hai 9 NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) is a treaty between Canada, the United States, and Mexico aimed at removing trade barriers and encouraging economic activity. 10 NAIRU stands at 6.5% 11 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation In 2017: An Idle Threat", dated January 9, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The uptrend in consumer confidence has the potential to be lasting, and therefore lead to an acceleration in real consumption over the next several quarters. In contrast, the rise in business optimism is thus far built on shakier fundamentals, and therefore vulnerable to disappointment - at least until corporate executives see signs of a pickup in consumer demand. Some of the cyclical tailwinds that have aligned for consumers are: very low essential spending burdens, rising incomes, a positive wealth effect, and improved credit scores. Several areas of the U.S. equity market are set to outperform on the back of this improved consumer profile. Feature Financial markets continue to be optimistic about a more fertile business backdrop under a Trump presidency. At current valuations, equities are likely to undergo a testing phase. Indeed, the equity market's reaction to President-elect's press conference last week - the first in months - may be an omen of what is in store should Trump disappoint relative to what appears like very high expectations for the early days of his Presidency. At first blush, it appears that the surge in sentiment among a broad range of economic agents was precipitated by just one factor: Donald Trump's victory in the presidential election. Measures of both business and consumer confidence all rose sharply after November 8th (Chart 1). An important question is how sustainable and how far-reaching is this new-found optimism? After all, a major missing ingredient in the recovery to date has been faith that the economic future would get better. Last year, over half of respondents to a Nielsen global confidence survey still believed the world was in recession. Our take is that the uptrend in consumer confidence has the potential to be lasting, and therefore lead to an acceleration in real consumption over the next several quarters. In contrast, the rise in business optimism is thus far built on shakier fundamentals, and therefore vulnerable to disappointment - at least until corporate executives see signs of a pickup in consumer demand. This view runs counter to the current popular narrative, where businesses - and therefore their stock prices - perform better once a new era of pro-business policies are ushered in. We have noted in past weekly reports that we believe the equity market has overshot and that policy is likely to under-deliver; it is a high bar to assume that the new American government will succeed in implementing a pro-business strategy of lower corporate taxes, increased infrastructure spending and a lighter regulatory burden, while simultaneously avoiding any negative shocks from trade reform and foreign policy blunders.1 Thus, we interpret the surge in business confidence, as reported in various surveys, to be exaggerated and prone to a pullback. On the flipside, a number of cyclical tailwinds have aligned for consumers. Although consumer sentiment surveys also spiked higher since November, this merely extends an already rising trend. Below, we outline the fundamental factors that support stronger consumption growth in the coming quarters. Cost Of Essentials Is Ultra-Low First, the cost of many essential items have declined throughout the recovery, particularly energy prices (Chart 2). The decline in energy prices since 2014 means that spending on energy as a percent of disposable income is near thirty year lows. Likewise, spending on food and interest payments as a share of income is also as low as it has been in thirty years. It is only the seemingly incessant climb in medical payments that keeps overall spending on essential items above 40% of disposable income. Still, at 41% of total disposable income, spending on essential items is far from burdensome relative to historical norms. Chart 1Confidence Surge: Some Trump, ##br##Some Fundamentals Chart 2Essential Spending Burden##br## Is Very Low Incomes Are Rising And Jobs Are Secure Much more importantly, the main driver of consumption trends, income, is on track to accelerate (Chart 3). Despite a moderation in payroll growth, overall income growth is likely to stay perky, now that wage growth is rising. Indeed, as we highlighted in a Special Report in November, the labor market has reached full employment, which is the necessary threshold for a broad-based acceleration in wages (Chart 4). Although there are structural factors that will mitigate rapid wage hikes, it is likely that mild upward pressure on wages will continue throughout 2017 (Chart 5). This is obviously good news because higher wages means that consumers will have the wherewithal to spend more. In addition to this, a tighter job market has boosted job security. Various measures of consumer confidence highlight that over the past year, consumers now have much greater confidence in long-term job prospects. This is important because when job security is high, the propensity to spend instead of save is much higher (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Income Properties Drives Spending##br## More Than Any Other Factor Chart 4(Part I) Full Employment Calls##br## For Gradually Higher Wages Chart 5Part (II) Full Employment Calls##br## For Gradually Higher Wages Although income is the primary driver of consumption, the trend can be enhanced by several factors, including consumer wealth, the ability of consumer to finance purchases and fiscal handouts. The Wealth Effect Will Remain A Tailwind The wealth effect is the change in spending that accompanies a change, or perceived change, in wealth. The combined wealth effect from real estate and financial markets has been positive for some time (Chart 6). Thus, it is not a new driver of consumer spending, but is nonetheless positive that wealth positions continue to improve. If our forecasts for financial markets and house prices pan out, i.e. that the bull market in stocks continues over time, that bonds experience only a mild bear market and that house price appreciation remains in the mid-single digits, then a positive wealth effect will continue to support consumption in 2017. Debt/Deleveraging Cycle Is Advanced One of the major headwinds to consumer spending since 2008 has been the long, dark shadow of deleveraging. But that process is now well-advanced for the consumer sector. Consumer debt levels as a percent of disposable income peaked in 2008 at over 120%, but are now back under 100%, i.e. at the level that existed prior to the housing bubble and bust. Indeed, the financial obligation ratio for households (both renters and homeowners) is lower today than at any time in the past thirty-five years (Chart 7). Of course, part of this is due to very low interest rates, but our Bank Credit Analyst will show in their February publication that even a 100 basis point rise in borrowing rates from current levels would not lift the interest payment burden to elevated levels by historical standards. Chart 6Wealth Effect Will Remain Positive Chart 7Credit Conditions Are Not Problematic Finally, access to credit remains favorable. In late 2016, lending standards for consumer loans tightened slightly in late 2016, but access to credit generally is not a constraint on spending. A second important point is the ability of those scarred from the housing bust to re-enter the credit market. By law, information about any credit payment delinquencies, including mortgage payment delinquencies, must be removed from an individual's credit record after seven years. Therefore, if no other delinquencies occurred, individuals who experienced a foreclosure see their credit scores recover in seven years and can once again become candidates for mortgage purchases and therefore homeownership. According to research by the Chicago Federal Reserve, since the peak of foreclosures occurred prior to 2011, the bulk of borrowers that foreclosed during the housing bubble and bust are now seeing their credit scores improve. By 2016, both prime and sub-prime borrowers who entered foreclosure between six and nine years earlier (in 2007-10) appear to have recovery rates that are converging with the historical rates of recovery among their predecessor cohorts: nearly 100% of sub-prime borrowers from 2007-2010 who foreclosed have re-attained their previous credit scores, while over 60% of prime borrowers from 2007-2010 re-attained theirs (Chart 8). This means that in large part, the massive drag on housing demand due to poor credit scores from the previous housing bust have been alleviated. Chart 8Share Of Home Mortgage Borrowers Who Recovered ##br##Pre-Delinquency Credit Score After Foreclosure Fiscal Help? President-elect Donald Trump has promised fiscal stimulus in the form of infrastructure spending, corporate tax cuts and personal income tax cuts. The latter could have a positive impact on consumption, although it would likely be small. According to the Tax Policy Centre, if enacted, the highest income taxpayers (0.1 percent of the population, or those with incomes over $3.7 million in 2016 dollars) would experience an average tax cut of nearly $1.1 million, over 14 percent of after tax income. Households in the middle fifth of the income distribution would receive an average tax cut of $ 1,010, or 1.8 percent of after -tax income, while the poorest fifth of households would see their taxes go down an average of $110 or 0.8 percent of their after-tax income.2 The bottom line is that fiscal policy, if Trump's plan is enacted, could be a small positive tailwind for consumption in 2017. Overall, there are increasing signs that the scar tissue from the Great Recession is finally fading and that the improvement in consumer confidence is sustainable. This, combined with better income prospects will give households the wherewithal to spend more freely and will push real GDP growth up to 2.5% or perhaps slightly stronger. Our past research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles only get underway once businesses see clear evidence that consumer final demand is on the upswing. Thus, perhaps a healthier capex cycle will get underway, and businesses will have a fundamental reason to be more upbeat about their prospects. But for now, it seems more likely that businesses are at risk of being disappointed with the speed and efficacy of federal policy changes. On this basis, favoring equity sectors geared to the consumer rather than capex still makes sense. Favor Consumer-Geared Equity Sectors An acceleration in consumer spending will benefit consumer-sensitive equity sectors and would also support our domestic-over-global equity tilt. In our December 5th report, we outlined the bullish prospects and compelling value on offer in the consumer discretionary sector. In addition, our sister publication, U.S. Equity Strategy service just published their annual high conviction equity list. Home improvement retail, and consumer finance stocks were top of the list of high conviction overweights: Home Improvement Retail (Chart 9): Enticing long-term housing prospects argue for looking through the recent rise in mortgage rates. And as highlighted above, consumers have only recently started re-levering, with banks more than willing to facilitate renewed appetite for mortgage debt. In addition, remodeling activity is booming and anecdotes of house flipping activity picking up steam are corroborating that the housing market is vibrant. Now that house prices have recently overtaken the 2006 all-time highs, the incentive to upgrade and remodel should accelerate. While the recent backup in bond yields has been a setback for housing affordability, the U.S. consumer is not priced out of the housing market. Yields are rising in tandem with job security and wages. Mortgage payments remain below the long-term average as a share of income and effective mortgage rates remain near generationally low levels. Consumer Finance (Chart 10): This group offers early-cyclical exposure and is levered to the rising interest rate environment and debt-financed consumer spending. Chart 9Home Improvement Retail Stocks Chart 10Consumer Finance Stocks Importantly, higher interest rates have boosted credit card interest rate spreads (the industry's equivalent net interest margin metric), underscoring that the next leg up in relative share prices will be earnings led. This group is well-placed to take advantage of the improving consumer trends discussed above. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Q&A: The Top Ten", dated November 21, 2016, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 2 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-donald-trumps-revised-tax-plan/full Appendix Monthly Asset Allocation Model Update Our Asset Allocation (AA) model provides an objective assessment of the outlook for relative returns across equities, Treasuries and cash. It combines valuation, cyclical, monetary and technical indicators. The model was constructed as a capital preservation tool, and has historically outperformed the benchmark in large part by avoiding major equity bear markets. Please note that our official cyclical asset allocation recommendations deviate at times from the model's recommendation. The model is just one input to our decision process. The model's recommended weightings for the major asset classes are unchanged: neutral equity exposure at 60% (benchmark 60%), slightly overweight Treasury allocation at 40% (benchmark 30%) and underweight cash at 0% (benchmark 10%). The diffusion index of the three components for The Equity Model remained neutral. The technical component retained its "buy" signal, with slightly more advancement in the breadth & trend indicators relative to the momentum indicator. The monetary component, which measures overall liquidity conditions, is still favorable for equities, albeit is moving into less bullish territory. However, on the cyclical front, the earnings-driven component still warrants caution. Even as real operating earnings have marginally improved, they remain at a significant distance from positive economic expectations. Earnings momentum is also sluggish, based on our earnings diffusion index. Our qualitative stance for the allocation of Treasuries in balanced portfolios is neutral (since November 7, 2016) in contrast to the slightly overweight recommendation from our quantitative model, unchanged from last month. Although the valuation and technical components of the bond model are still constructive, the cyclical component is significantly less bullish this month. Chart 11Portfolio Total Returns Chart 12Current Model Recommendations Note: The asset allocation model is not necessarily consistent with the weighting recommendations of the Cyclical Investment Stance. For further information, please see our Special Report "Presenting Our U.S. Asset Allocation Model", February 6, 2009.

Special Report

Highlights Argentina's structural reform story keeps getting better and the bull market in the nation's assets has further to go. Further interest rate cuts means a cyclical economic recovery is in the making. The South American nation will continue to attract, and retain, global capital. Stay with the long ARS / short BRL trade. Dedicated EM and FM investors should remain overweight Argentine equities, and stay with the long Argentina / short Brazil relative equity trade. Sovereign credit traders should stay overweight Argentine credit within EM credit portfolios. In addition, go overweight Argentine local currency government bonds versus the EM benchmark. A new trade: go long 7-year Argentine local currency government bonds, currency unhedged. Feature After taking a pause over the past few months, Argentine share prices have once again begun to climb (Chart 1), and rightfully so. Yet another round of reforms and needed policy adjustments by the all-star cabinet of President Mauricio Macri have been rolled out. In fact, the sheer volume and frequency of orthodox policy measures deployed so far has been so extensive that not a week has gone by when seemingly yet another price control has been lifted or incentive-distorting subsidy scrapped. This is also a sign of how many distortions were in place to begin with, but clearly the government's reform momentum remains in high gear. Chart 1The Bull Market In Argentine Equities Has More To Go With positive long-term reform, however, comes short-term pain, as we highlighted back in September.1 Unsurprisingly, Argentina's recession has been deep and prolonged. This is about to change. A strong disinflationary momentum is starting emerge, and will re-animate growth in the months to come as interest rates drop significantly. Ultimately, what matters for investors is the outlook for the economy's return on capital, and signs point towards a potentially multi-year and sustainable economic expansion in the making. The re-rating process has further to go. Stay long/overweight Argentine assets, including equities, sovereign and local credit, and the Argentine peso versus the Brazilian real. Full-Out Structural Transformation Continues 2017 has been kicked off with a full reform swing in Argentina, as the Macri administration has implemented another round of orthodox measures. Among them: Capital Markets Liberalization. Capital controls have been eliminated. The 120-day holding period for repatriating capital has been abolished. In addition, the central bank has done away the maximum monthly amount of foreign exchange purchases. Energy Reform. A major agreement with oil companies and oil unions has been announced regarding the nation's massive Vaca Muerta shale oil and gas basin. Competitiveness will be boosted via lower labor costs as unions have agreed to more flexible contracts and to limit benefits. In addition, firms have pledged to invest US$5 billion in 2017. Also, export taxes on crude oil and derivatives have been removed, and oil price subsidies will continue to be reduced. Telecom Reform. For the first time since 2001, the government is no longer intervening to block price increases, even for regulated services where tariffs had not increased since 2001. In addition, regulations in the telecommunications sector will be loosened in a bid to increase competition, boost investment and modernize the nation's internet service. On top of these recent reforms, the government is already beginning to implement an ambitious infrastructure plan while currently drafting a long-term strategy - its so-called 2020 Production Plan. The plan boasts eight main pillars, among them: developing and deepening local capital markets to attract more foreign investment; lowering the cost of capital for firms; working towards much needed tax reforms to lower the incredibly high tax burden on corporations; improving labor legislation; fostering innovation; increasing competition; reducing red tape; and boosting infrastructure. This continued supply-side reform push, coupled with a big pullback in the role of the state in the economy to crowd in investment, is exactly what this capital-starved economy needs (Chart 2). Startlingly, even among low savings/investment South American economies, at 14% of GDP, Argentina's capex-to-GDP is the lowest in the region, with Brazil now in a close second-to-last place (Chart 3). As a capex-boom materializes in Argentina, the potential upside for return-on-capital of such a mismanaged and underinvested economy is enormous. Chart 2Argentina: More Investment, Less Government? Chart 3Structural Reforms Will Improve Argentina's Abysmal Investment Rate A clear advantage is that the nation boasts an overall well-educated population, at least by South American standards. The country's tertiary educational enrollment rate, a quantity measure, currently stands at 80% - a high level both in absolute terms and relative to South American peers (Chart 4). And when looking at standardized test scores, a quality measure, Argentina stands close to the middle of the pack relative to other emerging market (EM) and frontier market (FM) economies, but near the top versus its Latin American peers (Chart 5). Overall, a supply-side reform bonanza, agile and orthodox policymaking and a relatively educated population means Argentina's overall return on capital and languishing labor productivity growth could experience a similar surge to the one seen during the 1990s (Chart 6). Chart 4Argentina Versus South America: ##br##Educational Attainment Chart 6Labor Productivity Is Set To Improve,##br##Significantly Bottom Line: Argentina's structural outlook is extremely positive. A Dollar Deluge... In Argentina? Argentina has been known much more for repelling capital (i.e. capital flight) than attracting it. However, its ongoing structural transformation means that foreign capital will continue to make its way back in. Attracting sufficient foreign capital is key to finance the Macri administration's ambitious capex-led growth plan. Yet at 15% of GDP, Argentina's domestic savings rate is low, also reflected by its current account deficit (Chart 7). Will the nation be able to attract sufficient capital to finance its current account deficit of 2.8% of GDP, or US$16 billion dollars? We believe so. If an economy offers a high return on capital, as is likely in Argentina at present for the reasons mentioned above, it will attract more than enough capital to finance its current account deficit - possibly even more than it requires. So far, this appears to be the case in Argentina. For instance: Portfolio inflows have gone vertical over the past year, reaching an astounding annualized level of US$29.1 billion dollars, a 20-year high (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 7Argentina's Domestic Savings Rate Is Low Chart 8Capital Will Likely Continue ##br##To Flood Into Argentina Moreover, cross-border M&A deals, a robust leading indicator for net FDI capital inflows, have surged (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 9Argentine Banks Are Flush With Dollars The first phase of a tax amnesty scheme that ran from May to last December has been a massive success. Roughly US$100 billion dollars' worth of assets were repatriated and/or declared, which generated ARS 108 billion, or 1.3% of GDP worth of tax revenues. The second round ends this March, and there may be much more to come. The Federal Reserve has suggested that due to decades of crises, Argentineans along with former Soviet countries have hoarded an enormous amount of (most likely undeclared) U.S. dollars.2 The result of repatriated or undeclared dollar financial assets as well as a boom in agricultural exports receipts, which followed from a more competitive currency and the elimination of almost all export taxes a year ago, has caused foreign currency deposits at commercial banks to soar to US$24 billion, or 20% of total deposits (Chart 9). Chart 10Argentina: Falling Foreign Lending Rates, ##br##Despite Rising U.S. LIBOR As foreign currency loans can only be made to exporters with revenue streams in U.S. dollars, the government has recently loosened regulations so that banks can use the equivalent of half the amount they lend out to exporters, currently US$9 billion in total, to underwrite dollar-denominated Treasury bonds. This means that at least US$4.5 billion worth of U.S. dollar sovereign debt will be able to be bought by local banks, something not possible since 2001. This will provide an additional source of demand for Argentine dollar-denominated debt in the event of any major global financial stress. Lastly, such an ample supply of foreign currency is being reflected in local dollar interest rates, which have been plummeting at a time when U.S. LIBOR rates have been rising fast (Chart 10). This will provide a cushion of cheaper U.S. financing for Argentine exporters as U.S. interest rates continue to rise.3 Importantly, the reason the Argentine peso has been relatively weak in the face of large capital inflows is largely due to the sizable pent-up demand for foreign capital (hard currency assets), following the removal of capital controls in place for so many years. Thus, it was natural there would be some sort of capital flight by households and firms. In addition, corporates that had been previously unable to repatriate profits abroad did so. However, we believe these were one-off's. Going forward the currency should stabilize and/or likely strengthen as the nation's robust macro policy framework boosts the country's return-on-capital, attracting further global capital. Bottom Line: Only a year ago Argentina was locked out of international debt markets and starved for foreign currency. Now, in the face of rising global interest rates, it is flush with foreign currency, with more on the way. A Disinflationary Boom Is On Its Way While the recession in Argentina will likely last a bit longer, there are already signs of an economic recovery in the making. Mainly: Not only has inflation begun to drop in earnest, but importantly inflation expectations are plunging (Chart 11). This is an incredibly significant development as inflation expectations tend to be "adaptive", meaning that they are set based on past experience rather than through some rational, forward-looking thought process. Therefore, such a dramatic fall in inflation expectations appears to be marking the end of Argentina's most recent battle with hyperinflation. Hoping to avoid a major policy mistake on its way toward implementing an inflation-targeting framework, the central bank has been relatively cautious. However, further rate cuts are on their way, which should re-ignite the credit cycle and boost economic activity (Chart 12 and 13). Chart 11Has Hyperinflation Finally Come To An End? Chart 12Much Lower Interest Rates Should Help Support Growth Chart 13Argentina's Credit Cycle Is About To Turn Up For their part, wages in real (inflation-adjusted) terms will be slow to recover (Chart 14), as dislocations to the labor market caused by the Macri government's shock therapy will take time to work themselves out. This is bullish for corporate profit margins and return on capital. In turn, high potential profitability will incentivize local and international companies to ramp up their capital spending in Argentina. Notably, capital goods imports are already rising, a sign that investment is recovering (Chart 15, top panel). As Argentine firms faced foreign currency restrictions for years, an increase in imported capital is bound to go a long way toward boosting productivity. Chart 14Incomes Will Take Time To Recover From Shock Therapy Chart 15Early Signs Of A Recovery In Investment? In addition, rising apparent consumption of cement suggests that the collapse in construction activity is in late stages (Chart 15, bottom panel). Lastly, as to external accounts, chances are the pros and cons will mostly balance out (Chart 16). Chart 16External Accounts Will Not Be A Drag ##br##On Growth Argentina's agribusiness exports will be aided by a competitive currency, and the current investment boom taking place in the sector. However, the country's single largest trading partner, Brazil, which consumes 15% of all its exports and most of its manufactured exports, has so far failed to even recover. Thus, gains from commodities exports will be offset by weak exports to Brazil, which at least will help keep the trade and current account balances in check as import demand recovers. Bottom Line: Aided by structural tailwinds, a cyclical economic recovery is in the making. Politics And Fiscal Policy Exactly one year ago the key risks we highlighted to our bullish Argentine view centered around the ability of the Macri administration to navigate the turbulent waters of shock therapy successfully.4 Specifically, history has shown the failure of Argentine center-right leaders to effectively balance meaningful economic reform with labor relations. In addition, the Macri administration and its alliance – made up mainly of Macri’s Republican Proposal (PRO), the Civic Coalition ARI (CC), the Radical Civic Union (UCR) parties – did not have a majority in either house of Congress, making restoring fiscal discipline challenging, given the deep hole dug by the previous government. While closing the fiscal deficit of 5% of GDP has indeed proved quite difficult in the midst of a recession and full-out structural transformation of the economy, as we expected, Macri's team has brilliantly managed all other risks. Now, as growth is set to recover, the deficit will be lifted by higher tax revenues in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Chart 17Can Macri Walk On Water? Importantly, with US$19 billion, or 3.1% of GDP, in external debt service due this year (principal and interest), fixed-income markets have been jittery over the 2017 debt financing plan. However, the latest news is once again incredibly bullish for Argentine assets. Just last week the administration unveiled its 2017 debt plan and it has already secured an 18-month repo line with international banks worth US$6 billion. The country also plans on borrowing another US$4 billion from multilateral agencies, and will tap global capital markets with US$10 billion worth of sovereign paper. The government is front-loading the debt issues and tapping global capital before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office on January 20 to hedge against possible market turbulence. External debt service requirements will also drop off considerably after this year - making tapping debt markets now an equally prudent move. To be sure, this year's legislative elections, to be held in October, will be important to monitor, as the balance of power in Congress may speed up or slow down the government's ambitious reform agenda. At present, we do not expect any major change. As a result, Macri's reform efforts will likely continue, particularly if the economy continues to recover. Besides, Macri's team has already proved not only incredibly capable of negotiating with labor unions, but also with politicians of diverse stripes, as was the case during last December's tax reform. To conclude, we warned investors last January that Macri would not "walk on water" when it came to suddenly reining in the fiscal accounts and engineering economic shock therapy. To his and his administration's credit, however, a year on and it appears they have managed to tip-toe on razor-thin ice rather successfully and even maintain a high approval rating to boot (Chart 17). Bottom Line: Argentina's fiscal situation seems poised to improve considerably, which is very bullish for Argentine fixed-income assets. Investment Recommendations Chart 18Stay Overweight Argentine Sovereign ##br##Debt Versus The EM Credit Benchmark Stay long ARS / short BRL. The Argentine peso is not expensive and structural reforms and orthodox macroeconomic policies will likely attract more than enough FDI to fund the nation's balance of payments. And while FDI inflows have also been strong in Brazil, we believe these FDI inflows are set to decelerate,5 in contrast to accelerating inflows in Argentina. Sovereign credit traders should stay overweight Argentine credit within EM credit portfolios (Chart 18), as the growth recovery will greatly improve the nation's fiscal metrics. Fiscal revenues in real (inflation-adjusted) will grow helping contain the fiscal deficit, and the recovery in economic activity will bring down the public debt-to-GDP ratio which currently stands at 57% of GDP. In addition, now that capital controls have been completely lifted, local fixed-income instruments yielding a 1400-basis-point spread above duration-matched U.S. Treasurys are incredibly attractive. Overweight local currency government bonds as well. A new trade: go long 7-year Argentine local currency government bonds, currency unhedged, yielding 15%. Dedicated EM and FM investors should remain overweight Argentine equities via the local market or the more liquid ADR market versus their respective benchmarks, and stay with the long Argentina/short Brazil equity trade. The Argentine FM benchmark and local Merval index are energy heavy, with 20% and 33% of their total market cap, respectively, comprising of energy companies. As we believe energy plays will outperform other commodities plays, particularly industrial metals, Argentine equities will benefit.6 Meanwhile, bank stocks, which account for 38% and 15% of the FM and Merval markets, respectively, are poised to perform well. As there was no credit buildup, unlike in many EMs, the looming rise in non-performing loans (NPL) will not hit earnings much. Moreover, private commercial banks have shifted massively into government bonds since 2014. Public debt holdings have risen 4-fold since 2014, and banks will reap capital gains on these investments as local rates drop. As government bond holdings now stand at nearly 20% of commercial banks total assets, these earnings streams will compensate from a compression in net interest margins (NIM) as interest rates continue falling. As to valuations, although price-to-book values seem elevated, we believe that these valuations have been distorted by hyperinflation. The value of shareholder equity did not rise as much as stock prices and earnings rose with hyperinflation. Thus, we believe Argentine equities will continue to benefit from a genuine re-rating story, and valuations are much cheaper than may appear using conventional metrics. Santiago E. Gómez, Associate Vice President Santiagog@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy and Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Argentina: Short-Term Pain, Long-Term Gain," dated September 7, 2016, available at fms.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Judsun, Ruth (2012), "Crisis and Calm: Demand for U.S. Currency at Home and Abroad From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to 2011," International Finance Discussion Papers, no. 1058. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System November 2012. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options," dated January 11, 2017, available on at ems.bcaresarch.com 4 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Assessing Political And Financial Landscapes In Argentina, Venezuela And Brazil," dated January 6, 2016, available on at ems.bcaresarch.com 5 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Brazil: The Honeymoon Is Over," dated August 3, 2016, available at ems.bcaresarch.com 6 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "EM Got "Trumped," dated November 16, 2016, available at ems.bcaresarch.com

Special Report

Highlights The pound will suffer more in the near term as Brexit negotiations take center stage. However, this will create a buying opportunity as the pound is only getting cheaper. Moreover, the economic outlook is constructive and the BoE will be repriced. Set a limit-sell on EUR/GBP at 0.933. The U.S. border-tax proposal will not boost the dollar by an additional 25%. Feature This week, the British Supreme Court started sitting again, with Brexit its hottest case. As the ultimate ruling nears, the pound will once again move to the forefront of investors' minds. Political risks remain elevated in the near term, but the economic negatives from Brexit are well discounted. The long-term outlook for the pound is brightening. Politics Still In The Driver Seat Investors have been pinning their hopes on the likely Supreme Court decision to uphold the High Court judgment, and rule that an act of parliament is necessary to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Such a move, in the eyes of pundits and market participants, greatly increases the likelihood that the U.K. will move toward a "soft Brexit" rather than a "hard Brexit". The pound already discounts some of this as a positive: since October 12, cable is flat near its closing low of 1.21, despite a nearly 5% rally in the dollar index. However, the coming months are likely to prove tumultuous. The pound will fall victim to the upcoming opening of negotiations between the EU and the U.K. The U.K. policy-uncertainty index collapsed after surging in the wake of the Brexit victory, preventing the pound from plunging against a surging dollar (Chart I-1). Nonetheless, uncertainty is set to rise anew, as Parliament will vote in favor of triggering Article 50: The political environment at home remains ardently pro-Brexit (Chart I-2). Moreover, while the May government has suggested it is willing to contribute to the EU's budget to retain access to the common market, it remains adamant on setting limitations to the free movement of people. Chart I-1Economic Uncertainty Is Too Low Chart I-2No Bregret Additionally, the EU has a built-in incentive to show to the European Union electorate that leaving the union comes at a heavy cost. Thus, EU negotiators will be intransigent and harsh when setting up their opening gambit. Chart I-3Immigration: A Key Concern In The EU With the EU holding the stronger hand in the negotiations, the headline risks for the pound will be great. Even the survival of the so-called passporting of financial services - i.e., the unfettered ability to conduct business within the European Economic Area - is looking increasingly tenuous, with TheCityUK - the country's most important financial lobby - giving up on the issue altogether. This will require an even greater discount on the pound. However, we expect calmer heads to prevail and for the U.K. to retain at least some access to the common market, with some transitional agreements likely to be struck. The U.K. has a strong incentive to keep passporting alive. Meanwhile, controlling movements of people is becoming increasingly popular in the EU. Immigration is a growing concern, now only second to unemployment for the EU as a whole, and the No. 1 worry in Germany (Chart I-3). This suggests a deal on limiting the movement of people is probable. Thus, the pound is likely to sell off as the triggering of Article 50 nears. Once this hurdle is over, political risk premia will be fully adjusted and markets will be able to focus once again on the economic fundamentals. Bottom Line: The politics of Brexit will continue to weigh on the pound until the opening rounds of the Brexit negotiations between the U.K. and the EU begin. Until then, economic factors will take the backbench, and the pound will fall against both the USD and EUR. British Economy To Best Expectations Beyond the politically dominated short-term time horizon, the pound should be driven by the economy and valuations. Let's begin with the economy. On this front, there is room for optimism, at least relative to dismal expectations. A recent survey by the Financial Times shows that 40% of economists are more pessimistic than before on the U.K. economy, and that only 13% expect some improvement relative to their prior forecasts. The first positive is that Great Britain's fiscal drag is being lessened relative to pre-Brexit expectations (Chart I-4). While the Hammond Autumn statement did not point to an outright implementation of stimulus, it did show a 1.1% and 1.3% of GDP reduction in the austerity measures that were to be implemented by the Treasury in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Moreover, the U.K. currently lags both the EU and other advanced economies in terms of public investments as a share of GDP (Chart I-5). This also suggests that, if need be, there is plenty of room to ease budgets going forward. In fact, the recent populist stance taken by May points to more spending in that realm, due to the higher multiplier associated with infrastructure spending. Chart I-4Fiscal Easing Chart I-5Scope For Stimulus Beyond the fiscal picture, the key to the U.K.'s economic future is the outlook for consumption, a sector representing 65% of GDP. Worries are very prevalent that the consumer will aggressively curtail spending, facing a surge in inflation due to the collapse of the pound. However, we are less gloomy. To begin with, the outlook for inflation is better than originally feared. Domestic price pressures, which affect nearly 70% of the consumption basket, remain well contained (Chart I-6). Moreover, while the fall in the pound could exert some upward motion on this inflation measure, their muted correlation implies that domestic prices are unlikely to rise much beyond 2-3%. Meanwhile, the British labor market remains quite tight, suggesting that the outlook for U.K. wages will remain healthy. The ILO unemployment rate stands at 4.8%, near all-time lows; and skilled-labor shortages have not been such a problem since 1990 (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Still Muted Domestic Inflation Chart I-7Tight U.K. Labor Market Put together, our wage and core CPI models point toward a slowdown in real wage growth, but not a contraction (Chart I-8). Since nominal wage growth is little affected by the Brexit vote and inflation is expected to be temporary, the permanent-income hypothesis suggests that households are likely to dip into their savings to absorb the slowdown in real income growth (Chart I-9). Thus, U.K. consumption growth should remain stable in 2017. Chart I-8No Contraction In Real Wages Chart I-9No Calamity In Consumption Another key consideration for the U.K. economy is the great easing in financial and monetary conditions registered in the past 12 months (Chart I-10). This easing first and foremost reflects collapsing borrowing costs. This is crucial as U.K. banks are very robust and are in a position to increase their lending, especially to households (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Massive Easing In British##br## Monetary Conditions Chart I-11U.K. Banks ##br##Are Strong As a result, the British credit impulse has improved considerably (Chart I-12). It is true that this improvement reflected some Brexit-related distortions, but the factors above suggest that it is likely to continue to point north, highlighting a positive outcome for the U.K. economy. Confirming this intuition, after sharply deteriorating, the RICS survey is improving anew, pointing toward higher house prices (Chart I-13). While we expect any house-price improvements to be stronger outside London than in the capital, the 16% decline in the pound since the beginning of 2016 is improving the attractiveness of this market to foreigners. The U.K. economy has historically been strongly affected by housing price dynamics, and a resilient housing market would be a key support for consumption, despite slowing real wage growth (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Credit Impulse Points Health Chart I-13Housing Is A Support Trade, too, should prove less of an issue than originally feared. In recent years, the contribution of net exports to growth has been negative, both at the global level and vis-à-vis the rest of the EU (Chart I-14). With Brexit, trade with Europe will continue to subtract from growth, but not at an accelerating pace. Meanwhile, the large decline in the pound should cushion trade with the rest of the world. Where the risk to the U.K. economy is most pronounced is in business capex. On that front, the large degree of uncertainty that the U.K. will still have to face points to a brake on capex. However, business capex only represents 9% of the U.K.'s economy and has already been contracting. Further muting the effect of uncertainty, U.K. PMIs are as strong as the U.S. equivalent measures (Chart I-15), and U.K. profits are also rebounding. Thus, we expect that the drag from U.K. capex will not deepen. If anything, U.K. capex could surprise to the upside. Chart I-14Trade Always Was A Drag On Growth Chart I-15U.K. Businesses Are Fine Bottom Line: We expect the U.K. economy to remain a positive surprise for investors. The fiscal drag is lessening; household consumption should prove robust; housing will strengthen, as the credit impulse continues to perk up; the trade drag is unlikely to deepen; and capex will not worsen, and may in fact improve going forward. Investment Conclusions In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, despite a sharp upward revision to its inflation forecast, the MPC implemented extraordinary policy easing to compensate for risks to growth looming on the horizon. The BoE cut rates to 0.25%, increased its asset purchases by GBP70 billion to GBP435 billion, and put in place the Term Funding Scheme to incentivize bank lending. This week, Governor Mark Carney highlighted that he thought the BoE had been too pessimistic regarding the outlook for U.K. growth and that, in his eyes, the MPC was likely to move away from its extraordinary easing sooner rather than later. We think this outcome is indeed warranted, and not priced into the market. While not out of control, inflation is rising, but the downside risk to the economy appears to be contained. Thus, the BoE is unlikely to extend its asset purchases and will lose its easy bias going forward. Markets are not ready for this reality. With the pound trading 25% below PPP against the USD, and 20% too cheap against the EUR, it is clearly a value play (Chart 16A and Chart 16B). While over a two-year basis, such discounts to PPP should result in an appreciation of the pound, this tells us nothing of the outlook for the next year or so. In fact, in 1984, GBP/USD traded at an even larger discount to PPP than it does today. Chart I-16AGBP Is Cheap Chart I-16BGBP Is Cheap Current-account considerations are still a worry. However, the elasticity of the current account to the pound is limited. In fact, while the elasticity of exports to the pound is of the expected sign in our modeling, for imports, it is not. This reflects the elevated import content of British exports. A lower pound is therefore unlikely to be the most crucial means to improve that current-account position. Moreover, despite its current-account deficit of nearly 6% of GDP, the U.K. still runs a basic balance-of-payments surplus of 12%, even after the recent fall in FDI inflows (Chart I-17). Instead, on an intermediate-term basis, the outlook is driven by interest rate differentials and policy considerations. Here again, the outlook for the pound is brightening, especially against the euro. Due to the balance-sheet operations conducted by the BoE and ECB, interest rates in the U.K. and the euro area do not fully reflect domestic policy stances. Instead, we like to use the shadow rates. Currently, shadow rates tentatively argue that GBP/USD should begin to roll over, and unequivocally point toward a lower EUR/GBP (Chart I-18). In fact, balance-sheet dynamics point toward shorting EUR/GBP. As such, with our core view that the USD remains in a cyclical bull market - albeit one experiencing a temporary pause - the outlook for GBP/USD may still be mired by the strength of the USD. Instead, we find it cleaner to play a better-than-expected British economy by going short EUR/GBP. Long-term technicals on this cross are also extremely stretched (Chart I-19). Chart I-17U.K. Basic Balance Is Healthy... Chart I-18Shadow Rates: Bullish Pound... Chart I-19EUR/GBP Has Rarely Been This Overbought Due to the political risk looming over the next few month, the timing is complex. We are reluctant to short EUR/GBP unhedged at this point in time. We expect GBP to remain weak over the next month or two. Instead, we recommend two strategies. One - very similar to the play recommended by Dhaval Joshi of our European Investment Strategy service - is to be long EUR/GBP spot while purchasing long-dated out-of-the money puts on this cross. The other, is to set a limit-sell order at EUR/GBP at 0.933. Nimble traders may want to buy EUR/GBP in the wake of the Supreme Court decision and sell it as Article 50 gets triggered. Bottom Line: This week, Carney took an upbeat stance on the U.K. economy. We agree, and think that the BoE will move away from its hyper-dovish policy stance sooner than markets expect. As such, we foresee rate differentials to move in favor of the very cheap pound. The optimal way to play this strength is against the euro. However, since we expect more volatility in the pound as the U.K. triggers Article 50, we elect to implement this view through a limit-sell order at EUR/GBP 0.933. A Few Words On Trump's Tax Policy This week, much ink has been spilled on Trump's and the GOP's tax plan, especially the border adjustment. While a 20% tax on imports, and a 0% tax on exports would in a textbook world result in a near-automatic 25% appreciation in the dollar, this is far from where the reality stands. This analysis forgets that such a move would instantaneously impair the net international investment position of the U.S. by another 10 to 15% of GDP, pushing it below -50% of GDP. Additionally, such a move would cause a complete collapse of commodity prices and a massive tightening of EM financial conditions, especially for borrowers with USD liabilities. The ensuing deflationary crisis would prevent the Fed from hiking as much as is currently priced in and may even cause a global recession. Additionally, such a policy is likely to provoke tit-for-tat responses from other nations, muting its economic repercussions and its impact on the dollar. Globalization is frittering away. Instead, as we argued in the Dirigisme theme of our 2017 outlook, such tax is bullish at the margin on the dollar as future investment by U.S. corporations will now be biased toward the U.S., especially if another component of the tax plan gets implemented: the greater expensing of capex.1 This means that the non-U.S. output gap will grow more negative relative to the U.S. than would have been the case without this piece of legislation. This would put upward pressure on U.S. rates vis-à-vis the rest of the world, but nothing on the order of 25%. Instead, we expect the U.S. dollar to appreciate by a bit more than 5% on a 12-18 months basis, with some upside risk. Peter Berezin of our Global Investment Strategy service will cover tax reforms in great detail in the coming weeks, a report whose conclusions we look forward to share with our clients. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits", dated December 16, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1U.S. Technicals 1 Chart II-2U.S. Technicals 2 Since Donald Trump's widely anticipated news conference, the DXY has fallen roughly 1.7% as markets recognized the risks represented by Trump's outlook on trade and relations with China. As a reiteration, we highlight the significance of market overpricing in the DXY's previous rally. This is a clear indication of participants remaining overly reliant and hopeful on Trump's fiscal proposals in determining the greenback's value. A disappointing proposal is likely to lead to a correction in the dollar, however downside will be limited by the crucial 99 to 100 level. Although our long-term case remains bullish - especially if the border tax goes through - it is possible that markets could react to Trump's comments at his inauguration on January 20, generating substantial volatility for the dollar. Report Links: Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 As the surging power of the dollar abates, so does the downward pressure on the euro. The common currency has made significant progress this year after bottoming below 1.04 three weeks ago. Following last week's strong data, this week's figures followed through with additional resilience: Eurozone industrial output increased 3.2% annually; French and German industrial output increased 2.2% monthly; German real GDP grew at 1.9%. More interestingly, the Czech economy recorded quite a strengthening in its economy, with retail sales increasing 7.9% on a yearly basis, and yearly inflation at 2% in December from 1.5%. Such an increase in inflation could prompt the CNB to abandon the floor on EUR/CZK to allow for the conduct of independent monetary policy and tighten rates accordingly. This should prove profitable for our short EUR/CZK trade. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 The yen continues to rally this year after its dramatic sell-off at the end of 2016. Although USD/JPY has now found support at its 10-week moving average, we expect that a repricing of growth expectations for the U.S. should push the yen up further to USD/JPY 110. On the data side, recent numbers in Japan paint a positive picture: Consumer confidence came at 43.1, against expectations of 41.3. This is the highest level of consumer confidence since July 2013. Bank lending also increased to 2.6% YoY growth versus 2.4% on November. Encouraging signs from the Japanese economy will only make the BoJ more resolute in its radical policies, given that so far they have shown to be effective. Consequently, the outlook for the yen on a cyclical basis remains very bearish. Report Links: Update On A Tumultuous Year - January 6, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Party Likes It's 1999 - November 25, 2016 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 In a remarkable volte-face, BoE Governor Mark Carney signaled a possible raise in economic forecast after admitting that fears of a recession triggered by Brexit were overblown. In his own words: "Having gone through the night and the day after, the scale of the immediate risks around Brexit have gone down for the U.K." We agree that Brexit will probably cause a slowdown in the economy. However what matters for the pound is not whether the U.K. slows down but rather how the slowdown compares to expectations. As we have mentioned many times we believe these expectations are overblown, as the pound is very cheap. Thus, while it is true that the pound could still suffer more downside up until when negotiations begin, once political risks dissipate, this currency will become a very attractive bargain, particularly against the euro. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Data was quite weak for Australia this week: Retail sales increased at a below-consensus monthly pace of 0.2%; Building permits contracted by 4.8% since last year in November; Job advertisements contracted by 1.9% in December; AiG Performance of Construction Index increased to 47 from 46.6 - although construction employment had the lowest reading on employment in nine months. Along with the USD's weakness, recent strength in iron ore has buoyed the AUD - even against the CAD and the NOK - lifting AUD/USD 4.8% since the beginning of this year. However, there does not seem to be a clear improvement in the Australian economy yet, which fundamentally reasons against this rally. Additionally, the 14-day RSI is approaching the crucial overbought level of 70, which may signal a potential end to this surge. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The New Zealand Dollar has been one of the best performers against the U.S. dollar since last week, appreciating by over 2%. All in all, the New Zealand economy continues to hum along as the top performer in the G10: Employment growth is around 6%, the highest pace in 23 years. The output gap is at 2% of GDP, which indicates that the economy is growing above potential and that inflationary pressures may eventually emerge in New Zealand. The last point is important because although headline inflation continues to be very low, core inflation is slowly creeping up. While it is true that the slowdown in dairy prices is concerning, it should be a matter of time before inflation starts to pick up again, a development that should lift the NZD against the AUD. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 The Canadian economy has shown resilience this year, with the Business Outlook Survey suggesting that the drag from the preceding oil collapse has subsided. Investment intentions are around 25% and employment intentions are close to 40%; Both input and output price expectations have seen a huge surge, and inflation expectations have ticked up; Also, housing starts have come out much better than expected. In addition, the recent strength in the Canadian dollar has also been supported by strong oil prices, as USD/CAD has decreased by almost 3% since the end of last year. As long as the greenback's momentum remains weak, oil prices are likely to see upside, boosting the CAD. Nevertheless, this rally is likely close to burning out: both the RSI and the Coppock Curve are indicating oversold and trend reversal levels for USD/CAD. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits -December 16, 2016 When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It - November 4, 2016 Relative Pressures And Monetary Divergences - October 21, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 As we suggested last week, EUR/CHF has rallied once more after hovering under the critical level right under 1.07 at which the SNB tends to intervene to depreciate the franc. As long as Switzerland suffers from deflation, the SNB will continue to intervene whenever the franc gets near this levels. Indeed, recent data should give assurance to the SNB that their strategy is working: Real retail sales growth came at 0.9%, not only beating expectations but also returning to positive territory after being negative for the past year and a half. The unemployment rate continues to be very low at 3.3%. On a cyclical basis we are bullish on the franc given Switzerland's large current account surplus of 11%, and that monetary policy is currently as accommodative as can be and will only tighten in the future. This means that risks for the franc point to the upside. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Global Perspective On Currencies: A PCA Approach For The FX Market - September 16, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 After rising for most of the week USD/NOK fell sharply on Wednesday, and is now near a support line established in October. The Norges Bank has repeatedly stated that inflation is bound to slow down any time soon. However recent data shows that inflation continues to stay strong in Norway: Headline inflation was unchanged in December, coming at 3.5%. Core Inflation slowed slightly, coming in at 2.5% versus 2.6% the previous month. If inflation continues to be high, the Norges Bank will eventually have to change its stand to a less dovish one, helping the NOK in the process, particularly against its crosses. Moreover, given that the U.S. is the marginal consumer of oil, and China the marginal consumer of metals, outperformance by the U.S. against China should continue to help oil producers against other commodity currencies. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 The Dollar: The Great Redistributor - October 7, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 The Swedish economy is showing resilience: Industrial production increased by 0.1% yearly and by 1.2% monthly in November; Inflation increased 0.5% mom, and 1.7% yoy. Inflation is approaching to the Riksbank’s 2% target. The SEK rallied on the release of the news, as EUR/SEK dropped 0.5% and USD/SEK by around 0.6%. A strengthening Swedish economy will likely cause diverging rate differentials between Sweden and the Euro area, as the latter still battles deflationary pressures. This will limit EUR/SEK’s upside. USD/SEK will be dictated mostly by movements in the dollar itself. Therefore, SEK should outperform both USD and EUR for now. Report Links: Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades