Emerging Markets

Highlights A partial reinvasion of Ukraine cannot be ruled out. The constraints on Russia are not prohibitive, especially amid global energy shortages. On this issue, it is better to be alarmist than complacent. We would put the risk of a partial re-invasion of Ukraine as high as 50/50, albeit with an uncertain time frame over 12-36 months. The negative impact of conflict may not stay contained within Russian and eastern European markets. The US and EU are now threatening major retaliatory sanctions if Russia invades. In response Russia could reduce energy exports, exacerbating global shortages and damaging Europe’s overall economy. Investors should stay short Russian assets and overweight developed European equities over emerging European peers. Stay long gold and GBP-CZK. The dollar will be flat-to-up. Feature Chart 1Ruble Faces More Downside From Geopolitics Ruble Faces More Downside From Geopolitics Ruble Faces More Downside From Geopolitics Geopolitical tensions surrounding Russia remain unresolved and investors should continue to reduce holdings of assets exposed to any renewed conflict in Ukraine and the former Soviet Union. The ruble has dropped off its peaks since early November when strategic tensions revived (Chart 1). Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin held their second bilateral summit on a secure video link on December 7 to discuss the situation in Ukraine, where Russia has amassed 95,000-120,000 troops on the border in a major show of force. Russia also mustered troops in April and only partially drew them down after the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva where the two sides agreed to hold talks to address differences. The two presidents agreed to hold consultations regarding Ukraine. Putin accused NATO of building up Ukraine’s military and demanded “reliable, legally fixed guarantees excluding the expansion of NATO in the eastern direction and the deployment of offensive strike weapons systems in the states adjacent to Russia.”1 President Putin’s red line against Ukraine joining NATO is well known. Recently he said his red line includes the placement of western military infrastructure or missile systems in Ukraine. Biden refused to accept any limits on NATO membership in keeping with past policy. After the summit National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said, “I will tell you clearly and directly [Biden] made no such commitments or concessions. He stands by the proposition that countries should be able to freely choose who they associate with.” 2 Biden, who had conferred with the UK, France, Germany, and Italy prior to the call, outlined the coordinated economic sanctions that would be leveled against Russia if it resorted to military force, as well as defense aid that would go to Ukraine and other eastern European countries.  Thus Putin gave an ultimatum and Biden rebuffed it – and yet the two agreed to keep talking. The Russians have since said that they will present proposals to the Americans in less than a week. Talks are better than nothing. But neither side has given concrete indication of a change in position that would de-escalate strategic tensions – instead they have both raised the stakes. Therefore investors should proceed with the strong presumption that tensions will remain elevated or escalate in the coming months. Clearing Away Misconceptions Before going further we should clear away a few misconceptions about the current situation: Ukraine has unique strategic value to Russia. Like Belarus, but unlike Central Asia, Ukraine serves as critical buffer territory protecting Moscow and the Russian core from any would-be invaders. Russia lacks firm geological borders so it protects itself by means of distance and winter. This grand strategy succeeded against King Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, and Hitler. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia shorn of much of its buffer territory. Ukraine also offers access to the Black Sea. Russia has long striven to gain access to warm-water ports. The loss of control over Ukraine resulted in a loss of access. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 only partially rectified the situation. Ukraine’s southern coastline around Crimea is the territory at risk today (Map 1). Chart It is Ukraine’s physical existence and unique strategic value – not its democratic leanings or ideological orientation – that ensures perpetual tensions with post-Soviet Russia. Russia has a strategic imperative to reassert control or at least prevent control by foreign powers. Ideological opposition may make things worse but an anti-Russian Ukrainian dictator would also face Russian coercion or aggression, perhaps even more than the current weak democracy. In fact Russia is trying to force Ukraine to revise its constitution and adopt a federal structure so as to grant greater autonomy to separatist regions Donetsk and Luhansk that Russia helped break away in 2014. But Ukraine has not relented to Moscow’s demands of political reform. It is not authoritarianism but a permanent foreclosure of Ukrainian membership in the EU and NATO that Moscow is after. Yet it is highly unlikely that Russia would try to invade and conquer all of Ukraine. Ukraine is the largest country by territory in Europe and has 255,000 active soldiers and 900,000 reserves (contra Russia’s 1 million active and 2 million reserves) who would defend their freedom and sovereignty against an invader.3 Russia would not be able to stage a full-scale invasion with the 175,000 maximum troop buildup that US intelligence is warning about. It would have to mobilize fully, dangerously neglecting other vast dimensions of its national security, and would inevitably get bogged down fighting a vicious insurgency backed by the NATO powers. It would save blood and treasure by paralyzing Ukraine’s politics and preventing it from allying with western militaries, which is what Putin is attempting to do today. Putin uses foreign adventures to strengthen his grip at home but an adventure of this nature would impose such burdens as to threaten his grip at home. A limited re-invasion of Ukraine could yield historic strategic advantages to Russia. Moscow could focus on a partial military incursion that would annex or shore up Donbass, or extend its control from Donbass to the Black Sea, conceivably all the way to the Dnieper river. This pathway would yield Russia maritime access and a buffer space to fortify Crimea. Naval warfare could also yield control of deep-water ports (Yuzhne, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Chornomorsk), control of the mouth of the Dnieper, control of the canal that supplies water to Crimea, and a means of bottling up the Ukrainian navy and preventing foreign maritime assistance. Ukraine would be further weakened and Russia would have a larger beachhead in Ukraine for future pressure tactics. Russia is not bluffing – its military buildup poses a credible threat. If there is anywhere Russia’s threats are credible, it is in taking military action against former Soviet republics like Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) that have pro-western leanings yet lack the collective security of the NATO alliance. At very least, given that Russian forces did deploy in Ukraine in 2014, Russian action in Ukraine cannot be ruled out. The military balance has not changed so significantly in that time and strongly favors Russia (Chart 2). The US has provided around $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine since 2014, and has sent lethal weapons including Javelin anti-tank missiles and launchers since 2017-18, including $450 million worth of military aid under the Biden administration (and $300 million just authorized by Congress on December 7). NATO allies have also provided defense aid. This is part of Putin’s complaint but these new arms are not game changers that would prevent Russia from taking military action. Chart 2 Thus if the West rejects Moscow’s core demands, war is likely. This is true even if Russia would prefer to achieve its aims through political and economic rather than military means. Russia does not deem the West’s threat of sanctions as prohibitive of invasion. The West’s sanctions since 2014 have failed to change Russia’s government, strategy, or posture in Ukraine. Yes, European nations joined the US in imposing sanctions. But Germany also pursued the Nord Stream II pipeline as a means of bypassing Ukraine and working directly with Russia to preserve economic engagement and energy security. Former Chancellor Merkel forced the pipeline through despite the objections of eastern Europeans and the United States. The allies also formed the “Normandy Quartet,” excluding the US, to force Ukraine to accept the Minsk agreements on resolving the conflict. Thus the lesson of 2014-21 is not that NATO allies stood shoulder-to-shoulder in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but rather that Germany and the EU, and the EU and the US, have major differences in interests and risk-tolerance in dealing with Russia. Russia does not face, or may think it does not face, a united front among the western powers. A partial reinvasion of Ukraine would bring the western allies together initially but probably not for long. Russia determines the timing of any new military incursion in Ukraine. Winter is not the ideal time to invade Ukraine, though it is possible. Russia could act in spring 2022, as the US has warned, but it could also act in the summer of 2023, the spring of 2024, or other times. From a strategic point of view, Russia has enjoyed a historic window of opportunity since 2001 when the US got bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and then the US and the EU got bogged down in economic and financial crisis. Given that the American political establishment is withdrawing from foreign quagmires, reactivating fiscal policy, bulking up the military-industrial complex, and making a dedicated effort to revitalize its global alliances, Russia may believe that its historic window is closing. Russia’s domestic fundamentals are deteriorating over time. Putin could decide it is necessary to seize strategic ground in Ukraine sooner rather than later. Bottom Line: Ukraine offers unique and irreplaceable buffer space and maritime access to Russia. Russia’s military actions in 2014 led to stalemate, such that Russia remains insecure, Ukraine remains defiant, and the West is still entertaining defense cooperation or even NATO membership with Ukraine. Yet the Crimea conflict also revealed a lack of concert among western powers exemplified by Germany’s Nord Stream II pipeline. Today Russia has the military capability to seize another slice of Ukrainian territory. Western retaliatory actions would be painful but may not be deemed prohibitive. Investors cannot rule out a partial re-invasion of Ukraine. Nord Stream Pipeline Is Not The Sole Factor Is Russia not making a show of military force merely to ensure that Nord Stream II pipeline goes into operation? Will Russia not back down if the pipeline is guaranteed? A common view in Washington and the financial industry is that Russia’s military buildup is just a bluff, i.e. Moscow’s aggressive way of demanding that Germany’s new government and the European Union approve Nord Stream. The pipeline finished construction in September but now awaits formal regulatory certification. Approval was originally expected by May 2022 but has now been delayed. The pipeline would carry 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas into Europe, about half of Russia’s current export capacity outside of Ukraine. Ukraine’s total capacity is around 150 billion cubic meters. The pipeline enables Russia and Germany to bypass Ukraine, whose conflicts with Moscow since 2004 have threatened Germany’s energy security. About 18% of EU’s total energy imports come from Russia, whilst this figure is 16% for Germany. That is about 0.5% and 0.2% of EU and German GDP, respectively. Meanwhile Russian energy exports to Germany and the EU make up 0.8% and 5.6% of GDP, respectively (Chart 3). Chart 3 The problem with this reasoning is that the US conceded Nord Stream to Russia over the summer. The US initially raised the threat of sanctions because the pipeline  strengthened Russo-German ties, diminished Ukraine’s leverage, and deprived the US of a chance to sell liquefied natural gas to Europe. But the Biden administration proved unwilling to take this aggressive approach. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has a long history of arguing that the US should prioritize strong relations with its European allies rather than punitive measures to try to block Russian gas sales. Biden met with outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel in July and agreed to let Nord Stream go forward. The only proviso was that Russia not “weaponize natural gas,” i.e. withhold supplies for geopolitical purposes, as it has done in the past.4 Before Russia’s military threats, Germany and the EU were expected to certify the pipeline by no later than May 2022 and an earlier certification looked possible because of Europe’s low natural gas supplies. Yet Russia, fresh off parliamentary elections, did precisely what Germany said it was not supposed to do. The pipeline was completed in September and reports of Russian limitations on natural gas supply surfaced in October. Moscow not only weaponized the gas but also mustered its army on the Ukrainian border again. Putin may have feared that the new German government, which officially took office on December 8, would change policy and refuse to certify the pipeline. He also could have feared that the US Congress would pass a Republican-backed provision that would require Biden to impose sanctions that would halt the pipeline. But these explanations are not satisfactory. First, the German government was not likely to halt Nord Stream. Quite the opposite, Berlin has pushed against all opposition to speed the pipeline into action. It only delayed the regulatory approval when Russia did the one thing that Germany had expressly prohibited, which was weaponize natural gas. Second, the US Congress was never likely to pass mandatory sanctions on Nord Stream operators. The Democrats opposed it, as it would have tied Biden’s hands, whereas presidents always retain discretion over foreign policy and national security. Even moderate Republicans opposed the measure, for the same reason. If either of these were the reason for Putin’s latest buildup, then the buildup will probably dissipate in the coming months. Putin also wants to force Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements. But the Biden administration adopted the Minsk framework in June for the first time, which was a concession to Russia. So the latest military threats are not solely about coercing Europe to approve the pipeline or Ukraine to implement Minsk. Putin is driving at something else. Putin’s Focus On Ukraine And NATO Putin used military pressure on Ukraine’s border to force the US to accept the pipeline and the Minsk agreements. He is now using the same tactic to raise the stakes and demand that the US and its allies permanently rule out NATO membership and defense cooperation with Ukraine. Biden rejected the first demand during the summit, as mentioned. There is no way that the US or NATO will forswear any and all eastward expansion. Even on Ukraine specifically, Biden cannot give Russia a legal guarantee because it would require a 60-seat majority in the Senate (not likely). Any future president would retain prerogative over the matter anyway and Putin knows this. Moreover Ukraine is never going to join NATO. Russia would attack. And NATO members would not be unanimous (as is required for new members) because the collective defense treaty would require them to defend Ukraine. They would be signing up for a war with Russia. Still Biden is unlikely to disavow Ukrainian NATO membership because to do so would be to deny the self-determination of nations, capitulate to Russian coercion, and demoralize the Ukrainians, whom the US hopes will maintain a plucky resistance against Russian domination. It would also demoralize US allies and partners – namely Taiwan, which also lacks a formal defense treaty and would be forced to sue for peace with China in the face of American abandonment. Biden’s refusal to ban Ukraine from NATO is encapsulated in Diagram 1, an exercise in game theory that exemplifies why the risk of war should not be dismissed. Diagram 1Game Theory Suggests Russia Will Keep Applying Military Pressure Russia/Ukraine: Don’t Be Complacent Russia/Ukraine: Don’t Be Complacent Biden may give private or executive assurances on Ukraine and NATO but Putin will know that these mean nothing since Biden may be out of office as early as January 2025 and then Putin would have to renegotiate. America is not a credible negotiator because partisanship has resulted in extreme foreign policy vacillations – the next president could revoke the deal. Even after Putin is gone Russia would have to negotiate with the US to prevent the US from arming Ukraine. Hence Moscow may decide to reduce Ukraine and improve Russia’s strategic position by force of arms. This is true even if Biden forswears the NATO option, as Diagram 1 illustrates. Putin’s second demand – that the US not provide offensive weapon systems in countries adjacent to Russia – is more material. This is what the new round of talks will focus on. This new Ukraine line of talks is separate, more urgent and important, than the other bilateral dialogues on the arms race, and cyber-war. US-Russia talks on Iran are also urgent, however, and Russia’s cooperation there may be contingent on US concessions regarding Ukraine. The US may be willing to stop its defense cooperation with Ukraine but not with other allies and partners, however. It is also not clear what Putin will accept. These negotiations will have to be watched. Biden cannot make major concessions with a gun to his head. It is unclear how far the US is willing to concede on defense cooperation with countries around Russia. The US may quietly abandon Ukraine but then it would need to reinforce its other defense relationships. If Putin draws down the troops, and Biden calls a stop to defense aid to Ukraine, then a crisis may be averted. What Could Go Wrong? Economic sanctions under consideration in Washington are significant: the US could freeze bank transactions, expand restrictions on trading Russian sovereign and corporate debt, and lobby Belgium to kick Russia off the SWIFT financial messaging system. However, these sanctions may not be effective in preventing Russia from using military force. Russia has weathered US sanctions since 2014, and the smaller and weaker Iranian economy has weathered maximum pressure sanctions since 2019. Energy producers like Russia and Iran have maximum geopolitical leverage when global energy inventories draw down, as is the case today. Even in the face of Russian military aggression, the Biden administration is vacillating on sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector that would contribute to global shortages and ultimately raise prices at the pump for voters in a midterm election year.5 Germany’s new government also hesitates to declare unambiguously that it will discontinue the Nord Stream II pipeline if Russia invades Ukraine. True, Germany signaled that the pipeline would be halted. Its energy regulator declared that the pipeline’s ownership must be unbundled, which pushes back the certification date to sometime after May 2022 – this was a geopolitical not a legalistic decision. But construction is completed, the pipeline physically exists, which will vitiate Germany’s commitment to sanctions whenever natural gas shortages occur, as is the case this winter (Chart 4). Shortages will continue to occur and Russia controls a large share of supply. Chart 4 ​​​​​​ Chart 5 It would take a catastrophe to drive Germany to restart coal and nuclear plants, so natural gas will continue to be in demand. Germany does not have liquefied natural gas import capability yet. If Europe imposes crippling sanctions on Russia, Russia could reduce energy supplies and harm Europe’s economy (Chart 5). The Russian economy and society would suffer which is one reason any military action in Ukraine would be limited in scope. Still, Moscow may believe that Germany would restrain the EU, and the EU would restrain the US, thereby preventing sanctions from being fully, uniformly, and durably implemented. Prior to Russia’s aggression, public opinion polls showed that the German public strongly supported Nord Stream. Even a majority of Green Party members supported it despite the fact that the Greens were the most critical of increasing Germany’s dependency on fossil fuels and an authoritarian petro-state. While public approval of the pipeline has surely suffered in the face of Russian aggression, a majority probably still favors the pipeline. Germany has a national consensus in support of engagement with Russia and avoiding a new cold war, given that the original Cold War cut Germany in half. For that reason invasion may only temporarily unite the western powers – it could ultimately drive a wedge between Germany and other EU members, namely in the former Soviet bloc. It would also divide the more risk-averse EU from the US in terms of how to deal with Russia. And it would weaken the Biden administration at a time when it is extremely vulnerable, exacerbating America’s internal divisions. Russian domestic patriotism would rally, at least initially. Note that Russia could miscalculate on this issue and that is one reason for high level of risk. Perhaps the West would prove far more unified and aggressive in its sanctions enforcement than it was after 2014. A falling ruble and rising inflation could cause Russian social unrest. But Russia could misread the situation. Unless the US and Europe escalate the sanctions threat massively to better deter Russia, their lack of concert is another reason for investors not to be complacent about renewed conflict. Bottom Line: The threat of sanctions may prove insufficient to deter renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. Germany favors engagement with Russia and Europe’s energy dependency on Russia makes it vulnerable to supply disruptions. Russia has leverage given tight global energy markets, Europe’s low natural gas inventories, and US domestic political considerations ahead of the 2022 midterms. Investment Takeaways The point of this report argues that a partial re-invasion of Ukraine cannot be ruled out. Russia has the capability to reinforce de facto control of Donbas, or expand its footprint in southern Ukraine, though not to invade the whole country. The threat of economic sanctions is not yet so overwhelming as to warrant overconfident predictions of de-escalation. In this case it is better to be alarmist than complacent. Russia would want to maintain an element of surprise so the timing of any belligerence is hard to predict. For de-escalation, investors should watch for Russia to withdraw troops from the Ukrainian border, US-Russia consultations to begin promptly and proceed regularly, and for the US and allies to delay or halt defense cooperation and arms transfers to Ukraine. While global investors would quickly become de-sensitized to conflict that is entirely contained in Ukraine, the trans-Atlantic threat of major sanctions now raises the stakes and suggests that global energy shocks could negatively affect the European or global economy in the event of conflict. Any conflict could also spill outside of Ukraine’s borders, as with Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, which was shot down by Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists in July 2014. The Black Sea has seen a dangerous uptick in naval saber-rattling and that strategic situation would become permanently more dangerous if Russia seized more of coastal Ukraine. Russian military integration with Belarus is also a source of insecurity for EU and NATO members. Global financial markets have only started to price the geopolitical risk emanating from Russia. Our Russian GeoRisk Indicator has ticked up (Chart 6). But Russian equity performance relative to broad emerging markets is only arguably underperforming what is implied by Brent crude oil prices. Chart 6Market Slow To React To Ukraine Crisis - Risk To Downside For Russian Assets Market Slow To React To Ukraine Crisis - Risk To Downside For Russian Assets Market Slow To React To Ukraine Crisis - Risk To Downside For Russian Assets This relatively muted reaction suggests more downside lies ahead if we are right that strategic tensions will be flat-to-up over the coming months. Sell the RUB-USD on any strength. Stay long GBP-CZK. Tactically short Russian equities versus EM-ex-Asia (Chart 7). They are exposed to further correction as a result of escalating geopolitical risk. Chart 7Russia Falling Off Peaks Of Performance Versus EM-Ex-Asia Russia Falling Off Peaks Of Performance Versus EM-Ex-Asia Russia Falling Off Peaks Of Performance Versus EM-Ex-Asia ​​​​​​ Chart 8Developed Europe A Safer Bet Than Emerging Europe Amid Tensions Developed Europe A Safer Bet Than Emerging Europe Amid Tensions Developed Europe A Safer Bet Than Emerging Europe Amid Tensions ​​​​​​ Stick to long DM Europe versus EM Europe – our main trade this year to capture rising geopolitical risk between Russia and the West (Chart 8).     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      President of Russia, "Meeting with US President Joseph Biden," December 7, 2021, kremlin.ru.  2     White House, "Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, December 7, 2021," whitehouse.gov. 3     Dan Peleschuk, "Ukraine’s military poses a tougher challenge for Russia than in 2014," Politico, April 14, 2021, politico.eu.; see also Gav Don, "LONG READ: Russia looks poised to invade Ukraine, but what would an invasion actually look like?" Intellinews, November 24, 2021, intellinews.com. 4     US Department of State, "Joint Statement of the United States and Germany on Support for Ukraine, European Energy Security, and our Climate Goals," July 21, 2021, state.gov. 5     Kylie Atwood and Natasha Bertrand, "US likely to hold off for now on energy sanctions for Russia, fearing impact on global prices," CNN, December 9, 2021, cnn.com. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights The last two years have taught us to live with Covid-19. This means global growth will remain strong in 2022. That is not reflected in a strong dollar. The RMB will be a key arbiter between a bullish and bearish dollar view. This is because a weak RMB will be deflationary for many commodity currencies, especially if it reflects weak Chinese demand. Inflation in the US will remain stronger than in other countries. The key question is what the Federal Reserve does next year. In our view, they will stay patient which will keep real interest rates in the US very low. Upside in the DXY is nearing exhaustion according to most of our technical indicators. We upgraded our near-term target to 98. Over a longer horizon, we believe the DXY will break below 90, towards 85 in the next 12-18 months. A key theme for 2022 will be central bank convergence. Either inflation proves sticky and dovish central banks turn a tad more hawkish, or inflation subsides and aggressive rate hikes priced in some G10 OIS curves are revised a tad lower. The path for bond yields will naturally be critical. Lower bond yields will initially favor defensive currencies such as the DXY, CHF and JPY. This is appropriate positioning in the near-term. Further out in 2022, as bond yields rise, the Scandinavian currencies will be winners. Portfolio flows into US equities have been a key driver of the dollar rally. This has been because of the outperformance of technology. Should this change, equity flows could switch from friend to foe for the dollar. A green technology revolution is underway and this will benefit the currencies of countries that will supply these raw materials. The AUD could be a star in 2022 and beyond. The rise in cryptocurrencies will continue to face a natural gravitational pull from policy makers.    Gold and silver will rise in 2022, but silver will outperform gold. Feature 2022 has spooky echoes of 2020. In December 2019, we were optimistic about the global growth outlook, positive on risk assets, and bearish the US dollar. That view was torpedoed in March 2020, when it became widely apparent that COVID-19 was a truly global epidemic. More specifically, the dollar DXY index (a proxy for safe-haven demand) rose to a high of 103. US Treasury yields fell to a low of 0.5%. Chart 1Covid-19 And The Dollar Covid-19 And The Dollar Covid-19 And The Dollar Today, the DXY index is sitting at 96, exactly the midpoint of the March 2020 highs and the January 2021 lows. Once again, the dollar is discounting that the new Omicron strain will be malignant – worse than the Delta variant, but not as catastrophic as the original outbreak (Chart 1). Going into 2022, we are cautiously optimistic. First, we have two years of data on the virus and are learning to live with it. This suggests the panic of March 2020 will not be repeated. Second, policymakers are likely to stay very accommodative in the face of another exogenous shock. This will especially be the case for the Fed. Our near-term target for the DXY index is 98, given that the macro landscape remains fraught with risks. This is a speculative level based on exhaustion from our technical indicators (the dollar is overbought) and valuation models (the dollar is expensive). Beyond this level, if our scenario analysis plays out as expected, we believe the DXY index will break below 90 in 2022. Omicron And The Global Growth Picture Chart 2Global Growth And The Dollar Global Growth And The Dollar Global Growth And The Dollar Our golden rule for trading the dollar is simple – sell the dollar if global growth will remain robust, and US growth will underperform its G10 counterparts. Historically, this rule has worked like clockwork. Using Bloomberg consensus growth estimates for 2022, US growth is slated to stay strong, but give way to other economies (Chart 2).  News on the Omicron variant continues to be fluid. As we go to press, Pfizer suggests a third booster dose of its vaccine results in a 25-fold increase in the antibodies that attack the virus. Additionally, a new vaccine to combat the Omicron variant will be available by March. If this proves accurate, it suggests the world population essentially has protection against this new strain. The good news is that vaccinations are ramping up around the world, especially in emerging markets. Countries like the US and the UK were the first countries to see a majority of their population vaccinated. Now many developed and emerging market countries have a higher share of their population vaccinated compared to the US (Chart 3). Chart 3ARising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US Chart 3BRising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US Rising Vaccinations Outside The US This has resulted in a subtle shift – growth estimates for 2022 are increasingly favoring other countries relative to the US (Chart 4). Let us consider the case of Japan - just in June this year, ahead of the Olympics, only 25% of the population was vaccinated. Today, Japan has vaccinated 77% of its population and new daily infections are near record lows. While Omicron is a viable risk, the starting point for Japan is very encouraging and should open a window for a recovery in pent-up demand and a pickup in animal spirits. Chart 4ARising Growth Momentum Outside The US Rising Growth Momentum Outside The US Rising Growth Momentum Outside The US Chart I-4 This template could very much apply to other countries as well. This view is not embedded in the dollar, which continues to price in an outperformance of US growth (Chart 5). The Risks From A China Slowdown China sits at the epicenter of a bullish and bearish dollar view. If Chinese growth is bottoming, then the historical relationship between the credit impulse and pro-cyclical currencies will hold (Chart 6). This will benefit the EUR, the AUD, the CAD and even the SEK which that track the Chinese credit impulse in real time. As an expression of this view, we went long the AUD at 70 cents. Chart 5Economic Surprises Outside The US Economic Surprises Outside The Us Economic Surprises Outside The Us Chart 6Chinese Credit Demand And Currencies Chinese Credit Demand And Currencies Chinese Credit Demand And Currencies Just as global policy makers are calibrating the risk from the Omicron variant, the Chinese authorities are also acknowledging the risk of an avalanche from a property slowdown. They have already eased monetary policy on this basis. Specific to the dollar, a key arbiter of a bullish or bearish view will be the Chinese RMB. So far, markets have judiciously separated the risk, judging that the Chinese authorities can surgically diffuse the real estate market, without broad-based repercussions in other parts of the economy (such as the export sector). Equities and corporate credit prices have collapsed in specific segments of the Chinese market but the RMB remains strong (Chart 7). Correspondingly, inflows into China remain very robust, a testament to the fact that Chinese growth (while slowing) remains well above that of many other countries (Chart 8). Chart 7The RMB Has Diverged From The Carnage In China The RMB Has Diverged From The Carnage In China The RMB Has Diverged From The Carnage In China Chart 8Strong Portfolio Inflows Into China Strong Portfolio Inflows Into China Strong Portfolio Inflows Into China China contributed 20% to global GDP in 2021 and will likely contribute a bigger share in 2022, according to the IMF (Chart 9). This suggests that foreign direct investment in China will remain strong . This will occur at a time when the authorities could have diffused the risk from a property market slowdown. Chart I-9 The commodity-side of the equation will also be important to monitor, especially as it correlates strongly with developed-market commodity currencies. It is remarkable that despite the slowdown in Chinese real estate, commodity prices remain resilient (Chart 10). This has been due to adjustment on the supply side, as our colleagues in the Commodity & Energy Strategy team have been writing. Finally, China offers one of the best real rates in major economies. It also runs a current account surplus. This suggests there is natural demand and support for the RMB (Chart 11). A strong RMB limits how low developed-market commodity currencies can fall. Chart 10Commodity Prices Remain Well Bid Commodity Prices Remain Well Bid Commodity Prices Remain Well Bid Chart 11Real Interest Rates Favor The RMB Real Interest Rates Favour The RMB Real Interest Rates Favour The RMB Inflation And The Policy Response Output gaps are closing around the world as fiscal stimulus has helped plug the gap in aggregate demand. This suggests that while inflation has been boosted by idiosyncratic factors (supply bottlenecks) that could soon be resolved, rising aggregate demand will start to pose a serious problem to the inflation mandate of many central banks. Chart 12A Key Driver Of The Dollar Rally A Key Driver Of The Dollar Rally A Key Driver Of The Dollar Rally As we wrote a few weeks ago, there have been consistencies and contradictions with the market response to higher inflation. The market is now pricing in that the Fed will raise interest rates much faster, compared to earlier this year. According to the overnight index swap (OIS) curve, the Fed is now expected to lift rates at least twice by December 2022, compared to earlier this year. Meanwhile, market pricing is even more aggressive when looking at the December 2022 Eurodollar contract, relative to either the Euribor contract (European equivalent) or Tibor (Japanese equivalent) (Chart 12). The reality is that outside the ECB and the BoJ, other central banks have actually been more proactive compared to the Federal Reserve. The Bank Of Canada has ended QE and will likely raise interest rates early next year, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has ended QE and raised rates twice, and the Reserve Bank of Australia has already been tapering asset purchases. The Bank of England will also be ahead of the Fed in raising interest rates, according to our Global Fixed Income Strategy colleagues. This suggests that the pricing of a policy divergence between the Fed and other G10 central banks could be a miscalculation and a potential source of weakness for the dollar. Chart 13The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation The US Is Generating Genuine Inflation Rising inflation is a global phenomenon and not specific to the US (Chart 13). So either inflation subsides and the Fed turns a tad more accommodative, or inflation proves sticky and other central banks turn a tad more hawkish to defend their policy mandates. We have two key short-term trades penned on this view – long EUR/GBP and long AUD/NZD. While the European Central Bank will lag the Bank of England (and the Fed) in raising interest rates, expectations for the path of policy are too hawkish in the UK, with 4 rate hikes priced in by the end of 2022. Similarly, hawkish expectations for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand are likely to be revised lower, relative to the Reserve Bank of Australia. As for the US, the Fed is likely to hike interest rates next year but real rates will remain very low relative to history (Chart 14A and 14B). Low real rates will curb the appeal of US Treasuries. Chart 14AReal Interest Rates In The US Are Very Negative Real Interest Rates In The US Are Very Negative Real Interest Rates In The US Are Very Negative Chart I-14 The Dollar And The Equity Market Chart 15The US Stock Market And The Dollar The US Stock Market And The Dollar The US Stock Market And The Dollar One of the biggest drivers of a strong dollar this year (aside from rising interest rate expectations), has been equity inflows. The greenback tends to do well when US bourses are outperforming their overseas peers (Chart 15). It is also the case that value tends to underperform growth in an environment where the dollar is rising. We discussed this topic in depth in our special report last summer. Flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns. So if investors expect the pandemic winners (technology and healthcare) to keep driving the market in an Omicron setting, the US bourses that are overweight these sectors will do well. We will err on the other side of this trade for 2022. Part of that is based on our analysis of the global growth picture in the first section of this report. If growth rotates from the US to other economies, their bourses should do well as profits in these economies recover. Earnings revisions in the US have been sharply revised lower compared to other countries (Chart 16). This has usually led to a lower dollar eventually. In the case of the euro area, there has been a strong and consistent relationship between relative earnings revisions vis-à-vis the US, and the performance of the euro (Chart 17). Chart 16Earnings Revisions Are Moving Against US Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving Against US Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving Against US Companies Chart 17Earnings Revisions Are Moving In Favor Of Euro Area Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving In Favor Of Euro Area Companies Earnings Revisions Are Moving In Favor Of Euro Area Companies In a nutshell, should profits in cyclical sectors recover on the back of rising bond yields, strong commodity prices and a tentative bottoming in the Chinese economy, value sectors that are heavily concentrated in countries with more cyclical currencies such as Australia, Norway, Sweden, and Canada, will benefit. Ditto for their currencies. The Outlook For Petrocurrencies Chart I-18 When the pandemic first hit in 2020, oil prices (specifically the Western Texas Intermediate blend) went negative. This drop pushed the Canadian dollar towards 68 cents and USD/NOK punched above 12. This time around, the drop in oil prices (20% from the peak for the Brent blend) has been more muted. We think this sanguine market reaction is more appropiate in our view for two key reasons. First, as our colleagues in the Commodity & Energy Stategy team have highlighted, investment in the resource sector, specifically oil and gas, has been anemic in recent years. In Canada, investment in the oil and gas sector has dropped 68% since 2014 at the same time as energy companies are becoming more and more compliant vis-à-vis climate change (Chart 18). Second, if we are right, and Omicron proves to be a red herring, then transportation demand (the biggest source of oil demand) will keep recovering. In terms of currencies, our preference is to be long a petrocurrency basket relative to oil consumers. As the US is the biggest oil producer in the world (Chart 19), being long petrocurriences versus the dollar has diverged from its historical positive relationship with oil prices. Chart 20 shows that a currency basket of oil producers versus consumers has had both a strong positive correlation with oil prices and has outperformed a traditional petrocurrency basket. Chart 19The US Is Now A Major Oil Producer The US Is Now A Major Oil Producer The US Is Now A Major Oil Producer Chart 20Hold A Basket Of Oil Consumers Versus Producers Hold A Basket Of Oil Consumers Versus Producers Hold A Basket Of Oil Consumers Versus Producers Technical And Valuation Indicators The dollar tends to be a momentum-driven currency. Past strength begets further strength. We modelled this when we published our FX Trading Model, which showed that a momentum strategy outperformed over time (Chart 21).  The problem with momentum is that it works until it does not. Net speculative long positions in the dollar are approaching levels that have historically signaled exhaustion (Chart 22). There is a dearth of dollar bears in today’s environment. That is positive from a contrarian standpoint. Meanwhile, our capitulation index (a measure of how overbought or oversold the dollar is) is approaching peak levels. Chart 21The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency Chart 22Long Dollar Is A Consensus Trade Long Dollar Is A Consensus Trade Long Dollar Is A Consensus Trade Valuation is another headwind for the dollar. According to all of our in-house models, the dollar is expensive. That is the case according to both our in-house curated PPP model (Chart 23) and a simple one based on headline consumer prices (Chart 24). Chart I-23 Chart 24The Dollar is Expensive The Dollar is Expensive The Dollar is Expensive     In a broader sense, we have built an attractiveness ranking for currencies (Chart 25). This ranks G10 currencies on a swathe of measures, including their basic balances, our internal valuation models, sentiment measures, economic divergences, and external vulnerability. The ranking is in order of preference, with a lower score suggesting the currency is sitting in the top/most attractive quartile of the measures. The Norwegian krone and Swedish krona are especially attractive as 2022 plays. Chart I-25 More specifically, the Scandinavian currencies have been one of the hardest hit this year. The Norwegian krone will benefit from the reopening of economies, particularly through the rising terms-of-trade. The Swedish krona will benefit from a pickup in the industrial sector, and continued strength in global trade. The least attractive G10 currencies are the New Zealand dollar and the greenback. This is mostly due to valuation. As we have highlighted in previous reports, valuation is a poor timing tool in the short term but over a longer-term horizon, currencies tend to revert towards fair value. Where Next For EUR/USD? Our bias is that the euro has bottomed. The ECB will lag the Fed in raising interest rates, but the spread between German bund yields and US Treasuries does not justify the current level of the euro. More importantly, if European growth recovers next year, this will sustain portfolio flows into the eurozone, which are cratering (Chart 26). Our 2022 target for EUR/USD is 1.25, a level that will unwind 10.6% of the undervaluation versus the dollar. Beyond valuation,s a few key factors support the euro: As a pioneer in green energy and a pro-cyclical currency, the euro will benefit from portfolio flows into renewable energy companies, as well as foreign direct investment. A close proxy for these flows are copper prices, that have positively diverged from the performance of the euro (Chart 27). Chart 26The Euro And Portfolio Flows The Euro And Portfolio Flows The Euro And Portfolio Flows Chart 27EUR/USD And Copper EUR/USD And Copper EUR/USD And Copper ​​​​​ Inflation in the euro area is lagging the US, but is undeniably strong. As such, while the ECB will lag the Fed in tightening monetary policy, the divergence in monetary policy will not widen. Earnings revisions are moving in favor of European companies, as we have shown earlier. Historically, this has put a floor under the euro. Safe-Haven Demand: Long JPY Safe-haven currencies will perform well in the near term. We are long the yen, which is the cheapest currency according to our models and also one of the most shorted. CHF will also do well in the near term, though as we have argued, will induce more intervention from the Swiss National Bank. Chart I-28 We are long both the yen and CHF/NZD as short-term trades, but our preference is for the yen. First, Japan has one of the highest real rates in the developed world. So, outflows from JGBs are going to be curtailed. Second, the DXY and USD/JPY have a strong positive correlation, and this places the yen in a very enviable position as the dollar weakens in 2022 (Chart 28). A Final Word On Gold, Silver, And Precious Metals Chart 29Hold Some Gold Hold Some Gold Hold Some Gold Along with our commodity strategists, we remain bullish precious metals. In our view, inflation could prove stickier than most investors expect. This will depress real rates and support precious metals. Within the precious metals sphere, we particularly like silver and platinum.  Almost every major economy now has negative real interest rates. Gold (and silver) have a long-standing relationship with negative interest rates (Chart 29). Central banks are also becoming net purchasers of gold, which is bullish for demand. The true precious metals winner in 2022 could be silver. The Gold/Silver ratio (GSR) tends to track the US dollar quite closely, so a bearish view on the dollar can be expressed by being short the GSR (Chart 30). Second, gold is very expensive compared to silver (Chart 31). In general, when gold tends to make new highs (as it did in 2020), silver tends to follow suit. This means silver prices could double from current levels over the next few years, to reclaim their 2011 highs. Finally, the bullish case for platinum is the same as for silver. It has lagged both gold and palladium prices. Meanwhile, breakthroughs are being made in substituting palladium for platinum in gasoline catalytic converters. Chart 30Hold Some Silver Hold Some Silver Hold Some Silver Chart 31Stay Short The GSR Stay Short The GSR Stay Short The GSR Concluding Thoughts Our currency positions, as we enter 2022, are biased towards a lower dollar, but we also acknowledge that there are key risks to the view. Our recommendations are as follows: The DXY will could touch 98 in the near term, but will break below 90 over the next 12-18 months. An attractiveness ranking reveals the most appealing currencies are JPY, SEK, and NOK, while the least attractive are USD and NZD. Chart 32Hold Some AUD Hold Some AUD Hold Some AUD Policy convergence will be a key theme at the onset of 2022. Stay long EUR/GBP and AUD/NZD as a play on this theme. Look to buy a basket of oil producers versus consumers once volatility subsides. We went long the AUD at 70 cents. Terms of trade are likely to remain a tailwind for the Australian dollar (Chart 32). The AUD will benefit specifically in a green revolution.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com​​​​​​​ Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Dear Clients, Next week, in addition to sending you the China Macro And Market Review, we will be presenting our 2022 outlook on China at our last webcasts of the year “China 2021 Key Views: A Challenging Balancing Act”. The webcasts will be held Wednesday, December 15 at 10:00 am EDT (English) and Thursday, December 16 at 9:00 am HKT (Mandarin). Best regards, Jing Sima China Strategist   Highlights China’s policymakers are balancing between staying the course with structural reforms and stabilizing the economy. This carefully calibrated approach means that Beijing will only initiate piecemeal policy easing in the near term. China will ramp up investment in the new economy, which is too small to fully offset the drag on the aggregate economy from weakening old economy sectors. In the next three to six months, the economy will deteriorate further, but Beijing will only press the stimulus accelerator harder if their pressure points are breached. A zero-tolerance policy towards COVID will be maintained for the foreseeable future. Uncertainties surrounding the Omicron variant will reinforce this approach. The common prosperity policy initiative will likely accelerate ahead of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (NCCCP) in the fall of 2022. While the plan will ultimately benefit income and consumption for the majority of Chinese households, the uncertainties surrounding impending tax reforms will curb demand for housing and luxury goods in the short term. We remain underweight Chinese stocks. Prices for onshore stocks will likely fall in the next three to six months when the market starts to price in lower-than-expected economic growth and disappointing stimulus. Selloffs in the first half of 2022 may present an opportunity to turn positive on onshore stocks in absolute terms. We will turn bullish on Chinese stocks relative to global equities only when credit expansion overshoots weakness in the economy, which has a low likelihood. We continue to favor onshore stocks versus offshore within a Chinese equity portfolio. Tensions between the US and China may intensify leading up to the political events next year. Chinese offshore stocks, highly concentrated in internet companies, still face the risks of being caught in both geopolitical crossfires and domestic regulatory pressures. Feature China’s economy slowed significantly in 2H21, with the extent of policy tightening and magnitude of the decline in growth much larger than global investors expected. As we forecasted in our last year’s Key Views report, 2021 marked the beginning of a new era in which policymakers would switch gears from building a "moderately prosperous society" to becoming a "great modern socialist nation”.The pivot means that officials would tolerate slower economic growth, implement tougher financial and industry regulations, and accelerate structural reforms. On the cusp of 2022, we are cautious about the willingness of China’s top leadership to initiate large-scale policy easing. Even though policy tone has shifted to a more pro-growth bias, authorities are still trying to replace old economic drivers with the new economy sectors. Furthermore, they are struggling to maintain a delicate balance between boosting short-term growth and maintaining long-term reforms goals. As a result, their policies are sending mixed signals. As seen in 2018 and 2019, the policymakers’ reluctance to activate a full-scale stimulus does not bode well for global commodity prices. Chinese onshore stocks underperformed their global counterparts during the 2018-19 period.  Chinese stocks will face nontrivial headwinds in the coming months and warrant a cautious stance until more stimulus is introduced and the macro picture begins to meaningfully improve. The main themes in our outlook for 2022 are discussed below. Key View #1: Balancing Between The Old And New Economies Despite a recent pro-growth bias in the policy tone, the speed of easing has been incremental and the magnitude piecemeal. Moreover, authorities are telegraphing policy support in new economy sectors (such as high tech and clean energy), while only somewhat loosening restrictions in old economy sectors (mainly property and infrastructure).  Chart 1Current Easing Path Is Looking A Lot Like In 2018/19 Current Easing Path Is Looking A Lot Like In 2018/19 Current Easing Path Is Looking A Lot Like In 2018/19 China’s policy framework has shifted since late 2017 as we noted in previous reports. The top leadership is more determined to stay the course with reforms and tolerate slower growth in the old economy. Our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator highlights policymakers’ carefully calibrated policy actions to avoid a dramatic overshoot of credit growth; these actions are consistent with 2018/19 and starkly contrast with policy frameworks in 2012 and 2015. Monetary conditions have meaningfully eased, but the rebound in money supply and credit growth has lagged and is muted due to heightened regulatory oversight (Chart 1).  Investors should keep low expectations about the policymakers’ willingness to boost growth in old economy sectors. The easing of restrictions in property sector – from prompting banks to resume lending to qualified homebuyers and developers, to allowing funding for developers to acquire distressed real estate assets – are steps to alleviate an escalating risk of widespread bankruptcies among real estate developers. However, regulators have not changed the direction of their structural policies. Funding constraints placed on both developers and banks since last August remain intact. Banks still need to meet the “two red lines” that set the upper limit on the portion of their lending to the property sector, while developers must bring their leverage ratios below the “three red lines” by end-2023. Maintaining these binding constraints on developers and banks will continue to weigh on the housing market in the coming years. The recent easing may reduce the intensity of funding constraints, but the banks will be extremely cautious to extend lending to a broad range of developers. Aggressive crackdowns on property market speculation in the past 12 months has fundamentally shifted both developers’ and consumers’ expectations for future home prices. Growth in home sales and new projects dropped to their 2015 lows, while current real estate inventories are comparable to 2015 highs (Chart 2). Therefore, unless regulators are willing to initiate more aggressive policy boosts, such as cutting mortgage rates and/or providing government funds to monetize inventory excesses in the housing market, the current easing measures probably will not revive sentiment in the property market. Thus, odds are that the property market downtrend will extend through 2022 (Chart 3). Chart 2Downward Momentum In Property Market Comparable To 2015 Downward Momentum In Property Market Comparable To 2015 Downward Momentum In Property Market Comparable To 2015 Chart 3Policymakers Will Have To Allow Significant Re-leveraging To Revive The Market Policymakers Will Have To Allow Significant Re-leveraging To Revive The Market Policymakers Will Have To Allow Significant Re-leveraging To Revive The Market Chart 4Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending Key Indicators Show Weak Signs Of Revival In Infrastructure Spending We expect some modest increase in infrastructure spending next year from the meager 0.7% growth in 2021, but we are skeptical that policymakers will allow any substantial rebound. Shadow banking activity and infrastructure project approval, two key indicators we monitor for signs of a meaningful easing in infrastructure spending, show little improvement (Chart 4). Our outlook for infrastructure investment is based on the following: Since 2017 policymakers have assumed a much more hawkish approach toward reducing investment in the capital-intensive and unproductive old economic sectors. Next year’s 20th NCCCP will not fundamentally change this policy setting. The 19th NCCCP in late 2017 deviated from the past; infrastructure investment growth downshifted following the event, whereas significant spending boosts had followed previous NCCCPs (Chart 5). Beijing adhered to its structural downshift in infrastructure spending even during the 2018/19 US-China trade war and after last year’s pandemic-induced economic contraction. Chart 5Infrastructure Investment Shifted To A Lower Gear Following The 19th NCCCP Infrastructure Investment Shifted To A Lower Gear Following The 19th NCCCP Infrastructure Investment Shifted To A Lower Gear Following The 19th NCCCP Chart 6 Secondly, government spending since 2017 has tilted towards social welfare over building “bridges to nowhere”, a meaningful change from the past and in keeping with President Xi Jinping’s political priorities (Chart 6). The trend will likely continue next year because local governments need to maintain large social welfare budgets to counter the economic impact of the prolonged domestic battle against COVID. Local government revenues, on the other hand, will be reduced due to slumping land sales. Thirdly, there has been strong policy guidance by the central government to shift investment to the new economy sectors and away from traditional infrastructure projects. The PBoC in early November launched the carbon emission reduction facility (CERF) to offer low interest loans to financial institutions that help firms cut carbon emissions. Chart 7 China’s new economy sectors have experienced rapid growth in recent years, but in the short-term, infrastructure spending in those sectors will not fully offset a reduction in traditional infrastructure (Chart 7). The combined spending in tech infrastructure (including information transmission such as 5G technology and services) and green energy stood at RMB1.6 trillion last year, compared with the RMB19 trillion investment in traditional infrastructure and RMB14 trillion in the real estate sector. Bottom Line: Beijing will continue to push for investment in new economy sectors since the leadership is determined to reduce dependency on unproductive segments of the economy. Even as the economy slows, they will be reluctant to ramp up leverage and channel capital to the old economy sectors. Unfortunately, the small size of the new economy’s sectors versus the old economy will inhibit their ability to stabilize and accelerate economic growth via these policies. Key View #2: The Pressure Points We do not think Beijing will allow the economy to freefall past the “point of no return”.  The economy still needs to grow by 4.5-5.0% per annum between 2021 and 2035 to achieve the target of doubling GDP by 2035 (Chart 8A and 8B). Chart 8AThe Structural Downshift In Chinese Growth Will Continue… The Structural Downshift In Chinese Growth Will Continue… The Structural Downshift In Chinese Growth Will Continue… Chart 8B...But A 5%+/- Rate Of Growth Will Keep China Well On Track Of Doubling Its GDP By 2035 ...But A 5%+/- Rate Of Growth Will Keep China Well On Track Of Doubling Its GDP By 2035 ...But A 5%+/- Rate Of Growth Will Keep China Well On Track Of Doubling Its GDP By 2035 Investors should watch the following pressure points to assess whether China’s leaders will feel the urgency to turn policy to outright reflationary: A collapse in onshore financial market prices. China’s economic fundamentals will weaken further in the next three to six months and the risks to Chinese equity prices are on the downside. However, the odds are still low that the onshore equity, bond and currency markets will plunge as in 2015. Onshore stocks are cheaper than during the height of their 2015 boom-bust cycle, margin trading remains well below its 2015 level and economic fundamentals are stronger (Chart 9). Selloffs by global investors in China’s offshore equity and high-yield bond markets have not triggered much panic in the onshore markets and, therefore, will not drive Beijing to change its macro policy (Chart 10). Chart 9Valuations In Chinese Stocks Are Not As Extreme As In 2015 Valuations In Chinese Stocks Are Not As Extreme As In 2015 Valuations In Chinese Stocks Are Not As Extreme As In 2015 Chart 10Onshore Markets Have Been Relatively Calm Onshore Markets Have Been Relatively Calm Onshore Markets Have Been Relatively Calm Chart 11China/US Growth Rates In 2022 Will Be Uncomfortably Close, Based On IMF Forecasts China/US Growth Rates In 2022 Will Be Uncomfortably Close, Based On IMF Forecasts China/US Growth Rates In 2022 Will Be Uncomfortably Close, Based On IMF Forecasts Narrowing growth differentials between China and the US. In the IMF’s October World Economic Outlook, economic growth in 2022 for China and the US is projected at 5.6% and 5.2%, respectively. The forecast suggests that next year the growth differential between the two largest economies will be narrowed to less than one percentage point, rarely seen in China’s post-reform history (Chart 11). Notably, the most recent Bloomberg consensus estimate for the 2022 US real GDP growth is much lower at 3.9%, whereas China is expected to grow by 5.3% and in line with the IMF forecast. We do not suggest that Beijing will make its policy decisions based on these growth projections. Rather, we expect that if China’s growth in 1H22 falls behind that in the US, Chinese policymakers will feel an urgency to stimulate the economy and show a better economic scorecard ahead of the all-important 20th NCCCP next fall.  Rising unemployment. Current data shows a mixed picture. Unemployment rates have been falling in all age groups (Chart 12). Demand for labor in urban areas, on the other hand, has been shrinking (Chart 13). The employment subindex in China’s service PMIs has also been dropping. Our view is that the resilient export/manufacturing sector has provided strong support to employment this year, while the labor supply in urban areas has been sluggish due to tighter travel restrictions and frequent regional lockdowns. The combination of strong manufacturing demand for labor and a lack of supply has reduced excesses in the labor market and the urgency to stimulate the economy (Chart 13, bottom panels). However, the picture could change if China’s exports start to slow into next year. Chart 12China's Unemployment Rate Is Falling... China's Unemployment Rate Is Falling... China's Unemployment Rate Is Falling... Chart 13...But Demand For Labor Is Also Falling ...But Demand For Labor Is Also Falling ...But Demand For Labor Is Also Falling Bottom Line: In the coming year, investors should watch for three pressure points that may trigger more forceful growth-supporting actions from policymakers: the onshore financial markets, economic growth differentials between the US and China, and labor market dynamics. Key View #3: The Exit Strategy Chart 14Service Sector Activities Have Been Restricted By Domestic Covid Cases And Frequent Lockdowns Service Sector Activities Have Been Restricted By Domestic Covid Cases And Frequent Lockdowns Service Sector Activities Have Been Restricted By Domestic Covid Cases And Frequent Lockdowns China will not completely lift its zero-tolerance policy toward COVID in the coming year. We will likely see tightened domestic preventive measures leading to the Beijing Olympics in February and the NCCCP in October. The zero-tolerance policy cannot be sustained in the long run; China’s stringent counter-COVID measures have created a stop-and-go pattern in China’s service sector, which has taken a toll on household consumption (Chart 14). As such, Chinese policymakers will face a trade-off between hefty economic costs from its current counter-COVID measures, and the potential social costs and risks if there is a dramatic increase in domestic COVID cases. China is estimated to have fully vaccinated more than 80% of its citizens and is close to launching its own mRNA vaccine next year to be used as a booster shot. However, the inoculation rate will likely matter less to Beijing’s decision to relax its draconian approach towards COVID given the emergence of the virulent Omicron variant. Recent statement by China's top respiratory experts suggests that China will return to normalcy if fatality rate of COVID-19 drops to around 0.1%, and when R0 (the virus reproduction ratio) sits between 1 and 1.5. A more important factor that could influence Beijing’s decision is the development and effectiveness of anti-viral drug treatments. Pfizer recently announced that its anti-viral oral drug Paxlovid can reduce the hospitalization and death rates by 89% if taken within three days of the onset of symptoms. The drug-maker has announced its intention to produce enough of the medication to treat 50 million people in 2022. China’s Tsinghua University has also developed an antibody combination drug that may reduce hospitalization and mortality by 78% and is expected to be approved by Chinese regulators within this year.  Beijing’s decision to abandon its zero-tolerance policy, therefore, will be based on the combined effectiveness of both vaccines and treatments. If clinical trials prove that the new antiviral drugs are effective in treating COVID patients, combined with China’s aggressive rollout of booster shots, then Beijing may incrementally relax its COVID containment measures by late 2022 or early 2023.  Bottom Line: China will not loosen its zero-tolerance policy until a combination of vaccines and treatments proves to be effective against COVID. Key View #4: Common Prosperity Will Gather Steam We expect the notion of common prosperity espoused by President Xi Jinping to gain momentum ahead of the 20th NCCCP. Beijing will likely roll out measures to support consumption, particularly for low-income households. At the same time, there is a high possibility that policymakers will introduce taxes on luxury goods and accelerate the legislative process on real estate taxes. Chart 15The Slump In Property Market Will Likely Be An Extended One The Slump In Property Market Will Likely Be An Extended One The Slump In Property Market Will Likely Be An Extended One The property market will remain in a limbo in 2022. In the near term, potential homebuyers will likely maintain their wait-and-see attitude before details of real estate taxes are disclosed. Home sales will remain in contraction despite improved mortgage lending conditions (Chart 15). Consumption taxes are expected to increase, targeting consumer discretionary and/or luxury goods. Chinese consumption of luxury goods benefited from government pro-growth measures last year, flush liquidity in the market and global travel restrictions. Meanwhile, growth in aggregate household income and consumption has been lackluster. President Xi Jinping’s common prosperity policy initiative is intended to narrow the income and wealth gap between the rich and poor. Moreover, empirical studies show that the marginal propensity to consume among lower- and middle-income groups, which account for more than 80% of China’s total population, is significantly higher than that of high-income groups. We expect more support for lower income groups as Beijing looks to stabilize the economy and narrow the wealth gap. Bottom Line: There is a high probability that policymakers will introduce taxes on the consumption of luxury goods and initiate the legislative process on real estate taxes in the next 12 months. Investment Conclusions Chinese stocks in both the onshore and offshore markets have cheapened relative to global equities. However, in absolute terms onshore stocks are not unduly cheap and offshore stocks are cheap for a reason (Chart 16). We remain defensive in our investment strategy for Chinese stocks in the next two quarters, given the headwinds facing the onshore and offshore markets. We do not rule out the possibility that China’s authorities will stimulate more forcefully in the next 12 months. However, for Chinese policymakers to ramp up leverage again, the near-term dynamics in the country’s economic cycle will have to significantly worsen. Chinese stocks will sell off in this scenario, but the selloff will provide investors with a good buying opportunity in the expectation of a more decisive stimulus (Chart 17). Chart 16Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap, While Offshore Stocks Are Cheap For A Reason Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap, While Offshore Stocks Are Cheap For A Reason Chinese Onshore Stocks Are Not Particularly Cheap, While Offshore Stocks Are Cheap For A Reason Chart 17Selloff Risks Are High Before The Economy Stabilizes Selloff Risks Are High Before The Economy Stabilizes Selloff Risks Are High Before The Economy Stabilizes Chart 18A Deja Vu Of 2018-2019? A Deja Vu Of 2018-2019? A Deja Vu Of 2018-2019? If the economy slows in an orderly and gradual manner, then there is a slim chance that policymakers will allow an overshoot in stimulus. The Politburo meeting on Monday sent a stronger pro-growth message, the PBoC cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate by 50bps, and regulators will likely allow a front-loading of local government special-purpose bonds in Q1 next year. However, based on the lessons learned in 2019, regulators can be quick to scale back policy support if they see there is a risk of overshooting in credit expansion (Chart 18). The measured stimulus during the 2018-2019 period did not bode well for Chinese stocks or global commodity prices (Chart 19A and 19B). Meanwhile, we do not think the recent selloff in offshore stocks provided good buying opportunities. In the next 6 to 12 months, any tactical rebound in Chinese investable stocks will present a good selling point. Chart 19AChina's Measured Stimulus In 2018-2019 Did Not Bode Well For Global Commodity Prices China's Measured Stimulus In 2018-2019 Did Not Bode Well For Global Commodity Prices China's Measured Stimulus In 2018-2019 Did Not Bode Well For Global Commodity Prices Chart 19BChinese Stocks Underperformed In 2018-2019 Chinese Stocks Underperformed In 2018-2019 Chinese Stocks Underperformed In 2018-2019 Investable stocks, highly concentrated in China’s internet companies, are caught in domestic regulatory clampdowns and geopolitical crossfires. We expect tensions between China and the US to intensify in 2022 in light of next fall’s 20th NCCCP in China and mid-term elections in the US. Furthermore, Didi Global’s decision to delist from the New York Stock Exchange last week highlights that both China and the US are unanimous in their efforts (although for different reasons) to remove Chinese firms from US bourses. Risks associated with future delisting of Chinese firms will continue to depress the valuations of Chinese technology stocks.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance