Energy

Dear client, We will not be publishing the US Equity Strategy next week, as I will be participating in BCA Investment Conference. We will return to our regular publishing schedule on September 19, 2022. Kind Regards, Irene Tunkel   Executive Summary Most Thematic ETFs Are Far Off Their Pandemic Peaks Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes In today’s sector Chart I-pack report we recap our structural investment themes. EV Revolution: The EV cohort benefits from a structural transformation of the automobile industry that is further supported by favorable legislative tailwinds, and shifting consumer preferences. Generation Z: Generation Zers are coming of age and wield an increasing influence over consumer trends. Cybersecurity: The pandemic-driven shift to remote work, broad-based migration to cloud computing and increasing geopolitical tensions, are all structural forces that will ensure a healthy demand pipeline for cybersecurity companies. Green And Clean: Green energy is becoming cheaper to produce, which supports a wider adaptation of green technologies. Green tech also enjoys favorable legislative tailwinds that are coming on the back of rising geopolitical tensions, the ongoing energy crisis, and climate change action. Renewables help to diversify energy sources and offer a path towards energy security. Bottom Line: Thematic investments that capture the latest technological breakthroughs present unprecedented long-term investment opportunities for investors who can stomach short-term volatility. Feature This week we are sending you a Sector Chart I-Pack, which offers macro, fundamentals, valuations, technicals, and uses of cash charts for each sector. In the front section of this publication, we will overview recent equity performance and provide a recap of the US Equity Strategy structural investment themes. August – When The Rally Came To A Stall As we predicted in the “What Will Bring This Rally To A Halt?” report, the “inflation is turning, and the Fed will be dovish” rally has come to a screeching halt. The S&P 500 was down 8% in August as investors finally believe that Jay Powell’s Fed is hell-bound on extinguishing inflation even if it means squelching economic growth (Chart I-1). The message from Jackson Hole was very much Mario Draghi-like: “whatever it takes.” The market reaction was swift and brutal. The rally winners were in the epicenter of the sell-off that ensued on the back of Powell’s comments. Invesco QQQ Trust is already down nearly 9% off its August 16 peak, while Ark Innovation (ARKK) is down 13% (Chart I-2).  We expect that equities will continue to revert to their pre-summer lows. Chart I-1Summer Rally Winners Are At The Epicenter Of The Sell-off Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Chart I-2Most Thematic ETFs Are Far Off Their Pandemic Peaks Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes With rates on the rise again, last week we shifted our overweight of Growth and underweight of Value to a neutral allocation. The last few months have been a rollercoaster. However, long-term investors may successfully survive the grind by resolutely sticking to some of the winning structural investment themes and ignoring short-term volatility. The fact that many themes are now more than 50% off their pandemic highs may indicate an opportune entry point. EV Revolution We initiated the EV Revolution theme in June 2021. Since then, the theme has outperformed the S&P 500 by 19%. The Auto and Components industry group is in the middle of a momentous transition to electric and autonomous vehicle manufacturing, thanks to technological advances in battery storage, AI, and radars. These technological breakthroughs help overcome most of the obstacles to the wide adoption of EVs. Multiple new entrants develop charging networks. Driving ranges are also rapidly increasing – Lucid promises a 500-mile range compared to Tesla’s 350. Couple that with the rising price of gas, the aging vehicle fleet, and the expectation that EVs will approach sticker parity with gas-powered cars as soon as 2023 (Chart I-3)  and there is no turning back to gas-guzzling vehicles. LMC Automotive forecasts that by 2031, EVs will reach 17 million units. Chart I-3EVs Will Reach Price Parity With ICEs In 2023 Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes The entire EV cohort also benefits from favorable legislative tailwinds, thanks to this administration’s support of decarbonization. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) includes approximately $370 billion in clean energy spending, as well as EV tax credits for both new and used cars. In addition, executive action by President Biden has tightened fuel economy standards. California has mandated a complete switch to EV vehicles by 2035. The surge in EV Capex and R&D spending will boost the entire supply chain, which consists of chip manufacturers, battery and lidar R&D, part manufacturers, and charging networks. Many of these companies are still small. An ETF may be the best way to capture the theme (Table I-1). Table I-1EV/AV ETFs Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Generation Z: The Digital Natives The GenZ theme, which we identified exactly a year ago, has collapsed since the beginning of the market downturn and is down 47%. Its success was at the root of its demise – it captured overcrowded names most popular among GenZers, who are avid investors (Chart I-4). However, the theme is not “dead,” as a new cohort of Americans is coming of age, and they are not shy about it. Generation Z in the US includes 62 million people born between 1997 and 2012 (Chart I-5). With $143B in buying power in the US alone making up nearly 40% of all consumer sales, Gen Z wields increasing influence over consumer trends. This is the first generation of digital natives—they simply can’t remember the world without the internet. They are the early adopters of the new digital ways to bank, get medical treatments, and learn. Gen Z is joining the workforce and replacing retiring baby boomers. Chart I-4Gen Zers Are Avid Investors... Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Chart I-5Gen Zers Are Taking Over Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Gen Z is an umbrella theme that captures many other prominent themes, such as Fintech (Paypal & Social Finance), Crypto (COIN), Meme-investing (HOOD), Gaming and Alternative Reality (GAMR & ESPO), and Online Dating. But GenZers have a few behavioral quirks that make them different even from Millennials: Quality-Over-Price Shoppers: Gen Z was found to be less price sensitive when buying products, choosing quality over price. Lululemon (LULU) and Goose (GOOS) are among Gen Z’s favorites. Healthy Lifestyle: Gen Z is a “green” generation that deeply cares about the planet, loves the outdoors and traveling, and is crazy about pets. This is also a generation that prizes a healthy lifestyle and working out: Beyond Meat (BYND), Planet Fitness (PLNT), and Yeti (YETI). Generation Sober Chooses Cannabis: GenZers perceive hard liquor and tobacco as bad for their health. Curiously, marijuana is considered “healthy.” MSOS, CNBS, YOLO, and THCX are the biggest ETFs in this space. How To Invest In Gen Z? Gen Z is a nascent investment theme, so there are no ETFs available in the market yet. We propose that investors follow our Gen Z investment themes or replicate fully or partially our Gen Z basket. Cybersecurity: A Must-Have For Survival Despite its celebrity status, this is an industry that is still in the early innings of a growth cycle. The pandemic-driven shift to remote work, broad-based migration to cloud computing, development of the internet-of-things, and increasing geopolitical tensions create new targets for hackers who are after valuable data or just want to achieve maximum damage to the networks. Ubiquitous digitization requires increasingly more complex cyber defenses. With cybercrime costing the world nearly $600 billion each year and cyberattacks increasing in number and sophistication, the global cybersecurity market is expected to grow from $125 billion in 2020 to $175 billion by 2024. Both large and small businesses are yet to fully implement cybersecurity defenses. According to a survey by Forbes magazine, 55% of business executives plan to increase their budgets for cybersecurity in 2021 aiming to prevent malicious attacks. In response to the numerous breaches, the current US administration is placing a high priority on defensive cyber programs. Since 2017, US government departments have seen the cybersecurity share of their basic discretionary funding rise steadily from 1.38% to 1.73%. These developments are a boon for cybersecurity stocks (Chart I-6 & Chart I-7 ), the sales of which are soaring (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Cybercrime Losses Spur Demand for Cybersecurity Cybercrime Losses Spur Demand for Cybersecurity Cybercrime Losses Spur Demand for Cybersecurity Chart I-7Stepped Up Government Spending Will Lift Cybersecurity Stocks Stepped Up Government Spending Will Lift Cybersecurity Stocks Stepped Up Government Spending Will Lift Cybersecurity Stocks Chart I-8Cybersecurity Sales Are Soaring Cybersecurity Sales Are Soaring Cybersecurity Sales Are Soaring We introduced cybersecurity as a structural investment theme back in October 2021. So far, the CIBR ETF, which we use as a proxy for the performance of the theme, has underperformed the S&P 500 by 11%. Monetary tightening has weighed on the performance of these companies as they tend to be younger, smaller, and less profitable than their S&P 500 counterparts, i.e., CIBR has a strong small-cap growth bias. However, with cybersecurity stocks down 26% off their November-2021 peak and valuation premium back to earth, now may be an opportune moment to add to the theme. After all, these stocks have tremendous growth potential, warranting a long-term position in most equity portfolios. There are several highly liquid ETFs powered by the cybersecurity theme, such as CIBR, BUG, and HACK, which can be excellent investment vehicles (Table I-2). Table I-2Cybersecurity ETFs Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Green And Clean We introduced the “Green and Clean” theme back in March. Since then, it has outperformed the S&P 500 by 22%, benefiting from this administration’s focus on the mitigation of climate change. Putin’s energy stand-off with Europe has also put the industry into the global spotlight. The development of renewables will help diversify energy sources and offer a path toward energy security. Thus, renewable energy and cleantech companies are at the core of the global push to increase energy security and contain climate change. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) expects renewables to scale up from 14% of total energy today to around 40% in 2030. Global annual additions of renewable power would triple by 2030 as recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Solar and wind power will attract the lion’s share of investments. Over the past 20 years, this country has made significant strides in shifting its energy generation toward renewable sources away from fossil fuels, increasing the share of clean energy from 3.7% in 2000 to 10% in 2020 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9A Structural Trend A Structural Trend A Structural Trend The key reason for the proliferation of green energy generation is that renewable electricity is becoming cheaper than electricity produced by fossil fuels – according to IRENA, 62% of the added renewable power generation capacity had lower electricity costs than the cheapest source of new fossil fuel-fired capacity. Costs for renewable technologies continued to fall significantly over the past year (Chart I-10). Renewables are similar to traditional utility companies: They require a massive upfront investment, but also enjoy substantial operating leverage. As production capacity increases, the cost of energy generation falls. Solar power generation is a case in point (Chart I-11). Hence, we have a positive reinforcement loop: more usage begets even more usage, bolstering the economic case for transitioning to cleaner energy resources. Chart I-10R&D Is Paying Off Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Chart I-11Capacity Is Inversely Correlated To Prices Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Increased renewables adaptation is possible thanks to several technological advancements including improved battery storage, implementation of smart grid networks, and an increase in carbon capture activities. There is a host of ETFs that offer investors a wide range of choices for access to renewable energy and cleantech themes (Table I-3). These ETFs differ in geographic span, industry focus, liquidity, and cost, but all are viable investment options. Table I-3Clean Tech ETFs Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Recap Of Long-term Investment Themes Bottom Line Thematic investments that capture the latest technological breakthroughs present unprecedented long-term investment opportunities. However, these investments come with a warning: Technological innovation themes are intrinsically risky as they are rarely immediately profitable and require both continuous investment and technological breakthroughs to succeed. Also, most technological innovation themes carry high exposure to the small-cap growth style and are sensitive to rising rates and slowing growth. As such, they are fickle over the short term but pay off over a longer investment horizon.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com     S&P 500 Chart II-1Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-2Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-3Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-4Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Communication Services Chart II-5Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-6Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-7Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-8Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Discretionary Chart II-9C Macroeconomic Backdrop C Macroeconomic Backdrop C Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-10Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-11Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-12Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Staples Chart II-13Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-14Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-15Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-16Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Energy Chart II-17Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-18Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-19Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-20Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Financials Chart II-21Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-22Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-23Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-24Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Health Care Chart II-25Sector vs Industry Groups Sector vs Industry Groups Sector vs Industry Groups Chart II-26Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-27Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-28Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Industrials Chart II-29Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-30Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-31Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-32Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Information Technology Chart II-33Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-34Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-35Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-36Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Materials Chart II-37Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-38Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-39Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-40Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Real Estate Chart II-41Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-42Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-43Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-44Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Utilities Chart II-45Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-46Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart II-47Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart II-48Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Recommended Allocation Recommended Allocation: Addendum What Our Clients Are Asking: The Bear Market 2.0 Webcast Follow Up What Our Clients Are Asking: The Bear Market 2.0 Webcast Follow Up

Listen to a short summary of this report     Executive Summary On the eve of the pandemic, most developed economies were operating at close to full capacity – the aggregate supply curve, in other words, had become very steep (or inelastic). Not surprisingly, in such an environment, pandemic-related stimulus, rather than boosting output, simply stoked inflation. Looking out, the inverse may turn out to be true: Just as an increase in aggregate demand did more to lift prices than output during the pandemic, a decrease in aggregate demand may allow inflation to fall without much loss in production or employment. Skeptics will argue that such benign disinflations rarely occur, pointing to the 1982 recession. But long-term inflation expectations were close to 10% back then. Today, they are broadly in line with the Fed’s target. Equities will recover from their recent correction as headline inflation continues to fall and the risks of a US recession diminish. Go long EUR/USD on any break below 0.99. Contrary to the prevailing pessimistic view, Europe is heading for a V-shaped recovery. The Aggregate Supply Curve Becomes Very Steep When Spare Capacity Is Exhausted Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Bottom Line: The US economy is entering a temporary Goldilocks period of falling inflation and stronger growth. The latest correction in stocks will end soon. Investors should overweight global equities over the next six months but look to turn more defensive thereafter.   Dear Client, I will be attending BCA’s annual conference in New York City next week. Instead of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report written by Mathieu Savary, BCA’s Chief European Strategist, and Robert Robis, BCA’s Chief Fixed Income Strategist, on Monday, September 12. Their report will discuss estimates of global neutral interest rates. We will resume our regular publication schedule on September 16. Best Regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist The Hawks Descend On Jackson Hole Chart 1Markets Still Think The Fed Will Start Cutting Rates Next Year Markets Still Think The Fed Will Start Cutting Rates Next Year Markets Still Think The Fed Will Start Cutting Rates Next Year Jay Powell’s Jackson Hole address jolted the stock market last week. Citing the historical danger of allowing inflation to remain above target for too long, the Fed chair stressed the need for “maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time.” Powell’s comments were consistent with the Fed’s dot plot, which expects rates to remain above 3% right through to the end of 2024. However, with the markets pricing in rate cuts starting in mid 2023, his remarks came across as decidedly hawkish (Chart 1). While Fedspeak can clearly influence markets in the near term, our view is that the economy calls the shots over the medium-to-long term. The Fed sees the same data as everyone else. If inflation comes down rapidly over the coming months, the FOMC will ratchet down its hawkish rhetoric, opting instead for a wait-and-see approach. The Slope of Hope Could inflation fall quickly in the absence of a deep recession? The answer depends on a seemingly esoteric concept: the slope of the aggregate supply curve. Economists tend to depict the aggregate supply curve as being convex in nature – fairly flat (or “elastic”) when there is significant spare capacity and becoming increasingly steep (or “inelastic”) as spare capacity is exhausted (Chart 2). The basic idea is that firms do not require substantially higher prices to produce more output when they have a lot of spare capacity, but do require increasingly high prices to produce more output when spare capacity is low. Chart 2The Aggregate Supply Curve Becomes Very Steep When Spare Capacity Is Exhausted Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? When the aggregate supply curve is very elastic, an increase in aggregate demand will mainly lead to higher output rather than higher prices. In contrast, when the aggregate supply curve is inelastic, rising demand will primarily translate into higher prices rather than increased output. In early 2020, most of the developed world found itself on the steep side of the aggregate supply curve. The unemployment rate in the OECD stood at 5.3%, the lowest in 40 years (Chart 3). In the US, the unemployment rate had reached a 50-year low of 3.5%. Thus, not surprisingly, as fiscal and monetary policy turned simulative, inflation moved materially higher. Goods inflation, in particular, accelerated during the pandemic (Chart 4). Perhaps most notably, the exodus of people to the suburbs, combined with the reluctance to use mass transit, led to a surge in both new and used car prices (Chart 5). The upward pressure on auto prices was exacerbated by a shortage of semiconductors, itself a consequence of the spike in the demand for electronic goods. Chart 3The Pandemic Began When The Unemployment Rate In The OECD Was At A Multi-Decade Low The Pandemic Began When The Unemployment Rate In The OECD Was At A Multi-Decade Low The Pandemic Began When The Unemployment Rate In The OECD Was At A Multi-Decade Low Chart 4With Supply Unable To Meet Demand, Goods Prices Surged During The Pandemic With Supply Unable To Meet Demand, Goods Prices Surged During The Pandemic With Supply Unable To Meet Demand, Goods Prices Surged During The Pandemic The supply curve for labor also became increasingly inelastic over the course of the pandemic. Once the US unemployment rate fell back below 4%, wages began to accelerate sharply. The kink in the Phillips curve had been reached (Chart 6). Chart 5Car Prices Went On Quite A Ride During The Pandemic Car Prices Went On Quite A Ride During The Pandemic Car Prices Went On Quite A Ride During The Pandemic Chart 6Wage Growth Soared When The Economy Moved Beyond Full Employment Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Chart 7Job Switchers Usually See Faster Wage Growth Job Switchers Usually See Faster Wage Growth Job Switchers Usually See Faster Wage Growth Faster labor market churn further turbocharged wage growth. Both the quits rate and the hiring rate rose during the pandemic. Typically, workers who switch jobs experience faster wage growth than those who do not (Chart 7). This wage premium for job switching increased during the pandemic, helping to lift overall wage growth. A Symmetric Relationship? All this raises a critical question: If an increase in aggregate demand along the inelastic side of the aggregate supply curve mainly leads to higher prices rather than increased output and employment, is the inverse also true – that is, would a comparable decrease in aggregate demand simply lead to much lower inflation without much of a loss in output or employment? If so, this would greatly increase the odds of a soft landing. Skeptics would argue that disinflations are rarely painless. They would point to the 1982 recession which, until the housing bubble burst, was the deepest recession in the post-war era. The problem with that comparison is that long-term inflation expectations were extremely high in the early 1980s. Both consumers and professional forecasters expected inflation to average nearly 10% over the remainder of the decade (Chart 8). To bring down long-term inflation expectations, Paul Volcker had to engineer a deep recession. Chart 8Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Much Better Anchored Now Than In The Early 1980s Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Chart 9Real Long Terms Bond Yields Are Currently A Fraction Of What They Were Four Decades Ago Real Long Terms Bond Yields Are Currently A Fraction Of What They Were Four Decades Ago Real Long Terms Bond Yields Are Currently A Fraction Of What They Were Four Decades Ago Jay Powell does not face such a problem. Both survey-based and market-based long-term inflation expectations are well anchored. Whereas real long-term bond yields reached 8% in 1982, the 30-year TIPS yield today is still less than 1% (Chart 9). The Impact of Lower Home Prices Chart 10Supply-Side Constraints Limited Home Building During The Pandemic, Helping To Push Up Home Prices Supply-Side Constraints Limited Home Building During The Pandemic, Helping To Push Up Home Prices Supply-Side Constraints Limited Home Building During The Pandemic, Helping To Push Up Home Prices While falling consumer prices would boost real incomes, helping to keep the economy out of recession, a drop in home prices would have the opposite effect on consumer spending. As occurred with other durable goods, a shortage of building materials and qualified workers prevented US homebuilders from constructing as many new homes as they would have liked during the pandemic. The producer price index for construction materials soared by over 50% between May 2020 and May 2022 (Chart 10). As a result, rising demand for homes largely translated into higher home prices rather than increased homebuilding.  Real home prices, as measured by the Case-Shiller index, have increased by 25% since February 2020, rising above their housing bubble peak. As we discussed last week, US home prices will almost certainly fall in real terms and probably in nominal terms as well over the coming years. Chart 11Despite Higher Home Prices, Households Have Not Been Using Their Homes As ATMs Despite Higher Home Prices, Households Have Not Been Using Their Homes As ATMs Despite Higher Home Prices, Households Have Not Been Using Their Homes As ATMs How much of a toll will falling home prices have on the economy? It took six years for home prices to bottom following the bursting of the housing bubble. It will probably take even longer this time around, given that the homeowner vacancy rate is at a record low and reasonably prudent mortgage lending standards will limit foreclosure sales. Thus, while there will be a negative wealth effect from falling home prices, it probably will not become pronounced until 2024 or so. Moreover, unlike during the housing boom, US households have not been tapping the equity in their homes to finance consumption (Chart 11). This also suggests that the impact of falling home prices on consumption will be far smaller than during the Great Recession. Inelastic Commodity Supply While inelastic supply curves had the redeeming feature of preventing a glut of, say, new autos or homes from emerging, they also limited the output of many commodities that face structural shortages. Compounding this problem is the fact that the demand for many commodities is very inelastic in the short run. When you combine a very steep supply curve with a very steep demand curve, small shifts in either curve can produce wild swings in prices.  Nowhere is this problem more evident than in Europe, where a rapid reduction in oil and gas flows has caused energy prices to soar, forcing policymakers to scramble to find new sources of supply.  Europe’s Energy Squeeze At this point, it looks like both the UK and the euro area will enter a recession. In continental Europe, the near-term outlook is grimmer in Germany and Italy than it is in France or Spain. The latter two countries are less vulnerable to an energy crunch (Spain imports a lot of LNG while France has access to nuclear energy). Both countries also have fairly resilient service sectors (Spain, in particular, is benefiting from a boom in tourism). The good news is that even in the most troubled European economies, the bottom for growth is probably closer at hand than widely feared. Despite the fact that imports of Russian gas have fallen by more than 60%, Europe has been able to rebuild gas inventories to about 80% of capacity, roughly in line with prior years (Chart 12). It has been able to achieve this feat by aggressively buying gas on the open market, no matter the price. While this has caused gas prices to soar, it sets the stage for a possible retreat in prices in 2023, something that the futures market is already discounting (Chart 13). Chart 12Europe: Squirrelling Away Gas For The Winter Europe: Squirrelling Away Gas For The Winter Europe: Squirrelling Away Gas For The Winter Chart 13Natural Gas Prices In Europe Will Come Back Down To Earth Natural Gas Prices In Europe Will Come Back Down To Earth Natural Gas Prices In Europe Will Come Back Down To Earth Europe is also moving with uncharacteristic haste to secure new sources of energy supply. In less than one year, Europe has become America’s biggest overseas market for LNG. A new gas pipeline linking Spain with the rest of Europe should be operational by next spring. In the meantime, Germany is building two “floating” LNG terminals. Germany has also postponed plans to mothball its nuclear power plants and has approved increased use of coal-fired electricity generators. Chart 14The Euro Is Undervalued The Euro Is Undervalued The Euro Is Undervalued France is seeking to boost nuclear capacity. As of August 29, 57% of nuclear generation capacity was offline. Electricité de France expects daily production to rise to around 50 gigawatts (GW) by December from around 27 GW at present. For its part, the Dutch government is likely to raise output from the massive Groningen natural gas field. All this suggests that contrary to the prevailing pessimistic view, Europe is heading for a V-shaped recovery. The euro, which is 30% undervalued against the US dollar on a purchasing power parity basis, will rally (Chart 14). Go long EUR/USD on any break below 0.99. Investment Conclusions Chart 15Falling Inflation Should Boost Real Wages And Buoy Consumer Confidence Falling Inflation Should Boost Real Wages And Buoy Consumer Confidence Falling Inflation Should Boost Real Wages And Buoy Consumer Confidence On the eve of the pandemic, most developed economies were operating at close to full capacity – the aggregate supply curve, in other words, had become very steep (or inelastic). Not surprisingly, in such an environment, pandemic-related stimulus, rather than boosting output, simply stoked inflation. Looking out, the inverse may turn out to be true: Just as an increase in aggregate demand did more to lift prices than output during the pandemic, a decrease in aggregate demand may allow inflation to fall with little loss in production or employment. Will this be the end of the story? Probably not. As inflation falls, US real wage growth, which is currently negative, will turn positive. Consumer confidence will improve, boosting consumer spending in the process (Chart 15). The aggregate demand curve will shift outwards again, triggering a “second wave” of inflation in the back half of 2023. Rather than cutting rates next year, as the market still expects, the Fed will raise rates to 5%. This will set the stage for a recession in 2024. Investors should overweight global equities over the next six months but look to turn more defensive thereafter. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on            LinkedIn & Twitter   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing? Inelastic Supply: The Secret To A Soft Landing?      

Executive Summary US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? A US-Iran deal would make for a notable improvement in the geopolitical backdrop during an otherwise gloomy year. It would remove the risk of a major new oil shock. We maintain our 40% subjective odds of a deal, which is well below consensus. The risk of failure is underrated. Our conviction level is only moderate because President Biden can make concessions to clinch a deal – and Supreme Leader Khamenei may want to earn some money and time. Yet we have high conviction in our view that the US will ultimately fail to provide Iran with sufficient security guarantees while Iran will pursue a nuclear deterrent. Hence the Middle East will present a long-term energy supply constraint. In the short term, global growth and recession risk will drive oil prices, not any Iran deal. Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / BROAD MARKET EQUITIES 2020-11-27 9.3% Bottom Line: Any US-Iran deal will be marginally positive for risky assets. However, the failure of a deal would sharply increase the odds of oil supply disruptions in the short run. Feature Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remain in a critical phase. Rumors suggest Iran has agreed to rejoin the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) with the United States. But these rumors are unconfirmed, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) just announced that Iran has started operating more advanced centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear site.1 In this report we provide a tactical update on the topic. A US-Iran nuclear deal is one item on our checklist for global macro and geopolitical stability (Table 1). We are pessimistic about a deal but it would be a positive outcome for markets. Table 1Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? A decision could come at any moment so investors should bear in mind our key conclusions about a deal: Chart 1Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga 1.  Any deal will be a short-term, stop-gap measure to delay a crisis until 2024 or beyond. This is not a small point because a crisis could lead to a large military conflict. 2.  The short-run implication of any deal is oil volatility, not a drop in oil prices (Chart 1). Global demand is wobbly and OPEC could cut oil production in reaction to a deal. 3.  Over the long run, global supply and demand balances will remain tight even if a deal is agreed. 4.  If there is no deal, then a major new source of global supply constraint will emerge immediately due to a new spiral of conflict in the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear program will continue which will prompt threats from Israel and the Gulf Arab states and Iranian counter-threats. We are sticking with our subjective 40/60 odds that a deal will occur – i.e. our conviction level is medium, not high. The Biden administration wants a deal and has the executive authority to conclude a deal. Iran wants sanctions lifted and can buy time with a short-term deal. Our pessimism stems from the fact that neither side can trust the other, the US can no longer give credible security guarantees, and Iran has a strategic interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. A deal can happen but its durability depends on the 2024 US election. Status Of Negotiations Table 2Iran’s Three Demands Of US For Rejoining 2015 Nuclear Deal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Ostensibly there were three outstanding Iranian demands over the month of August that needed to be met to secure a deal (Table 2). Iran reportedly dropped the first demand: that the US remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps from the US State Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This concession prompted the news media to become more optimistic about a deal. This leaves two outstanding demands. Iran wants the IAEA conclude a “safeguards” investigation into unexplained uranium traces found at unauthorized sites in Iran, indicating nuclear activity that has not been accounted for. The IAEA will be very reluctant to halt such a probe on a political, not technical, basis. But it could happen under US pressure. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyRoulette With A Five-Shooter Iran also wants the US to provide a “guarantee” that future presidents will not renege on the nuclear deal and reimpose sanctions like President Trump did in 2019. President Biden cannot give any credible guarantee because the JCPA is an executive action, not a formal treaty, so a different president could reverse it. (The deal always lacked sufficient support in the Senate, even from top Democrats.) Iran is demanding certain diplomatic concessions and/or an economic indemnity in the event of another American reversal. Aside from attempting to incarcerate former President Trump, Biden can only offer empty promises on this front. In what follows we review the critical constraints facing the US and Iran. The US’s Constraints The first constraint on the US is the stagflationary economy. High inflation and oil prices pose a threat to President Biden and the Democrats not only in this year’s midterm elections but also in the 2024 presidential election. A recession is not at all unlikely by that time, given the inverted yield curve (Chart 2). If the US can help maintain stability in the Middle East, then the odds of another major oil supply shock (on top of Russia) will be reduced. Lifting sanctions on Iran will free up around 1 million barrels of oil to feed global demand. With Europe and the US imposing an oil and oil shipping embargo on Russia, the world is likely to lose around two million barrels of crude per day that the Gulf Arab states can only partially make up for, according to our Chief Commodity Strategist Bob Ryan (Table 3). This is a notable material constraint – and the main reason that Bob is more optimistic about an Iran deal than we are. Chart 2US Economic Constraint: Stagflation US Economic Constraint: Stagflation US Economic Constraint: Stagflation ​​​​​ Table 3The Oil Math Behind Any Iran Deal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? However, Saudi Arabia would be alienated by a US-Iran détente. The American view is that Iranian production would threaten Saudi market share and force the Saudis to produce more. But the Saudis are seeing weakening global demand and have signaled that they will cut production. There is still an economic basis for an Iran deal but it is not clear that it will lower prices, especially in the short run. Over the long run the Saudis are a more reliable oil producer than Iran for both economic and geopolitical reasons. The second constraint is political. The US public is primarily concerned about the economy. Stagflation or recession could ultimately bring down the Biden administration. However, in the short run, American voters are much more concerned about domestic social issues (such as abortion access) than they are about foreign policy. In the long run, American voters are likely to maintain their long-held negative view of Iran (Chart 3). So the Biden administration has an incentive to prevent geopolitical events from hurting the economy but not to join arms with Iran in a major diplomatic agreement. The third constraint is military. Americans are not as war-weary today as they were in 2008 or 2016 but they are still averse to any new military conflicts in the Middle East. An Iranian nuclear bomb could change that view – but until a bomb is tested it will persist. Chart 3US Political Constraint: Americans Ignore Foreign Policy, Dislike Iran Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? ​​​​​​ Chart 4US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? If Iran freezes its nuclear program then it will reduce the odds of a Middle Eastern war and large-scale oil supply disruptions. If Iran does not freeze its nuclear program, then Israel will have to demonstrate a credible military threat against nuclear weaponization, and then Iran will have to demonstrate its region-wide militant capabilities, including the ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz (Chart 4). The Biden administration wants to delay this downward spiral or avoid it altogether. Chart 5US Strategic Constraint: Avoid Mideast Quagmires Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? The fourth constraint is strategic. The Biden administration wants to avoid conflict if possible because it is attempting to reduce America’s burden in the Middle East so that it can focus on emerging great power competition in Eastern Europe and East Asia. The original motivation for the Iran deal was to enable the US to “pivot to Asia” and counter China. Iranian hegemony in the Middle East is less of a threat than Chinese hegemony in East Asia (Chart 5). This logic is sound if Iran can really be brought to halt its nuclear program. The Europeans need to stabilize and open up the Middle East to create an alternative energy supply to Russia. The Americans need to avoid a nuclear arms race and war in the Middle East that distracts them from China. However, if Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapon, then the US suffers strategically for doing a short-term deal that provides Iran with time and access to funds. Ultimately the only thing that can dissuade Iran from going nuclear is American power projection in the Middle East – and this capability is also one of the US’s greatest advantages over China. Bottom Line: The US has a strategic, military, and economic interest in concluding a deal that freezes Iran’s nuclear program. It arguably has an interest in a deal even if Iran violates the deal and pursues nuclear weaponization, since that will provide a legitimate basis for what would then become a necessary military intervention. The Biden administration faces some political blowback for a deal but will suffer more if failure to get a deal leads to a Middle Eastern oil shock. For all these reasons Biden administration is attempting to clinch a deal. But Iran is the sticking point. Iran’s Constraints Our reasons for pessimism regarding the nuclear talks hinge on Iran, not the United States. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s goal is to secure the regime and arrange for a stable succession in the coming years. A deal with the Americans made sense in that context. But going forward, if dealing with the Americans does not bring credible security guarantees and yet makes the economy vulnerable again to a future snapback of sanctions, then the justification for the deal falls apart. We cannot read Khamenei’s mind any more than we can read Biden’s mind, so we will look at the material limitations. Chart 6Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation First, the economic constraint: The Iranian economy suffered a huge negative shock from the reimposition of sanctions in 2019 (Chart 6). However, the economy has sputtered through this shock and the Covid-19 shock without collapsing. Social unrest is an ever-present risk but it has not spiraled out of control. There has not been an attempted democratic revolution like in 2009. The upswing in the global commodity cycle has reinforced the regime. Sanctions do not prevent exports entirely. There is still a huge monetary incentive to let the Biden administration lift sanctions if it wants to do so: a deal is estimated to free up $100 billion dollars per year in revenue for the regime for ten years.2 Realistically this should be understood as more than $275 billion for two years since the longevity of the deal is in question. The problem is that Iran’s economy would be fully exposed to sanctions again if the US changed its mind. The bottom line is that the economic constraint does not force Iran to accept a deal but it is enticing. Second comes the political constraint. President Ebrahim Raisi hopes to become supreme leader someday and is loath to put his name on a deal with weak foundations. He originally opposed the deal, was vindicated, and does not now want to jeopardize his political future by making the same mistake as his hapless predecessor, Hassan Rouhani. Opinion polls may not be reliable in putting Raisi as the most popular politician in Iran but they probably are reliable in showing Rouhani at the bottom of the heap (Chart 7). There is a significant political constraint against rejoining the deal. Chart 7Iran’s Political Constraint: Risk Of American Betrayal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Chart 8Iran’s Military Constraint: Outgunned, Unsure Of Allies Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Third comes the military constraint. While Iran is extremely vulnerable to Israeli and American military attack, it is also a fortress of a country, nestled in mountains, and airstrikes may not succeed in destroying the entire nuclear program or bringing down the regime. An attack by Israel could convert an entirely new generation to the Islamic revolution. And Iran may believe that the US lacks the popular support for military action in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran may also believe that China and Russia will provide military and economic support (Chart 8). Ultimately, America has demonstrated a willingness to attack rogue states and Iran will try to avoid that outcome, since it could succeed in toppling the regime. But if Iran believes it can acquire a deliverable nuclear weapon in a few short years, then it may make a dash for it, since this solution would be a permanent solution: a nuclear deterrent against western attack, as opposed to temporary diplomatic promises. We often compare Iran’s strategic predicament to that of Ukraine, Libya, and North Korea. Ukraine gave up its Soviet nuclear weapons after the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which promised that Russia, the US, the UK, France, and China would guarantee its security. Yet Russia ended up invading 20 years later – and none of the others prevented it or sent troops to halt the Russian advance. Separately Libya gave up its nuclear program in 2003 but NATO attacked and toppled the regime in 2011 anyway. Meanwhile North Korea played the diplomatic game with the US, ever inching along on the path toward nuclear weapons, and today has achieved nuclear-armed status and greater regime security. The outflow of refugees from the various regimes shows why Iran will emulate North Korea (Chart 9). Chart 9Iran’s Strategic Constraint: The Need For A Nuclear Deterrent Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Bottom Line: Iran has a short-term economic incentive to agree to a deal and a long-term military incentive. But ultimately the US cannot provide ironclad security guarantees that would justify halting the quest for a nuclear deterrent. A nuclear deterrent would overcome the military constraint. Therefore Iran will continue on that path. Any deal will be a ruse to buy time. Final Assessment The 2015 deal occurred in a context of Iranian strategic isolation, when American implementation was credible, oil prices were weak, and Iran had not achieved nuclear breakout capacity. Today Iran is not isolated (thanks to US quarrels with Russia and China), American guarantees are not credible (thanks to the polarization of foreign policy), oil prices are not weak (thanks to Russia), and Iran has already achieved nuclear breakout (Table 4). Table 4Iran’s Nuclear Program Status Check, Aug. 31, 2022 Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? The US’s strategic aim is to create a balance of power in the region but Iran’s strategic aim is to ensure regime survival. The US’s emerging balancing coalition (Israel and the Gulf Arab states) increases the strategic threat to Iran and hence its need for a nuclear deterrent. While Russia and China formally support the 2015 deal, they each see Iran as a valuable asset in a great power struggle with the United States. Iran sees them the same way. Russia needs Iran as a partner to bypass western sanctions. Regardless, it benefits from Middle Eastern instability, which could entangle the United States. China must develop a deep long-term partnership with Iran for its own strategic reasons and does not look forward to a time when the US divests from that region to impose tougher strategic containment on China. China can survive a US conflict with Iran – and such a conflict could reduce the US ability to defend Taiwan. While neither Russia nor China positively desire Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, neither power stopped North Korea from obtaining the bomb – far from it. Russia assumes that Israel and the US will take military action to prevent weaponization, which would be catastrophic for the region but positive for Russia. China also assumes Israel and the US will act, which reinforces its need to diversify energy options so that it can access Russian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern oil via pipeline. Investment Takeaways Our negative view on the global economy and geopolitical backdrop is once again being priced into global financial markets as equities fall anew. An Iran deal would delay a notable geopolitical risk for roughly the next 24 months and hence remove a major upside risk for oil prices. This would be marginally positive for global equities, although it will not be the driver. Europe’s and China’s economic woes are the drivers. The failure of a deal would bring major upside risks for oil into the near term and as such would be negative for equities – and could even become the global driver, as Middle Eastern oil disruptions will follow promptly from any failure of the deal. We continue to recommend that investors overweight US equities relative to global, defensive sectors relative to cyclicals, and large caps relative to small caps. We are overweight aerospace and defense stocks, India and Southeast Asia within emerging markets, and underweight China and Taiwan.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See Iran International, “Exclusive: Ex-IAEA Official Says US And Iran To Sign Deal Soon,” August 30, 2022, iranintl.com. See also Francois Murphy, “Iran enriching uranium with more IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz -IAEA,” Reuters, August 31, 2022, reuters.com. 2     See Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Tehran’s $1 Trillion Deal: An Updated Forecast of Iran’s Financial Windfall From a New Nuclear Agreement,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 19, 2022, fdd.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Dear Client, We will not be publishing the Commodity & Energy Strategy next week, as I will be participating in a panel discussion with Dr. Bassam Fattouh, Director of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES), which will focus on global energy markets and their evolution.  Our panel will be moderated by my colleague Roukaya Ibrahim, Managing Editor of BCA Research's Daily Insights.  We will return to our regular publishing schedule on September 15, 2022. Sincerely, Robert Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist Executive Summary  The Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) will throw just under $370 billion at incentivizing renewable-energy development via tax credits, grants and loans, and, in what arguably is a concession to common sense, to adding and extending incentives for conventional energy sources, carbon capture and hydrogen. In the short run, the IRA could add to systematic stress in the North American bulk power supply market, which still is contending with grid stability issues caused by solar PV generation. In a direct shot at the dominance of EV supply chains by China, the IRA subsidizes EVs assembled in North America using batteries sourced from there and critical minerals sourced either from the US or states which have a Free Trade Agreement with the US. The IRA will increase global competition for base metals supplies, which already are tight.  This will push prices higher to incentivize the development of the mines and local metals-refining operations required to satisfy this demand. IRA’s $370 Billion Allocations US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy Bottom Line: The IRA incentivizes investment in clean energy, pollution reduction and GHG remediation, and employment in the energy-supply market writ large.  The next year likely will be taken up writing the actual regulations implementing the IRA.  If it succeeds in significantly boosting renewable energy investment and EV sales, it will stoke already-tight base metals markets and drive costs higher.  By incentivizing the development of carbon-capture and hydrogen technologies, it would extend the life of traditional hydrocarbon energy. Feature The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) will make $370 billion available to energy providers and households via tax credits, grants and loans to incentivize green-energy production and deployment in the US (Chart 1). It also seeks to incentivize the expansion of locally built EVs in North America, the batteries that will power them, and the critical minerals crucial for green energy, as it attempts to break China’s dominance of EV and critical mineral supply chains globally. Support for carbon-capture and use, and hydrogen as a fuel also will be expanded. Chart 1IRA’s $370 Billion Allocations US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy The US DOE estimates the IRA and the previously passed Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 1,150 MMT CO2e in 2030, equivalent to a 40% reduction vs 2005 GHG levels, in 2030.1 The inclusion of Carbon-Capture-Use-and-Storage (CCUS) technology in the IRA will incentivize technology that would allow for fossil fuels to be used as a bridge for the green energy transition, which, if successful, will dramatically extend the useful life of hydrocarbon resources. Per the IRA, tax credits for CCUS can reach a maximum of USD 60 – USD 85/ MT of CO2 captured depending on how successful the technology is in actually removing CO2.2 This is $25-$35/MT more than what is provided by the existing CCUS tax credits. As we argued in previous reports, lower production costs for nascent green technologies such as CCUS will spur research and development, unlocking a virtuous cycle of increased production and deployment, and lower costs.3 The IRA is technologically agnostic as to how low-carbon energy is produced – i.e., via renewables, hydrocarbons, or nuclear power. From 2025, Investment- and Production-Tax Credits (IC and PC tax credits) will be available for technology-neutral electricity production, meaning electricity from fossil fuels or nuclear power will receive tax and investment credits alongside renewables, provided no toxic GHG emissions are released. This will catalyze the development and use of CCUS technology, especially in existing power plants, which can be retrofitted with this technology. Controversy Around Oil, Gas Attends The IRA Among the more controversial features of the Act are provisions supporting oil and gas production. One of the provisions requires 2mm acres of public land and 60mm acres of water to be offered for lease to oil and gas companies a year prior to issuing new onshore solar or wind rights-of-way. We do not believe this will meaningfully increase US oil production since its main constraint isn’t a dearth of land but investor-induced drilling restraint – i.e., the capital discipline that compels oil and gas producers to only produce what can profitably be produced. We also are doubtful that increasing oil and gas royalties to 16.6-18.75% under the IRA will influence drillers’ production decisions since most states’ royalties, most notably Texas and New Mexico’s will be at parity or higher than the revised rate under the new law.4 The duration and coverage of investment and production tax credits for solar and wind projects have increased. Furthermore, energy storage technology will now receive ITCs and PTCs, which should encourage the development of this technology. Energy storage technology – e.g., utility-scale lithium batteries – will make green electricity more reliable, providing a competitive alternative to fossil fuel-generated electricity. Increasing Solar PV Resources Strain Power Grids As Chart 1 shows, renewables are receiving massive support from the IRA, particularly solar PV and wind resources. This will, over the short run, present problems for grid stability. The North American power grid is being stressed by lack of investment in systems capable of fully integrating renewables – particularly solar PV – with incumbent bulk power supplies from fossil fuels and nuclear power. This is being exacerbated by extreme-weather events (e.g., prolonged heat waves, droughts, fire storms, flooding, etc.).5 The IRA focuses on incentivizing particular power-generation technologies and, in conjunction with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, investing in and bolstering North American electric grids.6 This is and will remain a critical issue, given the threat to bulk power system (BPS) stability posed by the large amount of small-scale solar supplies, which are not required to meet NERC reliability standards, per the NERC’s analysis. This risk is being analysed in depth following widespread loss of solar PV power in California during the summer of 2021, which was compounded by droughts and wildfires.7 “The ongoing widespread reduction of solar PV resources continues to be a notable reliability risk to the BPS, particularly when combined with the additional loss of other generating resources on the BPS and in aggregate on the distribution system,” the April 2022 NERC report notes. In an earlier report, NERC analysts noted much of the solar PV resource operates at a smaller scale than other supplies (baseload nuclear power, e.g.), and are not part of the NERC’s bulk electric supply (BES) system (Chart 2).8 Practically speaking, the NERC noted, “the vast majority of solar PV plants connected to the BPS, totaling over half the capacity, are not considered BES and are therefore not subject to NERC Reliability Standards.” Chart 2Solar PV Resources Strain Grids US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy In theory, this could limit the expansion of solar PV resources until the grid stability problems are addressed. Because of its intermittency, wind resources also can be unreliable sources of power, which means fossil-fuels alternatives – particularly natural-gas-fired generation – will continue to be favored to maintain grid stability and to provide back-up generation if wind or solar PV generation becomes unavailable. If CCUS technology can be harnessed to significantly reduce methane discharge – another goal of the IRA – along with particulates, natural gas production stands to increase as the US migrates to a low-carbon future. Investment Implications The recently enacted IRA law will incentivize increased investment in renewables and conventional resources. In addition, it will spur investment in energy-transmission and –transportation resources. The drafting and implementation of the regulations required to implement the law will be done over the next year or so, so it is difficult to forecast which investments will get off to the fastest start. We remain bullish base metals – the sine qua non of the renewal-energy transition – and conventional hydrocarbon resources. We continue to favor equity exposure via ETFs – the XME and XOP for exposure to miners and oil-and-gas producers, respectively. We also remain long the COMT ETF, an optimized version of the S&P GSCI to retain exposure to commodities directly.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish EU gas storage facilities were 80.17% full as of August 29 , reaching the bloc’s 80% target two months early (Chart 3) and raising the possibility of natgas rationing to reduce demand will not be needed this winter. The EU’s willingness to purchase gas at high prices over the summer injection months, given the dire consequences of possibly low gas storage levels in the winter withdrawal period, is responsible for this result. As Russian gas flows have dropped, the EU has had to rely on other sources, namely the US. LNG imports of 39 Bcm from the US to the EU over the first six months of this year have surpassed full year 2021 flows, according to Reuters. Elevated US gas flows to Europe have come at the expense of gas flows to states which are unable to afford the fuel at such high prices. In the US, high Henry Hub gas prices signal low domestic fuel availability primarily due to higher gas exports (Chart 4). Base Metals: Bullish High electricity and fuel prices in Europe are making metal smelting increasingly expensive, and are forcing refiners to voluntarily reduce operations. Nyrstar’s Budel zinc smelter and Norsk Hydro’s Slovalco aluminum smelter are the latest refinery operations forced to shutter operations going into the winter. Reduced domestic metal production runs counter to the continent’s aim of becoming more self-reliant on the supply of minerals critical to strategic industries such as defense and aerospace. Precious Metals: Neutral Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell stressed the importance of price stability and reiterated the Fed’s commitment to restrictive policy to reduce inflation at the Jackson Hole conference. Gold prices fell on his speech as markets adjusted to higher interest rates than previously expected. However, counter to BCA’s US Bond Strategy view, markets still expect the Fed to start cutting rates in 2023. Two key drivers for gold prices next year will be the Fed’s rate hike regime and inflation perpetuated by potentially high oil prices following European sanctions on Russian oil and oil products. Chart 3 US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy Chart 4 US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy US IRA Supports Renewable, Conventional Energy       Footnotes 1     Please see The Inflation Reduction Act Will Significantly Cut the Social Costs of Climate Change, published by the US Department of Energy on August 23.  See also 8.18 InflationReductionAct_Factsheet_Final.pdf (energy.gov) for additional DOE analysis of the IRA. 2     Manufacturers of different green technologies can maximize tax credits by ensuring certain labor and materials sourcing requirements are met. 3    For a report with our most recent discussion on this issue, please see EU Gas Crisis Boosts Hydrogen’s Prospects, which we published on April 7, 2022.  See also Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views, published on July 8, 2021, and Industrial Commodities Super-Cycle Or Bull Market?, published on March 4, 2021, for additional discussion on the need for carbon-capture investment. 4    The Permian basin, which constitutes 60% of total US shale production is located in these two states. 5    Please see the North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s recent report entitled Summer Reliability Assessment, May 2022, for an in-depth discussion of electric grid reliability going into the 2022 summer. 6    Please see “The Inflation Reduction Act Drives Significant Emissions Reductions and Positions America to Reach Our Climate Goals,” published by the US DOE as DOE/OP-0018, August 2022. 7     Please see “Multiple Solar PV Disturbances in CAISO, Disturbances between June and August 2021, April 2022,” published by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. 8    Please see “Summary of Activities, BPS-Connected Inverter-Based Resources and Distributed Energy Resources,” published by NERC in September 2019.   Investment Views and Themes  New, Pending And Closed Trades WE WERE STOPPED OUT OF OUR LONG SPDR S&P METALS & MINING ETF (XME) TRADE ON AUGUST 29, 2022 WITH A RETURN OF 19.43%. WE WILL RE-ESTABLISH A LONG POSITION IN THE XME AT TONIGHT'S CLOSE. Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary   Surging Electricity, Gas Prices Will Fuel Higher Inflation Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Heat waves in the Northern Hemisphere are sending electricity and natgas prices through the roof, which will feed into higher inflation prints in the months ahead. Heat waves and droughts this summer also will damage crops, and, on the back of higher natgas prices, will raise the cost of fertilizer, and push food prices up. Central banks attempting to control inflation cannot address exogenous supply shocks related to weather and commodity shortages via monetary policy, which will complicate their attempts to rein in inflation. Higher prices for necessary commodities – heat, cooling and food – will, perforce, account for increasing shares of firms’ operating expenses and household budgets. This will reduce spending on other goods and services. And it will provide central banks with some policy space to keep rate hikes from becoming so draconian they add unmanageable strains to firms’ and households’ budgets. Bottom Line: A remarkable confluence of exogenous weather shocks and supply constraints in commodity markets will push food and energy prices higher, and raise inflation expectations. Further down the line, supplies of base metals will come under pressure, as refinery and smelting operations are curtailed. We remain long direct commodity exposure via the COMT ETF. We also remain long equity exposure to oil and gas producers and miners via XOP and XME ETFs, respectively, (please see tables at the back of this report for details). Feature Electricity and natural gas prices continue to surge in Europe – this week on the back of reduced wind-power availability and higher air-conditioning demand (Chart 1). Meanwhile, Brent crude oil prices again were trading above $100/bbl earlier this week.1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyTight Commodity Markets: Persistently High Inflation             Elsewhere in the Northern Hemisphere, energy prices in the US also are trading higher, as are agricultural commodities. In the US, drought and heat are stressing grains. The US Climate Prediction Center is expecting hotter- and dryer-than-average weather conditions until November.2 In China, drought and heat waves are straining the electricity network. Energy rationing is forcing curtailments of power and closures of factories and metals refineries, and limiting exports of fertilizers; natural gas comprises ~ 70% of fertilizer inputs. Chart 1Surging Electricity, Gas Prices Will Fuel Higher Inflation Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Higher Energy, Grain Prices; Higher Inflation Chart 2AFood, Energy Drive US, EU Inflation Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Chart 2BFood, Energy Drive US, EU Inflation Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Higher energy and food prices will continue to drive inflation gauges in the US (Chart 2A) and Europe (Chart 2B). Our modeling shows the Bloomberg energy, agricultural and base metals spot subindexes – aggregations of the futures in the complete index – are cointegrated with the 5-year/5-year CPI swaps (5y5y CPI), meaning these series share a common long-term trend (Chart 3). The complete Bloomberg Commodity index based on prompt-delivery contracts also is cointegrated with CPI 5y5y inflation expectations, as is the 3-year forward WTI futures, which is one of the strongest relationships (Chart 4). Chart 35Y5Y CPI Inflation Expectations Move With Commodity Groups 5Y5Y CPI Inflation Expectations Move With Commodity Groups 5Y5Y CPI Inflation Expectations Move With Commodity Groups Chart 4Spot Commodities Impact 5y5y Expectations Spot Commodities Impact 5y5y Expectations Spot Commodities Impact 5y5y Expectations We continue to expect higher Brent and WTI crude oil prices going forward, particularly following the announcement from Saudi Arabia’s oil minister earlier this week that cutting oil production – say, in the event the US and Iran agree to revive the nuclear deal proffered by the EU – remains among its options to manage its production.3 For 4Q22, we expect Brent to trade at $119/bbl, while next year we expect prices to average $117/bbl. Any shock that moves Brent and WTI higher will push inflation higher. Fed Policy Rates And Commodities In earlier research, we noted oil prices are more than an input cost for manufacturing, mining, agriculture, etc. We share the ECB’s view that the oil price is a barometer of global economic activity, as well as being an input cost and the price of an asset.4 In this report, we delve into the relationship between Fed policy and commodity markets, specifically oil prices. We believe we have identified a feedback loop between market-cleared crude oil prices and Fed monetary policy vis-à-vis setting the Fed funds rate. We use the following theoretical framework to study this. High crude-oil prices feed into general price levels, which drive up inflation and inflation expectations as revealed in the CPI 5y5y swaps. Seeing this, the Fed begins to signal it will tighten monetary policy, trying to cool aggregate demand. On the other side of the coin, low crude oil prices drive inflation and inflation expectations lower – assuming markets are not in the midst of a market-share war – giving the Fed space to run a looser monetary policy. Granger Causality tests provide evidence of a short-term relationship between crude oil futures prices, inflation expectations evident in the 5y5y CPI swaps market, and Fed funds rate expectations revealed in the 1-year/1-year (1y1y) US Overnight Indexed Swap rates. We find past and present values of the front-month WTI contract help predict market expectations of 1-year Fed funds rates one year from now.5 What is interesting about this result is that we find Granger Causality between the expected Fed funds rates revealed in the 1y1y US OIS rate and 3-year forward WTI futures, which is a strong explanatory variable for 5y5y CPI swaps. This is to say, the 1y1y OIS rate Granger Causes the 3-year WTI futures, but not vice versa. Consistent with the feedback loop we posit between crude oil futures and Fed funds rates, we find that past and present values of the 1y1y Fed funds rate derived from the OIS curve help predict expected WTI prices 3 years forward. This means the 3-year WTI futures are reacting to short-term inflation expectations revealed in the OIS rates – and, most likely, the Fed’s assumed policy-response function contained in forward guidance – which, in turn, is used to calibrate 5y5y CPI swaps expectations (Chart 5). Chart 5Forward Oil Prices Drive 5y5y CPI Swaps Forward Oil Prices Drive 5y5y CPI Swaps Forward Oil Prices Drive 5y5y CPI Swaps Investment Implications Weather shocks – drought and heat waves across the Northern Hemisphere – and supply constraints (energy demand in excess of energy supply) will push food and energy prices higher, and lift inflation and inflation expectations. Tight natural gas markets will increase the cost of fertilizer, which will keep grain prices elevated. Further down the line, supplies of base metals will come under pressure, as refinery and smelting operations are curtailed. We remain long direct commodity exposure via the COMT ETF. We also remain long equity exposure to oil and gas producers and miners via XOP and XME ETFs, respectively.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish US commercial crude oil inventories ex-SPR barrels fell 3.3mm barrels week-on-week for the week ended 19 August 2022, according to the EIA. Including SPR barrels, total US crude oil inventories were down 11.4mm barrels. Total US oil stocks – crude and products – including the SPR barrels were down 6.7mm barrels; without the SPR draws, inventories built 1.4mm barrels. The US SPR now stands at 453.1 million barrels, the lowest since January 1985, according to reuters.com. The US has made 1mm b/d available to the market from its SPR over since May; this program will terminate at the end of October. We expect the SPR release will be extended, if the US and Iran cannot agree to extend the Iran nuclear deal in the near future. Low-sulfur distillates fell 1.7mm barrels, reflecting tight inventories of diesel, heating oil and jet fuel (Chart 6). Total products supplied (the EIA’s nomenclature for demand) fell 2.5mm b/d y/y, and now stands at 19.34mm b/d. Base Metals: Bullish Iron ore prices rose on Chinese growth prospects following the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) decision to cut lending rates on Monday, one week after its initial rate cut. More aggressive policy will be needed to stimulate credit activity and growth in an economy which has to contend with a zero COVID tolerance policy and a faltering property market. With no dearth of money in the economy, credit demand maybe the issue, not supply. M2 money supply – which includes cash and deposits - rose 12% y/y in July, while new bank lending dropped nearly 40% y/y (Chart 7). Precious Metals: Neutral Gold prices on Tuesday were supported by weak US manufacturing and household sales data. Significant support for the yellow metal will occur after the US Federal Reserve begins reducing interest rates, which we do not believe will occur this year. The Fed will continue tightening monetary policy, at the risk of increasing unemployment. Chart 6 Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Energy-Price Surge Will Drive Inflation Higher Chart 7 M2 Money Supply Increasing While New Bank Loans Decreasing M2 Money Supply Increasing While New Bank Loans Decreasing       Footnotes 1     Please see European Power Prices Smash Records in Another Inflation Blow published by bloomberg.com on August 23, 2022. The surge in prices has lifted European power prices above the equivalent of $1,000/bbl, more than 10x the Brent price on Wednesday. See also Drought Negatively Impacting China, the U.S. and Europe, as Ukrainian Black Sea Exports Continue published on August 22, 2022 by farmpolicynews.illinois.edu. 2     Please see Prognostic Discussion for Long-Lead Seasonal Outlooks published by the National Weather Service’s Climate Prediction Center on August 18, 2022. See also Farm Futures Daily AM - U.S., China heat concerns lift grains - 08/24 (penton.com) for a summary of ag market trading and crop conditions. 3    Please see Oil pares losses after Saudi oilmin says OPEC+ has options including cuts published by reuters.com on August 22, 2022. 4    At a high level of abstraction, we model crude oil demand as a function of real GDP, while supply is assumed to react to realized demand – i.e., oil producers are data-dependent vis-à-vis the volume of crude they produce to meet demand. Our crude-oil price estimate is calculated using supply, demand and inventories – along with US financial variables. In other words, our model uses real and financial variables to estimate a crude-oil price, which, we contend, qualifies it as a summary statistic for the variables on the right-hand side of our model. Please see Tight Commodity Markets: Persistently High Inflation, a Special Report we published on March 24, 2022 for further discussion. We note this is aligned with the way the ECB thinks about oil prices. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    Market expectations for the US federal funds rate are derived using US Overnight Indexed Swap rates. The US Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) is used as the floating rate for the swap deal and tracks the federal funds rate.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating The euro is likely to undershoot in the near term, as the winter months approach and economic volatility in Europe rises. However, much of the euro’s troubles are well understood and discounted by financial markets. This suggests a floor closer to parity for the EUR/USD. Unlike many other developed economies, the fiscal drag in the eurozone is likely to be minimal for the rest of this year and early next year. The forces pressuring equilibrium rates lower in the periphery are slowly dissipating. That should lift the neutral rate of interest in the entire eurozone. China’s zero Covid-19 policy along with property market troubles has weighed heavily on the euro, but that could change. RECOMMENDATIONS INCEPTION LEVEL inception date RETURN Long EUR/GBP 0.846 2021-10-15 -0.13 Short EUR/JPY 141.20 2022-07-07 2.46 Bottom Line: The euro tends to be largely driven by pro-cyclical flows, which will be a positive when risk sentiment picks up. Meanwhile, making a structural case for the euro is easy when it comes to valuation. According to our in-house PPP models, an investor who buys the euro today can expect to make 6% a year over the next decade, should the euro mean revert to fair value and beyond. Our current stance is more measured because investors could see capitulation selling in the coming months. Feature Chart 1Two Decades After The Creation Of The Euro Two Decades After The Creation Of The Euro Two Decades After The Creation Of The Euro The creation of the euro was an ambitious project. It began with a simple idea – let’s create the biggest monetary union and everything else will follow, not least, economic might. Over the last two decades, the euro has survived, but its ambitions have been jolted by various crises. Today, the euro is sitting around where it was at the initiation of the project (Chart 1). That has been a tremendous loss in real purchasing power for many of its citizens. Given that we are back to square one, this report examines the prospects for the euro from the lens of its original ambitions, while navigating the economic and geopolitical landscape today. Surviving The Winter Chart 2A European Recession Is Well Priced In A European Recession Is Well Priced In A European Recession Is Well Priced In Winter will be tough for eurozone citizens. But how tough? In our view, less than what the euro is pricing in. According to the ZEW sentiment index, the eurozone manufacturing PMI should be around 45 today, but sits at 49.8. The euro, which has been tracking the ZEW index tick-for-tick has already priced in a deep recession, worse than the 2020 episode (Chart 2). Bloomberg GDP growth consensus forecasts for the eurozone are still penciling in 2.8% growth for 2022, down from a high of 4%. For 2023, forecasts have hit a low of 0.8%. It is certainly possible that euro area growth undershoots this level, which will cause a knee jerk sell off in the euro. However, much of the euro’s troubles are well understood and discounted by financial markets. Natural gas storage is already close to 80%, the EU’s target, to help the eurozone navigate the winter. Coal plants are firing on all cylinders, and Germany has decided to delay the closure of its nuclear power plants. It is true that electricity prices are soaring, but part of the story has been weather-related, notably a heat wave across Europe, falling water levels along the Rhine that has delayed coal shipments, and lower wind speeds that have affected renewable energy generation. France is also having problems with nuclear power generation, due to little availability of water for cooling reactors. Looking ahead, energy markets are already discounting a steep fall in prices from the winter energy cliff (Chart 3). If that turns out to be true, it will be a welcome fillip for eurozone growth. First, it will ease the need for the ECB to tighten policy aggressively, and second, it will boost real incomes, which will support spending. This is not being discussed in financial markets today. Chart 3AFutures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Chart 3CFutures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Chart 3BFutures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Fiscal Policy To The Rescue? Unlike many other developed economies, the fiscal drag in the eurozone is likely to be minimal for the rest of this year and early next year (Chart 4). As funds from the next generation EU plan are being disbursed into strategic sectors, including renewable energy, Europe’s productive capital base will also improve. This is likely to have a huge multiplier effect on European growth. Chart 4AThe Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal Chart 4BThe Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal Taking a bigger-picture view, what has become evident in recent years is stronger solidarity among eurozone countries, both economically and politically. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyMonth In Review: Inflation Is Still Accelerating Globally Economically, the standard dilemma for the eurozone was that interest rates were too low for the most productive nation, Germany, but too expensive for others, such as Spain and Italy. As such, the euro was often caught in a tug of war between a rising equilibrium rate of interest for Germany, but a very low neutral rate for the peripheral countries. The good news is that for the eurozone, a lot of this internal rupture has been partly resolved. Labor market reforms have seen unit labor costs in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain collectively contract since 2008. This has effectively eliminated the competitiveness gap with Germany, accumulated over the last two decades (Chart 5). Italy remains saddled with a rigid and less productive workforce, but the overall adjustments have still come a long way to close a key fissure plaguing the common currency area. The result has been a collapse in peripheral borrowing spreads, relative to Germany (Chart 6). Ergo, interest payments as a share of GDP are now manageable. It is true that Italy remains a basket case but the ECB’s Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) will ensure that peripheral spreads remain well contained and a liquidity crisis (in Italy) does not morph into a solvency one. Chart 5The Periphery Is Now Competitive The Periphery Is Now Competitive The Periphery Is Now Competitive Chart 6Peripheral Spreads Are Still Contained In Real Terms Peripheral Spreads Are Still Contained In Real Terms Peripheral Spreads Are Still Contained In Real Terms Beyond the adjustment in competitiveness, productivity among eurozone countries might also converge. Our European Investment Strategy colleagues suggest that the neutral rate is still wide between Germany and the periphery. That said, gross fixed capital formation in the periphery has been surging relative to core eurozone members (Chart 7). If this capital is deployed in the right sectors, it will have two profound impacts. First, the neutral rate of interest in the eurozone will be lifted from artificially low levels. The proverbial saying is that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. This means that if the forces pressuring equilibrium rates lower in the periphery are slowly dissipating, that should lift the neutral rate of interest in the entire eurozone. Over a cyclical horizon, this should be unequivocally bullish for the euro. Second, and more importantly, economic solidarity among eurozone members will help ensure the survival of the euro, over the next decade and beyond. Chart 7The Periphery Could Become More Productive The Periphery Could Become More Productive The Periphery Could Become More Productive Trading The Euro The above analysis suggests long-term investors should be buying the euro today. However, the long run can be a very long time to be offside. Our trading strategy is as follows: Over the next 6 months, stay neutral to short the euro. The economic landscape for the eurozone remains fraught with risk. This is a typical recipe for a currency to undershoot. Eurozone banks are very sensitive to economic conditions in the eurozone, and ultimately the performance of the euro, and the signal from bank shares remains negative (Chart 8). Chart 8European Banks Are Not Part Of The Agenda Watch Eurozone Banks European Banks Are Not Part Of The Agenda Watch Eurozone Banks European Banks Are Not Part Of The Agenda Watch Eurozone Banks Investors have been cutting their forecasts for the euro but have not yet capitulated. Bets are that the euro will be at 1.10 by the end of next year, and 14% higher in two years. A bottom will be established when investors cut their forecasts below current spot prices (Chart 9). This corroborates with data from net speculative positions that have yet to hit rock bottom.  Chart 9Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Real interest rates in the euro area are still plunging across the curve, relative to the US. The two-year real yield has hit a cyclical low. Five-year, 10-year and 30-year real yields are also falling. Historically, the euro tends to trend higher when interest rate differentials are moving in favor of the eurozone (Chart 10). Chart 10AReal Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Chart 10BReal Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Hedging costs have risen tremendously, as the forward market (like investors) is already pricing in an appreciation in the euro. The embedded two-year return for EUR investors is circa 4%, in line with the carry costs (Chart 11). In real terms, the returns are closer to 9% to compensate for much higher inflation expectations in the eurozone. Higher hedging costs will dissuade foreign investors from gobbling up European assets on a hedged basis. Chart 11A 5% Rally In The Euro Is Already Anticipated A 5% Rally In The Euro Is Already Anticipated A 5% Rally In The Euro Is Already Anticipated In short, the euro is likely to enter a capitulation phase. Our sense is that that it will push EUR/USD below parity, towards 0.98. Below that level, we believe the risk/reward profile will become much more attractive for both short- and longer-term investors. Signals From External Demand Chart 12The Euro Is Increasingly Dependant On Chinese Data The Euro Is Increasingly Dependant On Chinese Data The Euro Is Increasingly Dependant On Chinese Data The eurozone is a very open economy. Exports of goods and services represented 51% of euro area GDP in 2021. This means that what happens with external demand, especially in the US, the UK and China, matters for European growth (Chart 12). Of all its major export partners, China is the biggest question mark. China’s zero Covid-19 policy along with property market troubles has weighed heavily on the euro. Historically, the Chinese credit impulse has been a good coincident indicator for EUR/USD. Lately, that relationship has decoupled (Chart 13A). We favor the view that the credit transmission mechanism in China is merely delayed, rather than broken. For one, a rising Chinese credit impulse usually leads European exports, and this time should be no different. Chinese bond markets are also becoming more liberalized, and as such are a key signal for financial conditions in China. For over a decade, easing financial conditions have usually been a good signal that import demand is about to improve (Chart 13B). This is good news for European export demand. The bottom line is that investors are currently too pessimistic on Europe’s growth prospects at a time when a few green shoots are emerging for external demand. That may not save the euro in the near term but will be a welcome fillip for euro bulls when it does undershoot. Chart 13AThe Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data Chart 13BThe Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data Concluding Thoughts Chart 14The Goldilocks Case For The Euro The Goldilocks Case For The Euro The Goldilocks Case For The Euro The euro tends to be largely driven by pro-cyclical flows. Fortunately for investors, European equities remain unloved, given that they are trading at some of the cheapest cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings multiples in the developed world. Analysts are aggressively revising up their earnings estimates for eurozone equities, relative to the US. They might be wrong in the near term, but over a 9-to-12-month horizon, this has been a good leading indicator for the euro.  Making a structural case for the euro is easy when it comes to valuation. According to our in-house PPP models, an investor who buys the euro today can expect to make 6% a year over the next decade, should the euro mean revert to fair value and beyond (Chart 14). Meanwhile, beyond the winter months, inflation could come crashing back to earth in the eurozone, which will provide underlying support for the fair value of the currency. Our near-term stance is more measured because investors are only neutral the euro, and risk reversals are not yet at a nadir. This is particularly relevant given that Europe still has a war in its backyard, with the potential of generating more market volatility ahead. Given this confluence of factors, we have chosen to play euro via two channels: Long EUR/GBP: As we argued last week, the UK has a bigger stagflation problem compared to the eurozone. This trade is also a bet on improving economic fundamentals between the eurozone and the UK, as well as a bet on policy convergence between the two economies. Short EUR/JPY: The yen is even cheaper than the euro. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY will sell off. In a risk-on environment, the yen can still benefit since it is oversold. Meanwhile, investors remain bullish EUR/JPY. Long EUR/USD: We will go long the euro if it breaks below 0.98.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary Russia’s Crude Oil Output Will Fall EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices Russia will have to lower oil production to ensure output it hasn’t placed with non-EU buyers does not tax its limited storage facilities, ahead of the bloc’s December 5 embargo. The EU’s insurance/reinsurance ban on ships carrying Russian material also commences in December. It will profoundly affect Russian output, if fully implemented. Russian and Chinese firms will expand ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas, along with external processing and storage services to mask crude and product exports. The EU embargos will force Russia to shut in ~ 1.6mm b/d of output by year-end, rising to 2mm b/d in 2023, by our reckoning. Gas-to-oil switching in Europe will boost distillate and residual fuel demand by ~ 800K b/d this winter. Chinese policymakers will be compelled to deploy greater fiscal and credit support to reverse weakening GDP. Tighter monetary policy in DM economies will dampen aggregate demand. Bottom Line: EU embargoes on Russian oil imports will significantly tighten markets, and lift Brent to $119/bbl by year-end. This has a 60% chance of being offset by ~ 1mm b/d of Iranian oil exports in 2023, in our estimation. We are maintaining our Brent forecast at $110/bbl on average for this year, and $117/bbl next year. WTI will trade $3-$5/bbl lower. At tonight’s close we are re-establishing our long COMT ETF position. Risks remain to the upside. Feature Chart 1Russia’s Crude Oil Output Will Fall EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices Following an unexpected increase in production during June and July, Russia will have to begin reducing its oil output ahead of the implementation of the EU’s embargo on its seaborne crude oil imports, which kicks on December 5. EU, UK and US shipping insurance and reinsurance sanctions also are scheduled to be implemented in December. If fully implemented, ~ 2.3mm b/d of seaborne imports of Russian crude oil will be excluded from EU markets by year-end. Come February, another 800k b/d of refined products will be embargoed. On the back of these lost sales, and production that cannot be loaded on ships due to insurance/reinsurance bans, we expect Russian production to fall ~ 2mm b/d by the end of next year (Chart 1).1 As noted in previous research, a goodly chunk of Russian crude continues to go to China and India. Together, these two states accounted for just over 40% of Russia’s crude sales last month – ~ 1.9mm b/d of a total of ~ 4.5mm b/d. This is down from just under 45.5% in May, according to Reuters. Both China and India have benefited from discounted prices of ~ 30% vs. Brent, which is a powerful inducement to buy. Asia accounts for more than half of Russia’s seaborne crude oil sales, according to Bloomberg data. Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyTighter Oil Markets On The Way Whether China and India can maintain these purchases depends on whether ships taking oil to them can get their cargoes insured. Both states have domestic insurance providers, and, in the case of the latter, long-standing trade relationships going back decades. Other Asian economies do not have such financial infrastructure. Still, this is a high concentration of sales to two buyers. In addition, press reports indicate China spent $347mm to secure tankers to conduct high-risk ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of Russian crude in the Atlantic Ocean.2 Similar STS transfers have been used to move ~ 1.2mm b/d of Iranian and Venezuelan crude oil, most of which ends up in China, according to Lloyds. Base Case Sees Markets Balance In our base case analysis, markets remain relatively balanced going into winter. On the supply side, we expect core OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – to continue to provide crude to the markets subject to their spare-capacity constraints (Chart 2, top panel). KSA likely will be producing close to 11mm b/d by year-end – vs its current output of 10.6mm b/d output presently – and the UAE will be close to 3.5mm b/d, vs 3.1mm b/d at present. KSA’s max capacity is 12mm b/d, while the UAE’s is 4mm b/d; both will want to maintain spare capacity to offset unexpected exogenous supply shocks next year. These two states account for most of the spare capacity in the world (Chart 3). The rest of OPEC 2.0 will continue to struggle to maintain its production, which makes the core producers’ spare capacity critically important (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2Core OPEC 2.0 Will Increase Supply EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices Chart 3Spare Capacity Concentrated In Core OPEC 2.0 EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices Outside of OPEC 2.0, we are expecting the largest contribution to global supply will continue to come from US shale production (Chart 4). Shale-oil output in the top 5 US basins is expected to increase ~540K b/d this year, and next. This will take shale output to slighly above 7.5mm b/d and account for 76% of Lower 48 production in the States this year. Next year, we are expecting US Lower 48 production to rise 700K b/d, and for total US crude output to go to 12.8mm b/d, a new record. Chart 4US Remains Top Non-OPEC 2.0 Supplier US Remains Top Non-OPEC 2.0 Supplier US Remains Top Non-OPEC 2.0 Supplier This winter we are expecting an uptick in oil demand – particularly for distillates like gasoil and diesel in Europe, as EU firms switch from natural gas to oil on the margin. We expect this will add 800K b/d of demand over the winter months (November through March), which will lift our overall demand estimate 150k b/d this year, and 20K b/d next year – +2.19mm b/d vs +2.04mm b/d, and 1.82mm b/d vs. 1.80mm b/d next year. Chinese year-on-year oil demand growth remains negative. January-July 2022 demand was 15.24mm b/d vs 15.34mm b/d in 2021, continuing a string of y/y contractions. The two other major economic pillars of global oil demand – the US and Europe – show positive y/y growth of 800K b/d each over the same period. Global demand in 1H22 recovered to 98% of its pre-COVID-19 level – even with China’s negative y/y growth – while supply recovered to 96% of its pre-pandemic level, according to the International Energy Forum (IEF). Over most of the forecast period, we estimate global balances will continue to show the level of supply below that of demand, which will lead to continued physical deficits (Chart 5). Refined-product inventories increased by 34mm barrels in 1H22, while crude-oil stocks fell 23mm barrels. Global crude and product inventories are ~ 460mm barrels below their five-year average, which includes pandemic demand destruction, the IEF reported. We continue to expect inventories to remain below their 2010-14 average, which we prefer to track – it excludes the market-share wars of 2015-17 and that of 2020, and the pandemic’s effects on inventories (Chart 6). This will revive the backwardation in Brent and WTI prices, particularly if the loss of Russian barrels is larger than we expect this year and next. This could be dampened if the US resumes its SPR releases after they’ve run their course in October. Chart 5Global Market Balanced, But Slight Deficits Will Persist Global Market Balanced, But Slight Deficits Will Persist Global Market Balanced, But Slight Deficits Will Persist Chart 6OECD Inventories Below 5Y Average OECD Inventories Below 5Y Average OECD Inventories Below 5Y Average Investment Implications Our analysis indicates markets are mostly balanced going into winter (Table 1). That said, the balance of risks remains to the upside ahead of the EU’s embargoes on Russian crude and product imports, and the EU/UK/US insurance/reinsurance bans on providing cover for vessels carrying Russian material. This all is highly contingent on the extent to which the EU and its allies follow through on these punitive actions imposed on Russia in retaliation for its invasion of Ukraine. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices The removal from the market of some 2mm b/d of Russian oil production due to the various EU embargoes – even if it is offset by the return of 1mm b/d of Iranian exports on the back of a deal with the US – will push crude oil prices higher and inventories lower (Chart 7).3  Chart 7Brent Price Expectation Unchanged, But Demand Shifts To Winter Brent Price Expectation Unchanged, But Demand Shifts To Winter Brent Price Expectation Unchanged, But Demand Shifts To Winter Given these views, we remain long the oil and gas producer XOP ETF, which is up 19.5% since we re-established it on July 5, and, at tonight’s close, will be re-establishing our COMT ETF, to take advantage of higher energy and commodity prices and increasing backwardation in oil markets as inventories draw.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish US distillate inventories – diesel and heating oil mostly – were up less than 1% for the week ended 12 August 2022, according to the US EIA. US distillate inventories stood at 112mm barrels. This did nothing to reverse the deep drawdown in distillate inventories of 18.5% y/y, which, along with European stocks, refiners are attempting to rebuild going into the 2022-23 winter. We expect natgas-to-oil switching this winter to add 800k b/d of demand to the market over the Nov-Mar winter season. Most of this demand will be for distillates, in our view, given its dual use as a fuel for industrial applications and household space-heating. Distillate demand could be higher this winter, if a La Niña produces colder-than-normal temperatures. The US Climate Prediction Center gives the odds of such an outcome 60% going into the 2022-23 winter. This would lift ultra-low-sulfur diesel futures in the US and gasoil futures in Europe higher as inventories draw (Chart 8). Base Metals: Bullish Copper prices dropped on weaker-than-expected Chinese macroeconomic data for July, although the fall was bounded by the People’s Bank of China’s decision to cut interest rates. According to US CFTC data, copper trading volumes are lower than pre-pandemic levels, as hedge funds' net speculative positions turned negative beginning in May and have mostly remained in the red since then. Low trading volumes will result in copper prices being highly susceptible to macroeconomic events, especially those occurring in China. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold prices are facing difficulty overcoming market expectations of high interest rates for the rest of this year (Chart 9). The bearish influence of tightening monetary policy and a strong USD has the upper hand on the supportive effect of recession risks, inflation, and geopolitical uncertainty for gold prices. Recent strength in US stock markets - which historically is inversely correlated with gold prices - following better-than-expected earnings, also contributed to recent gold price weakness. Chart 8 EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices EU Russian Oil Embargoes, Higher Prices Chart 9 Investors Expect Fed Tightening To Give Way To An Easing Cycle In 2023 Investors Expect Fed Tightening To Give Way To An Easing Cycle In 2023     Footnotes 1 Please see Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over, which we published 11 August 2022, for additional discussion. NB: We discuss the differences between our view and that of our Geopolitical Strategy service regarding a deal between the US and Iran, which returns 1mm b/d of crude oil exports to the market. We give 60% odds to such a deal, while our colleagues at the GPS service assign a 40% probability to it. In our base case modeling presented herein, we expect these barrels to return to the market by 2Q23, perhaps sooner. 2 Please see Anonymous Chinese shipowner spends $376m on tankers for Russian STS hub published by Lloyd’s List 9 August 2022. The report notes, “All the ships are aged 15 years or older, precluding them from chartering by most oil majors, as well being unable to secure conventional financing, suggesting the beneficial owner is cash rich. The high seas logistics network offers scant regulatory and technical oversight as crude cargoes loaded on aframax tankers from Baltic Russian ports are transferred to VLCCs mid-Atlantic for onward shipment to China. One cargo has been tracked to India.“ 3 Please see Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over, which we published 11 August 2022, for additional discussion. NB: We discuss the differences between our view and that of our Geopolitical Strategy service regarding a deal between the US and Iran, which returns 1mm b/d of crude oil exports to the market. We give 60% odds to such a deal, while our colleagues at the GPS service assign a 40% probability to it. In our base case modeling presented herein, we expect these barrels to return to the market by 2Q23, perhaps sooner.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary With the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis materializing, the odds of a major war between the world’s great powers have gone up. Our decision trees suggest the odds are around 20%, or double where they stood from the Russian war in Ukraine alone. The world is playing “Russian roulette” … with a five-round revolver. Going forward, our base case is for Taiwan tensions to flatten out (but not fall) after the US and Chinese domestic political events conclude this autumn. However, if China escalates tensions after the twentieth national party congress, then the odds of an invasion will rise significantly. If conflict erupts in Taiwan, then the odds of Russia turning even more aggressive in Europe will rise. Iran is highly likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG US 10-YEAR TREASURY 2022-04-14 1.3% LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 13.8% Bottom Line: Investors should remain defensively positioned at least until the Chinese party congress and the US midterm election conclude this fall. Geopolitical risk next year will depend on China’s actions in the Taiwan Strait. Feature Chart 1Speculation Rising About WWIII Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter Pessimists who pay attention to world events have grown concerned in recent years about the risk that the third world war might break out. The term has picked up in online searches since 2019, though it is the underlying trend of global multipolarity, rather than the specific crisis events, that justifies the worry (Chart 1).1 What are the odds of a major war between the US and China, or the US and Russia? How might that be calculated? In this report we present a series of “decision trees” to formalize the different scenarios and probabilities. If we define WWIII as a war in which the United States engages in direct warfare with either Russia or China, or both, then we arrive at a 20% chance that WWIII will break out in the next couple of years! Those are frighteningly high odds – but history teaches that these odds are not unrealistic and that investors should not be complacent. Political scientist Graham Allison has shown that the odds of a US-China war over the long term are about 75% based on historical analogies. The takeaway is that nations will have to confront this WWIII risk and reject it for the global political environment to improve. Most likely they will do so as WWIII, and the risk of nuclear warfare that it would bring, constitutes the ultimate constraint. But the current behavior of the great powers suggests that they have not recognized their constraints yet and are willing to continue with brinksmanship in the short term. The Odds Of A Chinese Invasion Of Taiwan The first question is whether China will invade Taiwan. In April 2021 we predicted that the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis would occur within 12-24 months but that it would not devolve into full-scale war. This view is now being tested. In Diagram 1 we provide a decision tree to map out China’s policy options toward Taiwan and assign probabilities to each option. Diagram 1Decision Tree For Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter While China has achieved the capability to invade Taiwan, the odds of failure remain too high, especially without more progress on its nuclear triad. Hence we give only a 20% chance that China will mobilize for invasion immediately. Needless to say any concrete signs that China is planning an invasion should be taken seriously. Investors and the media dismissed Russia’s military buildup around Ukraine in 2021 to their detriment. At the same time, there is a good chance that the US and China are merely testing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which will be reinforced after the current episode. After all, this crisis was the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis – none of the previous crises led to war. If Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping are merely flexing their muscles ahead of important domestic political events this fall, then they have already achieved their objective. No further shows of force are necessary on either side, at least for the next few years. We give 40% odds to this scenario, in which the past week’s tensions will linger but the status quo is reinforced. In that case, the structural problem of the Taiwan Strait would flare up again sometime after the US and Taiwanese presidential elections in 2024, i.e. outside the time frame of the diagram. Unfortunately we are pessimistic over the long run and would give high probability to war in Taiwan. For that reason, we give equal odds (40%) to a deteriorating situation within the coming two years. If China expands drills and sanctions after the party congress, after Xi has consolidated power, then it will be clear that Xi is not merely performing for his domestic audience. Similarly if the Biden administration continues pushing for tighter high-tech export controls against China after the midterm election, and insists that US allies and partners do the same, then the US implicitly believes that China is preparing some kind of offensive operation. The danger of invasion would rise from 20% to 40%. Even in that case, one should still believe that crisis diplomacy between the US and China will prevent full-scale war in 2023-24. But the risk of miscalculation would be very high. The last element of this decision tree holds that China will prefer “gray zone tactics” or hybrid warfare rather than conventional amphibious invasion of the kind witnessed in WWII. The reasons are several. First, amphibious invasions are the most difficult military operations. Second, Chinese forces are inexperienced while the US and its allies are entrenched. Third, hybrid warfare will sow division among the US allies about how best to respond. Fourth, Russia has demonstrated several times over the past 14 years that hybrid warfare works. It is a way of maximizing strategic benefits and minimizing costs. The world knows how the West reacts to small invasions: it uses economic sanctions. It does not yet know how the West reacts to big invasions. So China will be incentivized to take small bites. And yet in Taiwan’s case those tactics may not be sustainable. Our Taiwan decision tree does not account for the likelihood that a hybrid war or “proxy war” will evolve into a major war. But that likelihood is in fact high. So we are hardly overrating the risk of a major US-China war. Bottom Line: Over the next two years, the subjective odds of a US-China proxy war over Taiwan are about 32% while the odds of a direct US-China war are about 4%. The true test comes after Xi Jinping consolidates power at this fall’s party congress. We expect Xi to focus on rebooting the economy so we continue to favor emerging Asian markets excluding China and Taiwan. The Odds Of Russian War With NATO The second question is whether Russia’s war in Ukraine will morph into a broader war with the West. The odds of a major Russia-West war are greater in this case than in China’s, as a war is already raging, whereas tensions in the Taiwan Strait are merely shadow boxing so far. An investor’s base case should hold that the Ukraine war will remain contained in Ukraine, as Europeans do not want to fight a devastating war with Russia merely because of the Donbas. But things often go wrong in times of war. The critical question is whether Russia will attack any NATO members. That would trigger Article Five of the alliance’s treaty, which holds that “an armed attack against one or more [alliance members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” justifying the use of armed force if necessary to restore security. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine this year, President Biden has repeatedly stated that the US will “defend every inch of NATO territory,” including the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which joined NATO in 2004. This is not a change of policy but it is the US’s red line and highly likely to be defended. Hence it is a major constraint on Russia. In Diagram 2 we map out Russia’s different options and assign probabilities. Diagram 2Decision Tree For Russia-Ukraine War (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter We give 55% odds that Russia will declare victory after completing the conquest of Ukraine’s Donbas region and the land bridge to Crimea. It will start looking to legitimize its conquests by means of some diplomatic agreement, i.e. a ceasefire. This is our base case for 2023. There is evidence that Russia is already starting to move toward diplomacy.2 The reason is that Russia’s economy is suffering, global commodity prices are falling, Russian blood and treasure are being spent. President Putin will have largely achieved his goal of hobbling Ukraine as long as he controls the mouth of the Dnieper river and the rest of the territory he has invaded. Putin needs to seal his conquests and try to salvage the economy and society. The sooner the better for Russia, so that Europe can be prevented from forming a consensus and implementing a full natural gas embargo in the coming years. However, there is a risk that Putin’s ambition gets the better of him. So we give 35% odds that the invasion expands to southwestern Ukraine, including the strategic port city of Odessa, and to eastern Moldova, where Russian troops are stationed in the breakaway region of Transdniestria. This new campaign would render Ukraine fully landlocked, neutralize Moldova, and give Russia greater maritime access. But it would unify the EU, precipitate a natural gas embargo, and weaken Russia to a point where it could become desperate. It could retaliate and that retaliation could conceivably lead to a broader war. We allot only a 7% chance that Putin attacks Finland or Sweden for attempting to join NATO. Stalin failed in Finland and Putin’s army could not even conquer Kiev. The UK has pledged to support these states, so an attack on them will most likely trigger a war with NATO. A decision to attack Finland would only occur if Russia believed that NATO planned to station military bases there – i.e. Russia’s declared red line. Any Russian attack on the Baltic states is less likely because they are already in NATO. But there is some risk it could happen if Putin grows desperate. We put the risk of a Baltic invasion at 3%. In short, if Russia uses its energy stranglehold on Europe not to negotiate a favorable ceasefire but rather to expand its invasions, then the odds of a broader war will rise. Bottom Line: The result is a 55% chance of de-escalation over the next 24 months, a 35% chance of a small escalation (e.g. Odessa, Moldova), and a 10% chance of major escalation that involves NATO members and likely leads to a NATO-Russia war. Tactically, investors should buy developed-market European currency and assets if the global economy rebounds and Russia makes a clear pivot to halting its military campaign and pursuing ceasefire talks. Cyclically, there needs to be a deeper US-Russia understanding for a durable bull market in European assets. The Odds Of US-Israeli Strikes On Iran The third geopolitical crisis taking place this year could be postponed as we go to press – if President Biden and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei agree to rejoin the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal. But we remain skeptical. The Biden administration wants to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal and free up about one million barrels per day of Iranian crude oil to reduce prices at the pump before the midterm election. US grand strategy also wants to engage with Iran and stabilize the Middle East so that the US can pivot to Asia. The EU is proposing the deal since it has even greater need for Iranian resources and wants to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Russia and China are also supportive as they want to remove US sanctions for trading with Iran and do not necessarily want Iran to get nukes. There is only one problem: Iran needs nuclear weapons to ensure its regime’s survival over the long run. The question is whether Khamenei is willing to authorize a deal with the Americans a second time. The first deal was betrayed at great cost to his regime. President Ebrahim Raisi, who hopes to replace the 83-year-old Khamenei before long, is surely staunchly opposed to wagering his career and personal security on whether Republicans win the 2024 election. Iran has already achieved nuclear breakout capacity – it has enough 60%-enriched uranium to construct nuclear devices – and it is unclear why it would achieve this capacity if it did not ultimately seek to obtain a nuclear deterrent. Especially given that it may someday need to protect its regime from military attacks by the US and its allies. However, our conviction level is medium because President Biden wants to lift sanctions and can do so unilaterally. The Biden administration has not taken any of the preliminary actions to make a deal come together but that could change.3 There is a good cyclical case to be made for short-term, stop-gap deal. According to BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE only have about 1.5 million barrels of spare oil production capacity between them. The EU oil embargo and western sanctions on Russia will force about two million barrels per day to be stopped, soaking up most of OPEC’s capacity. Hence the Biden administration needs the one million barrels that Iran can bring. We cannot deny that the Iranians may sign a deal to allow Biden to lift sanctions. That would benefit their economy. They could allow nuclear inspectors while secretly shifting their focus to warhead and ballistic missile development. While Iran will not give up the long pursuit of a nuclear deterrent, it is adept at playing for time. Still, Iran’s domestic politics do not support a deal – and its grand strategy only supports a deal if the US can provide credible security guarantees, which the US cannot do because its foreign policy is inconsistent. US grand strategy supports a deal but only if it is verifiable, i.e. not if Iran uses it as cover to pursue a bomb anyway. Iran has not capitulated after three years of maximum US sanctions, a pandemic, and global turmoil. And Iran sees a much greater prospect of extracting strategic benefits from Russia and China now that they have turned aggressive against the West. Moscow and Beijing can be strategic partners due to their shared acrimony toward Washington. Whereas the US can betray the Raisi administration just as easily as it betrayed the Rouhani administration, with the result that the economy would be whipsawed again and the Supreme Leader and the political establishment would be twice the fools in the eyes of the public. Diagram 3 spells out Iran’s choices. Diagram 3Decision Tree For Iran Nuclear Crisis (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter If negotiations collapse (50% odds), then Iran will make a mad dash for a nuclear weapon before the US and Israel attack. If the US and Iran agree to a deal (40%), then Iran might comply with the deal’s terms through the 2024 US election, removing the issue from investor concerns for now. But their long-term interest in obtaining a nuclear deterrent will not change and the conflict will revive after 2024. If talks continue without resolution (10%), Iran will make gradual progress on its nuclear program without the restraints of the deal (though it may not need to make a mad dash). In short, Russia and China need Iran regardless of whether it freezes its nuclear program, whereas the US and Israel will form a balance-of-power Abraham Alliance to contain Iran even if it does freeze its nuclear program. Bottom Line: Investors should allot 40% odds to a short-term, stop-gap US-Iran nuclear deal. The oil price drop would be fleeting. Long-term supply will not be expanded because the US cannot provide Iran with the security guarantees that it needs to halt its nuclear program irreversibly. The Odds Of World War III Now comes the impossible part, where we try to put these three geopolitical crises together. In what follows we are oversimplifying. But the purpose is to formalize our thinking about the different players and their options. Diagram 4 begins with our conclusions regarding the China/Taiwan conflict, adjusts the odds of a broader Russian war as a result, and adds our view that Iran is highly likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Again the time frame is two years. Diagram 4Decision Tree For World War III (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter The alternate conflict scenario to WWIII consists of “limited wars” – a dangerous concept that refers to hybrid and proxy wars in which the US is not involved, or only involved indirectly. Or it could be a conflict with Iran that does not involve Russia and China. We begin with China because China is the most capable and most ambitious global power today. China’s strategic rise is upsetting the global order and challenging the United States. We also start with China because we have some evidence this year that Russia does not intend to expand the war beyond Ukraine. Either China takes further aggressive action in Taiwan – creating a unique opportunity for Russia to take greater risks – or not. If not, then the odds of WWIII fall precipitously over the two-year period. This scenario is our base case. But if China attacks Taiwan and the US defends Taiwan, we give a high probability to Russia invading the Baltics. If China stages hybrid attacks and the US only supports Taiwan indirectly, then we increase the odds of Russian aggression only marginally. The result is 20% odds of WWIII, i.e. a direct war between the US and Russia, or China, or both. Whether this war could remain limited is debatable. War gaming since 1945 shows that any war between major nuclear powers will more likely escalate than not. But nuclear weapons bring mutually assured destruction, the ultimate constraint. The nuclear escalation risk is why we round down the probability of WWIII in our decision trees. The more likely 59% risk scenario of “limited wars” may seem like a positive outcome but it includes major increases in geopolitical tensions from today’s level, such as a Chinese hybrid war against Taiwan. Bottom Line: According to this exercise the odds of WWIII could be as high as 20%. This is twice the level in our Russia decision tree, which is appropriate given that our Taiwan crisis forecast has materialized. The critical factor is whether Beijing continues escalating the pressure on Taiwan after the party congress this fall. That could unleash a dangerous chain reaction. The global economy and financial markets still face downside risk from geopolitics but 2023 could see improvements if Russia moves toward a ceasefire and China delays action against Taiwan to reboot its economy. Investment Takeaways When Russia invaded Ukraine earlier this year, our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist, argued that the odds of nuclear Armageddon were 10%. At very least this is a reasonable probability for the odds that Russia and NATO come to blows. Now the expected Taiwan crisis has materialized. We guess that the odds of a major war have doubled to 20%. The corollary is an 80% chance of a better outcome. Analytically, we still see Russia as pursuing a limited objective – neutralizing Ukraine so that it cannot be prosperous and militarily powerful – while China also pursues a limited objective – intimidating Taiwan so that it pursues subordination rather than nationhood. Unless these objectives change, we are still far from World War III. The world can live with a hobbled Ukraine and a subordinated Taiwan. However, there can be no denying that the trajectory of global affairs since the 2008 global financial crisis has followed a pathway uncomfortably similar to the lead up to World War II: financial crisis, economic recession, deflation, domestic unrest, currency depreciation, trade protectionism, debt monetization, military buildup, inflation, and wars of aggression. If roulette is the game, then the odds of a global war are one-sixth or 17%, not far from the 20% outcome of our decision trees. Even assuming that we are alarmist, the fact that we can make a cogent, formal argument that the odds of WWIII are as high as 20% suggests that investors should wait for the current tensions over Ukraine and Taiwan to decrease before making large new risky bets. A simple checklist shows that the global macro and geopolitical context is gloomy (Table 1). We need improvement on the checklist before becoming more optimistic. Table 1Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter Chart 2Stay Defensively Positioned In H2 2022 Stay Defensively Positioned In H2 2022 Stay Defensively Positioned In H2 2022 Specifically what investors need is to be reasonably reassured that Russia will not expand the war to NATO and that China will not invade Taiwan anytime soon. This requires a new diplomatic understanding between the Washington and Moscow and Washington and Beijing that forestalls conflict. That kind of understanding can only be forged in crisis. The relevant crises are under way but not yet complete. There is likely more downside for global equity investors before war risks are dispelled through the usual solution: diplomacy. Wait for concrete and credible improvements to the global system before taking a generally overweight stance toward risky assets. Favor government bonds over stocks, US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and disfavor Chinese and Taiwanese currency and assets (Chart 2).     Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017). 2     For example, the Turkish brokered deal to ship grain out of Odessa, diplomatic support for rejoining the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, referendums in conquered territories like Kherson, and attempts to build up leverage in arms reduction talks. Cutting off Europe’s energy is ultimately a plan to coerce Europe into settling a ceasefire favorable for Russia. 3     Iran is still making extraneous demands – most recently that the IAEA drop a probe into how certain manmade uranium particles appeared in undisclosed nuclear sites in Iran. The IAEA has not dropped this probe and its credibility will suffer if it does. Meanwhile Biden is raising not lowering sanctions on Iran, even though sanction relief is a core Iranian demand. Biden has not removed the Iranian Revolutionary Guards or the Qods Force from the terrorism list. None of these hurdles are prohibitive but we would at least expect to see some movement before changing our view that a deal is more likely to fail than succeed. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades ()

Executive Summary Oil Markets Remain Tight Oil Markets Remain Tight Oil Markets Remain Tight US and Iranian negotiators received an EU proposal for reviving the Iran nuclear deal on Monday, which could return ~ 1mm b/d of oil to markets.  The EU’s embargo of Russian seaborne crude imports, which commences December 5, will remove 90% of seaborne imports of Russian crude (~ 2.3mm b/d) by year-end.  In February 2023, another 800k b/d of refined products will be embargoed.  December also will usher in insurance and reinsurance sanctions on shipping Russian oil – arguably the strongest sanctions the EU, UK and US can impose. Without those Iranian barrels, the determination of the EU, UK and US to enforce a Russian oil embargo will be suspect. We give odds of 60% to a US-Iran deal getting done in the near term.  Our Geopolitical Strategy maintains the likelihood of a deal is 40% at best. Bottom Line: Oil markets are pricing in the likelihood of large energy supply dislocations over the next couple of months.  The evolution of prices hinges upon the degree to which the EU’s embargo on Russian oil imports is implemented.  A revived Iran nuclear deal with the West would offset some of the embargoed Russian oil.  Even so, oil balances still will remain tilted to deficit conditions in 2023.  We continue to expect Brent will move above our 2022 $110/bbl expectation by 4Q22, and average $117/bbl next year. Feature US and Iranian negotiators received a proposal from EU negotiators for reviving the Iran nuclear deal on Monday.1 If the US and Iran can agree, the door opens for 1mm b/d of Iranian oil to return to markets. These barrels are becoming increasingly important to the EU, especially following the suspension of southerly flows of oil on Russia’s Druzhba pipeline due to a payment dispute.2 Brent popped ~ $1.50/bbl Tuesday morning as the Druzhba news broke, and the backwardation in the forward market increased (Chart 1). Brent gave back these early gains by the end of trading, following news a Hungarian refiner transferred the fee required to use the Ukrainian section of the pipeline.3 Chart 1Oil Markets Remain Tight Oil Markets Remain Tight Oil Markets Remain Tight Complicated Motives On All Sides The EU obviously has an interest in freezing Iran’s nuclear program and accessing more Iranian fossil fuels while it is locked in an energy struggle with Russia – hence the its proposal to revive the Iran nuclear deal. However, the US and Iranian positions are more complicated. Iranian’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has an interest in removing the US’s economic sanctions – and in obtaining deliverable nuclear weapons, notes Matt Gertken, BCA Research’s chief geopolitical strategist. Khamenei’s plan is to develop a nuclear weapon so that Iran can deter any aggression from a future US administration or the Abraham alliance. This is the path to regime survival, power succession, and national security. Hence Iran will not freeze its nuclear program over the long run. But Khamenei may wish to buy time while the Democrats still run the White House. Chart 2KSA, UAE Preserving Spare Capacity Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over We’ve noted repeatedly the Biden administration has been pressing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – the only states in OPEC 2.0 able to raise output and maintain production at higher levels – to increase output for the better part of this year. These efforts yielded only a 100k b/d production increase earlier this month. KSA and the UAE insist they are close to the maximum levels of oil they can supply to the market, given their current production and the need to maintain minimal spare capacity (Chart 2).4 KSA’s max capacity is 12mm b/d. The Kingdom will be producing at or slightly above 11mm b/d later this year to offset declines in non-core OPEC 2.0 production. KSA’s trying to get its max capacity to 13mm b/d, but that will take until 2027, according to the state oil company ARAMCO. UAE’s max capacity is 4mm b/d. It will be producing at or close to 3.5mm b/d this year, and after that they’ll want to hang on to that last bit as spare capacity. UAE’s trying to get its spare capacity to 5mm b/d, but that’s going to take until 2030, according to its state oil company ADNOC. There’s an increasing risk to the Russian output arising from the EU embargo scheduled to take effect December 5, and sanctions on providing insurance and reinsurance to ships carrying Russian material. If the EU/UK/US embargo is successful and results in Russia being forced to shut in 2mm b/d by the end of next year, per our expectation, KSA and UAE spare capacity will not cover the loss of production, and falling output within OPEC 2.0. Given these dynamics – and the expectation at least some of the sanctions will stick after Dec. 5 – KSA and UAE have to hang on to those last barrels to be able to meet the increasingly likely loss of Russian shut-in production. Additional spare capacity is not available in the US shales, or in any of the other producing provinces outside OPEC 2.0 sufficient to cover the loss of Russian barrels. Indeed, output from OPEC 2.0 outside the core producers has been trending lower for years (Chart 3).5 Complicating a deal with Iran is the possibility it could re-open the breach between the US and KSA. If KSA wanted to express its displeasure with a US-Iran deal it wouldn’t need to do much to re-balance the market: If the Kingdom does not offset production losses by the rest of OPEC 2.0, or step up to cover, e.g., Libyan production – now back on the market with just under 500k b/d – global supply falls and prices rise, all else equal.6 Chart 3KSA, UAE Are Core OPEC 2.0 Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Our Geopolitical Strategy gives 40% odds of an Iran deal and 60% odds that negotiations fall apart (or drag on without resolution). We make the odds higher – 60% chance of success – given the compelling interest of the Biden administration to get more oil into the market going into midterms in November, and a general interest in the West to offset potential losses of Russian volumes to sanctions that kick in in December. The difference in these views hinges on what Iran will do, as the Biden administration is seeking a deal. Sanctions Kicking In In December The EU is set to roll into its embargo of Russian oil imports on December 5. If fully implemented, ~ 2.3mm b/d of seaborne imports of Russian crude oil will be excluded from EU markets by year-end. Beginning in February, another 800k b/d of refined products will be embargoed. EU, UK and US shipping insurance and reinsurance sanctions also are set to kick in in December. These arguably are the strongest sanctions available to the West in its effort to take Russian oil and refined products off the market (no insurance means no shipping). The EU recently relaxed sanctions on buying and transporting Russian crude oil, which will allow additional volumes of oil to be purchased and transported to end-use markets.7 While this will let a little more Russian oil into the market in the near term, we believe it opens the possibility of additional exceptions being made by the EU to make more oil available, if prices move sharply higher on the back of increasing supply scarcity. The EU and US are looking a bit wobbly on the insurance and reinsurance bans due to kick in in December.8 If they relax or forego these sanctions in some fashion, more Russian crude and products will flow to market in 4Q22 than currently is anticipated. This would undermine US efforts to secure a price cap on Russian oil sales. Slower sanction enforcement is a path available to Biden that does not involve bowing to Iran’s various demands. Some, but not all, of the Russian volumes lost to EU exports will continue to be scooped up by China and India, which have become the largest buyers of Russian oil following the sanctions imposed by the West after the invasion of Ukraine.9 India loaded 29.5mm barrels of Russian crude in July – a record – while China loaded 18.1mm barrels. These levels likely will fall, but these two states will remain big buyers of Russian crude and products going forward. Household Budgets Will Remain Strained High energy prices – particularly for gasoline and diesel fuel – and falling real incomes have eaten into US household budgets, and are a key factor for Biden’s low approval ratings (Chart 4). July US CPI was unchanged from June and was 8.5% higher y-o-y. While the gasoline price index dropped from June, it remained one of the main contributors to the high energy index. (Chart 5).10 Based on the sharp increase in gasoline prices over the first six months of this year, we estimate the cost of running a car is 50% higher in 1H22 vs. 1H21 in the US. Chart 4Wealth Destruction Key To Low Biden Approval Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Chart 5Energy Driving High US Prices Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over US gasoline and distillate prices have rolled over since mid-June, driven by high refined-product prices, which weakened demand, and fear of global recession as central banks tighten monetary policy. Higher Russian crude output in 1H22 – up 3.6% to ~ 10.1mm b/d – partly contributed to weaker product prices. However, this trend likely will reverse: Russian crude output in 2Q22 was down 1.1% y/y to 9.7mm b/d, based on our estimates. We expect prices of gasoline and diesel fuel to remain at elevated levels, given low inventories (Chart 6), and a second consecutive year of lower US refining capacity (Chart 7). Higher crude oil prices brought about by Russian oil and product embargoes will feed into these refined product prices, pushing them higher. Chart 6Low Product Stocks… Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Chart 7…And Refining Capacity Are Bullish For Petrol Products Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over There is scope for an increase in gasoline demand over the rest of the driving season, while elevated US and overseas distillate demand will support diesel and heating oil prices. The eurozone’s record high inflation in July was driven by energy prices (Chart 8), indicating high energy prices are a problem for households worldwide. According to the Household Electricity Price Index, residential electricity prices in EU capitals were more than 70% higher in 1H22 y/y. The IMF expects high fuel prices will increase EU households’ share of energy expenditure by 7% in 2022.11 In response to high energy prices, governments are enacting policies such as price caps and direct transfers to lower the damage to household wealth.12 An unintended consequence of this will be high prices for longer, as consumers will not register the signal the market is sending via higher prices to encourage lower demand. This will result in continued draws on inventories. Chart 8High Energy Prices Responsible For Eurozone Inflation High Energy Prices Responsible For Eurozone Inflation High Energy Prices Responsible For Eurozone Inflation Investment Implications With EU sanctions scheduled to become effective December 5, oil markets are focused on supply measures that could sharply reduce Russian oil exports. This makes the US-Iran negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal critically important. Agreement to restore the deal could return 1mm b/d of oil to markets at a time when supplies are at risk of contracting sharply going into 2023. Failure to restore these volumes will tighten supply significantly if the EU’s embargo of Russian oil imports is successful. We give the restoration of the Iran nuclear deal a 60% chance of success. In and of itself, the return of Iranian oil exports will not offset all of the potential loss of Russian crude oil exports to the EU. That said, the evolution of crude oil prices hinges upon the degree to which the EU’s embargo on Russian oil imports is implemented. There's a subtle point to be aware of in the evolution of US-Iran negotiations: The Biden administration could just turn a blind eye to Iranian crude sales, without agreeing to revive the nuclear deal being negotiated. Signing a deal, on the other hand, would be more positive for supply than merely not contesting Iranian's renewed exports of 1mm b/d of crude. It is worthwhile bearing in mind that the point of the deal is that Iran pauses its nuclear program, which reduces war risk in the medium term, or as long as deal is in force. Reducing the level of agita in the region, at least for a couple of years, is a net benefit. Our geopolitical strategist Matt Gertken notes, "If Iranians sign a deal, then they are endorsing Biden and the Democratic Party for 2024, meaning they want a Democratic White House in the US through 2028. There would be no reason to sign it unless you plan to implement at least through 2024." We remain bullish oil, and continue to expect Brent to trade above $110/bbl on average this year, and $117/bbl next year. We remain long the XOP ETF to retain our exposure to oil and gas E+Ps.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The EIA expects US natural gas inventories to finish the injection season at ~ 3.5 Tcf – 6% below the five-year average – at the end of October (Chart 9). LNG exports are expected to average 11.2 Bcf/d, which, if realized, will be 14% over 2021 levels. The EIA increased its estimate of LNG exports on the back of an earlier-than-expected return of Freeport LNG exports. For 2023, the EIA expects US LNG exports will average 12.7 Bcf/d. Close to 70% of the 57 bcm of US LNG exports are being shipped to Europe, where it is helping offset the cutoff of Russian gas supplies following the war in Ukraine. In 1H22, the US became the world’s largest exporter of LNG. Dry gas production in the US is expected to average just under 97 Bcf/d in 2022, a 3% increase over 2021 levels. Base Metals: Bullish Total Chinese copper imports for July were up 9.3% at ~464kt for July, despite economic weakness and a property market slowed by companies' payment defaults and lower consumer confidence in real estate groups. Copper in SHFE warehouses were at 35kt which is 65% lower y/y as of the week ending August 5th, while stocks in China’s copper bonded inventories were 40% lower y/y at 262kt for the month of June. Low copper prices and Chinese stocks, and high imports indicate that the world’s largest copper consumer is capitalizing on weak prices to restock low inventories. Precious Metals: Bullish The World Gold Council reported gold ETF outflows for the third consecutive month in July at 80.1 tons (Chart 10) due to low gold prices, a strong USD and a hawkish Fed. The latest July US CPI data was unchanged from June, as high prices due to pandemic induced supply chain bottlenecks eased. Inflation remains well above target. Despite the mildly positive inflation data, we expect the Fed to hike interest rates again in September. The magnitude of this hike will depend on the August US CPI and employment prints, given the Fed’s data dependency. By year-end, if the Russian oil embargo and insurance bans on shipping vessels are implemented in their current form, high crude oil prices will feed into inflation, and the Fed will be forced to remain aggressive. Chart 9 Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Chart 10 Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over Oil: It Ain't Over Till It's Over     Footnotes 1     Please see Agreement on nuclear deal within reach but obstacles remain published by politico.com on August 8, 2022. 2     Please see Russia suspends oil exports via southern leg of Druzhba pipeline due to transit payment issues published by reuters.com on August 9, 2022. 3    Please see Oil drops on Druzhba pipeline news and U.S. inflation expectations published by reuters.com on August 10, 2022.  According to the International Association of Oil Transporters, the Druzhba pipeline capacity is ~ 1.3mm b/d.  In July, its southern leg supplying Hungary, the Czech Republic and was carrying ~ 230k b/d, according to OilX, a satellite service monitoring oil and shipping movements globally. 4    Please see Tighter Oil Markets On The Way, which we published on July 21, 2022, for additional detail. 5    Please see footnote #4. 6    The background factor in this situation is Russia’s involvement in Libya’s civil disorder.  We noted in our July 14, 2022 report Russia Pulls Oil, Gas Supply Strings: “Sporadic force majeure declarations and output losses in Libya, where Russian mercenaries actively support Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), continue to make supply assessments difficult.” 7     Please see How the EU Will Allow a Slight Increase in Russian Oil Exports published by Bloomberg.com on August 1, 2022. 8    Please see US warns of surge in fuel costs as it renews push for Russian oil price cap published by ft.com on July 26, 2022. 9    Please see Russian crude prices recover on strong India, China demand, and Column-Russian crude is more reliant on India and China, but signs of a peak: Russell | Reuters, published by reuters.com on August 7 and August 9, 2022. 10   After fuel oils, the 44% y-o-y increase in the gasoline price index was the largest contributor to the increase in the energy index. 11    Please see Surging Energy Prices in Europe in the Aftermath of the War: How to Support the Vulnerable and Speed up the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels, published by the IMF on July 29, 2022. 12    For an example of such policy, please see State aid: Commission approves Spanish and Portuguese measure to lower electricity prices amid energy crisis     Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022

Executive Summary China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic A greater-than-expected contraction in manufacturing and construction in China – evidenced by the latest PMI and home sales data – will keep pressure on copper prices. Higher inflation will continue to drive the cost of labor, fuels and materials higher. Lower copper prices and higher input costs will weaken margins, leading to reduced capex. This also will put pressure on the rate of spending on projects already sanctioned. Payouts to shareholders – buybacks and dividends – will fall, reducing the appeal of miners’ equities. Debt-service costs will rise as interest rates are pushed higher by central banks. Civil unrest in critically important metals-producing provinces is forcing some miners to suspend production guidance. This will be exacerbated in Chile by changing tax regimes, which likely will reduce capex as well. Bottom Line: As global demand for copper increases with the renewable-energy transition and higher arms spending in Europe, miners’ ability to expand supply is being seriously challenged. Falling prices and rising costs – along with higher tax burdens and civil unrest in key mining provinces – are forcing copper miners to lower production and capex guidance, which will redound to the detriment of supply growth. With demand expected to double by 2030-35, copper prices will have to move higher to keep capex flowing to support supply growth. We remain long the XME ETF as the best way to express our bullish, decade-long view. Feature Just as the world is scrambling to develop additional energy supplies in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, copper supplies – the critical element of the renewable-energy buildout – are being squeezed by an unusual convergence of fundamental, financial and social factors. Chart 1China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic China Copper Consumption Failed To Revive Post-Pandemic Firstly, copper demand is weak, which, all else equal, is suppressing prices. This is largely down to China’s zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, and uncertainty over whether the EU will be pushed into a massive recession, following the cutoff of its natural gas supplies from Russia. These are two of the three major pillars of the global economy, and their economies are entwined via trade in goods. China’s COVID-19 policy is hammering its critically important property market – sales were down almost 40% y/y in July – and forcing a contraction in manufacturing. Construction represents ~ 30% of total copper demand in China. Manufacturing is contracting, based on China’s official July PMI report, which showed the index fell below 50 to 49.0 for July.1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyOne Hot Mess: EU Energy Policy China accounts for more than half of global copper demand, and, because of its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, was the only major economy to register a year-on-year contractions in copper demand throughout the pandemic up to the present (Chart 1). The EU accounts for ~ 12.5% of global copper demand, which we expect will continue to be supported by the bloc’s renewable-energy and defense buildouts.2 We noted in earlier research the odds of the EU going into recession remain high as the bloc scrambles to prepare for winter, in the wake of its attempts to replace its dependence on Russian natural gas supplies.3 We continue to expect the EU will avoid a major recession, and that it will be able to navigate this transition, leaving it on a better energy footing in subsequent years.4 Lower Copper Prices Will Hurt Capex Chart 2Copper Price Rally Fades Copper Price Rally Fades Copper Price Rally Fades After bottoming in March 2020 at $2.12/lb on the COMEX, copper prices staged a 125% rally that ended in March of this year. This was due to the post-pandemic reopening of most economies ex-China, which was accompanied by massive fiscal and monetary stimulus that super-charged consumer demand. Copper prices have since fallen ~33% from their March highs on the back of a substantial weakening of demand resulting from China’s zero-tolerance COVID policy and a concerted global effort to rein in the inflation caused by governments’ largess (Chart 2). Most year-end 2021 capex expectations for 2022 and into the future among copper miners were drawn up prior to the price collapse in June. After that, fear of central-bank policy mistakes – chiefly over-tightening of monetary policy that pushes the global economy into recession – and weak EM demand took prices from ~ $4.55/lb down to less than $3.20/lb by mid-July. A strong USD also pushed demand lower during this time. Chart 3DRC Offsets Chile, Peru Weakness Copper Capex Under Pressure Copper Capex Under Pressure Following the copper-price rout, miners are re-thinking production goals, dividend policy and capex. Social and governance issues also are contributing to weaker copper output. Rio Tinto, for example, notified markets it would shave $500mm from its $8 billion 2022 capex budget. For 1H22, Rio cut its dividend to $2.67/share from $5.61/share in 1H21. Elsewhere, Glencore said copper output from its Katanga mine in the DRC now is expected to come in 15% lower this year, at 1.06mm MT, owing to geological difficulties. Separately, output guidance for Chinese miner MMG Ltd’s Las Bambas mine in Peru has been suspended, following a 60% drop in production. The company expected it would be producing up to 320k tons this year. Civil unrest at Las Bambas has been ongoing since production started in 2016, according to Reuters. Big producers like Chile and Peru – accounting for ~ 35% of global ore production – along with the DRC face multiple challenges. Chile accounts for ~ 25% of global copper ore production. Its output fell ~ 6% in 2Q22 vs year-earlier output due to falling ore quality, water-supply constraints, and rising input costs (Chart 3). Chile’s government expects copper ore output to decline 3.4% y/y in 2022, with many of the country’s premier mines faltering (Chart 4). Chart 4Chile Expecting Lower Copper Output Copper Capex Under Pressure Copper Capex Under Pressure Chile also is proposing to increase taxes and royalties, to raise money for its budget. However, this may have the effect of driving away investment in the country’s copper mining industry. Fitch notes, “Increased costs will decrease mining cash flows and discourage new mining investments in Chile, favoring the migration of investors to other copper mining districts.”5 BHP Billiton, on que, said it will reconsider further investment in Chile, if the new legislation is approved. Renewables Buildout Will Widen Copper Deficit Markets appear to be trading without regard for the huge increase in copper supply that will be required for the global renewable-energy transition, to say nothing of the upcoming re-arming of the EU and continued military spending by the US and China. In our modeling of supply-demand balances, we move beyond our usual real GDP-based estimates of demand, which estimates the cyclical copper demand, and include assumptions for the demand the green-energy transition will contribute. Hence, this additional copper demand for green energy needs to be added to the copper demand forecast generated by the model. Using projections for global supply taken from the Resource and Energy Quarterly published by the Australian Government’s Department of Industry, Science and Resources, we estimate there will be a physical refined copper deficit of 224k tons in 2022 and 135K tons next year (Chart 5). Among other things, we are assuming refined copper demand will double by 2030 and reach 50mm tons/yr by then. This is a somewhat more aggressive assumption than S&P Global’s estimate of demand doubling by 2035. If we assume refined copper production is 2% lower than the REQ’s estimate, we expect the physical deficit in the refined copper market rise to a ~ 532k-ton deficit in 2022 and ~ 677k-ton deficit in 2023. These results including renewables demand highlight the need to not only account for cyclical demand but also the new demand that will be apparent as the EU, the US and China kick their renewables investments into high gear. Importantly, this kick-off is occurring with global commodity-exchange inventories still more than ~ 35% below year-ago levels (Chart 6). Chart 5Coppers Deficit Will Narrow On Lower Demand Coppers Deficit Will Narrow On Lower Demand Coppers Deficit Will Narrow On Lower Demand ​​​​​​ Chart 6Exchange Inventories Remain Exceptionally Low Exchange Inventories Remain Exceptionally Low Exchange Inventories Remain Exceptionally Low ​​​​​​ Investment Implications Copper prices will have to move higher to keep capex flowing to support supply growth normal cyclical demand and renewable-energy demand will require over coming decades. Falling prices and rising costs – along with higher tax burdens and civil unrest in key mining provinces – are forcing copper miners to lower production and capex guidance, which will redound to the detriment of supply growth. This situation cannot persist unless governments call off their renewable-energy transition, and, in the case of the EU, their efforts to re-arm Europe’s militaries following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. We remain bullish base metals, particularly copper. We remain long the XME ETF as the best way to express this decade-long view. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 agreed a token increase in oil production Wednesday of 100k b/d, partly as a sop to the US following President Biden’s visit to the Kingdom last month. KSA will be producing close to 11mm b/d in 2H22. We have argued this is about all KSA will be willing to put on the market, in order to maintain some spare capacity in the event of another exogenous shock. OPEC 2.0 spare capacity likely falls close to 1.5mm b/d in 2023 vs. an average of 3mm b/d this year, which will limit the capacity of core OPEC 2.0 – KSA and the UAE – to backstop unforeseen production losses. Separately, the US EIA reported total US stocks of crude oil and refined products rose 3.5mm barrels (ex SPR inventory). Demand for refined products in the US was down 28mm barrels in the week ended 29 July, or 4mm b/d. We continue to expect prices to average $110/bbl this year and $117/bbl next year (Chart 7). Base Metals: Bullish China flipped from a net importer of refined zinc in 2021 to a net exporter for the first half of 2022, despite a high export tax on the metal. This is indicative of the premium Western zinc prices are commanding over the domestic price. Chinese zinc demand has fallen, following reduced manufacturing activity and an ailing property sector. Thursday’s Politburo meeting did little to encourage markets of a Chinese rebound later this year. A subdued Chinese recovery, along with European zinc smelters operating at reduced capacity, if at all, could see this reversal in trade flow perpetuate for the rest of the year. Precious Metals: Bullish As BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy highlighted, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will increase tensions between the US and China but will not lead to war. For now. Increased uncertainty normally is good for gold and its rival, the USD. While geopolitical uncertainty from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine initially buoyed the yellow metal, gold has since dropped below the USD 1800/oz level. The greenback was the main beneficiary from the war (Chart 8). It is yet to be seen how this round of geopolitical risk will impact gold and USD, with the backdrop of increasing odds of a US recession and a hawkish Fed. Chart 7 Brent Backwardation Will Steepen Brent Backwardation Will Steepen Chart 8 Gold Prices Going Down Along With USD Gold Prices Going Down Along With USD   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see China’s factory activity contracts unexpectedly in July as Covid flares up published by cnbc.com on July 31, 2022. The PMI summary noted contractions in oil, coal and metals smelting industries led the index’s decline. 2     Please see One Hot Mess: EU Energy Policy, which we published on May 26, 2022, for additional discussion. 3     Please see Copper Prices Decouple From Fundamentals, which we published on July 7, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4     Please see Energy Security Rolls Over EU's ESG Agenda published on July 28, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5     Please see Proposed Tax Reform Weakens Cost Positions for Chilean Miners (fitchratings.com), published by Fitch Ratings on July 7, 2022.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022