Energy

Highlights The global fight against the Delta variant of COVID-19 continued to show progress in the month of September, but not without cost. Growth in services activity slowed meaningfully, which has likely delayed the return to potential output in the US until March of next year (at the earliest). However, even with this revised timeline, maximum employment remains a very possible outcome by next summer, barring a further extension of the pandemic in advanced economies. In this regard, the Fed’s likely decision at its next meeting to taper the rate of its asset purchases makes sense and is consistent with a first rate hike in the second half of 2022. The rise in long-maturity bond yields following this month’s Fed meeting is consistent with the view that 10-year Treasurys are overvalued and that yields will trend higher over the coming year. Fixed-income investors should stay short duration. The degree to which global shipping costs are being driven by the forces of supply versus demand will affect the Fed's criteria for liftoff next year, via changes in goods prices as well as consumer expectations for inflation. In our view, a detailed examination of shipping prices over the past 18 months points to a future pace of inflation that is not dangerously above-target, but does meet the Fed’s liftoff criteria. A mix-shift in consumer spending, away from goods and toward services, is not a threat to economic activity or S&P 500 earnings – so long as the decline in the former is not outsized relative to the rise in the latter. It will, however, disproportionately impact China, and could be the trigger for meaningful further easing by Chinese policymakers. In the interim, a catalyst for EM stocks may remain elusive. We continue to recommend an overweight stance toward value versus growth stocks and global ex-US versus the US, particularly in favor of developed markets ex-US. Investors should remain cyclically overweight stocks versus bonds, although it is possible that both assets will post negative returns for a short period at some point over the coming 12 months in response to higher long-maturity bond yields. Still, we expect both stock prices and the stock-to-bond ratio to be higher a year from today. Feature The global fight against the Delta variant of COVID-19 continued to show progress in the month of September. Chart I-1 highlights that an estimate of the reproduction rate of the disease in developed economies has fallen below one, and the weekly change in hospitalizations in both the US and UK – the two countries at the epicenter of the Delta wave that have not reintroduced widespread COVID-19 control measures – have fallen back into negative territory. In addition, we estimate that approximately 6% of the world’s population received vaccines against COVID-19 in September, with now 45% of the globe having received a first dose and 33% now fully vaccinated. Pfizer’s announcement last week that it has found a “favorable safety profile and robust neutralizing antibody responses” from its vaccine trial in children five to eleven years of age suggests that the FDA may grant emergency use authorization within weeks, which would likely raise the vaccination rate in the US (and ultimately other advanced economies) by at least 5 percentage points in fairly short order. This would also further reduce the impact of school/classroom closures on the labor market, via both an increased participation rate and increased hiring in the education sector. This fight, however, has not been without cost. US jobs growth slowed significantly in August, manufacturing and services PMIs continued to slow in September, and, as Chart I-2 highlights, the normalization in transportation use that was well underway in the first half of the year has clearly inflected in both the US and UK in response to the spread of Delta. Consensus market expectations for Q3 growth have been cut in the US, and to a lesser extent in the euro area, and the Fed reduced its forecast for 2021 real GDP growth from 7% to 5.9% following the September FOMC meeting. Chart I-1The Delta Wave Continues To Abate... The Delta Wave Continues To Abate... The Delta Wave Continues To Abate... Chart I-2...But At A Cost To Economic Activity ...But At A Cost To Economic Activity ...But At A Cost To Economic Activity   The Path Toward Eventually Tighter Monetary Policy It has been surprising to some investors that the Fed has moved forward with their plans to taper the rate of its asset purchases against this backdrop of slowing near-term growth – an event that now seems likely to occur at its next meeting barring a disastrous September payroll report. In our view, this is not especially surprising, given that the Fed has expressed a desire for net purchases to reach zero before they raise interest rates for the first time. Chair Powell noted during last week’s press conference that FOMC participants felt a “gradual tapering process that concludes around the middle of next year is likely to be appropriate”, underscoring that the Fed wants the flexibility to raise interest rates in the second half of next year. The timing of the first Fed rate hike is entirely subject to the evolution of the economic data over the next year, and is not, in any way, calendar-based. But we presented in last month's Special Report why the Fed’s maximum employment criteria may be met as early as next summer,1 and the Fed’s projections for the pace of tapering are consistent with our analysis. Chart I-3Maximum Employment Remains A Very Possible Outcome By Next Summer Maximum Employment Remains A Very Possible Outcome By Next Summer Maximum Employment Remains A Very Possible Outcome By Next Summer The Fed’s most recent Summary of Economic Projections (“SEP”) also seemingly confirmed Fed Vice Chair Richard Clarida’s view that a 3.8% unemployment rate is consistent with maximum employment, barring any issues with the “breadth and inclusivity” of the labor market recovery. We noted in last month’s report that these issues are unlikely in a scenario where jobs growth is sufficiently high to bring down the unemployment rate below 4%. Chart I-3 highlights that both the Fed’s forecast and Bloomberg consensus expectations imply a closed output gap by March, even after factoring in the near-term impact of the Delta variant. Consequently, maximum employment remains a very possible outcome by next summer, barring a further extension of the pandemic in advanced economies. Long-maturity bond yields rose following the Fed meeting, which is also not especially surprising given how low yields have fallen relative to the fair value implied by the Fed’s SEP forecasts even assuming a December 2022 initial rate hike. Chart I-4 highlights that the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield today is roughly 2% using this approach, rising to 2.15% by next summer. Ironically, the September SEP update modestly lowered the fair value shown in Chart I-4 relative to what would otherwise have been the case, as it implied that the Fed is expecting to raise interest rates at a pace of approximately three hikes per year – rather than the four that prevailed prior to the pandemic. Investors should also note that the fair value for the 10-year yield is nontrivially lower based on market participant and primary dealer estimates of the terminal Fed funds rate (also shown in Chart I-4), although they still imply that long-maturity yields should trend higher over the coming year. Global Trade, Inflation, And The Fed A return to maximum employment will likely signal the onset of monetary policy tightening, as long as the Fed's inflation criteria for liftoff have been met. For now, inflation is signaling a green light for hikes next year, even after excluding the prices of COVID-impacted services and cars (Chart I-5). In fact, more recently, CPI ex-direct COVID effects has been pointing in the “non-transitory” direction, which continues to prompt questions from investors about whether the Fed will be forced to hike earlier than it currently expects for reasons other than a return to maximum employment. Chart I-4US Long-Maturity Bond Yields Are Set To Move Higher Over The Coming Year US Long-Maturity Bond Yields Are Set To Move Higher Over The Coming Year US Long-Maturity Bond Yields Are Set To Move Higher Over The Coming Year Chart I-5For Now, Inflation Is Signaling A Green Light For Hikes Next Year For Now, Inflation Is Signaling A Green Light For Hikes Next Year For Now, Inflation Is Signaling A Green Light For Hikes Next Year   At least some portion of the current pace of increase in consumer goods prices is tied to surging import costs, which have run well in-excess of what would be predicted by the relationship with the US dollar (Chart I-6). This, in turn, is being driven by an explosion in shipping costs that has occurred since the onset of the pandemic, which is being driven both by demand and supply-side factors (Chart I-7). Chart I-6US CPI Is Being Affected By Surging Import Prices... US CPI Is Being Affected By Surging Import Prices... US CPI Is Being Affected By Surging Import Prices... Chart I-7...Which Are Being Driven By An Explosion In Shipping Costs ...Which Are Being Driven By An Explosion In Shipping Costs ...Which Are Being Driven By An Explosion In Shipping Costs   The degree to which global shipping costs are being driven by the forces of supply versus demand will affect the Fed's criteria for liftoff next year, via changes in goods prices as well as consumer expectations for inflation. To the extent that demand side factors are mostly responsible, investors should have higher confidence that the recent surge in consumer prices is transitory, because a shift away from above-trend goods spending and toward below-trend services spending is likely over the coming year. If supply-side factors are mostly responsible, then it is conceivable that the global supply chain impact on consumer goods prices will persist for longer than would otherwise be the case, potentially raising the odds of a larger or more sustained rise in inflation expectations. In our view, a detailed examination of shipping prices over the past 18 months points to a mix of both demand and supply effects, even since the beginning of 2021. However, as we highlight below, several facts point toward the view that supply-side factors will be the dominant driver over the coming year, and that they are more likely to exert a disinflationary/deflationary rather than inflationary effect: Chart I-8 breaks down the cumulative change in the overall Freightos Baltic Index by route since December 2019. The chart makes it clear that shipping costs from China/East Asia to the West Coast of the US have risen far more than any other route, underscoring that US demand for goods has been an important part of the rise in shipping costs. Chart I-8US Demand For Goods Is An Important Part Of The Shipping Cost Story October 2021 October 2021 Chart I-9US Goods Spending Has Clearly Been Boosted By US Fiscal Policy US Goods Spending Has Clearly Been Boosted By US Fiscal Policy US Goods Spending Has Clearly Been Boosted By US Fiscal Policy Chart I-9 shows the level of real US personal consumption expenditures on goods relative to its pre-pandemic trendline, underscoring both that goods spending is currently well-above trend, and that there have been two distinct phases of rising goods spending: from May to October 2020 following the passage of the CARES act, and from January to March 2021 following the December 2020 extension of UI benefits and in anticipation of the passage of the American Rescue Plan. Since March, US real goods spending has trended lower, a pattern that we expect will continue over the coming year. Chart I-10 highlights that while the global supply chain struggled heavily last year in response to surging demand and the lagging effects of labor shortages and factory shutdowns during the earliest phase of the pandemic, there were some signs of supply-side normalization in the first half of 2021. The chart highlights that the number of ships at anchor at the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports declined meaningfully from February to June, and global shipping schedule reliability tentatively improved in March. The chart also shows that shipping costs from China/East Asia to the West Coast of the US continued to rise in Q2 seemingly as a lagged response to the Jan-Mar rise in goods spending, but they were still low at the end of June compared to today’s levels. Chart I-10Supply-Side Factors Seem To Have Driven A Majority Of This Year's Increase In Shipping Costs Supply-Side Factors Seem To Have Driven A Majority Of This Year's Increase In Shipping Costs Supply-Side Factors Seem To Have Driven A Majority Of This Year's Increase In Shipping Costs In Q3, circumstances drastically changed. Shipping costs between China/East Asia to the West Coast of the US rapidly doubled, and the number of ships at anchor at the LA/LB ports exploded well past its peak in early February. This rise in China/US shipping costs since late-June has accounted for nearly 60% of the cumulative rise since the pandemic began, and cannot be attributed to increased demand. Instead, the increase in prices and the surge in port congestion in Q3 appears to have been caused by the one-month closure of the Port of Yantian that began in late-May, in response to an outbreak of COVID-19 in Guangdong province. Yantian is the fourth largest port in the world and exports a sizeable majority of global electronics given its close proximity to Shenzhen, underscoring the impact that its closure likely had on an already bottlenecked logistical system. There are two key points emanating from our analysis of global shipping costs. First, demand has been an important effect driving costs higher, but it does not appear to have driven most of the increase in shipping costs this year. Still, over the coming year, goods demand in advanced economies is likely to wane as consumer spending shifts from goods to services spending, which will help ease clogged global trade channels and lower shipping costs. Second, the (brief) evidence of supply-side normalization in the first half of 2021, when consumer demand was actually strengthening, suggests that the supply-side of the global trade system will turn disinflationary over the coming year if further COVID-related labor market shocks can be avoided. What does this mean for the Fed and the prospect of monetary policy tightening next year? In our view, the combination of a positive output gap, stable but normalized inflation expectations, and disinflation (or outright deflation) in COVID-related goods and services (including import prices) is likely to lead to a pace of inflation that meets the Fed’s liftoff criteria. Chart I-11 highlights that important longer-term inflation expectations measures have recently been well-behaved, despite a surge in actual inflation and shorter-term expectations for inflation. Aided by disinflation/deflation in certain high-profile COVID-related goods and services prices, this argues against meaningful upside risks to inflation. However, the current level of long-term expectations and the fact that the output gap is set to turn positive in the first half of next year argues against the notion that inflation will fall below target outside of COVID-related effects. As such, we continue to expect that the Fed will raise interest rates next year, potentially as early as next summer, driven by the progress towards maximum employment. Spending Shifts And The Equity Market We noted above, and in previous reports, that consumer spending in advanced economies is likely to continue to shift away from goods and toward services over the coming year. This raises the question of whether a contraction in goods spending will weigh disproportionately on the economy and equity earnings, given the close historical correlation between manufacturing activity and the business cycle. Chart I-12 illustrates this risk: in a hypothetical scenario in which real goods spending were to return to the trendline shown in Chart I-9 by March of next year, it would contract on the order of 10% on a year-over-year basis, on par with what occurred last year and vastly in excess of what even normally occurs during a recession. Chart I-11Longer-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Well-Behaved Longer-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Well-Behaved Longer-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Well-Behaved Chart I-12A Contraction In Goods Spending Is Likely Over The Coming Year A Contraction In Goods Spending Is Likely Over The Coming Year A Contraction In Goods Spending Is Likely Over The Coming Year   Chart I-12 is a hypothetical scenario and not a forecast, as there is some evidence that consumers are currently deferring durable goods purchases on the expectation that prices will become more favorable. In addition, a positive output gap next year implies that goods spending may settle above its pre-pandemic trendline. Nevertheless, the prospect of a potentially significant slowdown in goods spending has unnerved some investors, even given the prospect of improved services spending. Chart I-13highlights that this fear is understandable given how the US economy normally behaves. The top panel of the chart shows the year-over-year contribution to real GDP growth from real goods and services spending, and the bottom panel shows these contributions in absolute terms to better illustrate their relative magnitudes. The chart makes it clear that goods spending is normally a more forceful driver of economic activity than is the case for services spending, which ostensibly supports concerns that a significant slowdown in the former may be destabilizing for overall activity. Chart I-13Normally, Goods Spending Predominantly Drives Activity. Not This Cycle. Normally, Goods Spending Predominantly Drives Activity. Not This Cycle. Normally, Goods Spending Predominantly Drives Activity. Not This Cycle. However, Chart I-13 also highlights that the magnitude of the recent contribution to growth from services spending has been absolutely unprecedented in the post-WWII economic environment. This is not surprising given the nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, but it is important because it underscores that investors should not rely excessively on typical rules of thumb about how modern economies tend to function over the course of the business cycle. In terms of the impact on overall economic activity, investors should focus on the net impact of goods plus services spending. It is certainly possible that the former will slow at a pace that is not fully compensated by the latter, but our sense is that this is not likely to occur barring a further extension of the pandemic in advanced economies. Chart I-14Over The Past 5 Years, S&P 500 Sales Have Been More Correlated With Services Than Goods Spending Over The Past 5 Years, S&P 500 Sales Have Been More Correlated With Services Than Goods Spending Over The Past 5 Years, S&P 500 Sales Have Been More Correlated With Services Than Goods Spending Chart I-14 presents a similar conclusion for the US equity market. The chart highlights the historical five-year correlation between the quarterly growth of nominal spending and S&P 500 sales per share. The chart shows that S&P 500 revenue was more sensitive to goods versus services spending prior to the 1990s, when the US was more manufacturing-oriented and goods were more likely to be produced domestically than is the case today. Another gap in the correlation emerged following the global financial crisis when the US household sector underwent several years of deleveraging. But over the past five years, Chart I-14 highlights that S&P 500 revenue growth has actually been more strongly correlated with US services spending than goods spending. Some of this increased correlation might reflect technology-related services spending which could suffer in a post-pandemic environment, but the bottom line from Chart I-14 is that there is not much empirical support for the view that US equity fundamentals will be disproportionately impacted by a slowdown in goods spending, so long as services spending rises in lockstep. China: Exacerbating An Underlying Trend Chart I-15China Will Be Disproportionately Affected By Slowing DM Goods Spending China Will Be Disproportionately Affected By Slowing DM Goods Spending China Will Be Disproportionately Affected By Slowing DM Goods Spending China, on the other hand, will be disproportionately affected by slower goods spending in advanced economies, because its exports have disproportionately benefited from the surge in spending on goods over the past year. Chart I-15 highlights that Chinese export volume growth has exploded this year, and that current export growth is running at a pace of 10% in volume terms – significantly higher than has been the case on average over the past decade. Several problems in China have been in the headlines over the past few months: a regulatory crackdown by Chinese authorities on new economy companies, the situation with Evergrande and, more recently, power shortages that have forced factories in several key manufacturing hubs to curtail production as a result of China’s ban on coal imports from Australia (Chart I-16). However, the key point for investors is that these are not truly new risks to China’s growth outlook; rather, they are developments that have the potential to magnify the impact of an already established trend: the ongoing slowdown in China’s economy that has clearly been caused by a decline in its credit impulse (Chart I-17). In turn, China’s decelerating credit impulse has been caused by tighter regulatory and monetary policy. Chart I-16Power Outages: The Latest Negative Headline From China Power Outages: The Latest Negative Headline From China Power Outages: The Latest Negative Headline From China Chart I-17China Is Slowing Because Policymakers Have Tightened China Is Slowing Because Policymakers Have Tightened China Is Slowing Because Policymakers Have Tightened   BCA’s China Investment Strategy service has provided a detailed analysis of the ongoing Evergrande saga.2 In short, our view is that the government will likely restructure Evergrande’s debt to prevent the company’s crisis from evolving into a systemic financial risk. As such, Beijing may rescue the stakeholders of Evergrande, but likely not its shareholders. However, in terms of stimulating the broader economy, it is still not clear that Chinese policymakers are willing to engage in more than gradual or piecemeal stimulus, given a higher pain threshold for a slower economy and a lower appetite for leverage. This may change once Chinese export growth slows in response to a shift in DM spending from goods to services, as policymakers will no longer be able to rely on the external sector for support. This potentially offsetting nature of eventual Chinese stimulus and global goods spending underscores both the importance of a normalization in DM services spending as an impulse for global growth, as well as the fact that a catalyst for EM stocks may remain elusive over the tactical horizon. Investment Conclusions In Section 2 of this month’s report, we explain why the performance of US stocks may be flat versus their global peers over a structural time horizon. We also highlighted that US stocks are likely to earn low annualized total returns over the coming 10 years (between 1.8 - 4.7%), which would fall well short of the absolute return goals of many investors. Chart I-18Losses From Both Stocks And Bonds Are Rare, But Are Linked To Higher Rates Losses From Both Stocks And Bonds Are Rare, But Are Linked To Higher Rates Losses From Both Stocks And Bonds Are Rare, But Are Linked To Higher Rates Over the coming 6-12 month time horizon, we continue to recommend an overweight stance towards value vs. growth stocks and global ex-US vs. US, particularly in favor of developed markets ex-US. The relative performance of value vs. growth stocks is likely to benefit from the transition to a post-pandemic state and a rise in long-maturity bond yields, as monetary policy shifts towards the point of tightening. Regional equity trends have been closely correlated with style over the past two years, and the underperformance of growth strongly implies US equity underperformance. From an asset allocation perspective, investors should remain overweight stocks versus bonds over the coming year, although it is possible that both assets will post negative returns for a short period at some point over the coming 12 months. Chart I-18 highlights that outside of the context of recessions, months with negative returns from both stocks and long-maturity bonds are quite rare, but they tend to be associated with periods of monetary policy tightening (or in anticipation of such periods). Fundamentally, we do not see a rise in bond yields to any of the levels shown in Chart I-4 as being threatening to economic growth or necessarily implying lower equity market multiples. But the speed of adjustment in bond yields could unnerve equity investors, and there are open questions as to how far the equity risk premium can fall before T.I.N.A. – “There Is No Alternative” – becomes a less persuasive argument. As such, we would not rule out a brief correction in stocks at some point over the coming several months, but we expect both stock prices and the stock-to-bond ratio to be higher a year from today. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst September 30, 2021 Next Report: October 28, 2021 II. The “Invincible” US Equity Market: The Longer-Term Outlook For US Stocks In Relative And Absolute Terms Since 2008, US equity outperformance versus global ex-US stocks has not been driven by stronger top-line growth. Instead, it has been caused by a narrowly-based increase in profit margins, the accretive impact of share buybacks on the EPS of US growth stocks, and an outsized expansion in equity multiples. To a lesser extent, the dollar has also boosted common currency relative performance. There are significant secular risks to these sources of US equity outperformance over the past 14 years. Elevated tech sector profit margins are likely to lead to increased competition and higher odds of regulatory action, leveraging has reduced the ability of US companies to continue to accrete EPS through changes to capital structure, relative multiples are not justified by relative ROE, and the US dollar is expensive and is likely to fall over a multi-year horizon. In absolute terms, we forecast that US stocks will earn annualized nominal total returns of between 1.8 - 4.7% over the coming decade, assuming 4-5% annual revenue growth, flat profit margins, a constant 2% dividend yield, and a constant equity risk premium. Long-maturity bond yields are below their equilibrium levels and are likely to rise in real terms over time, which will weigh on elevated equity multiples. Over the coming 6-12 months, our view that US 10-Year Treasury yields are likely to rise argues for an underweight stance toward growth versus value stocks. In turn, this implies that US stocks will underperform global stocks, especially versus developed markets ex-US. The risks that we have highlighted to the sources of US outperformance suggest that US stocks may be flat versus their global peers over the long-term, arguing for a neutral strategic allocation. It also suggests that investors should be prepared to accept more volatility in order to reduce the gap between expected and desired returns, and should look towards riskier investments and asset classes (such as real estate and alternative investments) as potential portfolio return enhancements. Chart II-1The US Has Massively Outperformed Other Equity Markets Since The Global Financial Crisis The US Has Massively Outperformed Other Equity Markets Since The Global Financial Crisis The US Has Massively Outperformed Other Equity Markets Since The Global Financial Crisis The US equity market has vastly outperformed its peers since the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. Chart II-1 highlights that an investment in US stocks at the end of 2007 is now worth over 4 times the invested amount, versus approximately 1.6 times for global ex-US stocks (when measured in US dollar terms). The chart also shows that USD-denominated total returns have been roughly the same for developed markets ex-US as they have been for emerging markets, highlighting the exceptional nature of US equities. In this report we provide a deep examination of the sources of US equity performance, their likely sustainability, and what this implies for long-term investor return expectations. US stocks have not outperformed because of stronger top-line (i.e. revenue) growth, and instead have benefitted from a narrowly-based increase in profit margins, active changes to capital structure that have benefitted stockholders, an outsized expansion in equity multiples relative to global stocks, and a structural appreciation in the US dollar. We conclude that there are significant risks to all of these sources of outperformance, and that a neutral strategic allocation to US equities is now likely warranted. We also highlight that, while a strategic overweight stance is still warranted toward stocks versus bonds, investors should no longer count on US stocks to deliver returns that are in line with or above commonly-cited absolute return expectations. This argues for a greater tolerance of volatility, and the pursuit of riskier investments and asset classes (such as real estate and alternative investments) as potential portfolio return enhancements. A Deep Examination Of US Outperformance Since 2008 Breaking down historical total return performance is the first step in judging whether US equities are likely to outperform their global ex-US peers on a structural basis. Below we deconstruct US and global total return performance over the past 14 years into six different components, and analyze the impact of some of these components on a sector-by-sector basis. The six components presented are: Total revenue growth for each equity market, in local currency terms The change in profit margins The impact of changes in capital structure and index composition The change in the trailing P/E ratio The income return from dividends The impact of changes in foreign exchange The sum of the first three factors explains the total growth in earnings per share over the period, and the addition of the fourth factor explains each market’s local currency price return. Income returns are added to explain total return over the period, with the sixth factor then explaining common currency total return performance. The FX effect for US stocks is zero by construction, given that we measure common currency performance in US$ terms. Chart II-2Strong US Returns Have Not Been Due To Strong Top Line Growth October 2021 October 2021 Chart II-2 presents the annualized absolute impact of these factors for the MSCI US index since 2008. The chart highlights that U.S. stock prices have earned roughly 11% per year in total return terms over the past 14 years, with significant contributions from revenue growth, multiple expansion, margins, and the return from dividends. Interestingly, however, Chart II-3 highlights that US equities have not significantly outperformed on the basis of the first factor, total local currency revenue growth, at least relative to overall global ex-US stocks (see Box II-1 for more details). DM ex-US stocks have experienced very weak revenue growth since 2008, but this has been compensated for by outsized EM revenue growth. It is also notable that US revenue growth has actually underperformed US GDP growth over the period, dispelling the notion that US equity outperformance has been due to strong top-line effects. Chart II-3The US Has Outperformed Due To Margins, Capital Structure, Multiples, And The Dollar October 2021 October 2021 Box II-1 Proxying The Impact Of Changes In Shares Outstanding We proxy the impact of changes in shares outstanding (and thus the impact of equity dilution / accretion) by dividing each index’s market capitalization by its stock price. This measure is not a perfect proxy, as changes in index composition (such as the addition/deletion of index constituents) will change the index’s market capitalization but not its stock price. We also calculate total revenue for each market by multiplying local currency sales per share by the market cap / stock price ratio, meaning that the total revenue growth figures shown in Chart II-3 should best be viewed as estimates that in some cases reflect index composition effects. However, Chart II-B1 highlights that adjusting the market cap / stock price ratio for the number of firms in the index does not meaningfully change our overall conclusions. This approach would imply a larger dilution effect for DM ex-US than suggested in Chart II-3, and a smaller effect for emerging markets (due to a significant rise in the number of EM index constituents since 2008). In addition, global ex-US revenue growth is modestly lower than US revenue growth when using this approach. But this gap would account for a fraction of US equity outperformance over the period, underscoring that the US has massively outperformed global ex-US stocks due to margin, capital structure, and multiple expansion effects. Chart II-B1The US Has Not Meaningfully Outperformed Due To Revenue Growth, No Matter How You Slice It October 2021 October 2021 Chart II-3 also highlights that global ex-US stocks have modestly outperformed the US in terms of the fifth factor, the income return from dividends. This has almost offset the negative FX return (the sixth factor) from a net rise in the US dollar over the period. What is clear from the chart is that the second, third, and fourth factors explain almost all of the difference in total return between US and global ex-US stocks since 2008. The US experienced a significant increase in profit margins versus a modest contraction for global ex-US, a modest fillip from changes in capital structure and index composition versus a substantial drag for ex-US stocks, and a sizable rise in equity multiples that has outpaced what has occurred around the globe in response to structurally lower interest rates. Chart II-4US Margin Outperformance Has Been Narrowly-Based October 2021 October 2021 The significant rise in aggregate US profit margins over the past 14 years has often been attributed to the strong competitiveness of US companies, but Chart II-4 highlights that the aggregate change mostly reflects a narrow sector composition effect. The chart shows the change in US and global ex-US profit margins by level 1 GICS sector since 2008, and underscores that overall profit margins outside of the US have fallen mostly due to lower oil prices. Conversely, in the US, profit margins have substantially risen in only three out of ten sectors: health care, information technology, and communication services. Chart II-5 highlights that global ex-US equity multiples have risen in a majority of sectors since 2008, but not by the same magnitude as what has occurred in the US. De-rating in the resource sector partially explains the gap, but stronger US multiple expansion in the heavily-weighted consumer discretionary, information technology, and communication services sectors appears to explain most of the gap in multiple expansion. Chart II-5Multiples Have Risen Globally, But More So For Broadly-Defined US Tech Stocks October 2021 October 2021 Finally, Charts II-6 & II-7 highlights that there has been a strong growth versus value dimension to the impact of changes in capital structure and index composition on regional equity performance. The charts show that equity dilution and other changes to index composition have caused a similar drag on the returns from value stocks in the US and outside the US. However, the charts also highlight that the more important effect has been the accretive impact of share buybacks on the EPS of US growth stocks, which has not been matched by growth stocks outside of the US. As noted in Box II-1, part of this gap may be explained by an increase in the number of companies included in the MSCI Emerging Markets index, but Chart II-8 highlights that the global ex-US ratio of market capitalization to stock price has still risen significantly over the past 14 years, in contrast to that of the US even after controlling for the number of index components. Chart II-6There Has Been A Strong Style Dimension… There Has Been A Strong Style Dimension... There Has Been A Strong Style Dimension... Chart II-7…To The Impact Of Changes In Capital Structure And Index Composition ...To The Impact Of Changes In Capital Structure And Index Composition ...To The Impact Of Changes In Capital Structure And Index Composition Chart II-8The Accretive Impact Of US Growth Stock Buybacks Has Not Been Matched Globally The Accretive Impact Of US Growth Stock Buybacks Has Not Been Matched Globally The Accretive Impact Of US Growth Stock Buybacks Has Not Been Matched Globally The bottom line for investors is that there have been multiple factors contributing to US equity outperformance since 2008, but aggregate top-line growth has not been one of them. Broadly-defined technology companies (including media & entertainment and internet retail firms) have been responsible for nearly all of the relative rise in profit margins and most of the relative expansion in multiples over the past 14 years, and US growth stocks have benefitted from the accretive impact of share buybacks to a larger degree than what has occurred globally. The Relative Secular Return Outlook For US Stocks We present below several structural risks to the continued outperformance of US equities for the factors that have been most responsible for this performance over the past 14 years. In some cases, these risks speak to the potential for US outperformance to end, not necessarily that the US will underperform. But even the cessation of US outperformance along one or more of these factors would be significant, as it would imply a potential inflection point in the most consequential trend in regional equity performance since the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. Profit Margins Chart II-9 presents the 12-month trailing combined profit margin for the US consumer discretionary, information technology, and communication services sector versus that of the remaining sectors. The chart underscores the points made by Chart II-4 in time series form, namely that the net increase in overall US profit margins since 2008 has been narrowly based. Chart II-9The US Profit Margin Expansion Has Been Driven By Broadly-Defined Tech Stocks The US Profit Margin Expansion Has Been Driven By Broadly-Defined Tech Stocks The US Profit Margin Expansion Has Been Driven By Broadly-Defined Tech Stocks Over a 6-12 month time horizon, the clear risk to US profit margins is an end to the COVID-19 pandemic. The profitability of broadly-defined tech stocks has surged during the pandemic, in response to a significant shift toward online goods purchases and elevated spending on tech equipment. A durable end to the pandemic is likely to reverse some of these spending patterns, which will likely weigh on margins for broadly-defined tech stocks. Chart II-10The Regulatory Risks Facing Big Tech Are Real October 2021 October 2021 Over the longer term, the risk is that extremely elevated profit margins are likely to increase the odds of regulatory action from Washington and invite competition. On the former point, our US Political Strategy service has highlighted that a bipartisan consensus in public opinion holds that Big Tech needs tougher regulation (Chart II-10), and this consensus grew substantially over the controversial 2020 political cycle.3 This regulatory pressure is currently best described as a “slow boil,” as not all surveys show strong majorities in favor of regulation, and Republicans and Democrats disagree on the aims of regulation. But the bottom line is that Big Tech is likely to remain in the hot seat after the various controversies of the pandemic and 2016-2020 elections, just as big banks faced tougher regulation in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. This underscores that a “slow boil” may turn into a faster one at some point over the secular horizon, which would very likely weigh on profit margins. Elevated tech sector profit margins makes regulatory action more likely because policymakers will perceive a stronger ability for these firms to weather a “regulatory shock.” On the latter point about competition, it is true that broadly-defined tech stocks follow a “platform” business model that will be difficult to supplant. These companies benefit from powerful network effects that have taken years to accrue, suggesting that they will not be rapidly replaced by competitors. Still, the experience of Microsoft in the years following its meteoric rise in the second half of the 1990s provides a cautionary tale for broadly-defined tech stocks today. In the late-1990s, it was difficult for investors to envision how Microsoft’s near-total product dominance of the PC ecosystem could ever be displaced, but it eventually lost market share due to the rise of mobile devices and their competing operating systems. In addition, Microsoft’s fundamental performance suffered even before the rise of the modern-day smartphone & mobile device market. Chart II-11 highlights the annualized components of Microsoft’s price return from 1999-2007 versus the late-1990s period, which underscores that changes in margins, changes in multiples, and stock price returns may be persistently negative in a scenario in which revenue growth slows (even if revenue growth itself remains positive). Chart II-11Microsoft Offers A Cautionary Tale For Dominant Business Models October 2021 October 2021 Some of the reversal of Microsoft’s fortunes during this period were self-inflicted, and the firm also suffered from an economy-wide slowdown in tech equipment spending as a result of the 2001 recession that persisted into the early years of the subsequent recovery. But the key point for investors is that company and sector dominance may wane, and the fact that broadly-defined tech sector profit margins are extremely elevated raises the risk that further increases may not materialize. Capital Structure And Index Composition As noted above, the beneficial impact from changes in capital structure and index composition for US equities has occurred due to the accretive impact of share buybacks on the EPS of US growth stocks, which has not been matched by growth stocks outside of the US. In our view, this accretive impact has occurred for two reasons. First, US growth stocks have taken advantage of historically low interest rates and leverage to shift their capital structure to be more debt-focused over the past 14 years. Second, this shift has been aided by the fact that US growth stocks have experienced stronger cash flows than their global peers, which have been used to service higher debt payments. However, Charts II-12 and II-13 suggest that this process may be in its late innings. Chart II-12 highlights that the US nonfinancial corporate sector debt service ratio (DSR) did indeed fall below that of the euro area following the global financial crisis, but that this reversed in 2016. At the onset of the pandemic, the US nonfinancial corporate sector DSR was rising sharply, and was approaching its early-2000 highs. During the pandemic, the corporate sector DSR has continued to rise in both regions, but this almost exclusively reflects a (temporary) decline in operating income, not a surge in corporate sector debt or a rise in interest rates. Not all of the pre-pandemic rise in the US corporate sector DSR was concentrated in broadly-defined tech stocks, but some of it likely was. The key point for investors is that the US nonfinancial corporate sector had a lower capacity to leverage itself relative to companies in the euro area at the onset of the pandemic, which implies a less accretive impact on relative earnings per share in the future. Chart II-13 reinforces this point by highlighting that the uptrend in relative cash flow for US growth stocks, versus global ex-US, appears to have ended in 2015. The uptrend has continued in per share terms, but this appears to be flattered by the impact of buybacks itself. Chart II-12Can The US Continue To Accrete EPS Through Stock Buybacks? Can The US Continue To Accrete EPS Through Stock Buybacks? Can The US Continue To Accrete EPS Through Stock Buybacks? Chart II-13US Growth Companies Are No Longer Generating More Cash Than Their Global Peers US Growth Companies Are No Longer Generating More Cash Than Their Global Peers US Growth Companies Are No Longer Generating More Cash Than Their Global Peers   Admittedly, we see no basis to conclude that the persistent earnings dilution that has occurred in emerging markets over the past 14 years will end, or even slow, over the secular horizon. This underscores that emerging markets will need to generate stronger revenue growth to prevent the dilution effect from acting as a continued drag on EM vs. US equity performance, and it is an open question as to whether this will occur. Thus, for now, we have more conviction in the view that capital structure and index composition changes may contribute less to US equity outperformance versus developed markets ex-US over the coming several years. Equity Multiples There are three arguments against the idea that US equity multiples will continue to expand relative to those of global ex-US stocks. First, Chart II-14 highlights a point that we have made in previous Bank Credit Analyst reports, which is that aggressive multiple expansion in the US has now rendered US stocks to be the most dependent on low long-maturity bond yields than at any point since the global financial crisis. Chart II-14US Stocks Are The Most Dependent On Low Bond Yields In Over A Decade US Stocks Are The Most Dependent On Low Bond Yields In Over A Decade US Stocks Are The Most Dependent On Low Bond Yields In Over A Decade Over the coming 6- to 12-months, we strongly doubt that US 10-year Treasury yields will rise outside of the range that would be consistent with the US equity risk premium from 2002 to 2007 (discussed in further detail in the next section). But the chart also shows that this range is now clearly below trend nominal GDP growth, suggesting that higher interest rates on a structural basis may cause outright multiple contraction for US stocks. This is particularly true for growth stocks, which have been responsible for a significant portion of US equity outperformance, given their comparatively long earnings duration. Chart II-15US Multiples Are Not Justified By Higher Return On Equity US Multiples Are Not Justified By Higher Return On Equity US Multiples Are Not Justified By Higher Return On Equity Second, it has been often argued by some investors that a premium is warranted for US stocks given their comparatively high return on equity, but Chart II-15 highlights that this is not the case. The chart shows the relative price-to-book ratio for the US versus global and developed markets ex-US compared with regression-based predicted values based on relative return on equity. The chart clearly highlights that the US price-to-book ratio is meaningfully higher than it should be relative to global stocks, especially when compared to other developed markets. Versus DM ex-US, the only comparable period that saw a relative P/B – relative ROE deviation of this magnitude occurred in the late-1980s, when US stocks were meaningfully less expensive than relative ROE would have suggested. This relationship completely normalized in the years that followed, which would imply a substantial relative multiple contraction for US stocks over the coming several years were the gap shown in Chart II-15 to close. Third, Chart II-16 presents the share of US stock market capitalization accounted for by the largest 10% of stocks by size. The chart highlights that the concentration of US market capitalization has risen to an extreme level that has only been reached in two other cases over the past century. Historically, prior stock market concentration has been associated with future increases in the equity risk premium, underscoring that broadly-defined US tech sector concentration bodes poorly for future returns. Chart II-16The US Stock Market Is Now Extremely Concentrated The US Stock Market Is Now Extremely Concentrated The US Stock Market Is Now Extremely Concentrated The Foreign Exchange Effect As a final point, Chart II-17 illustrates the degree to which US relative performance has meaningfully benefitted from a rise in the US dollar since 2008. The chart highlights that an equity market-weighted dollar index has risen 20% from its late-2007 level, which has boosted US common currency relative performance. The US dollar was arguably modestly undervalued just prior to the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, but Chart II-18 highlights that it is now meaningfully overvalued versus other major currencies. Over a multi-year horizon, this argues against further relative common currency gains for US stocks from the foreign exchange effect. Chart II-17The US Dollar Has Helped US Common Currency Performance... The US Dollar Has Helped US Common Currency Performance... The US Dollar Has Helped US Common Currency Performance... Chart II-18…And Is Now Expensive October 2021 October 2021   The Absolute Secular Return Outlook For US Stocks Over a secular horizon, the most common method for forecasting equity returns is to predict whether earnings are likely to grow faster or slower than nominal potential GDP growth, and whether equity multiples are likely to rise or fall. For the reasons described above, we have no plausible basis on which to forecast that US profit margins are inclined to rise further over time given how extended they have become. This suggests that a reasonable long-term earnings forecast should be closely linked to one’s forecast for revenue growth. Chart II-19S&P 500 Revenue Is Low Relative To US GDP, And May Rise Over The Next Decade S&P 500 Revenue Is Low Relative To US GDP, And May Rise Over The Next Decade S&P 500 Revenue Is Low Relative To US GDP, And May Rise Over The Next Decade Chart II-19 presents S&P 500 revenue as a percent of nominal GDP, and underscores a fact that we noted above: revenue growth for US equities has underperformed US GDP since the global financial crisis. This undoubtedly has been linked to the fallout from the crisis and other exogenous shocks like the massive decline in energy prices in 2014/2015, which are unlikely to be repeated. Over the next ten years, the US Congressional Budget Office is forecasting nominal potential growth of roughly 4%; allowing for a potential rise in US equity revenue to GDP suggests that investors should expect earnings growth on the order of 4-5% per year over the coming decade, if extremely elevated profit margins are sustained. Chart II-20Multiples Seem To Predict Future Returns Well… October 2021 October 2021 Unfortunately for equity investors, there are slim odds that US equity multiples will continue to rise or even stay at their current level. Equity valuation has been shown to have nearly zero ability to predict stock returns over a 6-12 month time horizon or even over the following 3-5 years, but 10-year regressions relating current valuations on future 10-year compound returns tend to be highly predictive (Chart II-20). Utilizing this approach, today’s 12-month forward P/E ratio would imply a 10-year future total return of just 2.9% (Chart II-21). That, in turn, would imply a annual drag of 3-4% from multiple contraction over the coming decade, given our 4-5% earnings growth forecast and a historically average dividend yield of roughly 2%. One problem with the method shown in Charts II-20 and II-21 is the fact that the relationship between today’s P/E ratio and 10-year future returns captures more than the impact of potentially mean-reverting multiples. It also includes any correlation between the starting point of valuation and subsequent earnings growth, which is likely to be spurious. This effect turns out to be important: we can see in Chart II-21 that the strong fit of the relationship is influenced by the fact that the global financial crisis occurred roughly 10-years after the equity market bubble of the late-1990s. Chart II-21...But That Depends Heavily On The Tech Bubble / GFC Relationship ...But That Depends Heavily On The Tech Bubble / GFC Relationship ...But That Depends Heavily On The Tech Bubble / GFC Relationship Astute investors may infer a legitimate causal link between these two events, via too-easy monetary policy. But from the perspective of forecasting, predicting future returns based on prevailing equity multiples confusingly mixes together three effects: the relative timing of business cycles, the impact of changes in interest rates, and the potential mean-reverting nature of the equity risk premium. In order to disentangle these effects for the purposes of forecasting, we present a long-history estimate of the US equity risk premium based on Robert Shiller’s Irrational Exuberance dataset (Chart II-22). We define the equity risk premium as earnings per share (as reported) as a percent of the S&P 500, minus the real long-maturity interest rate. We calculate the real rate by subtracting the BCA adaptive inflation expectations model – essentially an exponentially smoothed version of actual inflation – from the nominal long-term bond yield. Chart II-22The US ERP Seems Normal Based On A Very Long Term History... The US ERP Seems Normal Based On A Very Long Term History... The US ERP Seems Normal Based On A Very Long Term History... The chart highlights that this estimate of the ERP is currently exactly in line with its median value since 1872. Chart II-23 presents essentially the same conclusion, based on data since 1979, using the forward operating P/E ratio for the S&P 500 and the same definition for real bond yields. This implies that, if interest rates were at equilibrium levels, investors would have a reasonable basis to conclude that equity multiples would be unchanged over a secular investment horizon. However, as we have highlighted several times in previous reports, long-maturity government bond yields are likely well below equilibrium levels. Chart II-24 highlights that long-maturity US government bond yields have not been this low relative to trend growth since the late-1970s. Chart II-23...And Based On The Forward Earnings Yield Over The Past Four Decades ...And Based On The Forward Earnings Yield Over The Past Four Decades ...And Based On The Forward Earnings Yield Over The Past Four Decades Chart II-24Interest Rates Are Well Below Equilibrium, And Are Likely To Rise Over Time Interest Rates Are Well Below Equilibrium, And Are Likely To Rise Over Time Interest Rates Are Well Below Equilibrium, And Are Likely To Rise Over Time   We presented in an April report why a gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but that a decline in the equilibrium real rate of interest (“r-star”) only appeared to be permanent due to persistent, non-monetary policy shocks to aggregate demand that occurred over the course of the last economic cycle.4 In a scenario where the US output gap turns positive, inflation rises modestly above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited over the coming 6-18 months, it seems reasonable to conclude that the narrative of secular stagnation may ultimately be challenged and that investor expectations for the neutral rate may converge toward trend rates of economic growth. This would weigh on equity multiples, and thus lower equity total returns from the 6-7% implied by our earnings forecast and income return assumption. Chart II-25US Stocks Are Likely To Earn Annual Total Returns Between 1.8-4.7% Over The Next Decade October 2021 October 2021 Were real long-maturity bond yields to rise by 100-200bps over the coming decade, this would imply annualized total returns of between 1.8 - 4.7% from US stocks, assuming 4-5% annual revenue growth, flat profit margins, a constant 2% dividend yield, and a constant ERP (Chart II-25). While this would beat the returns offered by bonds, implying that investors should still be structurally overweight equities versus fixed-income assets, it would also fall meaningfully short of the average pension fund return objective (Chart II-26), as well as the absolute return goals of many investors. Chart II-26Future Returns From US Stocks Will Greatly Disappoint Investors Future Returns From US Stocks Will Greatly Disappoint Investors Future Returns From US Stocks Will Greatly Disappoint Investors Investment Conclusions Chart II-27Over The Coming Year, Favor Value And Global Ex-US Stocks Over The Coming Year, Favor Value And Global Ex-US Stocks Over The Coming Year, Favor Value And Global Ex-US Stocks Over the coming 6-12 months, our view that 10-year US Treasury yields are likely to rise supports an overweight stance toward value versus growth stocks. Chart II-27 highlights that the underperformance of growth argues for an underweight stance toward US stocks within a global equity portfolio, especially versus developed markets ex-US. Over a longer-term horizon, there are two key investment implications from our research. First, the risks that we have highlighted to the sources of US outperformance over the past 14 years suggests that investors should not bank on a continuation of this trend over the next decade. We have not made the case in this report for the outperformance of global ex-US stocks, merely that the continued outperformance of US stocks now rests on an unreliable foundation. This may suggest that US relative performance will be flat over the structural horizon, arguing for a neutral strategic allocation. But even the cessation of US outperformance would be a significant development, as it would end the most consequential trend in regional equity performance in the post-GFC era. Second, investors should expect meaningfully lower absolute returns from US stocks over the next decade than what they have earned since 2008/2009, barring a continued rise in the already stretched profit margins of broadly-defined tech stocks. A structurally overweight stance is still warranted toward equities versus fixed-income, but even a 100% equity allocation is unlikely to meet investor return expectations in the high single-digits. As a consequence, global investors should be prepared to accept more volatility in order to reduce the gap between expected and desired returns, and should look towards riskier investments and asset classes (such as real estate and alternative investments) as potential portfolio return enhancements. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators remain very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has retreated below the boom/bust line, although this mostly reflects the use of producer prices to deflate money growth. In nominal terms, the supply of money continues to grow. Still, the retreat in the indicator highlights that the monetary policy stance is likely to shift in a tighter direction over the coming year. Forward equity earnings are pricing in a substantial further rise in earnings per share, and there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum as net revisions and positive earnings surprises remain near record highs. Bottom-up analyst earning expectations are now almost certainly too high, but stocks are likely to be supported by robust revenue growth over the coming year. Within a global equity portfolio, global ex-US equities have underperformed alongside cyclical sectors, banks, and value stocks more generally. On a 12-month time horizon, we would recommend that investors position for the underperformance of financial assets that are negatively correlated with long-maturity government bond yields. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has broken above its 200-day moving average, beginning its recovery after falling sharply since mid-March. After a decline initially caused by waning growth momentum and the impact of the Delta variant of SARS-COV-2, long-maturity bond yields appear to be responding to the interest rate guidance that the Fed has been providing. 10-Year Treasury Yields remain below the fair value implied by a late-2022 rate hike scenario, underscoring that 10-Year Yields are set to trend higher over the coming year. The extreme rise in some commodity prices over the past several months has eased. Lumber prices have almost fully normalized, whereas the pace of advance in industrial metals prices has eased. Global shipping costs have exploded due to supply-side constraints, but are likely to ease over the coming year if further COVID-related labor market shocks can be avoided. US and global LEIs remain very elevated but have started to roll over. Our global LEI diffusion index has declined very significantly, but this likely reflects the outsized impact of a few emerging market countries (whose vaccination progress is still lagging). Still-strong leading and coincident indicators underscore that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly at some point over the coming year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4US Stock Market Breadth US Stock Market Breadth US Stock Market Breadth Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "The Return To Maximum Employment: It May Be Faster Than You Think," dated August 26, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see China Investment Strategy "A Quick Take On Embattled Evergrande," dated September 21, 2021, and China Investment Strategy "The Evergrande Saga Continues," dated September 29, 2021, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Political Strategy "Forget Biden's Budget," dated June 2, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 4     Please see The Bank Credit Analyst “R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks,” dated March 31, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Asian and European natural gas prices will remain well bid as the Northern Hemisphere winter approaches. An upgraded probability of a second La Niña event this winter will keep gas buyers scouring markets for supplies (Chart of the Week). The IEA is pressing Russia to make more gas available to European consumers going into winter. While Russia is meeting contractual commitments, it is also trying to rebuild its inventories. Gas from the now-complete Nord Stream 2 pipeline might not flow at all this year. High natgas prices will incentivize electric generators to switch to coal and oil. This will push the level and costs of CO2 emissions permits higher, including coal and oil prices. Supply pressures in fossil-fuel energy markets are spilling into other commodity markets, raising the cost of producing and shipping commodities and manufactures. Consumers – i.e., voters – experiencing these effects might be disinclined to support and fund the energy transition to a low-carbon economy. We were stopped out of our long Henry Hub natural gas call spread in 1Q22 – long $5.00/MMBtu calls vs short $5.50/MMBtu calls in Jan-Feb-Mar 2022 – and our long PICK ETF positions with returns of 4.58% and -10.61%. We will be getting long these positions again at tonight's close. Feature European natural gas inventories remain below their five-year average, which, in the event of another colder-than-normal winter in the Northern Hemisphere, will leave these markets ill-equipped to handle a back-to-back season of high prices and limited supply (Chart 2).1 The probability of a second La Niña event this winter was increased to 70-80% by the US Climate Prediction Center earlier this week.2 This raises the odds of another colder-than-average winter. As a result, markets will remain focused on inventories and flowing natgas supplies from the US, in the form of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) cargoes, and Russian pipeline shipments to Europe as winter approaches. Chart of the WeekSurging Natural Gas Prices Intensify Competition For Supplies Natgas Markets Continue To Tighten Natgas Markets Continue To Tighten Chart 2Natgas Storage Remains Tight Natgas Markets Continue To Tighten Natgas Markets Continue To Tighten US LNG supplies are being contested by Asian buyers, where gas storage facilities are sparse, and European buyers looking for gas to inject into storage as they prepare for winter. US LNG suppliers also are finding ready bids in Brazil, where droughts are reducing hydropower availability. In the first six months of this year, US natgas exports averaged 9.5 bcf/d, a y/y increase of more than 40%. Although Russia's Nord Stream 2 pipeline has been completed, it still must be certified to carry natgas into Germany. This process could take months to finish, unless there is an exemption granted by EU officials. Like the US and Europe, Russia is in the process of rebuilding its natgas inventories, following a colder-than-normal La Niña winter last year.3 Earlier this week, the IEA called on Russia to increase natgas exports to Europe as winter approaches. The risk remains no gas will flow through Nord Stream 2 this year.4 Expect Higher Coal, Oil Consumption As other sources of energy become constrained – particularly UK wind power in the North Sea, where supplies went from 25% of UK power in 2020 to 7% in 2021 – natgas and coal-fired generation have to make up for the shortfall.5 Electricity producers are turning more towards coal as they face rising natural gas prices.6 Increasing coal-fired electric generation produces more CO2 and raises the cost of emission permits, particularly in the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS), which is the largest such market in the world (Chart 3). Prices of December 2021 ETS permits, which represent the cost of CO2 emissions in the EU, hit an all-time high of €62.75/MT earlier this month and were trading just above €60.00/MT as we went to press. Chart 3Higher CO2 Emissions Follow Lower Renewables Output Higher CO2 Emissions Follow Lower Renewables Output Higher CO2 Emissions Follow Lower Renewables Output Going into winter, the likelihood of higher ETS permit prices increases if renewables output remains constrained and natgas inventories are pulled lower to meet space-heating needs in the EU. This will increase the price of power in the EU, where consumers are being particularly hard hit by higher prices (Chart 4). The European think tank Bruegel notes that even though natgas provides about 20% of Europe's electricity supply, it now is setting power prices on the margin.7 Chart 4EU Power Price Surge Is Inflationary Natgas Markets Continue To Tighten Natgas Markets Continue To Tighten Elevated natgas prices are inflationary, according to Bruegel: "On an annual basis, a doubling of wholesale electricity prices from about €50/megawatt hour to €100/MWh would imply that EU consumers pay up to €150 billion (€50/MWh*3bn MWh) more for their electricity. … Drastic increases in energy spending will shrink the disposable income of the poorest households with their high propensity to consume." This is true in other regions and states, as well. Is the Natgas Price Surge Transitory? The odds of higher natgas and CO2 permit prices increase as the likelihood of a colder-than-normal winter increases. Even a normal winter likely would tax Europe's gas supplies, given the level of inventories, and the need for Russia to replenish its stocks. However, at present, even with the odds of a second La Niña event this winter increasing, this is a probable event, not a certainty. The global natgas market is evolving along lines similar to the crude oil market. Fungible cargoes can be traded and moved to the market with the highest netback realization, after accounting for transportation. High prices now will incentivize higher production and a stronger inventory-injection season next year. That said, prices could stay elevated relative to historical levels as this is occurring. Europe is embarked on a planned phase-out of coal- and nuclear-powered electricity generation over the next couple of years, which highlights the risks associated with the energy transition to a low-carbon future. China also is attempting to phase out coal-fired generation in favor of natgas turbines, and also is pursuing a buildout of renewables and nuclear power. Given the extreme weather dependence on prices for power generated from whatever source, renewables will remain risky bets for modern economies as primary energy sources in the early stages of the energy transition. When the loss of wind, for example, must be made up with natgas generation and that market is tight owing to its own fundamental supply-demand imbalance, volatile price excursions to high levels could be required to destroy enough demand to provide heat in a cold winter. This would reduce support for renewables if it became too-frequent an event. This past summer and coming winter illustrate the risk of too-rapid a phase out of fossil-fueled power generation and space-heating fuels (i.e., gas and coal). Frequent volatile energy-price excursions, which put firms and households at risk of price spikes over an extended period of time, are, for many households, material events. We have little doubt the commodity-market effects will be dealt with in the most efficient manner. As the old commodity-market saw goes, "High prices are the best cure for high prices, and vice versa." All the same, the political effects of another very cold winter and high energy prices are not solely the result of economic forces. Inflation concerns aside, consumers – i.e., voters – may be disinclined to support a renewable-energy buildout if the hits to their wallets and lifestyles become higher than they have been led to expect. Investment Implications The price spike in natgas is highly likely to be a transitory event. Another surge in natgas prices likely would be inflationary while supplies are rebuilding – so, transitory.  Practically, this could stoke dissatisfaction among consumers, and add a political element to the transition to a low-carbon energy future. This would complicate capex decision-making for incumbent energy suppliers – i.e., the fossil-fuels industries – and for the metals suppliers, which will be relied upon to provide the literal building blocks for the renewables buildout.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish US crude oil inventories fell 3.5mm barrels in the week ended 17 September 2021, according to the US EIA. Product inventories built slightly, led by a 3.5mm-build in gasoline stocks, which was offset by a 2.6mm barrel draw in distillates (e.g., diesel fuel). Cumulative average daily crude oil production in the US was down 7% y/y, and stood at 10.9mm b/d. Cumulative average daily refined-product demand – what the EIA terms "Product Supplied" – was estimated at 19.92mm b/d, up almost 10% y/y. Brent prices recovered from an earlier sell-off this week and were supported by the latest inventory data (Chart 5). Base Metals: Bullish Iron ore prices have fallen -55.68% since hitting an all-time high of $230.58/MT in May 12, 2021 (Chart 6). This is due to sharply reduced steel output in China, as authorities push output lower to meet policy-mandated production goals and to conserve power. Even with the cuts in steel production, overall steel output in the first seven months of the year was up 8% on a y/y basis, or 48mm MT, according to S&P Global Platts. Supply constraints likely will be exacerbated as the upcoming Olympic Games hosted by China in early February approach. Authorities will want blue skies to showcase these events. Iron ore prices will remain closer to our earlier forecast of $90-$110/MT than not over this period.8 Precious Metals: Bullish The Federal Open Market Committee is set to publish the results of its meeting on Wednesday. In its last meeting in June, more hawkish than expected forecasts for interest rate hikes caused gold prices to drop and the yellow metal has been trading significantly lower since then. Our US Bond Strategy colleagues expect an announcement on asset purchase tapering in end-2021, and interest rate increases to begin by end-2022.9 Rate hikes are contingent on the Fed’s maximum employment criterion being reached, as expected and actual inflation are above the Fed criteria. Tapering asset purchases and increases in interest rates will be bearish for gold prices. Chart 5 BRENT PRICES BEING VOLATILE BRENT PRICES BEING VOLATILE Chart 6 BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI)RECOVERING BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI)RECOVERING       Footnotes 1     Equinor, the Norwegian state-owned energy-supplier, estimates European natgas inventories will be 70-75% of their five-year average this winter.  Please see IR Gas Market Update, September 16, 2021. 2     Please see "ENSO: Recent Evolution, Current Status and Predictions," published by the US Climate Prediction Center 20 September 2021.  Earlier this month, the Center gave 70% odds to a second La Niña event in the Northern Hemisphere this winter.  Please see our report from September 9, 2021 entitled NatGas: Winter Is Coming for additional background. 3    Please see IEA calls on Russia to send more gas to Europe before winter published by theguardian.com, and Big Bounce: Russian gas amid market tightness.  Both were published on September 21, 2021. 4    Please see Nord Stream Two Construction Completed, but Gas Flows Unlikely in 2021 published 14 September 2021 by Jamestown.org. 5    Please see The U.K. went all in on wind power. Here’s what happens when it stops blowing, published by fortune.com on 16 September 2021.  Argus Media this week reported wind-power output fell 56% y/y in September 2021 to just over 2.5 TWh. 6    Please see UK power firms stop taking new customers amid escalating crisis, published by Aljazeera; Please see UK fires up coal power plant as gas prices soar, published by BBC. 7     Please see Is Europe’s gas and electricity price surge a one-off?, published by Bruegel 13 September 2021. 8    Please see China's Recovery Paces Iron Ore, Steel, which we published on November 5, 2020. 9    Please see 2022 Will Be All About Inflation and Talking About Tapering, published on September 22, 2021 and on August 10, 2021 respectively.     Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights The odds of a stronger recovery in EM oil demand next year are rising, as vaccines using mRNA technology are manufactured locally and become widely available.1 This will reduce local lock-down risks in economies relying on less efficacious COVID-19 vaccines – or lacking them altogether – thereby increasing mobility, economic activity and oil demand. Our global crude oil balances estimates are little changed to the end of 2023, which leaves our price expectations mostly unchanged: 4Q21 Brent prices are expected to average $70.50/bbl, while 2022 and 2023 prices average $75 and $80/bbl, respectively (Chart of the Week). The balance of risks to the crude oil market remain to the upside in our estimation. In addition to a higher likelihood of better-than-expected EM demand growth, we expect OPEC 2.0 production discipline to hold, and for the price-taking cohort outside the coalition to continue prioritizing investors' interests. We remain long commodity index exposure – S&P GSCI and COMT – and, at tonight's close, will be getting long the DFA Dimensional Emerging Core Equity Market ETF (DFAE) on the back of increasing local mRNA vaccine production in EM economies. Feature As local production of COVID-19 vaccines employing mRNA technology spreads throughout EM economies, the odds of a stronger-than-expected recovery in oil demand next year will increase. The buildout of production and distribution facilities for this technology is progressing quickly in Asia – e.g., Chinese mRNA tech joint ventures are expected to be in production mode in 4Q21 – Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.2 Accelerated availability of more efficacious vaccines globally will address the "fault lines" identified by the IMF in its July 2021 update. In that report, the Fund notes a major downside risk to its global GDP growth expectation of 6% this year remains slower-than-expected vaccine rollouts to emerging and developing economies.3 The other major risk identified by the Fund is too-rapid a winddown of policy support in DM economies, which would lead to tighter financial conditions globally. Our global demand expectation is driven by GDP estimates from the IMF and World Bank. The implication of that assumption is the powerful recovery in DM oil demand seen this year will slow while EM demand picks up next year (Chart 2). We proxy DM oil demand with OECD oil consumption and EM demand with non-OECD consumption. We continue to expect overall oil demand to recover by just over 5.0mm b/d this year and 4.4mm b/d next year (Table 1). Chart of the WeekOil Forecasts Hold Steady Oil Forecasts Hold Steady Oil Forecasts Hold Steady Chart 2Higher EM Oil Demand Expected in 2022 Higher EM Oil Demand Expected in 2022 Higher EM Oil Demand Expected in 2022 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Upside Price Risk Rises For Crude Upside Price Risk Rises For Crude Global Oil Supply To Remain Steady Hurricane Ida will have removed ~ 30mm barrels of US offshore oil output by the time losses are fully tallied, based on IEA estimates. Even so, in line with the US EIA, we expect offshore US oil production will recover from the damage caused by the storm in 4Q21 and be back at ~ 1.7mm b/d on average over the quarter. This will allow oil prices to ease slightly from current elevated levels over the balance of the year. Inland, US shale-oil output remains on track to average ~ 9.06mm b/d this year, 9.55mmb/d in 2022 and 9.85mmb/d in 2023, in our modeling (Chart 3). We expect production in the Lower 48 states of the US to remain mostly steady going forward. Production from finishing drilled-but-uncompleted (DUCs) shale-oil wells is the lowest it's been since 2013.  Output from these wells will remain relatively low for the rest of the year. This supply was developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, as it was cheaper to bring on than new drilling. For 2022 and 2023 overall, our model points to a slow build-up in US shale-oil output as drilling increases. Going into 2022, we expect continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0, and for the coalition to continue to manage output in line with actual demand it sees from its customers. The 400k b/d being returned monthly to the market over August 2021 to mid-2022 will accommodate demand increases. However, it will be monitored closely in the event demand fails to materialize, as has been OPEC 2.0's wont over the course of the pandemic. Chart 3US Shale-Oil Output Mostly Stable US Shale-Oil Output Mostly Stable US Shale-Oil Output Mostly Stable Oil Markets To Remain Balanced We see markets remaining balanced to the end of 2023, with OPEC 2.0 maintaining its production-management strategy – keeping the level of supply just below the level of demand – and the price-taking cohort led by US shale-oil producers remaining focused on maintaining margins so as to provide competitive returns to investors. On the demand side, EM growth will pick up as DM growth slows. Given our fundamental view, global crude oil balances estimates are little changed to the end of 2023 (Chart 4). This allows inventories to continue to draw this year and next, then to slowly rebuild as production increases toward the end of 2023 (Chart 5). Falling inventories will keep the Brent forward curve backwardated – i.e., prompt-delivery oil will trade higher than deferred-delivery oil. Chart 4Markets Remain Balanced... Markets Remain Balanced... Markets Remain Balanced... Chart 5...And Oil Inventory Continues To Draw ...And Oil Inventory Continues To Draw ...And Oil Inventory Continues To Draw The backwardated forward curve means OPEC 2.0 producers will continue to realize higher delivered prices on their crude oil than the marginal shale-oil producer, which hedges its production 1-2 years forward to stabilize revenue. This is the primary benefit to the member states in the producer coalition: a backwardated curve pricing closer to marginal cost limits the amount of revenue available to shale-oil producers, and thus restrains output to that which is profitable at the margin. Investment Implications Our supply-demand outlook keeps our price expectations mostly unchanged from last month's forecast. We expect 4Q21 Brent prices to average $70.50/bbl, while 2022 and 2023 prices average $75 and $80/bbl, respectively, as can be seen in the Chart of the Week. WTI prices will continue to trade $2-$4/bbl below Brent over this interval. With fundamentals continuing to support a backwardated forward curve in Brent and WTI, we continue to favor long commodity-index exposure, which benefits from this structure.4 Therefore, we remain long the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF, which is an optimized version of the GSCI that concentrates on positioning in backwardated futures contracts. The upside risk to oil prices resulting from increasing local production of mRNA vaccines in EM economies that had relied on less efficacious vaccines undoubtedly will increase mobility and raise oil demand, if, as appears likely, the impact of this localization is realized in the near term. This also could boost commodity demand generally, if it allows trade and GDP growth to accelerate in EM economies, which supports our long commodity-index view. The rollout of mRNA technology into EM economies also suggests EM GDP growth could increase at the margin with locally produced mRNA vaccines becoming more available. This would redound to the benefit of trade and economic activity generally.5 It also could help unsnarl the movement of goods globally. The wider implications of a successful expansion of locally produced mRNA vaccines leads us to recommend EM equity exposure on a tactical basis. At tonight's close, we will be getting long the DFA Dimensional Emerging Core Equity Market ETF (DFAE). As this is tactical, we will use a tight stop (10%) for this recommendation.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Natural gas demand is surging globally. Record-breaking heat waves in the US are driving demand for gas-fired generation required to meet space-cooling demand. In addition, in the June-August period, the US saw record LNG exports. Europe and Asia are competing for the fuel as both prepare for winter. Brazil also has been a strong bid for LNG, as drought there has reduced hydropower supplies. In Europe, natural gas inventories were drawn hard this past winter as LNG supplies were bid away to Asia to meet space-heating demand. This is keeping Europe well bid now as winter approaches (Chart 6). The US Climate Prediction Center last week gave 70-80% odds of a second La Niña for the Northern Hemisphere winter. Should it materialize, it could again drive cold artic air into their markets, as it did last winter, and push natgas demand higher. Our recommendation to get long 1Q22 $5.00/MMBtu calls vs short 1Q22 $5.50/MMBtu calls last week was up 17% as of Tuesday's close. We remain long. Base Metals: Bullish The slide in iron ore prices from its ~ $230/MT peak earlier this year can be attributed to weak Chinese demand, and the possibility of its persistence through the winter and into next year (Chart 7). The world’s largest steel-producing nation is aiming to limit steel output to no higher than 2020 levels, in a bid to reduce industrial pollution. According to mining.com, provincial governments have directly asked local steel mills to curb output. Regulation in this sector in China will continue to reduce prices of iron ore, a key raw material in steel production. Precious Metals: Bullish The lower-than-expected reading on the US core CPI earlier this week weighed on the USD, and propelled gold prices above the $1,800/oz mark. While markets expected lower consumer prices for August to diminish the Fed’s resolve to taper asset purchases by year-end, we do not think the lower month-on-month CPI number will delay tapering. The timing of the Fed's initial rate hike – expected by markets to occur after the tapering of the central bank's asset-purchase program – will depend on the US labor force reaching "maximum employment." According to BCA Research's US Bond Strategy, this criterion will be met in late-2022 or early-2023. Low-interest rates, coupled with persistent inflation until then, will be bullish for gold prices. Chart 6 Upside Price Risk Rises For Crude Upside Price Risk Rises For Crude Chart 7 CHINA IMPORTED IRON ORE GOING DOWN CHINA IMPORTED IRON ORE GOING DOWN   Footnotes 1     Please see Everest to bring Canadian biotech's potential Covid shots to China, other markets published on September 13, 2021 by indiatimes.com. 2     Examples of this include Brazil's Eurofarma to make Pfizer COVID-19 shots for Latin America, published by reuters.com; Biovac Institute to be first African company to produce mRNA vaccines, published be devex.com; and mRNA Vaccines Mark a New Era in Medicine, posted by supertrends.com. The latter report also discusses the application of mRNA technology to other diseases like malaria. 3    Please see Fault Lines Widen in the Global Recovery published 27 July 2021 by the Fund. 4    Backwardation is the source of roll yield for long-index exposure.  This is due to the design of these index products, which buy forward then – in backwardated markets – roll out of futures contract as they approach physical delivery at a higher level and re-establish their exposure in a deferred contract. 5    The lower realized efficacy of Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines and high reinfection rates in economies using these vaccines are one of the key risks to our overall bullish commodity view.  Please see Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views, which we published on July 8, 2021. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights The US Climate Prediction Center gives ~ 70% odds another La Niña will form in the August – October interval and will continue through winter 2021-22. This will be a second-year La Niña if it forms, and will raise the odds of a repeat of last winter's cold weather in the Northern Hemisphere.1 Europe's natural-gas inventory build ahead of the coming winter remains erratic, particularly as Russian flows via Ukraine to the EU have been reduced this year. Russia's Nord Stream 2 could be online by November, but inventories will still be low. China, Japan, South Korea and India  – the four top LNG consumers in Asia  – took in 155 Bcf of the fuel in June. A colder-than-normal winter would boost demand. Higher prices are likely in Europe and Asia (Chart of the Week). US storage levels will be lower going into winter, as power generation demand remains stout, and the lingering effects from Hurricane Ida reduce supplies available for inventory injections. Despite spot prices trading ~ $1.30/MMBtu above last winter's highs – currently ~ $4.60/MMBtu – we are going long 1Q22 NYMEX $5.00/MMBtu natgas calls vs short NYMEX $5.50/MMBtu natgas calls expecting even higher prices. Feature Last winter's La Niña was a doozy. It brought extreme cold to Asia, North America and Europe, which pulled natural gas storage levels sharply lower and drove prices sharply higher as the Chart of the Week shows. Natgas storage in the US and Europe will be tight going into this winter (Chart 2). Europe's La Niña lingered a while into Spring, keeping temps low and space-heating demand high, which delayed the start of re-building inventory for the coming winter.  In the US, cold temps in the Midwest hampered production, boosted demand and caused inventory to draw hard. Chart of the WeekA Return Of La Niña Could Boost Global Natgas Prices A Return Of La Niña Could Boost Global Natgas Prices A Return Of La Niña Could Boost Global Natgas Prices Chart 2Europe, US Gas Stocks Will Be Tight This Winter NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming Summer in the US also produced strong natgas demand, particularly out West, as power generators eschewed coal in favor of gas to meet stronger air-conditioning demand. This is partly due to the closing of coal-fired units, leaving more of the load to be picked up by gas-fired generation (Chart 3). The EIA estimates natgas consumption in July was up ~ 4 Bcf/d to just under 76 Bcf/d. Hurricane Ida took ~ 1 bcf/d of demand out of the market, which was less than the ~ 2 Bcf/d hit to US Gulf supply resulting from the storm.  As a result, prices were pushed higher at the margin. Chart 3Generators Prefer Gas To Coal NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming US natgas exports (pipeline and LNG) also were strong, at 18.2 Bcf/d in July (Chart 4). We expect US LNG exports, in particular, to resume growth as the world recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 5). This strong demand and exports, coupled with slightly lower supply from the Lower 48 states – estimated at ~ 98 Bcf/d by the EIA for July (Chart 6) – pushed prices up by 18% from June to July, "the largest month-on-month percentage change for June to July since 2012, when the price increased 20.3%" according to the EIA. Chart 4US Natgas Exports Remain Strong US Natgas Exports Remain Strong US Natgas Exports Remain Strong Chart 5US LNG Exports Will Resume Growth NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming Chart 6US Lower 48 Natgas Production Recovering US Lower 48 Natgas Production Recovering US Lower 48 Natgas Production Recovering Elsewhere in the Americas, Brazil has been a strong bid for US LNG – accounting for 32.3 Bcf of demand in  June – as hydroelectric generation flags due to the prolonged drought in the country. In Asia, demand for LNG remains strong, with the four top consumers – China, Japan, South Korea, and India – taking in 155 Bcf in June, according to the EIA. Gas Infrastructure Ex-US Remains Challenged A combination of extreme cold weather in Northeast Asia, and a lack of gas storage infrastructure in Asia generally, along with shipping constraints and supply issues at LNG export facilities, led to the Asian natural gas price spike in mid-January.2 Very cold weather in Northeast Asia, drove up LNG demand during the winter months. In China, LNG imports for the month of January rose by ~ 53% y-o-y (Chart 7).3 The increase in imports from Asia coincided with issues at major export plants in Australia, Norway and Qatar during that period. Chart 7China's US LNG Exports Surged Last Winter, And Remain Stout Over The Summer NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming Substantially higher JKM (Japan-Korea Marker) prices incentivized US exporters to divert LNG cargoes from Europe to Asia last winter. The longer roundtrip times to deliver LNG from the US to Asia – instead of Europe – resulted in a reduction of shipping capacity, which ended up compounding market tightness in Europe. Europe dealt with the switch by drawing ~ 18 bcm more from their storage vs. the previous year, across the November to January period. Countries in Asia - most notably Japan – however, do not have robust natural gas storage facilities, further contributing to price volatility, especially in extreme weather events. These storage constraints remain in place going into the coming winter. In addition, there is a high probability the global weather pattern responsible for the cold spells around the globe that triggered price spikes in key markets globally – i.e., a second La Niña event – will return. A Second-Year La Niña  Event The price spikes and logistical challenges of last winter were the result of atmospheric circulation anomalies that were bolstered by a La Niña event that began in mid-2020.4 The La Niña is characterized by colder sea-surface temperatures that develops over the Pacific equator, which displaces atmospheric and wind circulation and leads to colder temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere (Map 1). Map 1La Niña Raises The Odds Of Colder Temps NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming The IEA notes last winter started off without any exceptional deviations from an average early winter, but as the new year opened "natural gas markets experienced severe supply-demand tensions in the opening weeks of 2021, with extremely cold temperature episodes sending spot prices to record levels."5 In its most recent ENSO update, the US Climate Prediction Center raised the odds of another La Niña event for this winter to 70% this month. If similar conditions to those of the 2020-21 winter emerge, US and European inventories could be stretched even thinner than last year, as space-heating demand competes with industrial and commercial demand resulting from the economic recovery. Global Natgas Supplies Will Stay Tight JKM prices and TTF (Dutch Title Transfer Facility) prices are likely to remain elevated going into winter, as seen in the Chart of the Week. Fundamentals have kept markets tight so far. Uncertain Russian supply to Europe will raise the price of the European gas index (TTF). This, along with strong Asian demand, particularly from China, will keep JKM prices high (Chart 8). The global economic recovery is the main short-term driver of higher natgas demand, with China leading the way. For the longer-term, natural gas is considered as the ideal transition fuel to green energy, as it emits less carbon than other fossil fuels. For this reason, demand is expected to grow by 3.4% per annum until 2035, and reach peak consumption later than other fossil fuels, according to McKinsey.6 Chart 8BCAs Brent Forecast Points To Higher JKM Prices BCAs Brent Forecast Points To Higher JKM Prices BCAs Brent Forecast Points To Higher JKM Prices Spillovers from the European natural gas market impact Asian markets, as was demonstrated last winter. Russian supply to Europe – where inventories are at their lowest level in a decade – has dropped over the last few months. This could either be the result of Russia's attempts to support its case for finishing Nord Stream 2 and getting it running as soon as possible, or because it is physically unable to supply natural gas.7 A fire at a condensate plant in Siberia at the beginning of August supports the latter conjecture. The reduced supply from Russia, comes at a time when EU carbon permit prices have been consistently breaking records, making the cost of natural gas competitive compared to more heavy carbon emitting fossil fuels – e.g., coal and oil – despite record breaking prices. With Europe beginning the winter season with significantly lower stock levels vs. previous years, TTF prices will remain volatile. This, and strong demand from China, will support JKM prices. Investment Implications Natural gas prices are elevated, with spot NYMEX futures trading ~ $1.30/MMBtu above last winter's highs – currently ~ $4.60/MMBtu. Our analysis indicates prices are justifiably high, and could – with the slightest unexpected news – move sharply higher. Because natgas is, at the end of the day, a weather market, we favor low-cost/low-risk exposures. In the current market, we recommend going long 1Q22 NYMEX $5.00/MMBtu natgas calls vs short NYMEX $5.50/MMBtu natgas calls expecting even higher prices. This is the trade we recommended on 8 April 2021, at a lower level, which was stopped out on 12 August 2021 with a gain of 188%.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Earlier this week, Saudi Aramco lowered its official selling price (OSP) by more than was expected – lowering its premium to the regional benchmark to $1.30/bbl from $1.70/bbl – in what media reports based on interviews with oil traders suggest is an attempt to win back customers electing not to take volumes under long-term contracts. This is a marginal adjustment by Aramco, but still significant, as it shows the company will continue to defend its market share. Pricing to Northwest Europe and the US markets is unchanged. Aramco's majority shareholder, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), is the putative leader of OPEC 2.0 (aka, OPEC+) along with Russia. The producer coalition is in the process of returning 400k b/d to the market every month until it has restored the 5.8mm b/d of production it took off the market to support prices during the COVID-19 pandemic. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $70/bbl in 2H21, $73/bbl in 2022 and $80/bbl in 2023. Base Metals: Bullish Political uncertainty in Guinea caused aluminum prices to rise to more than a 10-year high this week (Chart 9). A coup in the world’s second largest exporter of bauxite – the main ore source for aluminum – began on Sunday, rattling aluminum markets. While iron ore prices rebounded primarily on the record value of Chinese imports in August, the coup in Guinea – which has the highest level of iron ore reserves – could have also raised questions about supply certainty. This will contribute to iron-ore price volatility. However, we do not believe the coup will impact the supply of commodities as much as markets are factoring, as coup leaders in commodity-exporting countries typically want to keep their source of income intact and functioning. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold settled at a one-month high last Friday, when the US Bureau of Labor Statistics released the August jobs report. The rise in payrolls data was well below analysts’ estimates, and was the lowest gain in seven months. The yellow metal rose on this news as the weak employment data eased fears about Fed tapering, and refocused markets on COVID-19 and the delta variant. Since then, however, the yellow metal has not been able to consolidate gains. After falling to a more than one-month low on Friday, the US dollar rose on Tuesday, weighing on gold prices (Chart 10). Chart 9 Aluminum Prices Recovering Aluminum Prices Recovering Chart 10 Weaker USD Supports Gold Weaker USD Supports Gold       Footnotes 1      Please see the US Climate Prediction Center's ENSO: Recent Evolution, Current Status and Predictions report published on September 6, 2021. 2     Please see Asia LNG Price Spike: Perfect Storm or Structural Failure? Published by Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 3     Since China LNG import data were reported as a combined January and February value in 2020, we halved the combined value to get the January 2020 amount. 4     Please see The 2020/21 Extremely Cold Winter in China Influenced by the Synergistic Effect of La Niña and Warm Arctic by Zheng, F., and Coauthors (2021), published in Advances in Atmospheric Sciences. 5     Please see the IEA's Gas Market Report, Q2-2021 published in April 2021. 6     Please see Global gas outlook to 2050 | McKinsey on February 26, 2021. 7     Please see ICIS Analyst View: Gazprom’s inability to supply or unwillingness to deliver? published on August 13, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights An Iran crisis is imminent. We still think a US-Iran détente is possible but our conviction is lower until Biden makes a successful show of force. Oil prices will be volatile. Fiscal drag is a risk to the cyclical global macro view. But developed markets are more fiscally proactive than they were after the global financial crisis. Elections will reinforce that, starting in Germany, Canada, and Japan. The Chinese and Russian spheres are still brimming with political and geopolitical risk. But China will ease monetary and fiscal policy on the margin over the coming 12 months. Afghanistan will not upset our outlook on the German and French elections, which is positive for the euro and European stocks. Feature Chart 1Bull Market In Iran Tensions Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Iran is now the most pressing geopolitical risk in the short term (Chart 1). The Biden administration has been chastened by the messy withdrawal from Afghanistan and will be exceedingly reactive if it is provoked by foreign powers. Nuclear weapons improve regime survivability. Survival is what the Islamic Republic wants. Iran is surrounded by enemies in its region and under constant pressure from the United States. Hence Iran will never ultimately give up its nuclear program, as we have maintained. Chart 2Biden Unlikely To Lift Iran Sanctions Unilaterally Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) However, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could still agree to a deal in which the US reduces economic sanctions while Iran allows some restrictions on uranium enrichment for a limited period of time (the 2015 nuclear deal’s key provisions expire from 2023 through 2030). This would be a stopgap measure to delay the march into war. The problem is that rejoining the 2015 deal requires the US to ease sanctions first, since the US walked away from the deal in 2018. Iran would need domestic political cover to rejoin it. Biden has the executive authority to ease sanctions unilaterally but after Afghanistan he lacks the political capital to do so (Chart 2). So Biden cannot ease sanctions until Iran pares back its nuclear activities. But Iran has no reason to pare back if the US does not ease sanctions. Iran is now enriching some uranium to a purity of 60%. Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz says it will reach “nuclear breakout” capability – enough fissile material to build a bomb – within 10 weeks, i.e. mid-October. Anonymous officials from the Biden administration told the Associated Press it will be “months or less,” which could mean September, October, or November (Table 1). Table 1Iran Nearing "Breakout" Nuclear Capability Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Meanwhile the new Iranian government of President Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner who is tipped to take over as Supreme Leader once Ali Khamenei steps down, is implying that it will not rejoin negotiations until November. All of these timelines are blurry but the implication is that Iran will not resume talks until it has achieved nuclear breakout. Israel will continue its campaign of sabotage against the regime. It may be pressed to the point of launching air strikes, as it did against nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 under what is known as the “Begin Doctrine.” Chart 3Israel Cannot Risk Losing US Security Guarantee Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) The constraint on Israel is that it cannot afford to lose America’s public support and defense alliance since it would find itself isolated and vulnerable in its region (Chart 3). But if Israeli intelligence concludes that the Iranians truly stand on the verge of achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon, the country will likely be driven to launch air strikes. Once the Iranians test and display a viable nuclear deterrent it will be too late. Four US presidents, including Biden, have declared that Iran will not be allowed to get nuclear weapons. Biden and the Democrats favor diplomacy, as Biden made clear in his bilateral summit with Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett last week. But Biden also admitted that if diplomacy fails there are “other options.” The Israelis currently have a weak government but it is unified against a nuclear-armed Iran. At very least Bennett will underscore red lines to indicate that Israel’s vigilance has not declined despite hawkish Benjamin Netanyahu’s fall from power. Still, Iran may decide it has an historic opportunity to make a dash for the bomb if it thinks that the US will fail to support an Israeli attack. The US has lost leverage in negotiations since 2015. It no longer has troops stationed on Iran’s east and west flanks. It no longer has the same degree of Chinese and Russian cooperation. It is even more internally divided. Iran has no guarantee that the US will not undergo another paroxysm of nationalism in 2024 and try to attack it. The faction that opposed the deal all along is now in power and may believe it has the best chance in its lifetime to achieve nuclear breakout. The only reason a short-term deal is possible is because Khamenei may believe the Israelis will attack with full American support. He agreed to the 2015 deal. He also fears that the combination of economic sanctions and simmering social unrest will create a rift when he dies or passes the leadership to his successor. Iran has survived the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions but it is still vulnerable (Chart 4). Chart 4Supreme Leader Focuses On Regime Survival Supreme Leader Focuses On Regime Survival Supreme Leader Focuses On Regime Survival Moreover Biden is offering Khamenei a deal that does not require abandoning the nuclear program and does not prevent Iran from enhancing its missile capabilities. By taking the deal he might prevent his enemies from unifying, forestall immediate war, and pave the way for a smooth succession, while still pursuing the ultimate goal of nuclear weaponization. Bringing it all together, the world today stands at a critical juncture with regard to Iran and the unfinished business of the US wars in the Middle East. Unless the US and Israel stage a unified and convincing show of force, whether preemptively or in response to Iranian provocations, the Iranians will be justified in concluding that they have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to pursue the bomb. They could sneak past the global powers and obtain a nuclear deterrent and regime security, like North Korea did. This could easily precipitate a war. Biden will probably continue to be reactive rather than proactive. If the Iranians are silent then it will be clear that Khamenei still sees the value in a short-term deal. But if they continue their march toward nuclear breakout, as is the case as we go to press, then Biden will have to make a massive show of force. The goal would be to underscore the US’s red lines and drive Iran back to negotiating table. If Biden blinks, he will incentivize Iran to make a dash for the bomb. Either way a crisis is imminent. Israel will continue to use sabotage and underscore red lines while the Iranians will continue to escalate their attacks on Israel via militant proxies and attacks on tankers (Map 1). Map 1Secret War Escalates In Middle East Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Bottom Line: After a crisis, either diplomacy will be restored, or the Middle East will be on a new war path. The war path points to a drastically different geopolitical backdrop for the global economy. If the US and Iran strike a short-term deal, Iranian oil will flow and the US will shift its strategic focus to pressuring China, which is negative for global growth and positive for the dollar. If the US and Iran start down the war path, oil supply disruptions will rise and the dollar will fall. Implications For Oil Prices And OPEC 2.0 The probability of a near-term conflict is clear from our decision tree, which remains the same as in June 2019 (Diagram 1). Diagram 1US-Iran Conflict: Critical Juncture In Our Decision Tree Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Shows of force and an escalation in the secret war will cause temporary but possibly sharp spikes in oil prices in the short term. OPEC 2.0 remains intact so far this year, as expected. The likelihood that the global economic recovery will continue should encourage the Saudis, Russians, Emiratis and others to maintain production discipline to drain inventories and keep Brent crude prices above $60 per barrel. OPEC 2.0 is a weak link in oil prices, however, because Russians are less oil-dependent than the Gulf Arab states and do not need as high of oil prices for their government budget to break even (Chart 5). Periodically this dynamic leads the cartel to break down. None of the petro-states want to push oil prices up so high that they hasten the global green energy transition. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Keeps Price Within Fiscal Breakeven Oil Price Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Chart 6Oil Price Risks Lie To Upside Until US-Iran Deal Occurs Oil Price Risks Lie To Upside Until US-Iran Deal Occurs Oil Price Risks Lie To Upside Until US-Iran Deal Occurs As long as OPEC 2.0 remains disciplined, average Brent crude oil prices will gradually rise to $80 barrels per day by the end of 2024, according to our Commodity & Energy Strategy (Chart 6). Imminent firefights will cause prices to spike at least temporarily when large amounts of capacity are taken offline. Global spare capacity is probably sufficient to handle one-off disruptions but an open-ended military conflict in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz would be a different story. After the next crisis, everything depends on whether the US and Israel establish a credible threat and thus restore diplomacy. Any US-Iran strategic détente would unleash Iranian production and could well motivate the Gulf Arabs to pump more oil and deny Iran market share. Bottom Line: Given that any US-Iran deal would also be short-term in nature, and may not even stabilize the region, some of the downside risks are fading at the moment. The US and China are also sucking in more commodities as they gear up for great power struggle. The geopolitical outlook is positive for oil prices in these respects. But OPEC 2.0 is the weak link in this expectation so we expect volatility. Global Fiscal Taps Will Stay Open Markets have wavered in recent months over softness in the global economic recovery, COVID-19 variants, and China’s policy tightening. The world faces a substantial fiscal drag in the coming years as government budgets correct from the giant deficits witnessed during the crisis. Nevertheless policymakers are still able to deliver some positive fiscal surprises on the margin. Developed markets have turned fiscally proactive over the past decade. They rejected austerity because it was seen as fueling populist political outcomes that threatened the established parties. Note that this change began with conservative governments (e.g. Japan, UK, US, Germany), implying that left-leaning governments will open the fiscal taps further whenever they come to power (e.g. Canada, the US, Italy, and likely Germany next). Chart 7Global Fiscal Taps Will Stay Open Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Chart 7 updates the pandemic-era fiscal stimulus of major economies, with light-shaded bars highlighting new fiscal measures that are in development but have not yet been included in the IMF’s data set. The US remains at the top followed by Italy, which also saw populist electoral outcomes over the past decade. Chart 8US Fiscal Taps Open At Least Until 2023 US Fiscal Taps Open At Least Until 2023 US Fiscal Taps Open At Least Until 2023 The Biden administration is on the verge of passing a $550 billion bipartisan infrastructure bill. We maintain 80% subjective odds of passage – despite the messy pullout from Afghanistan. Assuming it passes, Democrats will proceed to their $3.5 trillion social welfare bill. This bill will inevitably be watered down – we expect a net deficit impact of around $1-$1.5 trillion for both bills – but it can pass via the partisan “budget reconciliation” process. We give 50% subjective odds today but will upgrade to 65% after infrastructure passes. The need to suspend the debt ceiling will raise volatility this fall but ultimately neither party has an interest in a national debt default. The US is expanding social spending even as geopolitical challenges prevent it from cutting defense spending, which might otherwise be expected after Afghanistan and Iraq. The US budget balance will contract after the crisis but then it will remain elevated, having taken a permanent step up as a result of populism. The impact should be a flat or falling dollar on a cyclical basis, even though we think geopolitical conflict will sustain the dollar as the leading reserve currency over the long run (Chart 8). So the dollar view remains neutral for now. Bottom Line: The US is facing a 5.9% contraction in the budget deficit in 2022 but the blow will be cushioned somewhat by two large spending bills, which will put budget deficits on a rising trajectory over the course of the decade. Big government is back. Developed Market Fiscal Moves (Outside The US) Chart 9German Opinion Favors New Left-Wing Coalition Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Fiscal drag is also a risk for other developed markets – but here too a substantial shift away from prudence has taken place, which is likely to be signaled to investors by the outperformance of left-wing parties in Germany’s upcoming election. Germany is only scheduled to add EUR 2.4 billion to the 25.6 billion it will receive under the EU’s pandemic recovery fund, but Berlin is likely to bring positive fiscal surprises due to the federal election on September 26. Germany will likely see a left-wing coalition replace Chancellor Angela Merkel and her long-ruling Christian Democrats (Chart 9). The platforms of the different parties can be viewed in Table 2. Our GeoRisk Indicator for Germany confirms that political risk is elevated but in this case the risk brings upside to risk assets (Appendix). Table 2German Party Platforms Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) While we expected the Greens to perform better than they are in current polling, the point is the high probability of a shift to a new left-wing government. The Social Democrats are reviving under the leadership of Olaf Scholz (Chart 10). Tellingly, Scholz led the charge for Germany to loosen its fiscal belt back in 2019, prior to the global pandemic. Chart 10Germany: Online Markets Betting On Scholz Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Chart 11Canada: Trudeau Takes A Calculated Risk Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) In June, the cabinet approved a draft 2022 budget plan supported by Scholz that would contain new borrowing worth EUR 99.7 bn ($119 billion). This amount is not included in the chart above but it should be seen as the minimum to be passed under the new government. If a left-wing coalition is formed, as we expect, the amount will be larger, given that both the Social Democrats and the Greens have been restrained by Merkel’s party. Canada turned fiscally proactive in 2015, when the institutional ruling party, the Liberals, outflanked the more progressive New Democrats by calling for budget deficits instead of a balanced budget. The Liberals saw a drop in support in 2019 but are now calling a snap election. Prime Minister Trudeau is not as popular in general opinion as he is in the news media but his party still leads the polls (Chart 11). The Conservatives are geographically isolated and, more importantly, are out of step with the median voter on the key issues (Table 3). Table 3Canada: Liberal Agenda Lines Up With Top Voter Priorities Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Nevertheless it is a risky time to call an election – our GeoRisk Indicator for Canada is soaring (Appendix). Granting that the Liberals are very unlikely to fall from power, whatever their strength in parliament, the key point is that parliament already approved of CAD 100 billion in new spending over the coming three years. Any upside surprise would give Trudeau the ability to push for still more deficit spending, likely focused on climate change. Chart 12Japan: Suga Will Go, LDP Will Stimulate Japan: Suga Will Go, LDP Will Stimulate Japan: Suga Will Go, LDP Will Stimulate Japanese politics are heating up ahead of the Liberal Democrats’ leadership election on September 29 and the general election, due by November 28. Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s sole purpose in life was to stand in for Shinzo Abe in overseeing the Tokyo Olympics. Now they are done and Suga will likely be axed – if he somehow survives the election, he will not last long after, as his approval rating is in freefall. The Liberal Democrats are still the only game in town. They will try to minimize the downside risks they face in the general election by passing a new stimulus package (Chart 12). Rumor has it that the new package will nominally be worth JPY 10-15 trillion, though we expect the party to go bigger, and LDP heavyweight Toshihiro Nikai has proposed a 30 trillion headline number. It is extremely unlikely that the election will cause a hung parliament or any political shift that jeopardizes passage of the bill. Abenomics remains the policy setting – and consumption tax hikes are no longer on the horizon to impede the second arrow of Abenomics: fiscal policy. Not all countries are projecting new spending. A stronger-than-expected showing by the Christian Democrats would result in gridlock in Germany. Meanwhile the UK may signal belt-tightening in October. Bottom Line: Germany, Canada, and Japan are likely to take some of the edge off of expected fiscal drag next year. Emerging Market Fiscal Moves (And China Regulatory Update) Among the emerging markets, Russia and China are notable in Chart 7 above for having such a small fiscal stimulus during this crisis. Russia has announced some fiscal measures ahead of the September 19 Duma election but they are small: $5.2 billion in social spending, $10 billion in strategic goals over three years, and a possible $6.8 billion increase in payments to pensioners. Fiscal austerity in Russia is one reason we expect domestic political risk to remain elevated and hence for President Putin to stoke conflicts in his near abroad (see our Russian risk indicator in the Appendix). There are plenty of signs that Belarussian tensions with the Baltic states and Poland can escalate in the near term, as can fighting in Ukraine in the wake of Biden’s new defense agreement and second package of military aid. China’s actual stimulus was much larger than shown in Chart 7 above because it mostly consisted of a surge in state-controlled bank lending. China is likely to ease monetary and fiscal policy on the margin over the coming 12 months to secure the recovery in time for the national party congress in 2022. But China’s regulatory crackdown will continue during that time and our GeoRisk Indicator clearly shows the uptick in risk this year (Appendix). Chart 13China Expands Unionization? China Expands Unionization? China Expands Unionization? The regulatory crackdown is part of a cyclical consolidation of Xi Jinping’s power as well as a broader, secular trend of reasserting Communist Party and centralization in China. The latest developments underscore our view that investors should not play any technical rebound in Chinese equities. The increase in censorship of financial media is especially troubling. Just as the government struggles to deal with systemic financial problems (e.g. the failing property giant Evergrande, a possible “Lehman moment”), the lack of transparency and information asymmetry will get worse. The media is focusing on the government’s interventions into public morality, setting a “correct beauty standard” for entertainers and limiting kids to three hours of video games per week. But for investors what matters is that the regulatory crackdown is proceeding to the medical sector. High health costs (like high housing and education costs) are another target of the Xi administration in trying to increase popular support and legitimacy. Central government-mandated unionization in tech companies will hurt the tech sector without promoting social stability. Chinese unions do not operate like those in the West and are unlikely ever to do so. If they did, it would compound the preexisting structural problem of rising wages (Chart 13). Wages are forcing an economic transition onto Beijing, which raises systemic risks permanently across all sectors. Bottom Line: Political and geopolitical risk are still elevated in China and Russia. China will ease monetary and fiscal policy gradually over the coming year but the regulatory crackdown will persist at least until the 2022 political reshuffle. Afghanistan: The Refugee Fallout September 2021 will officially mark the beginning of Taliban’s second bout of power in Afghanistan. Will Afghanistan be the only country to spawn an outflux of refugees? Will the Taliban wresting power in Afghanistan trigger another refugee crisis for Europe? How is the rise of the Taliban likely to affect geopolitics in South Asia? Will Afghanistan Be The Last Major Country To Spawn Refugees? Absolutely not. We expect regime failures to affect the global economy over the next few years. The global growth engine functions asymmetrically and is powered only by a fistful of countries. As economic growth in poor countries fails to keep pace with that of top performers, institutional turmoil is bound to follow. This trend will only add to the growing problem of refugees that the world has seen in the post-WWII era. History suggests that the number of refugees in the world at any point in time is a function of economic prosperity (or the lack thereof) in poorer continents (Chart 14). For instance, the periods spanning 1980-90 and 2015-20 saw the world’s poorer continents lose their share in global GDP. Unsurprisingly these phases also saw a marked increase in the number of refugees. With the world’s poorer continents expected to lose share in global GDP again going forward, the number of refugees in the world will only rise. Chart 14Refugee Flows Rise When Growth Weak In Poor Continents Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Citizens of Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Myanmar today account for two-thirds of all refugees globally. To start with, these five countries’ share in global GDP was low at 0.8% in the 1980s. Now their share in global GDP is set to fall to 0.2% over the next five years (Chart 15). Chart 15Refugee Exporters Hit All-Time Low In Global GDP Share Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Per capita incomes in top refugee source countries tend to be very low. Whilst regime fractures appear to be the proximate cause of refugee outflux, an economic collapse is probably the root cause of the civil strife and waves of refugee movement seen out of the top refugee source countries. Another factor that could have a bearing is the rise of multipolarity. Shifting power structures in the global economy affect the stability of regimes with weak institutions. Instability in Afghanistan has been a direct result of the rise and the fall of the British and Russian empires. American imperial overreach is just the latest episode. If another Middle Eastern war erupts, the implications are obvious. But so too are the implications of US-China proxy wars in Southeast Asia or Russia-West proxy wars in eastern Europe. Bottom Line: With poorer continents’ economic prospects likely to remain weak and with multipolarity here to stay, the world’s refugee problem is here to stay too. Is A Repeat Of 2015 Refugee Crisis Likely In 2021? No. 2021 will not be a replica of 2015. This is owing to two key reasons. First, Afghanistan has long witnessed a steady outflow of refugees – especially at the end of the twentieth century but also throughout the US’s 20-year war there. The magnitude of the refugee problem in 2021 will be significantly smaller than that in 2015. Secondly, voters are now differentiating between immigrants and refugees with the latter entity gaining greater acceptance (Chart 16). Chart 16DM Attitudes Permissive Toward Refugees Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Chart 17Refugees Will Not Change Game In German/French Elections Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Concerns about refugees will gain some political traction but it will reinforce rather than upset the current trajectory in the most important upcoming elections, in Germany in September and France next April. True, these countries feature in the list of top countries to which Afghan refugees flee and will see some political backlash (Chart 17). But the outcome may be counterintuitive. In the German election, any boost to the far-right will underscore the likely underperformance of the ruling Christian Democrats. So the German elections will produce a left-wing surprise – and yet, even if the Greens won the chancellorship (the true surprise scenario, looking much less likely now), investors will cheer the pro-Europe and pro-fiscal result. The French election is overcrowded with right-wing candidates, both center-right and far-right, giving President Macron the ability to pivot to the left to reinforce his incumbent advantage next spring. Again, the euro and the equity market will rise on the status quo despite the political risk shown in our indicator (Appendix). Of course, immigration and refugees will cause shocks to European politics in future, especially as more regime failures in the third world take place to add to Afghanistan and Ethiopia. But in the short run they are likely to reinforce the fact that European politics are an oasis of stability given what is happening in the US, China, Brazil, and even Russia and India. Bottom Line: 2021 will not see a repeat of the 2015 refugee crisis. Ironically Afghan refugees could reinforce European integration in both German and French elections. The magnitude of the Afghan crisis is smaller than in the past and most Afghan refugees are likely to migrate to Pakistan and Iran (Chart 17). But more regime failures will ensure that the flow of people becomes a political risk again sometime in the future. What Does The Rise Of Taliban Mean For India? The Taliban first held power in Afghanistan from 1996-2001. This was one of the most fraught geopolitical periods in South Asia since the 1970s. Now optimists argue that Taliban 2.0 is different. Taliban leaders are engaging in discussions with an ex-president who was backed by America and making positive overtures towards India. So, will this time be different? It is worth noting that Taliban 2.0 will have to function within two major constraints. First, Afghanistan is deeply divided and diverse. Afghanistan’s national anthem refers to fourteen ethnic groups. Running a stable government is inherently challenging in this mountainous country. With Taliban being dominated by one ethnic group and with limited financial resources at hand, the Taliban will continue to use brute force to keep competing political groups at bay. Chart 18Taliban In Line With Afghanis On Sharia Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) Biden's Show Of Force (GeoRisk Update) At the same time, to maintain legitimacy and power, the Taliban will have to support aligned political groups operating in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Second, an overwhelming majority of Afghani citizens want Sharia law, i.e. a legal code based on Islamic scripture as the official law of the land (Chart 18). Hence if the Taliban enforces a Sharia-based legal system in Afghanistan then it will fall in line with what the broader population demands. It is against this backdrop that Taliban 2.0 is bound to have several similarities with the version that ruled from 1996-2001. Additionally, US withdrawal from Afghanistan will revive a range of latent terrorist movements in the region. This poses risks for outside countries, not least India, which has a long history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. The US will remain engaged in counter-terrorism operations. To complicate matters, India’s North has an even more unfavorable view of Pakistan than the rest of India. With the northern voter’s importance rising, India’s administration may be forced to respond more aggressively to a terrorist event than would have been the case about a decade ago. It is also possible that terrorism will strike at China over time given its treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. China’s economic footprint in Afghanistan could precipitate such a shift. Bottom Line: US withdrawal from Afghanistan is bound to add to geopolitical risks as latent terrorist forces will be activated. India has a long history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist movements. Incidentally, it will take time for transnational terrorism based in Afghanistan to mount successful attacks at the West once again, given that western intelligence services are more aware of the problem than they were in 2000. But non-state actors may regain the element of surprise over time, given that the western powers are increasingly focused on state-to-state struggle in a new era of great power competition.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com   Section II: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar