Equities

Highlights Bond yields have trapped equities, and equities have trapped bond yields. The double-digit investment opportunities are within asset-classes. From a tactical perspective: Banks will outperform the broad market. EM will outperform DM. The Eurostoxx50 will briefly outperform the S&P500. Raw industrial commodities will outperform crude oil. Feature What has been the biggest driver of financial markets this year? Trade wars and the emerging market slowdown? The budget spat between Italy and the EU Commission? The U.S. mid-term elections? Or perhaps, central bank policy normalization? These are all sensible answers, and each one has generated endless output of commentary and analysis. But none of these tells the biggest story of 2018. Chart of the WeekIn 2018, Bond Yields Have Trapped Equities, And Equities Have Trapped Bond Yields The Biggest Story Is Not Economics Or Politics... It Is Mathematics This year, the two largest five-day plunges in the global stock market - 6 percent in February and 7 percent in mid-October - resulted directly from the two largest five-day spikes in the global bond yield (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). This simple observation reveals the biggest story in the financial markets this year: the hypersensitivity of the stock market to rising bond yields, and especially when the global 10-year yield approaches 2 percent - or equivalently 'the rule of 4': when the sum of the 10-year U.S. T-bond, German bund and Japanese government bond approaches 4 percent (Chart of the Week).1 Chart I-2Equities Plunged In February After A Spike In Bond Yields Chart I-3Equities Plunged In October After A Spike In Bond Yields With the global stock market now flat year-to-date, it follows that excluding these two five-day plunges, global equities would be comfortably higher even with the emerging market slowdown, trade war quarrels, and political spats. Meaning that this year's market action is not explained by economics or by politics. It is explained by mathematics, and specifically the great misunderstanding of investment risk. Previous reports have focused on this great misunderstanding, most recently Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance, to which we refer our readers. Here, we will just summarize:2 An investment's risk depends on the negative asymmetry of its short-term returns. At very low bond yields, bond returns develop the same negative asymmetry as equity returns. This means that equities lose their excess riskiness versus bonds, requiring equity valuations to experience a phase transition sharply higher. But when bond yields normalize, equities regain their excess riskiness versus bonds - and their valuations must suffer a phase transition sharply lower. This phase transition to sharply lower equity valuations is most pronounced when the global 10-year bond yield rises to 2 percent. This dynamic has proved to be the biggest driver of financial markets in 2018, and is likely to be the biggest driver in 2019 too. Essentially, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, limiting the upside in the stock market (Chart I-4). In turn, a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets threatens a disinflationary impulse, limiting the sustainable upside in bond yields. Chart I-4Equities Remain Richly Valued In effect, bond yields have trapped equities, and equities have trapped bond yields (Chart I-5). The result is that in 2018 the global asset-classes: equities, bonds, commodities, and cash have all ended up going nowhere. Indeed, the global 30-year bond yield has been trapped since early 2017!3 Chart I-5The Global 30-Year Bond Yield Has Been Trapped For Two Years The Double-Digit Investment Opportunities Are Within Asset-Classes Although the global asset-classes have ended up going nowhere this year (Chart I-6), 2018 has still provided double-digit investment opportunities. But to find these double-digit opportunities, you have to look below the main asset allocation decision to within the asset-classes, in sector, region and country allocation. Chart I-6In 2018, Global Asset-Classes Have Ended Up Going Nowhere For example, until very recently: banks had underperformed the broad equity market by 10 percent globally and 25 percent in Europe; emerging market equities had underperformed developed market equities by 15 percent; the Eurostoxx50 had underperformed the S&P500 by 13 percent; and raw industrial commodities had underperformed crude oil by 30 percent. But in the last month or so, these strong trends have exhausted and even started to reverse: banks have started to outperform the market; the Eurostoxx50 has eked ahead of the S&P500; emerging market equities have retraced versus developed market equities; and raw industrial commodities have made up much lost ground on crude oil (Charts I-7 - Chart I-10). One important reason is that the sharp down-oscillation in global credit growth which was responsible for many of this year's intra asset-class trends has now clearly rebounded into an up-oscillation. Chart I-7Banks Have Started To Outperform Chart I-8The Eurostoxx50 Is Starting To Outperform The S&P500 Chart I-9EM Has Started To Outperform DM Chart I-10Industrial Commodities Are Starting To Outperform Crude Oil Hence, we expect these trend reversals to continue in the coming months. From a tactical perspective only, this means: 1. Banks will outperform the broad market. 2. EM will outperform DM. 3. The Eurostoxx50 will briefly outperform the S&P500. 4. Raw industrial commodities will outperform crude oil. Such an inflection point can leave investors scratching their heads in confusion, because sector performances seem to conflict with the economic data releases. But the conflict is easily resolved. Though we are now in mid-November, the economic data releases - for example, German exports - are a lagging indicator, referring to a time in the past, September, when global credit growth might still have been in a down-oscillation. Whereas the financial markets - for example, bank equities' relative performance - are a contemporaneous indicator, sensing credit growth's switch to an up-oscillation in real-time. Always remember that market prices move on the marginal change in information and expectations. To be absolutely clear, we are not referring to the business cycle. We are referring to predictable oscillations in credit growth that occur within the business cycle, but which nevertheless create double-digit investment opportunities - such as bank equities' relative performance. The Importance Of 6-Month Credit Growth Still, several clients have asked about our choice of 6-month credit growth, as it appears to be an arbitrary period plucked out of thin air or, more cynically, 'data-mined'. In fact, our choice of 6-month growth has a rock-solid foundation in economic theory.4 For any item, if supply lags demand by a period t, then economic theory proves that both the quantity of the item and its price will experience oscillations with half-cycle length t. Clearly, bank credit is such an item whose supply does lag demand. For example, a mortgage is only allocated and released after a time-consuming process of checking collateral and creditworthiness. For bank credit in aggregate, the lag between demand and supply, and specifically final spending of the funds, averages six to eight months. Once you accept this fundamental truth, it follows that credit growth must also experience oscillations whose half-cycles last six to eight months. So we end with a very important investment lesson. If you only look at the conventionally examined year-on-year credit growth data, you will not see the predictable oscillations in 6-month credit growth. And if you do not look at 6-month credit growth, you will miss the double-digit investment opportunities that are always on offer (Chart I-11). Chart I-11A Sharp Down-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Has Rebounded Into An Up-Oscillation The choice is yours. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 We use the MSCI All Country World Index in local currency terms to capture the global stock market. 2 Negative asymmetry of returns means the possibility of larger short-term losses than short-term gains. Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance", October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?", September 13, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles", January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* Palladium has outperformed nickel by 50% in the past three months, but this strong trend is nearing exhaustion according to its 65-day fractal dimension. Hence, this week's trade recommendation is long nickel/short palladium setting a profit target of 14% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Highlights Chinese pro-consumption policy stimulus will likely stabilize Chinese household consumption growth at 8-10% over the next 12-15 months, with service consumption continuing to be the key driver. Our research shows that Chinese nominal retail sales of consumer goods are currently growing at only 3-4%, significantly lower than the 9-10% pace that the Chinese government has reported, and that the market has commonly quoted. We expect it to rebound moderately to 4-6% in 2019 on the government's pro-consumption stimulus. The services sector including healthcare, education, travel, entertainment, sports, high-tech, daycare for kids, nursing homes for the elderly, and so on will likely experience strong growth. In the consumer discretionary space, car sales will also likely rebound as the country may soon release stimulus measures supporting the auto industry. For now, we advise overweighting consumer discretionary stocks versus the benchmark. We also recommend going long consumer discretionary versus consumer staples. Feature The Chinese economy is in transition from investment- and export-led growth to consumer-led growth. With faltering investment growth and escalating China-U.S. trade tensions, the strength and durability of Chinese household consumption has become all the more important to the country's economic growth. To address increasing challenges facing the economy, the government over the past several months has released a slew of policies aimed at stimulating domestic consumption. Our focus in this week's report is to outline these policies and in turn gauge what the strength of Chinese household consumption will be over the next 12-15 months. In order to do this, some key questions need to be addressed, including: What is the current growth rate of household consumption? What pro-consumption policies have already been implemented, and what additional policies are likely on the way? How effective will stimulus be on Chinese household consumption this time around? One of our key findings is that Chinese nominal retail sales of consumer goods - a common proxy for Chinese household spending - is currently growing at only 3-4%, significantly lower than the 9-10% pace the Chinese government has reported, and that the market has commonly quoted (Chart 1). Chart Retail Sales Growth Measure: Which One Is Accurate? Another important finding is that recent pro-consumption policy stimulus will likely increase household income levels by 400-500 billion RMB. In addition, we expect more pro-consumption policies from the Chinese government later this year or early 2019 - i.e., cutting car sales taxes or giving out subsidies to encourage households' purchases of automobiles, especially in rural areas, and/or lowering the policy rate to spur spending by reducing households' borrowing costs. This will stabilize Chinese household consumption growth at 8-10% over the next 12-15 months, with service consumption continuing to be the key driver. Making Sense Of The Data According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data, Chinese nominal household consumption accounted for about 40% of GDP last year, and grew 8.2% year-on-year (about 9-10% in 2015 and 2016). We estimate that currently about 65-70% of Chinese household consumption is consumer goods, with the remainder going to services. Goods consumption Chinese retail sales figures are probably the most-often-used among market participants as a proxy for Chinese household consumption, despite the fact that the data only provide a partial picture of Chinese household spending: spending on consumer goods. Based on the NBS's definition, Chinese total retail sales of consumer goods refer to the sum of retail sales of commodities sold to urban and rural households for household consumption, and to social institutions for public consumption for non-production purposes. Chinese total retail sales also include online goods sales but do not include online service sales. They also do not include many service sectors including education, medical care, travel, entertainment, eldercare and childcare. In short, while Chinese retail sales cannot represent the full picture of Chinese household consumption, they can indeed reveal the strength of Chinese household consumption on consumer goods. The most quoted retail sales growth data by the majority of market participants is from the NBS - a straight growth number that the bureau reported every month - which recently decelerated to 9% (the dotted line in Chart 1). The bureau does not give out information about how to calculate this growth data. The NBS also reports the level data of retail sales every month, from which the year-on-year growth actually plunged to 3.8% (the solid line in Chart 1). Which one is more accurate? All of the findings below suggest the validity of the growth estimates we calculated from the level of NBS retail sales. For major consuming discretionary goods like cars, washing machines, air conditioners, refrigerators and TVs, all products excluding TVs exhibited a sharp drop in sales volume growth this year (Chart 2). Chart 2Falling Sales Volume Nearly Across The Board From Discretionary Goods... Some major consumer staples such as dairy products, soft drinks and liquor - also experienced a sharp decline in sales-volume terms (Chart 3). Chart 3...To Major Consumer Staples The sub-categories of total nominal retail sales in value terms also showed a significant slowdown in terms of urban and rural, and in terms of commodity goods and catering (Chart 4). Chart 4Weakness In Retail Sales From Urban To Rural Meanwhile, 26 out of 31 provinces experienced retail sales growth slower than 6% for the first six months, with three provinces - Shandong, Jilin and Guizhou - in contraction. Why did Chinese retail sales experience such a significant drop this year? We believe it is because households' sentiment and willingness to consume has diminished considerably (Chart 5). Chart 5Falling Marginal Propensity To Consume The cracking down of peer-to-peer lending, falling stock prices and high mortgage payments this year have all reduced household wealth. Mortgage interest payments currently account for nearly 50% of the nation's household disposable income, higher than 45% a year ago.1 In addition, rising China-U.S. trade tensions have also increased uncertainty on future income growth and affected confidence. Service consumption If our estimate of Chinese retail sales growth can correctly capture the strength of consumer goods consumption, what data can be used to measure services consumption. Chart 6 can at least provide some sense in gauging the strength of household service consumption, as tourism, medical services and entertainment services (i.e., movie box office receipts) are all major household service consumption components. In the meantime, online services sales can also somewhat reflect the overall strength of Chinese household services consumption. Chart 6Services Consumption Still Growing At A Double Digit Pace Chart 6 clearly shows that despite the growth deceleration, nominal services consumption growth is currently still quite strong - in the range of 10-15% - considerably higher than the 3-4% growth in nominal consumer goods consumption. To gauge how Chinese nominal household consumption growth will be going forward, we need to assess the pro-consumption policies that have already been implemented. Consumption Stimulus A flurry of pro-consumption policies has been announced over the past several months, aiming at spurring consumer spending to support the country's underlying economic growth. Personal tax cuts and tax exemptions will increase households' ability to spend, while improvements in the quality of goods and services supplied and more availability of high-quality products will also encourage consumption. On October 21, China unveiled a new income tax law to boost consumption. The law increases the tax-free threshold from 3,000 RMB per month to 5,000 RMB per month and expands the lower tax brackets, effective October 1, 2018. It also adds new itemized tax deductions related to education, housing, eldercare, childcare and medical care, which will come into effect on January 1, 2019. Additional details of the new itemized deductions have so far not been released. The Ministry of Finance estimates that the tax changes will collectively lift household incomes by approximately 320 billion RMB. This is equivalent to about 1% of household consumption expenditures, or about 0.4% of GDP. Given that the total amount of personal income tax was 1.2 trillion RMB last year, the total tax deduction from the new income law and new itemized tax deductions should be much smaller than the amount of total personal income tax. Assuming 40-50% of the 1.2 trillion RMB personal tax will be deducted in 2019, this will be equal to about 500-600 billion RMB in household incomes (1.6-1.9% of household consumption expenditures, and about 0.6-0.7% of GDP). On September 20, the government released a policy guideline: "New measures to spur residential consumption." Two weeks later, on October 11, the government announced a "three-year (2018-2020) action plan to stimulate domestic consumption." The government's plan is geared to facilitating a virtuous cycle in which boosting consumption leads to supply innovation, and subsequently improvement in new consumption growth. According to the plan, the authority will widen the openness of seven key service sectors for private and / or overseas companies to enter in sectors such as tourism, culture, sports, healthcare, eldercare, home services and education/training. The country aims to develop rental markets, promote new-energy automobiles, support high-tech products (VR, robots, etc.), encourage green consumption and upgrade the quality of existing goods and services. Insufficient high-quality supply in these service sectors have in the past curbed consumption growth to some extent. By boosting the supply of high-quality services, the government expects to increase consumption in these sectors. Starting on July 1, China reduced import tariffs on 1449 imported items, resulting in a decline in average import tariffs from 15.7% to 6.9%. Starting on November 1, the government further lowered tariffs with most-favored nations on an additional 1585 items with the average tax rate falling from 10.5% to 7.8%. Clearly, there are two trends from these policies. First, the services sector including healthcare, education, travel, entertainment, sports, high-tech, childcare, eldercare, and so on will benefit most, as households in general have high demand for these services and are willing to spend more on these sectors (Chart 7). Chart 7Service Consumption Vs. Consumer Staples Consumption: Higher Growth For example, while China's aging population will have increasing demands for medical and eldercare service, the termination of the one-child policy will continue to boost demand for childcare and education services. Food and clothing accounts for about 35% of total Chinese household consumption expenditures (Chart 8), significantly higher than the 21% proportion in South Korea. Meanwhile, Chinese consumers spend 11% of their disposable income on education, culture and recreation, lower than the 17% figure in South Korea. Chart 8Chinese Household Consumption Structure Second, the supply of high-quality consumer goods and high-quality services will strongly increase in response to rising demand of wealthier Chinese consumers. This increase in supply will be met by both domestic production of goods and services and overseas imports. What additional policies could be implemented in the remainder of 2018 and 2019? The government may release more supportive policies to promote car sales - i.e., reducing the sales tax on cars with a capacity of 1.6L or lower, or providing subsidies on car purchases. They have implemented similar stimulus measures since 2008. If recent pro-consumption policies and supportive policies for the auto industry still cannot revive household consumption strongly enough, the authorities may cut the policy rate to spur additional spending. After knowing the probable scale of the pro-consumption stimulus, we can now put everything together to see what Chinese household consumption growth could be in 2019. How Strong Will Household Consumption Be? Structurally, we believe growth in Chinese household consumption is facing strong headwinds, including lower household income growth in real terms (inflation-adjusted) because of slowing productivity growth and rising household debt levels (Chart 9). Chart 9Structural Headwinds For Chinese Household Consumption Growth However, over the next 12-15 months, we still expect the government's pro-consumption policies to be able to stabilize domestic household consumption growth at 8-10%. We estimated in the first section that the new income law and itemized tax deduction policy will likely release about 500-600 billion RMB of income available for spending. The ratio of marginal propensity to consume gauges the proportion of one additional unit of disposable income spent on consumption. We estimated that the marginal propensity to consume for Chinese households is currently at about 50%. This will result in 250-300 billion RMB spending on household consumption, equaling about 0.7-0.8% of 2017 Chinese retail sales of consumer goods (36.6 trillion RMB), or 0.8-0.9% of household consumption expenditures. Autos will be another major potential driver of overall household consumption growth. China has stimulated the car industry by slashing the auto sales tax from 10% to 5% in 2009-2010 and again in 2015-2016. As a result, the volume of passenger car sales jumped 50% in 2009 and 15% in 2016, respectively (Chart 10). While car sales have dropped each time the stimulus measures have expired, a temporary growth rebound in auto sales in 2019 is still possible. Chart 10The Government May Stimulate The Auto Market Again As car sales volumes are currently in double-digit contraction, the Chinese government is likely to implement similar stimulus measures in late 2018 or early 2019. If so, Chinese car sales in volume terms may rebound by 5-10% in 2019. By the end of last year, the measure of urban households with cars was about 37.5 out of 100. There is still plenty of upside, with the rural areas having much bigger potential for car sales than urban areas. The value of Chinese auto sales was 4.2 trillion RMB last year. It increased 280 billion RMB in 2016 and 220 billion in 2017, but decreased 220 billion for the first nine months of this year. Assuming a 5% growth in the auto sales value next year because of the stimulus, it will be about 200 billion RMB increase, equivalent to 0.2% of 2017 GDP or 0.6% of household consumption expenditures. Although households have already taken out much more in the way of consumer loans for purchases of homes and other day-to-day expenses, with plenty of consumption-related stimulus policy in place, consumer loan growth will likely continue to grow in the double digits in 2019 (Chart 11). In September, household loans for short-term consumption (non-mortgage) grew at 28% year-on-year. Chart 11Consumer Loan Growth May Remain Strong In 2019 Chart 12 shows that the breakdown of household borrowing - medium- and long-term consumption loans (mostly mortgage loans) accounted for 60% of total household borrowing. Chart 12Most Of Consumption Loans Are Mortgage With the property market now slowing down and a gradual decline in the Chinese central bank's PSL lending,2 property sold has been decelerating (Chart 13). This may lead to less mortgage borrowing, leaving more loans available for short-term spending. Chart 13Household Borrowing In 2019: Less For Mortgage And More For Consumption? How different is this round of stimulus versus the previous two episodes? First, the strength of household consumption growth due to recent policy stimuli will be much weaker than the 2009-2010 and 2015-2016 episodes (Chart 14). Chart 14Stimulus Impact On Household Consumption Growth In 2019: Less Than Previous Episodes Home appliance markets like TVs, air conditioners, washing machines and refrigerators have already entered a mature phase. On average, as of the end of 2017 there were already 133 TVs, 100.3 air conditioners, 97.1 washing machines and 97.2 refrigerators for every 100 urban households (Chart 15, top panel). Even in rural areas, as of the end of last year there were 120 TVs, 52.6 air conditioners, 86.3 washing machines and 91.7 refrigerators for every 100 households, significantly higher than 2008 levels (Chart 15, bottom panel). Chart 15Home Appliance Markets: More Mature Than The Auto Market Second, this time the stimulus is focusing more on the services sector, while the previous two episodes were more on consumer goods. As result, this time the stimulus will have much less impact on commodities than the previous two episodes, in which major commodity goods sales and production experienced significant growth. Overall, China's pro-consumption policies will likely stabilize Chinese household consumption growth at 8-10% over the next 12-15 months, with services consumption remaining the key driver. We expect household service consumption to continue to grow at 10-15%, and retail sales growth to rebound to 4-6% from 3-4%. Investment Implications Chinese pro-consumption policy will likely benefit services and the automobile industry more than consumer staples. Meanwhile, commodity sectors may not benefit much. For now, we recommend overweighting the domestic consumer discretionary sector versus the Chinese CSI300 benchmark, a trade that we are initiating as of today (Chart 16, top panel). The sector's relative P/E and P/B valuations versus the benchmark also suggest its relative attractiveness (Chart 16, middle and bottom panels). Chart 16Overweight Consumer Discretionary Versus Benchmark China's pro-consumption stimulus also warrants the opposite position of what was one of our most successful trades over the past year (long investable staples / short investable discretionary), which we closed at the end of September for a profit of 48%.3 Within the domestic market, investors should go long consumer discretionary versus consumer staples, a trade that we are also initiating as of today (Chart 17). In addition to the cyclical tailwind from policy, relative valuation ratios suggest that the former is likely to outperform the later. Chart 17Go Long Consumer Discretionary Versus Consumer Staples Finally, our conclusion that policymakers are likely to succeed at stabilizing household consumption growth has implications beyond the relative performance of consumer stocks. Our outlook for a stable consumer over the coming year supports the argument that China will not push for a significant reacceleration in credit growth as a response to ongoing economic weakness, and argues in favor of our view that the "strike price" of the China put option has fallen. As we have noted in previous reports, we have no doubt that Chinese policymakers will eventually move to a maximum reflationary stance if they feel that the existing slowdown will lead to deep, threatening economic instability. But it will be impossible for investors and policymakers to make a judgement about the true odds of such an outcome without hard evidence of the magnitude of the tariff-induced export shock, which for now remains obscured by trade front-running (which may persist until the new year). This means that it is too soon to bottom fish deeply oversold Chinese financial assets (such as A-shares), and China-related plays more generally. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy EllenJ@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease refer to Table 1 in the China Investment Strategy Special Reports "China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here? ", dated September 13, and Table 1 in the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?", dated April 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?", dated September 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Reports "GICS Sector Changes: The Implications For China", dated September 26, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Neutral When we downgraded the S&P home improvement retail index (HIR) to neutral in September, the core of our thesis was that fixed residential investment as a percentage of GDP appeared to have peaked, up 50% from trough to the recent highs, whereas relative HIR performance is up 170% in the same time frame (top and second panels).1 Such euphoria, both among investors and the sell side community (bottom panel), leaves the index prone to fall, should a disappointment occur. Yesterday's results from index giant Home Depot reinforce this point. The company exceeded earnings expectations and raised their guidance (albeit for only one quarter) and the stock still underperformed the market. Considering the cautious guidance from management on the housing market, cost pressures from tariffs and a much-reduced price of lumber, it is of little wonder the company failed to live up to expectations. Net, while we remain constructive on the overall housing market, we continue to think the positivity is fully baked in to the S&P HIR index; stay neutral. Clients seeking housing exposure should consider the compellingly valued S&P homebuilding index that we are overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Indurated," dated September 24, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights So What? The Trump administration is focusing on re-election in 2020, which could push the recession call into 2021. Why? The midterms were investment-relevant, just not in the way most of our clients thought. We are downgrading our alarmism on Iran; Trump is aware of his constraints. But investor optimism regarding the trade war may be overdone. China has contained its capital outflows, which suggests Beijing will be comfortable with more CNY/USD downside. A new GPS mega-theme: Bifurcated Capitalism! Watch carefully for any upcoming trade action on semiconductors. Feature There is no better feeling than hearing from our clients that we got a call wrong because we misjudged the constraints of the Trump administration by focusing too much on its preferences. Why? Because it means that clients are keeping us honest by employing our most important method: constraints over preferences. This is one of the takeaways from a quarter filled with meetings with our clients in the Midwest, Toronto, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Frankfurt, Berlin, Auckland, Melbourne, Sydney, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and sunny Marbella, Spain! In this report, we discuss several pieces of insight from our clients. Midterms Are Investment Relevant Generally speaking, few of our clients agreed with our assessment that the midterm elections were not investment-relevant. The further away from the U.S. we traveled, the greater the sense among investors that equity markets influence U.S. politics: both the upcoming takeover of the House of Representatives by the Democratic Party and the odds of trade war intensification. We strongly disagree with this assessment. Both periods of equity market turbulence this year were preceded by a rising U.S. 10-year yield, not any particularly damning trade war chatter (Chart 1). In fact, the intensification of the trade war this summer occurred amidst a fairly buoyant S&P 500! Meanwhile, the odds of a Democratic takeover of the House were priced in well before the October equity decline began. Chart 1Yields, Not Trade, Matter For Stocks Generally speaking, even midterms that produce gridlock have led to a relief rally (Chart 2). This time could be the same, especially because the likely next Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, has signalled that the main policy goal for 2019 would be infrastructure spending. In her "victory" speech following the election, Pelosi mentioned infrastructure numerous times (impeachment, zero times). Chart 2Stocks Are Indifferent To Midterm Results Democratic Representative Peter DeFazio, likely head of the House of Representatives committee overseeing transportation, has already signalled that he will ask for "real money, real investment."1 DeFazio has previously proposed a $500bn infrastructure plan, backed by issuance of 30-year Treasuries and raising fuel taxes. He has rejected the February 2017 Trump proposal, which largely relied on raising private money for the job. Would President Trump go with such a plan? Maybe. In early 2018, he stunned lawmakers by saying that he supported hiking the federal gasoline tax by 25 cents a gallon (the federal 18.4 cent-a-gallon gasoline tax has not been hiked since 1993). He has since confirmed that "everything is on the table" to achieve an infrastructure deal. Several clients from around the world pointed out that both Democrats and President Trump have an incentive to make a deal. President Trump wants to avoid the deeply negative fiscal thrust awaiting him in 2020 (Chart 3). Given the House takeover by the Democrats, it is tough to imagine that new tax cuts are the means for Trump to avoid the "stimulus cliff." As such, another round of stimulative fiscal spending may be the only way for him to avoid a late-2020 recession (although the latter is currently the BCA House View). Chart 3Can Trump And Pelosi Reverse... Democrats, on the other hand, have an incentive to ditch "Resistance" and embrace policy-making. Yes, hastening the recession in 2020 would be the Machiavellian play, but President Trump would be able to blame Democrats for the downturn - since they will necessarily have had to participate in planning an infrastructure bill only to sink it. They also learned the lesson from the January 2018 government shutdown, which backfired at the polls and forced Senate Democrats to come to an agreement quickly on a two-year stimulative budget deal. What about the GOP fiscal conservatives? They don't necessarily need to come on board. The House is held by Democrats. And the Democrats in the Senate would only need 15-18 GOP Senators to support a profligate infrastructure plan. Given that infrastructure is popular, that the president will be pushing it, and that the GOP-controlled Senate agreed with the budget bill in January, we think that even more Republican Senators can go along with an infrastructure plan. Another big takeaway from the midterms is that the GOP suffered deep losses in the Midwest. President Trump's party lost ten out of twelve races in the region (Table 1). The two most representative contests were the loss of Republican Wisconsin Governor and one-time rising presidential star Scott Walker, and the victory of the left-wing and über-protectionist Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio. Table 1Massive Republican Losses Across The Midwest Senator Brown won his contest comfortably by 6.4% in a state that Trump carried by 8.13%. The appeal of Brown to the very blue-collar voters that Trump himself won is obvious. On trade, there is no daylight between the left-wing Brown and President Trump. Meanwhile, Walker, an establishment Republican who built his reputation on busting public-sector unions, could not replicate Trump's success in Wisconsin. Several of our clients suggested that the GOP performance in the Midwest was poor because of the aggressive trade rhetoric. But that makes little sense. Republicans did not run Trump-style populists in the Midwest, to their obvious detriment. Democrats have always claimed to be for "fair trade" rather than "free trade." And we know, empirically, that Trump saw a key swing of turnout in 2016 in these states, largely thanks to his protectionist rhetoric (Chart 4). Chart 4Trump Owes The Midwest The Presidency President Trump cannot take Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin lightly. His performance in 2016 was extraordinary, but also tight. The Democrats will win these states if Trump does not grow voter turnout and support, according to demographic projections - and they lost them by less than a percentage point of white voters (Map 1). As such, we think that Democrats will talk tough on trade and try to reclaim their union and blue-collar voters, while President Trump has to double down on an aggressive trade posture towards China. Map 1Can 'White Hype' Work In 2020? Trump's Margins Are Small The midterms are investment relevant after all, but not in the way some might think. The Democratic takeover of the House, and the resultant gridlock, will potentially avert the "stimulus cliff" in 2020. This ought to support short-term inflation expectations and thus allow the Fed to stay-the-course. For markets, this could be unsettling given the correlation between yields and downturns in 2018. For the dollar, this should be supportive. The odds of an infrastructure deal are good, above 50%, with the key risk being a Democratic House focused on impeaching Trump. Such a bill would augur even higher levels of fiscal spending through 2020, possibly prolonging the business cycle, and setting up an even wider budget deficit when the next recession hits (Chart 5). Chart 5Pro-Cyclical Policy Has To Continue Meanwhile, the shellacking in the Midwest ought to embolden the president to go even harder against China on trade. Rather than the upcoming Xi-Trump meeting in Buenos Aires, the key bellwether of this thesis is whether Trump signals afterwards that he will implement the tariff rate hike on January 1, 2019 (and whether he announces a third round of tariffs). Bottom Line: Go long building products and construction material stocks. Stay short China-exposed S&P 500 companies. The 10-year yield may end the year even closer to 3.5% when the market realizes that the odds of an infrastructure deal are higher than previously thought. The political path of least resistance in the U.S. continues to point towards greater profligacy. Trump Is Aware Of His Constraints In The Middle East Throughout 2018, we have flagged U.S.-Iran tensions as the risk for 2019. In early October, we went long Brent / short S&P 500 as a hedge against this risk, a trade that we closed for a 6% gain last week. During our meetings with clients this quarter, however, several astute observers pointed out that in our own analyses we have stressed the geopolitical and political constraints to President Trump. First, we have argued that the original 2015 nuclear deal signed by President Obama had a deep geopolitical logic, allowing the U.S. to pivot to Asia and stare down China by geopolitically deleveraging the U.S. from the Middle East. If President Trump undermined the détente with Iran, he would be opening up a two-front conflict with both China and Iran, diluting his administration's focus and capabilities. Second, we noted that a rise in oil prices could precipitate an early recession and push up gasoline prices in 2019, a probable death knell for any president's re-election prospects. Our clients were right to ask: Why would President Trump face down these constraints, given the high cost that he would incur? We did not have a very good answer to this question. It is difficult to understand President Trump's preferences for raising tensions against Iran beyond the fact that he promised to do so in his campaign, appears to want to undermine all of President Obama's policies, and turned to Iran hawks to head his foreign policy. Are these preferences worth the risk of a recession in 2019? Or worth the risk of triggering yet another military conflict in the Middle East over a country that only 7% of Americans consider is the 'greatest enemy' (Chart 6)? Chart 6Americans Don't Perceive Iran As 'The Greatest Enemy' Given that the administration has offered exemptions to the oil embargo to eight key importers, it now appears that President Trump is well aware of his geopolitical and domestic constraints. The combined imports of Iranian oil by these eight states is ~1.4mm b/d. While we do not have the detail of the volumes that will be allowed under the waivers, it is likely that these Iranian sales will recover some of the ~1mm b/d of exports lost already (Chart 7). Chart 7Waivers Will Restore Iranian Exports For 180 Days What does this mean for investors? On one hand, it means that the risk of oil prices spiking north of $100 per barrel have substantively decreased. On the other hand, however, it also means that the Trump administration agrees with BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy view that oil markets remain tight and that OPEC 2.0's spare capacity may be a constraint to future production increases. Bottom Line: The risks of an oil-price-shock-induced 2019 recession have fallen. However, oil prices may yet surge in 2019 to the $85-95 level (Brent) on the back of supply risks in Venezuela and Iran, especially if Saudi Arabia and Russia prove unable to expand production much beyond their current levels. Most of our clients in the Middle East shared the skepticism of our commodity strategists that Saudi Arabia would be able to increase production much higher than current levels in 2019. However, the view was not unanimous. Risks Of Saudi Arabia Going Rogue Have Declined Clients in the Middle East were convinced that the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi would have no impact on Saudi oil production decisions. However, the insight from the region is that the incident has probably ended the "blank cheque" that the Trump administration initially gave Riyadh on foreign policy. For global investors, this may not have a major impact. But it may have been at least part of the administration's reasoning behind giving embargo exemptions to such a large number of economies. The incident has likely forced Saudi Arabia to adjust its calculus on three issues: Qatar: The Saudi-Qatari split never made much sense in the first place. It was initially endorsed by President Trump, who may not have understood the strategic value of Qatar to the United States. Defense Secretary James Mattis almost immediately responded by reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the Persian Gulf country which hosts one of the most strategic U.S. air bases in the world. Yemen: The U.S. has now openly called on Saudi Arabia to end its military operations in Yemen. We would expect Riyadh to acquiesce to the request. Iran: With the U.S. giving major importers of Iranian oil exemptions, the message is twofold. First, the U.S. cares about its domestic economic stability. Second, the U.S. does not care about Saudi domestic economic stability. Our commodity strategists believe that Saudi fiscal breakeven oil price is around $85. As such, the U.S. decision to slow-roll the sanctions against Iran will be received with chagrin in Riyadh, especially as the latter will now have to shoulder both lower oil prices and the American request for higher output. Could Saudi Arabia break with the U.S.? Not a chance. The U.S. is the Saudis' security guarantor. As such, it is up to Saudi Arabia to acquiesce to American foreign policy goals, not the other way around. While we think that President Trump ultimately succumbed to geopolitical and political constraints when he decided to take the "phoney war" approach to Iran, he may have been nudged in that direction by Khashoggi's tragic murder. Bottom Line: A major risk for investors in 2019 was that the Trump administration would treat Saudi preferences for a major confrontation with Iran as its own interests. Such a strategy would have destabilized the global oil markets and potentially have unwound the 2015 U.S.-Iran détente that has allowed the U.S. to focus on China. However, the death of Khashoggi has marginally hurt President Trump domestically - given that it makes him look soft on Saudi Arabia, an unpopular stance in the U.S. Moreover, the administration has come to grips with the risks of a dire oil shock should Iran retaliate. The shift in U.S. policy vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia will therefore refocus the Trump administration on its own priorities, not that of its ally in the Middle East. Trade War Is All About CNY/USD In The Short Term... Clients in Australia and New Zealand are the most sophisticated Western investors when it comes to China. The level of macro understanding of the Chinese economy and the markets in these two countries is unparalleled (outside of China itself, of course). We therefore always appreciate the insights we pick up from our clients Down Under. And they are convinced that the massive capital outflow from China has clearly ceased. The flow of Chinese capital into Auckland, Melbourne, and Sydney real estate has definitely slowed, and anecdotal evidence appears to be showing up in the price data (Chart 8). Separately, this intel has been confirmed by clients from British Columbia and California. Chart 8Pacific Rim Home Prices Rolling Over The reality is that China has successfully closed its capital account. How else can we explain that a 4.7% CNY/USD depreciation in 2015 precipitated a $483 billion outflow of forex reserves, whereas a 10.1% depreciation this year has not had a major impact (Chart 9)? Chart 9On Balance, China Is Experiencing Modest Outflows To be fair, forex reserves declined by $34bn in October, but that is still a far cry from the panic in 2015. Our other indicators suggest that the impact on capital seepage is muted this time around, largely due to the official crackdown on various forms of capital outflows: Quarterly data (Chart 10) reflecting the change in foreign exchange reserves minus the sum of the current account balance and FDI, indicate that while net inflows have remained negative, they are still a far cry from 2015 levels. Chart 10Far Cry From 2016 Crisis Import data (Chart 11) no longer show the massive deviation between Chinese national statistics and IMF figures. Imports from Hong Kong (Chart 12), specifically, are now down to normal levels, with the fake invoicing problem having quieted down for now. Chart 11No More Confusion Regarding Imports Chart 12Fake Invoicing Has Been Curbed Growth rate of foreign reserves (Chart 13) is not clearly contracting yet, and has been positive this year. Chart 13Severe FX Reserve Drawdown Has Ended Chinese foreign borrowing (Chart 14) is down from stratospheric levels, which limits the volume of potential outflows. Chart 14China's Foreign Lending Has Eased And the orgy of M&A and investment deals in the U.S. (Chart 15) has ended. Chart 15M&A Deals Have Eased Bottom Line: Anecdotal and official data suggest that capital outflows are in check despite their recent uptick. This could embolden Chinese leaders to continue using CNY/USD depreciation as their primary weapon against President Trump's tariffs, especially if the global backdrop is not collapsing. An increase of the 10% tariff rate to 25% on January 1 could, therefore, precipitate further weakness in the CNY/USD. The announcement of a third round of tariffs covering the remainder of Chinese imports could do the same. This would be negative for global risk assets, particularly EM equities and currencies. ... In the Long Term, Bifurcated Capitalism Our annual pilgrimage to Oceania included our traditional meeting with The Smartest Man In Oceania The Bloke From Down Under.2 He shares our belief that the long-term result of the broader Sino-American geopolitical conflict will be a form of Bifurcated Capitalism. His exact words were that "countries may soon have to choose between being in the Amazon or Alibaba camp," a great real-world implication of our mega-theme. Australian and New Zealand clients are particularly sensitive to the idea that the world may soon be split into spheres of influence because both countries are so high-beta to China, while obviously retaining their membership card in the West. Our suspicion is that both will be fine as they export mainly a high-grade and diversified range of commodities to China. Short of war, it is unlikely that the U.S. will one day demand that New Zealand stop its dairy exports to China, or that Australia stop iron ore and LNG exports. Countries exporting semiconductors to China, on the other hand, could face a choice between enforcing a future embargo or incurring the wrath of their closest military ally. The Bloke From Down Under has pointed out that, given China's dependency on semiconductor technology, a U.S. embargo of this critical tech could be comparable to the U.S. oil embargo against Japan that precipitated the latter's attack on Pearl Harbor. Chart 16China Accounts For 60% Of Global Semiconductor Demand The global semiconductor market reached $354 billion in 2016, with China accounting for 60% of total consumption (Chart 16). Despite the country's insatiable appetite for semiconductors, no Chinese firm is among the world's top 20 makers. This is why Beijing's "Made in China 2025" plan has focused so much on semiconductor capability (Chart 17). The goal is for China to become self-sufficient in semiconductors, gaining 35% share of the global design market. Chart 17China's High-Tech Protectionism A key feature of Bifurcated Capitalism will be impairment of investment in high-tech that has dual-use applications in military. Semiconductors obviously make that list. Another key feature would be investment restrictions in such high-tech sectors, particularly the kind of investments and M&A deals that China has been looking for in the U.S. this decade. Further, clients in California are very concerned about the U.S.'s proposed export controls, which would cut off access to China and wreak havoc on the industry. The Trump administration has already signalled that it will restrict Chinese inbound investment. Congress passed, with a large bipartisan majority, an expanded review system, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). The law has expanded the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), a secretive interagency panel nominally under control of the Treasury Department that can block inbound investment on national security grounds. CFIUS, at its core, has always been an entity focused on China. While the Treasury Department initially signalled it would take as much as 18 months to adopt the new FIRRMA rules, Secretary Mnuchin has accelerated the process. The procedure now will expand review from only large-stake takeovers to joint ventures and smaller investments by foreigners, particularly in technology deemed critical for national security reasons. This oversight began on November 10 and will allow CFIUS to block foreigners from taking a stake in a business making sensitive technology even if it gives the foreign investors merely a board seat. Countries of "special concern" will inherently receive heightened scrutiny, and a country's history of compliance with U.S. law, as well as cybersecurity and American citizens' privacy, will be considerations. A new interagency process led by the Commerce Department will focus on refurbishing export controls so as to protect "emerging and foundational technologies." Such impediments to capital flows are likely to become endemic and expand beyond the U.S. We may be seeing the first steps in the Bifurcated Capitalism concept that one day comes to dominate the global economy. Entire countries and sectors may become off-limits to Western investors and vice-versa for Chinese market participants. At the very least, companies whose revenue growth is currently slated to come from expansion in overseas markets may see those expectations falter. At its most pessimistic, however, Bifurcated Capitalism may precipitate geopolitical conflict if it denies China or the U.S. critical technology or commodities. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see David Shepardson, "Democrats to push for big infrastructure bill with 'real money' in 2019," Reuters, dated November 7, 2018, available at reuters.com. 2 At the time of publication, the said investor was unable to secure the permission of his wife for the "The Smartest Man" moniker. Geopolitical Calendar

Despite a stellar Q3 earnings print, the S&P 500 had a terrible October as EPS continues to do the hard work in lifting the market (Chart 1). Chart 1EPS Doing The Heavy Lifting We bought the dip,1 consistent with our view of deploying longer term oriented capital were a 10% pullback to occur, given our view of no recession for the next 9 to 12 months.2 Financials and industrials should lead the next leg up and we believe a rotation into these beaten up stocks is going to materialize in the coming months. On the flip side, as volatility is making a comeback and the fed is on a path to lift rates to 3% by June of next year, fixed income proxies and consumer discretionary stocks should be avoided and a preference for large caps over small caps should be maintained (Chart 2). Chart 2The Return Of Vol May Spoil The Party Further, a valuation reset has taken hold, pushed by the surprising rise of the equity risk premium over the course of the past two years, representing a surge in negative sentiment from investors, despite the usually tight inverse correlation with the ISM, the core sentiment indicator of the manufacturing economy (Chart 3). Chart 3ERP And The Economy Are Inversely Correlated Nevertheless, while everyone is focusing on the euphoric above trend growth of the U.S. economy, a risk lurking beneath the surface is a domestic economic soft patch.3 We have likely stolen demand from the future and brought consumption forward especially with the stock market related fiscal easing that is front loaded to 2018 and less so for next year. On that front our Economic Impulse Indicator is warning that the U.S. economy cannot grow at such a pace, unless a bipartisan divide can be crossed to deliver enough firepower to rekindle GDP growth (Chart 4). Chart 4Economic Impulse Yellow Flag Further, at least part of the blame for higher volatility rests with increasing trade uncertainty as the Trump administration has pursued an aggressive trade policy. Still, the evidence so far indicates that any trade weakness has been borne disproportionately by the rest of the world, to the U.S.' benefit (Charts 5 & 6). Chart 5U.S. Is Winning The Trade War Chart 6U.S. Has The Upper Hand We remain cognizant of a few key risks to our sanguine U.S. equity view. Principal among these is the rising U.S. dollar and its eventual infiltration into S&P 500 earnings, which has thus far been muted (Chart 7). Chart 7Watch The U.S. Dollar Further, a softening housing market bodes ill for U.S. economic growth. This is the first time since the GFC that residential investment's contribution to real GDP growth turned negative for three consecutive quarters (Chart 8). Chart 8Peak Housing Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Daily Insight, "Time To Bargain Hunt," dated October 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "The "FIT" Market," dated October 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Critical Reset," dated October 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. S&P Financials (Overweight) Unchanged from its trajectory when we updated our cyclical indicators earlier this year, the S&P financials CMI has continued to accelerate. A historically low unemployment rate, combined with unusually resilient economic growth, underpin the surge in the CMI to its highest levels post-GFC. Further goosing the indicator, particularly with respect to the core banks sub-sector, is the recent rise in Treasury yields and a modest steepening in the yield curve both of which bode well for bank profits. However, financials have not responded to this exceptionally bullish data the way we expected, with worries over future loan growth fully offsetting the positive backdrop; financials have been falling throughout 2018. Still, inflation is threatening to rise (albeit gradually) and a selloff looms in the bond market. We highlighted earlier this fall that sectors who benefit from rising interest rates while serving as inflation hedges should outperform against this backdrop. Cue the return of S&P financials. As shown in Chart 10, the S&P financials index has shown a historically strong positive correlation with interest rates and inflation expectations and we expect the recent divergence to be closed via a catch-up in the former. As noted above, bearishness has reigned in 2018 and the result has been a steep fall in our valuation indicator (VI) to more than one standard deviation below normal while our technical indicator (TI) is deep in oversold territory. Chart 9S&P Financials (Overweight) Chart 10Financials Are Trailing Rates S&P Industrials (Overweight) S&P industrials, much like their cyclical brethren S&P financials, benefit from higher interest rates and also serve as hedges against rising inflation. As we have noted in recent research, industrials are levered to the commodity cycle and thus represent an indirect inflation hedge. This hedge only becomes problematic when industrials stocks are unable to pass these rising commodity costs through to the consumer. As shown in Chart 12, pricing power is not yet an issue for these deep cyclicals. Given the positive macro backdrop for S&P industrials, the CMI has risen to new cyclical highs. Despite the forgoing, fears over trade wars and tariff-driven higher input costs, combined with slowing global demand for capital goods, have weighed on the index. The result is that S&P industrials remain deeply oversold on a technical basis while hovering around the neutral line from a valuation perspective. We reiterate our overweight recommendation. Chart 11S&P Industrials (Overweight) Cjart 12Resilient Industrials Pricing Power S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) Our energy CMI has moved horizontally since our last update of the cyclical macro indicators. However, this followed a snap-back recovery from the extremely depressed levels of 2016 and 2017. Nevertheless, the S&P energy index has moved sideways in line with the CMI. Energy stocks have significantly trailed crude oil prices since the latter broke out roughly a year ago (Chart 14). Disbelief in the longevity of the increase in oil prices is the likely culprit weighing on the index, along with a bottleneck-induced steep shale oil price discount to WTI. There are high odds that a catch up phase looms, especially if BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service's view of a looming oil price spike materializes, and we reiterate our overweight recommendation. Our VI has been hovering at one standard deviation below fair value, while our TI trending into oversold territory. Chart 13S&P Energy (Overweight, High-Conviction) Chart 14Crude Prices Are Still Leading The Way S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Unchanged from our previous update, our consumer staples CMI has moved sideways, near a depressed level. However, share prices have finally been staging the recovery we have anticipated for several years on the back of firm consumer data, solid sector profitability and an overall cyclical rotation into staples. Despite the recent outperformance, both from an earnings and market perspective, consumer staples remain a deeply unloved sector. With respect to the former, earnings growth has outstripped the market's reaction by a wide margin. This is reflected on our VI which only recently rose from one standard deviation below fair value while our TI has only just begun a retreat from oversold territory. Staples' share of retail sales have arrested their steep declines from 2014-2016, which we view as a precursor to a rebound in weak industry sales (top panel, Chart 16). Exports of consumer staples have already been staging a comeback, despite the strengthening of the U.S. dollar which has historically presaged a relative earnings outperformance (middle panel, Chart 16). Considering the already-strong industry return on equity, any relative earnings gains should result in a valuation rerating (third panel, Chart 16). We reiterate our outperform rating on this cyclically defensive index. Chart 15S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Chart 16Staples Are Making A Comback S&P Health Care (Neutral) In a mid-summer report , we upgraded the S&P pharma and biotech indexes to neutral which, considering their ~50% weight of the S&P health care index, took our overall recommendation on S&P health care to neutral. In the report, we proffered five reasons why the S&P pharma and biotech indexes were set for a rebound following their precipitous decline from 2016 onwards. These were: firming operating metrics, late cycle dynamics, likelihood of pricing power regulatory relief, the rising U.S. dollar and investor and analyst capitulation. Our timing has proved prescient as the S&P pharma index has been dramatically outperforming since the upgrade (top panel, Chart 18). With respect to pharma's operating metrics, our pharma productivity proxy (industrial production / employment) has been soaring, implying that earnings should surge (second panel, Chart 18). This seems particularly likely as the pace of improvement in drug shipments exceeds inventory growth by a fairly wide margin (third and bottom panels, Chart 18). Despite the upbeat backdrop for pharma, our health care CMI has declined modestly, though remains at a neutral level relative to history. Further, the pharma recovery has taken our VI from undervalued to a neutral position, a reading which is echoed by our TI. Chart 17S&P Health Care (Neutral) Chart 18Pharma Strength Is Lifting Health Care S&P Technology (Neutral) The stratospheric rise of tech profits, particularly in the past two years, have done most of the heavy lifting in pulling the S&P 500's profit margin ever higher (second panel, Chart 20) as well as pushing the index itself to new all-time highs in September. The San Francisco Fed's tech pulse index - an index of coincident indicators of technology sector activity - suggests more profit growth is in the offing (third panel, Chart 20), an intimation repeated by our technology CMI. However, we remain cognizant of three material risks to bullishness in tech. First, the tech sector garners 60% of its revenues from abroad and thus the appreciating U.S. dollar is a significant profit headwind (bottom panel, Chart 20). Second, a rising U.S. inflation backdrop along with the related looming selloff in the bond market should knock the wind out of the tech sector's sails. Third, leading indicators of emerging Asian demand are souring rapidly and were the trade war to re-escalate, EM economic data would retrench further. Lastly, neither our VI nor our TI send particularly compelling messages, as both are on the expensive side of neutral, despite the recent tech selloff. We sustain a barbell portfolio within the sector by recommending an overweight position in the late-cyclical and capex-driven technology hardware, storage & peripherals and software indexes while recommending an underweight position in the early-cyclical semi and semi equipment indexes. Chart 19S&P Technology (Neutral) Chart 20Tech Is King But Beware The U.S. Dollar S&P Materials (Neutral) Our materials CMI has recently plumbed new lows, a result of tightening monetary policy and the accompanying selloff in the bond market. As a reminder, the heavyweight chemicals component of the materials index typically sees earnings (and hence stock prices) underperform as real interest rates are moving higher. Despite this negative backdrop, chemicals fundamentals have remained surprisingly resilient. Pricing power has stayed in its multi-year uptrend (second panel, Chart 22) while productivity gains have accelerated, coinciding with an erosion of sell-side bearishness (third panel, Chart 22). Still, chemical production has clearly rolled over (bottom panel, Chart 22) which could lead to a quick reversal of the gains in our productivity proxy and a faltering in rebounding EPS estimates. Combined with BCA's view of rising real interest rates for the next year, this is enough to keep us on the fence. Our VI too shows a neutral reading, though our TI has declined steeply into an oversold position. Chart 21S&P Materials (Neutral) Chart 22Fundamentals In Chemicals Have Improved S&P Utilities (Underweight) Our utilities CMI is at a 25-year low, driven down by the ongoing backup in interest rates. Such a move is predictable, given that utilities stocks are the closest to perfect fixed income proxies in the equity space. The S&P utilities sector has been enjoying a relative resurgence recently, driven by spiking natural gas prices and a supportive electricity demand backdrop from a roaring economy (ISM survey shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 24) and, more than anything, a general market retreat into safe haven assets. We recently trimmed our exposure to the sector from neutral to underweight because the S&P utilities sector was yielding 3.5% and the competing risk free asset was near 3.2% and investors would prefer to shed, at the margin, riskier high-yielding equities and park the proceeds in U.S. Treasurys (top panel, Chart 24). Since the run up in S&P utilities without a corresponding decline in Treasury yields, that spread has narrowed. Neither our VI nor our TI send compelling messages as both are in neutral territory, though our bearish thesis on utilities has less to do with their valuation relative to themselves or other equities than to bonds. Chart 23S&P Utilities (Underweight) Chart 24Utilities Should Still Be Avoided S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Our real estate CMI has reversed a recent recovery to set a new decade low; the only time it has shown a lower reading was during the Great Financial Crisis. Excluding the inflating of the property bubble in advance of the GFC, REITs have had a very tight inverse correlation with UST yields; the resulting downward pressure on the S&P REITs index is thus very predictable (top panel, Chart 26). Much like the S&P utilities sector in the previous section, and in the context of BCA's higher interest rate view, we continue to avoid this sector. The rate-driven downward pressure could be overlooked if all was well on an operating basis but this is not the case. Non-residential construction continues to rise (albeit more slowly than last year) in the face of higher borrowing rates (second panel, Chart 26). Further, demand looks slack as occupancy rates clearly crested at the beginning of last year (bottom panel, Chart 26). As well, on the residential front, multi-family housing starts remain elevated which should prove deflationary to rents. Our VI suggests that REITs are fairly valued, which is somewhat surprising given the negative backdrop, while our TI echoes a neutral view. Chart 25S&P Real Estate (Underweight) Chart 26A Bearish Backdrop For REITs S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) While we remain constructive on financials that benefit from higher rates, we continue to recommend investors avoid the consumer discretionary sector - the other early cyclical - that suffers when interest rates rise. The second panel of Chart 28 depicts this inverse correlation consumer discretionary equities have with interest rates, especially the fed funds rate. Most discretionary equites are levered off of floating rates and thus any increase in the fed funds rates gets reflected immediately in banks' prime lending rate. Also, most consumer debt is floating rate debt and thus tighter monetary conditions, at the margin, dampen consumer debt uptake and as a knock off on effect, weigh on discretionary consumer outlays. Not only are higher interest rates anchoring consumer discretionary stocks but rising energy prices are also dealing a blow to this sector. We show our Consumer Drag Indicator (CDI, comprising mortgage rates and energy prices) in the bottom panel of Chart 28. Historically, our CDI has been an excellent leading indicator of relative share price momentum. Currently, the message is clear: the sinking CDI signals that a bear market in consumer discretionary stocks has likely commenced. All of this is captured by our CMI which has been sinking since the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, our VI has broken out to nearly its highest level ever which we believe is largely a function of the decreasing diversification of the S&P consumer discretionary index as AMZN now represents more than 30% of its market value following the redistribution of the media indexed to the new S&P communication services index. Our TI has been falling from overbought territory recently and now sends a neutral message. Chart 27S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Chart 28Higher Rates Spell Declines For Consumer Discretionary S&P Communication Services (Underweight) As the newly-minted communication services has little more than a month of existence, we do not have adequate history to create a cyclical macro indicator. However, we have created Chart 29 below with a number of valuation indicators, though we caution that they too are less reliable than the other indicators presented in the preceding pages, owing to a dearth of history. Rather, we refer readers to our still-fresh initiation of coverage on the sector and look forward to being able to deliver something more substantive in the future. Chart 29S&P Communication Services (Underweight) Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Our size CMI has been hovering near the boom/bust line, as it has for most of the last two years. Despite the neutral CMI reading, we downgraded small caps earlier this year , and moved to a large cap preference, based on the diverging (and unsustainable) debt levels of small caps vs. their large cap peers (top and second panels, Chart 31). We expect the divergence in leverage and stock price to be rationalized as it usually has: via a fall in the latter. Considering the dramatic valuation gap that has opened between large and small caps, particularly on a Shiller P/E (or cyclically adjusted P/E, CAPE) basis (bottom panel, Chart 31), no space remains for any small cap profit mishaps. Our VI is trending towards small caps being undervalued, though without conviction while our TI is hovering in the neutral zone. Chart 30Size Indicator (Favor Large Vs. Small Caps) Chart 31Too Much Debt And High Valuations Should Hurt Small Caps