Equities
Dear Client, In this report, we image a hypothetical timeline of key economic and financial events spanning the next five years. The events described in the report correspond with our view that the global economy will continue to expand into the second half of 2019, before succumbing to a recession and a decade of stagflation in the 2020s. This warrants an overweight position in risk assets for the next 6-to-12 months, but a much more cautious stance thereafter. Charts 1-4 provide a visual representation of how we see the main asset classes evolving over the coming years. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature I. The Blow-Off Phase December 4, 2017: U.S. stocks fall by 1.7% on reports that Mitch McConnell does not have enough votes to get the tax bill through the Senate. A sell-off in high-yield markets and a tightening of financial conditions in China aggravate the situation. December 13, 2017: The Fed hikes rates by 25 basis points, taking the Fed funds target range to 1.25%-to-1.5%. December 14, 2017: Global equities continue to weaken. The S&P 500 suffers its first 5% correction since June 2016. December 15, 2017: The correction ends on news that the Senate will consider a revised bill which trims the size of corporate tax cuts and uses the savings to finance a temporary reduction in payroll taxes. President Trump and House leaders promise to go along with the proposal. The PBoC also injects fresh liquidity into the Chinese financial system. December 29, 2017: Global equities rally into year-end. The S&P 500 hits 2571 on December 29, placing it just shy of its November high. The dollar also strengthens, with EUR/USD closing at 1.162. The 10-year Treasury yield finishes the year at 2.42%. January 10, 2018: The global cyclical bull market in stocks continues. European and Japanese indices power higher. Both the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 hit fresh record highs. EM stocks move up but lag their DM peers, weighed down by a stronger dollar. January 12, 2018: U.S. retail sales surprise on the upside. Department store stocks, having been written off for dead just a few months earlier, end up rising by an average of 40% between November 2017 and the end of January. February 14, 2018: The euro area economy continues to grow at an above-trend pace. Nevertheless, inflation stays muted due to high levels of spare capacity across most of the region and the lagged effects of a stronger euro. The 2-year OIS spread between the U.S. and the euro area widens to a multi-year high. February 26, 2018: China's construction sector cools a notch, but industrial activity remains robust, spurred on by a cheap currency, strong global growth, and rising producer prices. Chinese H-shares rise 13% year-to-date, beating out most other EM equity indices. March 14, 2018: The U.S., Canada, and Mexico reach a last-minute deal to preserve NAFTA. The Canadian dollar and Mexican peso breathe a sigh of relief. March 16, 2018: In a surprise decision, Donald Trump nominates Kevin Hassett as Fed vice-chair. Trump cites the "tremendous job" Hassett did in selling the GOP's tax cuts. A number of Fed appointments follow. Most of the picks turn out to be more hawkish than investors had expected. This gives the greenback further support. March 18, 2018: Pro-EU parties do better than anticipated in the Italian elections. Italian bond spreads compress versus the rest of Europe. March 21, 2018: The Fed raises rates again, bringing the fed funds target range up to 1.50%-to-1.75%. April 8, 2018: Bank of Japan governor Kuroda is granted another term in office. He pledges to remain single-mindedly focused on eradicating deflation. April 11, 2018: Chinese core CPI inflation reaches 2.9%. Producer price inflation stays elevated at 6%. A major market theme in 2018 turns out to be how China went from being a source of global deflationary pressures to a source of inflationary ones. April 30, 2018: U.S. core PCE inflation jumps 0.3% in March, reaching 1.7% on a year-over-year basis. Goods and service inflation both pick up, while the base effects from lower cell phone data charges in the prior year drop out of the calculations. May 17, 2018: Oil prices continue to rise on the back of ongoing discipline from OPEC and Russia, smaller-than-expected shale output growth, and production disruptions in Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela. June 13, 2018: Strong U.S. growth in the first half of the year, a larger-than-projected decline in the unemployment rate, and higher inflation keep the Fed in tightening mode. The FOMC hikes rates again. June 25, 2018: Global capital spending accelerates further. Global industrial stocks go on to have a banner year. June 27, 2018: Wage growth in the U.S. accelerates to a cycle high. Donald Trump takes credit, stating that "this wouldn't have happened" without him or his tax cuts. July 31, 2018: The Japanese labor market tightens further. The unemployment rate falls to 2.6%, 1.2 percentage points below 2007 levels, while the ratio of job vacancies-to-applicants moves further above its early-1990s bubble high. A number of high-profile companies announce plans to raise wages. August 2, 2018: A brief summer sell-off sees global equities dip temporarily, but strong global earnings growth keeps the cyclical bull market in stocks intact. August 28, 2018: The London housing market continues to weaken, with home prices falling by 9% from their peak. The rest of the U.K. economy remains fairly resilient, however. EUR/GBP closes at 0.87. August 31, 2018: The Greek bailout program ends and a new one begins. Greece's economy continues to recover, but Tsipras fails to obtain debt relief from creditors. September 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to a 49-year low of 3.7%, nearly a full percentage below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. September 26, 2018: The Fed raises rates again. By now, the market has gone from pricing in only two hikes for 2018 at the start of the year to pricing in almost four. September 27, 2018: Profit growth in the U.S. moderates somewhat as higher wage costs take a bite out of earnings. Nevertheless, stock market sentiment remains buoyant. Retail participation, which had been dormant for years, takes off. CNBC sees a surge in viewers. Micro cap stocks go wild. October 7, 2018: The outcome of Brazil's elections shows little appetite for major structural reforms. Economic populism lives on. October 31, 2018: Realized inflation and inflation expectations continue grinding higher in Japan, triggering market speculation that the BoJ will abandon its yield-curve targeting policy. The resulting rally in the yen is short-lived, however. At its monetary policy meeting, the Bank of Japan indicates that it has no near-term plans to modify its existing strategy. November 6, 2018: The Democrats narrowly regain control of the House but fail to recapture the Senate. Investors shrug off the results, figuring correctly that a Republican Senate will keep Trump's corporate tax cuts in place and that Democrats will agree to extend the expiring payroll tax cut and other tax measures that benefit the middle class. December 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to 3.5%. Donald Trump tweets "You're welcome, America". December 19, 2018: The Fed raises rates for the fourth time that year - one more hike than it had signaled in its December 2017 "dot plot" - taking the fed funds target range to 2.25%-2.5%. December 31, 2018: The MSCI All-Country Index finishes up 12% for the year (in local-currency terms), led by the euro area and Japan. U.S. stocks gain 8%. EM equities manage to rise 6%. Small caps edge out large caps, value stocks beat growth stocks, and cyclical stocks outperform defensives. December 31, 2018: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield finishes the year at 3.05%. German bund yields reach 0.82%, U.K. gilt yields rise to 1.7%, Canadian yields hit 2.3%, and Australian yields back up to 3%. Japanese 10-year yields remain broadly flat, but the 20-year yield moves up 40 basis points to nearly 1%. Credit spreads finish the year close to where they started, providing a modest carry pick-up over high-quality government bonds. December 31, 2018: The DXY index rises 4% to 98. EUR/USD closes at 1.11, USD/JPY at 123, GBP/USD at 1.31, and AUD/USD at 0.76. The Canadian dollar manages to edge up against the greenback on the year, with CAD/USD finishing at 0.81. The Chinese yuan also strengthens to 6.4 versus the dollar. December 31, 2018: Brent and WTI spot prices finish the year at $65 and $63, respectively. Copper and metal prices are broadly flat for the year, having faced the dueling forces of a stronger dollar (a negative) and above-trend global growth (a positive). Gold sinks to $1,226. II. The Clouds Darken February 22, 2019: The global economy starts to decelerate. The slowdown is led by China, where the government's crackdown on shadow banking activities begins to take a bigger toll on growth. Most measures of U.S. economic activity also soften somewhat in the first two months of the year. Investors take heart in the hope that the economy will achieve a soft landing, allowing the Fed to moderate the pace of rate hikes. February 27, 2019: In an otherwise mundane day, the S&P 500 edges up 0.3% to 2832. Little do investors know that this marks the cyclical peak in the U.S. stock market. March 13, 2019: Hopes that the Fed can take its foot off the brake are dashed when the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that inflation rose by more than expected in February. U.S. core CPI inflation increases to 2.9% while the core PCE deflator accelerates to 2.4%. Market chatter turns from whether the Fed can slow the pace of rate hikes to whether it needs to start hiking more rapidly than once-per-quarter. The S&P falls 2.1% on the day. March 20, 2019: The Fed lifts the funds rate target range to 2.5%-to-2.75% and signals a readiness to keep hiking rates. The 10-year Treasury yield rises to 3.3%. EUR/USD sinks to 1.08. The first quarter of 2019 marks a watershed of sorts. In 2018, the Fed raised rates because of stronger growth; in 2019, it kept raising them because of brewing inflation. As it turned out, risk assets were able to tolerate the former, but not the latter. March 29, 2019: The U.K. does not leave the EU two years after Britain invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU votes to prolong negotiations given growing political support within Britain for the country to remain part of the European bloc. April 5, 2019: The S&P 500 sinks further and is now 10% below its February high, returning close to where it was at the start of 2018. The increasingly sour mood on Wall Street does not appear to be hurting Main Street very much, however. The U.S. unemployment rate edges down further to 3.4%. Euro area growth remains resilient. May 31, 2019: The Brazilian government announces that the fiscal deficit will come in larger than originally expected. USD/BRL slips to 3.45. June 4, 2019: Jens Weidmann, who had gone out of his way to soften his hawkish rhetoric over the preceding months, is chosen to succeed Mario Draghi, whose term expires in October. Nevertheless, the euro still strengthens on the news. June 6, 2019: Markets temporarily regain their composure. The S&P 500 gets back to within 4% of its all-time high. The reprieve does not last long, however. June 12, 2019: The Fed hikes rates, taking the fed funds target range to 2.75%-to-3%. The FOMC cites inflation as its primary concern. July 8, 2019: Global risk assets weaken anew as a fiscal crisis grips Brazil. Turkey, South Africa, and a number of other emerging markets show increasing signs of fragility. August 20, 2019: Korean exports, a leading indicator of the global business cycle, decelerate once again. Global PMIs sag, as do most measures of business confidence. September 25, 2019: Despite a slowing U.S. economy, the Fed hikes rates again, bringing the fed funds target range to 3%-to-3.25%. The FOMC justifies the decision based on the fact that the unemployment rate is below NAIRU, core inflation is above the Fed's 2% target, and real rates are less than 1%. To assuage markets, Jay Powell suggests that the Fed could keep rates on hold in December. This turns out to be more prescient than he realizes. It will be another three years before the Fed raises rates again. By then, Powell is no longer the Fed chair. September 30, 2019: Commodity prices tumble, further adding to the pressure facing emerging markets. The U.S. yield curve inverts for the first time during this business cycle. The dollar, which previously strengthened due to a hawkish Fed, now starts strengthening on flight-to-safety flows back into the U.S. The yen appreciates even more than the greenback. October 15, 2019: The bottom falls out of the Canadian housing market. Home sales dry up and prices begin to sink. The Canadian dollar, which peaked back in February at 83 cents, falls to 74 cents against the U.S. dollar. October 19, 2019: A failed North Korean launch lands a missile 80 kilometres from Japanese shores. Prime Minister Abe pledges swift retaliation. October 21, 2019: The negative feedback loop between a rising dollar, falling commodity prices, and EM stress intensifies. Sentiment towards emerging markets deteriorates dramatically. Rumours begin to swirl that Brazil will miss a debt payment. October 23, 2019: Trump tweets "Dopey Rocketman thinks he is so smart, but we know where all his hideouts are. Sweet dreams!" October 24, 2019: News reports are abuzz about a massive buildup of troops on the North Korean side of the border. Panic grips Seoul. Asian bourses sell-off, taking global stock markets down with them. III. The Reckoning October 25, 2019: All hell breaks loose. North Korea's state broadcaster announces that Kim Jong-un has been "incapacitated". It later turns out that the tubby tyrant was killed by a group of military officers. Having not slept for days, Kim had become increasingly erratic and paranoid. Convinced that he was surrounded by spies and that Trump had deployed a secret weapon to read his mind, he ordered the execution of many people in his inner circle. Fearing for their lives, his henchmen decided to strike first. October 31, 2019: North Korea's new military rulers signal a desire for closer relations with China and a less belligerent posture towards the South. Over the coming decades, historians will debate whether Trump's tactics were a reckless gambit that luckily paid off, or the work of a master strategist playing 3D chess while everyone else was playing backgammon. Trump himself wastes no time in taking credit for ousting the Kim dynasty. November 4, 2019: The relief investors feel from the ebbing of tensions in the Korean Peninsula does not last long. The turmoil in emerging markets intensifies. A series of high-profile defaults rock the Chinese corporate debt market. Copper and iron ore prices nosedive. Brent swoons to $39/bbl. November 5, 2019: The head of Brazil's central bank resigns after the government pressures it to increase its holdings of government bonds in an effort to ward off an imminent default. The Brazilian real falls to nearly 6 against the dollar. Other EM currencies plunge. The Turkish lira is particularly badly hurt. December 6, 2019: The pain on Wall Street finally spreads to Main Street. U.S. payrolls rise by only 19,000 in November. Subsequent revisions ultimately show a drop of 45,000 for that month. The NBER will eventually go on to declare November as the start of the recession. December 11, 2019: Having raised rates just three months earlier, the FOMC cuts rates by 25 basis points and signals that it is willing to keep easing if economic conditions deteriorate further. December 16, 2019: Markets initially cheer the prospect of lower rates, but the euphoria is quickly forgotten. Credit spreads soar as investors price in an increasingly bleak economic outlook. Commercial real estate prices fall. Banks further tighten lending standards. IV. A Global Recession December 19, 2019: The recession spreads around the world. The ECB ditches plans to raise rates. The U.K., Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all cut rates. In the emerging world, Korea, Taiwan, and Poland reduce interest rates, but a number of other countries - most notably, Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia raise rates in a desperate bid to prop up their currencies so as to keep the local-currency value of their foreign-currency obligations from spiraling out of control. December 31, 2019: The S&P 500 closes at 2194, down 21% for the year. Most other bourses fare even worse. The U.S. dollar, which peaked against the euro at $1.02 just six weeks earlier, finishes at $1.07. The 10-year Treasury yield closes at 2.37%, down 68 basis points on the year. The 10-year German bund yield falls back to 0.5%. January 11, 2020: In a surprise twist, WikiLeaks reveals that the CIA has found no credible evidence that Russia had any material influence over the 2016 elections, but that Putin has been trying to cultivate the impression that it did. The document disparagingly notes that "Putin has relished the U.S. media's characterization of him as a master political manipulator with global reach, when in fact he is just the ruler of an impoverished, demographically depleted, militarily overextended country." The Mueller probe fizzles out. January 27, 2020: Voting in the Democratic primaries begins. Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown lead a crowded field of hopefuls. Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden choose not to run. Brown enjoys the biggest lead against Trump in head-to-head polls, but his support among primary voters is weighed down by his status as a cisgendered white male. January 28, 2020: On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.K. holds another referendum - this one to ratify the separation agreement reached with the EU. The terms of the agreement are widely regarded as being highly unfavorable to the U.K. Prime Minister Corbyn, having formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP following elections in late 2018, makes it clear that a rejection of the deal is tantamount to a vote to stay in the EU. With the British economy in the doldrums, 53% of voters reject the deal. The U.K. remains in the EU. EUR/GBP falls to 0.84. January 29, 2020: The Fed cuts rates by another 25 basis points. Hiking rates once per quarter was good enough when unemployment was falling. However, now that the economy is on the rocks, the Fed reverts to a more aggressive loosening cycle, cutting rates once per meeting. Even so, a growing chorus of voices both inside and outside the Fed argue that it is not doing enough. February 17, 2020: Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren pull out ahead in the Democratic primaries. Similar to the Clinton/Sanders duel in 2016, Warren polls best among younger, whiter voters, while Harris leads among minorities and establishment Democrats. March 10, 2020: Donald Trump, seeing his poll numbers tank after the post-Korea bump, unilaterally raises trade barriers across a wide variety of industries. Foreign producers retaliate, leading to a contraction in global trade. April 26, 2020: Warren's relentless characterization of Harris as a shill for moneyed interests pays off. The Massachusetts senator secures the Democratic nomination. Hollywood celebrities line up to support Warren. Taylor Swift's silence on the matter is deafening, leading to a further increase in her album sales. June 5, 2020: The U.S. unemployment rate surges to 5.1%. Corporate America sees a wave of business closings, with the retail sector being particularly badly hit. July 21, 2020: The bellwether German IFO index falls to a multi-year low. Germany's manufacturing sector feels the pinch from the collapse in demand for capital equipment, especially from emerging markets. Merkel's popularity plummets after it is revealed that she tried to suppress data that more than half of asylum seekers classified as children were actually adults. Support for the Alternative for Deutschland Party, which by this time has greatly moderated its anti-EU rhetoric, rises sharply. August 17, 2020: The trade-weighted yen continues to strengthen, pushing Japan deeper into recession. In response, the Japanese government announces a major new stimulus package. In the clearest attempt yet to link fiscal with monetary policy, the authorities pledge to start issuing consumption vouchers to households, the value of which will be incrementally increased until long-term inflation expectations rise to the Bank of Japan's 2% target. The policy proves to be a smashing success. September 9, 2020: The U.S. presidential campaign ends up being even more divisive than the one in 2016. Unlike four years earlier, equities rally at any glimmer of hope that Trump will win. However, with unemployment rising, such moments prove few and far between. September 22, 2020: Senator Warren states on the campaign trail that she will not renominate Jay Powell in 2022 for a second term as Fed chair if she is elected president. Lael Brainard's name is floated as a likely replacement. V. The Return Of Stagflation October 13, 2020: Green shoots appear in the U.S. economy, marking the end of the recession. The unemployment rate rises for another two months, peaking at 6.8% in December. Other economies also begin to turn the corner. November 3, 2020: The tentative improvement in U.S. economic data happens too late to bail out Trump. Elizabeth Warren wins the presidential election. Warren loses Ohio but picks up Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. An influx of Democratic voters from Puerto Rico puts her over the top in Florida. The Democrats take back control of the Senate. November 4, 2020: The S&P 500 barely moves the day after the election, having already priced in the outcome months earlier. Still, at 2085, the index is 26% below its February 2019 peak. December 2, 2020: President-elect Warren pledges to introduce a major spending package after she is inaugurated. She brushes off concerns from some economists that fiscal stimulus is coming too late, noting that the unemployment rate is more than three points higher than it was one year earlier. Stocks rally on the news. January 27, 2021: The FOMC votes to keep rates on hold at 1%. Lael Brainard dissents, arguing that further monetary stimulus is necessary. March 19, 2021: The Chinese government shifts more bad loans from commercial banks into specially-designed state-owned asset management companies. The banks generally receive well above-market prices for their loans. Chinese bank shares move higher. April 2, 2021: Congress proposes to significantly raise taxes on higher-income earners and corporations with more than 500 employees and use the proceeds to fund an expansion of the Affordable Care Act. It also promises to introduces a "Tobin tax" on financial transactions. The post-election stock market rally fades. June 8, 2021: In a seminal speech, Lael Brainard argues that current inflation measures fail to adequately correct for technological improvements and other methodological issues. She suggests that this leads to an overstatement of the true level of inflation. The implication, she concludes, is that an inflation target of 2.5%-to-3% would be consistent with the Fed's existing mandate. September 24, 2021: Many Trump-era deregulation measures are rolled back. Anti-trust efforts are also ramped up. Despite an improving economy, the S&P 500 sinks to 2031, marking a five-year low. November 17, 2021: A wave of panic selling grips Wall Street. The S&P 500 crashes to 1969, down 31% from its February 2019 peak. As is often the case, this marks the bottom of the equity bear market. The subsequent recovery, however, proves to be tepid and prone to numerous setbacks. January 31, 2022: Thanks to ample fiscal stimulus, inflation in Japan rebounds from its recession lows. Aggregate income growth slows as more Japanese workers exit the labor force, but spending holds up as health care expenditures continue to climb. Japan's current account moves into a structural deficit position. February 16, 2022: Lael Brainard succeeds Jay Powell as Fed chair. The decision by Republicans in 2013 to reduce the number of senators necessary to approve appointments to the Fed board from 60 to 51 ensures smooth sailing for Brainard during congressional hearings and the confirmation of a slew of highly dovish candidates over the subsequent two years. April 6, 2022: China belatedly introduces modest financial incentives to encourage couples to have more children. The public jokingly dubs this as the new "at least one child policy". It ends up having little effect. Future Chinese scholars will end up describing China's failure to arrest the decline in its population as its greatest geopolitical blunder. July 20, 2022: The U.S. becomes the latest country to introduce strict restrictions on the use of bitcoin. Although the U.S. government never says so, fears that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will eat into the $75 billion in seigniorage revenue that the Treasury earns every year underpins the decision. The price of bitcoin falls to $550, down 95% from its all-time high. September 29, 2022: Japan officially abandons its yield-curve targeting regime. The 30-year yield rises to 2.5%. Faced with onerous long-term debt-servicing costs and stagnant tax revenues, the government starts refinancing much more of its debt through short-term borrowings. The Bank of Japan obliges, keeping short-term rates near zero. The combination of negative short-term real rates and higher inflation allows Japan to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This proves to be the modus operandi for Japan and many other fiscally-challenged governments over the coming decades. October 18, 2022: Productivity growth in most developed economies continues to disappoint. For the first time in modern history, the flow of new workers entering the labor force are no better skilled or educated than the ones leaving. With potential GDP growing at a lackluster pace, output gaps disappear, setting in motion the acceleration in inflation over the remainder of the decade. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield rises to 4%. It will be over 6% by the middle of the decade. November 22, 2022: The price of gold surpasses its previous high of $1895/oz. The 2020s turn out to be an excellent decade for bullion. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Market Outlook: Equities Chart 2Market Outlook: Bonds Chart 3Market Outlook: Currencies Chart 4Market Outlook: Commodities Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through EM and commodities in 2018. Granted the ongoing policy tightening in China will likely dampen money growth further, the only way mainland nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. Assigning equal probabilities to various scenarios of velocity of money, the outcome is as follows: one-third probability of robust nominal growth (continuation of the rally in China-related plays) and two-third odds of a non-trivial slowdown in nominal growth with negative ramifications for China-related plays. Hence, we reiterate our negative stance on EM risk assets Feature The key question for emerging markets (EM) in 2018 is whether a slowdown in Chinese money growth will translate into a meaningful growth deceleration in this economy, and in turn produce a reversal in EM risk assets. This week we address the above question in detail elaborating on what could make China's business cycle defy the slowdown in its monetary aggregates and how investors should approach such uncertainty. Before this, we review the status of financial markets going into 2018. Priced To Perfection Or A New Paradigm? Several financial markets are at extremes. Our chart on the history of financial market manias reveals that some parts of technology/new concept stocks may be entering uncharted territory (Chart I-1). Tencent's share price, for instance, has surged 11-fold since January 2010. Chart I-1History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade This is roughly on par with the prior manias' average 10-year gains. As this chart indicates, the manias of previous decades run wild until the turn of the decade. It is impossible to know whether technology/new concept stocks will peak in 2018 or run for another two years. Regardless whether or not the mania in tech/new concept stocks endures up until 2020, some sort of mean reversion in their share prices is likely next year. This has relevance to EM because the magnitude of the EM equity rally in 2017 has been enormously boosted by four large tech/concept stocks in Asia. Our measure of the cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for the U.S. market suggests that equity valuations are reaching their 2000 overvaluation levels (Chart I-2, top panel). The difference between our measure and Shiller's measure of CAPE is that Shiller's CAPE is derived by dividing share prices by the 10-year moving average of EPS in real terms (deflated by consumer price inflation). Our measure is calculated by dividing equity prices by the time trend in real EPS (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Our CAPE measure assumes that in the long run, U.S. EPS in real terms will revert to its time trend. Meanwhile, the Shiller CAPE is based on the assumption that real EPS will revert to its 10-year mean. Hence, the assumptions behind our CAPE model are quite reasonable if not preferable to those of Shiller's P/E. Remarkably, the U.S. (Wilshire 5000) market cap-to-GDP ratio is close to its 2000 peak (Chart I-3). With respect to EM equity valuations, the non-financial P/E ratio is at its highest level in the past 15 years (Chart I-4). EM banks have low multiples and seem "cheap" because many of them have not provisioned for NPLs. Hence, their profits and book values are artificially inflated. In short, excluding financials, EM stocks are not cheap at all, neither in absolute terms nor relative to DM bourses. Chart I-2A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation Chart I-3The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP ##br##Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak Chart I-4EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap Such elevated DM & EM stock market valuations might be justified by currently low global long-term bond yields. Yet, if and when long-term bond yields rise, multiples will likely shrink. The latter will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices, as multiples are disproportionately and negatively linked to interest rates - especially when interest rates are low - but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 As a result, a small rise in long-term bond yields will lead to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Despite very high equity valuations, U.S. advisors and traders are extremely bullish on American stocks. Their sentiment measures are at all time and 11-year highs, respectively. So are copper traders on red metal prices (Chart I-5). The mirror image of the strong and steady rally in global stocks is record-low implied volatility. The aggregate financial markets' implied volatility index is at a multi-year low (Chart I-6). Finally, yields on junk (high-yield) EM corporate and sovereign bonds are at all-time lows (Chart I-7). They are priced for perfection. Chart I-5Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Chart I-6Aggregate Global Financial Markets ##br##Implied VOL Is At Record Low Chart I-7EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low Are we in a new paradigm, or are we witnessing financial market extremes that are unsustainable? In regard to the timing, can these dynamics last throughout 2018 or at least the first half of next year, or will they reverse in the coming months? We have less conviction on the durability of the U.S. equity rally, but our bet is that EM risk assets will roll over in absolute terms and begin underperforming their DM peers very soon. What could cause such a reversal in EM risk assets? China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through emerging markets and commodities. China: "Financial Stability" Priority Entails Tighter Policy The Chinese authorities are facing unprecedented challenges: The outstanding value of broad money in China (measured in U.S. dollars) is now larger than the combined U.S. and euro area broad money supply (Chart I-8, top panel). Chart I-8Beware Of Money Excesses In China As a share of its own GDP, broad money in China is much higher compared to any other nation in history (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In brief, there is too much money in China and most of it - $21 trillion out of $29 trillion - has been created by the banking system since early 2009. We maintain that the enormous overhang of money and credit in China represents major excess/imbalances and has nothing to do with the nation's high savings rate.2 Rather, it is an outcome of animal spirits running wild among bankers and borrowers over the past nine years. Easy money often flows into real estate and China has not been an exception. Needless to say, property prices are hyped and expensive relative to household income. Policy tightening amid lingering excesses and imbalances makes us negative on China's growth outlook. In a nutshell, we place more weight on tightening when there are excesses in the system, and downplay the importance of tightening in a healthy system without excesses. Importantly, excessive money creation seems to finally be pushing inflation higher. Consumer price services and core consumer price inflation rates are on a rising trajectory (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). As a result, banks' deposit rates in real terms (deflated by core CPI) have plunged into negative territory for the first time in the past 12 years (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Remarkably, the People's Bank of China's existing $3 trillion of international reserves is sufficient to "back up" only 13% and 11% of official M2 and our measure of M3, respectively (Chart I-10). If Chinese households and companies decide to convert 10-15% of their deposits into foreign currency and the PBoC takes the other side of the trade, its reserves will be exhausted. Chart I-9China: Inflation Is Rising And ##br##Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Chart I-10China: Low Coverage Of ##br##Money Supply By FX Reserves Therefore, reining money and credit expansion is of paramount importance to China's long-term financial and economic stability. "Financial stability" has become the key policy priority. "Financial stability" is policymakers' code word for containing and curbing financial imbalances and bubbles. Having experienced the equity bubble bust in 2015, policymakers are determined to preclude another bubble formation and its subsequent bust. Consequently, the ongoing tightening campaign will not be reversed in the near term unless damage to the economy becomes substantial and visible. By the time the authorities and investors are able to identify such damage in the real economy, China-related plays in financial markets will be down substantially. Chart I-11China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve Faced with significant excesses in money, leverage and property markets, the Chinese authorities have been tightening - and have reinforced their policy stance following the Party's Congress in October. There is triple tightening currently ongoing in China: 1. Liquidity tightening: Money market rates have climbed, and onshore corporate bond yields are rising (Chart I-11, top panel). Remarkably, the yield curve is flat, pointing to weaker growth ahead (Chart I-11, bottom panel). 2. Regulatory tightening: The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, and is reining banks' involvement in shadow banking activities. In addition, financial regulators are trying to remove the government's implicit "put" from the financial system, and thereby curb speculative and irresponsible investment behavior. Finally, many local governments are tightening investors' participation in the real estate market. 3. Anti-corruption campaign is embracing the financial institutions: The powerful anti-corruption commission is planning to dispatch groups of inspectors to examine financial institutions' activities. This could dampen animal spirits among bankers and shadow banking organizations. The Outlook: The "Knowns"... In China, broad money growth has already slumped to an all-time low (Chart I-12). The money as well as the credit plus fiscal spending impulses both point to a considerable slowdown in the mainland's industrial cycle and overall economic activity (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Broad Money ##br##Growth Is At All-Time Low Chart I-13China: Money And Credit & ##br##Fiscal Impulses Are Negative The slowdown is not limited to money growth; there are a few real business cycle indicators that are already weakening. For example, the growth rate of property floor space sold and started has slumped to zero (Chart I-14). Electricity output and aggregate freight volume growth have both decisively rolled over (Chart I-15). Chart I-14China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again Chart I-15China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown That said, based on the past correlation between money and credit impulses on the one hand and the business cycle on the other, China's economy should have slowed much more, and its negative impact on the rest of the world should have already been felt (Chart I-13, on page 9). This has been the key pillar of our view on EM, but it has not yet transpired. Is it possible that the relationship between money/credit impulses and the business cycle has broken down? If so, why? And how should investors handle such uncertainty? Bottom Line: China's ongoing policy tightening will ensure that money and credit impulses remain negative for some time. Can the country's industrial sectors de-couple from its past tight correlation with money and credit? ...And The "Unknowns" By definition, the only way to sustain nominal economic growth in the face of a decelerating money supply is if the velocity of money increases. This is true for any economy. Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money Provided China's policy tightening will likely further dampen money growth, the only way nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. This is the main risk to our view and strategy. Chart I-16 portrays all three variables. Chart I-16China: Money, Nominal GDP ##br##And Velocity Of Money Even though the velocity of money has fallen structurally over the past nine years (Chart I-16, bottom panel), it has risen marginally in 2017, allowing the mainland's nominal economic growth to hold up despite a considerable relapse in money supply growth. Notably, this has been the reason why our view has not worked this year. What is the velocity of money, and how can we forecast its fluctuations and, importantly, the magnitude of its variations? The velocity of money is one of the least understood concepts in economic theory. The velocity of money is anything but stable. In our opinion, the velocity of money reflects animal spirits of households and businesses as well as government spending decisions. Forecasting animal spirits and the magnitude of their variations is not very a reliable exercise. In a nutshell, the banking system (commercial banks and the central bank) creates money via expanding its balance sheet - making loans to or acquiring assets from non-banks. However, commercial banks have little direct influence on the velocity of money. The latter is shaped by non-banks' decisions to spend or not (i.e., save). Significantly, non-banks' spending and saving decisions do not alter the amount of money in the system. Yet they directly impact the velocity of money. The banking system creates money, and non-banks churn money (make it circulate). At any level of money supply, a rising number of transactions will boost nominal output, and vice versa. Further, there is a great deal of complexity in the interaction between money supply and its velocity. Both are sometimes independent, i.e. they do not influence one another, but in some other cases one affects the other. For example, with the ongoing triple tightening in China and less money being originated by the banking system, will households and businesses increase or decrease their spending? Our bias is that they will not increase spending. This is especially true for the corporate sector, which has record-high leverage and where access to funding has been tightening. It is also possible that rising velocity will lead to more money creation as more spending leads to higher loan demand and banks accommodate it - i.e., originating more loans/money. These examples corroborate that money supply and the velocity of money are not always independent of each other. On the whole, it is almost impossible to reliably forecast the magnitude of changes in velocity of money. In the same vein, it is difficult to forecast animal spirit dynamics in any economy. Chart I-17U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money ##br##Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money One recent example where nominal GDP has decoupled from broad money growth is the U.S. Chart I-17 demonstrates that in the past 12 months, U.S. nominal GDP growth has firmed up even though broad money (M2) growth has slumped. This decoupling can only be explained by a spike in the velocity of M2. In other words, soaring confidence and animal spirits among U.S. households and businesses have boosted their willingness to spend, even as the banking system has created less money and credit growth has slowed considerably over the past 12 months. Going back to China, how should investors consider such uncertainty in changes in the velocity of money? Investing is about the future, which is inherently uncertain. Hence, an investment process is about assigning probabilities to various scenarios. Provided the velocity of money is impossible to forecast, we assign equal probabilities to each of the following scenarios for China in 2018 (Figure I-1): One-third odds that the velocity of money rises more than the decline in broad money growth, producing robust nominal GDP growth; One-third probability that the velocity of money stays broadly flat - the outcome being meaningful deceleration in nominal GDP growth; A one-third chance that the velocity of money declines - the result being a severe growth slump. Figure I-1How Investors Can Consider Uncertainty Related To Velocity Of Money In short, a positive outcome on China-related plays has a one-third probability of playing out, while a negative outcome carries a two-thirds chance. This is why we continue to maintain our negative view on EM and commodities. Commodities Our view on commodities and commodity plays is by and large shaped by our view on China's capital spending. Given the credit plus fiscal spending impulse is already very weak, the path of least resistance for capital expenditures is down. Besides, the government is clamping down on local governments' off-balance-sheet borrowing and spending (via Local Government Financing Vehicles). A deceleration in capital expenditures in general and construction (both infrastructure and property development) in particular is bearish for industrial metals (Chart I-18). Money and credit impulses herald a major downturn in Chinese imports values and volumes (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Industrial Metals / Copper Are At Risk Chart I-19China Will Be A Drag On Its Suppliers As to China's commodities output reductions, last week we published a Special Report3 on China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal. The report concludes the following: The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. Importantly, the mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. The capacity swap policy introduced by the authorities has been allowing steel and coal producers to add new capacity in order to replace almost entirely obsolete capacity. The combination of demand slowdown and modest production recovery will weigh on non-oil raw materials. As for oil, the picture is much more complicated. Oil prices have been climbing in reaction to declining OECD inventories as well as on expectations of an extension to oil output cuts into 2018. One essential piece of missing information in the bullish oil narrative is China's oil inventories. In recent years, China has been importing more crude oil than its consumption trend justifies. Specifically, the sum of its net imports and domestic output of crude oil has exceeded the amount of refined processed oil. This difference between the sum of net imports and production of crude oil and processed crude oil constitutes our proxy for the net change of crude oil inventories. Chart I-20 shows that our proxy for mainland crude oil inventories has risen sharply in recent years. This includes both the nation's strategic oil reserves as well as commercial inventories. There is no reliable data on the former. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the country's commercial crude oil inventories. Chart I-20China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories Nevertheless, whether crude oil inventories have risen due to a build-up of strategic petroleum reserves or commercial reserves, the fact remains that crude oil inventories in China have surged and appear to be reaching the size of OECD total crude and liquid inventories (Chart I-20). In short, China has been a stabilizing force for the oil market over the past three years by buying more than it consumes. Without such excess purchases from China, oil prices would likely have been much weaker. Going forward, the pace of Chinese purchases of crude oil will likely slow due to several factors: (a) China prefers buying commodities on dips, especially when it is for strategic inventory building. With crude oil prices having rallied to around $60, the authorities might reduce their purchases temporarily, creating an air pocket for prices, and then accelerate their purchases at lower prices; (b) Commercial purchases of oil will likely decelerate due to tighter money/credit, possibly high inventories and a general slowdown in industrial demand for fuel. Bottom Line: Raw materials and oil prices4 are at risk from China and overly bullish investor sentiment. Beyond Commodities The slowdown in China will impact not only commodities but also non-commodity shipments to the mainland (Chart I-21). In fact, 47% of the nation's imports are commodities and raw materials and 45% are industrial/capital goods - i.e., China's imports are heavily exposed to investment expenditures, not consumer spending. This is why money/credit impulses correlate so well with this country's imports. Consistently, China's broad money (M3) impulse leads EM corporate profit growth by 12 months - and currently heralds a major EPS downtrend (Chart I-22). In addition, aggregate EM narrow money (M1) growth also points to a material slump in EM EPS (Chart I-23). Chart I-21China Is A Risk To ##br##Non-Commodity Economies Too Chart I-22Downside Risk To EM EPS The only EM countries that are not materially exposed to China and commodities are Turkey and India. The former is a basket case on its own. Indian stocks are expensive and will have a difficult time rallying in absolute terms when the EM equity benchmark relapses. As for Korea and Taiwan, their largest export destination is not advanced economies but China. China accounts for 25% of Korea's exports and 28% of Taiwan's. This compares to a combined 22% of total Korean exports and 20% of total Taiwanese exports going to the U.S. and EU combined Can robust growth in the U.S. and EU derail the growth slowdown in China when capital spending slows? This is very unlikely, in our view. Chart I-24 portends that China's shipments to the U.S. and EU account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP, while capital spending and credit origination constitute 45% and 25% of GDP, respectively. Chart I-23EM M1 And EM EPS Chart I-24What Drives Chinese Growth? A final word on tech stocks. EM's four large-cap tech stocks (Tencent, Ali-Baba, Samsung and TSMC) have gone exponential and are extremely overbought. At this juncture, any strong opinion on tech stocks is not warranted because they can sell off or continue advancing for no fundamental reason. We have been recommending an overweight position in tech stocks, and continue recommending overweighting them, especially Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor companies. As for Tencent and Alibaba, these are concept stocks, and as a top-down house we have little expertise to judge whether or not they are expensive. These are bottom-up calls. Investment Strategy EM Stocks: Asset allocators should continue to underweight EM versus DM, and absolute-return investors should stay put. Our overweights are Taiwan, China, Korean tech stocks, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Chart I-25EM Currencies: A Canary In ##br##Coal Mine For EM Credit? Stay short a basket of the following EM currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs (or our currency overweights) are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Continue underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. The mix of weaker EM/China growth, lower commodities prices and EM currency depreciation bode ill for already very tight EM credit spreads (Chart I-25). Within the sovereign credit space, our underweights are Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa and Malaysia and our overweights are Russia, Argentina and low beta defensive credits. The main risk to EM local currency bonds is EM currency depreciation. With foreign ownership of EM domestic bonds at all-time highs, exchange rate depreciation could trigger non-trivial selling pressure. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, China, India, Argentina and Central Europe. Other high-conviction market-neutral recommendations: Long U.S. banks / short EM banks. Long U.S. homebuilders / short Chinese property developers. Long the Russian ruble / short oil. Long the Chilean peso / short copper. Long Big Five state-owned Chinese banks / short small- and medium-sized banks. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, given that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model, a one percentage point change in interest rates from a low level can have a significant impact on the fair value P/E ratio. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, link available on page 22. 4 This is the Emerging Markets Strategy team's view and is different from BCA's house view on commodities. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Risk assets continue to rise despite a flattening yield curve. Individual investors are more sanguine than institutional investors as stocks make new highs. The S&P 500 is testing the top of a key channel. Will it break out or break down? Bond market sentiment, positioning and technicals today vs. 1994. Feature Risk-on returned to financial markets last week as the S&P 500 hit a new all-time high and oil prices reached a 2-year high. Credit spreads narrowed as well. This occurred despite growing investor angst regarding the flattening yield curve. At 58 basis points, the 2/10 yield curve is still in positive territory, but the recent flattening could be interpreted as heralding a Fed policy mistake. We, too, are concerned. The flattening curve is being driven by the Fed's determination to continue lifting short-term rates even in the face of subdued inflation readings. Our base case outlook sees inflation grinding higher in the coming months, leading to a temporarily steeper curve. Nonetheless, we will re-evaluate our asset allocation if the curve continues to flatten and core inflation remains stuck in a range. BCA expects U.S. stocks to outperform Treasuries in 2018. S&P 500 EPS growth and margins will hold up through mid-year, supported by an above-trend domestic economic expansion in 1H 2018, a dose of fiscal stimulus and accelerating economic activity outside the U.S. Still, many investors are concerned that sentiment and valuations are signaling that a pullback is nigh. Sanguine Sentiment Our technical and sentiment indicators are not flashing red as in previous bear markets, but neither are they giving an all-clear for U.S. equity investors. Sentiment levels are a bigger concern than technical indicators and investors should monitor both for signs of an equity sell-off. BCA's U.S. equity sentiment indicator is elevated, although not at an extreme (Chart 1). Remarkably, in contrast to previous market troughs, individual Investors (panel 2) are more sanguine than either financial advisors (panel 3) or traders (panel 4). Bullishness among traders is at a 10-year high. Typically, after a long bull run, institutions are more cautious about equities than the oft-maligned individual investor. Several other sentiment surveys illustrate the divergence in sentiment between institutions and individuals. As per the American Institute of Individual Investors, the percentage of small investors who are bearish (Chart 2, 35%, panel 2) is in the middle of a 30-year range while the percentage of bulls (29%, panel 3) is at the low end. Moreover, Chart 3 shows the gap in the expectation between households and professionals on future stock market returns (as tallied by the Yale School of Management's International Center for Finance) and on buying the dips (panel 4). That said, individuals and institutions are more aligned on the likelihood of a stock market crash in the next six months. None of the three sentiment indicators from the Yale survey are at an extreme. Chart 1Overall Sentiment Levels Elevated##BR##But Not At Extremes Chart 2Individuals Are Not##BR##Overly Bullish Active managers have reduced equity risk since the beginning of Q4 (Chart 4). At 61%, the average equity exposure of institutional investors surveyed by the NAAIM1 is at the lowest level since May 2016 and is nearly half the 102% exposure at the start of 2017. The March 2017 reading was the highest since 2007, just before the S&P 500 peak in October 2007. Chart 3Gap Between Individual##BR##And Institutional Investors Chart 4Active Managers Still##BR##Overweight Equities... Similarly to previous bear markets, BCA's equity speculation index moved into "high speculation" territory in early 2017 and remains so as the year ends and range bound on average at somewhat lower levels. Net speculative positions of S&P 500 stocks are in balance, however, and do not signal that market risk-taking is rampant (Chart 5). Moreover, the dispersion of equity volatility of new high and lows of the S&P500 is quite wide, ranging from over 20% to below 5%, over previous historical periods since 1994. Although volatility is not a leading indicator of future equity market returns, good or bad, the current low level of volatility, especially over the short-term, 6 months to 1-year, may be longer-lasting, having peaked from over 15% only since early 2016 and now closer to 5%. Longer-term volatility, for example, based on 2-, 3- and 4-years, still remains above 10%. It is not unusual for both short-term and long-term volatility to eventually converge, as seen in post-bear market phases, especially in the mid-2000s (Chart 6). Chart 5Speculation High, But Not At Extremes Chart 6Equity Vol Remains Low Warning Signs From Technicals? On balance, the technical indicators we monitor do not suggest that the market is stretched. Chart 7 shows that the S&P 500 is testing the top end of the 2009-2017 recovery trend channel. A failure to break out of the channel may result in some near-term consolidation for U.S. equities. However, a definitive break above 2616 would imply another upleg for stocks. The escalating advance/decline line is also in a bullish trend (Chart 7). The other technical indicators we monitor fall into two categories. Some are elevated, but not at extremes. Others are still in the middle of the range and are not a concern. The S&P 500 is 6% above its 200-day moving average, in the upper end of its post-2000 range, which is well below the recent highs set in 2009, 2011 and 2013. The S&P's distance from its 50-day MA is in a similar position (Chart 8, panels 1 and 2). BCA's composite technical measure is in the middle of the 2007-2017 range, and is not a concern (Chart 9, panel 5). Moreover, the percent of NYSE stocks above their 10- and 30-week highs are midway in their recent range. Furthermore, new highs minus new lows is at neutral lows (Chart 6, panel 2). Chart 7Breakout...Or Breakdown##BR##At Top Of Channel? Chart 8S&P Not Elevated Vs.##BR##Moving Averages Chart 9U.S. Stocks Not##BR##Overextended Bottom Line: Neither sentiment nor technical indicators are flashing red, although the fact that institutional managers are heavily overweight stocks is worrying. We continue to recommend stocks over bonds in the next 12 months, but acknowledge that risks to BCA's stance are climbing. Investors should be prudent with risk assets, paring back any maximum overweight positions and holding some safe-haven assets within diversified portfolios. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service maintains a positive technical stance on the energy sector2 and notes that technicals in the consumer discretionary sector look washed out.3 BCA downgraded consumer discretionary from overweight to neutral on September 25, 2017 despite the attractive technical backdrop of the sector. Is It 1994 - Again? BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service puts fair value on the U.S. 10-year Treasury at 2.69%,4 and rates may climb as high as 3.0% in 2018 if inflation returns to the Fed's 2.0% target. Fundamentals (elevated inflation, above-trend U.S. growth, a more aggressive Fed) support our bond view. However, what does the technical picture in the bond market tell investors? Charts 10 and 11 show the sentiment and technical indicators for the bond market in 2017 and 1994. The duration positioning of portfolio managers in late 2017 matches the situation in 1994. At 100%, portfolio duration is the highest since March 21, 2017. This positioning implies that the market is vulnerable to a spike in rates, as it was in 1994 when the Fed's 75-basis point rate hike in February caught the market off guard. In October 1994, portfolio duration was 103%. While BCA views a Fed policy mistake as a risk to our bullish equity call in 2018, a 1994-style surprise from the Fed is unlikely. In 1994, the Fed's policy intentions were opaque, at best. Since then, the Fed has become increasingly transparent and frequently seeks a "buy-in" from the market before boosting rates. Chart 10Bond Market Positioning,##BR##Sentiment And Technicals In 1994.... Chart 11...And In##BR##2017 The 10-year Treasury yield is currently in an uptrend as it was in early 1994. Today, yields have climbed 80 bps off their post-Brexit lows in mid-2016. The 10-year yield troughed in October 1993 at 5.19%, and rose 60 bps before the Fed's shock rate hike in early 1994. However, in 1994 yields were only beginning to enter the second decade of what would become a 35-year fall in bond yields. BCA's view is that the 1.57% yield in June 2016 marked the end of that multi-year decline. The bond market in late 2017 is as oversold as the bond market was in early 1994, although it took different paths to get to the same juncture. According to BCA's Composite Bond Indicator, the bond market in late 1993 and early 1994 was working off a deeply overbought position. However, by early 1994, bonds were modestly oversold. BCA's bond measure was deeply oversold in late 2016 and early 2017, but shifted into overbought territory in the summer. Today, bonds are modestly oversold. Panel 4 of Charts 10 and 11 show that Fed rate hikes were not priced in at the end of 1993 and in early 1994; today, a few increases are priced in. Investors were net purchasers of bond funds in 1993 and 1994, which is the same as the current situation. In 1993, however, investors were shedding bond funds while individuals are now adding to their bond positions. Bottom Line: Several sentiment and technical indicators in the bond market echo the scenario in 1994. Nonetheless, 25 years of increased Fed transparency means it would be unlikely that the market will be surprised by the Fed's next rate increase. Still, with a new Fed Chair, a record number of vacancies on the Fed's Board and an unprecedented unwinding of its balance sheet, a policy misstep by the Fed would threaten BCA's position on the economy, equities and bonds in 2018. A bigger risk may be that the bond market is still priced for the low inflation environment to persist. Accordingly, if there is an upside surprise on inflation, bonds could be hit hard on a re-assessment of the Fed's rate path. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 National Association of Active Investment Managers. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Invincible", published November 6, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report "Resilient", published September 25, 2017. Available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary "Into The Fire", published November 7, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Synchronized global capex growth, a derivative of BCA's synchronized global growth thesis, will be a dominant theme next year, benefiting cyclicals over defensives. Three high-conviction calls are levered to this theme. Higher interest rates on the back of a pickup in inflation expectations is another BCA theme that should materialize in 2018. Three calls focus on a selloff in the bond markets for the coming year. Two special situations round up our high-conviction calls for 2018. Recent Changes S&P Software index - Boost to overweight. S&P Homebuilding index - Downgrade to underweight. Table 1 Feature Equities continued to grind higher last week, largely ignoring tax bill passage jitters. The S&P 500 is on track to register an eighth consecutive month of positive monthly returns, an impressive feat. Firm global economic data suggests that the synchronized global growth theme is gaining traction and remains investors' focal point. While the 10/2 yield curve flattening is a bit unnerving, another curve to watch is the spread between 2-year yields and the Fed funds rate, or what BCA often refers to as the "Fed Spread". This spread has widened 50bps since early September closely tracking the Citi economic surprise index (Chart 1A), and signals that the U.S. economy remains on a solid footing. We would be most worried that a recession was imminent were both slopes concurrently flattening and approaching inversion (third panel, Chart 1A). Chart 1AThe 'Fed Spread'Is Right Chart 1BHigher Interest Rates Theme Moreover, credit growth has turned the corner, and the three, six and twelve month credit impulses are all simultaneously rising at a time when total loans outstanding have hit an all-time high. Importantly, credit breadth is also broad-based. Our six month impulse diffusion index shows that six out of the eight credit categories that the Fed tracks have a positive second derivative (Chart 1A). All of this suggests that, cyclically, the path of least resistance is higher for equities, especially given BCA's view of a recession hitting only in 2019. In this context, we are revealing our high-conviction calls for the next year. Most of our calls leverage two BCA themes: synchronized global capex growth (a derivative of our flagship publication's "The Bank Credit Analyst" synchronized global growth theme articulated in last week's outlook)1 and a higher interest rate theme ("The Bank Credit Analyst" expects yields to be under upward pressure in most major markets during 2018)2. Over the past few months we have been articulating the ongoing synchronized global capital spending macro theme3 that, despite still flying under the radar, will likely dominate in 2018. Table 2 on page 4 shows that both DM and EM countries are simultaneously expanding gross fixed capital formation. As a result, we reiterate our recent cyclical over defensive portfolio bent,4 and tie three high-conviction overweight calls to this theme. Table 2Synchronized Global Capex Growth Similarly in recent reports we have been highlighting BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy view of a higher 10-year yield on the back of rising inflation expectations for 2018. If BCA's constructive crude oil view pans out then inflation and rates may get an added boost (Chart 1B). Three high-conviction calls are levered to this theme. Finally, we have a couple of special situations, and this year we characterize two out of these eight calls as speculative. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, "OUTLOOK 2018 Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Ibid. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Invincible" dated November 6, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives" dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Living With The Carry Trade" dated October 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Construction Machinery & Heavy Trucks (Overweight, Capex Theme) The capex upcycle will likely fuel the next machinery stock outperformance upleg. Not only are expectations for overall capital outlays as good as they get (Chart 2), but there are also tentative signs that even the previously moribund mining and oil & gas complexes will be capex upcycle participants. While we are not calling for a return to the previous cycle's peak, even a modest renormalization of capital spending plans (i.e. maintenance capex alone would suffice) in these two key machinery client segments would rekindle industry sales growth. A quick channel check also waves the green flag. Both machinery shipments and new orders are outpacing inventory accumulation (Chart 2). Moreover, backlogs are rebuilding at the quickest pace of the past five years (not shown). This suggests that client demand visibility is returning. This machinery end-demand improvement is a global phenomenon. In fact, the fourth panel of Chart 2 shows that global machinery new orders are climbing faster than domestic new order growth. Tack on the reaccelerating global credit impulse courtesy of the latest Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review and the ingredients are in place for a global machinery export boom. Finally, our machinery EPS model is firing on all cylinders, underscoring that the earnings-led recovery has more running room (Chart 2). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CSTF - CAT, CMI, PCAR. Chart 2S&P Construction Machinery & Heavy Trucks Energy (Overweight, Capex Theme) The slingshot recovery in basic resources investment - albeit from a very low base - suggests that there is more room for relative gains in the S&P energy index in the coming months (second panel, Chart 3). The U.S. dollar remains down significantly for the year and, irrespective of future moves, it should continue to goose energy sector profits owing to the positive impact on the underlying commodity. Importantly, energy producers are a levered play on oil prices and the latter have jumped roughly $14/bbl to $58/bbl or ~32% since July 10th, but energy stocks are up only 8% in absolute terms. Given BCA's still sanguine crude oil market view, we expect a significant catch up phase in energy equity prices into 2018. On the supply front, Cushing and OECD oil stocks are now contracting. As oil inventories get whittled down, OPEC stays disciplined and oil demand grinds higher, oil prices will remain well bid. The implication is that the relative share price advance is still in the early innings. Relative valuations have ticked up in the neutral zone according to our composite relative Valuation Indicator, but on a number of metrics value remains extremely compelling in the energy space. Finally, our EPS model heralds additional growth in the coming quarters on the back of solid industry pricing power and sustained global oil producer discipline. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRS - XLE:US. Chart 3S&P Energy Software (Overweight, Capex Theme) The S&P software index is a clear capex upcycle beneficiary (Chart 4) and we recommend an upgrade to a high-conviction overweight stance today. If software commands a larger slice of the overall capital spending pie as we expect, then industry profits should enjoy a healthy rebound (second panel, Chart 4). Small business sector plans to expand have returned to a level last seen prior to the Great Recession, underscoring that software related outlays will likely follow them higher. Recovering bank loan growth is also corroborating this upbeat spending message: capital outlays on software are poised to accelerate based on rebounding bank loans. The latter signals that businesses are beginning to loosen their purse strings anew (Chart 4). Reviving animal spirits suggest that demand for software upgrades will stay elevated. CEO confidence is pushing decade highs. Such ebullience is positive for a pickup in software investments. It has also rekindled software M&A activity, with the number of industry deals jumping in recent months. Meanwhile, the structural pull from the proliferation of cloud computing and software-as-a-service has served as a catalyst to raise the profile of this more defensive and mature tech sub-sector. Finally, our newly introduced S&P software EPS model encapsulates this sanguine industry backdrop and heralds a bright profit outlook. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT-MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, ATVI, INTU, EA, ADSK, RHT, SYMC, SNPS, ANSS, CDNS, CTXS, CA. Chart 4S&P Software Banks (Overweight, Higher Interest Rates Theme) The S&P banks index is a core overweight portfolio holding and there are high odds of significant relative gains in the coming quarters. All three key drivers of bank profits, namely price of credit, loan growth and credit quality, are simultaneously moving in the right direction. On the price front, the market expects the 10-year yield to hit 2.47% in November 2018 from roughly 2.32% currently. BCA expects the 10-year yield will rise more quickly than is discounted in the forward curve. Our U.S. bond strategists think core inflation will soon resume its modest cyclical uptrend (Chart 5). A parallel recovery in the cost of inflation protection will impart 50-60 basis points of upside to the 10-year Treasury yield by the time core inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target.5 C&I and consumer loans, two large credit categories, are both forecast to reaccelerate in the coming months. The ISM has been on fire lately and consumer confidence has been following closely behind. Our credit growth model captures these positive forces and is sending an unambiguously positive message for loan reacceleration in the coming months (Chart 5). Finally, credit quality remains pristine despite some pockets of weakness in, subprime especially, auto loans. At this stage of the cycle, near or at full employment, NPLs will remain muted. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX - WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT. Chart 5S&P Banks Utilities (Underweight, Higher Interest Rates Theme) Increasing global economic growth expectations bode ill for defensive utilities stocks (global manufacturing PMI diffusion index shown inverted, top panel, Chart 6). Synchronized global economic and capex growth (second panel, Chart 6) and coordinated tightening in monetary policy spells trouble for bonds. Our U.S. Bond strategists expect a bond selloff to gain steam in 2018. Given that utilities essentially trade as a proxy for bonds, this macro backdrop leaves them vulnerable to a significant underperformance phase. Importantly, the stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio and utilities sector relative performance also has a tight inverse correlation. The implication is that downside risks remain acute. Without the support of continued declines in bond yields, or of indiscriminate capital flight from all riskier assets, utilities advances depend on improving fundamentals. The news on the domestic operating front is grim. Contracting natural gas prices, the marginal price setter for the industry, suggest that recent utilities pricing power gains are running on empty. Add on waning productivity, with labor additions handily outpacing electricity production, and the ingredients for a margin squeeze are in place. Finally, industry utilization rates are probing multi-decade lows and overcapacity is negative for pricing power. Turbine and generator inventories have been hitting all-time highs. This is a deflationary backdrop. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5UTIL - XLU:US. Chart 6S&P Utilities Pharmaceuticals (Underweight, Special Situation) Weak pricing power fundamentals, a soft spending backdrop, a depreciating U.S. dollar and deteriorating industry operating metrics will sustain downward pressure on pharma stocks in the coming year. Both in absolute terms and relative to overall PPI, pharma selling prices are steadily losing steam (Chart 7). In the context of a bloated industry workforce, the profit margin outlook darkens significantly. If the Trump administration also manages to clamp down on the secular growth of pharma selling price inflation, then industry margins will remain under chronic pressure. Moreover, our dual synchronized global economic and capex growth themes bode ill for defensive pharma stocks. Nondiscretionary health care outlays jump in times of duress and underwhelm during expansions. Currently, the soaring ISM manufacturing index is signaling that pharma profits will remain under pressure in the coming months as the most cyclical parts of the economy flex their muscles (the ISM survey is shown inverted, second panel, Chart 7). A depreciating currency is also synonymous with pharma profit sickness (bottom panel, Chart 7). While pharma exports should at least provide some top line growth relief during depreciating U.S. dollar phases, they are contracting at an accelerating pace (middle panel, Chart 7), warning that global pharma demand is ill. Finally, even on the operating metric front, the outlook is dark. Pharma industrial production is nil and our productivity proxy remains muted, warning that profits will likely underwhelm. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PHAR - JNJ, PFE, MRK, BMY, AGN, LLY, ZTS, MYL, PRGO. Chart 7S&P Pharma Homebuilding (Speculative Underweight, Higher Interest Rates Theme) Year-to-date, the niche homebuilding index is the best performing sub-index within consumer discretionary stocks surpassing even the internet retail subgroup that AMZN is part of, and has bested the broad market by 50 percentage points. Such exuberance is unwarranted and we deem that stocks prices have run way ahead of earnings fundamentals. Worrisomely the trifecta of higher interest rates, high lumber prices and likely tax reform blues are substantial headwinds to the index's profit potential. The second panel of Chart 8 shows that if BCA's interest rate view materializes in 2018, then 30-year fixed mortgage rates will rise in tandem with the 10-year yield (assuming the spread stays intact) and cause, at the margin, some consternation to homeownership. Near all-time highs in lumber prices are also a cause for concern (bottom panel, Chart 8). Lumber is an input cost to new homes built and eats into homebuilder margins if they decide not to pass it on to the consumer. If they do add it as a surcharge to new home selling prices, then existing homes become a "cheaper" alternative, hurting new home demand. Finally, the GOP tax plan may change mortgage interest and property tax deductions, affecting largely new home owners and becoming a net negative to the homebuilding index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME-DHI, LEN, PHM, LEN / B. Chart 8S&P Homebuilding Semiconductor Equipment (Speculative Underweight, Special Situation) Semiconductor stocks in general and semi equipment in particular have gone parabolic. The latter have bested the market by 60 percentage points year-to-date, and over a two-year period the outperformance jumps to roughly 180 percentage points (top panel, Chart 9). Something has got to give, and we are putting the S&P semi equipment index on our speculative high-conviction underweight list. A global M&A frenzy and the bitcoin/ICO mania (bottom panel, Chart 9) have pushed chip equipment stocks to the stratosphere. In absolute terms this index is near the tech bubble peak, and relative share prices are following close behind (top panel, Chart 9). Worrisomely five year EPS growth forecasts recently surpassed the 25% mark, an all-time high. Both the tech sector's (in 2000) and the biotech index's (2001 and 2014) long term growth estimates hit a wall near such breakneck pace (second panel, Chart 9). This indefinite profit euphoria is unwarranted and we would lean against it. On the operating front, DRAM prices (a pricing power proxy) have tentatively peaked and so have semi sales (an industry end-demand proxy), warning that extrapolating the recent semi equipment V-shaped profit recovery far into the future is fraught with danger (third & fourth panels, Chart 9). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SEEQ-AMAT, LRCX, KLC. Chart 9S&P Semis Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.