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Special Report Highlights In a world with low expected returns from various asset classes and still-elevated target returns among largely underfunded pension funds, asset allocators may have to consider the use of leverage to meet liability requirements. Canadian pension funds have been more open to using leverage than their US counterparts, but even the very conservative Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has an allocation to levered asset classes such as private equity, albeit at a very low weight. Retail investors do not have access to low-cost financing as institutional investors do. Still, they too can add leverage via ETFs and Liquid Alts mutual funds. When leverage is used at the asset-class level such as in alternative asset classes, financing costs play an important role in investment decisions. For pension funds with access to low-cost financing, “direct investing” in alternative assets is more advantageous than indirect investment via alternative funds. When leverage is used at the portfolio level, such as via a risk-parity structure, the financing cost impacts mostly just the return, but the leverage constraints impact both return and volatility. Risk-parity strategy is more advantageous when it’s used as one of the strategies in a total portfolio, rather than at the total-fund level because usually a sub-portfolio can have a much higher leverage ratio than the total fund. Leverage should be managed in a centralized risk-management system at the total-fund level, together with all other risk exposures. 1. Why Should Leverage Be Considered? In a Global Asset Allocation Special Report on long-term return assumptions,1 the key conclusion was that, for the next decade, investors would not be able to achieve the kind of return targets they were used to over the previous two decades because all asset classes would see much lower returns going forward, with the largest reductions coming from fixed-income and alternative assets such as farmland, REITs, and commodities. This is bad news for investors, especially pension fund investors with long-term liabilities to match. For example, according to Wilshire Consulting,2 at the end of 2018, the aggregate funded ratio (defined as the fund assets as a percentage of the fund obligations) of 134 US state retirement systems was 72.2%, which is better than the low at the end of 2016 (Chart 1). However, as shown in Chart 2, there were still about 11% of the funds with assets at less than 50% of liabilities. Chart 1US Pensions' Funded Status* Chart 2US Pensions' Funded Ratio Distribution* Over the past two decades, the risk-return profile of traditional assets like equities and government bonds has already been much less attractive than historical averages, as shown in Chart 3, but investors have diversified into credit and alternative asset classes (which contain embedded leverage) to enhance their portfolios’ risk-return profile. Chart 3Future Risk-Return Profiles Less Attractive Than Historical Averages According to the above-mentioned Global Asset Allocation Special Report, with a conventional 50/30/20 (equities/bonds/alts) allocation, a US investor could comfortably achieve a 7% annual return over the past two decades. Now, alternative asset classes have become mainstream, likely producing a much lower future return. The same 50/30/20 portfolio would currently generate only about 4.9% annually, much less than what’s required to match liabilities. In fact, alternatives’ future return expectations have been cut to 6.1% from their past 20-year average of 15.1% annually, meaning that even if 100% of assets are fully invested in alternatives, the expected return will still be lower than the 7% that’s still assumed by some US state pension funds.3 Not to mention that at the end of 2018, over 34% of US retirement pension funds had long-term rate-of-return expectations higher than 7.5%, as shown in Chart 4. Chart 4Challenging Long-Term Return Expectations Chart 5Why Should Leverage Be Considered? According to Modern Portfolio Theory, to achieve a higher return investors can take higher risk in three different ways, as shown in Chart 5:  1) Allocating more funds to higher-return/higher-risk assets, i.e. moving upwards to the right along the efficient frontier (red line) – for example, a 60-40 equity/bond portfolio is well to the upper-right side of the “optimal” allocation; 2) Levering up one or more assets to alter the shape of the frontier (grey line) – for instance, incorporating private-equity and infrastructure funds that contain embedded leverage; and 3) Levering up the “optimal” (in terms of return per unit of risk) risky portfolio with funds borrowed at the total-fund level (green line). Risk parity is a close proximation. For more detail about the basics of leverage, please see Appendix 1 on pages 21-22. Chart 5 illustrates three different frontiers based on the assumed risk-return forecast for US equities, US Treasurys, and alternative assets.4 We can observe the following: When the target return is low (at target 1), leverage does not provide significant benefit no matter which form is used; As the return target moves up relative to what the underlying assets can provide (target 2), direct leverage produces a better return/risk profile than embedded leverage, which in turn is better than the portfolio without any leverage; When the target return is higher than what any efficient combination from the available asset classes can achieve (target 3), investors must consider the use of direct leverage. In theory, investors should always prefer to use leverage at the total-fund level to lever up the “optimal” portfolio. In reality, however, some investors are constrained from borrowing. In addition, some investors do not have the expertise or infrastructure to manage the additional complexity that results from the use of direct leverage. In fact, direct leverage has typically been considered dangerous by many investors. Misuse of leverage was attributed to some high-profile failures, such as Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. So how has leverage been used by asset allocators? What are the key factors that determine if and how leverage should be used? What are the key risks associated with the use of leverage, and how should leverage be managed? In the sections below, we first review how some pension funds and retail investors have been using leverage (we ignore hedge funds, even though they are the most obvious users of leverage, because they are a part of the “alternative” asset class with embedded leverage). From there, we attempt to address, 1) How does financing cost impact leverage at the asset-class level? and 2) How does financing cost impact the decision to use leverage at the portfolio level if investors are constrained by the amount of leverage that can be used? Finally, we suggest a centralized leverage management framework to monitor and manage leverage at the total-portfolio level. 2. Use of Leverage By Pension Funds Leverage can be applied in many different ways. In general, the use of leverage by pension funds can be grouped into four categories: First, with a focus on return-seeking. This is achieved mainly by using alternative asset funds such as private-equity funds, hedge funds, real-estate funds, and infrastructure funds. These funds have embedded leverage, but with much higher costs. They provide diversification and higher risk-adjusted returns, partly because of their embedded leverage and lock-up advantages. Large pension funds, especially the Canadian pension funds which all have excellent credit ratings and strong in-house talent, have also taken advantage of their solid balance sheets to acquire low-cost financing to invest directly in alternatives. For example, the first bond issued by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) in 2001 was $600 million at 5.7%, while the Canada Public Pension Investment Board (CPPIB) even issued euro-denominated bonds in both 2017 (2 billion euros, 7-year, 0.375% coupon) and 2018 (1 billion euros, 15-year, 1.5% coupon).5 Proceeds from these bond issues have mostly been used to invest in alternative assets, which now account for a large proportion of the major Canadian pension funds’ assets under management (Table 1). Table 1“Alternatives” Have Become Mainstream For The Canadians                     Most US state pension funds are more conservative than their Canadian peers. They too have been gradually adding exposure to alternatives with embedded leverage such as private equity, real estate, and hedge funds, as shown in Chart 6. Even Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), the very conservative Japanese sovereign wealth fund, in its current operating guideline has a 5% allocation to alternatives such as private equity, real estate, and infrastructure.6 That’s an impressive amount considering its first investment in the space was in 2013, as shown in Chart 7. Chart 6The Americans Are Catching Up On Alternatives Chart 7GPIF’s Push Into Alternatives* However, the push into alternative asset classes by large pension funds has made it increasingly difficult to allocate funds to alternative assets. For example, CalPERS has only an 8% allocation to private equity,7  yet its most recent exposure as of June 2019 stood at only 7.1% – because it could not find enough suitable private-equity investments to build the asset class to the desired scale.8 Second, with a focus on liability matching. Pension funds who follow the liability-driven investing (LDI) approach often construct two portfolios. One is the liability-matching portfolio and the other is the active portfolio. The former matches the liabilities, while the latter generates alpha to cover management fees and to provide a cushion for estimation errors. Since most pension liabilities are indexed to inflation, liabilities are often modelled as a combination of nominal bonds and inflation-linked bonds with leverage. The leverage ratio can often be higher than two or three times because of the ultra-long duration of the liabilities versus the available bond instruments. For example, the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP) uses an LDI approach, which is why its leverage ratio is much higher than some other pension plans, as shown in Chart 8.  Chart 8Use Of Leverage By Some Pension Funds Third, with a focus on risk diversification. Risk-based strategies such as risk parity generate a more diversified portfolio with lower absolute returns compared to a conventional 60/40 equity/bond portfolio, but in general have a much higher Sharpe ratio, and therefore require leverage to achieve the required return/risk objective.9 Even though most risk-parity believers dedicate a portion of their assets to risk-parity strategies (either internally with direct leverage or externally with embedded leverage), some pension funds have adopted such a risk-diversification approach at the total-fund level. Danish pension fund ATP and the Missouri State Employees Retirement System (MOSERS) are two examples. As shown in Chart 8, as of June 2019, MOSERS’ leverage was about 50%,10 a lot higher than CalPERS’ newly augmented total-fund leverage limit of 20% (from 5% previously),11 because CalPERS does not use the same approach to apply leverage. Fourth, with a focus on more tactical moves, such as tail-risk hedging, revenue generation, and opportunistic strategies to take advantage of short-term dislocations in the marketplace. These tactics are achieved mostly using derivatives such as futures, options, and swaps. For example, equity and bond futures or swaps are often used to tactically adjust asset allocation at the total-fund level without impacting the underlying asset-class management. 3. Use of Leverage By Retail Investors Retail investors do not enjoy low-cost financing as large institutions do. They can use lines of credit or margin accounts to invest, and they can also use derivatives if they are qualified to do so. For those who are not qualified or not comfortable using leverage themselves, there are two types of retail products with embedded leverage: Levered or inverse ETFs and “Liquid Alts” mutual funds or ETFs. Levered or Inverse ETFs: These products are rebalanced daily to a fixed leverage multiple, often -3X, -2X, -1X, 2X, and 3X of the underlying assets. As such, only daily performance matches the intended performance objective. Because of the daily realization of gain and loss, they are not suitable for long-term buy-and-hold investors because the longer the holding period, the larger the drift due to the compounding effect. For example, Chart 9 shows the Nasdaq-100 ETF (QQQ) and the associated levered ETFs. It’s interesting to note that in several annual periods ending in 2011, 2016, 2018 and 2019, QQQ’s one-year return was slightly positive, yet 3X ETF’s corresponding returns were negative! This is due to the “negative diversification return” effect as defined by Qian.12 Chart 9NASDAQ-100 Linked ETF Performances* Liquid Alternative Mutual Funds/ETFs: These are the “liquid” version of alternative investment strategies aimed at retail investors. They are easy to buy and sell. In Canada, since National Instrument 81-102 became effective in January 2019, retail investors who do not have the sophistication to directly invest in alternatives now have access to such investments via mutual funds and ETFs. As shown in Table 2,13 these funds can utilize leverage up to 3X based on gross aggregate exposure by borrowing or short-selling. In the US, liquid alts have been available to retail investors since 2013, and the market has grown rapidly to over US$225 billion.14 Now there are signs emerging that even some institutional investors are starting to look into liquid alts ETFs.15 Table 2Canadian Regulation On Liquid Alts Mutual Funds 4. Leverage At Asset-Class Level Alternative funds, such as funds that invest in private equity, private debt, and infrastructure, typically use leverage. These funds carry a high cost because 1) investors in these funds must pay a premium for not managing leverage, and 2) these funds often have much higher financing costs. For example, the average financing cost for leveraged buyouts in 2014 was more than 5%,16 while the average risk-free rate in 2014 was 0.03%. Research has shown that private-asset performance can be proxied by using leverage and the corresponding public asset. In Table 3, the base case is based on the forecast for US equities and Treasurys without leverage, and a risk-free rate of 2.6%.17 Then equities are leveraged by 1.5 times to proximate private equity. The low-cost case has a financing cost of 1.57% (which is what the average 3-month T-Bill rate was in 2019), while the high-cost case with a financing cost of 3.92%, which is 2.5 times the low-cost rate. Table 3Assumed Returns/Risks* Chart 10Financing-Cost Impact On The Use Of Embedded Leverage Chart 10 shows the corresponding frontiers of the three cases. It’s clear that leverage expands the frontier to the right, meaning that leverage helps to achieve a higher return with better diversification, albeit with higher volatility. However, the financing cost plays a very important role in the feasibility of the leverage decision. When the financing cost is low, leverage is better than the base case at any return-target level. When the financing cost is high, however, leverage is worse – so long as the return target is lower than what the underlying assets can achieve without leverage. This supports the shift to “direct investing” by some institutional investors with access to lower financing when investing in alternative asset classes. 5. Leverage At Portfolio Level Risk parity is an obvious example of using leverage at the portfolio level. As shown in our previous report on risk parity, there are different approaches to implementing risk parity, and they can generate different results – especially when there are more than two assets.18 To analyze the impact of leverage constraints and financing costs, we use a two-asset (US equity/Treasury) risk-parity portfolio as the basis of our analysis. One definitive conclusion we arrived at in our previous report was that risk-parity approach historically always outperforms in recessions. This conclusion has passed the real-time test in the most recent pandemic-induced recession. As shown in Chart 11A, risk-parity portfolios that target the same volatility as a 60/40 US equity/Treasury portfolio have outperformed the latter significantly. The same holds true for the portfolios that target the same volatility as an equity portfolio (Chart 11B).   Chart 11AUS Risk Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Chart 11BUS Risk Parity With Same Vol As US Stocks However, as described in the previous Special Report on risk parity, we did not impose any cap on the use ofleverage. As such, some strategies that use a relatively short lookback period to calculate historical statistics required very high leverage ratios at some time periods in our back-tests. What would happen if we set a cap on the leverage ratio? And what if the financing cost is higher than the 3-month T-bill rate assumed in most academic research, and also in our previous report? Chart 12A and Chart 12B show the results when leverage is capped at three times and the financing cost is Libor +25 basis points. It’s clear that Chart 12A looks the same as Chart 11A because the leverage cap is higher than the required leverage employed, while the cost impact is negligible for such a short period. But Chart 12B shows that, even though the risk-parity portfolio still outperformed, the outperformance has been much less so far this year because the required leverage was a lot higher than three times. Chart 12AImpact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Low-Vol Target Risk-Parity Chart 12BImpact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On High-Vol Target Risk-Parity The impact of financing costs in Chart 12A is barely seen because the time period was short and the interest rate was low. What is the long-run impact of leverage restrictions and financing costs then? Chart 13A and Chart 13B show the long-run statistics from April 1945 to July 2020 based on a 180-month look-back period for two portfolios: RPL1, the risk-parity portfolio with the same volatility target as a 60/40 US equity/Treasury portfolio; and RPL2, the risk-parity portfolio with the same volatility as MSCI US equity index. Chart 13C shows the risk-adjusted returns for three portfolios with constant volatility targets at 10%, 12%, and 15%, respectively. Chart 13ALong-Term Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity With Low Vol Target* Chart 13BLong-Term Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity With High Vol Target*     Chart 13CLong-Tem Impact Of Financing Cost And Leverage Constraint On Risk-Parity Portfolio* Some observations are worth highlighting: Financing costs mainly impact average return, but have very little impact on volatility. As such, higher financing costs reduce risk-adjusted returns. When there is no financing cost, all risk-parity portfolios with different volatility targets should have the same risk-adjusted return as the underlying unlevered risk-parity portfolio. When financing costs are present, however, this is no longer the case. Leverage constraints impact both returns and volatility in the same direction – i.e., stricter constraints on leverage reduce both return and volatility, and vice versa. The magnitude of the impact from leverage constraints, however, varies because the target volatility of the portfolio plays a key role in the required leverage. For a constant-volatility target, a tighter control on leverage will reduce volatility more than return, resulting in a higher risk-adjusted return (Chart 13C); for a variable-volatility target such as RPL1 and RPL2, however, the same conclusion cannot be drawn (Charts 13A and 13B) Long-run statistics do not tell the full story because they really depend on the period chosen. Chart 14A shows the dynamic impact of financing when there were no constraints on leverage, and Chart 14B shows the dynamic impact of leverage when there were no additional financing costs. Chart 15 shows the combined impact when leverage is capped at three times and the financing cost at Libor+25 basis points. They are for five different risk-parity portfolios with different volatility targets with a lookback window length of 180 months. (For different lookback window, please see Appendix 2 on pages 23-25). Chart 14ADynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity Without Leverage Constraint* Chart14BDynamic Impact Of Leverage Cap On Risk Parity Without Extra Financing * Chart 15Dynamic Impact Of Financing On Risk Parity With Leverage Being Capped At 3X It is interesting to note the following: When there is no restriction on leverage, additional financing cost eats away cumulative total return in a much more significant way when an risk parity portfolio has a higher-volatility target than a lower-volatility target (Chart 14A). This is simply because a higher-volatility target requires higher leverage. When there was no additional cost of financing, constraint on leverage ate away total returns – mostly in the early years of the back-test when required leverage was often very high. In recent years, the impact was significant only when the leverage cap dropped to three times or lower. Also, the higher the volatility target, the more reduction in return risk-parity portfolio would suffer compared to its base case (Chart 14B). When the lookback window length is changed, the impact of leverage and financing cost also changes. The shorter the window length, the larger the impact (Charts in Appendix 2). A 180-month lookback period was the preferred choice in our previous report, and it is still more appropriate to use than 36 months or 360 months. Since additional cost and restriction on leverage eat away total return so much, is it really worthwhile to even consider using a risk-parity approach at all? Charts 16A and 16B show that overall total returns were worse during the entire period from April 1945 to July 2020, when additional cost and leverage constraints are applied. Since the burst of the tech bubble, however, risk-parity portfolios with the same volatility target as US 60/40 and also MSCI US have generated higher total returns than US 60/40 and MSCI US, respectively.  Chart16ADoes Risk-Parity With Same Vol As US 60/40 Outperform US 60/40? Chart 16BDoes Risk-Parity With Same Vol As MSCI USI Outperform MSCI US? We are in a low interest-rate environment, and rates may stay low for a long time to come. In addition, when futures contracts are used to implement leverage, the implied cost is very close to 3-month T-Bills; Libor or Libor + may be present mostly when swaps are used due to factors such as supply/demand and counterparty risk. As such, financing costs will likely play less of a role than leverage constraints until interest rates rise significantly. Given that total-fund leverage is much lower than individual strategy/portfolio leverage, the implication is that risk-parity is more advantageous when it is used as a strategy in a sub-portfolio other than at the total fund level. 6. Suggestion For Leverage Management In a low-return environment, asset allocators face more challenges to meet return targets than in the past. Unless return targets are lowered to what the underlying assets can reasonably provide, asset allocators may have to consider the use of leverage to beef up overall portfolio returns. However, leverage is also a double-edged sword because it also increases portfolio volatility. As such, we suggest a centralized risk-management system to monitor and manage all risks, including risks associated with leverage, in line with our suggestion on currency hedging outlined in our 2017 Special Report. Appendix 1: Leverage Basics Leverage is an investment strategy of using borrowed money – specifically, the use of various financial instruments or borrowed capital – to increase the potential return of an investment. It also amplifies the loss potential if the levered investment does not work out as expected. This is why it is also often called a “double-edged sword.” Leverage has many different forms and is used in many different places. For example, residential home mortgages are a form of leverage that the general public understands very well, yet the leverage embedded in a futures contract may sound alien to some retail investors. For asset allocators, the most important decision on leverage is whether to apply leverage directly at the total-portfolio level or use assets with embedded leverage. For example, issuing bonds to lever up a diversified portfolio (a mean-variance optimal portfolio or a suboptimal risk-parity portfolio) is an example of the former. On the other hand, investing in a private equity fund is an example of the latter. Research has shown that for large pension funds with excellent credit ratings, the latter is less efficient than the former due to the much higher cost of financing.1  For example, in 2014, the average cost of financing for leveraged buyouts was in excess of 5% when the short-term interest rate was close to zero.2 It’s not surprising that pension investors have formed joint ventures to invest in alternative assets directly instead of relying on specialty funds. In terms of financing, there is on-balance-sheet leverage and off-balance-sheet leverage. On-balance-sheet leverage raises liabilities, such as via bond issuance. Off-balance-sheet leverage uses the balance sheet of a counterparty, such as OTC financial derivatives. A repo agreement is a repurchase agreement that involves selling a security (often a government bond) to a counterparty (a lender) with the promise of buying it back after a pre-defined period at a pre-defined price. It’s often used for short-term liquidity management.  Depending on the form of financing, the measurement of leverage differs. Accounting leverage or balance-sheet leverage is calculated as total assets divided by net assets. This measurement is accurate only if on-balance-sheet leverage is used for long-only investments. When off-balance-sheet leverage is used or when shorting is involved, then accounting leverage severely understates the actual leverage. For example, Appendix Table A1 below is a snapshot from the 2018 annual report of Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP). The notional value of its derivatives was $333 billion, which is over 10 times the fair value of these instruments, and over four times the fund’s net asset value. Appendix Table A1HOOPP's Use Of Derivatives* So, when derivatives are used, accounting leverage is often adjusted for derivative exposure by taking the delta-adjusted notional value of derivative contracts.3 When there are short positions, leverage can be measured as Gross and Net Leverage after derivatives exposure is delta-adjusted. Gross Leverage is defined as the total exposure of long and short positions divided by net assets. This is accurate when the long and short positions are totally separate active bets. Net Leverage, is defined as the net exposure between long and short positions, divided by net assets. This is an accurate measure of leverage when the long and short positions are taken as hedges for one another. 1  Dr. Serguei Zernov, “Leverage to Meet the Pension Promise,” Global Risk Institute, Jan 24, 2019. 2  L’her, J.F., Stoyanova, R., Shaw, K., Scott, W. and Lai, C, “A bottom-up approach to the risk-adjusted performance of the buyout fund market”, Financial Analysts Journal, July/August 2016. 3  Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy and Gregoty B. van Inwegen, “Hedge Fund Leverage,” Journal of Financial Economics, January 25, 2011. Appendix 2: Impact Of Leverage Caps And Financing Costs With Different Lookback Window Lengths In Section 5, Chart 14A, Chart 14B and Chart 15 were presented using a lookback window of 180 months, a prefered window length based on our previous research on risk parity. However, practioners have been using different lookback windows. Below are the corresponding charts showing lookback windows of 360 months and 36 months, respectively. It’s easy to see that, the shorter the lookback window, the more significant the impact of  both financing costs and leverage constraints. The reason is simple: a shorter lookback window generates much higher leverage compared to a longer lookback window. APPENDIX 2 Chart 1AImpact Of Financing With 360-Month Lookback APPENDIX 2 Chart 1BImpact Of Financing With 36-Month Lookback   APPENDIX 2 Chart 2AImpact Of Leverage Cap With 360-Month Lookback APPENDIX 2 Chart 2BImpact Of Leverage Cap with 36-Month Lookback   APPENDIX 2 Chart 3AImpact Of Financing When Leverage Capped At 3X With 360-Month Lookback APPENDIX 2 Chart 3BImpact Of Financing When Leverage Capped At 3X With 36-Month Lookback   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaoliT@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 2 Ned McGuire and Brice Shirimbere, "2019 Wilshire Consulting Report on State Retirement Systems: Funding Levels and Asset Allocation," Wilshire Associates, March 2019. 3 “State Pension Funds adjust to ‘New Normal’ of Lower Returns,” Chief Investment Officer, January 2, 2020, 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 5 Martha Porado, “A look at how Canadian pension funds are using leverage,” dated Aug 10, 2018. 6GPIF (Government Pension Investment Fund) 2018 annual report. 7 "2017-18 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report,"CalPERS. p106, 2018 annual report. 8 "CalPERS Falling Short of Private Equity Goals," dated November 18, 2019. 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Demystifying Risk Parity," dated May 8, 2019. 10 https://www.mosers.org/funding/annual-reports 11 Arleen Jacobius, "CalPERS shifts $150 billion as part of new strategic asset allocation," Pensions And Investments, dated August 20, 2019. 12 Edward Qian, “Rebalance and Diversification Returns of Leveraged Portfolios,” Investment Insight, Panagora, December 2011. 13https://www.mackenzieinvestments.com/content/dam/mackenzie/en/2019/03/mm-investing-in-liquid-alternatives-en.pdf 14 https://perspectives.scotiabank.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Liquid-A… 15 "5 Use Cases for Liquid Alt ETFs," Institutional Investor dated November 18, 2019. 16 L’ her et al, “A bottom-up approach to the risk-adjusted performance of the buyout fund market,” Financial Analysts Journal, 72(4), 2016. 17 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Return Assumptions – Refreshed And Refined,” dated June 25, 2019. 18 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, Demystifying Risk Parity," dated May 8, 2019.
Highlights Overweighting the SIFI banks is our highest-conviction call, … : Our enthusiasm for the four banks deemed to be systemically important financial institutions is founded on the view that generous monetary and fiscal policy will lead to considerably smaller credit losses than the SIFIs’ depressed valuations imply. … but investors are none too sure of it, inside and outside of BCA: The SIFIs have underperformed the broad market since we overweighted them in late April, and they will likely run in place until our mild-credit-loss thesis can be borne out. Banks’ fortunes are not tied to the slope of the yield curve … : Banks do not borrow short to lend long and the widespread belief that their stocks are hostage to the yield curve has no empirical support. … and the US banking industry is not in structural decline: US banks have experienced steady growth in real loans, net interest income and net income. Their businesses have yet to be disrupted by new entrants; so far, technology has increased profitability and we expect that the pandemic will point the way to future efficiency improvements. Feature In response to ongoing client questions and a lively internal debate, we are devoting this week’s report to reviewing our highest-conviction call: overweighting the SIFI banks.1 After restating our thesis and what it would take to get us to abandon it, we challenge two arguments that have been cited in support of a bearish view. We hold fast to our underlying rationale, though we concede that it will likely take more time for the call to pan out. We always recommended it for investors with a time frame of at least a year, and it may take until first quarter 2021 earnings to start generating alpha, but we still believe it will. A Feature, Not A Bug Our entire editorial staff gathers every month to define the consensus view on all the major asset classes, which becomes the BCA House View until we revisit it the next month (or sooner, if need be). The House View is not a party line that we all parrot; any individual managing editor is free to express an opposing view, provided s/he clearly states that s/he is departing from the House View and, ideally, explains why. Although this policy does not always lead to neatly packaged views, it affords clients a window on our internal debates, allowing them to evaluate the merits of opposing points of view for themselves. It also helps us attract and retain the informed, opinionated researchers we seek. Banking On Washington The pandemic, and the lockdown measures imposed to limit its spread, tore a huge hole in the economy. Policymakers swiftly mobilized to build a bridge across the hole until the virus could be contained. Before March was out, the Fed had soothed the Treasury market, prized open the corporate bond market and had set bond spreads on a path to tighten. Congress passed measures providing nearly $3 trillion of aid, highlighted by the massive CARES Act. Although another significant round of federal aid is not assured, it would be in the House's, the Senate's and the White House's interest, so we expect it will eventually materialize. Thanks to the CARES Act’s copious household support, personal income reversed its March slide and comfortably exceeded February's pre-pandemic level in April, May, June and July (Chart 1). With much of the economy still in suspended animation, absent another round of direct payments to households, unemployment insurance benefit supplements, support for badly disrupted businesses and aid to state and local governments facing severe revenue shortfalls, potentially dire economic consequences loom. With even run-of-the-mill recessions dooming incumbent administrations’ election prospects, it is in the White House’s best interests to advocate for more spending to hold back the flood. Republican control of the Senate also lies in the balance. Chart 1Fiscal Transfers Have Kept Households Afloat With the Democrats seeking to demonstrate that bigger government is the solution, House, Senate and White House interests all align with the passage of a major new aid package ahead of the election. Despite the worsening climate, we expect that elected officials’ self-interest will carry the day. All creditors stand to benefit, since fiscal transfers have been vital to limiting bankruptcies and defaults, and the SIFIs would get a major boost as we attribute their dreadful year-to-date performance to market fears of credit losses well in excess of the loan loss reserves they’ve already set aside. The key to our pro-SIFIs call is that we see them as the foremost beneficiary of continued fiscal largesse. Just The SIFIs, Please We are not enamored of the entire banking industry. Low rates are likely to undermine net interest margins for an extended period and weakening loan growth, a function of borrower and lender caution, will hurt lending volumes. Banks that principally take deposits and make loans to the households and businesses within their geographic footprint will suffer. Several community banks face stiff headwinds as do some regionals. The SIFIs have quite a few earnings streams, though, and only get around half of their revenues from net interest income. They are hybrids that combine investment banks boasting bulge-bracket underwriting, top-tier sales and trading, and formidable wealth management businesses with a nationwide commercial banking footprint. These companies do not live and die by loan volumes and interest rate spreads, as much of their loan originations are securitized and their loan books are not bound to the intrinsic risk of their local economies. The SIFIs trade slightly below book value and only slightly above tangible book value (Table 1, left panel). This would be cold comfort if their book values were at risk of falling because of optimistic carrying values for their assets or impending reserve builds that would eat away at retained earnings. We are not at all worried about bad marks, however – post-GFC regulation kept the SIFIs from getting out over their skis in the just-concluded expansion – and we think that they are adequately reserved in the aggregate. Assuming that the virus will be contained by the end of the year, we stick to our initial projection that they would need to build sizable loan loss reserves only through this year's first three quarters. Table 1SIFI Book Values On their second quarter earnings calls, the SIFIs were of the view that their reserve building was nearly complete. National infection rates have remained high, however, and the supplemental federal unemployment insurance benefit has since lapsed. We expect that the rollback of re-opening measures and the interruption of CARES Act relief provisions will force the SIFIs to add to their reserves this quarter in amounts approaching first and second quarter levels, but if Congress does provide another round of meaningful aid this month or next, we think that will be the end of the big builds. Equity investors do not seem to have recognized that the SIFIs’ earnings power has allowed them to take their sizable reserve builds in stride. Book values didn’t budge in the first two quarters (Table 1, right panel), and if they continue to hold their ground, the selling in their stocks is way overdone. We are quite happy to find a group that’s so inexpensive against a backdrop in which nearly every public security is trading at elevated levels relative to history, especially when that group will be a clear winner from continuing fiscal support. If further aid on a meaningful scale is not forthcoming, however, we will exit our SIFI overweight. We are not irresolute, but we close out positions when their underlying rationale no longer applies. Psst. The Yield Curve Doesn’t Matter Old superstitions die hard. US Investment Strategy has been presenting evidence for ten years that the yield curve does not drive bank earnings.2 Although the intuition behind the view is logical, it fails to acknowledge that banks do not borrow short to lend long. As the gargantuan interest rate swap market and the FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile demonstrate, all but the smallest community banks rigorously match the duration of their assets and liabilities. We typically show line charts overlaying the slope of the yield curve (the 10-year Treasury yield less the 3-month T-bill rate) with aggregate net interest income or net income, showing that there has been no consistent relationship between the two series. We’ve even shown that the yield curve is largely uncorrelated with bank net interest margins. Alas, one may as well try to convince a native New Yorker that s/he is not the most important element of the universe, or an English soccer fan that his/her side is not among the favorites to capture the next World Cup. Fiscal aid has held defaults way below levels that would typically be associated with such a severe economic shock and another hearty round of it would position SIFI credit losses to come in way below the market's worst fears. This time around, we present over 60 years of monthly data in one scatterplot after another that takes the shape of an amorphous blob. They demonstrate that there is no coincident relationship between the level of the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ performance relative to the S&P 500 (Chart 2), or the change in the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ relative performance (Chart 3). They also show that there is no leading relationship over six- (Chart 4A) or twelve-month periods (Chart 4B) between the level of the slope of the yield curve and bank stocks’ relative performance. The change in the slope of the yield curve also comes a cropper with six- (Chart 5A) and twelve-month lead times (Chart 5B). With every one of the six regressions generating r-squareds below 1%, we conclude that neither the level of the slope of the yield curve, nor its direction, explains any element of relative bank stock performance. Chart 2The Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Influence Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Chart 3The Change In The Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Influence Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Chart 4AThe Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 6 Months Chart 4BThe Steepness Of The Yield Curve Does Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 12 Months Chart 5AChanges In Yield Curve Steepness Do Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 6 Months Chart 5BChanges In Yield Curve Steepness Do Not Lead Bank Stocks' Relative Performance Over 12 Months Rumors Of The Banks’ Structural Decline Have Been Greatly Exaggerated We submit that US banks are not in the throes of a structural decline. Adjusted for inflation, growth in their core lending business has been steady, except during recessions and their aftermath, for 70 years (Chart 6). Despite a persistent trend toward increasing non-bank intermediation that has reduced the industry’s market share, loan volumes continue to expand. Chart 6Real Bank Loan Balances Have Steadily Grown For 70 Years Industry viability is not only about sales volume, however. Participants in a declining industry could retain or even grow volumes, only to see their profits shrink in the face of competition from incumbents or new entrants. Real net interest income has continued to grow, however, more or less in line with real loan growth (Chart 7), demonstrating that margins have not eroded. Real net income, which includes credit costs and fees and other non-interest items that are more sensitive to the business cycle, is much more volatile, but has also followed a broad upward trend (Chart 8). Chart 7Real Net Interest Income Growth Has Decelerated, But It's Still Positive ... Chart 8... While Real Net Income Quickly Surpassed Its Pre-GFC Peak Futurists see fintech and cryptocurrencies as looming disruptive threats to the banking industry, but they have yet to make a significant dent in its volumes or its profits. To this point (Chart 9), technological advances have done more to reduce the industry’s operating costs than they have to undermine its moat. One would expect that a meaningful downward move in the efficiency ratio might be in store, based on what the banks have learned from the pandemic about optimizing human inputs, virtual applications and their costly branch footprints. The data do not support the claim that the industry is in the midst of a structural decline and an efficiency tailwind is likely in the offing once the acute phase of the pandemic passes. Chart 9Banks' Non-Interest Expenses Relative To Revenue Are Structurally Declining Concluding Thoughts Stocks that are oversold can become even more oversold and cheap does not necessarily mean valuable. It is entirely possible that the SIFI banks are a value trap; our call has underperformed since the late May/early June backup in long yields was summarily unwound (Chart 10). Something seems off, however, when the SIFIs are performing nearly as badly year-to-date as office and retail REITs. The latter face a structural shrinking of their businesses while banks are looking at nothing more than a cyclical ebb. Chart 10A Marathon, Not A Sprint Fiscal policymakers demonstrated their ability to counter the cyclical drag over the spring and summer; if they recover their willingness to do so, the SIFIs' outlook is far less grim than markets are currently discounting. Given our view that both the administration’s re-election prospects and Republican control of the Senate depend on staving off severe adverse economic consequences from the pandemic, we think that Congress will rediscover its resolve. If it doesn’t, we will have to close our position and potentially seek a better entry point after the new session of Congress convenes in January. It won't be all hearts and rainbows for the SIFIs over the next year, but concerns about the yield curve and the banking industry's trend earnings and revenue growth are misplaced. They are positioned to climb a wall of worry as soon as the pandemic begins to loosen its grip. Under our base-case policy scenario, the selling in the SIFIs has gone way too far. With policymakers squarely in the SIFIs’ corner, we’re thrilled to have a chance to take a shot at them from the long side below book value. The market is right to recognize that the banks will not have smooth sailing even if Congress eventually comes through, but we think it has failed to consider how much more protected the SIFIs are than their smaller brethren. If it’s holding them down because of yield curve concerns, or the idea that the banking industry is in the midst of a long-run decline, it simply has its facts wrong and we’re confident that they will rise over the next six to nine months. Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     JPM, BAC, C and WFC are the commercial/universal banks that regulators have deemed systemically important. 2     Please see the February 28, 2011 US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Banks And The Yield Curve,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights We remain bearish on the US dollar over the next 12 months. The best vehicle to express this view continues to be the Scandinavian currencies (NOK and SEK). Precious metals remain a buy so long as the dollar faces downside. However, we remain more bullish on silver than gold. Go short the gold/silver ratio (GSR) again at 75. At the crosses, our favorite trade is short NZD against other cyclical currency pairs. These include the CAD, AUD, and SEK. Sterling is selling off as we anticipated, but our timing was offside. That said, the pound is cheap. We will go long cable if it falls below 1.25. Short EUR/GBP at current levels. The Swiss franc will continue to appreciate versus the USD, but will lag behind the euro. EUR/CHF will touch 1.15. We prefer the JPY to the CHF as a currency portfolio hedge. We argued last week that Prime Minster Shinzo Abe’s resignation does not change the yen’s outlook. Feature Our trade basket this year has been centered on a dollar-bearish theme. Since the top in the DXY index on March 19th, we have been expressing this view via various vehicles, most of which have been very profitable. Our favorites have been the Scandinavian currencies, silver, and the AUD, either at the crosses or against the US dollar. So far, these are among the best-performing trades in the G10 currency world (Chart I-1). Chart I-1A Currency Report Card Going into the final leg of 2020, the key question is which currency pairs will provide the most upside. In this report, we revisit the rationale behind our high-conviction trades. The Case For Scandinavian Currencies A review of Q2 GDP across the G10 reveals which countries have been doing relatively better during the pandemic. Norway emerges as the economy that had the best quarter-on-quarter annualized growth (Chart I-2). Swedish growth held up very well in Q1 and even the drop in Q2 still puts it well ahead of the US, the euro area, and the UK. As small, open economies which are very sensitive to global growth conditions, this is a very impressive feat for Sweden and Norway. Part of the reason for this is that over the years, the drop in their currencies, both against the US dollar and euro, has made them very competitive. Chart I-2A Currency Report Card Norway benefited from a few things during the pandemic. First, as a major oil exporter, the sharp fall in the NOK helped cushion the domestic economy against the crash in crude prices. Second, the handling of the pandemic was swift and rigorous, and this has almost completely purged the number of new infections in Norway. Third, aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus (zero rates, quantitative easing, and the first budget deficit in 40 years) has set the economy on a recovery path. As a result, consumption is rebounding smartly and the Norges Bank expects mainland GDP to touch pre-crisis levels by 2023. Already, real retail sales have exploded higher (Chart I-3). Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks (and value stocks in general) could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Norwegian Consumption Has##br##Recovered Chart I-4A Bounce In Oil & Gas Stocks Will Help The Krone In the case of Sweden, the sharp rebound in the manufacturing PMI also suggests the industrial base is recovering. This will also coincide with a solid bounce in exports, cementing Sweden’s rise in relative competitiveness and its exit from the pandemic-induced recession (Chart I-5). The Riksbank’s resource utilization indicator has stabilized, suggesting deflationary pressures are abating. Meanwhile, home prices are on the cusp of a recovery, which should help boost consumer confidence and support consumption. With our models showing the Swedish krona as undervalued by 19% versus the USD, there is much room for currency appreciation before financial conditions tighten significantly. Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher. The bottom line is that both Norway and Sweden are well poised to benefit from a global economic recovery, with much undervalued currencies that will bolster their basic balances. We expect both the SEK and NOK to be the best performers versus the USD in the coming year (Chart I-6).  Chart I-5The Swedish Economy Is On The Mend Chart I-6The Scandinavian Currencies Remain Cheap Stay Long Precious Metals, Especially Silver In a world of ample liquidity and a falling US dollar, gold and precious metals are bound to benefit. This is especially the case on the back of a central bank that is trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. Gold has a long-standing relationship with negative interest rates, though the correlation has shifted over time. The intuition behind falling real rates and rising gold prices is that low rates reduce the opportunity cost of holding non-income-generating assets such as gold. But more importantly, the correlation is between the rise in gold prices and the level of real interest rates, meaning as long as the latter stays negative, it is sufficient to sustain the gold bull market (Chart I-7). Gold tends to be a “Giffen good,” meaning demand increases as prices rise. This can be seen in the tight correlation between our financial demand indicator (proxied by open futures interest on the Comex and ETF holdings, Chart I-8) and gold prices. The conclusion is that, just like the US dollar, gold tends to be a momentum asset, where higher prices beget more demand – at least until the catalyst of easy money and negative rates vanishes Chart I-7Gold Prices And Real Yields Chart I-8Gold Is A Giffen Good There is reason to believe that the bull market in gold might be sustained for longer this time around. The reason is that central banks have become important (and price-insensitive) buyers. Foreign central banks have been amassing almost all of the gold annual output in recent years. It is remarkable that for most of the dollar bull market this past decade, the world’s major central banks (and biggest holders of US Treasurys) have seen rather stable exchange rates relative to the gold price (Chart I-9). This suggests that gold price risks could be asymmetric to the upside. A fall in prices encourages accumulation by EM central banks as a way to diversify out of their dollar reserves, while a rise in prices encourages financial demand and boosts the value of gold foreign exchange reserves. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. During precious metals bull markets, prices tend to move in sequence, starting with gold, then silver. Meanwhile, the gold/silver ratio (GSR) tends to track the US dollar (Chart I-10), since silver tends to rise and fall more explosively than gold. Part of the reason is that the silver market is thinner and more volatile. Silver’s rising industrial use has also led to competition with investment demand in recent years. Chart I-9Central Banks Will Put A Floor Under Gold Prices Chart I-10Silver Should Outperform Gold As The Dollar Falls The next important technical level for silver will be the 2012 highs near $35/oz. After this, silver could take out its 2011 highs that were close to $50/oz, just as gold did. Globally, the world produces much more gold than silver, with a supply ratio that is 7:1. Meanwhile, the price ratio between gold and silver is near 70:1. Back in the 1800s, Isaac Newton concluded that the appropriate ratio was 15.5:1. We initially shorted the GSR at 100 and eventually took 25% profits when our rolling stop was triggered. We recommend putting a limit sell at 75. More speculative investors can buy silver outright. Stay Short NZD At The Crosses, Especially Versus The CAD Chart I-11Stay Long CAD/NZD In our currency portfolio, trades at the crosses are equally important as versus the USD in terms of adding alpha. Over the past year, we have successfully been playing the short side of the kiwi trade. We closed our long SEK/NZD trade for a profit of 7.8% on March 20, and our long AUD/NZD trade for a profit of 5.2% on June 26. Today, we remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. First, the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the G10, while Canadian bourses are heavy in cyclical stocks. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD cross. Second, immigration was an important source of labor for New Zealand, and COVID-19 has eaten into this dividend for the economy. As such, the neutral rate of interest is bound to head lower. And finally, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy will fare better than agriculture, boosting Canada’s relative terms of trade. At the Bank of Canada’s meeting this past Wednesday, the tone was slightly optimistic as it kept rates on hold. Recent data has been rather strong in Canada, especially in housing and goods consumption. This allows for the possibility of the BoC tapering asset purchases faster than the market expects, as argued by my colleague Mathieu Savary. This arbitrage is already being reflected in real interest rates, where they offer a premium of 180 basis points in Canada relative to New Zealand (Chart I-11). What To Do About Sterling? Trade negotiations between the UK and EU are once again hitting a brick wall. The key issue is around Northern Ireland. Ireland wants to remain bound to the EU’s customs and trade regime. The UK is seeking an amendment to be able to intervene, if there is “inconsistency or incompatibility with international or domestic law.” In short, it allows for UK discretion in the movement of goods to and from Northern Ireland, as well as state aid to Northern Ireland. The EU argues this is a clear breach of the treaty agreed to last year.    We remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. As negotiations go on, our base case is that a deal will eventually be reached. This is because neither side wants the worst-case scenario, namely, a no-deal Brexit. Should no deal be reached, the sharp rise in the trade-weighted euro will be exacerbated by a drop in the pound. This is deflationary for the euro area. And while the drop in the pound could be beneficial to the UK in the longer term, it will be very destabilizing since the UK is highly dependent on capital flows. Our roadmap for sterling is as follows: Historically, odds of a “hard” Brexit have usually been associated with cable near 1.20. This occurred after the UK referendum in 2016 and after Prime Minister Boris Johnson was elected with a mandate to take the UK out of the EU (Chart I-12). Intuitively, this suggests that maximum pessimism on the pound, driven by Brexit fears, pins cable at around 1.20. A “weak” deal cobbled together at the eleventh hour will still benefit cable. Depending on the details, 1.35-1.40 for cable will be within striking distance. In the case where both the UK and EU come to a “perfect” agreement, the pound could be 20%-25% higher. The real effective exchange rate for the pound is now lower than where it was after the UK exited the ERM in 1992, with a drawdown that has been similar in size. A good deal should cause the pound to overshoot the mid-point of its historical real effective exchange rate range (Chart I-13). Chart I-12GBP Has Historically Bottomed At 1.20 Chart I-13The Pound Is Cheap The pound is also cheap versus the euro, and we expect the EUR/GBP to start facing significant headwinds near 0.92. It is remarkable that UK data continues to outperform both the US and euro area (Chart I-14). As such, cable should be bought on weakness. Tactically, we would be buyers of the pound in the 1.24-1.25 zone, and our limit sell on EUR/GBP was triggered yesterday at 0.92.   Chart I-14The UK Economy Is Improving Thoughts On The ECB The main takeaways from the European Central Bank (ECB) conference were threefold. First, data in the euro area was better than the ECB expected. Second, the ECB did not give any hints on its policy review or extend forward guidance. Keeping policy easy until inflation is up to, but still below, 2% appears more hawkish than the Federal Reserve, which is now trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. And finally, the ECB said they are monitoring the exchange rate, but fell short of providing any hints that they will actively lean against the currency. The euro took off, both against the dollar and other European currencies. We outlined in last week’s report why we do not believe the euro can fall much from current levels. These include the common currency being cheap and having a large share of exports in the eurozone. A Few Words On The CHF Finally, a few clients have asked what happens to the Swiss franc in an environment where the euro is rising (and the dollar is falling). Our bias is that the Swiss National Bank lets a rising EUR/CHF ease financial conditions in Switzerland, and even leans into it. The Swiss National Bank has been stepping up its pace of intervention since EUR/CHF touched 1.05 this year and will continue to do so (Chart I-15). Unfortunately, there is not much it can do about a falling USD/CHF. This suggests the franc will fall against the euro, but not so much against the dollar. In a world where global yields eventually converge to zero, holding the Swiss franc is an attractive hedge. Chart I-15USD Weakness Will Be A Headache For The SNB   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been positive: On the labor market front, nonfarm payrolls fell to 1371K from 1734K in August. The average hourly earnings increased by 4.7% year-on-year. The unemployment rate declined from 10.2% to 8.4%. Initial jobless claims increased by 884K for the week ending on September 4th.  Finally, the NFIB business optimism index increased from 98.8 to 100.2 in August. The DXY index initially rose to a 4-week high of 93.6 earlier this week with positive data releases, then fell back to 93. Our bias is that while the dollar has been rebounding since the beginning of the month, the rally could prove to be a healthy counter-trend move in the long-term dollar bear market. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 A Simple Framework For Currencies - July 17, 2020 DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been mixed: The Sentix investor confidence increased from -13.4 to -8 in September. GDP plunged by 11.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, or 14.7% year-on-year.  The euro declined by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The ECB decided to keep its interest rate and PEPP program unchanged on this Thursday. President Christine Lagarde sounded quite hawkish in the press conference, saying that incoming data since the last monetary policy meeting suggest “a strong rebound in activity broadly in line with previous expectations.” We continue to favor the euro against the US dollar. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been mixed: The coincident index increased from 74.4 to 76.2 in July. The leading economic index also climbed up from 83.8 to 86.9 in July. The current account balance widened from ¥167 billion to ¥1,468 billion in July. GDP plunged by 7.9% quarter-on-quarter in Q2, or 28.1% on an annualized basis. Preliminary machine tool orders continued to fall by 23.3% year-on-year in August. Overall household spending contracted by 7.6% year-on-year in July. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The expansion in Japan’s current account balance is mainly driven by the decline in domestic demand. Exports fell by 19.2% year-on-year in July while imports slumped at a faster pace by 22.3%. This suggests that deflationary forces are returning to Japan, which will boost real rates and buffet the yen. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been mostly positive: Retail sales continued to increase, rising by 4.7% year-on-year in August, following a 4.3% increase the previous month. Halifax house prices increased by 5.2% year-on-year for the 3 months to August. The Markit construction PMI declined from 58.1 to 54.6 in August. The British pound extended its sell-off this week, depreciating by 2.5% against the US dollar, making it the worst-performing G10 currency. Under ongoing trade negotiations, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit is now putting more downward pressure on the pound after the summer rally. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been mixed: The AiG services performance index fell from 44 to 42.5 in August. The NAB business confidence increased from -14 to -8 in August while the business conditions index fell from 0 to -6. The Australian dollar appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Spending fell sharply during the pandemic, pushing Australia’s savings rate to 19.8% from 6%. Until consumer spending returns in earnest, the RBA is unlikely to raise rates, which puts a cap on how far the AUD can rise. The good news is that household balance sheets are being mended, which reduces macroeconomic risk. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been mixed: Manufacturing sales plunged by 12.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. The preliminary ANZ business confidence index increased from -41.8% to -26% in September. The ANZ activity outlook index also ticked up from -17.5% to -9.9%. The New Zealand dollar fell initially against the US dollar, then recovered, returning flat this week. The ANZ New Zealand Business Outlook shows that most activity indicators have increased to the highest levels since the beginning of the pandemic but are still well below pre-COVID-19 levels. We like the New Zealand dollar against the US dollar but believe that it will underperform against other pro-cyclical currencies including the Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been positive: On the labor market front, the unemployment rate declined from 10.9% to 10.2% in August. The participation rate increased from 64.3% to 64.6%. Average hourly wages surged by 6% year-on-year in August. Housing starts increased by 6.9% month-on-month to 262.4K in August, the highest reading since 2007. The Canadian dollar depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of Canada maintained its target rate at 0.25% on Wednesday. It is also continuing large-scale asset purchases of at least C$5 billion per week of government bonds. Moreover, the Bank suggested that the bounce-back in activity in Q3 was better than expected, which bodes well for the loonie. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been mixed: FX reserves continued to increase from CHF 847 billion to CHF 848 billion in August. The unemployment rate remained unchanged at 3.4% in August. The Swiss franc appreciated by 1% against the US dollar this week. The SNB Chairman Thomas Jordan said that “stronger currency market interventions relieve over-valuation pressure on the Swiss franc and protect the Swiss economy”. Recent dollar weakness could be another headache for the SNB, accelerating SNB’s currency intervention. While we like the franc as a safe-haven hedge with high real rates, the upside potential is likely to be more gradual as the SNB leans against it. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been positive: Manufacturing output increased by 1.8% month-on-month in July. Headline consumer price inflation ticked up from 1.3% to 1.7% year-on-year in August. Core inflation continued rising to 3.7% year-on-year from 3.5% the previous month. The Norwegian krone depreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The increase in headline inflation was mainly driven by furnishings and household equipment (10%), communications (4.9%) and food (3.7%). However, the Norwegian krone is still tremendously undervalued against the US dollar according to our models. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been mostly positive: The current account surplus fell to SEK 63.2 billion in Q2 from SEK 75.5 billion in Q1. However, this compares favorably to a surplus of SEK 34.7 billion the same quarter last year. Manufacturing new orders continued to fall by 6.4% year-on-year in July. This is an improvement compared to the 13.1% contraction the previous month. Headline consumer prices inflation increased from 0.5% to 0.8% year-on-year in August. Core inflation also climbed up from 0.5% to 0.7% year-on-year. The Swedish krona appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. We continue to favor the Swedish krona amid global economy recovery. Moreover, our PPP model shows that the krona is still undervalued by 19% against the US dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights Stocks face near-term downside risks from further delays in passing a new US fiscal stimulus package, a potentially slower-than-expected rollout of a Covid-19 vaccine, and the unwinding of speculative call option positions in large-cap US tech companies. Nevertheless, we continue to favor equities over bonds over a 12-month horizon. One key reason is that the global equity risk premium – proxied by the difference between the stock market earnings yield and the real government bond yield – remains quite large. Many observers argue that the bond yield component of the equity risk premium is distorted by central bank manipulation. They also contend that low bond yields reflect poor economic prospects and that structurally low borrowing costs could lead to malinvestment down the road. In this report, we push back against these views. We argue that today’s low bond yields do, in fact, provide a reliable estimate of the risk-free component of the discount rate; that the drop in yields over the past year mainly reflects higher private-sector savings and easier monetary policy rather than pessimism about growth and earnings; and that instead of leading to overinvestment, the main effect of falling interest rates, at least so far, has been to inflate the rents earned by companies with monopoly power. All of this means that lower interest rates really do justify higher market valuations. The Correction Is Not Over, But We Are Sticking With Our Bullish 12-Month View On Stocks Chart 1Tech Stocks At Greatest Risk Of A Pullback After recouping some of their losses on Wednesday, stocks stumbled again on Thursday. Since reaching new highs last week, global equities have dropped by 5.3%. US equities have taken the brunt of the beating. They are down 7% from last week’s top, compared to 3% for non-US stocks (Chart 1). The tech-heavy Nasdaq remains 9.4% off its record high. We continue to see near-term downside risks to global stocks, particularly US equities. It has now been six weeks since emergency US federal unemployment benefits lapsed. The US economy is set to rebound at a brisk pace in the third quarter – the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow model projects that output will grow 30% at an annualized pace – but GDP is rising from a very low base. In the absence of a new fiscal package, US growth could slow sharply in the fourth quarter and beyond, causing more workers to become permanently unemployed. Concern over the safety of the vaccines being developed to fight Covid-19 could also unsettle investors. On Wednesday, AstraZeneca announced that it had temporarily paused the Phase 3 trial of its vaccine co-developed with the University of Oxford after a patient suffered a severe reaction. Such delays are normal in the conduct of vaccine testing, but they do raise memories of the 1976 debacle with the Swine flu vaccine, which caused 450 Americans to come down with Guillain-Barré syndrome, a life-threatening neurological disorder.1 Chart 2Nasdaq Volatility Declined Even As Share Prices Tumbled These worries come on the heels of a six-month rally in tech stocks – one that was dangerously amplified by speculative call option purchases by retail investors. The preference among retail investors for short-dated calls allowed them to gain control of large swathes of shares at relatively little cost. Market makers and other counterparties who sold the calls were forced to buy the underlying stock to hedge their exposure. This created a self-reinforcing feedback loop where rising call option prices generated more purchases of the underlying stock, leading to even higher call prices. Starting last week, the process began to go in reverse. It is noteworthy that Nasdaq implied volatility actually fell on both Monday and Wednesday as tech stocks imploded, a possible sign that nervous investors were liquidating their call positions (Chart 2). It is difficult to know how much further this process has to run, but our guess is that a capitulation point has not yet been reached. This suggests that the correction is not yet over.   TINA’s Siren Song Despite our near-term concerns, we expect global equities to be higher in 12 months’ time. At least one of the nine vaccine candidates currently in Phase 3 trials is likely to produce a viable formula. Policymakers are also liable to heed the will of voters and maintain generous fiscal stimulus measures. All this should allow global growth to pick up. Stocks usually do well when global growth is accelerating (Chart 3). And then there is TINA. TINA — There Is No Alternative — has become a popular adage on Wall Street. As the argument goes, no matter how expensive stocks seem to get, bonds and cash are even less attractive. There is some logic to this view. Today, the dividend yield on the S&P 500 stands at 1.6%. While this dividend yield is well below its historic average of 4.3%, it is still higher than the 0.68% yield on the 10-year Treasury note (Chart 4). Chart 3Stocks Usually Do Well When Global Growth Is Accelerating Chart 4Bond Yields Have Fallen Below Dividend Yields Imagine an investor having to decide whether to place their money in an S&P 500 index fund or a 10-year Treasury note. Dividends-per-share paid by S&P 500 companies have almost always increased over time. However, even if we make the pessimistic assumption that dividends-per-share remain unchanged for the next ten years, the value of the S&P 500 would still have to fall by 9% over the next decade to equal the return on the 10-year note. Assuming that inflation averages 2% over this period, the real value of the S&P 500 would need to drop by 25%. The picture is even more dramatic outside the US. In the euro area, the index would have to fall by over 30% in real terms for investors to make more money in bonds than stocks. In the UK, it would need to fall by over 50%. Elevated Equity Risk Premia Granted, stocks are riskier than bonds. However, based on a comparison of dividend yields with bond yields, stocks today are significantly cheaper than usual (Chart 5). Chart 5AStocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds Chart 5BStocks Would Need To Fall A Lot For Equities To Underperform Bonds The relative attractiveness of stocks can also be inferred by subtracting the real bond yield from the cyclically-adjusted earnings yield on stocks in order to get an implied equity risk premium (ERP)2 (Chart 6). Outside the US, the ERP is high both because earnings yields are elevated and because real bond yields are depressed. In the US, which accounts for 56% of global stock market capitalization, the earnings yield is below its long-term average. Nevertheless, the US ERP is still quite high because real bond yields reside deep in negative territory. In fact, the US ERP has barely fallen since March because the decline in real yields has largely offset the rise in stock prices (Chart 7). Chart 6Equity Risk Premia Are Elevated Chart 7The Decline In US Real Yields Since March Has Largely Offset The Rise In Stock Prices   Are Bond Yields Fake News? Stock market bears will argue that the ERP is overstated by the abnormally low level of bond yields. Their argument typically centers on three points: Quantitative easing, forward guidance, NIRP and ZIRP have distorted bond yields to such an extent that we can no longer use them as a reliable measure of the risk-free component of the discount rate. Even if one accepts the premise that current bond yields are a valid proxy for the risk-free rate, the fact that yields are so low is hardly a cause for celebration. This is because today’s low yields reflect dismal economic prospects, which justifies a higher-than-normal equity risk premium. Low bond yields are incentivizing all sorts of malinvestment. With time, this will depress the rate of return on capital, leading to lower stock prices. Let’s examine all three arguments in turn. Are Bond Yields Being Manipulated? The term financial repression gets bandied around quite often these days. There is no doubt that central banks would like to keep yields low, but how much higher would yields be in the absence of any unorthodox monetary measures? Our guess is not much higher. The simplest test of whether bond yields are above or below their equilibrium level is to look at whether growth is above or below trend. The recovery following the financial crisis was anemic, suggesting that monetary policy was only modestly accommodative. If anything, one can argue that in much of the world, bond yields would be even lower today were it not for the fact that nominal interest rates cannot go much below zero. Do Low Bond Yields Reflect Bad News? Bond yields can decline for many reasons. Some of these reasons are positive for equity investors, while others are negative. If yields fall on the expectation of weaker economic growth, that is clearly bad for stocks. On the flipside, if yields drop because monetary policy has turned more dovish, that is good for stocks. The impact on equities from other factors influencing bond yields can be ambiguous. For example, consider the case of an increase in private-sector savings. All things equal, higher savings will lead to less spending. A decline in spending is likely to result in lower output and diminished corporate profits. That is bad for stocks. However, if governments absorb the excess private-sector savings by running larger budget deficits, there may end up being no net loss in aggregate demand. In that case, stock prices may not fall. Indeed, one can very easily envision a scenario where an adverse shock to private-sector spending leads to an increase in equity valuations. To see this point, consider a standard dividend discount model. Suppose something happens that leads the private sector to spend less at any given interest rate. Let us also suppose that the central bank reacts to this shock by cutting interest rates all the way down to zero, at which point governments, taking advantage of cheaper borrowing costs, step in and increase fiscal stimulus. The upshot could be a lower interest rate but at the same level of aggregate spending (See Box 1 for a formal economic discussion of how this process works). If aggregate demand – and by extension, corporate earnings and dividends — drop temporarily, while interest rates fall permanently (or at least semi-permanently), the present value of cash flows will rise. As far-fetched as this scenario may seem, something along these lines appears to have happened over the past six months. Chart 8 shows that analysts expect global profits to contract by 19% in 2020, but then rebound by 29% in 2021 and rise a further 16% the following year, leaving 2022 profits 21% above 2019 levels. Like everywhere else, analysts expect US profits to return to their long-term trend over the next few years. Meanwhile, the 30-year TIPS yield – a proxy for the risk-free component of the discount rate – has fallen by 94 basis points since the start of the year. Even if one assumes, contrary to the optimistic forecasts of analysts, that the level of US EPS does not return to its pre-pandemic trend until 2030, this would still leave the fair value of the S&P 500 17.5% higher than it was at the start of the year (Chart 9). Chart 8Analysts Expect Global Profits To Contract This Year Before Rebounding Chart 9The Present Value Of Earnings: A Scenario Analysis Will Low Interest Rates Lead To Malinvestment? A drop in interest rates may seem like a free lunch for shareholders: It increases the present value of future cash flows without reducing the cash flows themselves. In fact, one could argue that lower rates actually increase future cash flows by shrinking net interest payments on outstanding debt. That might be all fine and dandy, but what about the effect of low interest rates on future investment decisions? To the extent that lower rates increase the market value of a firm’s capital stock relative to its replacement cost – the so-called Tobin’s Q ratio – lower rates could spur more investment. Higher investment, in turn, could drive down the rate of return on capital, leading to lower profits (Box 2 illustrates this point with a simple example featuring a lemonade stand). While there is some truth to this logic, it is less compelling than it once was. This is because much of the capital stock of listed companies today takes the form of intangible capital – which is often difficult to reproduce – rather than physical capital. Such intangible capital may include patents and trademarks as well as monopoly power. In particular, internet companies have gained significant monopoly power from network effects: The more people use their service, the more valuable their service becomes. This is a key reason why falling interest rates have helped the tech giants more than other companies. The Path Ahead The section above argued that today’s low bond yields do, in fact, provide a reliable estimate of the risk-free component of the discount rate; that the drop in yields over the past year mainly reflects higher private-sector savings and easier monetary policy rather than pessimism about growth and earnings; and that instead of leading to overinvestment, the main effect of falling interest rates, at least so far, has been to inflate the rents earned by companies with monopoly power. All this means that lower interest rates really do justify higher market valuations. Looking out, while bond yields are unlikely to rise significantly over the next two years in the absence of any meaningful inflationary pressures, yields are unlikely to fall either given how low they already are. This is not necessarily bad news for stocks. As mentioned above, the equity risk premium is quite high, which means that stocks can rise even if bond yields do edge somewhat higher. The more interesting action is likely to occur beneath the broad indices. If bond yields stabilize, this will remove a major headwind to bank shares (Chart 10). On the flipside, the reopening of economies will benefit companies that were crushed by lockdown measures. Money will shift from “pandemic plays” to “recovery plays.” Chart 10Stabilization In Bond Yields Would Remove A Major Headwind To Bank Shares Chart 11US Stocks Are More Expensive   As we predicted three weeks ago in a report titled “The Return Of Nasdog,” tech and health care stocks will go from leaders to laggards. The US has a higher concentration of tech and health care stocks than most other regions. US stocks are also quite expensive based on standard valuation measures, including the Tobin's Q ratio discussed above (Chart 11). The bottom line is that investors should remain overweight global equities over a 12-month horizon, while pivoting towards value stocks and non-US markets.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Box 1The Role Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy Following Savings Shocks Box 2Fancy Some Lemonade? An Example Of Tobin’s Q Footnotes 1 Rick Perlstein, “Gerald Ford Rushed Out a Vaccine. It Was a Fiasco,” The New York Times, September 2, 2020. 2 It is necessary to subtract the real bond yield, rather than the nominal bond yield, from the earnings yield because the earnings yield provides an estimate of the real total expected return to shareholders. For further discussion on this, please see Appendix A of the Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “TINA To The Rescue?” dated August 23, 2019.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Special Report Feature Investors are increasingly concerned that the US presidential election this year will fail to produce a legitimate result, leading to an escalation in political instability and uncertainty. In this report we hold a Q&A session that we hope will serve as your concise and definitive guide to a contested US election – by which we mean an election that is not decided by the popular vote or Electoral College but requires the intervention of the US Congress or Supreme Court to determine the final outcome. As always, this report draws on the best academic work on the subject, but is not limited to academic conclusions. We apply our geopolitical method and macroeconomic perspective to determine the likeliest scenarios and financial market impacts.  The takeaway? Most likely the election result will be decisive, as incumbent presidents tend to lose amid recessions. However, with President Trump staging a comeback, a contested election is possible and investors would be wise to prepare for volatility over the next two-to-four months at minimum.         Chart 1Trump At Disadvantage In Popular Opinion A good rule of thumb: Trump is at a disadvantage in raw popular opinion (Chart 1), so anything that directs the election decision away from the popular vote and toward constitutional procedures should be seen as a lifeline for Trump, and hence a recipe for a bigger trade war and prolonged US equity outperformance. How Is The US President Elected? The US elects presidents by means of electors, private citizens appointed by each of the 50 states to vote on their population’s behalf, i.e. the Electoral College. The popular vote, or canvass, has been the prevailing method of choosing each state’s electors since the 1840s. The vote is held and tallied by the election authorities of the states on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November (e.g. November 3, 2020). Each state has different laws on how to hold elections and appoint a slate of electors loyal to the winning candidate in the state. The constitution grants state legislatures the power to appoint the electors. This could become a source of controversy in a contested election.1 Generally the state’s secretary of state approves the popular tally which then determines which slate of electors is appointed. The state governor certifies the names of the electors and the numbers of votes received, signs the letter and applies the state seal, and then sends multiple copies to various authorities for surety.2  If disputes arise over a state’s election results, the state will ideally resolve them by December 8 (Table 1), six days before the electors meet to fill out their ballots for the president and vice-president. Electors meet in the state capital on the first Monday after the second Wednesday of December (e.g. Monday, December 14, 2020) and cast their vote. They send certificates of their vote to the President of the United States Senate in Washington, DC, who is also the nation’s vice president, currently Mike Pence.  Table 1Calendar Of US Election 2020 On January 6 of the New Year (2021), the President of the Senate presides over a special joint session of the new Congress, which itself convenes on January 3. He presents the states’ electoral votes to Congress alphabetically. The votes are counted, with Congress employing official tellers to record the sums.3  If any disputes are raised against any state’s electoral votes, the two houses of Congress must agree in order to disqualify those votes. If the two houses disagree, the votes will be counted. The Senate President, as the constitutional keeper of the electoral returns and presiding officer of the joint session, has some influence, which is another potential source of controversy. When the count is done, the tellers hand their results to the Senate President, who reads them off. Usually the leading candidate captures an absolute majority of the Electoral College (270/538 votes), so the next president is crystal clear and the whole ceremony is finished in half an hour. Alas, not always. What Electoral Results Can Be Ruled Out In 2020? Before getting into contested elections, it is important to address what is highly unlikely to occur in 2020. First, President Trump will not win the popular vote. Chart 2Trump Highly Unlikely To Win Popular Vote Trump won 46% of the popular vote in 2016, trailing Hillary Clinton by 2.9 million votes. Since 2017, Trump’s national approval rating has never risen above 50% in the average of polls. His disapproval rating is almost always higher than his approval (Chart 2). Thus if Trump wins the election it will be through his Electoral College strategy, as in 2016 – or through a contested election. The US has split the popular and Electoral College vote on five occasions, yielding a historical probability of 9%. The fifth time was President Trump’s victory in 2016; he would be the first president to do so twice. This is possible because the regional and demographic factors behind Trump’s win four years ago are still largely intact. Currently our quantitative election model gives Trump a 45% chance of winning the election (Chart 3). This is in line with the consensus view, as online betting markets put Trump’s odds at 43%. However, online gamblers put the odds of the next president losing the popular vote in a range of 27%-31%, which implies that his odds are lower given his low popularity (Chart 4). Chart 3Our Quant Election Model Gives Trump 45% Chance Of Victory Chart 4Trump Odds Weighed Down By Low Chance Of Popular Win Subjectively, we are sticking with our 35% chance of Trump winning, which falls in the middle of this range. What is clear is that Trump has a much greater chance than the historical 9% probability of winning without the popular vote.  There is nothing illegitimate about an Electoral College victory – far from it, it is the constitutional way in which the presidency is won. Nevertheless a victory without a popular mandate deprives the new administration of political capital. A second-term Trump is likely to be stymied at home and more inclined to act unilaterally abroad, a downside risk to global equity markets. Second, Republicans will not reclaim a majority of the House of Representatives. Chart 5Republicans Highly Unlikely To Win House Of Representatives To do so, the GOP would have to retain all Republican-leaning seats (yielding 186) plus all “toss up” seats (totaling 214) and then four additional Democratic-leaning seats. Yet there are only two Democratic-leaning seats that do not benefit from the incumbent advantage (Chart 5).4 The re-election rate in the House and Senate is around 85-95%. Neither the state of the economy nor Trump’s approval rating suggest that Republicans are capable of such a big victory in the House (Chart 6). Chart 6Trump An Albatross For House Republicans Third, Democrats are unlikely to win a majority of the state delegations in the House of Representatives. Currently, Republicans have a majority on 26 of the 50 delegations of lawmakers that the states send to the US House of Representatives. Democrats control 23 state delegations, while Pennsylvania is neutral. If the presidential election is close, then the balance of power among the state delegations will most likely stay the same. Republicans are likely to retain 25 state delegations, whereas Democrats would have to win all five toss-up delegations plus Florida merely to tie the Republicans with 25 delegations (Table 2). This is a tall order. Table 2Democrats Unlikely To Win Majority Of State Delegations In House Of Representatives The Republicans’ state-by-state House majority would prove critical in a contested election, as we will see. Otherwise it doesn’t matter much. What Is A Contested Election? Chart 7Extreme Political Polarization Means Election Disputes Will Rage The 2020 election will inevitably see legal challenges, vote recounts, and procedural problems. Partisanship is at extreme levels, meaning that the two parties will do anything to win (Chart 7). The unprecedented large-scale adoption of mail-in voting due to the COVID-19 pandemic also ensures that recounts and legal disputes will abound.5 Neither candidate is likely to concede defeat quickly or easily. While President Trump is explicit about his reluctance to concede, there is zero chance that Joe Biden will bow out quietly like Al Gore did in the 2000 dispute.   However, investors should distinguish a contested election, in which the resolution of disputes will determine the final outcome, from a controversial election, in which the final outcome is known but the defeated candidate refuses to concede. Either could be market-relevant, but the first scenario is the primary concern as it yields the powers of the presidency. The rest is aftermath. The bedrock principle of US presidential succession is as follows: Constitutionally, if the Electoral College vote falls short of a clear majority (270 out of 538), the House of Representatives chooses the president on a majority vote, with each state receiving only one vote. Similarly, the Senate chooses the vice president.6 President Trump is favored to win in this scenario. As mentioned, Republicans may well hold 26 of the 50 state delegations in the House. A clear majority on either side removes any risk of indecision: the next president will be chosen on a party-line vote of the states. For Democrats to choose the president in the House, they need a landslide victory. This is possible, but then it would imply that President Trump has been soundly beaten in the presidential race. A contested election presupposes a close national race that is likely to result in the status quo balance of power among the states in Congress, and hence an advantage for Trump if the House chooses the president. Map 1 illustrates the fundamental shift in American political power if the House of Representatives votes on a state-by-state basis to resolve a contested election. It alters the geography of each state according to the voting age population, the Electoral College representation from 2016, and an equal weighting in which each state gets the same number of votes, as in the House’s contested election procedure. The Electoral College is not nearly as distortive of the popular will as is often made out. However, the red states greatly increase their prominence in an equal weighting (just as in the US Senate). Map 1Trump Disfavored In Popular Vote, But Favored If Contested Election Decided In House Of Representatives The fundamental takeaway is that President Trump is disfavored when it comes to the popular vote in the states, but if the election is contested and shifts to the House of Representatives, he has a lifeline. Yet if Democrats win the Senate in the election, this lifeline will be cut off. Moreover, the Supreme Court is a wild card, as discussed below.  What Can We Learn From Past Contested Elections? Chart 8US Contested Elections Often Coincide With Deflationary Economy The US has witnessed four contested elections under our definition. Most of them occurred amid deflationary economic trends, which would fit with today’s environment (Chart 8). Each episode can be described as a “stolen election,” depending on one’s point of view.  The key lessons for today are as follows: 1800 – “The Revolution” – Vice President Thomas Jefferson, as Senate President, chose to count the electoral votes from Georgia even though they lacked the governor’s signature and failed to meet federal requirements. This gave him a majority of the electoral votes, which ultimately led to his election.7 If he had rejected these votes, the outgoing House of Representatives would have chosen his rival candidate, John Adams, as president. Takeaway: The vice president has the constitutional authority to present the electoral votes for counting and to oversee the joint session of Congress. If Congress is divided, and the vice president has a decision as to whether to present a certain set of electoral votes, then the vice president could tip the election in his own party’s favor. Also noteworthy: the presence or absence of a governor’s signature on a state’s electoral votes is not definitive. 1824 – “The Corrupt Bargain” – Andrew Jackson lost the election despite winning both the popular vote and the Electoral College vote. With a hung vote in the college, the House of Representatives decided the election among the top three candidates. The Speaker of the House threw his weight behind John Quincy Adams, who then nominated the speaker as the secretary of state in his new administration. Takeaway: Washington insiders can determine the outcome arbitrarily if they control the House of Representatives. A hung Electoral College, or tie, throws the election to the House and thus favors Trump. 1876 – “The Stolen Election” – Democrat Samuel Tilden won the popular vote and the most electoral votes, at 184, while Republican Rutherford Hayes won 165 electoral votes. Tilden was one vote shy of an Electoral College majority (185), while Hayes fell 20 votes shy. Republican control of four states led to an alternative set of Republican electoral votes being sent to Washington. Congress then had to choose between the rival electoral slates. To resolve the dispute, Congress created a special bipartisan committee. The tiebreaking member of the committee was disqualified by a fluke, leading to a replacement who voted on party lines, awarding all 20 disputed electoral votes to Hayes, who thus won the presidency. Simultaneously lawmakers negotiated a grand compromise to ensure Congress would not filibuster the committee’s decision: Hayes would withdraw federal troops from the South, which had been occupied since the Civil War. Takeaway: A party can use control of states to send an alternate set of electoral returns to Washington, muddying the electoral counting process and throwing the election into Congress’s hands. Also, Congress is supreme and can create special mechanisms to resolve electoral disputes. Political solutions are essential when constitutional mechanisms fail.   2000 – Bush versus Gore – Contested election results in Florida led Democrat Al Gore to withdraw his concession to Republican George W. Bush. The Gore legal team convinced the Florida Supreme Court to allow several recounts, including a statewide recount. The Florida legislature, along with Florida Governor Jeb Bush, prepared to certify Jeb’s brother’s victory and send electoral votes to Washington. The US Supreme Court intervened, halting a statewide recount, on the basis of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and in rejection of the Florida court’s novel recount scheme. Takeaway: The Supreme Court can and will intervene in a state election dispute if it is becoming a legal morass. Previously the states settled disputes themselves, or the US Congress settled disputes in Washington. Though the Supreme Court claimed that its ruling did not set a precedent, the clear precedent is that the Supreme Court will intervene if there is a power vacuum. Each of these contested elections sparked extreme partisan controversy.8 In two of them, both the popular and electoral results were thrown out the window. The lesson is that the House of Representatives is definitive. Unless, of course, the Supreme Court preempts it. Since both the Constitution and statutory history point to Congress, not the Supreme Court, as the arbiter of presidential elections, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would overrule the House if the House makes its decision first. But it is still possible, and this is a major source of uncertainty for 2020 or future elections. To fix the various problems that have arisen over the years, Washington has passed several laws, such as the twelfth amendment (1804) and the Electoral Count Act (1887). But fundamental disagreements can still emerge: namely over the constitutional power of the state legislatures to appoint electors, the value of the governor’s signature on his or her state’s electoral votes, and whether the President of the Senate has a substantive or merely ceremonial role. Any of these factors could result in confusion and controversy in 2020-21. How Will States Settle Disputes? On the state level, prior to the joint session of Congress to count the electoral votes on January 6, a range of shenanigans could occur, and the states may never actually settle their disputes. States are supposed to settle any internal recounts or disputes by December 8, 2020 for “safe harbor” status. This status urges, but does not require, the US Congress to accept the state’s final determination of its own electoral votes. If a state fails of this status, Congress may still count its votes, but it has a freer hand to do as it pleases. Thus each party will attempt through judicial or legislative actions to rush and achieve safe harbor status if it believes it won the popular vote count, and will attempt to delay and deprive the state of that status if not. If the legislature and governor agree, then this will be no problem. If they do not agree, the risk emerges that a state battle could escalate all the way to Washington. States with Republican governors, and a Republican or at least a divided legislature, could ensure that Republican electoral votes are sent to Washington in the event of a dispute. This is particularly important in the case of Arizona and Florida, but it also applies to Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas in 2020. The same goes for Democrats, although there are fewer swing states that fit this description (e.g. Minnesota), as Table 3 shows. Table 3Swing States: Balance Of Legislative And Executive Power The reason for this is that the Electoral Count Act of 1887 instructs Congress to favor the electoral votes with the governor’s signature if there is any dispute about which results to accept when the US Congress holds the final count. If the governor is not opposed by his own legislature, then his certified results will be the ones that go to Congress.    However, states with a unified legislature, either Republican or Democratic, could conceivably send electoral votes of their choice regardless of what the state governor does – and this is relevant for several of the most important swing states in 2020, specifically Republican legislatures under Democratic governors in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, and North Carolina, and Democratic legislatures under Republican governors, as in New Hampshire. The constitution endows state legislatures with the power to appoint electors, so legislatures could attempt to override their governors – or even their state supreme courts. Indeed, Florida’s legislature and governor were prepared to send Republican electoral votes to Washington regardless of the Florida high court’s actions in the year 2000. How Will Congress Count The Votes? Republicans will not have unified control of the federal legislature and executive, as noted above. Hence Republican congressmen and senators will not be able to pick and choose which electoral votes to accept at their discretion when the votes are counted on January 6, 2021. House Democrats would prevent them from rejecting any state’s electoral votes for arbitrary reasons.  On the other hand, the Democrats are quite likely to pick up the Senate, and a united Democratic Congress would have the power to pick and choose electoral votes at its discretion. The Democrats could disqualify the electoral votes of a state that voted for Trump in the event of a dispute, tipping the scales in Biden’s favor, during the electoral counting process. For example, say President Trump wins 270 electoral votes and Biden wins 268 – a likely scenario if Trump wins all the 2016 states but loses Pennsylvania and Michigan. Ostensibly President Trump would be re-elected. But the Democratic House and Senate could disqualify the 10 electoral votes of Wisconsin due to any disputes in that state over its popular vote or electors. Trump’s votes would fall to 260 while Biden would retain his original 268. A unified Congress could simultaneously decide to disqualify Wisconsin’s electors from the 538 total of appointed electors, saying the electors were not legally appointed, bringing the total denominator of electors to 528, thus giving Biden a three-vote margin of victory (majority: 265/528). Biden would become the president. If Congress is divided then this kind of manipulation is not possible. Either a bipartisan agreement would determine whether to count a state’s votes – which would be credible and legitimate – or a bipartisan disagreement would lead to the disputed electoral votes being counted. Chart 9Democrats Likely To Win Senate, Hence Congress – Huge Perk In Electoral Count Hence the makeup of the Senate on January 3, which may not be wholly complete at that time, is of great consequence. Democrats are structurally favored to win the Senate this year. They have 12 seats up for re-election versus 23 for Republicans, and only two of their seats are at risk whereas 10 are at risk for Republicans (Chart 9). We expect Democrats to take the Senate, but in a close presidential race the Senate could tie at 50-50. If Republicans retain the Senate, then Vice President Mike Pence could take on a substantive role in counting the Electoral College votes, rather than a merely ceremonial role of presenting the electoral returns to the joint session. If a state sends questionable electoral returns, or more than one set of returns, Pence could conceivably choose which results to present to Congress. A unified Congress could override him but a divided Congress might not. There is precedent for a vice president making a decision on electoral counting that affects the outcome in his own favor, as noted above. While modern scholars tend to highlight the conflict of interest here, the constitution could be read as giving the vice president this advantage so as to more speedily settle any disputes.9 The Electoral Count Act of 1887 says that when in doubt, Congress should accept the electoral votes certified by a state’s governor. But this position was controversial at the time and may not be constitutional. The vice president could assert his own authority to present the legitimate votes to Congress to be counted. It is not clear that a conservative-leaning Supreme Court would contradict him, since neither the constitution nor the Electoral Count Act envisions the court as arbitrating these kinds of disputes. Thus it is conceivable that a situation could arise in which a critical swing state sends two sets of returns and Vice President Pence chooses the electors in favor of himself and President Trump, with a Republican Senate preventing the Democratic House from doing anything about it. A strict constructionist Supreme Court would likely defer to whatever happens in Congress. However, the court could be activist, given that Chief Justice John Roberts is a well-known swing player. It could interpose in a way that precludes any actions deemed entirely arbitrary or lacking a plausible basis in the facts of the state’s election results and laws. As we saw, the court will be inclined to fill a power vacuum. The takeaway is that a unified Congress could count the electoral votes in such a way as to secure a Biden win, while a divided Congress could count the electoral votes in such a way as to give President Trump a lifeline in a disputed election. The Supreme Court is a wild card. What About An Electoral College Tie Or Faithless Electors? A contested election, using the narrow definition, would occur due to an Electoral College tie at 269-269 or any other anomalies that prevent either candidate from reaching a 270-vote majority. Again, the House of Representatives would decide on a state-by-state basis, likely favoring Trump. For example, some electoral votes could be disqualified, a third party candidate could split the vote, or “faithless electors” could vote contrary to their state’s popular choice.10  An electoral tie is not a negligible risk in 2020 – there are 68 possible combinations, and many of them are plausible.11 In 2016, 11 states had a margin of victory less than 5%. Take two equally realistic examples. If Trump lost Pennsylvania and Michigan (likely) as well as Nebraska’s second district (Omaha/suburbs, which President Obama won) then he would tie Biden at 269. Or, if Trump lost Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Arizona (which leaned Democratic in 2018), yet gained Minnesota (the epicenter of the crisis over race and law enforcement), a tie would occur. In a near-tie, a few wayward electors could deprive either candidate of a win. This is far more likely to happen to Trump than Biden. Table 4Range Of Electoral College Votes, 2020 The current combinations of truly competitive states suggest that the Democrats have a lock on 268-319 electoral votes while Republicans only have a lock on 169-219 electoral votes (Table 4). Trump is widely expected to lose both Pennsylvania and Michigan, which alone cut him down to 270 votes; the loss of a single vote from there would deprive him of a majority. By contrast, Biden would hit 278 votes at minimum by picking off a single Republican state in addition to Pennsylvania and Michigan. It is more likely that Trump would lose one or two faithless electors than that Biden would lose nine or ten. So it is more likely that faithless electors would deprive Trump of a win than Biden. But then the House of Representatives would have to resolve the impasse, and would likely favor Trump. What Is The Line Of Succession If The House Fails To Choose A President? What happens if a contested election goes to the House but the state delegations tie at 25-25? Then the House must continue voting over and over until one of the presidential candidates gets the majority. A single lawmaker in a critical state could swing the balance. That lawmaker could be swayed by conscience, bribes, or chance. In 1824, a critical lawmaker from New York changed his vote at the last minute because he found a ballot with John Q. Adams’s name on it and believed it was a sign from God. In 1876, the tiebreaking Supreme Court judge in the congressional commission delegated to work out a compromise solution was disqualified after it was found he had won a simultaneous race for a seat in the Senate.12 The House would eventually decide, but if the state delegations are evenly split, the voting could continue through January 20, Inauguration Day. The vice president would take over at that time. The vice president is chosen by a majority vote of the Senate. If Democrats take the Senate, they would choose California Senator Kamala Harris as the vice president, and she would act as president until the House made its choice. If the Senate vote also split at 50-50 on the new vice president, then the Speaker of the House, who is likely still to be California Representative Nancy Pelosi, would serve as acting president under the statutory line of presidential succession (Table 5). Table 5US Line Of Succession If Presidency Vacant Obviously both the House and the Senate would be under immense pressure to make a decision, so the power vacuum would not last more than a couple of months at most. The US would not be without a leader. However, its leader would be an interim leader with limited ability to make major policy changes or act proactively at home or abroad. It might be a good time for China to stage a surprise attack on Taiwan, or for other revisionist powers like Russia, Iran, or Turkey to make aggressive moves, while the global policeman is asleep at the wheel.13  What Is The “Blue Shift” And Does It Matter? The scholar Edward Foley has called attention to the phenomenon of the “Blue Shift” as a possible pretext for President Trump to contest the election result. The blue shift is the emerging tendency for US election tallies to change significantly after election day as a result of absentee and mail-in ballots that arrive after in-person ballots are counted.14  In 2018, the Arizona senate election went from Republican, as of the tally on November 6 to Democratic as of November 12 as a result of the blue shift. This produced whiplash for Republican supporters who thought they had won (Table 6).  Table 6“ Blue Shift” Means Vote Count Leans Democratic As Late Votes Arrive Will COVID-19 exacerbate the blue shift in 2020? While Republicans are less fearful of the virus and Democrats more enthusiastic about mail-in voting, the pandemic’s effect will be for more people in general to vote by mail, which should reduce the Democratic skew relative to previous elections. Still, there will be some Democratic skew which opens the possibility that an election that looks like a Republican win in the wee hours of November 4 could later fall to the Democrats. Foley entertains a scenario in which President Trump disputes the election on the basis of this apparent, but not real, shift in the election results. However, a blue shift would not prevent state-level election boards from correctly tallying and certifying the result. Trump can always cry foul, but only a small group of Republican supporters will believe him if the results are duly and transparently verified by a bipartisan consensus among the branches of state government. This scenario is thus governed by the points made above regarding the role of state legislatures: if a swing state’s legislature genuinely disagrees with the state’s election board or governor, then it could send its own set of electoral votes to Washington. If Republicans control the Senate, then this alternate set of electoral votes could be accepted. What Happens After A Contested Election? The constitutional power to count the Electoral College votes, and to determine the election if the college is indecisive, lies with Congress (and/or the Supreme Court). The rest is just the wailing and gnashing of teeth.  This wailing and gnashing could still prove market-relevant, however. If the defeated candidate has enough popular support, he would reduce the effectiveness of the new administration. If President Trump is re-elected on any of the technicalities above, he will face an unprecedented popular opposition and social unrest, likely fanned by Biden and a unified Democratic Party. Trump’s administration would be weak at home and would only have influence abroad, creating downside for global risk assets. Polarization is extreme – the two parties will do anything to win the White House. Chart 10Republicans Will Drop Trump Like Nixon If He Loses By contrast, if President Trump loses and refuses to concede, then he will actually reduce policy uncertainty in the United States. Trump’s support among Republicans is premised on his ability to win and drive through their favored policies; his support will plummet if he loses, just as Richard Nixon’s plummeted after the Watergate tapes were revealed (Chart 10). Trump could create an alt-right social media empire and serve as a gadfly, or he could lead a “rump” of the Republican Party to break away. Either way, he would divide and weaken the Republicans relative to the now-ruling Democrats, which would eventually lead to greater policy certainty. Without steady opposition, Democrats would achieve more of their agenda. This would increase risks for certain equity sectors (health care, energy), but would actually reduce polarization as the Democratic majority would more easily cooperate with moderate Republicans.  The latter scenario would be hugely important. Trump could hobble the Republicans for years. This would pave the way for a Democratic ascendancy. Such an ascendancy is already possible based on trends in age, demographics, and ideology, but a serious split in the Republican Party would ensure that it comes to pass. The negative side-effect is that the populist fringe would be more likely to become disaffected or radicalized. Implications For The Long Run The advanced democracies have seen a period of relative peace and prosperity since World War II that kept their electoral disputes limited. They have sought to use multilateral institutions to promote free and fair elections across the rest of the world. But globalization has disrupted their internal political balances, particularly in the United States, making them vulnerable to governance and electoral failures usually associated with emerging and frontier markets (Table 7). Table 7Worldwide Contested Elections Rarely End Peacefully Even prior to COVID-19 the US had reached historic levels of political polarization. The downward spiral of partisanship began when the Soviet Union collapsed and the country no longer faced a common external enemy. The Democrats and Republicans rapidly descended into a fratricidal battle over what they thought would be world supremacy. Today polarization is exploding into open power struggle, with President Trump preemptively casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election and his challenger suggesting that the US military will have to remove him from office if he defies the election result (with prominent generals explicitly contemplating “collective action” to remove Trump).15 Social unrest is morphing into ideological and political violence in the streets. There is ample fuel for unrest and violence to intensify. The party that comes out on top of the 2020 election will have significant influence over the future, including taxing and spending, trade and foreign policy, Supreme Court picks, redistricting after the 2020 census, the fate of the Senate filibuster, and the debate over statehood for Washington, DC. If President Trump wins, it will either be narrowly, through the Electoral College, or through a contested election settled in the House of Representatives. It will prevent a new consensus forming on fiscal policy and the redistribution of wealth. The same goes for a Biden win with Republicans keeping the Senate. As such, polarization will increase for a few more years, before the next generation’s leftward political shift overtakes the Republicans.  Nevertheless, while domestic policy will swing on the Senate, the next president will mostly be important in shaping US policy toward the rest of the world. In this respect, it is notable that Biden and Trump are both competing to see who is more mercantilist and protectionist. The US’s secular competition with China is likely to help cultivate national consensus on a range of policies in the coming decade. And if the Democrats win with a clean sweep – which we still see as the most likely outcome – the painful process of forming a new consensus on taxing and spending will begin in 2021. The US will have witnessed a sea change in fiscal policy as well as trade policy. Partisanship will remain high, but a strong Democratic majority on taxing and spending, combined with Democrats flagrantly coopting Trump’s stance on trade and China, looks to us like the seeds of a new national policy consensus that will reduce US political polarization over the long run. A Trump victory on a technicality will lead to a weak government and trade war. A Biden victory will have popular support and lead to higher taxes. Chart 11Stock Market Will Sell Off Amid Contested Election, As In Past Unfortunately, this year and the next few years will still see polarization at extremes.  It goes without saying that the US election cycle in 2020-21 will bring surprises and likely induce financial market volatility, beyond what has been seen. Judging by history, a full-fledged contested election will likely lead to a substantial equity pullback (Chart 11) – especially in a recessionary context, as in the case of the 1876 “Stolen Election.”   Beyond that, Trump’s re-election would pose a major trade war risk for global assets, a boon for continued US equity outperformance relative to the world. Biden would reduce global risks, while hiking domestic risks due to higher taxes and regulation, thus encouraging the opposite effect.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    See Article II, Section I of the US Constitution.  2   See “Electoral College Instructions To State Officials,” National Archives and Records Administration, Office of the Federal Register, available at archives.gov. 3   See Article II, i and Amendment XII of the Constitution. There is some disagreement about what the constitution says regarding who does the counting. But a miscounting of the results, if the results are clear, is not credible. The vice president cannot deliberately miscount the vote, nor could Congress. However, if the results are not clear, disagreements could emerge in which the vice president could have a decisive impact. See Stephen A. Siegel, “The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide To The Electoral Count Act of 1887,” Florida Law Review 56 (2004), floridalawreview.com. Throughout this report we are highly indebted to Siegel’s authoritative study. 4   See Cook Political Report, “2020 House Race Ratings,” August 21, 2020, cookpolitical.com.  5   See for example Anna Baringer et al, “Voting by Mail and Ballot Rejection: Lessons from Florida for Elections in the Age of the Coronavirus,” University of Florida Election Science Group, August 20, 2020, electionscience.clas.ufl.edu. 6   See Amendment XII of the Constitution. 7   See Siegel, “The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide.” For the historical details in this section, see Paul F. Boller, Jr., Presidential Campaigns: From George Washington To George W. Bush (Oxford: OUP, 1984 [2004]). The House had to vote between Jefferson and his vice presidential candidate, Aaron Burr, who had the same number of electoral votes. At that time the president and vice president were not treated separately. Jefferson ultimately won when a handful of state delegations in the House abstained after several rounds of voting. Subsequently the twelfth amendment to the constitution was passed so that presidents and vice presidents were chosen separately, avoiding an Electoral College tie between two members of the same party ticket. 8   In 1800, Thomas Jefferson warned of civil war. In 1824, Andrew Jackson fumed that the will of the people had been cheated and plotted revenge, which he got in 1828. In 1876, Washington sent federal troops to monitor state election boards and some southern states threatened to rise up again. In 2000, a debatable court intervention fueled a left-wing backlash and a vicious spiral of polarization that continues to this day. 9   Here and elsewhere in this report we are indebted to Edward B. Foley, “Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An Exercise in Election Risk Assessment and Management,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 51:2 (2019), lawecommons.luc.edu. 10  Regarding “faithless electors,” the Supreme Court this year unanimously upheld the ability of states to punish electors who break their pledge. But faithless electors are still possible, and could conceivably deprive an Electoral College winner of his victory. The 2016 election saw seven electors deviate from their party (out of 10 who tried), abnormally high. The extreme political environment is likely to produce defectors. See “Supreme Court Clarifies Rules for Electoral College: States May Restrict Faithless Electors,” Congressional Research Service, July 10, 2020, crsreports.congress.gov. 11   See “Electoral College Tie Finder,” 270 To Win, www.270towin.com. 12  See Boller, Presidential Campaigns. 13  See Admiral James A. Winnefeld and Michael J. Morell, "The War That Never Was?" US Naval Institute Proceedings 146: 8 (August 2020), usni.org. 14  See Foley, “Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election.” This trend began with electoral reforms that made absentee balloting easier in 2002, but it is also a broader trend. Republicans tend to vote in person; those who vote through mail skew Democratic. Therefore the initial results favor Republicans, while the final results bring in a rush of ballots favoring Democrats. 15  See Brittany Bernstein, “Mattis Told Then-DNI Coats They May Be Forced to Take ‘Collective Action’ against ‘Unfit’ Trump, According to New Woodward Book,” National Review Online, September 9, 2020, nationalreview.com.
Highlights Economic data in August point to a faster recovery in demand than in production. The service-sector recovery is picking up speed; consumption growth remains negative, but will benefit from a steady rebound in the service sector. The strong upward momentum in China’s stock prices, on the other hand, has lost some steam since the second half of July. Policy supports and improving economic fundamentals still warrant a constructive stance on Chinese stocks over the coming 6 to 12 months. Feature Both soft and hard data released over the past couple of weeks indicate that China’s economic recovery remains on track. August’s official PMI new orders sub-index continued to advance, and the official non-manufacturing PMI made the largest month-to-month improvement since March when the Chinese economy reopened. Hard economic data, such as exports and sales of homes, cars and retail goods, show that both external and domestic demand growth is strengthening.   Chart 1Chinese Stocks Taking A Breather From July's Rally, Despite Improving Economic Fundamentals Despite the economic improvement, the July rally in Chinese stocks faltered in August and into the first week of September. Although stock prices are still 12-15% higher than the end of June and continue to outperform global benchmarks, they are slightly below their mid-July peak in absolute terms (Chart 1). The pause in China’s stock market was inevitable because of the stunning pace of acceleration in early July, which saw margin lending rise to explosive levels that invited Chinese policymakers to cool the market. Last week’s corrections in the high-flying US tech stock prices also dragged down some of the Chinese tech sector's top performers. US sanctions targeting China’s tech companies may exacerbate downward pressure on the sector’s performance. Therefore, we continue to recommend that investors hold a neutral position for the next three months on Chinese tech stocks, in both absolute and relative terms. The outlook for China’s economic growth and monetary conditions supports our constructive view on the overall Chinese stocks, over a cyclical (6 -12 months) horizon. In the near term, we prefer offshore stocks outside of the tech sphere, and prefer onshore semiconductor stocks within a global semi equity portfolio. China’s “old economy” sectors, such as industrials and materials, will continue to benefit from the ongoing massive stimulus. Furthermore, the semiconductor sector has become China’s new poster child, as the country ramps up longer-term, earnings-friendly policy supports to develop its domestic semiconductor industry and counter the Trump administration’s restrictions.1  Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Tables 1 and 2 present key developments in China’s economic and financial market performance in the past month, and we highlight several aspects below: China’s NBS manufacturing PMI was essentially unchanged in August (51 vs. 51.1 in July), but details of the survey imply that what has underpinned an industrial sector improvement this year remains in place. Although the production sub-index slowed, the new orders component increased, indicating that demand is strengthening relative to supply (Chart 2). The export orders component of the manufacturing PMI and the newly released trade data are both improving, suggesting that external demand is also holding up (Chart 2, bottom panel). The steel industry’s PMI fell to 47 in August from 49.2. As noted in last month’s China Macro And Market Review,2 the consistent outperformance in production recovery relative to demand since Q1 has led to an inventory buildup and a pullback in production. Inventory destocking will likely impede China’s imports of major commodities until the laggard recovery in industrial demand sustainably outpaces production (Chart 3). Chart 2Demands Are Improving On Both Domestic And External Fronts... Chart 3...But Inventory Buildup Is Temporarily Impeding Production And Imports Chart 4Accelerating Service Sector Recovery Should Give A Boost To Consumption Despite a minor drop in the construction PMI sub-index due to heavy rains and floods in China’s central provinces, the acceleration in service activities pushed the non-manufacturing PMI to its highest level since early 2018 (Chart 4). China’s domestic COVID-19 infection rate remains low, giving rise to a rebound in service sector’s activities, such as tourism, catering, sports and entertainment. The resumption rate of theater operations reached 88% by the end of August. While the year-over-year growth rate in total retail sales of consumer goods remains negative, household purchases from larger enterprises registered a 2.2% increase in July (Chart 4, bottom panel). The normalization of activities in the service sector, coupled with the upcoming holiday season in September/October, will further support China’s household consumption recovery. China’s central bank and housing authorities have reportedly rolled out new rules to curb borrowing among overly indebted property developers. We do not expect the new directions to have a significant impact on our near-term outlook for real estate activities. Bank loans account for less than 15% of Chinese property developers’ funds, compared with down payments at 35%. Therefore, strong housing demand should more than offset any potential pullback in bank lending to property developers (Chart 5).  Despite some pullbacks in the prices of Chinese stocks of late, we do not think that the cyclical upturn in Chinese stocks has run its course. Even though the PBoC seems to have normalized its post-COVID 19 monetary policy, monetary conditions remain very accommodative and fiscal stimulus will accelerate the pace of credit expansion through Q3.3 Continued money creation should prop up both China’s economic recovery and stock outperformance, in absolute terms and relative to global benchmarks. In addition, 10-year government bond yields rose 15bps in the past month and are now 66bps above their April low. The mounting bond yields on the back of an improved economic outlook, coupled with the continued outperformance in Chinese cyclical stocks over defensives, also support our constructive view on Chinese stocks on a 6-to-12 month basis (Chart 6). Chart 5Demand Should Continue Driving Property Sector Growth Chart 6Fundamentals Are Supportive Of A Positive Cyclical View On Chinese Stocks Chinese tech company stocks suffered losses last week due to selloffs in the global equity market led by US tech stocks. Technology is at the root of the ongoing US-China struggle, which we discussed in our weekly report on Aug 12.4 Given that the MSCI China index is heavily weighted towards some of China’s tech giants (e.g.: Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu), Chinese investable stocks are more vulnerable to both gyrations in the US tech sector and the escalating tech war between the US and China. As such, we continue to recommend that investors overweight investable stocks that are exposed to China’s “old economy” sectors. An acceleration in China’s demand-side recovery and a normalization of service activities will bode well for the performance of cyclical sectors, such as industrials and materials (Chart 7). In addition, we continue to overweight Chinese onshore semiconductor stocks relative to their global peers. Despite some volatility in recent weeks, we believe the structural upcycle in the Chinese onshore semi sector will continue, driven by Chinese policymakers’ ramped-up policy initiatives to support the nation’s domestic semiconductor research and production (Chart 8). Some of the fiscal and monetary incentives such as multi-year tax exemptions and cheaper bank credits will boost the sector’s longer-term growth prospects, whereas policies like government funding support and prioritized initial public offerings will push up the sector’s near-term multiple expansion. Chart 7Stick To "Old Economy" Chinese Stocks For The Time Being Chart 8Chinese Semis On A Policy-Driven Structural Upturn     Qingyun Xu, CFA Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1, 4Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Sticking With Chinese “Old Economy” Stocks In A Widening Tech War," dated August 12, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2, 3Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Macro And Market Review," dated August 5, 2020, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Portfolio Strategy We are introducing a structurally constructive US equity market view with an SPX 7000 target for year 2028 on the back of peak cycle EPS of $310 and peak cycle P/E multiple of 23. The reopening of the global economy is enticing us to recommend a trade going long a basket of 14 laggard “back to work” stocks versus a basket of 14 high-flying “COVID-19 winners.” While we maintain a cyclical and secular bullish outlook on the broad market, a short-term correction due to technical and (geo) political reasons is likely in the cards. In the last segment of the Weekly Report we identify five technical reasons, in no particular order. A playable short-term pullback is in order. Recent Changes Go long a basket of 14 “back to work” stocks versus a basket of 14 COVID-19 proof stocks. Table 1 Feature Our structural target is neither a joke nor a marketing ploy. And yes, it really does read SPX 7000! This is our S&P 500 target for the year 2028. A new business cycle has commenced and with it a fresh bull market. Our secular US equity market view is bullish. Our readers can fault us for our optimistic view on the world. But we live by the Buffett maxim that “there are no short sellers in the Forbes Billionaires list.” What gives us confidence in this prima facie hyperbolic market view? The Fed’s explicit acceptance that it is ready to incur inflation risk, cementing the fed funds rate near the zero-lower bound for as long as the eye see. In the last cycle, it took the Fed seven years to lift the fed funds rate from zero, a move that ended being judged as premature and forced the Yellen-led Fed to pause for another year (bottom panel, Chart 1). Seven years.  As such, there is a good chance the Fed will stay put until the year 2028, another election year. Even if it ultimately raises interest rates faster due to an overheated economy goosed up on the sweet nectar of fiscal largesse, it is highly likely to be behind the curve. Before we move on to justifying our target, some observations on ZIRP are in order. Chart 1Prolonged ZIRP Neither Eliminates Corrections… First, the Fed’s unorthodox monetary policy (QE and ZIRP) in the last cycle did not prevent stock market corrections, including a near 20% fall in 2011 (top panel, Chart 1). In other words, we do not expect smooth sailing or a 45-degree angle line in the SPX heading to 2028. Rather, an era of volatility with a plethora of sizable corrections is upon us, but the path of least resistance will be higher. Make no mistake, we are in a “buy the dip” market now. Similar to 2008-2015, there will be a lot of fits and starts and a number of mini economic cycles will develop. Chart 2 highlights that the ISM oscillated violently during the ZIRP years and so did equity momentum and the 10-year Treasury yield. Granted, the Fed managed to suppress economic volatility as real GDP averaged ~2%/annum in the aftermath of the GFC, but mini economic cycles and profit growth scares did not disappear (top panel, Chart 3). Importantly, while the 10-year Treasury yield moved with the ebbs and flows of the ISM manufacturing survey’s readings, it remained in a downtrend and every bond market selloff proved a buying opportunity in the era of ZIRP (third panel, Chart 2). What the Fed failed to generate was inflation – of either the CPI or PCE deflator variety. In fact, the Fed has not seen core PCE price inflation overshoot 2.5% since the early 1990s (bottom panel, Chart 3). Chart 2...Nor Mini Economic Cycles Chart 3“Lowflation”/Disinflation Has Been The Story Of The Past 30 years Another feature of the ZIRP years in the last cycle was that early on easy monetary policy coincided with easy fiscal policy, as was warranted for the first few years post the GFC. Subsequently, fiscal thrust increased starting in 2016 counterbalancing the Fed’s interest rate hikes. Despite all that fiscal easing, real GDP growth peaked at 3% in 2018 before decelerating last year, raising a question mark about the long-term health of the US economy, a question to be answered in a future Special Report. Frequent readers of US Equity Strategy know our long-held view that the two primary equity market drivers have been easy fiscal and monetary policies since the March carnage. Looking ahead, the Fed has cemented the view that easy monetary policy will stay with us for quite some time. While the jury is still out on fiscal policy, it appears at the moment that profligacy has staying power as no party in Washington is campaigning on austerity or worrying about paying down the debt (save for the lone voice of the Kentucky Senator Rand Paul). The Buenos Aires Consensus is a paradigm shift, and the most important long-term consequence will be higher inflation. The US has abandoned the guardrails on populism established by the Washington Consensus – countercyclical fiscal policy, independent central banking, free trade, laissez-faire economic policy – and has adopted something… different. A new Consensus. These are extremely potent macro forces and given that there is a lag between the time both easy monetary and loose fiscal policies hit the economy, their effects will be long lasting. Especially given that they are now synchronized – unlike for large periods of the previous cycle – and undertaken at a much greater order of magnitude than after the GFC. With that macro backdrop in mind, let us circle back to our 7000 SPX target. A fresh bull market has commenced and we consider the breakout above the previous cycle’s highs as its starting point. In August, the SPX surpassed the February 19, 2020 highs, giving birth to the new bull market. Using empirical evidence since the late-1950s we conclude that, on average, the SPX doubles from its breakout point (Table 2). This gives us the SPX 7000 reading before the new bull is slayed in the plaza de toros of economic cycles. While this qualitative analysis is enticing, ultimately earnings have to deliver in order to justify the equity market’s appreciation. Put differently, easy fiscal and monetary policies the world over will deliver EPS inflation. Table 2 On the quantitative EPS front, we first turn to the reconstructed S&P 500 earnings back to the late-1920s. On average, EPS have grown by 7.5%/annum, effectively doubling every decade (Chart 4). Chart 4Average Annual EPS Growth Since 1920s = 7.5% More recently, using I/B/E/S data, there have been four distinct EPS growth periods over the past four decades with different durations. From trough-to-peak, EPS have enjoyed an average CAGR of over 10% (top panel, Chart 5). Chart 5EPS Can Double In Next Eight Years The current trough in forward EPS stands just shy of $140. Applying the average CAGR until 2028 results in a $310 EPS figure. This is our starting point of our EPS sensitivity analysis. Assigning the current forward multiple equates to an SPX terminal value of over 7000. Table 3 showcases different EPS and forward P/E multiple permutations with the grey shaded area representing our tight range of peak cycle multiples and peak EPS estimates. Table 3SPX EPS & Multiple Sensitivity With regard to what is currently priced in by sell side analysts, the 5-year forward EPS growth rate – the longest duration estimate available – is near a trough reading of 10%. The historical mean is 12% since 1985, with a range of 19% near the dotcom bubble peak and a trough of 9% at the depths of the 2016 manufacturing recession (bottom panel, Chart 5). A few words on presidential cycles are relevant given our structural bullish equity market view.  We first noticed Tables 4 & 5 in the WSJ in late-2016 and we have corrected some minor mistakes and updated them filling in the gaps. Drawdowns are frequent during term presidencies1 dating back to Hoover. Table 4Every Presidency Experiences Drawdowns Table 5S&P 500 Returns During Presidential Terms What is truly remarkable, however, is that since the late-1920s only three term presidencies ended up in the red. What the WSJ article did not mention was that in all three market declines GOP presidents were at the helm and had taken over at/or near all-time highs in the SPX! This represents a risk to our SPX 7000 view. If President Trump wins the upcoming election, given the recent modest recovery in the polling, he could meet the same fate as his Republican predecessors. Our sister Geopolitical Strategy service still assigns 35% probability for the incumbent to remain in office, a solid figure that suggests the race remains close. Importantly, while we believe a transition to a Democratic president will be tumultuous as we have been cautioning investors recently, a Biden presidency along with the possibility of a “Blue Wave” will bode well for the long-term prospects of the US equity market, if history at least rhymes. BCA’s Geopolitical strategist Matt Gertken assigns 65% odds to a Biden win and 55% to a Blue trifecta. Finally, on a technical note, the recent megaphone formation has stirred a lot of debate among technical analysts in the blogosphere and is eerily reminiscent of a similar formation that lasted from 1965 until 1975. Typically, these megaphone formations get resolved/completed by a diamond formation (Chart 6). Chart 6Of Megaphones And Diamonds While this points to a selloff in the broad equity market in the near-term, which is in accordance with our tactically cautious view (please see the last section of this Weekly Report), it is very bullish for the long-term, as equities catapult higher from such a diamond base formation (Chart 7). In other words, odds are much higher that the SPX will hit 7000 first, before it ever revisits 2200. Adding it all up, we are introducing a structurally constructive US equity market view with an SPX 7000 target for year 2028 on the back of peak cycle EPS of $310 and peak cycle P/E multiple of 23. Chart 7Diamond Base Is Long Term Bullish This week we recommend a basket of 14 stocks to play the “back to work” reopening of the global economy versus a basket of 14 "COVID-19 winners". We also reiterate our view not to chase the broad equity market higher in the short-term and back it up with five key technical reasons. “Back To Work” Versus “Stay At Home” Today we recommend buying a basket of 14 stocks levered to the economic reopening and the “back to work” theme, at the expense of a basket of 14 “COVID-19 winners” stocks. There is no question that we are in a V-shaped economic recovery, partly due to arithmetic, i.e. base effects. The severe blow to the economy that the pandemic-induced shutdowns inflicted is reversing violently. Easy monetary and loose fiscal policy have been a tonic and are allowing enough time for the economy to heal and stand on its own two feet. Chart 8 shows a number of economic variables that are in this V-shaped recovery. Our sense is that there will be a rotation out of mostly high-flying tech titans and select health care COVID-19 beneficiaries and into laggard stocks that would benefit from the reopening of the global economy. The transition to these stocks will be anything but smooth, however, it is a necessary precondition for the continuation of the rally late in the year post the election and into 2021. Clearly, the "COVID-19 winners" have stolen demand from the future. Now that the working-from-home setup is nearly complete for most workers, the pendulum is likely to swing in the opposite direction. In other words, at the margin, employees will slowly start to return to work and the economic reopening should serve as a catalyst for this rotation. Chart 8V-Shapes Galore Chart 9Buy "Back To Work" Stocks Importantly, a definitive vaccine breakthrough will assist some of the beaten down stocks and sectors that at some point were priced for bankruptcy. We remain hopeful that such positive news will soon hit the tape. As a result, this will unleash a stream of bargain hunters out of the woodwork in favor of “back to work” equities and send short sellers reeling. Ultimately, the violent recovery in relative earnings forecasted by the sling shot recovery in the ISM manufacturing survey and most of its subcomponents will boost the “back to work” basket at the expense of the “COVID-19 winners” (Chart 9). For the “back to work” basket we have selected two airlines, two hotels, two oil producers, two restaurant operators, two capital goods manufacturers, two credit card companies, an automobile manufacturer, and a steel producer. In contrast, the “COVID-19 winners” basket that we first created in mid-March currently includes: a bankruptcy consultant, a software company that enables remote access, three grocers, a tele-medicine company, two biotech giants, a Big Pharma company, the biggest online store in the US, an online streaming service company, a teleconferencing company, and finally two household/cleaning products leaders. Bottom Line: Go long a basket of 14 “back to work” stocks at the expense of 14 “COVID-19 winners” equities. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the US Equity Strategy “back to work” basket are: LUV, DAL, MAR, HLT, CVX, EOG, SBUX, MCD, CAT, HON, AXP, COF, NUE, GM. The ticker symbols for the US Equity Strategy “COVID-19 winner” basket are: TDOC, FCN, ZM, CTXS, JNJ, AMGN, REGN, CLX, RBGLY, WMT, COST, KR, NFLX, AMZN. Five Reasons Not To Chase Equities In the Near-Term Over the past weeks, we have been cautioning investors not to chase the equity market higher as the risk/reward trade-off at current levels is tilted to the downside. While we maintain a 9-12 month bullish view on the broad market, a short-term correction due to technical and/or (geo) political reasons is likely in the cards. Consequently, patient investors will be rewarded with a compelling entry point likely in the coming months. Below are five reasons, in no particular order, arguing that a playable short-term pullback is in order: Reason #1: The 200-day Moving Average Moving averages are a perfect tool to put the speed of any rally in perspective and to highlight extreme investor optimism. Chart 10 shows standardized SPX and Nasdaq 100 (NDX) price ratios with respect to their 200-day moving averages. If we look at the current cycle, whenever both the SPX and NDX crossed above the one standard deviation (std) line, a sizable pullback was quick to follow. While NDX has been well above its 1 std line for some time, last week’s price action finally pushed the SPX into the overstretched column. The implication is that a correction is looming. Chart 10Overstretched Reason #2: Monthly Moving Averages For the second reason, we look at the concept of price deviations from the moving average through a different lens – Bollinger bands (BBs). A traditional (20,2) BB includes a 20-period moving average of the price, as well as 20-period 2-standard standard deviation lines. While it can be plotted on any time frame, we use monthly data as set ups in longer time frames (i.e. monthly) dictate the behavior of the shorter (i.e. daily) time frames. Chart 11 shows the S&P 500 together with its (20,2) BBs on a monthly time frame. Whenever the market spikes above the 2 std line, a sizable correction ensues. Currently, the market is squarely above the 2 std line, which has historically been a precursor to a 5-10% drawdown. Chart 11Too Far Too Fast Reason #3: Growth/Value Staying on the topics of extreme rallies, Chart 12 shows the year-over-year growth rate in the S&P growth / S&P value share price ratio. In the entire history of the data, never has it printed a jaw-dropping 34% growth rate, not even after the depths of GFC or to the lead up to the dotcom March 2000 peak. Such a pace is clearly not sustainable and since growth stocks are dominated by FAANG-like companies that have done all of the heavy lifting year-to-date, a reset in the S&P growth / S&P value ratio will weigh on the overall market. A selloff in the bond market will likely serve as a catalyst to boost the allure of beaten down value stocks at the expense of overvalued tech titans. Chart 12In Need Of A Breather Reason #4: Options/Volatility Markets Option and related volatility market movements reveal some vulnerabilities in the broad equity market. More specifically, the VIX and the VXN which by construction are inversely correlated with the S&P 500 and NASDAQ 100, respectively, serve as an excellent timing tool. We look at the 20-day moving correlation of those respective variables, and similarly to Reason #1, a reliable sell signal is given once both (VIX, SPX) and (VXN, NDX) 20-day moving correlations shoot into positive territory (Chart 13). While the (VXN, NDX) correlation has been going haywire over the past quarter as likely single stock call option buying has been heavily hedged by NDX put buying, the (VIX, SPX) moving correlation only slingshot higher at the end of last week - finally producing a decisive sell signal. Again, similarly to Reason #2, each sell signal resulted into a sizable correlation in the SPX, warning that a 5-10% pullback – the sixth since the March lows – is inevitable in the coming weeks. Chart 13Unsustainable Correlation   Reason #5: Bad Breadth Tech stocks have clearly been the work horse behind this rally pushing markets into uncharted territory in a very short period of time since the March lows. However, and as we highlighted in our previous research, it is only a handful of tech titans that propelled the markets to all-time highs. Overconcentration of returns in just a few tickers is not healthy, and a reset is only a question of time. Chart 14 highlights that today only 58% of NASDAQ Composite stocks are trading above their respective 50-day moving average, which stands in marked contrast to the all-time highs in the NASDAQ Composite. Such a divergence is unsustainable and typically gets resolved by a snap back in equity prices. While Chart 14 cannot be used as a precise timing tool, it has been consistently leading the NASDAQ Composite especially at peaks, cautioning that a healthy pullback is forthcoming. Chart 14Bad Breadth Bottom Line: While we maintain a cyclical and structural stance in the broad equity market, the shorter-term risk/reward trade-off is tilted to the downside, and presents a playable opportunity.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     By term presidencies we are referring to the different duration of Presidents staying in office.   Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views July 27, 2020 Overweight cyclicals over defensives April 28, 2020  Stay neutral large over small caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth
Special Report Highlights Along with momentum, quality has been the best performing factor over the past 30 years. It has also been less volatile and has exhibited milder drawdowns than other factors. There are multiple traits that are considered as signs of quality. However, profitability explains the lion’s share of the quality premium, though accounting quality and payout dilution also play a role. The reason why quality stocks outperform remains a mystery, though the preference for lottery stocks as well as the failure to account for the persistence of quality are plausible explanations. Both small caps and value stocks have negative tilts to quality. Adjusting for this tilt by buying small-cap quality indices or value indices with quality filters, can help investors exploit these factors more effectively. Feature “Investment must always consider the price as well as the quality of the security” – Benjamin Graham & David Dodd, Security Analysis, Principles and Technique, 1934 Legendary investor Benjamin Graham is one of the most significant figures in the history of finance. His two books, The Intelligent Investor and Security Analysis, stand as foundational pillars in the field of fundamental analysis. Moreover, as the mentor of the most famous investor ever, Warren Buffet, he has influenced a generation of investors into caring deeply about not overpaying for stocks. Thanks to these feats, Graham has come to be known as the “father of value investing”. And yet this moniker, though well-deserved, ignores a substantial portion of his legacy. Graham was not solely concerned with valuations.1 In fact, out of the seven criteria that he used to pick securities, only two of them focused on valuation measures. The rest, focused on metrics like profitability, leverage, and stability. These attributes encompass what is broadly known today as quality. But what exactly is quality? While certain traits have historically been associated with this factor, quality was not seen until more recently as something that you could easily define. Instead, a more holistic approach to quality was preferred.2 It wasn’t until the work of Robert Novy-Marx in the early 2010s, and US investment firm AQR thereafter, that the possibility of measuring quality, as well as systematically exploiting it, became prominent within the factor literature. Since then, quality has become a more popular strategy, with various commercial providers offering quality indices in recent years. However, much remains unknown about this newly discovered factor. Thus, in this report we take a deep dive into quality with the intent of providing some clarity on the following three issues: Definition of quality: What metrics are used to determine if a stock is a “quality” stock? Which of the many quality traits have the best track record? Characteristics of quality: What has been the historical performance of quality? What is its sector exposure? Why does it work? Implementation of quality: How can the quality factor be used in conjunction with other factors to increase returns? In order to answer these questions, we explore the historical performance of the MSCI Quality indices – though we also touch on quality indices by other providers. Moreover, we survey the academic literature around quality, and we propose a couple of ways by which investors can use this factor to exploit the value and small-cap premia more effectively. Definition Of Quality There is no universal agreement on how to measure quality, though there are some general traits that are agreed upon by the academic literature. An often used definition of quality is the “Quality Minus Junk” (QMJ) factor by AQR. In their research, Assness et al. use three traits, each of which is measured by five to six different metrics3 (Table 1). All the metrics are standardized and then averaged to arrive at a single quality measure. This quality measure is then used to build a quality portfolio. Table 1Metrics Used In AQR's Quality Minus Junk Factor (QMJ) However, not all quality indices take so many measures into account. In fact, most commercial providers limit themselves to three or four variables to construct their quality indices. As an example, MSCI determines quality using three criteria: Return on equity, earnings variability, and leverage. All three variables are then winsorized,4 standardized, and then averaged to create a quality score. This quality score determines the weight of each stock within the index. Table 2 expands on the methodology of the quality benchmarks offered by various index providers. Table 2Quality Metrics For Popular Index Providers The lack of a homogenous definition for quality makes performance evaluation of quality problematic. After all, the outperformance of quality could simply be a function of data mining by optimizing for a group of variables that produce excess returns in a backtest. This approach can lead to a large outperformance in-sample, but which might not necessarily replicate when applied in a real-world portfolio.5 To address this issue, some academics have tried to pinpoint which among the many quality traits truly add value in order to build a simpler and more parsimonious factor. In “What is Quality?”, Hsu et al. found that profitability is the most important quality characteristic, having a large and significant multifactor alpha6 (Table 3). Accounting quality and payout dilution have also been relatively reliable sources of excess returns. On the other hand, there is little evidence that most metrics for capital structure, profitability growth, or earnings stability, provide a premium that is not captured by other factors. Table 3Drivers Of The Quality Premium Given the preponderance that profitability has in the overall performance of the quality factor, some academics have suggested that the quality factor should be reduced to profitability.7 However, not everybody agrees with this approach. In fact, other researchers have advocated for including more metrics such as ESG or corporate governance, in an effort to bring back the more holistic approach that Graham practiced.8 Overall, much disagreement about how to measure quality remains, and the subject is still an open debate. Characteristics Of Quality Historical Performance, Composition And Valuation Over the past 30 years, the MSCI Quality Index has, along with momentum, been the best performing factor in the equity markets (Chart 1, top panel). During this time frame, quality stocks have outperformed minimum volatility stocks by 2.6% per year, the global benchmark by 3.5% per year, and value stocks by 4% per year. The performance of quality has also been relatively robust, though the factor has performed better in some countries than others (Chart 1, bottom panel). Quality has performed best in European countries and Canada, while its outperformance has been more muted in Australia and Japan. Historically, quality has been the second most defensive factor after minimum volatility (Chart 2, panels 1 and 2). Moreover, it has exhibited lower volatility, and smaller drawdowns than the overall market. The defensive tilt of quality seems to arise because of the “flight to quality” phenomenon, where investors flock to higher quality assets during periods of markets stress. Interestingly, quality tends to outperform in equity markets and bond markets at the same time (Chart 2, bottom panel). This suggests that quality might be a common risk factor that is captured across asset classes. Chart 1Quality Has Outperformed Most Other Factors Chart 2Quality Is A Defensive Factor Chart 3Quality Overweights Expensive Sectors What about composition? Within the global index, the quality factor currently has a large country bias to defensive markets like the US and Switzerland. This is mostly the result of its overweight to Information Technology, Consumer Staples and Health Care, and a large underweight position in Financials (Chart 3, top panel). This sector positioning also results in quality having high valuations relative to the overall market (Chart 3, bottom panel). It must be noted that valuations for quality stocks have risen significantly over the past few years. It is hard to know how this valuation compares to the past for the MSCI indices, given that valuation measures for MSCI Quality are only available starting in 2013. However, research by AQR has shown that relatively high prices for quality tend to result in lower returns.9 Thus, high valuations could pose a risk for quality going forward. Explanations For The Quality Anomaly Using a dividend-discount framework, one can show that, in theory, high-quality companies should trade at higher price-to-book values than low quality ones (for more details please see Appendix 1). Asness et at have shown that this is the case empirically – high-quality stocks trade at a valuation premium to low-quality stocks (Chart 4, top panel). Chart 4Analysts Are Most Optimistic On Low Quality Stocks However, the mystery of quality lies in the fact that this premium does not appear to be as large as it should be. In other words, while analyst and market participants correctly assign higher multiples to high-quality stocks, this multiple is not large enough, and results in high-quality stocks being undervalued. Ultimately, this leads to the outperformance of high-quality stocks versus low-quality ones (Chart 4, bottom panel). Why do market participants overvalue low quality/junk stocks and undervalue high quality stocks? One reason could be a preference for lottery-like stocks. As we discussed in our January report on the low- volatility anomaly, investors tend to prefer “home-run” stocks – a result of behavioral biases as well as the incentives in the money management industry.10 Thus, distressed companies with low levels of profitability and large levels of debt, may attract some investors betting on a turnaround in the hope of a large windfall if the company survives.11 On the flip side, investors might perceive that high-quality companies – which are usually stable, profitable, and more expensive – cannot produce the same type of extreme payoff, and may even be prone to mean reversion, given that their success is evident and well known.  But this last assumption is a mistake. Quality is a highly persistent characteristic, which means that a high-quality stock today is very likely to remain a high-quality stock in the future (Table 4). It is easy to see why this is the case. A company with very high levels of profitability has likely achieved this by building a moat around its business through a strong brand, proprietary technology, or network effects. It is possible that failure to take this into account results in an undervaluation of high-quality stocks.  Table 4Quality Is Persistent BOX 1 The Behavior Of Quality In Equity And Credit Markets Chart 5Quality Delivers A Different Premium In Different Asset Classes While there is a very tight correlation between the performance of quality in credit and equity markets, the structural premium obtained from this factor in each market is very different. Over a long period, investors are rewarded for investing in high-quality equities, while the opposite occurs when investing in high-quality credit issues (Chart 5). Why would the same risk factor provide a positive premium in one market but provide a negative one in another? The exact reason remains unclear, but the behavioral explanations for the quality factor might provide a clue. As opposed to equity markets, returns in credit markets – even if very high – are naturally capped. As an example: An investor who buys a low-quality issue with a 20% yield-to-maturity, knows that in the absence of a default, the most he or she can earn from holding the issue to maturity is 20%. The fact that the maximum return is well established beforehand might prevent investors from displaying behavioral biases. Specifically, a well-defined upside might cause investors to think more rationally and mechanically about an investment. In contrast, securities where the upside is high but not well-defined might make it more likely for investors to see a very risky investment as a lottery, since extraordinary returns are technically within the realm of possibility. Whatever the reason is, the different premium that this factor offers in these two asset classes presents a potentially attractive opportunity for asset allocators. We will explore how investors could take advantage of this discrepancy in future reports on factor allocation.   Implementation Of Quality Using Quality And Size Chart 6The Small-Cap Premium Is Higher When Adjusted For Quality Historically, small-cap stocks have delivered excess returns over large cap-stocks – a well-documented phenomenon known as the size premium. However, this premium has been very unstable and extremely seasonal, occurring mostly in the month of January, and providing no excess returns in all other months. Moreover, some research has suggested that the size premium cannot be harvested easily in practice, since most of the premium is concentrated in the very smallest stocks (microcaps), which are highly illiquid.12 The issues surrounding the size premium have prompted some academics to question its existence. However, recent research on the interaction of quality and size has brought back interest to this topic. In the paper “Size Matters, If You Control Your Junk”, Assness et al show that many of the problems with the size premium are caused by the bias that small caps have to low quality. Once this low-quality bias is accounted for, the size premium becomes much larger and stable – a result that also holds when controlling for a quality proxy like profitability (Chart 6). Notably, the concentration of returns in January and in microcaps also disappears when the bias is removed.13 This bias to low quality is a significant problem in most popular small-cap indices. The profitability of indices like the S&P 600 has historically been lower than its large-cap counterparts (Chart 7,  top panel). Moreover, a similar story holds for leverage: While the much maligned increase in corporate debt is evident in small-cap indices, it is virtually nonexistent when looking at large-cap indices like the S&P 500, where leverage measures stand barely above 30- year lows (Chart 7, bottom panel). How can this bias be removed? Stock-level filters for quality might be difficult to implement for many investors. Instead, an easier solution is to exploit the size premium through a small-cap quality index. S&P currently offers the S&P 600 Quality Index, which selects the 120 highest-quality stocks out of the S&P 600. Importantly, since this quality adjustment removes some of the low-quality bias from the S&P 600, the S&P 600 Quality index is able to maintain performance on the upside, while also limiting the sharp periods of underperformance that usually affect small caps during bear markets (Chart 8). Chart 7Small-Cap Stocks Have A Lot Of Junk Chart 8Small-Cap Quality Is A Better Way To Exploit The Size Anomaly   Using Quality And Value The intersection between value and quality – a pair of factors that have a negative correlation – has been a topic of interest since quality was first discovered.14 They stand as perfect complements of each other: The value factor tries to find cheap stocks, regardless of their quality, while the quality factor tries to find quality stocks regardless of their price. Together they make for a powerful combination: Quality stocks at affordable prices. Some research has suggested that this combination of value and quality lies behind the success of Graham’s greatest student. According to the seminal paper titled “Buffet’s Alpha”, the biggest factor exposures of the Berkshire Hathaway portfolio from 1980 to 2011, outside of overall market risk, were quality and value15 (Chart 9). Exposure to these factors, along with low beta, as well as the ability of Berkshire Hathaway to obtain cheap leverage thanks to its insurance business, explained most of the excess returns that Warren Buffet was able to achieve. Chart 9Buffett's Motto: High Quality, Cheap, And Low Risk Commercial providers have started to offer indices which combine value and quality. As an example, MSCI offers the Prime Value indices, where stocks are first screened for quality and then ranked according to a value score. This methodology has outperformed its normal value counterparts in both the euro area and the US (Chart 10). Chart 10Quality Adjustments By MSCI Improve Value In The Euro Area Chart 11Stronger Quality Filters Are Needed In The US To Enhance Value   Interestingly, despite value’s recent doldrums, the quality adjustment done in the Prime Value index has helped value perform relatively well in the euro area for the past couple years. However, the same cannot be said in the US where performance of Value and Prime Value has been almost identical since 2003. This suggest a couple of options: It could be that, even when adjusting for quality, value behaves fundamentally differently in different countries. Alternatively, it could also mean that the US market is more efficient at pricing quality, which would imply that a simple quality filter would not do much, since quality at an attractive valuation would be harder to find. We suspect the reason might be the latter. In this case a stronger quality filter might be needed to substantially enhance the performance of value. The newly released Russell 1000 QARP (Quality At A Reasonable Price) Index follows this methodology. It applies a double quality filter and then compounds it by a value score. This index has substantially enhanced performance relatively to the Russell 1000 Value index (Chart 11). Moreover, it has also been able to fare better relative to the broad market and has avoided the large underperformance that value has undergone since 2018. Bottom Line Quality has been one of the most successful factors over the past three decades. But will this performance continue? While the exact reason behind the quality anomaly remains unclear, the evidence suggests that institutional incentives and behavioral biases, which are likely to persist in the future, might be responsible for the outperformance of quality in the market. Thus, investors should consider adding quality stocks to their portfolios. Moreover, quality can also be used to enhance the performance of other popular factors in the following ways: Correcting for the low-quality bias of small caps, makes the small-cap premium larger and much more stable over the long term. A practical way to correct for this low-quality bias is to buy small-cap quality portfolios such as the S&P 600 Quality Index. Value stocks also tend to have low quality. Investors can improve the performance of the value factor by using quality filters to find quality stocks that are also cheap. The quality filters in the MSCI Prime Value Index has significantly improved the performance of value in the euro area. Meanwhile, the Russell 1000 QARP index, which selects for value stocks using a stronger quality filter than MSCI, has kept pace with the overall market even amidst value’s collapse.   Juan Correa Ossa, CFA  Associate Editor juanc@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1 Footnotes 1  Robert Novy-Marx, “Quality Investing,” Working Paper, 1-28 (2014) 2  In Graham’s own words: “An indefinite and approximate measure of the intrinsic value may be sufficient. To use a homely simile, it is quite possible to decide by inspection that a woman is old enough to vote without knowing her age or that a man is heavier than he should be without knowing his exact weight.” 3  Asness, C.S., Frazzini, A. & Pedersen, L.H. “Quality minus junk,” Rev Account Stud 24, 34–112 (2019). 4 Winsorization is a way to remove the effects of outliers in the data. In this case all the values above the 95th percentile are set to the 95th percentile value and all the values below the 5th percentile are set to the 5th percentile value. 5 Robert Novy-Marx, “Backtesting Strategies Based on Multiple Signals,” NBER Working Paper No. w21329 (2015). 6 Jason Hsu, Vitali Kalesnik, Engin Kose, “What Is Quality?” Financial Analysts Journal, 75:2, 44-61 (2019). 7 Amanda White, “Quality is Explained by Profitability,” Top1000funds.com, (2015). 8 Dan Hanson and Rohan Dhanuka, “The ‘Science’ and ‘Art’ of High Quality Investing,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 27:2 (2015). 9 C.S. Asness, A. Frazzini, and L.H. Pedersen, “Quality minus junk,” Rev Account Stud 24, 34–112 (2019). 10 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Less Risk And More Reward? The Low-Volatility Factor In Equity Markets”, dated January 29, 2020. 11 This theory on the quality anomaly might explain the different performance of quality in credit and equity markets. For more details, please see Box 1. 12 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, “Small Cap Outperformance: Fact Or Myth?” dated April 7, 2020. 13 Cliff S. Asness, Andrea Frazzini, Ronen Israel, and Lasse Heje Pedersen, “Size Matters, If You Control Your Junk,” CEPR Discussion Paper, No. DP12684 (2018). 14 Robert Novy - Marx, “The Other Side of Value: The Gross Profitability Premium,” Journal of Financial Economics, 108(1) , 1 - 28, (2013) and “The Quality Dimension of Value Investing,” University of Rochester, Working Paper (2014). 15 Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller, and Lasse Heje Pedersen,  "Buffett’s Alpha," Financial Analysts Journal, 74-4, 35-55 (2018).    
Highlights Chart 1Permanent Job Losses Still Rising The biggest event in bond markets last month was the Fed’s shift toward a regime of average inflation targeting. Treasuries sold off in the days following the announcement and, overall, the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index underperformed cash by 111 basis points in August (Chart 1). We view this market reaction as sensible, since it seems clear that the Fed’s new commitment to tolerate an overshoot of its 2% inflation target will be bearish for bonds in the long run. However, for this bond bear market to play out the US economy must first generate some inflation. This will take time. Despite the drop in the headline U3 unemployment rate, August’s employment report showed that permanent job losses continue to rise (bottom panel). This is a clear sign that the economic recovery is not yet on a solid footing. We advise bond investors to keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for the time being. We also recommend several yield curve trades across the nominal, real and inflation compensation curves (see pages 10 & 11). Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -356 bps. Spreads on Baa-rated corporate bonds continued their tightening trend through August, even as spreads were roughly flat for bonds rated A and above. As a result, Baa-rated bonds outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 30 bps on the month while higher-rated credits underperformed. Valuation remains more attractive for the Baa space than for higher-rated credits (Chart 2), but spreads for all credit tiers look cheaper than they did near the end of 2019. Given the Fed’s strong support for the market through both its emergency lending facilities, and now, its extraordinarily dovish forward rate guidance, we see further room for spread compression across all credit tiers. At the sector level, we continue to recommend a focus on high-quality Baa-rated issuers. That is, Baa-rated bonds that are unlikely to face a ratings downgrade during the next 12 months. Subordinate bank bonds are a prime example of debt that falls into this sweet spot.1 We also recommend overweight allocations to Healthcare and Energy bonds2 and underweight allocations to Technology3 and Pharmaceutical bonds.4 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 121 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -351 bps. All junk credit tiers delivered strong returns in August, but the lowest-rated credits performed best. Caa-rated & below junk bonds outperformed Treasuries by 255 bps on the month compared to 98 bps of outperformance for Ba-rated bonds (Chart 3). The recent strong performance of low-rated junk bonds makes us question whether our focus on the Ba-rated credit tier is overly conservative. If the economy is indeed on a quick road to recovery, then we are leaving some return on the table by avoiding the B-rated and lower credit tiers. However, we aren’t yet confident enough in the economic recovery to move down in quality. Last week’s employment report showed that permanent job losses continue to rise and Congress has still not passed a much needed follow-up to the CARES act. What’s more, current junk spreads imply a very rapid decline in the corporate default rate during the next 12 months, from its current level of 8.4% all the way to 4.4% (panel 3).5  In this regard, August’s steep drop in layoff announcements is a positive development (bottom panel), though job cuts are still running well above pre-pandemic levels. At the sector level, we advise overweight allocations to high-yield Technology6 and Energy7 bonds. We are underweight the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sectors.8 MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -37 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 7 bps in August, but it still offers a small spread pick-up compared to other similarly risky sectors. The MBS OAS of 77 bps is greater than the 75 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 67 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 35 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the spread advantage, we are concerned that the elevated primary mortgage spread is a warning that refinancing risk could flare later this year  (Chart 4). Even if Treasury yields are unchanged, a further 50 bps drop in the mortgage rate due to spread compression cannot be ruled out. Such a move would lead to a significant increase in prepayment losses. With that in mind, we are concerned about the low level of expected prepayment losses (option cost) priced into the MBS index (panel 3). A fourth quarter refi wave would undoubtedly send that option cost higher, eating into the returns implied by the OAS. The recent spike in the mortgage delinquency rate does not pose a near-term risk to spreads as it is being driven by households that have been granted forbearance from the federal government (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders only comes into play if many households are unable to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period expires early next year. But even in that case, further government action to either support household incomes or extend the forbearance period could mitigate the risk. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 31 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -295 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 105 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -468 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 13 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -694 bps. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 33 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -337 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 8 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -54 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -9 bps. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, most of the dollar’s recent depreciation has occurred against other Developed Market currencies, not Emerging Markets (Chart 5). Added to that, dollar weakness against all trading partners helps US corporate sector profits, and Baa-rated corporate bonds continue to offer a spread pick-up versus EM sovereigns (panel 4). Within the Emerging Market Sovereign space: Turkey, South Africa, Mexico, Colombia and Russia all offer a spread pick-up relative to quality and duration-matched US corporate bonds. Of those attractively priced countries, Mexico stands out as particularly compelling on a risk/reward basis.9 Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -492 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads versus Treasuries have widened during the past month, more so at the long-end than at the short-end, and the entire Aaa muni curve remains above the Treasury curve, despite municipal debt’s tax-exempt status (Chart 6). Municipal bonds also remain attractively priced relative to corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum, as we demonstrated in a recent report.10 The Fed reduced the pricing on its Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) by 50 basis points last month. Most likely, it felt pressure to act as Congress has still not passed a state & local government aid package. However, the Fed’s move will not have much impact on municipal bond spreads. Even after the reduction, municipal yields continue to run well below the cost offered by the MLF (panel 3). Extremely attractive valuation causes us to stick with our municipal bond overweight, though spreads will widen in the near-term if much needed stimulus doesn’t arrive soon. In the long-run, we remain optimistic that elevated state rainy day funds will help cushion the fiscal blow and lessen the risk of ratings downgrades (bottom panel).    Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-steepened in August. The 2/10 and 5/30 Treasury slopes steepened 14 bps and 22 bps, reaching 58 bps and 121 bps, respectively. One easy way to think about nominal Treasury yields is as the market’s expectation of future changes in the federal funds rate.11 With that in mind, the Fed’s recent shift toward a regime of average inflation targeting will likely lead to nominal yield curve steepening. That is, the Fed will keep a firm grip on the front-end of the curve, but long-maturity yields could rise as investors price-in the possibility that the Fed will have to eventually respond to high inflation by quickly tightening policy. For this reason, we retain a core position in nominal yield curve steepeners. Specifically, we recommend buying the 5-year bullet and shorting a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 Treasury curve steepening, which should play out over the next 6-12 months, assuming the economic recovery is sustained. Valuation is a concern with this recommended positioning. The 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7), and the 5-year bullet looks expensive on our yield curve models (Appendix B).     However, the 5-year bullet traded at much more expensive levels during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom panel). With short rates once again pinned at zero, we expect the 5-year to once again hit extreme levels of overvaluation. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 240 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -76 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 25 bps and 22 bps on the month. They currently sit at 1.67% and 1.78%, respectively. TIPS breakeven inflation rates have moved up rapidly during the past couple months, a trend that was supercharged by the Fed’s Jackson Hole announcement. In fact, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is now right around fair value according to our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 8).12 TIPS will soon turn expensive if current trends continue. That is, unless stronger CPI inflation sends our model’s fair value reading higher. We place strong odds on the latter occurring during the next few months, with trimmed mean inflation measures still running well above core (panel 3). However, we cautioned in a recent report that inflation is likely to moderate in 2021 after core inflation re-converges with the trimmed mean.13 In addition to our overweight stance on TIPS, we continue to recommend real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we would expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also keeping a firmer grip over short-dated nominal yields than over long-dated ones, this means that short-maturity real yields will come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 30 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +53 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 24 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +46 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 73 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +95 bps. Aaa ABS are a high conviction overweight, given that spreads remain elevated compared to historical levels and that the sector benefits from Fed support through the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF). However, spreads are even more attractive in non-Aaa ABS (Chart 9) and we recommend owning those securities as well. This is despite the fact that only Aaa-rated bonds are eligible for TALF. We explained our rationale for owning non-Aaa consumer ABS in a recent report.14  We noted that the stimulus received from the CARES act caused real disposable personal income to increase significantly between February and July and, faced with fewer spending opportunities, households used that windfall to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Granted, further income support from fiscal policymakers is needed now that the CARES act’s enhanced unemployment benefits have expired. But given the substantial boost to savings that has already occurred, we are confident that more stimulus will arrive in time to prevent a wave of consumer bankruptcies.  Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 77 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -320 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 57 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -108 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 160 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -1008 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa non-agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Our reasoning is simple. Aaa CMBS are eligible for TALF, meaning that spreads can still tighten even as the hardship in commercial real estate continues. Without Fed support, non-Aaa CMBS will struggle to deal with a climbing delinquency rate (panel 3).15 Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -4 bps. The average index spread tightened 6 bps on the month to 66 bps, still well above typical historical levels (bottom panel). The Fed is supporting the Agency CMBS market by directly purchasing the securities as part of its Agency MBS purchase program. The combination of strong Fed support and elevated spreads makes the sector a high conviction overweight. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities​​​​​​​ Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of September 3, 2020) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of September 3, 2020) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 72 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 72 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of September 3, 2020)   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Case Against The Money Supply”, dated June 30, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020 and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 We assume a 25% recovery rate and target a spread of 150 bps in excess of default losses. For more details on this calculation please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020, and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Treasury Market Amid Surging Supply”, dated May 12, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bonds Are Vulnerable As North America Re-Opens”, dated May 26, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 For more details on this forecasting framework please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 12 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 14 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 15 For a deeper dive into the outlook for US commercial real estate please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Working From Home, Urban Flight, And Commercial Real Estate Loans: How Bad Can Things Get?”, dated August 28, 2020, available at gis.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Highlights Stocks, particularly tech stocks, are technically overbought and highly vulnerable to a further correction. Nevertheless, investors should continue to overweight global equities relative to bonds on a 12-month horizon, while rotating equity allocations into cheaper sectors and regions. What should policymakers do if they wish to maximize growth and restore full employment? In the feature section of this report, we argue that the optimal course of action for most countries is to loosen fiscal policy until labor slack has been eliminated and the central bank’s inflation target has been met. Once this has been achieved, governments should trim the budget deficit to keep inflation from accelerating too much. What will policymakers actually do? While today’s budget deficits are smaller than what most economies need, they will ultimately prove to be too big once private sector demand recovers. The upshot is that inflation will increase by the middle of the decade, first in the US and then everywhere else. The secular bull market in equities will end only when central banks are forced to scramble to contain inflation. Fortunately, that day of reckoning is at least a few years away. Feature Apparently, Stocks Don’t Always Go Up After a relentless rally, stocks buckled under the pressure on Thursday. The MSCI All-Country World index lost 3%, the S&P 500 shed 3.5%, and the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite plunged 5%. Two weeks ago, in a report titled “The Return Of Nasdog,” we argued that the leadership role was set to pivot away from tech and health care, as pandemic angst subsided and investors began to price in a recovery in the sectors of the stock market that had been crushed by lockdown measures. Chart 1A Weaker Dollar Is Generally Associated With Non-US Equity Outperformance, But Not Since The Covid Crash Historically, non-US equities have outperformed their US peers when the dollar has weakened (Chart 1). This relationship broke down this year because of the outsized weight that tech and health care command in US indices. If the relative performance of tech and health care stocks peaks over the coming weeks, this should translate into a clear outperformance for non-US stock markets. Value stocks should also start outperforming growth stocks. Stock market leadership changes often occur within the context of broad-based equity corrections. Our near-term view on stocks, as illustrated in the view matrix at the end of this report, is more cautious than our 12-month view. Thus, we would not be surprised if the major indices sell off over the coming weeks, with tech stocks leading the way down. The same sort of technical factors that amplified the move up in stocks over the past few weeks could exacerbate the move down. Most notably, so-called delta hedge option strategies, in which an investor sells calls and hedges the risk by purchasing the underlying stock, can create a self-reinforcing feedback loop where rising call prices force investors to buy more shares, leading to even higher call prices. Once the stock market starts falling, the process goes into reverse. Nevertheless, we do not expect tech stocks to suffer the sort of crash they experienced in 2000. Tech valuations are not as stretched as they were back then, earnings growth is stronger, and balance sheets are much healthier. Moreover, unlike in 2000, when the Fed lifted rates to as high as 6.5% in May, monetary policy is at no risk of turning hawkish. All this suggests that tech stocks are more likely to go sideways than down over a 12-month horizon (albeit in a fairly volatile manner). Investors should continue to overweight global equities relative to bonds on a 12-month horizon, while tilting equity allocations towards cheaper sectors and regions. Feature: Should Versus Will Investors want to know what the future will bring. As such, our primary interest at BCA Research is in predicting what policymakers will do rather than what they should do. Sometimes, however, it is useful to ask the “should” question since the answer may shape one’s view on the “will” question. This is especially the case when a particular set of goals is aligned with both the incentives and constraints that policymakers face. With that in mind, let us ask what the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy should be, assuming that policymakers have the goal of maximizing growth and moving the economy towards full employment. As we argue below, this is a relevant question to ask not because we necessarily share this goal – our personal value judgments are besides the point here – but because most policymakers think this is the correct goal. Propping Up Demand Chart 2Labor Markets In Developed Economies Have Rarely Overheated Over The Past Few Decades Maintaining full employment requires that spending match the economy’s productive capacity. In theory, this should not be a difficult objective to achieve. After all, people like to spend. Increasing demand should be easy. The hard part should be raising supply. In practice, it has not worked out that way. Even before the pandemic, unemployment rates rarely fell below their full employment level across the G7 economies (Chart 2). High Unemployment: Cyclical Or Structural? Some will argue that surplus unemployment is necessary to shift workers from sectors of the economy where they are not needed to sectors where they are. The failure to facilitate such resource reallocation could, it is alleged, stymie long-term growth. This is largely a spurious claim. As Chart 3 shows, there is always a huge amount of churn in the labor market. In 2019, a year in which total employment rose by 2.1 million, a total of 70 million people were hired in the US compared to 64 million who quit or lost their jobs. In fact, labor market churn tends to decrease during recessions as workers become reluctant to quit their jobs. Chart 3Labor Market Turnover Tends To Increase During Expansions Chart 4Residential Construction Accounted For Less Than 20% Of The Job Losses During The Great Recession Far from reflecting structural factors, the vast majority of the rise in joblessness during economic downturns is gratuitous in nature. For example, more than 80% of the jobs lost during the Great Recession were outside the residential real estate sector (Chart 4). Moreover, employment growth is highly correlated with investment spending (Chart 5). The easiest way to induce firms to boost capex – and, in the process, augment the economy’s productive capacity – is to adopt policies that raise overall employment. A stronger labor market will generate more demand for goods and services. It will also make labor more expensive in relation to capital, thereby incentivizing labor-saving capital investment. Chart 5Employment Growth And Investment Spending Go Hand-In-Hand Today, unemployment is elevated once again. As was the case during prior recessions, some workers will need to transition from sectors of the economy that will be slow to recover (retail, travel, and hospitality, for example) to sectors where jobs will be more plentiful. The risk is that there will not be enough job vacancies in the latter sectors to compensate for job losses in the former. The fact that permanent job losses have been creeping higher in the US over the past few months, even as temporary layoffs have come down, is evidence that such an outcome is a clear and present danger (Chart 6). Chart 6Many Are Returning To Work, But The Number Of Permanent Layoffs Is Slowly Increasing As Well Central Banks Can’t Do It All One does not need to refill a leaky bucket through the same hole the water escaped. As long as there is enough demand throughout the economy, workers who lose their jobs in declining sectors will eventually find new jobs in other sectors. So why has the bucket seemed chronically short of water in recent years? The answer is that monetary policy has been tasked to do more than it is realistically capable of achieving. Monetary policy operates with “long and variable lags.” When unemployment rises, the best that central banks can do is cut interest rates and hope that the more interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy eventually perk up. If the interest-rate sensitive sectors of the economy are tapped out, just as housing was following the financial crisis, or policy rates are near their lower bound, as they are now, monetary policy will be even less potent than usual. The Role Of Fiscal Policy This is where fiscal policy ought to fill the void. Even if monetary policy is exhausted, governments can cut taxes, raise transfers to households and businesses, or increase direct spending on goods and services. The extent to which fiscal policy is loosened should not be preordained. Rather, it should simply reflect the state of the economy. There is no limit to how much money governments can transfer to the public. In fact, one can easily imagine a system where governments cut taxes and increase transfer payments whenever unemployment moves up. Such a powerful system of automatic stabilizers would go a long way towards keeping the economy on an even keel. Why have governments been reluctant to embrace such a system? One key reason is that such a system would produce open-ended budget deficits. That would not be much of a problem if the red ink lasted just a few years, but what if the need for large budget deficits did not go away? The Japanese Example Consider the case of Japan. Starting in the early 1990s, Japan’s private sector became a chronic net saver, as demand for credit evaporated amid savage deleveraging (Chart 7). In order to keep the economy from falling into a full-blown depression, the government started to run continual budget deficits. Effectively, the government had to soak up persistent private savings with its own dissavings. As a result, the debt-to-GDP ratio ballooned from 64% in 1991 to 237% by 2019 and is set to rise further this year. Many people predicted a debt crisis would engulf Japan. Takeshi Fujimaki, a former banker turned politician, has been forecasting a debt crisis for more than two decades.In 2010, financial pundit John Mauldin described Japan as a “bug in search of a windshield.” He reckoned that the country would “implode within the next two-to-three years,” with the yen falling to 300 against the dollar. Kyle Bass has made similarly dire predictions.1 How was Japan able to escape what seemed like certain doom? The answer is that the same factor that necessitated persistent budget deficits, namely excess private-sector savings, also allowed interest rates to fall. Despite a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, government interest payments have been trending lower over time (Chart 8). Today, the government actually earns more interest than it pays because two-thirds of all Japanese debt bears negative yields. Chart 7The Japanese Government Runs Persistent Budget Deficits Amid The Private Sector's Desire To Save Chart 8Japan: Ballooning Debt And Declining Interest Payments If anything, Japan erred in not easing fiscal policy by enough. Had Japan run even larger budget deficits, deflationary pressures would have been less acute, and as a result, real interest rates would have fallen even more than they actually did (Chart 9). Chart 9Japanese Real Yields Are Higher Than In Many Other Major Economies A Fiscal Free Lunch? The standard equation for public debt sustainability says that as long as the government’s borrowing rate is below the growth rate of the economy, the debt-to-GDP ratio will converge to a stable level no matter how large the fiscal deficit happens to be (See Box 1 for details). The caveat is that this “stable” debt-to-GDP ratio could turn out to be quite high. For example, if the government wants to run a primary budget deficit of 10% of GDP indefinitely, and GDP growth exceeds the real interest rate by two percentage points, the debt-to-GDP ratio will eventually converge to 500%. If interest rates were guaranteed to stay at zero forever, even a debt-to-GDP ratio of 500% would be no cause for alarm. But, of course, there is no such guarantee. For a country such as Italy, letting debt levels soar into the stratosphere would be highly risky. Countries that do not possess a central bank capable of acting as a lender of last resort could find themselves in a vicious spiral where rising bond yields raise the probability of default, leading to even higher bond yields (Chart 10). Chart 10Multiple Equilibria In The Debt Market Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort For countries that do issue debt in their own currencies, default risk is less of a problem since their central banks can set short-term rates at any level they want and, if necessary, target long-term rates with yield curve control strategies. Nevertheless, even these countries would face difficult choices if the excess savings that permitted interest rates to stay low disappeared. A decline in national savings would raise the neutral rate of interest (the rate which equalizes aggregate demand with aggregate supply). If policy rates remained unchanged, the neutral rate of interest would end up being higher than policy rates, which would eventually cause the economy to overheat. At that point, policymakers would have two options: First, they could simply let the economy overheat such that inflation rises. If inflation is very low to begin with, modestly higher inflation would be welcome, as it would make the zero lower bound constraint less of a problem.2 Higher inflation would also speed up the pace of nominal income growth, leading to a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. That said, if inflation were to rise too much, it could have destabilizing effects on the economy. Second, they could tighten fiscal policy. A smaller budget deficit would add to national savings, while giving the government more resources to pay back debt. Tighter fiscal policy would also subtract from aggregate demand, thus reducing the neutral rate of interest. This would diminish the need for central banks to raise rates in the first place. Putting it all together, the optimal course of action, at least for countries that can issue debt in their own currencies, is to loosen fiscal policy until full employment has been restored and the central bank’s inflation target has been met. Once this has been achieved, the government should trim the budget deficit to keep inflation from getting out of hand. What Will Be Done Okay, so much for the idealized strategy. What will actually happen? As was the case following the Great Recession, there is a risk that some countries will tighten fiscal policy prematurely, causing the economic recovery from the pandemic to be slower than it would otherwise be. In the US, this is already happening. Federal emergency unemployment benefits under the CARES Act expired at the end of July; funding for the small business paycheck protection program has run out; and state and local governments are facing a severe cash crunch. BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy team, led by Matt Gertken, expects the logjam in Washington to be resolved in September. Most voters, including the majority of Republicans, want emergency unemployment benefits to be restored (Table 1). Additional fiscal stimulus would cushion the economy in the lead up to the November election, which would arguably benefit President Trump and the Republican party. Hence, there is a good chance that Congressional Republicans will accede to a fairly generous fiscal package. Table 1The Majority Continues To Support Expanded Unemployment Insurance Globally, the prevalence of negative real rates (and in some cases, negative nominal rates) should incentivize governments to run larger budget deficits than they have in the past. Increasing political populism will amplify this trend. Thus, despite some near-term hiccups, fiscal policy will remain highly stimulative. The Inflation End Game Chart 11The Ratio Of Workers-To-Consumers Is Now Falling What will happen when unemployment rates return to their pre-pandemic level in three or four years? Will governments tighten fiscal policy to prevent overheating or will they let inflation run loose? Our guess is that they will let inflation rise. National savings can shrink either because the private sector is spending more or because the private sector is earning less. Looking out beyond the next few years, the latter is more likely than the former. This is because the ratio of workers-to-consumers globally will decline sharply over the coming decade as more baby boomers exit the labor force (Chart 11). Spending will decelerate, but output and income will decelerate even more by virtue of this demographic reality. It is difficult to boost tax revenue in an environment of slowing real income growth. If output falls in relation to spending, inflation will rise. At least initially, central banks will welcome the burst of inflation. They have been trying to push up inflation for years. Past inflation undershoots will be used to justify future inflation overshoots, a doctrine the Fed officially blessed at the virtual Jackson Hole symposium last week. Other central banks will be loath to raise rates if the Fed stands pat for fear that their own currencies will surge against the US dollar. The end result is that inflation will increase, first in the US and then everywhere else. A quick glance at long-term inflation expectations suggests that markets do not discount this risk at all (Chart 12). What does all this mean for investors? For the next few years, the combination of ample fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy will foster a supportive backdrop for global equities. Despite the rally in stocks since March, the global equity risk premium remains quite elevated, especially outside the US (Chart 13). Investors should remain overweight global stocks versus bonds on a 12-month horizon. Chart 12Investors Believe Inflation Will Stay Muted In The Long Term Chart 13Non-US Stocks Look Cheaper Than Their US Peers In Both Absolute Terms And In Relation To Bond Yields Looking further out, the secular bull market in equities will end only when central banks are forced to scramble to contain inflation. Fortunately, that day of reckoning is at least a few years away.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Ben McLannahan, “Japanese Bonds Defy the Debt Doomsters,” Financial Times, dated August 8, 2012; Mariko Ishikawa, Kenneth Kohn and Yumi Ikeda, “Soros Adviser Turned Lawmaker Sees Crisis by 2020,” Bloomberg News, dated September 27, 2013; and Dan McCrum, “Kyle Bass bets on full-blown Japan crisis,” Financial Times, May 21, 2013. 2 For example, if inflation is 3%, a central bank could produce a real rate of -3% by bringing policy rates down to zero. In contrast, if inflation is only 1%, the lowest that real rates could fall is -1%, which may not be stimulative enough for the economy.   Box 1The Arithmetic Of Debt Sustainability   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Current MacroQuant Model Scores