Financial Markets
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The risk/reward equity market tradeoff is to the downside and we remain tactically cautious. The trade war re-escalation risks pushing out the global growth recovery to early-2020 and has shaken our confidence in our cyclically constructive equity market view. An enticing safe-haven macro backdrop, firming industry operating metrics and rock-bottom profit expectations and valuations all signal that it no longer pays to be underweight the S&P telecom services index. Waning residential investment, the recent flare up in the U.S./China trade tussle, crumbling lumber prices and adverse supply/demand dynamics warn that the S&P home improvement retail (HIR) index has ample downside. Recent Changes Lift the S&P telecom services index to neutral for a gain of 6% since inception. Early last week we got stopped out of our S&P homebuilding overweight recommendation, which is now back to neutral, and booked profits of 10% since inception relative to the SPX. Table 1 Feature Equities continued to whipsaw last week and lacked clear direction as the dust from President Trump’s May 5 tariff tweet has still not settled. While the trade talks could go either way, we are reluctant to take a stance and would rather err on the side of caution. Clearly the SPX wants to spring higher and craves a U.S./China trade deal, but our geopolitical strategists believe the trade talks have taken a turn for the worse and the odds of a positive trade resolution are falling quickly. We remain cautious on the short-term equity market outlook and are now increasingly worried that our sanguine cyclical posture is in jeopardy. Worrisomely, the stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio is sounding the alarm and is now part of the slew of indicators we track that have rolled over decisively (Chart 1). The S/B ratio has formed a bearish head and shoulders trading pattern and suggests that the SPX is at risk of a further pullback. While up to very recently falling bond yields were an undoubtedly equity market recovery pillar, any further melting in the 10-year Treasury yield would exert downward pull on the equity market. There are other signs that the U.S. equity market may be hanging by a thread. The average stock has failed to make new all-time highs using the Value Line Arithmetic Index as a gauge. The median U.S. stock is also suffering the same fate, again according to the Value Line Geometric Index (middle & bottom panels, Chart 2). Chart 1Tread Carefully Chart 2More Non-Confirming Indicators The trade-weighted U.S. dollar is also sending a deflationary impulse signal and likely reflects a continued global growth deceleration (top panel, Chart 2). This is a net negative for EPS especially for internationally exposed SPX constituents. Thus, this week we are further de-risking our portfolio by crystalizing gains in a defensive high-yielding communications services sub-index and lifting exposure to neutral from underweight. In addition, we update our bearish view on an early-cyclical subgroup and continue to protect the portfolio by adding trailing stops. Meanwhile, taking the pulse of global bourses is disconcerting. With the exception of the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ, no other stock market (in USD terms) confirms the SPX’s breakout to all-time highs. Highs were either hit in 2006-2007 or in early 2018. Now a big gulf has opened up, reminiscent of last year’s late-summer dichotomies when the SPX vaulted to fresh highs, but none of the other major global bourses confirmed the September highs (Charts 3 & 4). There are rising odds that a repeat may be unfolding. Chart 3I Know What You Did Last Summer Chart 4I Still Know What You Did Last Summer In our view, what explains the reversal of fortunes that led to a U.S. market dominating outperformance since early 2017 has been the massive fiscal injection the Trump administration undertook (Chart 5), with rising fiscal deficits three years running (an unprecedented backdrop during expansions). Chart 6 puts this easing in fiscal policy in a global perspective and shows the average fiscal balance from 2017-2020 using the IMF’s WEO April 2019 dataset that includes projections. The delta in the U.S.’s fiscal largess is quite significant. Our worry is that this is unsustainable and, similar to last fall/winter, the rest of the world may pull down the U.S. stock market until at least there are clear signs of a positive resolution in the U.S./China trade dispute. Adding it all up, the equity market’s risk/reward tradeoff is poor and we remain tactically cautious. The trade war re-escalation risks pushing out the global growth recovery to early-2020 and has shaken our confidence in our cyclically constructive equity market view. Thus, this week we are further de-risking our portfolio by crystalizing gains in a defensive high-yielding communications services sub-index and lifting exposure to neutral from underweight. In addition, we update our bearish view on an early-cyclical subgroup and continue to protect the portfolio by adding trailing stops. Chart 5Explaining U.S. Outperformance Dialing Up Profits In the context of a further de-risking of the portfolio, we are monetizing our gains of 6% since inception in our underweight recommendation in the S&P telecom services index and are upgrading this high yielding sector to neutral (bottom panel, Chart 7). Not only have bond yields plunged of late, raising the allure of fixed income equity proxies, but the recent escalation of the trade spat has caused U.S. manufacturers to pull in their horns. Markit’s flash manufacturing PMI survey that took place post the May 5 Trump tweet fell to 50.6 the lowest level since the history of the data. It is surprising that this latest reading near the 50 boom/bust line is below the late-2015/early 2016 level when global trade came to an abrupt halt. Historically, relative share price momentum has moved inversely with the annual change in this series and the current message is to expect a sustained rebound in the former (middle panel, Chart 7). Beyond this enticing macro backdrop for defensive equities, firming operating metrics also suggest that it no longer pays to be bearish telecom services stocks. Industry CEOs have shown labor restraint of late, at a time when selling prices are on the verge of expanding (middle & bottom panels, Chart 8). While the dust has yet to settle on the T-Mobile/Sprint saga, any reduction in supply should prove positive at the margin for industry selling prices. Chart 7Macro Headwinds Beneficiary Chart 8Firming Operating Metrics Tack on a tick up in consumer outlays on telecom services and this likely troughing in demand will also boost the sector’s revenue growth prospects (top panel, Chart 8). In sum, an enticing safe-haven macro backdrop, firming industry operating metrics and rock-bottom profits expectations and valuations all signal that it no longer pays to be underweight the S&P telecom services index. Meanwhile, bombed out profit expectations, suggest that the bar is set extremely low for incumbents and is likely a precursor of positive surprises. In fact, the five year out profit bearishness is unprecedented: telecom carriers are expected to trail the broad market by 13 percentage points (third panel, Chart 9). Despite this downbeat EPS message, relative share prices have fallen even faster, pushing the 12-month forward P/E multiple to multi-decade lows (bottom panel, Chart 9). Nevertheless, we refrain from bumping this niche safe haven index to overweight given some structural negative balance sheet issues. Chart 10 shows that telecom services debt burden is deteriorating. Net debt-to-EBITDA is pushing 3x versus below 2x for the broad market, and the interest coverage ratio is sinking steadily. Chart 9Bombed Out EPS Prospects And Valuations Chart 10Balance Sheet Trouble In sum, an enticing safe-haven macro backdrop, firming industry operating metrics and rock-bottom profits expectations and valuations all signal that it no longer pays to be underweight the S&P telecom services index. Bottom Line: Lift the S&P telecom services index to neutral and lock in gains of 6% since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5TELSX – VZ, T, CTL. Home Improvement Retailers: Timber Alert While our high-conviction underweight call in the S&P home improvement retail index is slightly in the red, our confidence has increased that these hard line retailers are about to get chopped. Netting it all out, waning residential investment, the recent flare up in the U.S./China trade tussle, crumbling lumber prices and adverse supply/demand dynamics warn that the S&P home improvement retailing index has ample downside. First, the latest GDP release as it pertains to housing made for grim reading: residential fixed investment is in retreat. Big Box DIY retailers are highly levered to this type of housing activity and the prognosis is negative. Residential fixed investment has subtracted from real GDP growth for five consecutive quarters, which is unprecedented outside of a recession (top panel, Chart 11). Chart 11Time To Converge Lower... Residential investment is on the verge of contracting in absolute terms, a feat already achieved compared to GDP growth (bottom panel, Chart 11). The direct link to HIR typically comes via existing home sales. In other words, when a home changes ownership, typically some renovation activity goes into that newly purchased home (second panel, Chart 12). Thus, any sustained softness in existing home sales especially given heightened competition from the newly built housing stock, will weigh on residential investment. Against such a backdrop, top line growth for building & supply stores will likely remain subdued (third panel, Chart 12). Second, the recently announced tariffs and the specter of additional tariffs on the remaining U.S./China trade balance will also weigh on home improvement retailers' margins and profits. While management teams have yet to pencil in the direct input cost increase hit to future profitability, as revealed in recent HD and LOW conference calls, if all of the cost is passed on to the consumer then sales will suffer the most. Put simply, at the margin, some remodeling projects would have to get trimmed or get postponed, warning that HIR same-store sales will remain under pressure (second panel, Chart 13). Chart 12...To Falling Residential Investment Chart 13Lumber Price Blues Third, lumber prices continue to crumble and, given that HIR makes a set margin on lumber sales, HIR profits will likely underwhelm (third panel, Chart 13). Finally, a buildup in industry inventories at a time when demand is easing has pummeled the sales-to-inventories ratio, warning that the path of least resistance for HIR profitability remains lower (bottom panel, Chart 13). Our HIR model does an excellent job in capturing most of these macro and operating headwinds, and suggests that a felling in the relative share price ratio looms (Chart 14). What is disquieting is that there is no real valuation cushion for these priced-to-perfection retailers to absorb any future profit hiccups that we anticipate in the coming quarters. Our sense is that the de-rating phase that commenced in early 2019 will gain steam in the back half of the year and a premium-to-discount valuation reversal would not surprise us at all (bottom panel, Chart 12). Netting it all out, waning residential investment, the recent flare up in the U.S./China trade tussle, crumbling lumber prices and adverse supply/demand dynamics warn that the S&P home improvement retailing index has ample downside. Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction underweight status in the S&P HIR index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI – HD, LOW. Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Chart 14Model Says Shy Away Housekeeping Early last week we obeyed our stop and booked profits in the S&P homebuilding index of 10% versus the S&P 500 since inception; we also downgraded this niche consumer discretionary index from previously overweight to currently neutral. We are taking this opportunity of de-risking our portfolio to add another trailing stop at 10% to a related market-neutral trade: long S&P homebuilding/short S&P HIR that has recently cleared the 13% return mark since inception. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights Corporate Bonds: Corporate bond spreads have been slow to price-in the escalation of the U.S./China trade dispute. Nimble investors should take steps to mitigate their near-term (0-3 month) exposure to credit spreads, but remain overweight corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Duration: With 50 bps of rate cuts already priced into the market for the next 12 months, there is very little money to be made from extending duration and potentially a lot of money to be made by keeping duration low. This is especially true given that the Fed has so far done nothing to suggest that rate cuts are on the table. TIPS: Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates look cheap on our model, and the core PCE deflator’s sharp drop probably overstates the deflationary pressures in the economy. Maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries in U.S. bond portfolios. Feature Concerns that the ongoing U.S./China trade war will exacerbate the decline in global growth flared again last week, and our geopolitical strategists see high odds of further near-term escalation.1 For starters, China has not yet retaliated to the U.S. Commerce Department’s blacklisting of Huawei and a handful of other Chinese tech firms. Meanwhile, the U.S. stands ready to extend tariffs across the full slate of imported Chinese goods. To cap it all off, there are currently no firm plans for the resumption of talks between the countries’ respective negotiating teams, and no assurance that Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will speak to each other at the G20 Summit in Japan on June 28-29. Credit Spreads Are Too Complacent Chart 1Corporate Bonds At Risk While Treasury yields responded to the turmoil by dropping for the second consecutive week, the spillover to corporate bond markets has been less severe. Chart 1 on page 1 shows that corporate bond excess returns have de-coupled from the CRB Raw Industrials index during the past 12 months. The CRB Raw Industrials index tracks a broad basket of commodity prices, making it an excellent real-time indicator of the market’s assessment of global growth. Like Treasury yields, the CRB index has fallen sharply during the past two weeks. The wide gulf between corporate bond and commodity returns suggests that we will soon see either a sell-off in the corporate bond market or a positive re-rating of global growth that sends the CRB index higher. Recent history provides examples of both cases (Chart 2). The CRB index rose to meet corporate bond returns in 2012, but dragged corporate bond returns lower in 2014. Given the long list of potential negative trade catalysts, some near-term downside for corporate bond excess returns appears more likely. But it’s not just political headlines that make us cautious about the near-term outlook for credit spreads. The uncertainty created by the U.S./China trade dispute is now finding its way into the economic survey data. Flash Manufacturing PMIs for the U.S., Eurozone and Japan all fell in May, with respondents quick to blame the decline on global trade tensions. Much like the CRB index, PMI readings are sending a starkly different message than credit spreads. Either trade tensions will ease during the next couple of months, sending PMIs higher, or corporate bond spreads will widen. A model of U.S. capacity utilization based on lagged junk spreads predicts that capacity utilization will rise from its current 78% to 80% during the next six months (Chart 3). However, both the Markit and ISM Manufacturing PMIs suggest a further decline is more likely. Once again, either trade tensions will ease during the next couple of months, sending the PMIs higher, or corporate bond spreads will widen. Chart 2Position For Reconvergence Chart 3Capacity Utilization & Junk Spreads We recommend that investors take measures to limit their near-term (~3-month) exposure to corporate spread risk. Stay Positive On A Cyclical (6-12 Month) Horizon Chart 4Expect More Stimulus From China While near-term caution is warranted, we would still position for positive corporate bond excess returns (both investment grade & high-yield) on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Ultimately, the U.S. and China will navigate toward some sort of truce, and the negative impact from tariffs is unlikely to derail the U.S. economic recovery.2 What’s more, Chinese policymakers will accelerate their stimulus efforts to mitigate the negative impact of higher tariffs. Our China Investment Strategy service tracks a composite of six money and credit growth indicators that lead Chinese economic activity. This leading indicator has already bottomed, and our strategists anticipate a return to stimulus levels reminiscent of mid-2016 (Chart 4).3 As long as a U.S. recession is avoided, corporate bond spreads will eventually settle near levels seen in the late stages of previous economic cycles (Chart 5A & Chart 5B).4 Chart 5AInvestment Grade Spread Targets Chart 5BHigh-Yield Spread Targets Bottom Line: Corporate bond spreads have been slow to price-in the escalation of the U.S./China trade dispute. Nimble investors should take steps to mitigate their near-term (0-3 month) exposure to credit spreads, but remain overweight corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Risk & Reward In The Treasury Market Unlike credit spreads, Treasury yields have responded aggressively to the negative news flow. The 10-year Treasury yield currently sits at 2.32%, 7 bps lower than at this time last week. Meanwhile, the overnight index swap curve is priced for two full 25 basis point rate cuts over the next 12 months. Interestingly, while market prices imply 50 bps of rate cuts during the next year, the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants shows that, as of the May FOMC meeting, investors didn’t actually expect rate cuts any time soon. The shaded region in Chart 6 shows the interquartile range of the surveyed investors’ fed funds rate forecasts, while the dashed black line shows the median forecast. The survey responses convey widespread consensus that the fed funds rate will remain flat until the end of the year – the 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile are all equal until the end of 2019. Then, heading into 2020, the 75th percentile of the distribution starts to forecast rate hikes. The 25th percentile doesn’t move in the direction of rate cuts until Q4 2020, and the median forecaster sees the fed funds rate staying put at least through the second half of 2021. Chart 6Market And Survey Expectations Differ Why would market prices imply a much lower path for the fed funds rate than actual investor survey responses? The most likely reason relates to assessments about the balance of risks. When responding to surveys, investors will usually provide their modal (or most likely) outcome. However, investor bets in financial markets will reflect a dollar-weighted average of different possible scenarios. It’s possible that while investors think a flat fed funds rate is the most likely outcome, they also view rate cuts as a higher probability tail risk than rate hikes. They therefore invest some of their money to hedge that risk, even if it does not reflect their base case view. The intuition that rate cuts remain a “tail risk” is confirmed by another question from the survey. This question asks investors to consider a time period between now and the end of the year, and then attach a probability to the Fed’s next move i.e. whether it will be hike, a cut, or whether there will be no change in the funds rate until the end of 2019 (Chart 7). As of the April/May survey, market participants thought the odds of a hike were 23%, odds of a cut were 17% and the odds of flat rates until the end of the year were 59%. Before the Fed meeting in March, investors saw 50% chance of a hike, 13% chance of a cut, and 37% chance of no change. The overall message is that investors continue to view a 2019 rate cut as a tail risk, but one that’s perceived probability is rising. In any event, for our purposes it doesn’t really matter how investors respond to surveys. According to our Golden Rule of Bond Investing, if the actual change in the fed funds rate over the next 12 months exceeds what is currently priced into the OIS curve for that period, then below-benchmark portfolio duration positions will pay off.5 In fact, the Golden Rule even gives us a framework for translating different rate hike/cut scenarios into expected 12-month Treasury returns (Table 1). Table 1The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Based on current prices, if the fed funds rate holds steady for the next 12 months – as the median market participant expects – we calculate that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index will lose between 1.98% and 2.41% relative to cash. Even in the scenario where the Fed delivers two rate cuts during the next 12 months, we would still expect Treasury index returns to lag cash by 12-13 bps. Negative excess returns in the “two rate cut” scenario are due to the negative carry in the Treasury index. Capital gains/losses would be close to zero in that scenario, since the change in the fed funds rate is exactly equal to the market’s expectations. Investors continue to view a 2019 rate cut as a tail risk, but one that’s perceived probability is rising. What’s evident from those figures is that there is currently very little money to be made betting on rate cuts, and quite a bit to be made betting on rate hikes. The risk/reward balance in the Treasury market clearly favors keeping portfolio duration low. But What Will The Fed Actually Do? The minutes from the last FOMC meeting show broad consensus around the Fed’s current “on hold” policy stance, though it’s notable that “a few” participants thought rate hikes would be appropriate if the economy evolved in line with their expectations. The minutes contain no mention of a possible rate cut. Our sense is that it would require a further sharp tightening of financial conditions or significantly worse economic data before the Fed seriously considers cutting rates. Our Fed Monitor – an aggregate indicator that measures economic growth, inflation and financial conditions – is currently very close to the zero line, a level consistent with the Fed’s “on hold” stance (Chart 8). The ISM Manufacturing PMI is also firmly above the 50 boom/bust line. Historically, Fed rate cuts are usually preceded by a negative reading from our Fed Monitor and a sub-50 PMI. We would be looking for those two signals before expecting the Fed to cut rates. Chart 8Sub-50 ISM Required Before The Fed Cuts Rates Bottom Line: With 50 bps of rate cuts already priced into the market for the next 12 months, there is very little money to be made from extending duration and potentially a lot of money to be made by keeping duration low. This is especially true given that the Fed has so far done nothing to suggest that rate cuts are on the table. Inflation & TIPS Chart 9Adaptive Expectations Model It’s not just nominal Treasury yields that dropped during the past two weeks. Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates – the spread between nominal Treasury yields and TIPS yields – also fell precipitously. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently 1.76% and the 5-year/5-year forward breakeven is only 1.9%. These figures suggest that the market does not trust the Fed to meet its inflation target in the long-run. Our main valuation tool for the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is our Adaptive Expectations Model.6 It derives a fair value for the 10-year breakeven based on: The 10-year rate of change in the core consumer price index The 12-month rate of change in the headline consumer price index The New York Fed’s Underlying Inflation Gauge At present, the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is 20 bps below the model’s fair value (Chart 9). It shouldn’t be too surprising that TIPS look cheap relative to nominals. Recent inflation data have been weak and the Fed has written off the weakness as “transitory”, leading to doubts about whether it will keep rates low enough to meet its target. For our part, we think investors should take advantage of low breakevens and overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries in U.S. bond portfolios. In fact, the Fed’s characterization of low inflation as “transitory” seems correct. Chart 10 shows both the core and trimmed mean PCE deflators. The dramatic fall in the core measure, which strips out food and energy prices from the headline number, is what has caught the market’s attention. But it’s important to note that trimmed mean PCE inflation has not confirmed the decline. In fact, it remains in a multi-year uptrend. Recent inflation data have been weak, but the Fed has written off the weakness as “transitory”. Chart 10Low Inflation Looks "Transitory" This is the third time during this cycle that core PCE inflation has diverged negatively from the trimmed mean. Core eventually rebounded and re-converged with the trimmed mean in both of the prior two episodes. The Fed is banking on the third time playing out the same way, and we think it would be unwise to bet against them. Recently released research from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas shows that trimmed mean PCE inflation provides a less-biased real-time estimate of the headline figure than the traditional core measure. The latter tends to run too low. The trimmed mean is also more closely related to labor market slack.7 Bottom Line: Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates look cheap on our model, and the core PCE deflator’s sharp drop probably overstates the deflationary pressures in the economy. Maintain an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries in U.S. bond portfolios. Ryan Swift U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “Is Trump Ready For The New Long March?” dated May 24, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 The potential economic impact from tariffs is discussed in Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Tarrified,” dated May 16, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Simple Arithmetic,” dated May 15, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 For details on how we determine the spread targets shown in Charts 5A & 5B, please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For details on the model’s construction please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Adaptive Expectations In The TIPS Market,” dated November 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 https://www.dallasfed.org/-/media/Documents/research/papers/2019/wp1903… Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Falling Yields: There have been three main drivers of the latest decline in global bond yields: slower global growth, softer inflation expectations and increased safe-haven demand for bonds given the intensifying U.S.-China trade conflict. The first two are more than fully discounted in current yield levels, but the latter is likely to persist in the near-term with no resolution of the trade conflict in sight. Model Portfolio Adjustments: We are tactically reducing the sizes of the overall strategic tilts in our model bond portfolio – below-benchmark duration exposure and overweight global corporates vs. governments. There is a growing risk of deeper selloffs in global equity and credit markets if the June G-20 meeting produces no positive signals on ending the trade dispute. We do not yet see a case to position more defensively on a medium-term horizon, however, given the pickup in “early” global leading economic indicators. Feature Chart of the WeekYields Discount A Lot Of Bad News The investment backdrop at the moment – slowing global growth momentum, softening inflation expectations, an increasingly prolonged U.S.-China trade dispute with no immediate sign of resolution, and a strengthening U.S. dollar– is fairly bond bullish. Unsurprisingly, government bond yields in the developed markets have fallen to levels more consistent with a less certain macro environment. At one point last week, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield dipped as low as 2.30%, while the 10-year German Bund fell deeper into negative territory at -0.13%. There are now expectations of easier monetary policy discounted in yield curves of several countries, most notably the U.S. where markets are priced for 50bps of Fed rate cuts over the next year – despite no indication from the Fed that cuts are coming anytime soon. From a valuation perspective, bond yields are starting to look a bit stretched to the downside (Chart of the Week). The term premium component of yields has fallen to near post-crisis lows in the majority of countries, while the U.S. dollar has surged despite lower U.S. interest rate expectations – both indications of investors driving up the value of traditional safe-havens at a time of uncertainty. Looking purely at the growth side of the equation, the downward momentum in bond yields should start to fade with the global leading economic indicator now in the process of bottoming out. That does not mean, however, that yields could not fall further in the near-term if the trade headlines get worse and risk assets sell off more meaningfully – an outcome that grows increasingly likely as the two sides in the trade war seem to be digging in for a longer battle. The State Of The World Since The “TTT” Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy now believe that there is only a 40% chance of a U.S.-China trade deal by the end of June. This could trigger a deeper selloff in global equity and credit markets if investors begin to price in a larger and more prolonged hit to economic growth and corporate profits from the U.S. tariffs. This would trigger even greater safe-haven flows into government bonds, pushing yields lower through a more negative term premium. The much lower level of U.S. Treasury yields has helped limit the hit to risk asset prices from the elevated uncertainty over global trade. Since the “Trump Tariff Tweet” (TTT) of May 5, when the new round of tariffs on U.S. imports from China was announced which sparked the new leg of the trade war, the fall in benchmark 10-year government bond yields across the developed world can be fully explained by the fall in the term premium (Table 1). For example, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield has fallen -14bps since the TTT, while our estimate of the term premium on the 10-year Treasury as decreased by -20bps. Over the same time period, 10-year U.S. inflation expectations have also fallen -11bps, but the market has only priced in an additional -5bps of Fed rate cuts over the next year according to our Fed Discounter. Table 1Decomposing 10-Year Government Bond Yield Changes Since The "Trump Tariff Tweet" The big difference between last December and today is the much lower level of U.S. Treasury yields. Lower yields have helped mute the hit to risk asset prices from the elevated uncertainty over global trade since the TTT (Chart 2). The Fed’s more dovish pivot in the early months of 2019 has helped push Treasury yields lower as investors have moved from pricing in rate hikes to discounting rate cuts. Even traditional “risk-off” measures like the VIX, U.S. TED spreads, the price of gold and the Japanese yen have only risen modestly since the TTT compared to the big moves seen back in December when investors feared that the Fed would tighten right into a U.S. recession (Chart 3). Chart 2Risk Assets Remain Relatively Calm Chart 3Falling Bond Yields Helping Keep Vol Subdued Easier monetary policy, if delivered, can help underwrite a rebound in equity and credit markets. When looking across the array of financial market returns since the TTT (Table 2), the only developed economies that have seen equities appreciate are Australia and New Zealand – countries where rate cuts are being signaled by policymakers (or already delivered, in the case of New Zealand). Table 2Asset Returns By Country Since The "Trump Tariff Tweet" In the case of the U.S., however, numerous Fed officials have stated recently that no changes to U.S. monetary policy are likely without decisive evidence that the new round of China tariffs and trade uncertainty was having a major negative impact on U.S. growth. On that front, forward-looking measures of U.S. economic activity, like the Conference Board leading economic indicator or our models for U.S. employment and capital spending, are not pointing to an imminent sharp slowing of U.S. growth (Chart 4). At the same time, leading indicators like our global LEI diffusion index and the China credit impulse are both signaling that global growth momentum may soon start surprising to the upside (Chart 5). Chart 4No U.S. Recession Signal Yet From These Indicators Chart 5Some Reasons For Optimism On Global Growth If the Fed does not see a case to deliver the rate cuts that are now discounted, or even to just signal to the markets that easier policy is coming soon, then there is a greater chance of a deeper pullback in U.S. equity and credit markets from any new negative news on trade. This suggests that the risk-aversion bid for U.S. Treasuries will result in an even more deeply negative U.S. term premium and lower bond yields. Easier monetary policy, if delivered, can help underwrite a rebound in equity and credit markets. Already, we are seeing such increasingly negative correlations between returns on equities and government bonds across the major developed markets. In Charts 6 & 7, we show the rolling 52-week correlation between local government bond and equity returns for the U.S., euro area, Japan, U.K., Canada and Australia. For each country, we also plot that correlation versus our estimate of the term premium on 10-year government bond yields. Chart 6Safe Haven Demand For Bonds ... Chart 7... Helping Drive Down Term Premia It is clear that there is a significant “risk-aversion bid” for government bonds right now, given the increasingly negative stock/bond correlations and falling term premia. One possible interpretation is that falling bond yields are being driven more by fears of a risk-off selloff in global equity and credit markets rather than rational pricing of future monetary policy or inflation expectations because of slowing growth. Interestingly, Australia – where the central bank has been signaling that rate cuts are imminent – is the only exception in this list of countries where the stock/bond correlation is not negative. There, the deeply negative term premium is more about weakening growth and low inflation expectations, which is forcing a dovish response from the Reserve Bank of Australia, rather than a risk aversion bid for safe assets from investors. It is clear that there is a significant “risk-aversion bid” for government bonds right now, given the increasingly negative stock/bond correlations and falling term premia. Net-net, while bond yields discount a lot of bad news and now look too low compared to tentative signs of improving global growth, it is hard to build a case for an imminent rebound in global bond yields without signs that U.S. and China are getting closer to a trade deal. Bottom Line: There have been three main drivers of the latest decline in global bond yields: slower global growth, softer inflation expectations and increased safe-haven demand for bonds given the intensifying U.S.-China trade conflict. The first two are more than fully discounted in current yield levels, but the latter is likely to persist in the near-term with no resolution of the trade conflict in sight. Tactical Risk-Reduction Adjustments To Our Model Bond Portfolio Chart 8Easier Monetary Policy Required In Europe & Australia Given the growing potential for a larger selloff in global risk assets if no U.S.-China trade deal comes out of next month’s G-20 meeting (where Presidents Trump and Xi will both be in attendance), we think it is prudent to make some tactical adjustments to the recommended weightings within our model bond portfolio. These moves will provide a partial hedge against any near-term widening of global credit spreads or further reduction in government bond yields in the event of a complete breakdown of the trade talks. Specifically, we are making the following changes: Duration Exposure: We are increasing the overall duration of the model bond portfolio by 0.5 years, which still leaves a duration position that is 0.5 years below the custom benchmark index of the portfolio. We are doing this by increasing allocations to the longer maturity buckets in the U.S., Japan and France. Credit Exposure: We are cutting the sizes of our recommended overweight tilts for U.S. corporates in half for both investment grade and high-yield. This is a combined reduction of nearly 4% of the portfolio that will be used to fund the increase in duration on the government bond side. We are making no other changes to our government bond country allocations, staying overweight in core Europe (Germany plus France), Japan and Australia where our Central Bank Monitors are calling for a need for easier monetary policy (Chart 8). We are also staying overweight U.K. Gilts, where yields continue to trade more off Brexit uncertainty than domestic economic growth or inflation pressures. We are not making any changes to the model bond portfolio exposure to euro area corporate debt or Italian governments, riskier spread products where we are already underweight. We are, however, maintaining our weightings for U.S. dollar denominated EM sovereign and corporate debt at neutral. EM debt has performed relatively well versus developed market equivalents since the May 5 “Trump Tariff Tweet” (TTT). We understand that not downgrading EM seems counterintuitive when we are trying to position more defensively in the model portfolio. We prefer to reduce exposure to U.S. credit, however, given that EM debt has performed relatively well versus developed market equivalents since the May 5 TTT (Table 3), and with EM spreads now at more attractive levels relative to U.S. investment grade (Chart 9). In addition, EM credit tends to perform better during periods when Chinese credit growth is accelerating, as is currently the case (bottom panel) – and which may continue if China’s policymakers eventually turn to more domestic stimulus measures to combat the effects of U.S. tariffs, as seems likely. Table 3Credit Market Performance Since The "Trump Tariff Tweet" Chart 9EM Credit Offers Value Versus U.S. Corporates Importantly, these are all only tactical changes to our model portfolio to partially protect against the risk of U.S. credit spread widening in the event of more negative news on the U.S.-China trade front. We still have not changed our strategic (6-12 month) views on global bond yields (higher) and global corporates (outperforming government bonds) given the tentative signs of improving global growth from the leading indicators. Bottom Line: We are tactically reducing the sizes of the overall strategic tilts in our model bond portfolio – below-benchmark duration exposure and overweight global corporates vs. governments. There is a growing risk of deeper selloffs in global equity and credit markets if the June G20 meeting produces no positive signals on ending the trade dispute. We do not yet see a case to position more defensively on a medium-term horizon, however, given the pickup in “early” global leading economic indicators. Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights In the second half of 2019, economic growth will stop accelerating… …but an underpinning of equity valuations will limit sell-off magnitudes to around 10 percent or so, rather than deeper sustained plunges. The equity market will end up in a sideways channel… …but defensives, such as healthcare, will outperform economically-sensitive sectors. Overweight Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. Overweight the JPY. Bitcoin is due another technical correction. Feature The 2019 playbook for economies and markets is playing out exactly as we predicted. In our first report of this year we wrote that 2019 would be the economic and investment opposite of 2018. Opposite to 2018 because the first half of 2019 would see inflation fade, and growth accelerate. And opposite to 2018 because the second half of 2019 would see inflation stop fading, and growth stop accelerating (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekIn The First Half Of 2019, Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated Inflation Faded, Growth Accelerated Back in early January, we wrote: “Inflation is set to disappoint as the recent near-halving of the crude oil price feeds into both headline and core consumer price indexes. With central banks now promising even greater ‘dependence on the incoming data’, this unfolding dynamic will force them to temper any hawkish intentions and rhetoric, limiting the extent of upside in bond yields.” This was a controversial view at the time. Yet within a month of writing, the Federal Reserve had stopped hiking interest rates, while the ECB and other major central banks had also pivoted to more dovish. We also wrote: “Germany should benefit from another support to growth. Last year, the auto sector – a major engine of the German economy – spluttered as it absorbed the new WLTP emissions testing standard. Through the middle of 2018 German motor vehicle exports suffered a €20 billion hit which shaved 0.6 percent from Germany’s €3.4 trillion economy (Chart I-2). Now, if auto exports stabilize, this drag will disappear. And if auto exports recover to the pre-WLTP level after this one-off and temporary shock, Germany will receive a 0.6% mirror-image boost to growth.” 1 2019 is the economic and investment opposite of 2018. We now know that the German economy accelerated to a close-to-trend 1.7% clip in the second quarter, up from a -0.8 percent rate of contraction in the third quarter of 2018 (Chart I-3). This is not just due to relief in the auto sector. Growth in other European economies has also rebounded, so the acceleration in growth has a broader foundation, and is now beyond doubt. Given the openness of the European economy, it is also inconceivable that this growth pick-up does not reflect a more generalized acceleration in global activity.2 Chart I-2The WTLP Drag On German Auto Exports Is Over Chart I-3German GDP Growth Accelerated To A 1.7 Percent Clip To repeat, the 2019 playbook for economies and financial markets is playing out exactly as expected; in the first half of the year, inflation faded while growth accelerated. The question is: what happens next? Growth Will Struggle To Accelerate Further Clients ask us an important theoretical question: what is the most important driver for the economy and financial markets; is it the change in the bond yield (or interest rate) or is it the level of the bond yield? The answer is that both the change and the level of the bond yield are important in their different ways. The German economy accelerated to a close-to-trend 1.7% clip in the second quarter. When it comes to accelerations and decelerations in credit creation, it is the change in the bond yield that is the most important. Remember, GDP is a flow statistic, which means that GDP growth is a change of flow statistic receiving contributions from the change of flow of credit. As changes in the flow of credit result from the change in the bond yield – all else being equal – it is the change in the bond yield that drives GDP growth. If all of this sounds somewhat confusing, then Chart I-4 should make the point crystal clear. Chart I-4The Change In The Bond Yield Drives GDP Growth Since last November, high-quality 10-year bond yields have plunged 70 bps, and this collapse in yields helped to provide a strong impulse to growth in the first half of 2019. To receive the same impulse again in the second half, bond yields would have to plunge another 70 bps. But with the German 10-year bund yield already at -0.1 percent, the same rate of decline seems highly unlikely, if not mathematically impossible. The upshot is that the growth impulse from declining bond yields can only fade in the second half of this year. However, when it comes to valuations and solvencies in the financial markets, it is the level of the bond yield that is the most important. Essentially, at a tipping point, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, triggering a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets which threatens a disinflationary impulse on the economy. The growth impulse from declining bond yields can only fade in the second half of this year. How can we sense this tipping point? It broadly equates to when the sum of the 10-year yields on the T-bond, German bund, and JGB is at 4 percent, the ‘rule of 4’ (Chart I-5). Conversely, when the sum is below 3 percent, the ‘rule of 3’, – as it is now – the seemingly rich valuation of equities versus bonds is broadly justified (Chart I-6).3 Chart I-5When The Sum Of 10-Year Yields On The T-Bond, Bund, And JGB Equals 4 Percent, The Global 10-Year Yield Equals 2 Percent Chart I-6The Rule Of 4, And The Rule Of 3 The upshot is that in the second half of 2019, economic growth will stop accelerating, but the support to equity valuations will limit sell-off magnitudes to around 10 percent or so, rather than deeper sustained plunges (Chart I-7). In aggregate, the equity market will end up in a sideways channel, but defensives, such as healthcare, will outperform economically-sensitive sectors. Chart I-7The Low Expected Return On Equities Is Justified When Bond Yields Are Ultra-Low How Did We Do? In our first report of the year, we also made (or reiterated) five investment recommendations. Today, we will review whether they worked or not, and what to do with them now. 1. Own a 25:75 combination of European banks relative to market, plus U.S. T-bonds. Chart I-8Banks Didn’t Outperform, But Bonds Did! Did it work? Yes. Although European banks underperformed the market, this was more than offset by the huge rally in T-bonds that resulted from the Fed going on hold (Chart I-8). Hence, the position is up 1 percent this year and 3.5 percent since its inception last November with the added advantage of negligible volatility. What to do now. Take profits. 2. Overweight EM versus DM. Did it work? No. EM has underperformed DM this year, though the position is broadly flat since its inception in November. What to do now. Close this position and switch into overweight Euro Stoxx 50 versus Shanghai Composite. 3. Overweight European versus U.S. equities. Did it work? The position is flat this year, though modestly up since its inception in November. What to do now. Maintain the position for a little while longer, as an expected short-term underperformance of the tech sector should benefit the tech-lite European equity market. 4. Overweight Italian assets versus European assets. Did it work? The position is broadly flat this year for both Italian equities and bonds relative to their European benchmarks. What to do now. Close any cyclical exposure to Italy, but maintain a structural exposure to Italian BTPs either in absolute or relative terms. 5. Overweight the JPY. Chart I-9In Japan And Europe, The Expected Interest Rate Cannot Go Much Lower Did it work? Yes. The broad trade-weighted JPY has outperformed this year, and especially so the JPY/EUR cross. What to do now. Maintain the position. When the expected interest rate is at its lower bound, then it is difficult for the central bank to hurt its currency. In technical terms, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew (Chart I-9). Of course, there are plenty of currencies whose interest rates are near the technical lower bound, but we like the JPY because it has less political risk than the others. So for the moment, remain overweight the JPY. Fractal Trading System* This week we note that after a 100 percent rally in a near straight line, bitcoin’s 65-day fractal dimension is at the lower bound that has reliably signaled previous technical corrections. On that basis, this week’s recommended trade is short bitcoin, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 27 percent. Also, we are very pleased to report that short tech versus healthcare quickly achieved its 6.5 percent profit target and is now closed. This leaves four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 German auto net exports and GDP are quoted at annualized rates. The Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicle test Procedure (WLTP) is a new standard for auto emissions that took effect on September 1 2018. 2 Quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth at annualized rates. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report “The Rule of 4 Becomes the Rule of 3” dated March 21, 2019 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading System Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Downgrade to a below benchmark allocation. At the margin deteriorating domestic conditions, along with a sustained softness in global growth indicators that are prone to an additional setback given the rising trade policy uncertainty suggest that it is prudent to move to the sidelines on the long materials/short utilities pair trade. Recent Changes Downgrade the S&P chemicals index to underweight, today. This also pushes the S&P materials sector’s weight back down to neutral. Close the long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade, today. Table 1 Feature The SPX suffered its first 5% pullback for the year early last week, and now that President Trump has opened Pandora’s Box, there are high odds that equities will continue to seesaw, at least, until the late-June G20 meeting when the heads of states meet again. Since early-March we have been, and remain, cautious on the short-term equity market outlook as a slew of our tactical indicators have soured. Chart 1 shows three additional non-confirming equity market breakout indicators that are exerting downward pull on the SPX. Stock correlations have increased (shown inverted, top panel, Chart 1), junk spreads have widened (shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 1) and the NYSE’s FANG+ Index has run out of steam (bottom panel, Chart 1). Now the risk is, as we first highlighted in the middle of last week, that the back half of the year global growth reacceleration phase goes on hiatus as this trade policy uncertainty further shatters CEO confidence and global exports remain downbeat (Chart 2). Chart 1Non-Confirming Indicators Chart 2Stalled Export Engine Worrisomely, a number of our cyclical indicators are also firing warning shots. Not only did the ISM’s manufacturing new orders-to-inventories ratio breach parity, but also BCA’s boom/bust indicator took a turn for the worse (Chart 3). Importantly, while a lot of ink is spent on how the U.S. economy is beyond full employment, labor markets are tight and the output gap has closed, resource utilization has petered out – interestingly at a lower high compared with the previous two peaks. This backdrop points to more stock market turmoil in the coming months, similar to the mid-2015 message (Chart 4). Chart 3Cyclical Trouble Brewing Chart 4No Tightness Here Tack on China’s cresting credit impulse and factors are falling into place for a tumultuous back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 3). Keep in mind that the two ultimate “risk off” indicators we track remain tame and underscore that investor complacency remains elevated: the TED spread is at 16bps and the Japanese yen has barely budged of late. This is worrying and suggests that investors expect a positive U.S./China trade resolution (USD/JPY shown inverted, Chart 5). Chart 5No Real Risk Off Phase Yet Were the equity markets to spin out of control however, the “Fed put” remains in place and would save the day. While the Fed has taken down the median dots and projects no hikes for the rest of the year and a single hike next year, the message from the bond market is diametrically opposite. Thus, we are de-risking our portfolio and this week we are downgrading a deep cyclical sector to neutral and also closing an explicit cyclical/defensive pair trade. Chart 6 shows that over 40bps of cuts are priced in by May 2020, according to the OIS curve. Historically, this has been an excellent leading indicator of the annual delta in the fed funds rate. Our takeaway is that the Fed remains the only game in town and were another mini-riot point to occur, then the Fed would not hesitate to step in and put a floor under the equity market. Chart 6The Bond Market Has The Stock Market’s Back In sum, the risks are rising for a prolonged consolidation phase in equities on the back of a trade war escalation that pushes out the global growth recovery to early-2020. Thus, we are de-risking our portfolio and this week we are downgrading a deep cyclical sector to neutral and also closing an explicit cyclical/defensive pair trade. Chemical Reaction We have been on the sidelines on the heavyweight S&P chemicals index of late (it comprises 74% of the S&P materials sector), but factors have now fallen into place and warrant a below benchmark allocation. First, global macro headwinds will continue to weigh on this deep cyclical index as the risk of a full blown trade war will likely take a bite out of final demand. Chemical producers garner 60% of their revenues from abroad (a full 20 percentage points higher than the SPX) and thus are extremely sensitive to the ebbs and flows of emerging markets economic growth in general and China in particular. Adding it all up, macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Chart 7 shows that U.S. chemical products exports are contracting and if the greenback sustains its recent upward trajectory given heightened global trade policy uncertainty, further global market share losses are likely at a time when the overall chemicals market will be shrinking. With regard to China specifically, the recent drop in the credit impulse is far from reassuring (bottom panel, Chart 3) and, assuming that the Chinese authorities will await a riot point prior to really opening up the credit spigots, more pain lies ahead for U.S. chemical exports. Second, the picture is not brighter on the domestic front. Importantly, the American Chemical Council’s Chemical Activity Barometer is nil, warning that domestic end-demand is also ailing (Chart 8). Chart 7Hazard Warning Chart 8Toxic Profit Prospects Tack on a surprisingly persistent jump in industry headcount (bottom panel, Chart 9), and the implication is that waning productivity will slash chemicals profits (bottom panel, Chart 8). Finally, a number of other operating metrics are languishing. Chemicals railcar loads are outright contracting and the softening ISM manufacturing survey points to further downside in the coming months (middle panel, Chart 9). The chemicals shipments-to-inventories ratio is also in contraction territory as this downbeat demand has been met with a buildup in inventories both at the wholesale and manufacturing levels. As a result, a liquidation phase has ensued and chemicals selling prices have sunk into the deflation zone (middle & bottom panels, Chart 10). Chart 9Deficient Demand Chart 10Liquidation Phase Adding it all up, macro headwinds, deficient demand along with rising chemicals stockpiles that have dealt a blow to industry pricing power warn that chemicals stocks are on the verge of a breakdown. Bottom Line: Trim the S&P chemicals index to underweight. Given the 74% weight chemicals stock have in the S&P materials sector, this move also pushes the S&P materials sector’s (Chart 11) weight to neutral from overweight, and we crystalize modest losses of 5.2% in this niche deep cyclical sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P chemicals index are: BLBG: S5CHEM – DWDP, ECL, SHW, PPG, IFF, CE, ALB, LIN, APD, DOW, LYB, FMC, CF, MOS, EMN. Chart 11Trim Materials Back Down To Neutral Materials/Utilities: Move To The Sidelines While we were early in identifying a reflationary impulse from the Chinese authorities and put on an explicit cyclicals/defensives pair trade to capitalize on this opportunity at the end of January, the long materials/short utilities pair trade has failed to live up to its expectations, and today we recommend moving to the sidelines. Such a move is part of our de-risking of the portfolio given the rising global macro headwinds on the horizon we identified earlier. More specifically on the domestic front, our Economic Impulse Indicator (EII) suggests that beneath the surface some cracks are appearing in the U.S. economy. The EII encapsulates six parts of the U.S. economy and on a second derivative basis, softness is apparent (top panel, Chart 12). The ISM manufacturing survey corroborates this message and is also flirting with the boom/bust 50 line, signaling that it is prudent to take some risk off the table (bottom panel, Chart 12). The bond market is sniffing out this deteriorating domestic backdrop and the recent 25bs drop in the 10-year Treasury yield has breathed life into utilities and sucked the oxygen out of materials. Fixed income proxies are also benefiting from the drubbing in Citi’s Economic Surprise Index to the detriment of growth-sensitive deep cyclicals. The melting stock-to-bond ratio reflects all these domestic forces and warns against preferring materials to utilities stocks (Chart 13). Chart 12Move To The Sidelines Chart 13Mushrooming Domestic… The specter of a re-escalation in the trade war will not only continue to weigh on some domestic indicators, but gauges monitoring the health of the global economy will also suffer a setback. Already, our Global Activity Indicator has lost its spark, underscoring that global export volumes will continue to contract. King Dollar is also flexing its muscles, especially versus vulnerable twin deficit emerging market countries which saps economic growth. Tack on the derivative deflationary effect the appreciating greenback has on the commodity complex and materials stocks are at a great disadvantage versus domestic focused utilities (Chart 14). A number of additional global growth indicators are waning and signal that relative profitability will move in favor of utilities and at the expense of materials in the coming months. BCA’s global synchronicity indicator, which gauges the number of countries with a PMI above versus below 50 is sinking like a stone. In fact, the overall global manufacturing PMI is just barely above the expansion/contraction line and global industrial production is decelerating. All of this is a net negative for the deep cyclical materials sector, but a net positive for defensive utilities stocks that sport nil foreign sales exposure (Chart 15). Chart 14…And Global Growth… Chart 15…Worries But before getting outright bearish on this pair, there is a powerful offset. Likely, most of the bad news is reflected in bombed out relative valuations and oversold technicals. This actually also prevents us from fully reversing the trade and buying utilities at the expense of materials. A move to the sidelines is more appropriate (Chart 16). At the margin deteriorating domestic conditions, along with a sustained softness in global growth indicators that are prone to an additional setback given the rising trade policy uncertainty suggest that it is prudent to move to the sidelines on the long materials/short utilities pair trade. Bottom Line: Book losses of 5.3% in the long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade and move to the sidelines. Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Chart 16Saving Grace Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights We’ve searched in vain for imminent domestic weakness in the U.S. economy, … : Much of our work this spring has focused on trying to poke holes in our view that the equilibrium fed funds rate remains above the target fed funds rate, but we haven’t found any evidence of overheating in the real economy, or worrisome excesses in financial markets. … but an exogenous shock could well precipitate a recession if it were serious enough: The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but there’s no such thing as full-on decoupling. The U.S. may react more slowly than other major economies to what’s going on in the rest of the world, but it’s not immune to it. A trade war would threaten global growth, … : U.S.-China trade negotiations have taken center stage over the last couple weeks, and escalating tension between the world’s two largest standalone economies will surely cast a pall over the global outlook. … but there are other potential threats that bear monitoring: Tensions with Iran could be the catalyst for an oil price shock, while a significant rollback of globalization could crimp corporate profit margins. Either would hasten the end of the equity bull market and the expansion. Feature Tight monetary policy is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a recession. We deem policy to be tight if the fed funds rate exceeds our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, and easy if it is below our estimate of equilibrium. Over the six decades for which we compute an estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, the U.S. has only ever experienced recessions when the fed funds rate has exceeded our estimate of equilibrium (Chart 1). Tight policy isn’t always tantamount to a recession – nothing came of tight settings in 1984 or 1995 – but recessions don’t occur without it. Chart 1Recessions Only Occur When Monetary Conditions Are Tight We currently estimate that the equilibrium fed funds rate, a.k.a. the neutral rate, is about 3⅛%, and we continue to project that it will be around 3⅜% by the end of the year. Those estimates leave the Fed with plenty of headroom before it materially slows the economy. If our estimate is on the money, it will take four more rate hikes to induce an inflection in the business cycle. We have not seen anything in the ongoing flow of macro data, or evidence of excesses in the financial markets, that would suggest a recession is already under way or is lurking around the corner. Internal dynamics should continue to support the expansion, but threats from outside the U.S. are growing. We therefore conclude that the next recession may well not arrive for another two years, in the absence of a significantly adverse exogenous event. This week, we extend our focus beyond the U.S. to try to uncover the external threats that could stop the U.S. economy, and the bull markets in risk assets, in their tracks. Beyond the tariff fireworks, we also contemplate the possibility that conflict with Iran could lead to an oil price shock, and the impact of a significant rollback of globalization. It is not our base case that any of the various external threats will tip the U.S. into a recession, but investors should keep tabs on the biggest ones. Tariffs The U.S.-China trade saga has unfolded in three pairs of moves and counter-moves (Diagram 1). While the aggregate $50bn worth of Chinese goods tariffed in the first two salvos mostly targeted industrial equipment and machinery, the third installment, covering $200bn worth of imports, extended the tariffs’ reach to consumer products. Major categories included not only commodities such as base metals, chemical products and mineral fuels and oils, but also a broad swath of foods, textiles, electronics, vehicles and spare parts. After a three-month cease-fire, the developments of the last two weeks arguably marked the most significant escalation of tensions on both sides. The U.S. is now threatening to levy tariffs on the remaining $325bn of Chinese goods that have so far been spared. Diagram 1Anything You Can Do Our colleagues at BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service suggest that recent foreign policy initiatives indicate that the White House does not feel any particular pressure to minimize economic risk this far ahead of the election. The risk of market-disruptive measures has therefore increased, and they see a 50-50 chance that the U.S. and China will fail to reach an accord (Table 1). Although the administration has delayed any action on autos and auto parts for now, Europe could be the next trade partner in its cross hairs. The odds that Section 232 (national-security-threat) tariffs will be levied on European auto imports is rising (Chart 2). Table 1U.S.-China Trade War: Probabilities Of A Deal By End Of June 2019 These heightened trade tensions may delay the global growth recovery that we were expecting to bloom in the summer, and they may also allow the dollar to keep advancing. The greenback is a countercyclical currency, moving inversely with global activity (Chart 3), and a bump in the road for global growth would likely extend its upward run. Chart 3The Countercyclical Dollar Although a strong dollar would be a headwind for exporters, the U.S. economy is comparatively closed. Tariffs are likely to exert the greatest pressure on the economy via softer consumption and investment. So far, the available evidence suggests that U.S. consumers and corporations have borne the brunt of higher tariffs in the form of higher retail prices and lower profit margins.1 Iran Our geopolitical strategists contend that investors have underrated conflict with Iran as a market risk for a while. Now that the contentiousness of U.S.-Iran relations has ratcheted higher upon the administration’s decision not to extend the import waivers on Iranian oil, the issue is back in the spotlight. Our strategists caution that managing the dispute may require more delicacy than the more hawkish elements of the administration realize. In their view, the potential for a misstep increases the odds of a recession and poses a significant risk to the equity bull market. In a joint Special Report by our Commodity and Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services at the beginning of the month, our in-house experts stressed that there are multiple moving parts driving the supply-demand balance in the global oil market.2 Investors should realize that the world faces the prospect of the loss of Venezuelan production (approximately 600,000 barrels per day (b/d)) and significant outages in Libya (~600,000 to 800,000 b/d), in addition to our strategists’ base-case estimate of 700,000 b/d from Iran’s current 1.3 million b/d output. BCA does not expect that all of that output will be lost, but the key point is that Iran is not the only potential source of a supply shortfall. Our energy strategists believe that OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, and supported by Saudi Arabia’s OPEC allies – has the capacity to make up for even their larger shortfall scenarios (Chart 4). The problem is that OPEC 2.0 may not have the will to do so in a timely fashion. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the OPEC 2.0 coalition were caught completely off guard by the administration’s issuance of import waivers in November, after they had ramped up production at its request to limit the market disruptions that would have ensued when Iran’s output was taken off the market. The last-minute waiver decision caused oil prices to crater in the wake of a supply glut that OPEC 2.0 has been working to sop up ever since (Chart 5). Chart 5... But The Oil Market Is Pretty Tight OPEC 2.0’s members may feel that they were badly used last fall, and may not be inclined to move proactively now. Russia is managing its own low-grade conflict with the U.S., and all of the coalition should bear in mind that the U.S. could release over a million b/d from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) for a solid six to nine months, according to our energy team’s estimates. If rising oil prices are often viewed as a tax on American consumers, a late summer/early fall release of holdings could be viewed as an election rebate, courtesy of the skilled economic managers in the White House. Our team expects that OPEC 2.0 will likely guard against an oversupply-driven swoon in oil prices by managing its production on something akin to a just-in-time inventory strategy. Our energy and geopolitical strategists caution that there are two other ways the administration may overplay its hand. First, it might overestimate U.S. shale drillers’ ability to export their production. While new pipeline construction will relieve the transportation bottleneck limiting the Permian Basin output that reaches the Gulf of Mexico, oil exports from the Gulf are limited by a shortage of deep-water harbor facilities. If global trade tensions do worsen, both the dollar and U.S. equities may attract safe-haven flows. There is also the possibility that Iran might strike at Iraq, putting some of its 3.5 million b/d output at risk. It could also make good on its repeated threat to close the Straits of Hormuz, through which nearly a fifth of global oil supplies travel daily. Either of these options would dramatically escalate the conflict, but a desperate Iran might pursue them if it felt cornered. The bottom line is that the probability of an oil price shock is not negligible. Brinkmanship with Iran could upset a delicate supply-demand balance in global oil markets, and a delicate geopolitical balance in the Middle East. If the Volcker double-dip is treated as a single event, a surge in oil prices has preceded every recession in the last 45 years, except for the 2001 recession precipitated by the bursting of the dot-com bubble (Chart 6). Chart 6Oil Price Spikes Often Precede Recessions Significant Rollback Of Globalization Our Geopolitical Strategy and Global Asset Allocation services have cited peak globalization as an important long-term investment theme for the last several years. The tariff tensions between the U.S. and its trading partners would seem to have borne out their predictions, especially if one views them as having been inspired by unskilled workers’ losses from globalization. Taking on foreign exporters is likely to play well in the electorally decisive Rust Belt states, where manufacturing job losses have hit especially hard. We fully subscribe to the theory of comparative advantage as formulated by David Ricardo in the early 19th century. By allowing individual countries to specialize in what they do best, free trade increases the size of the global economic pie. Empirical evidence suggests that globalization also re-slices the pie, however. In the developed world, outsourcing manufacturing has operated to the benefit of investors and the detriment of less-skilled workers. For U.S.-based multinationals, tariffs are a minor irritant compared to the prospect of having to reroute supply chains around China. The modest headwinds to globalization observed before the U.S. began engaging in serial bilateral trade conflicts did not undermine corporate profit margins in any material way. A bigger anti-globalization push that forced global supply chains to be rerouted or partially unwound would have much more negative effects. The U.S. is a comparatively closed economy, but the multinationals that dominate equity market capitalization rely heavily on interactions with the rest of the world. Unwinding the global supply chains that have been carefully constructed over the last 30 years would be disruptive and costly. The worst-case scenario envisioned by our geopolitical strategists, in which U.S.-China relations dramatically worsen and the tariff back-and-forth escalates in a major way, would hit equities hard, especially if supply chains had to be rebuilt. As a proxy for what globalization has meant for investors’ and blue-collar workers’ share of the pie, we consider the path of real wages relative to productivity over the last 50 years. From 1970 through 2001, U.S. wages generally kept pace with productivity gains, observing a fairly narrow, well-defined range (Chart 7). Once China entered the WTO (as denoted by the vertical line on the chart), productivity-adjusted wages fell precipitously, and even their periodic bounces have fallen well short of the level that marked the lower end of the previous range. Chart 7The Pie Has Grown, But Unskilled Labor's Slice Has Shrunk Bottom Line: Temporary barriers to free trade, implemented as a negotiating tactic, are not a big deal for equities. A significant rollback of globalization would be, however, and a need to divert global supply chains away from China could stop the bull market in its tracks. Investment Implications Along with our Global Investment Strategy colleagues, we are somewhat more sanguine than our Geopolitical Strategy service that a worst-case outcome between the U.S. and China can be averted. We therefore continue to believe that the U.S. expansion, and the bull markets in risk assets, will persist until the Fed tightens monetary conditions enough to spark the next recession. We reiterate our recommendations that investors should maintain at least an equal weight position in equities and spread product. Enough is at stake in the conflicts with China and Iran, however, that a worsening of either could cause us to change our view, and we will be watching developments on each front closely. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe Senior Analyst, Global ETF Strategy jenniferl@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare,” NBER Working Paper No. 25672, (March 2019). 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “U.S.-Iran: This Means War?,”dated May 3, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights The rising spectre of global market volatility has reignited interest in the Swiss franc. In the current geopolitical game of brinksmanship between the U.S. and China, the risk of miscalculation is high, suggesting it pays to have insurance in place. The large net short positioning in the Swiss franc and cheap valuation make it attractive from a contrarian standpoint. That said, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is unlikely to sit and watch the CHF catapult to new highs. We expect currency intervention will be actively and aggressively used as a policy tool. Over the longer term, high domestic savings, rising productivity and a chronic current account surplus are underlying sources of support for the Swiss franc. Hold on to CHF/NZD positions recommended on April 26. We expect the unofficial floor of EUR/CHF 1.08-1.12 to hold in the near term but will respect our stop-loss at 1.11 if it is breached. Feature For most of the past decade, the Swiss franc has tended to be a dormant currency, interspersed by short bouts of intense volatility. For example, the USD/CHF is sitting today exactly where it was in early 2008, yet during this period the franc has seen wild gyrations that have lasted anywhere from just a few days to a few months. Outside of these swings, both USD/CHF and EUR/CHF have been mostly stable (Chart I-1). Chart I-1On The Verge Of A Big Move? The first bout of volatility occurred during the Great Financial Crisis, when the franc appreciated by 13% versus the euro, from July to October 2008. The second adjustment was marked by the European debt crisis, with the drop in the euro putting tremendous upward pressure on the franc. From the beginning of 2010 until September 2011 (when the SNB eventually put a currency floor in place), the euro plummeted by almost 35% versus the franc. More importantly, two-thirds of this adjustment occurred in the short few months before the SNB took action. The most recent adjustment in the franc has been the most interesting, because it was the central bank itself – not market forces – that triggered volatility in the exchange rate. In January 2015, the SNB decided to abandon the EUR/CHF 1.20 floor. The euro instantaneously cratered by about 30% versus the franc before retracing half of those losses a few days after. Since then, the EUR/CHF has been slowly creeping back towards the levels that prevailed before the floor was abandoned. The unifying theme across all three episodes is that the franc has tended to stage big moves near market riot points. Over the past week, the Swiss franc has emerged as one of the best-performing currencies amid the rising spectre of global market volatility (Chart I-2). This brings forward a few interesting questions. Will the SNB abandon the unofficial floor of EUR/CHF 1.08-1.12, or does it have an incentive to vigorously defend the currency? Should market volatility intensify from current levels, what trading opportunities are available to investors? Finally, what is the medium- and long-term outlook for the Swiss franc? Chart I-2The Franc Loves Volatility The Case For An Unofficial Cap The irony of the Swiss currency cap is that both its inception in 2011 and eventual demise in 2015 were rooted in deep external deflationary shocks, but the rationale behind the SNB’s moves in both episodes was vastly different. Back in 2011, Switzerland was rapidly stepping back into deflation, having just barely escaped it a year earlier. More importantly, this was driven by tradeable goods prices, given the franc’s rampant appreciation. At its nadir in 2011, goods prices were deflating by 3%, and rapidly dragging down inflation expectations with them. The SNB quickly realized that for a small, open economy like Switzerland, the exchange rate becomes incrementally important if deflation is entrenched (Chart I-3). Ergo, sitting and watching the trade-weighted Swiss franc continue to appreciate, especially given the euro was in a cascading downdraft, appeared to be a recipe for disaster. The stakes were especially high, given recent memory of the Great Recession. The cap worked like a charm, and the authorities could not have hoped for a better result. Inflation expectations staged a V-shaped recovery, along with headline inflation. The economy entered into a meaningful economic rebound, with the PMI swiftly rising above 50 and real GDP growth accelerating from near standstill to a 2.5% pace by 2014. This set the stage for a stock market rally that more than doubled the SMI index, nudging it back to its pre-crisis highs. The SNB quickly realized that for a small, open economy like Switzerland, the exchange rate often dictates the trend in domestic inflation. Since then, the inflation dynamics have improved even further, reinforcing the view that the SNB continues to manage the currency, even though the EUR/CHF floor was abandoned over four years ago. Inflation has risen almost uninterruptedly since it bottomed in 2015 (Chart I-4) – a feat that has not been replicated in major economies like the U.S. or euro area. During the same period, the EUR/CHF has trended higher, stabilizing during bouts of EUR/USD weakness but strengthening alongside gains in the euro. This has cheapened the trade-weighted franc, buffeting consumer prices. Chart I-3Exchange Rates Affect Tradeable Goods' Prices Chart I-4The SNB Has Done A Good ##br##Job So Far Our bias is that the whisper floor of 1.08-1.12 for EUR/CHF will continue to persist until the Swiss economy decisively exits deflation. In its latest monetary policy report, the SNB lowered its inflation target for 2019 and 2020 from 0.5% to 0.3% and 1% to 0.6% respectively. Meanwhile, three key factors suggest the inflation rate will continue to be anchored at low levels in the near term: Global trade has slowed meaningfully since the onset of 2018 and continues to drift downward. Given the complex nature of Swiss exports and their high-ranking in the value chain, they have been largely insulated from the slowdown (Chart I-5). It also helps that exporters have been able to cut prices to maintain volume sales. However, there is a natural limit as to how much exporters can cut prices to maintain demand, or how long exports can be insulated from a global slowdown, let alone a trade war. Falling exports will be a renewed powerful deflationary pulse for the domestic economy. While the franc has cheapened, our models suggest it still remains 5% overvalued versus the euro (Chart I-6). This explains in part why import prices remain under downward pressure, since it is just the mirror image of an expensive currency. In a world of still-low inflation, any adjustment in the real exchange rate can only occur very slowly. Swiss prices are rising at a 0.7% annual rate, while eurozone prices are rising at a 1.7% clip. This suggests it will take about five years just for the franc to close its overvaluation gap versus the euro. This suggests the SNB will be loath to tolerate any knee-jerk appreciation in the franc. Chart I-5Swiss Exports At Risk From A Trade War Chart I-6EUR/CHF Is Still 5% Cheap While the output gap has closed, it remains well below levels that have previously begun to generate meaningful inflationary pressures in the domestic economy. Domestic retail sales remain weak on the back of tepid wage growth. While the unemployment rate is at 2.4%, it usually takes the unemployment rate falling below 1% before it begins to generate any significant inflationary pressures. This is unlikely to happen over the next six to nine months. The Swiss labor market is extremely flexible and fluid, allowing for tremendous efficiency. Part-time employment continues to dominate job gains, meaning the need for precautionary savings will continue to restrain spending. Chart I-7Money Supply Growth Has Converged To GDP Growth Interestingly, the SNB has not had to ramp up its balance sheet significantly in recent years. Part of the reason is that the slowdown in global trade eased natural demand for francs, which meant the SNB was no longer accumulating foreign exchange reserves at a rampant pace. More importantly, the SNB has used the global slowdown to drain excess liquidity from the system and somewhat renormalize policy. Back in 2011 when the SNB put the cap in place, there was an explosion in domestic liquidity, with broad money supply rising at a 10% pace. As panicked investors were fleeing the European periphery, there were large inflows into the Swiss economy and into the haven of government bonds, driving up the franc in the process. The same pattern was repeated again in 2016 after the U.K. referendum to leave the EU. This time around, a lack of significant EU tail risks on the near-term horizon have curtailed safe-haven flows into the franc. This has allowed Swiss money supply growth to converge towards nominal GDP growth, effectively sterilizing excess liquidity (Chart I-7). The message from SNB Central Bank Chair Thomas Jordan has been very clear: Interest rates could be lowered further, along with powerful intervention in the foreign exchange market if necessary. This suggests that in the near term the preference for the SNB is for a stable exchange rate. The issue is that market forces have occasionally dictated otherwise, especially during riot points. With the S&P 500 off its highs, corporate spreads both in the U.S. and euro area inching higher, the VIX in an uptrend and government bond yields falling, we may be approaching such a point. Lessons From The 1990s And 2015 The natural questions that follow are that if the cap worked so perfectly, then why was it scrapped in the first place? And why not explicitly put it back on, given the rising specter of global asset volatility and Swiss franc strength? After all, if the risk for Switzerland is that it could abruptly step back into deflation, then the SNB can use the franc as a potent weapon to ease domestic financial conditions. Capping the franc at a cheap level to the euro, say back at 1.20, could be exactly what the doctor prescribed. The reality is that there are both political and economic constraints to such a commitment. While the decision to scrap the EUR/CHF floor was a puzzle to most investors back in 2015, a post-mortem analysis suggests the reasoning in hindsight was rather obvious. Back in 2015, the world economy was entering into a manufacturing recession as China closed off the credit spigots. This was particular acute in the Eurozone, which had just exited a double-dip recession but was facing credit growth falling at a 7% pace. Enter quantitative easing. The deflationary backdrop back then had already led to an explosion of high-powered money as foreigners flocked into Swiss assets. Foreign exchange reserves were rapidly outpacing the monetary base and quickly closing in on nominal GDP (Chart I-8). The risk of course is that if surging money and credit growth cannot fuel consumer price inflation, it can only stimulate an asset price boom. A floor to a currency about to ride a wave of large-scale monetary stimulus was disconcerting to even the most Keynesian of Swiss central bankers. A floor to a currency about to ride a wave of large-scale monetary stimulus was disconcerting to even the most Keynesian of Swiss central bankers. Meanwhile, there had already been a rising chorus of discontent among right-wing politicians in 2014, specifically those within the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) who wanted the central bank to stop buying foreign currencies and significantly lift its gold holdings instead. As early as October of 2014, opinion polls suggested that support for the proposal was at 44%, with only 39% of Swiss citizens against.1 Memories from the 1990s asset burst in Switzerland were front and center among SVP members. The Plaza Accord had led to the proliferation of carry trades into Switzerland as the U.S. dollar fell. This was supercharged by strong migration into Switzerland ahead of the fall of the Berlin Wall. All of this lit a fire under the real estate market. The SNB was eventually forced to raise interest rates from 3.5% in 1998 to 9% in 1992, transforming a real estate bull market into a 20-year bust (Chart I-9). With the SVP currently ahead in opinion polls ahead of the October 2019 elections, this is likely to remain a constraint Chart I-8Still Lots Of High-Powered Money In Switzerland Chart I-9Macro-Prudential Measures Have Stymied A Housing Bubble Economically, the SNB has to walk a fine line between a predominantly deflationary backdrop in Switzerland but a rising debt-to-GDP ratio that pins it among the highest in the G10 (Chart I-10). Too little stimulus, and the economy runs the risk of entering a debt-deflation spiral, as inflation expectations continue to be anchored strongly to the downside. Too much stimulus, and the result will be a build up of imbalances, leading to an eventual bust. This dilemma was the “raison d’ être” of the Swiss currency cap in 2011, but let to its eventual demise in 2015. Chart I-10The Swiss Have Lots Of Debt A final thought about the cap: It is different from a peg in that the former allows the franc to depreciate versus the euro, while the latter does not. This makes the cap an asymmetric mechanism: Only when the CHF is under upward pressure will the cap act as a QE mechanism, because the SNB has to buy euros while selling Swiss francs. Should the franc weaken against the euro, the SNB does not have to intervene, hence its balance sheet stops expanding and QE ends. The key risk is that the euro drops substantially, inviting speculation back into the Swiss economy. This risk is clearly unpalatable for both Swiss politicians and the SNB, which is why two-way asymmetry was reintroduced into the system. Trading Dynamics As A Safe Haven Switzerland ticks off all the characteristics of a safe-haven currency. Its large net international investment position of 125% of GDP generates huge income inflows. Meanwhile, rising productivity over the years has led to a structural surplus in its trading balance and a rising fair value for the currency. Consequently, the franc has tended to have an upward bias over the years, supercharged during periods of risk aversion (Chart I-11). Switzerland ticks off all the characteristics of a safe-haven currency. During bull markets, countries that have negative interest rates are subject to powerful outflows from carry trades. The impact of these are difficult to measure, but it is fair to assume that periods of low hedging costs (which tend to correspond with periods of lower volatility) can be powerful catalysts. As markets get volatile and these trades get unwound, unhedged positions become victim to short-covering flows. Given the negative yield from hedging trades funded in Swiss francs (Chart I-12), it is fair to assume a pronounced flight-to-safety will cause a knee-jerk appreciation in the franc, like in past episodes. Chart I-11The "Curse" Of The##br## SNB Chart I-12Hedging Against Franc Strength Is Expensive This is especially true, since the U.S. tax reforms have already driven foreign affiliates in Switzerland to liquidate investments (mostly real estate) and repatriate those funds back into Treasurys. Foreign direct investment in Switzerland is falling at a rate of 15% of GDP, causing the basic balance to hit -4% of GDP. These FDI outflows are unlikely to remain a headwind for the franc going forward, assuming the tax benefit was a one-time deal. Instead, a favorable balance-of-payments backdrop will continue to be a key underpinning behind the strong franc (Chart I-13). Chart I-13A One-Time Adjustment In The Basic Balance The message is that during rising periods of risk aversion, like now, speculators should accumulate francs as a portfolio hedge. We continue to favour the CHF/NZD, recommended on April 26. Aggressive investors can also sell the USD/CHF. Investment Conclusions Our long-term fair value models suggest the Swiss franc is currently cheap (Chart I-14). This makes it attractive both on a short- and longer-term basis versus a basket of currencies. The exception is versus the euro, given the EUR/CHF is still undervalued by 5%. Froth in the housing market has been eliminated. Stricter policies toward immigration, along with macro-prudential measures, such as a cap on second homes and stricter lending standards, have helped (Chart I-15). Meanwhile, the surprise move by the SNB to abandon the EUR/CHF floor has rebalanced the market. Back then, Swiss real estate became more expensive for investors in the euro area who used the SNB put to speculate on properties in Zurich and Geneva. Demand for Swiss real estate has largely decreased since then, eliminating this key source of risk for the SNB (Chart I-16) Chart I-14The Swiss Franc Is Cheap By Some Measures Chart I-15The Swiss People's Party ##br##Had Its Way Our bias is that over the next few years, the Swiss franc will be more of a dormant currency, gently appreciating towards its fair value but periodically interspersed by bouts of intense volatility. Interestingly, we may be entering such a riot point. German bund yields fell below Japanese levels this week. Historically, a falling bund yield has been a bad omen for EUR/CHF. We will respect our 1.11 stop loss on long EUR/CHF if breached (Chart I-17). Chart I-16The SNB Had Its Way Chart I-17Where Next For Bund Yields? Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see www.reuters.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the U.S. have been positive: Headline inflation and core inflation increased to 2% and 2.1% year-on-year respectively in April. NFIB business optimism index increased to 103.5 in April. NY Empire State Manufacturing index increased to 17.8 in May. Retail sales fell by 0.2% month-on-month in April, but the Redbook retail sales clocked in a solid 5.4% growth year-on-year. Industrial production decreased by 0.5% month-on-month in April, but is still growing at 0.9% year-on-year. On the housing market front, MBA mortgage applications contracted by 0.6% in May. NAHB housing market index increased to 66 in May. Housing starts increased by 5.7% to 1.24 million month-on-month in April. Building permits increased by 0.6% to 1.3 million in April. DXY index increased by 0.4% this week. U.S. and Chinese negotiators failed to reach an agreement regarding tariffs. The increased tariffs on Chinese goods was followed by the inevitable retaliation by China this Monday. As the market gauges the net impact of the tariff from both sides, volatility will prevail. Report Links: President Trump And The Dollar - May 9, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been weaker-than-expected: Industrial production in the euro area fell by 0.6% year-on-year in March. The euro area ZEW economic sentiment fell to -1.6 in May. The German ZEW economic sentiment fell to -2.1 in May, while current situation improved to 8.2. Euro area GDP growth came in line at 1.2% year-on-year in Q1. German GDP growth increased to 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, while on a year-on-year measure, the growth rate fell from 0.9% to 0.6%. Trade balance in the euro area fell to 17.9 billion euros in March. German harmonized consumer price inflation was unchanged at 2.1% year-on-year in April. French industrial output contracted by 0.9% month-on-month in March, while non-farm payrolls increased to 0.3% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. EUR/USD fell by 0.4% this week. While signs are still pointing to a tentative recovery in the euro area, global trade war rhetoric and volatile incoming data continue to weigh on investor sentiment. Trump is poised to delay a decision to impose auto tariffs on EU and Japanese exports by up to six months, which suggests he might ramp up the trade war with China. Report Links: Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Reading The Tea Leaves From China - April 12, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: Leading economic index and coincident index fell to 96.3 and 99.6 respectively in March. Trade balance by the balance-of-payment measure increased to 700 billion yen in March. Adjusted current account balance fell to 1.27 trillion yen in March. On the housing market front, the construction orders increased by 66.1% year-on-year in March. Housing starts grew by 10% year-on-year in March. Reconstruction efforts following last year’s disasters appear well underway. Machine tool orders contracted by 33.4% year-on-year in April. Japanese producer price inflation decreased to 1.2% year-on-year in April, while still higher than expected. USD/JPY fell by 0.7% initially, then gradually recovered, returning flat this week. The ongoing trade disputes largely increased short-term volatility in the yen. We continue to recommend the yen as a portfolio hedge. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Tug OF War, With Gold As Umpire - March 29, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been solid, despite softer employment data: Nominal GDP growth increased to 1.8% year-on-year in Q1. Manufacturing production increased by 2.6% year-on-year in March. Industrial production increased by 1.3% year-on-year. Total trade balance came in at a deficit of 5.4 billion pounds in March. This was an improvement from the last reading of a 6.2 billion deficit in February. ILO unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in March, while the average earnings growth fell from 3.5% to 3.2%. Moreover, claimant count increased by 24.7K in April. GBP/USD fell by 1.6% this week. The pound remains one of our favorite currencies for the time being from a valuation perspective. Moreover, U.K. data continue to surprise positively. The catalyst for pound weakness this week was Theresa May’s announcement she will set out a timetable for her resignation next month, once the fourth iteration of Brexit is submitted for a vote. Report Links: Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 A Trader’s Guide To The Yen - March 15, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been negative: Home loans contracted by 2.5% in March. Crucially, this was driven by both owner-occupied and investor lending. National Australia Bank’s business conditions and business confidence indices both fell in April. Business conditions fell to 3, and business confidence decreased to 0. Westpac consumer confidence fell to 0.6% in May. Consumer inflation expectations fell to 3.3% in May. On the labor market front, the wage price index was unchanged at 2.3% year-on-year in Q1. Unemployment rate increased to 5.2%, while participation rate increased to 65.8%. 28.4 thousand new jobs were created in April. However, this is due to the creation of 34.7 thousand part-time jobs, while 6.3 thousand full-time jobs were lost. AUD/USD fell by 1% this week. We remain overweight the Australian dollar as it will be one of the first pro-cyclical currencies to benefit from Chinese stimulus. But we will respect our AUD/USD 0.68 stop loss if it is breached. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Food price index fell by 0.1% month-on-month in April. Visitor arrivals contracted by 2.6% year-on-year in March. REINZ house sales continue to contract by 11.5% year-on-year in April. Net migration fell to 59 thousand in Q1. Migration has been an important source of demand for New Zealand. NZD/USD fell by 0.4% this week. The New Zealand dollar remains very vulnerable to external shocks, especially from the trade front. Meanwhile, terms of trade dynamics continue to favor AUD vis-à-vis NZD. The domestic environment, including reduced immigration also remains a headwind for the economy. Report Links: Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been promising: Building permits increased by 2.1% month-on-month in March. On the labor market front, the unemployment rate fell to 5.7% in April, and 106.5 thousand new jobs were created. Participation rate increased to 65.9%, and average hourly earnings increased by 2.6% year-on-year in April. This was a blockbuster jobs report. Headline inflation increased to 2% year-on-year in April, while core inflation decreased to 1.5%. Manufacturing sales increased by 2.1% month-on-month in March. USD/CAD decreased by 0.1% this week. The good news from the Canadian housing sector and labor market has supported the loonie. On Wednesday, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland called again for the U.S. to lift steel and aluminum tariffs in order to create “true free trade” on the continent. On the U.S. side, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said that Washington was close to resolving its differences with Mexico and Canada over steel and aluminum tariffs. Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Into A Transition Phase - March 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 There is little data from Switzerland this week: Producer and import prices fell by 0.6% in April. USD/CHF fell by 0.1% this week. The Swiss franc remains a safe-haven currency, and growing political uncertainty will increase demand for the franc. We discuss the outlook for the franc at length in the front section of this report. Report Links: Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been mixed: Core inflation fell to 2.6% year-on-year in April, while still higher than the expected 2.5%. Headline inflation was unchanged at 2.9% year-on-year in April. Real GDP growth did slow down to a 0.3% quarter-on-quarter pace in Q1. However, seasonal factors were at play. Strong agricultural output in Q4 2018 was not repeated in Q1 following last year’s summer drought. There was also low power production in the months of February and March. The trade balance increased to 17.6 billion NOK in April. USD/NOK has been volatile but returned flat this week. Two Saudi oil-pumping stations were targeted in a drone attack this Tuesday. The tensions in the Middle East increased the risk of oil supply shortages, which is bullish for oil price, thus beneficial for the Norwegian krone. Report Links: Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 A Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies - March 22, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been positive: Swedish Public Employment Service (PES) unemployment rate fell to 3.5% in April. Headline consumer price inflation climbed to 2.1% year-on-year in April. Core consumer price inflation increased to 1.6% year-on-year in April. USD/SEK has been flat this week. As a pro-cyclical currency, the Swedish krona will soon benefit from a global growth recovery once political uncertainties and external shocks play out. We remain positive on the krona. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But... - January 25, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Feature In what has become a tradition, I met with Ms. Mea following client meetings in Europe last week. Ms. Mea is a long-term BCA client who has been following our Emerging Markets Strategy very closely over the years. It was our fourth meet-up in the past 18 months. Ms. Mea keeps our meetings interesting by always challenging our views and questioning the nuances of our analysis. The timing of our most recent meeting was particularly notable, as we had just received news that the latest U.S.-China trade talks had not produced an agreement. In light of this, Ms. Mea started our conversation with a question on the link between geopolitics and financial markets: Ms. Mea: Why have the U.S. and China failed to reach a trade accord when it is clear that without one, both global financial markets and business sentiment will be hurt? Answer: The U.S. and China are intertwined in a geopolitical confrontation that will endure for decades. Their strategic national interests are not aligned at all. Therefore, any accord on trade and other geopolitical disputes will not be lasting. It is impossible to accurately forecast and time all turns of the negotiation process and the associated event risks. Therefore, an investment process should be informed and guided by a thematic approach. The U.S. and China are intertwined in a geopolitical confrontation that will endure for decades. Our theme has been, and remains, that China and the U.S. are in a long-term geopolitical confrontation that epitomizes a rivalry between an existing and a rising superpower. This suggests that the demands of one side will be unacceptable to the other. That makes any agreement unsustainable over the long run. In brief, there was a structural regime shift in the U.S.-China relationship last year. Yet global equity markets rallied this year on rising expectations of a major trade deal. Notably, most of the gains in EM equities since late December occurred on days when there was positive news on the progress of trade talks. Hence, the EM rally can largely be attributed to expectations of a trade deal. Not surprisingly, the failure to conclude a trade accord has quickly pushed EM share prices back down to their mid-January levels (Chart I-1). As such, the majority of investors who have bought the EM equity index since early this year lost a substantial part of their gains in the recent selloff. Chart I-1EM Equity Index: Between Support And Resistance Given that these two nations are embroiled in a long-term geopolitical rivalry, it will be difficult to find solutions on trade and geopolitical disputes that can simultaneously satisfy both sides. Even so, this does not imply that global risk assets will be in freefall forever. Financial markets currently need to price in both (1) a geopolitical risk premium on a structural basis; and (2) the impact of trade tariffs on global business activity on a cyclical basis. Once these two components have been priced in, markets will become less sensitive to the ebbs and flows of tensions between the U.S. and China. Finally, China’s exports to the U.S. constitute only 3.5% of mainland GDP (Chart I-2). This is considerably smaller than capital spending, which makes up 42% of China’s GDP. Further, most of the investment outlays over the past 10 years have not been in productive capacity to supply goods to the American market. On the contrary, the overwhelming share of capital expenditures since 2008 have occurred in domestic segments of the economy rather than export industries. Certainly, the trade confrontation will weigh on consumer and business sentiment in China as well as reduce the flow of U.S. dollars to the Middle Kingdom, warranting RMB depreciation. Still, there are other predicaments unrelated to the U.S. import tariffs that Chinese policymakers are facing. These include the credit, money and property bubbles that we have written about extensively. China’s exports to the U.S. constitute only 3.5% of mainland GDP. Ms. Mea: With no trade deal, the odds appear to be rising that the Chinese authorities will ramp up both credit and fiscal stimulus. Should investors not be looking through the near-term volatility and be buying EM risk assets and China-plays – because this stimulus will produce a cyclical recovery in the mainland economy? Answer: It is a safe bet that the Chinese authorities will encourage more credit creation and ramp up fiscal spending. The difficulty for investors is in gauging two unknowns: What is the lead time between the stimulus and economic growth, and what will be the multiplier effect of these stimuli. Lead time: Chart I-3 portends our aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse. Based on the past relationship between turning points in this indicator and the business cycle in China, the latter is likely to bottom around August. Chart I-2Structure Of Chinese Economy Chart I-3China: Stimulus Works With A Time Lag Chart I-4China's Stimulus And Financial Markets: 2012 Versus 2016 Multiplier effect: The impact of stimulus on the economy also depends on the multiplier effect. The latter is contingent on households’ and companies’ willingness to spend. If households and companies hasten the pace of spending, the economy can recover with little stimulus. If they reduce their expenditure growth, the economy may require much more stimulus. The majority of investors and commentators are comparing China’s current stimulus efforts with what occurred in 2016. However, our hunch is that the current Chinese business cycle might actually resemble the 2012-‘13 episode due to similarities in the multiplier effect. The size of credit and fiscal stimulus in 2012 was as large as in 2016. Nevertheless, the business cycle recovery in 2012-‘13 was very muted, as illustrated in Chart I-3 on page 3. Consistently, EM share prices and commodities did not stage a cyclical rally in 2012 as they did in 2016-‘17 (Chart I-4). Ms. Mea: It seems you are implying that differences between the 2012 and 2016 economic and financial markets outcomes are due to the multiplier. How does one appraise the multiplier effect? Answer: In a word, yes. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to forecast consumers’ and businesses’ willingness to spend – particularly in the midst of a clash between the positive effects of stimulus and the negative sentiment stemming from the ongoing U.S.-China confrontation. We have constructed indicators that measure the willingness to spend among households and companies in China. Our proxies for their marginal propensity to spend (MPS) are currently in decline (Chart I-5A and I-5B). Chart I-5AChina: Households' Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart I-5BChina: Enterprises’ Marginal Propensity To Spend MPS does not affect day-to-day expenditures, but rather captures consumer spending on large-ticket items such as housing, cars and durable goods, as well as investment expenditures by companies. Consistently, mainland companies’ MPS leads industrial metal prices by several months (Chart I-5B). Chart I-6 illustrates the critical difference between 2012 and 2016 in terms of the impact of credit and fiscal stimulus. In both episodes, the size of the stimulus was roughly the same, but the manufacturing PMI did not really recover in 2012-’13, gyrating in the 49-51 range. In contrast, it did stage a cyclical recovery in 2016-‘17 (Chart I-6, second panel). In brief, the difference between the 2012 and 2016 episodes was the MPS by companies and households (Chart I-6, third and fourth panels). There are other predicaments unrelated to the U.S. import tariffs that Chinese policymakers are facing. These include the credit, money and property bubbles that we have written about extensively. Provided the not-so-upbeat sentiment among Chinese households and businesses due to their high debt levels and the ongoing trade conflict, the odds are that their MPS will remain weak for now. As a result, the impact of credit and fiscal stimulus on China’s business cycle will be muted for now. As such, more stimulus and longer lead time may be required to engineer a cyclical recovery. Interestingly, the current profiles of both EM and developed equity markets closely resemble their 2012 trajectories – both in terms of direction and magnitude (Chart I-7). Chart I-6China's Stimulus In 2012 And 2016: Beware Of Multiplier Effect Chart I-7Is 2018-2019 Akin ##br##2011-2012? Ms. Mea: So, you are suggesting risks to China-related plays and EM financial markets are skewed to the downside. How should one assess how much downside there is, and what should investors look for to gauge turnings points in financial markets? Answer: We continuously assess the investment landscape, not only based on our fundamental analysis of the global/EM/China business cycles but also on various financial market valuations, positioning and technicals. Let’s review where we stand with respect to these metrics. Equity Valuations: EM stocks are not cheap. Our favored measure of equity valuations is the composite indicator-based 20% trimmed means of the following multiples: trailing and forward P/E, price-to-cash earnings, price-to-book value and price-to-dividend ratios (Chart I-8). On these metrics, EM stocks appear fairly valued. Nevertheless, these valuations should be viewed in the context of structural decline in EM corporate profitability. The measures of return on equity and assets for non-financial companies in EM are on par with their 2008 lows (Chart I-8, middle and bottom panels). When valuations are neutral, the equity market’s direction is dictated by the profit outlook. The latter currently remains negative for EM and Chinese companies (Chart I-9). Chart I-8EM Equities Are Not Cheap Chart I-9Downside Profit Surprises In EM And China Currency Valuations: The U.S. dollar is only moderately (one standard deviation) expensive, according to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs (Chart I-10). The latter is our most favored currency valuation measure. The greenback has been in a major structural bull market since 2011. Secular bull/bear markets do not typically end before valuations reach 1.5-2 standard deviations. We reckon that the cyclical and structural backdrop remains favorable for the dollar, and odds are it will overshoot before a major top sets in. Going forward, most of the dollar’s additional gains will not occur versus the euro or the Japanese yen – which are already modestly undervalued (Chart I-10, middle and bottom panels) – but against other currencies. In particular, commodity currencies of developed economies have not yet cheapened enough (Chart I-11). Typically, a structural bear market in commodities does not end until these commodity currencies become cheap. Hence, the current valuation profile of these commodity currencies is consistent with the notion that the secular bear markets in commodities prices and EM are not yet over. Chart I-10The Euro Is Fairly Valued, The Yen Is Cheap G3 Currency Valuations Chart I-11Commodities Currencies ##br##Are Not Cheap Yet Unfortunately, there are no data for unit labor cost-based real effective exchange rates for the majority of EMs. However, it is a safe bet to infer that long- and medium-term cycles in EM currencies coincide with those of DM commodity currencies because they are all pro-cyclical. If DM commodity currencies have not yet bottomed, EM currencies remain vulnerable. Relative to the global equity benchmark, global materials have broken down to new cyclical lows. This could be a harbinger of EM relative equity performance making new lows. Ms. Mea: But the positioning in the U.S. dollar is long. How consistent is this with your view of further dollar strength? Positioning: While investors are long the U.S. dollar versus several DM currencies, they are short the greenback versus EM currencies. Chart I-12 illustrates the aggregate net long positions of both leveraged funds and asset managers in the BRL, MXN, RUB and ZAR. As of May 10 (the last datapoint available), investors were as long these EM high-beta currencies as they were at their cyclical peak in early 2018. As to emerging Asian currencies, ongoing RMB depreciation will drag emerging Asian currencies down. Notably, the Korean won has already broken down from its tapering wedge pattern. Concerning EM equities, investor positioning and sentiment was still very elevated before last week’s market turmoil. Chart I-13 demonstrates the number of net long positions in EM ETFs (EEM) by leveraged funds and asset managers. The last datapoint is also as of May 10. Chart I-12Investors Have Been Long EM Currencies Chart I-13Investors Have Been Bullish On EM Stocks In short, investor sentiment on EM was bullish and long positions in EM were extended before the U.S.-China trade confrontation escalated again. Tell-tale signs and technicals: Market profiles can sometimes help us gauge whether an asset class is in a bull or bear market, and what the next move is likely to be. We have the following observations: U.S. dollar volatility is close to its record lows (Chart I-14). Following the previous three low-volatility episodes, EM shares prices in dollar terms dropped substantially over the ensuing 18 months – 60% in 1997-1998, 65% in 2007-2008 and 30% in 2014-2015. The rationale is that very low global currency volatility indicates that investors do not foresee a major tectonic macro shift. When this does inevitably occur, currency markets move violently. The RMB depreciation could be a tectonic macro shift that global markets are not prepared for. The absolute and relative performances of EM stocks resemble that of global materials stocks. Global materials are breaking below their long-term moving averages (technical support lines) in absolute terms, raising the odds that the EM equity index will do the same. Relative to the global equity benchmark, global materials have broken down to new cyclical lows. This could be a harbinger of EM relative equity performance making new lows (Chart I-15). Chart I-14U.S. Dollar Volatility And ##br##EM Equity Returns Chart I-15EM And Global Materials: Relative To Global Index Consistently, industrial metals prices as well as our Risk-on/Safe-Haven Currency Index have potentially formed a head-and-shoulders pattern and may be entering a major down leg (Chart I-16). Further weakness in these variables would be consistent with a risk-off phase in EM financial markets. Finally, the relative performance of the MSCI China All-Share Index – which includes all onshore- and offshore-listed stocks – has relapsed relative to the global equity benchmark, failing to break above its long-term moving average (Chart I-17). This is a negative tell-tale sign, and often warrants considerable downside. Chart I-16A Head-And-Shoulder Pattern In Global Cyclical Markets? Chart I-17China All-Share Index: Absolute And Relative Performance Ms. Mea: It seems to me that the RMB holds the key. What are your thoughts on the Chinese currency? Answer: There are several reasons why the RMB will likely depreciate. First, yuan depreciation is needed to mitigate the impact of U.S. import tariffs on Chinese exporters’ profitability. Authorities could use the RMB depreciation to fight back against U.S. import tariffs – a response that U.S. President Donald Trump will certainly not like. Second, the ongoing cyclical downturn in China and rising deflationary pressures also warrant a cheaper currency. Third, there is a vast overhang of money supply in China: The broad money supply is equivalent to US$30 trillion. More stimulus will only make this oversupply of yuans larger. This, along with the desire of mainland households and businesses to diversify their deposits into foreign currencies/assets, is like “the sword of Damocles” on the yuan’s exchange rate. Finally, the sources of foreign currency that previously offset capital outflows in China are no longer available. The current account surplus has largely evaporated. In addition, the central bank seems to be reluctant to reduce its foreign exchange reserves to fund capital outflows. In fact, at US$3 trillion, its foreign currency reserves are equivalent to only 10% of local currency broad money supply. All in all, we are structurally short the RMB versus the dollar. Chart I-18China, Commodities, & EM: Identical Cycles Ms. Mea: What are the investment implications? Where are we in the EM/China investment cycle? Answer: Our investment themes since early this decade have been that EM share prices and currencies are in a bear market, the U.S. dollar is in a structural bull market, and commodities are in a structural downtrend (Chart I-18). With the exception of 2016-‘17, these themes have played out quite well. These structural moves have not yet been exhausted. At the moment, we do not foresee a 2016-’17-type cyclical rally either. The failure of EM equities to outperform DM stocks and the resilience of the U.S. dollar during the risk-on period since early this year, give us comfort in maintaining a negative stance on EM risk assets. Importantly, a decade-long poor EM performance is likely to end with a bang rather than a whimper, especially when investors by and large remain bullish on EM. On the whole, we recommend trading EM stocks on the short side and underweighting EM equities in a global equity portfolio. Within the EM equity universe, our overweights are Russia, central Europe, Thailand, non-tech Korean stocks, Mexico, Chile, the UAE and Vietnam. Our underweights are Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Peru, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines. Fixed-income investors should also position for higher volatility and weaker EM currencies, favoring low-beta versus high-beta markets. Russian and Mexican markets are our favored local currency and U.S. dollar bonds. Finally, we continue to recommend shorting a basket of the following EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Our currency overweights are MXN, RUB, SGD and the THB as well as central European currencies. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations