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Highlights Fed: The Fed will not automatically slow the pace of rate hikes as the funds rate approaches current estimates of its neutral level. Rather, estimates of that neutral level will be revised depending on the outlook for the economy. For the time being investors should continue to expect a rate hike pace of 25 bps per quarter. Credit Cycle: For the time being both our monetary and credit quality indicators recommend an overweight allocation to corporate bonds. Inflation expectations are not yet anchored around the Fed's target, and gross leverage is trending sideways. Both of these measures will likely send a more negative signal later this year, and we will reduce exposure to corporate credit at that time. Emerging Market Debt: Despite the recent weakness in emerging market currencies, U.S. corporate credit still looks more attractive than USD-denominated emerging market sovereign debt. At the country level, only Russian debt warrants an overweight allocation relative to U.S. corporates. Feature The Federal Reserve meets this week and will deliver the second rate hike of the year, bringing the target range for the federal funds rate up to 1.75% - 2%. With that hike already fully discounted, investors will be more concerned with parsing the post-meeting statement, Summary of Economic Projections, and Chairman Powell's press conference for clues about the future path of rates. We expect only minor changes to the statement, though the Committee could decide to tweak its promise that "the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run". Such a change would simply acknowledge that if gradual rate hikes continue, then the federal funds will move close to most estimates of its neutral (or equilibrium) level within the next 12 months. This touches on an important question for bond investors. Would the Fed actually start to slow the pace of rate hikes once the funds rate reaches its estimated neutral level? Or will it need to see some evidence of decelerating economic growth before slowing the pace of rate hikes below its current 25 bps per quarter pace? Chart 1 shows why this question is important. The shaded boxes in that chart outline a "gradual" rate hike path of 25 bps per quarter. The Fed has been lifting rates at this pace since late 2016. The "x" markings denote the median expected fed funds rate from the Fed's Survey of Primary Dealers, and the "F" markings denote the Fed's own median projections. Notice that there are two "F"s shown at the end of 2018. This is because an equal number of FOMC participants (6) expect a fed funds rate of 2% - 2.25% as expect one of 2.25% - 2.5%. We expect the median will coalesce around the 2.25% to 2.5% range by the end of tomorrow's meeting. Chart 1The Outlook For Rate Hikes Notice in Chart 1 that both primary dealers and the Fed expect to deviate from the quarterly rate hike pace around the middle of next year. This would be consistent with the pace of hikes starting to slow as the fed funds rate approaches its currently anticipated neutral level near 3%. But how confident is the Fed in its estimate of that neutral rate? We would argue that its confidence should be quite low. We are not alone in this assessment. In one of Janet Yellen's final speeches as Fed Chair she warned against placing too much confidence in estimates of the neutral rate.1 [T]he neutral rate changes over time as a result of the interaction of many forces, including demographics, productivity growth, fiscal policy, and the strength of global demand, so its value at any point in time cannot be estimated or projected with much precision. We expect that the current FOMC will heed this warning, and if there are no signs of economic deterioration by the middle of next year, then the Fed will continue to hike rates at a pace of 25 bps per quarter and estimates of the neutral rate will be revised higher. We examined what could potentially make the Fed deviate from its 25 bps per quarter rate hike pace, by hiking either more quickly or more slowly, in a recent report.2 Crucially, Chart 1 shows that not only is the market priced for the Fed to slow its pace of rate hikes as we reach the middle of next year, it is also priced for a slower pace of rate hikes than is expected by the Fed or the primary dealers. This divergence means that below-benchmark portfolio duration continues to make sense on a 6-12 month horizon. Bottom Line: The Fed will not automatically slow the pace of rate hikes as the funds rate approaches current estimates of its neutral level. Rather, estimates of that neutral level will be revised depending on the outlook for the economy. For the time being investors should continue to expect a rate hike pace of 25 bps per quarter. A Quick Update On Our Tactical Long Position On May 22 we advised clients with a short-term (0-3 month) horizon to position for lower U.S. bond yields in the near term.3 This call was premised on two catalysts. First, bond market positioning had become excessively net short. That picture now looks more mixed (Chart 2). Net speculative positions in 10-year Treasury futures remain deep in "net short" territory and the Marketvane survey of bond sentiment is still "bearish", but the JP Morgan Duration Surveys for both "all clients" and active clients" have moved somewhat closer to neutral. The second catalyst was that our auto-regressive model pointed to strong odds of a negative reading from the U.S. Economic Surprise Index during the next month (Chart 3). This remains the case, but the reading from our model has moved much closer to the zero line. Chart 2Positioning Now Closer To Neutral Chart 3Surprise Index Still Low Taken together, our two indicators no longer send a resounding "buy bonds" signal. But given the deeply net short Treasury futures positioning and the low level of the surprise index, we are inclined to maintain our tactical buy recommendation for another week. We will re-assess again next week based on trends in the surprise index and the positioning data. The Fed & The Credit Cycle The Powell Fed has so far not been kind to credit spreads. Since February our index of financial conditions has tightened considerably, driven by a combination of falling equity prices, wider quality spreads and a stronger dollar (Chart 4). Yet, the Fed seems relatively unconcerned and is broadly expected to lift rates this week. All in all, the Powell Fed seems less concerned with responding to tighter financial conditions than was the Yellen Fed. Chart 4How Much Pain Can The Fed Take? There is some truth to this observation, though we think the difference has more to do with recent trends in inflation than with any change in approach between the two Fed Chairs. As inflation pressures mount, the Fed is marginally less concerned with responding to weakness in financial markets and marginally more concerned with preventing an inflation overshoot. This is why we will reduce our allocation to corporate bonds once our monetary indicators tell us that inflation expectations are well anchored around the Fed's target. Monetary Indicators Long maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates are the primary indicators we are monitoring in this regard. When both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, that will be consistent with past periods of well-anchored inflation expectations and we will start reducing exposure to corporate credit (Chart 5). But we should not rely solely on one indicator. It is conceivable that the financial crisis ushered in a structural shift (possibly due to stricter banking regulations) and that the level of TIPS breakevens consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations is now slightly lower.4 For this reason we also pay attention to the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure (Chart 5, bottom panel). This model is designed to output the percent chance that inflation will exceed 2.5% during the next 12 months, and we have found that corporate bond excess returns decline significantly when it exceeds 15%.5 It currently sits at 13%. Finally, it's also a good idea to pay attention to core PCE inflation itself. The year-over-year rate of change in core PCE inflation jumped sharply in recent months, but it has not yet returned to the Fed's 2% target (Chart 6). It is therefore still reasonable to expect that inflation expectations are not consistent with target inflation. It is likely that many investors still have doubts about whether inflation will recover to the Fed's target. Chart 5Credit Cycle: Monetary Indicators Chart 6The Fed's Inflation Model Those doubts would probably fade if the year-over-year rate of change in core PCE inflation actually rose to 2% and stayed there for several months. At that point we would have to conclude that inflation expectations are well anchored, whatever the level of TIPS breakeven rates. Incidentally, the recent bounce in core inflation brought it back in line with the reading from Janet Yellen's Phillips Curve model that she presented in a speech from 2015.6 In the context of this model, a continued decline in the unemployment rate will pressure inflation slowly higher, meaning that we expect to receive a signal from our monetary indicators sometime this year. We will pare exposure to corporate bonds at that time. It will be very interesting to hear from Chair Yellen herself when she visits the BCA Conference in September, and we hope to gain insight not only about her inflation forecast but also about how the Fed thinks about its responsiveness to financial markets, and most importantly, about how the Fed is likely to manage the tightening cycle as the funds rate approaches its estimate of neutral. Credit Quality Indicators Outside of Fed policy and the inflation outlook, we are also closely monitoring the relationship between profit growth and debt growth for the nonfinancial corporate sector. Leverage rises whenever debt growth exceeds profit growth and rising leverage tends to coincide with widening credit spreads (Chart 7). Nonfinancial corporate debt grew at an annualized rate of 4.4% in the first quarter, while pre-tax profits actually contracted at an annualized rate of 5.7%. As a result, our measure of gross leverage ticked higher from 6.9 to 7.1. More broadly, profits grew 5.8% in the four quarters ending in Q1 2018, only slightly faster than the 5.2% increase in corporate debt. This does not provide much of a buffer, and it will not take much to send profit growth below debt growth on a sustained basis. In fact, we expect that if labor compensation costs continue to accelerate we will see leverage start to rise more meaningfully in the second half of this year. Our overall Corporate Health Monitor improved noticeably in the first quarter (Chart 8). But this large move will almost certainly reverse in Q2. The improvement was concentrated in the components of the Monitor that use after-tax cash flows, and as such they were influenced by the sharp decline in the corporate tax rate. Profit margins, for example, increased from 25.8% to 26.4% on an after-tax basis in Q1 (Chart 8, panel 2), but would have fallen to 25.5% if the effective corporate tax rate had remained the same as in 2017 Q4. As the effective corporate tax rate levels-off around its new lower level (Chart 8, bottom panel), last quarter's improvement in the Corporate Health Monitor will start to unwind. Chart 7Leverage Is Poised To Head Higher Chart 8Tax Cuts Helped Balance Sheets In Q1 Bottom Line: For the time being both our monetary and credit quality indicators recommend an overweight allocation to corporate bonds. Inflation expectations are not yet anchored around the Fed's target, and gross leverage is trending sideways. Both of these measures will likely send a more negative signal later this year, and we will reduce exposure to corporate credit at that time. Still No Opportunity In Emerging Market Debt We pointed out in a recent report that a persistent divergence between U.S. and non-U.S. economic growth was the most likely catalyst that could cause the Fed to slow its pace of rate hikes.7 A divergence between strong U.S. growth and weaker growth in the rest of the world puts upward pressure on the U.S. dollar, and this is a particular problem for many emerging markets that carry large balances of U.S. dollar denominated debt. Our Emerging Markets Strategy service published a Special Report last week that explains in detail this particular problem faced by emerging markets and shows which countries face the most pressing debt concerns.8 For U.S. fixed income investors another important question is whether the recent strength in the U.S. dollar, and weakness in emerging market currencies, has resulted in an opportunity to shift out of U.S. corporate credit and into USD-denominated emerging market sovereign debt. On that note, Chart 9 shows that the average option-adjusted spread for the Baa-rated U.S. Corporate bond index recently dipped below the average spread for the investment grade USD Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign index. However, we think it is still too soon to move into emerging market debt. After adjusting for differences in duration and spread volatility between the two indexes, we come up with a measure of "Months-To-Breakeven". This indicator shows the number of months of spread widening required for each index to lose money relative to U.S. Treasuries. By this measure, U.S. Corporate bonds still look attractive compared to investment grade EM Sovereigns. At the country level, Chart 10 shows the 12-month breakeven spread for the USD-denominated sovereign debt of several major EM countries. It also shows each country's foreign funding requirement, a measure of the foreign capital inflows required in the next 12 months for each country to cover any shortfall in current account transactions and service its foreign currency debt. Chart 9EM Sovereigns Are Still Expensive Chart 10USD-Denominated Emerging Market Debt: Risk/Reward At The Country Level For the Baa-rated countries, Colombia, Mexico and Indonesia all offer spreads similar to what can be found in the Baa-rated U.S. Corporate bond market. The Philippines looks quite expensive, but Russia looks cheap compared to U.S. Corporates and has one of the lowest foreign funding requirements of any EM country. In High-Yield space, Turkey is fairly priced relative to Ba-rated U.S. junk, while Brazil and South Africa both look expensive. Argentina also looks expensive relative to B-rated U.S. junk. Bottom Line: Despite the recent weakness in emerging market currencies, U.S. corporate credit still looks more attractive than USD-denominated emerging market sovereign debt. At the country level, only Russian debt warrants an overweight allocation relative to U.S. corporates. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20170926a.htm 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Breaking Points", dated May 29, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Pulling Back And Looking Ahead", dated May 22, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 We explored some possible reasons for such a shift in the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Breakevens Ever Recover?", dated April 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Breaking Points", dated May 29, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "A Primer On EM External Debt", dated June 7, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Special Report Much has been made of preparing for the arrival of the Millennial generation, accompanied by well-worn stereotypes of general 'failure to launch' as they reach adulthood. However, the former is a misnomer as this age cohort is already the largest and the latter is simply untrue. In the report below, authored by guest editor Richard Dias, we explore these themes and conclude with our recommendations for a Millennials basket of stocks to capture the strength of this cohort as consumers. The Echo Boom Heard Round The World According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Millennials are the U.S.'s largest living generation. Millennials, (or Echo Boomers) defined as people aged 18 to 36 (born 1982 to 2000), now number more than +80mn and represent more than one quarter of the U.S.'s population - Baby Boomers (born 1946 to 1964) number about 75mn.1 Stealthily becoming the largest age group in the U.S. over the last few years, Millennials per-year-birth-rate peaked at 4.3mn in 1990. Surprisingly, the pace matched that of the post-war Baby Boom peak-per-year-birth-rate in 1957 - the per-year average over the period was higher for the Baby Boomers (Chart 1). Chart 1Echo Boom This gap is now set to grow rapidly as the death rate of Baby Boomers accelerates. What's more, with the largest one-year age cohort only 25 years old, Millennials will be the dominant generation for many years. How these "kids" will impact the market as they become the most important consumers, borrowers and, to a lesser degree, investors is unclear but make no mistake: this is a seismic shift in economic power and it is here to stay. Also of note is how much better the demographic picture is in the U.S. versus other developed markets (Chart 2) but this last point will not be the focus of this report. Rather, the focus will be on the Echo Boom's domestic implications touching on the labor market (wage growth), inflation, debt and housing, CAPEX and growth. Chart 2Labor Force Growth The Graduates Chart 3Educational Intensity Is Increasing Unabated Millennials have invested in "human capital" more than any previous generations. By 2014, more received a postsecondary degree (associates, bachelor's, or graduate degree) than any other generation (Chart 3). More higher education is a rational response to a labor market that pays college graduates much more than adults without a college degree.2 Millennials have also been much more likely to attend graduate school than previous generations - enrollment increased at an even faster rate than undergraduate enrollment, jumping from 2.8% in 1995 to 3.8% in 2010.3 Timing Is Everything Unfortunately Echo Boomers entered the workforce at the worst possible time (Chart 4). During recessions, enrollment increases along with duration of study. This reflects a lower opportunity cost of schooling, as well as a stronger incentive to improve one's skills in a tougher job market. This cyclical pattern was exacerbated by the severity of the Great Recession. A lot has also been made of the historically low youth labor participation rates (Chart 5) but this is partly explained by Millennials focusing on studies instead of combining school and work.4 A rise in educational intensity - more time devoted to schoolwork and other extracurricular activities5 - has also played a role. Difficultly finding employment and poor returns therein (low wages) has also coincided with the massive uptake in student loans - now much more readily available - and acting as a major income substitute (more on this below). Chart 4Recessions Mean More Higher Learning... Chart 5...And Lower Participation Rates Forever Young Another dubious narrative is that Millennials don't want to grow up. In reality, horrible early career economic conditions have meant large and lasting delays to adulthood. Entering the labor market during a recession can result in substantial earnings losses that persist, with negative effects lasting longer for college graduates.6 Poor job prospects and earnings are reflected in reduced labor mobility (not chasing jobs that are no longer available), lower marriage rates (living with parents longer) (Table 1) and home ownership7 rates that are much lower than for previous generations (partly a combination of the two). Table 1Marital Status Of The Adult Population Millennials continue to delay marriage (and leaving home) for several reasons8 but this does not mean they do not want to marry. Indeed over 80% of Millennials say that they "think that they will marry", more than Generation Xers and Baby Boomers did at similar ages. Similarly, they are more likely to believe that they will have kids. Once you control for some of the demographic trends9 that keep kids at home, 25 to 34 year olds continue to set up independent households at roughly the same rate as they always have and recently this household formation has accelerated. It is also worth remembering that major inflection points in homeownership rates have happened before; following a large increase pre-war, there was a sustained decline in the number of young people living at home in the 1940-50s. Another problem with this narrative is that campus housing is considered "living at home". So as enrollment increased, so did the number of young "living at home". Now, almost half of young people "living with their parents" are in college (campus housing) - even if they pay for the education with student loans or are on scholarship. Assessing the merit of these commonplace assertions is important as an unwind of the negative impulses caused by the recession, along with echo boomers coming of age, will influence the U.S. economy for many years. Back In The Saddle With the youngest of Millennials finally coming of age (the largest one-year age cohort is now 25) and the economic recovery complete, Millennials are finally joining the labor force (Chart 5). Participation rates that were justifiably depressed during Millennials' college-going years have since made a recovery, though, notably, educational intensity remains unchanged for the younger cohort of Millennials (17 to 24) (Chart 5). This significant increase in participation occurred as the size of this cohort expanded at its fastest rate in 20 years (Chart 6). The growing numbers finishing college in a less horrible economic environment are faced with a higher opportunity cost; over the last two years there has been a big jump in the real median income for these older Millennials (Chart 7). Chart 6Participation Is Recovering... Chart 7...So Are Earnings Millennials' economic force (population times wages or wage growth) is set to increase in size and as such its relative importance over the next decade. These demographics are positive for home buying, consumption and, ultimately, economic growth. House Prices & Consumption Set To Reaccelerate Americans are moving at the lowest rate on record10 but as we have argued above, this is set to change. Ownership rates for residential real estate have a distinct life cycle pattern; rates start low when households first reach adulthood and rise substantially by the time they reach their late 30s and early 40s. Chart 8Better Household Balance Sheets Supports House Price Gains With a huge number of Millennials entering this cycle relatively unburdened (see grey box below) and households in aggregate having de-levered (top panel, Chart 8) since the recession, we have a situation where both demand and supply (bottom panel, Chart 8) dynamics point to a highly supportive environment for housing over the short to medium term. But What About All That Student Debt Chart 9Student Loans Are Rising But##br## Other Categories Are Falling A lot has been made about the levels of student debt in the U.S. It is obviously large; the total amount of debt currently stands at 1.4Tn dollars and it has trebled in 10 years (top panel, Chart 9). And it is clear that delinquency rates are high, at about 11% (bottom panel, Chart 9). The reigning theory is that new or recent graduates, heavily burdened by debt, are unable or unwilling to take the next steps into adulthood. This misses the point. Lost in all of this is that while student loan burdens climbed, every other major debt category fell (credit cards, auto loans, mortgages and home equity loans). According to the NY Fed, Millennials now have less per capita debt overall than they did in 2003.11 Granted, the difference (between 2003 & 2015) is modest but when you consider the difference within the context of the wider point, it becomes important to keep in mind: the largest cohort in a generation is entering their (albeit delayed) prime borrowing (and spending) years on better financial footing that in 2003!12 The issue of payments has also been overlooked.13 Although loan balances have ballooned, the average payment has increased only 50%. And, not to belabor the point, a misunderstanding about the debt distribution compounds this false narrative. A small fraction of borrowers have huge payments while 50% of borrowers had payments of $200 or less, and another 25% had payments of $200 to $400. The top panel of Chart 10 highlights the jump in home ownership.14 This is of course due in part to the recovery but Millennials are also now a growing portion of this household formation. As they continue to create millions of new households (delayed by the recession but now accelerating), mortgage debt and house prices (with the help of underwhelming housing supply growth) will be biased higher (bottom panel, Chart 10). This household formation drives consumption (e.g white goods & services). And, as Millennials mature into their peak earning and spending years, this consumption is set to increase (Chart 11). Chart 10Homeownership Is Rising Again Chart 11Millennials Are Consumers Phillips Curve Gaining Traction It has been 15 years since we have had employment growth (of young people) of this magnitude (in percentage terms and absolute numbers). The Phillips curve tells us employment and inflation are linked. Hence Chart 12 should not surprise, as it simply suggests that a big jump in the key segment of the population - newly employed, forming households, and able to borrow and consume - help drive up the costs of consumer goods and services. We should expect protracted rises in inflation over the next few years as a function of Millennials flexing their economic might. Bringing It All Together; What Does This All Mean For Growth? The Echo Boom is a big, generational demographic wave. A difficult and painful delay has not tempered its looming importance. Finally here, this wave of echo-boomers is educated, relatively unburdened by debt, and as they inevitably "grow up", will soon begin to form new households (and have kids). They will borrow, spend, earn, but not necessarily save and invest. And this will be an important long-term theme going forward. Near term we might already be seeing signs of their arrival and firms have begun to pivot accordingly. Millennials will support household consumption. Employment growth will underpin much higher inflation. Private residential gross fixed capital formation - which has lagged - will pick up. Add to that a CAPEX cycle (largely independent) that is firing on all cylinders (Chart 13), and improving productivity growth which will follow stronger wage growth and it seems that real GDP growth reaccelerating is the odds-on likely scenario (Chart 14). Chart 12Demand Is Increasing Along With Employment Chart 13Capex Is Surging Chart 14GDP Growth Is Pointing Higher Admittedly this note paints a rosy picture of future growth (real and nominal) and takes a narrow view by focusing on demographics. And of course this is not without risks; Baby Boomer burdens (debt & health), corporate debt and a tighter monetary policy to name a few. But nominal GDP growth solves many of these and more. Investment Implications The report above does an excellent job underlining why Millennials will boost consumption spending but does not offer many insights on how that consumption will change. For example, healthcare currently makes up 17% of personal consumption expenditure in the U.S., roughly in line with housing and utilities. We would anticipate the natural attrition of the aging Baby Boomer generation to push down health care's share of the consumer's wallet (we currently have an underweight recommendation for the S&P health care index). At the same time, and as discussed in detail above, the positive implications of the relatively unburdened Millennial cohort entering prime home acquisition age factors into our sanguine home-related equities view (we currently have an overweight recommendation for the S&P home improvement retail index and recently upgraded S&P homebuilders to neutral).15 Further, Millennials consume differently from their parents; social media, online shopping and smart phones are not the consumption categories of the Baby Boomers. With this in mind, we have created a basket of ten stocks that we think will be driven over the long term by the demographic rise of the Millennial. We note that these stocks are heavily weighted to the technology and consumer discretionary sectors, which is logical as Millennial consumption habits tend to be discretionary-focused and technology-based. Beginning with consumer discretionary, we are highlighting AMZN, NFLX and SPOT as core holdings in our Millennials basket. AMZN's heft dwarfs consumer discretionary indexes but it could fall in several categories; the acquisition of Whole Foods makes it a Millennials-focused consumer staples retailer and its cloud computing web services segment is a tech leader. NFLX and SPOT represent the means by which Millennials consume media, by streaming movies and music, respectively, over the internet. The idea of owning physical media is rapidly becoming an anachronism. The home ownership themes noted in the report above lead us to add HD and LEN to the basket. Millennials are "doers" and are set to be the dominant DIYers in the next few years, making HD a logical choice. LEN, as the nation's largest home builder, should benefit from the Millennials coming of age into home buyers. We are also adding TSLA to our basket as a lone clean tech-oriented equity. TSLA capitalizes on the increasing shift to clean energy of Millennials (the key reason why no traditional energy companies have a spot in our basket). The technology stocks in our Millennials basket are AAPL, FB and MSFT, together representing more than 9% of the total value of the S&P 500. AAPL's inclusion in the list is predictable as the leading domestic purveyor of devices on which Millennials consume media content. FB too is a predictable holding, with more than half of all Americans being monthly active users, dominated by the Millennial cohort. Our inclusion of MSFT is based on its leadership in cloud computing, a rapidly growing industry we expect the connectivity and mobile computing demands of Millennials will accelerate. Chart 15BCA Millennial Basket It is worth noting at this point that at least some of the stocks noted above will be shifting out of both consumer discretionary and tech in September of this year. Stay tuned for our report on the to-be announced communications services sector later this summer. The last stock we are adding to our basket is also the only financial services equity. Though avid consumers, Millennials have shown an aversion to cash, preferring card payment systems, including both debit and credit-based. Accordingly, we are adding the leader in both of these, V, to our Millennials basket. Our basket is shown in Chart 15. To create the basket, we have imagined a $1M portfolio, invested $100,000 in each of our basket stocks at the date of publishing. While the resulting basket has obviously been an outstanding performer in the past year, meaning that it is not as attractive an entry point as it was in recent history, we think a long term view should support continued outperformance. With respect to stocks to avoid, we are believers that Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria will gain in importance as Millennials invest their newfound wealth in the stock market. Accordingly, we would tend to avoid 'sin stocks', including gambling, tobacco and alcohol; demand for their services is unlikely to decline but investment weightings should mean that share prices will underperform. Further, and as noted above, we think demographics and a clean energy shift will mean energy and health care will be long term underperformers. Bottom Line: Investors seeking long term exposure to stocks lifted by the supremacy of the Millennial generation should own our Millennial basket (AAPL, AMZN, FB, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). We would not hesitate to add other sharing economy stocks, including Airbnb and Uber, to this basket should they become investable. Richard Dias, CFA Guest Editor Chris Bowes Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Millennials Outnumber Baby Boomers and Are Far More Diverse (June 2015) http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-113.html 2 The Rising Cost of Not Going to College (Feb 2014) http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/02/11/the-rising-cost-of-not-going-to-college/ 3 15 Economic Facts About Millennials (Oct 2014) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf 4 NEET (Youth not in employment, education or training) level for youth 19 to 29 increased by only 4% during the Great Recession and has since returned to pre-recession levels about 15%. 5 Labor force participation: what has happened since the peak? (Sep 2016) https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/labor-force-participation-what-has-happened-since-the-peak.htm 6 The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy (Apr 2010) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537109001018 7 Homeownership Rates Are Falling, And It's Not Just A Millennial Problem (May 2016) https://www.forbes.com/sites/shreyaagarwal/2016/05/06/homeownership-rates-are-falling-and-its-not-just-a-millennial-problem/#3df54894494a 8 Reasons Millennials (17 to 35) stay at home longer include; this generation is younger (more 17 to 24 that 25 to 35), more culturally diverse, societally more tolerant, more time in post-secondary education, and houses have gotten much bigger 9 Five-year age subgroup, marital status, presence of children, sex, race, ethnicity, nativity (i.e. native- or foreign-born), current school enrollment, and educational attainment (Nov 2015) - http://jedkolko.com/2015/11/23/why-millennials-still-live-with-their-parents/ 10 Americans Moving at Historically Low Rates, Census Bureau Reports https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-189.html 11 This myth about millennials needs debunking (Mar 2016) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/this-myth-about-millennials-need… 12 Also of note from this two charts (Chart 21 & 22) is that it is NOT young people that are increasing their borrowing but old people. A 2016 blog post from the NY Fed "The Greying of American Debt" - expands on this theme. http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/02/the-graying-of-ame… 13 Is There a Student Loan Crisis? Not in Payments (May 2016) https://clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/forefront/ff-… 14 Demographics: Renting vs. Owning (Feb 2017) http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2017/03/demographics-renting-vs-ownin… 15 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Seeing The Light," dated May 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Highlights Since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 there have been five major episodes where U.S. dollar moves were not uniform across all currencies. These episodes share common features: a rallying broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar, desynchronized global growth and falling commodity prices. The above conditions will likely be met in the coming months, producing a period of global currency divergence. Commodity and EM currencies will weaken the most against the U.S. dollar, then against the yen, and finally depreciating the least against the euro. Feature It is often assumed that the dollar behaves like a monolith. However, this is not always the case: some currencies do manage to occasionally buck the dollar's general trend (Chart 1). Interestingly, the yen is most often the currency that manages to avoid the broad dollar's general directionality. Chart 1Episodes Of Currency Divergence ##br##Versus the Dollar Our view has been and remains that the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar still has meaningful upside this year, and that the EM currency complex will be under heavy selling pressure in the coming months. That said, it is worth asking whether all other currencies will share the same fate against a rising broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar, or whether some could diverge from the general dollar trend. This is essentially akin to trying to understand the pecking order of currencies outside the USD. To address these challenges, we believe it is important to understand how global growth will evolve, how relative growth dynamics among regions will shift, and how commodity prices will perform over the coming six to 12 months. When The Dollar Wears Many Masks There have been five major periods of currency divergence versus the U.S. dollar. These have lasted anywhere from one to three years (Table 1). Table 1Summary Of Currency Divergence Episodes Interestingly, they share some common features, heeding important insights for global investors. These features are as follows: 1) Common feature #1: A Rising Broad Trade-Weighted Dollar With the exception of the 2005-2007 episode, all other episodes where some currencies diverged from the general trend in the USD occurred when the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar was in a bull market. 2) Common feature #2: Desynchronized Global Growth All episodes of divergence in the FX market occurred when global growth was desynchronized. This underscores the importance of growth as a key driver of FX movements. During the 1991-1993 period, the yen was able to buck the dollar's strength (Chart 2) even though Japanese growth was falling quite fast relative to the U.S. Explaining this seeming inconsistency was the policy conducted by the Bank of Japan at the time. The BoJ was cutting rates, from 6% in 1991 to below 2% in 1993, but it was not doing so fast enough to alleviate budding deflationary pressures. As a result, Japanese real interest rates did not fall. This caused real rate differentials to move firmly in favor of the yen. In the final months of 1991, Japanese 2-year and 10-year real rate spreads versus the U.S. were 50 basis points and -75 basis points respectively, but by June 1993, these spreads became 145 basis points and 115 basis points. In the 1995-1996 episode, all the economic blocks experienced a slowdown in growth relative to the U.S. While this time the yen plunged versus the dollar, commodity currencies managed to appreciate against the dollar. This was because commodity prices rose during this timeframe, creating a positive terms-of-trade tailwind that lifted these currencies (Chart 3). Chart 2Episode 1: The Yen Diverges Chart 3Commodity Currencies Diverge In 1997 and 1998, the euro was the currency that managed to remain stable versus the U.S dollar, while the yen and commodity currencies sagged meaningfully (Chart 4).The euro was able to defy the gravity of a strong dollar because the euro area's relative growth differential versus the U.S. remained stable. Essentially, in the late '90s, as the euro area periphery was enjoying the full dividend of convergence toward the living standards of core Europe, European domestic demand was left unaffected by the Asian crisis. Meanwhile, commodity producers and Japan - two groups with much deeper links with EM economies - were experiencing deeper repercussions from the EM economic contraction. The 2005-2007 period of de-synchronized currency action against the dollar is somewhat of an outlier (Chart 5). First, this particular episode of currency divergence materialized in an environment where the dollar was weak. Chart 4Episode 3: The Euro Diverges Chart 5Episode 4: The Yen Diverges Again Second, the outlier was the yen, which managed to depreciate against the dollar while all other currencies were strengthening against the greenback. Chart 6Episode 5: The Euro Diverges again Third, while Japanese growth was below that of the U.S. it was not falling versus the U.S. However, this still caused Japan to be the odd man out in terms of growth performance, as other economic blocs delivered better growth than the U.S. Moreover, Japan was not experiencing the same growth dividend from China's miraculous boom as emerging Asian or commodity producers were. Adding fuel to the fire was the endemic implementation of carry trades. The low FX and rate volatility of that era was an invitation to engage in this kind of strategy.1 But Japan's deflation, along with its sub-par economic performance when compared to non-U.S. economies, re-assured investors that the BoJ would keep rates at rock-bottom levels for the foreseeable future. This was an invitation to investors to sell the yen to fund these carry trades in EM and commodity currencies as well as the euro. Finally, during the 2012-2013 episode the euro area was the global growth laggard. However, the euro was the currency that was able to strengthen against the dollar, defying the greenback's broad appreciation (Chart 6). It is true that euro area domestic demand growth was slightly improving versus the U.S. More importantly though, this was the time period that followed European Central Bank President Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" speech. These soothing words caused the break-up risk premia across euro area member states to collapse, lifting the euro in the process. 3) Common feature #3: Commodity Prices Were Falling In three out of five episodes, commodity prices were falling, which is consistent with the fact that four out of the five episodes were periods of broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar strength. The only exceptions were the 1995-1996 and 2005-2007 episodes, where commodities rallied. The latter period was further marked by a weak broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar. Bottom Line: Looking back at history, there have been five episodes where some major currencies diverged from the U.S. dollar's broad trend. In the majority of these episodes, the broad trade-weighted U.S dollar was rising, global growth was desynchronized, and commodity prices were falling. When Is The Next Episode On The Air? The aforementioned three common features can be thought of as pre-conditions for some currency divergence to transpire. So, when can investors expect the next episode to hit the proverbial airwaves? In our view, this scenario is most likely to materialize over the coming six to 12 months. Our main macro themes have been and remain2 that the global macro landscape over the coming months will be shaped by two tectonic shifts: on the one hand, America's fiscal stimulus will sustain robust U.S. growth, and on the other hand, the continued slowdown in money and credit in China will culminate in a relapse in capital spending. The Chinese leg of the scenario will depress commodity prices and consequently emerging market economies; meanwhile, thanks to considerable fiscal stimulus, easy financial conditions and relative economic insularity, U.S. growth will remain steady, leaving it as the global growth outperformer. These dynamics are bullish for the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar: The U.S. economy is growing robustly despite rising interest rates. In fact, interest rate-sensitive sectors are showing no signs of slowing down, confirming the resilience of the economy at this stage of the cycle. Both the housing market and commercial lending standards are not flagging growth risks (Chart 7). Chart 8 demonstrates that BCA's broad money measure (M3) for China leads import volumes and industrial metals prices by about six months. Based on the indicator's track record, odds are that industrial commodity prices will fall meaningfully over the coming months. Chart 7U.S. Economy Is Weathering##br## Rising Interest Rates Chart 8China's Money/Credit Is Bearish ##br##For Industrial Metals While oil prices could hold out for longer due to supply dynamics and geopolitics, positioning remains extremely elevated. As such, we are not ruling out a meaningful pullback in crude as traders head for the exits - all in the context of slowing global demand. Bottom Line: Pieces are falling in place to create the conditions necessary for some currency decoupling: global growth is set to become desynchronized, and commodity prices are likely to weaken - all in the context of a rising broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar. A Reverse Currency Pecking Order Slowing global trade as well as a growth deceleration in China's capital spending and demand for commodities will have the biggest repercussions for commodity and EM Asian currencies (Chart 9). This leaves the euro and the yen as the two most likely candidates to potentially diverge from the broad U.S. dollar in this coming episode. In our view, we think the yen could win this title. First, while the euro area economy is less leveraged to a slowdown in China/EM than Japan, it is still extremely vulnerable. Investors are still very long the euro, and therefore are vulnerable to negative surprises. Euro area industrial production could be the impulse to continue generating underwhelming economic numbers, as it is very much leveraged to China (Chart 10), mainly due to Germany's own deep trade links with EM and China. Notably, the German IFO index for business expectations in German manufacturing - a good leading indicator for global trade - is pointing to a further slowdown in global exports (Chart 11, top panel). Furthermore, German manufacturing new orders from non-euro area countries are starting to roll over, suggesting German exports will weaken imminently (Chart 11, middle panel). Lastly, the Swiss KOF leading indicator has come in below 100 (Chart 11, bottom pane Chart 9EM Asia & Commodity Currencies To Remain Weak Chart 10When China Decelerates, So Does Europe Chart 11Global Trade Is Slowing Down Second, it seems that historically the yen has a greater ability to rally than the euro when commodity prices are falling or when the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is in a bull market, highlighting the counter-cyclical nature of the Japanese currency. This happened in the early to mid-'90s and in 2008 (Chart 12). The only exception was in 1998, when the euro was able to rally amid a selloff in commodity prices and a strengthening dollar because domestic growth was so resilient. Today, euro area domestic growth is healthier than it was in 2012-2013, but it is still much weaker than is the case in the U.S., especially as the latter is receiving a shot in the arm thanks to a large dose of late-cycle stimulus. Chart 12The Yen Has Counter Cyclical Attributes Chart 13Euro Long Positioning Is Higher Than For The Yen As such, we believe the euro has more downside than the yen against the U.S. dollar in this coming episode. Furthermore, speculators remain too long the euro versus the yen (Chart 13). Third, the yen is a crucial funding currency in global carry trades, while the euro has not been used by traders for this purpose over the past 18 months.3 As such, a selloff in EM and commodity currencies, which is our base case, could spur a rush to the exits for short yen positions, while the euro is not likely to benefit from a similar short squeeze. Additionally, Japan sports a large positive net international investment position of US$3.1 trillion, while Europe's stands at -US$0.6 trillion. Consequently, Japanese investors have proportionally more funds held abroad than European investors to repatriate home in the event of an upsurge in global/EM market volatility, adding a further impetus for the yen to buck the dollar trend. One of the best currency valuation metrics is the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs, because it takes into account both wages and productivity. Unfortunately, this data set does not exist for all countries. On this metric, the U.S. dollar is not expensive (Chart 14, top panel). Adding credence to our view that the yen will be more resilient than the euro this year, according to the unit labor costs-based measures, the JPY appears to be cheap in trade-weighted terms and relative to the EUR (Chart 14, bottom panel). Chart 14The Yen Is Cheaper Than the Euro,##br## Dollar Is Fairly Valued Chart 15The Korean Won##br## Is Expensive Chart 16Commodity Currencies ##br##Are Not Cheap The Korean won - the only emerging Asian currency for which this measure is available - seems to be expensive (Chart 15). Chart 16 demonstrates that commodity currencies including those of Australia, New Zealand and Chile are on the expensive side, while the Canadian dollar and the Colombian peso are fairly valued. Bottom Line: Putting all the pieces together, our reverse pecking order for global investors from the weakest to strongest currency against the U.S. dollar is as follows: commodity currencies, non-commodities EM currencies (primarily Asian), the euro, and the yen. Investment Conclusions We recommend the following strategy to best navigate the coming global currency divergence episode over the coming six to 12 months: Global asset allocators should underweight the following currencies, from most to least, in the following order: First, the extremely vulnerable commodity currencies (BRL, IDR, ZAR, CLP, COP, AUD, NZD, NOK, and CAD); second, the EM Asian currencies (KRW, MYR, SGD, TWD, and PHP); third, the euro; and lastly, the yen. Currency traders stand to benefit the most in this coming episode by going short commodity and EM Asian currencies versus the U.S. dollar. That said, Japanese and European investors also stand to benefit by selling or underweighting commodity and EM currencies. The yen and the euro will depreciate significantly less than commodity and EM currencies, with the yen potentially ending flat versus the U.S. dollar. To capture these dynamics we suggest a new currency trade: long JPY / short SGD. The rationale behind this trade is that the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) manages the Singapore dollar against a basket of currencies of its major trading partners. Consequently, if as we anticipate the Japanese yen strengthens versus all other currencies with the exception of the greenback, the MAS will likely have to depreciate the Singapore dollar versus the yen. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Two Tectonic Macro Shifts", dated January 31, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Euro: Risk On Or Risk Off?", dated November 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report Highlights Investors are underestimating the risks of U.S.-Iran tensions; The Obama administration's 2015 deal resulted in Iran curbing aggressive regional behavior that threatened global oil supply; The U.S. negotiating position vis-à-vis Iran has not improved; Unlike North Korea, Iran can retaliate against the Trump administration's "Maximum Pressure" doctrine - particularly in Iraq; U.S.-Iran conflicts will negatively affect global oil supply, critical geographies, and sectarian tensions - hence a geopolitical risk premium is warranted. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy (CES) desk is using a new ensemble forecast, which takes its 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl, and WTI to $70/bbl from $72/bbl. For next year, CES's Brent forecast goes to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and WTI goes to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. CES expects higher volatility, as well. Feature Following the roll-out of our oil-price ensemble model last week, we are publishing a Special Report written by our colleague Marko Papic, who runs BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. This report explores the more nuanced aspects of the U.S. - Iran sanctions conflict, and why the contest for Iraq is important for investors. We also summarize our latest forecast. We trust you will find this analysis informative, Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy Tensions between the U.S. and Iran snuck up on the markets (Chart 1), even though President Trump's policy agenda was well telegraphed via rhetoric, action, and White House personnel moves.1 Still, investors doubt the market relevance of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international agreement between Iran and the P5+1.2 Chart 1Iran: Nobody Was Paying Attention! Several reasons to fade the risks - and hence to fade any implications for global oil supply - have become conventional wisdom. These include the alleged ability of OPEC and Russia to boost production and Washington's supposed ineffectiveness without an internationally binding sanction regime. Chart 2BCA's Updated Ensemble Forecast:##BR##Brent Averages /bbl in 2H18 Our view is that investors and markets are underestimating the geopolitical, economic, and financial relevance of the U.S.-Iran tensions. First, the ideological rhetoric surrounding the original U.S.-Iran détente tends to be devoid of strategic analysis. Second, Iran's hard power capabilities are underestimated. Third, OPEC 2.0's ability to tap into its spare capacity is overestimated.3 CES's updated ensemble forecast takes its 2H18 Brent forecast to $76/bbl from an average $78/bbl previously, and its WTI forecast to $70/bbl from $72/bbl (Chart 2). For next year, CES's Brent forecast goes to $73/bbl from $80/bbl, and its WTI expectation goes to $67/bbl from $72/bbl. CES expects higher volatility, as well, as markets continue to process sometimes-conflicting news flows. This means spike to and through $80/bbl for Brent are more likely than markets currently anticipate. Why Did The U.S.-Iran Détente Emerge In 2015? Both detractors and defenders of the 2015 nuclear deal often misunderstand the logic of the deal. First, the defenders are wrong when they claim that the deal creates a robust mechanism that ensures that Iran will never produce a nuclear device. Given that the most critical components of the deal expire in 10 or 15 years, it is simply false to assert that the deal is a permanent solution. More importantly, Iran already reached "breakout capacity" in mid-2013, which means that it had already achieved the necessary know-how to become a nuclear power.4 We know because we wrote about it at the time, using the data of Iran's cumulative production of enriched uranium provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).5 In August 2013, Iran's stockpile of 20% enriched uranium, produced at the impregnable Fordow facility, reached 200kg (Chart 3). Chart 3Iran's Negotiating Leverage At that point, Israeli threats of attacking Iran became vacuous, as the Israeli air force lacked the necessary bunker-busting technology to penetrate Fordow.6 As we wrote in 2013, this critical moment gave Tehran the confidence to give up "some material/physical components of its nuclear program as it has developed the human capital necessary to achieve nuclear status."7 The JCPOA forced Iran to stop enriching uranium at the Fordow facility altogether and to give up its stockpile of uranium enriched at 20%. However, Iran only agreed to the deal because it had reached a level of technological know-how that has not been eliminated by mothballing centrifuges and "converting" facilities to civilian nuclear research. Iran is a nuclear power in all but name. Second, the detractors of the JCPOA are incorrect when they claim that Iran did not give up any regional hegemony when it signed the deal. This criticism focuses on Iran's expanded role in the Syrian Civil War since 2011, as well as its traditional patronage networks with the Lebanese Shia militants Hezbollah and with Yemen's Houthis. However, critics ignore several other, far more critical, fronts of Iranian influence: Strait of Hormuz: In 2012, Iran's nearly daily threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were very much a clear and present danger for global investors (Map 1). Although we argued in 2012 that Iran's capability was limited to a 10-day closure, followed by another month during which they could threaten the safe passage of vessels through the Strait, even such a short crisis would add a considerable risk premium to oil markets given that it would remove about 17-18 million bbl/day from global oil supply (Chart 4).8 Since 2012, Iran's capabilities to threaten the Strait have grown, while the West's anti-mine capabilities have largely stayed the same.9 Map 1Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province Is A Crucial Piece Of Real Estate Chart 4Geopolitical Crises And Global Peak Supply Losses Iraq: The key geographic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran is Iraq (Map 2). Iran filled the power vacuum created by the U.S. invasion almost immediately after Saddam Hussein's overthrow. It deployed members of the infamous Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into Iraq to support the initial anti-American insurgency. Iran's support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was critical following the American withdrawal in 2011, particularly as his government became increasingly focused on anti-Sunni insurgency. Map 2Iraq: A Buffer Between Saudi Arabia And Iran Bahrain: Home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Bahrain experienced social unrest in 2011. The majority of Bahrain's population are Shia, while the country is ruled by the Saudi-aligned, Sunni, Al Khalifa monarchy. The majority of Shia protests were at least rhetorically, and some reports suggest materially, supported by Iran. To quell the protests, and preempt any potential Iranian interference, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield Force. Eastern Province: Similar to the unrest in Bahrain, Shia protests engulfed Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 2011. The province is highly strategic, as it is where nearly all of Saudi oil production, processing, and transportation facilities are located (Map 1). Like Bahrain, it has a large Shia population. Saudi security forces cracked down on the uprising and have continued to do so, with paramilitary operations lasting into 2017. While Iranian involvement in the protests is unproven, it has been suspected. Anti-Israel Rhetoric: Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran threatened Israel with destruction on a regular basis. While these were mostly rhetorical attacks, the implication of the threat was that any attack against Iran and its nuclear facilities would result in retaliation against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq and direct military action against Israel. Both defenders and detractors of the JCPOA are therefore mistaken. The JCPOA does not impact Iran's ability to achieve "breakout capacity" given that it already reached it in mid-2013. And Iran's regional influence has not expanded since the deal was signed in 2015. In fact, since the détente in 2015, and in some cases since negotiations between the Obama administration and Tehran began in 2013, Iran has been a factor of stability in the Middle East. Specifically, Iran has willingly: Stopped threatening the Strait of Hormuz (the last overt threats to close the Strait of Hormuz were made in 2012); Acquiesced to Nouri al-Maliki's ousting as Prime Minister of Iraq in 2014 and his replacement by the far more moderate and less sectarian Haider al-Abadi; Stopped meddling in Bahraini and Saudi internal affairs; Stopped threatening Israel's existence (although its material support for Hezbollah clearly continues and presents a threat to Israel's security); Participated in joint military operations with the U.S. military against the Islamic State, cooperation without which Baghdad would have most likely fallen to the Sunni radicals in late 2014. The final point is worth expanding on. After the fall of Mosul - Iraq's second largest city - to the Islamic State in May 2014, Iranian troops and military advisors on the ground in Iraq cooperated with the U.S. air force to arrest and ultimately reverse the gains by the radical Sunni terrorist group. Without direct Iranian military cooperation - and without Tehran's material and logistical support for the Iraqi Shia militias - the Islamic State could not have been eradicated from Iraq (Map 3). Map 3The Collapse Of A Would-Be Caliphate How did such a dramatic change in Tehran's foreign policy emerge between 2012 and 2015? Iranian leadership realized in 2012 that the U.S. military and economic threats against it were real. Internationally coordinated sanctions had a damaging effect on the economy, threatening to destabilize a regime that had experienced social upheaval in the 2009 Green Revolution (Chart 5). It therefore began negotiations almost immediately after the imposition of stringent economic sanctions in early and mid-2012.10 Chart 5Iran's Sanctions Had A Hard Bite To facilitate the negotiations, the Guardian Council of Iran disqualified President Ahmadinejad's preferred candidate for the 2013 Iranian presidential elections, while allowing Hassan Rouhani's candidacy.11 Rouhani, a moderate, won the June 2013 election in a landslide win, giving him a strong political mandate to continue the negotiations and, relatedly, to pursue economic development. Many commentators forget, however, that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei allowed Rouhani to run in the first place, knowing full well that he would likely win. In other words, Rouhani's victory revealed the preferences of the Iranian regime to negotiate and adjust its foreign policy. Bottom Line: The 2015 U.S.-Iran détente traded American acquiescence in Iranian nuclear development - frozen at the point of "breakout capacity" - in exchange for Iran's cooperation on a number of strategically vital regional issues. As such, focusing on just the JCPOA, without considering the totality of Iranian behavior before and since the deal, is a mistake. Iran curbed its influence in several regional hot spots - almost all of which are critical to global oil supply. The Obama administration essentially agreed to Iran becoming a de facto nuclear power in exchange for Iran backing away from aggressive regional behavior. This included Iran's jeopardizing the safe passage of oil through the Strait of Hormuz either by directly threatening to close the channel or through covert actions in Bahrain and the Eastern Province. The U.S. also drove Iran to accept a far less sectarian Iraq, by forcing out the ardently pro-Tehran al-Maliki and replacing him with a prime minister far more acceptable to Saudi Arabia and Iraqi Sunnis. Why Did The U.S. Chose Diplomacy In 2011? The alternative to the above deal was some sort of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The U.S. contemplated such action in late 2011. Two options existed, either striking Iran's facilities with its own military or allowing Israel to do it themselves. One reason to choose diplomacy and economic sanctions over war was the limited capability of Israel to attack Iran alone.13 Israel does not possess strategic bombing capability. As such, it would have required a massive air flotilla of bomber-fighters to get to the Iranian nuclear facilities. While the Israeli air force has the capability to reach Iranian facilities and bomb them, their effectiveness is dubious and the ability to counter Iranian retaliatory capacity with follow-up strikes is non-existent. Chart 6Great Power Competition The second was the fact that a U.S. strike against Iran would be exceedingly complex. Compared to previous Israeli strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq (Operation Opera 1981) and Syria (Operation Outside The Box 2007), Iran presented a much more challenging target. Its superior surface-to-air missile capability would necessitate a prolonged, and dangerous, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission. In parallel, the U.S. would have to preemptively strike Iran's ballistic missile launching pads as well as its entire navy, so as to obviate Iran's ability to retaliate against international shipping or the U.S. and its allies in the region. The U.S. also had a strategic reason to avoid entangling itself in yet another military campaign in the Middle East. The public was war-weary and the Obama administration gauged that in a world where global adversaries like China and Russia were growing in geopolitical power, avoiding another major military confrontation in a region of decreasing value to U.S. interests (thanks partly to growing U.S. shale oil production) was of paramount importance (Chart 6). Notable in 2011 was growing Chinese assertiveness throughout East Asia (please see the Appendix on page 24). Particularly alarming was the willingness of Beijing to assert dubious claims to atolls and isles in the South China Sea, a globally vital piece of real estate (Diagram 1). There was a belief - which has at best only partially materialized - that if the United States divested itself of the Middle East, then it could focus more intently on countering China's challenge to traditional U.S. dominance in East Asia and the Pacific. Diagram 1South China Sea As Traffic Roundabout Bottom Line: The Obama administration therefore chose a policy of military posturing toward Iran to establish a credible threat. The military option was signaled in order to get the international community - both allies and adversaries - on board with tough economic sanctions. The ultimate deal, the JCPOA, did not give the U.S. and its allies everything they wanted precisely because they did not enter the negotiations from a position of preponderance of power. Critics of the JCPOA ignore this reality and assume that going back to the status quo ante bellum will somehow improve the U.S. negotiating position. It won't. What Happens If The U.S.-Iran Détente Ends? The Trump administration is serious about applying its Maximum Pressure tactics on Iran. Buoyed by the successful application of this strategy in North Korea, the White House believes that it can get a better deal with Tehran. We do not necessarily disagree. It is indeed true that the U.S. is a far more powerful country than Iran, with a far more powerful military. On a long enough timeline, with enough pressure, it ought to be able to force Tehran to concede, assuming that credible threats are used.14 Unlike the Obama administration, the Trump administration will presumably rely on Israel far less, and on its own military capability a lot more, to deliver those threats, which should be more effective. The problem is that the timeline on which such a strategy would work is likely to be a lot longer with Iran than with North Korea. This is because Iran's retaliatory capabilities are far greater than the one-trick-pony Pyongyang, which could effectively only launch ballistic missiles and threaten all-out war with U.S. and its regional allies.15 While those threats are indeed worrisome, they are also vacuous as they would lead to a total war in which the North Korean regime would meet its demise. Iran has a far more effective array of potential retaliation that can serve a strategic purpose without leading to total war. As we listed above, it could rhetorically threaten the Strait of Hormuz or attempt to incite further unrest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The key retaliation could be to take the war to Iraq. The just-concluded election in Iraq appears to have favored Shia political forces not allied to Iran, including the Alliance Towards Reform (Saairun) led by the infamous cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr (Chart 7). Surrounding this election, various Iranian policymakers and military leaders have said that they would not allow Iraq to drift outside of Iran's sphere of influence, a warning to the nationalist Sadr who has fought against both the American and Iranian military presence in his country. Iraq is not only a strategic buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two regional rivals, but also a critical source of global oil supply, having brought online about half as much new supply as U.S. shale since 2011 (Chart 8). If Iranian-allied Shia factions engage in an armed confrontation with nationalist Shias allied with Muqtada al-Sadr, such a conflict will not play out in irrelevant desert governorates, as the fight against the Islamic State did. Chart 7Iraqi Elections Favored Shiites But Not Iran Chart 8Iraq Critical To Global Oil Supply Instead, a Shia-on-Shia conflict would play out precisely in regions with oil production and transportation facilities. In 2008, for example, Iranian-allied Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fought a brief civil war against Sadr's Mahdi Army in what came to be known as the "Battle of Basra." While Iran had originally supported Sadr in his insurgency against the U.S., it came to Maliki's support in that brief but deadly six-day conflict. Basra is Iraq's chief port through which much of the country's oil exports flow. Iraq may therefore become a critical battleground as Iran retaliates against U.S. Maximum Pressure. From Iran's perspective, holding onto influence in Iraq is critical. It is the transit route through which Iran has established an over-land connection with its allies in Syria and Lebanon (Map 4). Threatening Iraqi oil exports, or even causing some of the supply to come off-line, would also be a convenient way to reduce the financial costs of the sanctions. A 500,000 b/d loss of exports - at an average price of $70 per barrel (as Brent has averaged in 2018) - could roughly be compensated by an increase in oil prices by $10 per barrel, given Iran's total exports. As such, Iran, faced with lost supply due to sanctions, will have an incentive to make sure that prices go up (i.e., that rivals do not simply replace Iranian supply, keeping prices more or less level). The easiest way to accomplish this, to add a geopolitical risk premium to oil prices, is through the meddling in Iraqi affairs. Map 4Iran Needs Iraq To Project Power Through The Levant It is too early to forecast with a high degree of confidence precisely how the U.S.-Iran confrontation will develop. However, Diagram 2 offers our take on the path towards retaliation. Diagram 2Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree The critical U.S. sanctions against Iran will become effective on November 4 (Box 1). We believe that the Trump administration is serious and that it will force European allies, as well as South Korea and Japan, to cease imports of oil from Iran. China will be much harder to cajole. Box 1: Iranian Sanction Timeline President Trump issued a National Security Presidential Memorandum to re-impose all U.S. sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA. The Office of Foreign Assets Control expects all sanctions lifted under the JCPOA to be re-imposed and in full effect after November 4, 2018. However, there are two schedules by which sanctions will be re-imposed, a 90-day and 180-day wind-down periods.1 Sanctions Re-Imposed After August 6, 2018 The first batch of sanctions that will be re-imposed will come into effect 90 days after the announced withdrawal from the JCPOA. These include: Sanctions on direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of several commodities (including gold), semi-finished metals, and industrial process software; Sanctions on the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the government of Iran; Sanctions on trade in Iranian currency and facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; Sanctions on Iran's automotive sector; Sanctions on export or re-export to Iran of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts. Sanctions Re-Imposed After November 4, 2018 The second batch of sanctions will come into effect 180 days after the announced Trump administration JCPOA withdrawal decision. These include: Sanctions on Iranian port operators, shipping, and shipbuilding activities; Sanctions against petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC); Sanctions against the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products from Iran; Sanctions on transactions and provision of financial messaging services by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran; Sanctions on Iran's energy sector; Sanctions on the provision of insurance, reinsurance, and underwriting services. 1a Please see the U.S. Treasury Department, "Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Re-Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to the May 8, 2018, National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," dated May 8, 2018, available at www.treasury.gov. By Q1 2019, the impact on Iranian oil exports will be clear. We suspect that Iran will, at that point, have the choice of either relenting to Trump's Maximum Pressure, or escalating tensions through retaliation. We give the latter a much higher degree of confidence and suspect that a cycle of retaliation and Maximum Pressure would lead to a conditional probability of war between Iran and the U.S. of around 20%. This is a significant number, and it is critical if President Trump wants to apply credible threats of war to Iran. Bottom Line: Unlike North Korea, Iran has several levers it can use to retaliate against U.S. Maximum Pressure. Iran agreed to set these levers aside as negotiations with the Obama administration progressed, and it has kept them aside since the conclusion of the JCPOA. It is therefore easy for Tehran to resurrect them against the Trump administration. Critical among these levers is meddling in Iraq's internal affairs. Not only is Iraq critical to Iran's regional influence; it is also key to global oil supply. We suspect that a cycle of Iranian retaliation and American Maximum Pressure raises the probability of U.S.-Iran military confrontation to 20%. We will be looking at several key factors in assessing whether the U.S. and Iran are heading towards a confrontation. To that end, we have compiled a U.S.-Iran confrontation checklist (Table 1). Table 1Will The U.S. Attack Iran? Investment Implications Over the past several years, there have been many geopolitical crises in the Middle East. We have tended to fade most of them, from a perspective of a geopolitical risk premium applied to oil prices. This is because we always seek the second derivative of any geopolitical event. In the context of the Middle East, by "second derivative" we mean that we are interested in whether the market impact of a new piece of information - of a new geopolitical event - will amount to more than just a random perturbation with ephemeral, decaying, market implications. To determine the potential of new information to catalyze a persistent market risk premium or discount, we investigate whether it changes the way things change in a given region or context. In 2015, we identified three factors that we believe are critical for a geopolitical event in the Middle East to have such second derivative implications, and thus global market implications.16 These are: Oil supply: The event should impact current global oil supply either directly or through a clear channel of contagion. Renewed sanctions against Iran do so directly. So would Iranian retaliation in Iraq or the Persian Gulf. Geography: The event should occur in a geography that is of existential significance to one of the regional or global players. Re-imposed sanctions obviously directly impact Iran as they could increase domestic political crisis. A potential Iranian proxy-war in Iraq would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Sectarian contagion: The event should exacerbate sectarian conflict - Sunni vs. Shia - which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. A renewed U.S.-Iran tensions check all of our factors. The risk is therefore real and should be priced by the market through a geopolitical risk premium. In addition, Iranian sanctions could tighten up the outlook for oil markets in 2019 by 400,000-600,000 b/d, reversing most of the production gains that Iran has made since 2016 (Chart 9). This is a problem given that the enormous oversupply of crude oil and oil products held in inventories has already been significantly cut. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Energy Sector Strategy teams believe that global petroleum inventories will be further reduced in 2019 (Chart 10). Chart 9Current And Future Iran##BR##Production Is At Risk Chart 10Tighter Markets And Lower Inventories,##BR##Keep Forward Curves Backwardated What about the hints from the OPEC 2.0 alliance that they would surge production in light of supply loss from Iran? Oil prices fell on the belief OPEC 2.0 could easily restore 1.8 MMb/d of production that they agreed to hold off the market since early 2017. Our commodity strategists have always considered the full number to be an illusion that consists of 1.2 MMb/d of voluntary cuts and around 500,000 b/d of natural production declines that were counted as "cuts" so that the cartel could project an image of greater collaboration than it actually achieved (Chart 11). In fact, some of the lesser "contributors" to the OPEC cut pledged to lower 2017 production by ~400,000 b/d, but are facing 2018 production levels that are projected to be ~700,000 b/d below their 2016 reference levels, and 2019 production levels are estimated to decline by another 200,000 b/d (Chart 12). Furthermore, renewed Iran-U.S. tensions may only be the second-most investment-relevant geopolitical risk for oil markets. Our commodity team expects Venezuelan production to fall to 1.2 MMb/d by the end of 2018 and to 1 MMb/d by the end of 2019, but these production levels could turn out to be optimistic (Chart 13). Chart 11Primary OPEC 2.0 Members Are Producing##BR##1.0 MMb/d Below Pre-Cut Levels Chart 12Secondary##BR##OPEC 2.0 Chart 13Venezuela Is##BR##A Bigger Risk 2H18, 2019 Oil Forecasts BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy updated its forecast last week, after the leaders of OPEC 2.0 indicated member states would be considering putting as much as 1mm b/d back on the market, following the price run-up accurately called from the beginning of this year. KSA and Russian are not being explicit about what they intend to do. In the background are the U.S.'s renewed Iran sanctions discussed above, which could remove ~ 500k b/d from the export markets by the end of 1H19, and the increasingly likely collapse of Venezuela's exports, which could remove ~ 1mm b/d. Against this, we have production in the U.S. shales increasing this year and next by ~ 1.3 - 1.4mm b/d to offset these potential losses, but even there we're seeing problems getting the shale oil out of the U.S.17 That's why CES went to an ensemble forecast, and will keep it in place as the market continues to process these conflicting signals (Chart 14). While some production will be restored to the market this year, it will be a drawn-out process, given CES's view OPEC 2.0 does not want to undo the hard work it took to drain OECD oil inventories (Chart 15). CES's Brent forecast was lowered $2/bbl in 2H18 and $7/bbl in 2019 to $76/bbl and to $73/bbl, respectively. CES's WTI forecast for 2H18 also was lowered $2/bbl to $70/bbl, while our 2019 forecast is now at $67/bbl, down $5/bbl vs. our previous forecast. Chart 14Factors In BCA's Ensemble Forecast Chart 15Balances Will Loosen If Supply Increases CES continues to expect continued strength on the demand side, with global oil consumption growing 1.7mm b/d. This will be driven by steady income growth in EM economies. One of the principal gauges CES uses to assess EM demand - import volumes - continues to move higher on a year-on-year basis, signaling incomes continue to expand (Chart 16). EM growth accounts for 1.3 of the 1.7mm b/d of growth we're expecting in 2018 and 2019. In forthcoming research, CES will be looking more deeply into the evolution of demand and the threat - if any - higher prices pose for EM growth. As was noted in last week's CES publication,17 consumers in many states no longer are shielded from high oil prices, as they were in the past: Governments around the world used the collapse in prices beginning in 2014 to remove/reduce fuel subsidies. This changes the dynamics of EM oil demand considerably, even if governments feel compelled to step into markets and order suppliers to not pass through the entire price increase. OPEC 2.0's leaders - KSA and Russia - appear united in their view of what is required to keep oil markets balanced over the long haul, so as not to disincentivize consumers from purchasing cars and trucks and the motor fuel required to run them. But over the short term, their goals differ. KSA is looking to IPO Saudi Aramco - next year, according to the latest reports - and this sale would most definitely benefit from higher prices. Indeed, KSA's oil minister Khalid al-Falih appeared to be comfortable with prices pushing toward $80/bbl recently. Russia's energy minister, Alexander Novak, has said in the past he favors an oil price somewhere between $50 and $60/bbl. CES continues to believe the dominant price risks remain on the upside - at 28.31% and 12.12%, markets continue to underestimate the probability Brent prices will trade above $80 and $90/bbl this year and next (Chart 17). Chart 16Strong EM Commodity Demand Expected,##BR##As Incomes And Imports Continue To Grow Chart 17Oil Markets Continue To Underestimate##BR##Upside Price Risks In 2H18 And 2019 Bottom Line: A renewal of U.S. - Iran tensions throws up real risks that are not being fully priced by the oil markets at present. They raise the probability global oil supplies out of the Middle East will be directly threatened, and that tensions in Iran and Iraq will flare into proxy wars. Such an outcome would be highly relevant to Saudi Arabia, which considers Iraq as a vital buffer with Iran. Lastly, rising tensions could exacerbate sectarian conflict in the Middle East as a whole, particularly along the Sunni - Shia divide, which is more likely to lead contagion than tribal conflict such as the Libyan Civil War. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Watching Five Risks," dated January 24, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 The JCPOA was concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus Germany (the "+1" of the P5+1). 3 BCA's Senior Commodity & Energy Strategist Robert P. Ryan has given the name "OPEC 2.0" to the Saudi-Russian alliance that is focused on regaining a modicum of control over the rate at which U.S. shale-oil resources are developed. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," dated March 30, 2017; and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" dated April 6, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 "Breakout" nuclear capacity is defined here as having enough uranium enriched at lower levels, such as at 20%, to produce sufficient quantities of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) required for a nuclear device. The often-reported amount of 20% enriched uranium required for breakout capacity is 200kg. However, the actual amount of uranium required depends on the number of centrifuges being employed and their efficiency. In our 2013 report, we gauged that Iran could produce enough HEU within 4-5 weeks at the Fordow facility to develop a weapon, which means that it had effectively reached "breakout capacity." 5 Please see International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation Of The NPT Safeguards Agreement And Relevant Provisions Of Security Council Resolutions In The Islamic Republic Of Iran," IAEA Board Report, dated August 28, 2013, available at www.iaea.org. 6 Although, in a move designed to increase pressure on Iran and its main trade partners, the Obama administration sold Israel the GBU-28 bunker-busting ordinance. That specific ordinance is very powerful, but still not capable enough to penetrate Fordow. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: Paradigm Shift," dated November 13, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Special Report, "Crisis In The Persian Gulf: Investment Implications," dated March 1, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 There are four U.S. Navy Avenger-class minesweepers based in Bahrain as part of the joint U.S.-U.K. TF-52. This number has been the same since 2012, when they were deployed to the region. 10 Particularly crippling for Iran's economy was the EU oil embargo imposed in January 2012, effective from July of that year, and the banning of Iranian financial institutions from participating in the SWIFT system in March 2012. 11 The Guardian Council of the Constitution is a 12-member, unelected body wielding considerable power in Iran. It has consistently disqualified reformist candidates from running in elections, which makes its approval of Rouhani's candidacy all the more significant. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reality Check: Israel Will Not Bomb Iran (Ever)," dated August 14, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 The NATO war with Yugoslavia in 1999 reveals how challenging SEAD missions can be if the adversary refuses to engage its air defense systems. The U.S. and its NATO allies bombed Serbia and its forces for nearly three months with limited effectiveness against the country's surface-to-air capabilities. The Serbian military simply refused to turn on its radar installations, making U.S. AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, designed to home in on electronic transmissions coming from radar systems, ineffective. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threats,'" dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Middle East: A Tale Of Red Herrings And Black Swans," dated October 14, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output; Volatility Set To Rise ... Again," published May 31, 2018.It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Notable Clashes In The South China Sea (2010-18) Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights One of Europe's major success stories is the structural and broad-based increase in female labour participation rates. The trend is set to continue for the next decade. Stay overweight the Personal Products sector as a long-term position. Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. It is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Buy exposure to Italian real estate as a new long-term position either directly or through Italy's small real estate equity sector. Feature Some analysts persist on comparing economic performances on the basis of real GDP per head of total population. But the total population includes children and the elderly who cannot contribute to economic output. Therefore, a correct assessment of economic performance should look at real GDP per head of working-age population. Chart I-1AWomen Are Powering The European Economy... Chart I-1B ...Less So In The U.S. Admittedly, as the retirement age rises, the definition of 'working-age' will gradually change, but the general principle still holds: only count in the denominator those who can contribute to economic output. GDP per head of working-age population can grow in several ways. One way is to get more output or better output from each hour worked through improvements in efficiency and/or quality. As this improvement is theoretically limitless, it is the main source of productivity gains in the long run. A second way is for each worker to work more hours. But given the physical and legal constraints on productive working time, there is only limited scope to increase output in this way. How Women Are Powering The European Economy There is one other way to increase GDP per head of working-age population: increase the percentage of the working age population that is in the labour force.1 In other words, structurally increase the labour participation rate. If this participation rate is already high - as it is for men - then there is little scope to increase it much further. But if the participation rate is low - as it is for European women - then there is considerable scope to increase it. This brings us to one of Europe's major, and largely untold, success stories - the structural and broad-based increase in female participation rates (Chart I-1-Chart I-5). Over the past twenty years, the EU28 female participation rate has risen from 57% to 68%, with an especially large contribution from the socially conservative southern countries. In Spain, female participation has surged from 47% to 70%. In Italy, it has shot up from 42% to 56% and has clear scope to rise much further. Chart I-2Italy: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-3Spain: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-4Germany: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-5France: Labour Force Participation Rate What is driving this structural trend? Two things. First, the employment sectors that are growing structurally - healthcare, social care, and education - tend to employ more women than men. Second, European countries have legislated a raft of policies encouraging women to join and remain in the labour force: generous paid maternity leave and subsidised childcare. The trend is for further improvements, with the focus now on improving paternity leave. Sharing parental and family responsibilities between mothers and fathers allows more women to enter and stay in the labour force.2 For the ultimate end-point in the trend, look to the Scandinavian countries which started such policies in the early 1970s. In Sweden, labour force participation for women and men is almost identical: 81% versus 84%. If the EU eventually adopts the Scandinavian model, it would mean another 20 million European women in employment and contributing to economic output (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Another 20 Million European Women ##br##Could Join The Labour Force Dispelling Two Myths: The Euro Area And Italy Having established that economic performances should be compared on the basis of GDP per head of working age population, we can now dispel two common myths. The first myth is that the U.S. generates superior productivity growth than the euro area. It is true that the U.S. has been better at getting more output from each hour worked, so on this measure, the U.S. does win. Against this, the euro area has been much better at getting more of its working-age population - albeit mostly women - into employment. So on this measure, the euro area wins (Chart of the Week). The net result is that, over the past twenty years, the U.S and the euro area have generated exactly the same growth in real GDP per working-age population (Chart I-7). Of course, the euro area's structural improvement in female participation rates cannot continue forever, but it can certainly continue for another decade or so, and this is generally the longest time horizon that most investors care about. Chart I-7The Euro Area And The U.S.: Identical Growth In Real GDP Per Head Of Working-Age Population The second myth concerns the subject du jour: Italy. Many people claim that Italy's economic stagnation is due to deep-seated structural problems which differentiate it from other major economies. The problem with this narrative is that from the mid-1990s until 2008 the growth in Italy's real GDP per head of working age population was little different to that in Germany, France or the U.S. (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Italy Performed In Line With Other Major Economies Until 2008 Italy's economic stagnation only started after the 2008 global financial crisis. After a financial crisis which cripples the banking system, there are two golden rules: unleash fiscal stimulus; and repair the banking system as quickly as possible. The U.S. and U.K. followed the golden rules perfectly and immediately; Ireland followed a couple of years later; Spain waited until 2013. But in each case, the economies rebounded very strongly as the fiscal stimulus kicked in and the banks recuperated. Italy neither unleashed fiscal stimulus, nor repaired its banks - so its economy has stagnated for a decade. Moreover, if output stagnates for a decade, it follows arithmetically that productivity growth will also look poor. In a back-to-front argument, critics have pounced on this as evidence of excessive 'red tape' and 'structural problems'. But this is a misdiagnosis of the malaise. To reiterate, Italy's real GDP per working-age population was growing very respectably before 2008. Italy's misfortune is that its indebtedness has an unusual profile: more public debt than private debt. France and Spain (and other major euro area economies) have the usual profile: less public debt than private debt. So the EU's fiscal rules - which can see only public debt and are blind to private debt - have severely and unfairly constrained Italy's ability to respond to financial crises. While every other major economy followed the golden rules to recover from the 2008 crisis, Italy could neither unleash fiscal stimulus to kick start the economy nor recapitalise its dysfunctional banking system. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Two Structural Investment Conclusions This week's two investment conclusions are both long term, and require a buy and hold mentality. The first conclusion reiterates a structural position: overweight the Personal Products sector. This is based on our expectation that, in Europe, female participation rates will continue their structural uptrend; while in the U.S. we expect female participation rates to continue outperforming male participation rates. Therefore the sales and profits of the Personal Products sector, in which female spending dominates, will benefit from a multi-year tailwind, at least relative to other sectors. And the extent of this tailwind is not fully discounted in valuations. The second conclusion is a new long-term recommendation: buy exposure to Italian real estate. This is based on our assessment that Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. Instead, it is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. Removing these shackles will allow a long-term recovery, just as it did for Spain in 2013. If we are right, the best multi-year buy and hold play is Italian real estate which has been in a decade-long bear market (Chart I-9). For those that cannot directly invest in property, Italy has a small real estate equity sector which faithfully tracks the long term profile of real estate prices (Chart I-10), and whose main component is Beni Stabili. The caveat is that the stock has a market cap of just €2 billion; the appeal is that it offers a juicy dividend yield of 4.5%. Chart I-9Italian Real Estate Has Suffered ##br##A Decade-Long Bear Market Chart I-10Italian Real Estate Equities##br## Track Real Estate Prices Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 And in employment. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Female Participation: Another Mega-Trend" published on April 6, 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* This week, we note that the 130-day fractal dimension for platinum versus nickel is close to its lower bound, a level which has consistently predicted a tradeable countertrend move over the following 130 days. Hence, this week's trade is long platinum/short nickel on a 130 horizon before expiry. The profit target is 14% with a symmetric stop-loss. Our two other open trades, long SEK/GBP and long PLN/USD, are both in profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Highlights Private debt raised a record $115 billion through 158 funds in 2017. Aggregate AUM has grown from $244 billion in 2007 to $664 billion in 2017. Private debt enjoys a higher yield and return, along with lower defaults, than traditional corporate bonds. This is driven by stronger covenants and collateral structures. Unlike traditional corporate debt with fixed coupons, most private debt has floating-rate coupons making it an attractive interest-rate hedge. Direct lending and mezzanine debt are low risk-low return capital-preserving strategies. Distressed and venture debt are more aggressive plays on operationally troubled firms and start-ups. Investors should allocate to private-debt funds with global exposure, to diversify away from U.S. corporate cash flow risk and increase exposure to different credit cycles. Business Development Companies (BDCs) are a liquid alternative to direct lending that provide impressive yield, but at the cost of higher volatility. Feature Introduction Private debt involves lending by institutional investors to middle-market companies in the form of investment-grade senior-secured debt, or subordinated debt. This space has experienced explosive growth: assets under management (AUM) have increased to $664 Bn in 2017 from $244 Bn in 2007. The key supply and demand factors driving this growth are: Chart 1Banking Sector Consolidation Bank Consolidation: For a couple of decades the U.S. banking industry has been consolidating, creating fewer but larger (Chart 1) commercial banks. These larger banks prefer to lend to larger rather than mid-market companies. Regulation: Following the financial crisis, increased regulation (for example, Dodd Frank and the Basel capital adequacy rules) forced commercial banks to reduce lending to the mid-market segment. This led to the rise of non-bank institutional lending. Search For Yield: With global bond yields depressed, institutional investors with target returns turned to alternate sources of income. This has created a new source of demand for private debt. Liquidity: The Volcker Rule, which banned proprietary trading in bond markets, reduced liquidity. ICG, a specialist asset manager, estimated that it took seven times as long for investors to liquidate bond portfolios in 2015 as it did in 2008. This made private debt's illiquidity relative to public markets less clear than previously.1 In this report, we run through the basics of private debt, and analyze past performance and fundraising cycles. In the following sections, we analyze different private-debt strategies and explain how investors can benefit from allocating to these. We close with a brief word on Business Development Companies (BDCs). Our conclusions are that: Private debt has returned an average net IRR of 13.0% from 1989-2015. This compares to an annualized total return of 7.0% and 7.2% for equities and corporate bonds respectively. Direct lending and mezzanine debt are intended to be capital preservation strategies that offer more stable returns while minimizing downside. Investors should allocate to these strategies from their alternative credit bucket. Distressed debt and venture debt are intended to be return-maximizing strategies that offer larger gains, but with a higher probability of losses. Investors should allocate to these strategies from their private equity bucket. In the late stages of an economic cycle, investors should deploy capital defensively through first-lien and other senior debt positions. In contrast, a recession would create opportunities for distressed strategies and within deeper parts of the capital structure. Unlike private equity and other private investments, private debt investors start receiving positive cash flow immediately and are charged management fees only on invested capital. This reduces the "J curve" effect. A note on the data we use in this report. All the returns and fund data are based on the private debt online platform from Preqin Ltd. Given the uncertainty around the investment horizon and cash flows of a private debt fund, it is hard to create a traditional total return index. Instead, we use the concept of internal rate of return (IRR) to understand past realized returns. (See Appendix for more detail on how the data is collected). The Private Debt Market Private debt funds raised a record $115 billion through 158 funds in 2017, surpassing the previous high of $100 billion in 2015. Total assets under management (AUM) have reached $664 Bn (Chart 2). There has been a trend towards the creation of larger funds, just as in private equity. Additionally, it took managers only 14 months to close fund-raising in 2017 versus 19 months in 2016, another testament to investors' strong appetite for this asset class. Finally, 58% of funds exceeded their target size. Below we describe key characteristics of this asset class. (In the Appendix, we explain in detail the key terms, and methodologies used to measure performance.) Chart 2Strong Investor Demand Chart 3Private Debt Market Return And Risk: Table 1 shows the past realized return for each private debt strategy and the range of outcomes that investors can expect from allocating to them. Distressed and venture debt produce a higher average IRR, but with greater dispersion in returns. Compared to traditional corporate credit, private debt enjoys a higher yield and return, along with lower default rates and credit loss.2 This is because public bonds are mostly unsecured obligations with standard indentures, whereas private debt investors have more control over terms and conditions such as covenants and collateral structures. Additionally, private debt can improve performance (Chart 3) by diversifying the sources of risk and return,3 and gives access to more esoteric exposures such as illiquidity and manager skill. Illiquidity premia are generated from both asymmetric information flow about target companies and also the low frequency of transactions. Another attractive feature is the ability to customize deals with favorable security packages and cash flow patterns to meet unique liability and payment schedules. Finally, many of the more aggressive private debt strategies provide investors with the option to convert to equity ownership, thereby further improving risk-return dynamics with an equity upside. Table 1Capital Preservation Vs. Return Maximizing Unlike most traditional corporate bonds with fixed coupon payments, most private debt investments have floating-rate coupons making them attractive hedges in rising-rate environments. Additionally, cash distributions to investors include both interest and principal repayments, and are mostly quarterly. Unlike traditional bullet repayment structures, periodic principal repayments reduce the average effective duration of the investment, and reduce refinancing risk. Finally, risk levels in the private debt space are highly dependent on the investment strategy; we address this issue in the next section. Diversification: Another important aspect of private debt is its ability to provide uncorrelated returns. Cross-asset class correlations have been rising since the start of easy monetary policy early this decade. The core risk exposure in a private-debt investment comes from idiosyncratic firm-specific sources, which is not the case with publicly traded corporate credit. Investors can gain exposure to different industries and customized duration horizons in the private space. Since deal origination is highly dependent on manager skills and relationships, private debt gives access to firms or projects that are not available via any index. Finally, private debt was the only group in the private space that did not experience a contraction in AUM during the financial crisis. Fund managers also had no challenges deploying capital - as seen by falling dry powder during the period. Chart 4Europe Will Be The Growth Engine Global Allocation: Investors looking to build a durable private-debt mandate will benefit tremendously from global allocation. This helps diversify away from the key risk factor of U.S. corporate cash flow, and also exposes returns to multiple credit cycles. Currently, North America is the largest and most developed private-debt market with issuance almost 4-5 times that of Europe. But looking forward, given the low level of non-bank penetration (Chart 4) in the lending market, Europe is likely to be the next growth engine. Investing in Europe versus the U.S. will have a few different characteristics: 1) lower leverage at the fund level; 2) a larger PIK4 (pay in kind) and smaller cash-pay5 component; 3) origination fees making up a greater portion of overall return. There has also been growth in the emerging markets/Asian private-debt space. Investors can expect an additional return of 4-6% relative to the U.S. and Europe for similar risk. A high level of idiosyncratic risk make these credits very attractive from a diversification perspective. For example, Australian and Korean authorities have very strict regulations on banks, thereby opening the door for alternative lenders. Moreover, the onshore and offshore markets created by capital controls in China increase the need for mezzanine and bridge financing. Deal Origination: For middle-market lending, there are three channels for sourcing deals: 1) sponsored, 2) direct (non-sponsored), and 3) capital markets. In the sponsored channel, private-debt funds can benefit by investing alongside control-focused private equity investors which also provide equity capital injections. In the non-sponsored or direct channel, private-debt funds have to maintain continuous communication and relationships with management teams, and this requires more involvement in terms of due diligence and portfolio monitoring. The capital markets channel involves participation in a third-party investment and comes with terms that have already been negotiated. Chart 5Compressing Fee Structures Chart 6Manager Selection Is Key Fee Structure: Fees (Chart 5) and administrative costs are important for an asset class where up to 25% of gross returns can be swallowed by costs. Compared to private equity, direct lending helps mitigate the effect of the "J-curve", as these funds typically charge management fees on invested capital, and carry over a hurdle rate. Increasing competition and rising dry powder have pushed management fees to the lowest level in 10 years. Finally, fees for direct-lending funds are much lower than other strategies because of the lack of equity components and a lower risk-return profile. Manager Selection: The heterogeneity in private debt means that picking the right general partner (GP) can have a big impact on returns (Chart 6). Like the entire private capital space, there is great dispersion between top-quartile managers and the rest. Additionally, there has also been a performance differential between first-time and returning managers. It is critical to conduct extensive due diligence. The private debt space consists of multiple strategies with different risk-return implications for a portfolio. Looking back at Table 1, these strategies can be split into the following two groups: Capital Preservation Strategies: These strategies offer more stable returns while minimizing downside. A more conservative risk-return profile means investors should allocate to these strategies from their alternative credit bucket. Direct lending and mezzanine debt fall under this group. Return Maximizing Strategies: These strategies offer larger gains but with a higher probability of deals going bust. A more aggressive risk-return profile means investors should allocate to these strategies from their private equity bucket. Distressed debt and venture debt fall under this group. Private Debt Strategies Direct Lending Chart 7Direct Lending Loans are made to middle-market companies without an intermediary bank or broker (Chart 7). This is done by going directly to private-equity sponsors or owner-operators of middle-market firms. Institutional lenders are more actively involved than commercial banks, offering customized financing solutions. The loans are mostly structured as term loans with 5-7 years maturity, and an emphasis on smaller loan sizes.6 These investors are sold with the intention of generating high current income with low volatility and losses. Most are senior secured loans underwritten as a multiple of EBITDA.7 Prospective investors compare direct lending to its public-market equivalent: syndicated leveraged loans. Direct lending offers a yield premium along with lower leverage levels, higher coverage ratios, and more conservative deal terms. Banking regulations such as Basel III and the new Federal Reserve loan guidelines will reduce banks' willingness to refinance the $180 Bn - $240 Bn of existing mid-market loans, which will give direct lenders a larger market to service. Additionally, with North American private equity dry powder at $530 Bn,8 there will be increased demand for direct lending to fund leveraged buyouts (LBOs). However, the direct lending space has grown 10-fold, from being an $18 Bn market in 2007 to $180 bn at the end of 2017. Investors looking to deploy capital in current market conditions may be skeptical. A recent development in the direct lending space, following the financial crisis, has been the creation of unitranche loans. This structure combines a senior and junior credit position into one blended loan and interest rate. The risk profile is a single lien that is often a senior first-lien position. Investors can benefit from advantageous pricing: the interest rate received falls between the rate of senior debt and subordinated debt. Deals originated through the private-equity sponsored channel have become very competitive. Investors should look at non-sponsored channel deals which are less crowded and make up a smaller fraction of the mid-market space. These are normally smaller and require more active due diligence, but potentially offer higher risk-adjusted returns compared to sponsored deals. Mezzanine Debt Chart 8Mezzanine Debt Directly originated loans that are subordinate to senior secured notes but senior to equity (Chart 8). These loans are secured by assets and are used to finance leveraged buyouts, recapitalize the balance-sheet, and for corporate acquisitions. They generally fill a funding gap due to insufficient capital from other sources. Most mezzanine loans are evaluated and structured based on the ongoing cash flow and enterprise value of the company, as opposed to asset-based lending which focuses on the liquidation value of assets. An added advantage is the ability to customize debt terms to match the cash flow profile of each company by changing the timing and amounts of current and deferred payments. This includes incurrence9 and maintenance10 covenants, unlike covenant-lite large-cap corporate issues. Given their subordinate position in the capital structure, investors can expect higher returns compared to direct lending (but at a higher risk, since these are highly leveraged situations). Coupon income is generally fixed-rate and paid in cash, and investors also enjoy call protection. Investors in this group mostly focus on total return versus income return in direct lending. This is because there exists an additional upside with the equity kicker,11 which means mezzanine holders enjoy features of both debt and equity. Additionally, not only do investors benefit from current payments in the form of cash interest and principal repayments, but also deferred payments through payment in kind (PIK) and bonus exit payments.12 The key risk with this investment is its junior position in the capital structure, putting the lender in first-loss position after the value of company drops by more than equity value. These investments tend to underperform when distressed managers outperform: environments of rising defaults, higher corporate leverage, and economic slowdown. Such events are bad for junior bondholders and reduce possible equity upside. Distressed Debt Chart 9Distressed Debt Investing in this group (Chart 9) can take a number of different forms depending on the manager's return and risk target and investment horizon. Investors are usually less familiar with the process and require fund managers with legal expertise to handle possible bankruptcy proceedings. In 2016, global non-performing loans reached 4%13 of total gross loans. The distressed market has changed substantially. In the early 2000s, funds could make attractive returns by effectively trading in and out of debt. Recently, fund managers have had to focus on restructuring and operational turnarounds which require private-equity like exposure. Since attractive opportunities in this space come less frequently, investors need to look for managers that are good at sourcing deals. What differentiates performance between different distressed managers is what they do with the securities after purchase. Most large returns will be generated through negotiation and restructuring, and only a smaller portion from "pull-to-par"14 investing. A key driver of returns is the accurate assessment of a borrower's enterprise value. Investors will have access to both a contractual coupon yield and also substantial capital appreciation driven by pull-to-par from a refinancing or settlement. Loan-to-own strategy. Taking an activist role with a target company will involve the possibility of converting to equity during bankruptcy proceedings. This also gives investors access to restricted information about the target and considerable leverage at the negotiating table. At the other end of the spectrum, managers target non-control15 transactions and acquire their debt at a discount to par with the hope of par refinancing driven by positive improvements at the firm. Investors should commit capital to distressed assets when fundamentals are solid and defaults are relatively low before the onset of the upturn in the economic cycle. Additionally, investors should analyze current political and economic trends to pinpoint where the next distressed opportunity will arise. Fund managers that keep ample dry powder waiting to be deployed will benefit from picking assets at beaten-down valuations. A classic example was following the 2014 oil bear market, when distressed managers with sufficient dry powder were able to source attractive deals. Additionally, investors looking to further customize risk-return dynamics can look to deploy capital to the growing distressed market in Asia. Along with years of rapid growth in China, there is a growing problem of bad corporate debt. However, investing in these new markets with different legislative mechanisms may require partnering with a local asset manager. Venture Debt CHart 10Venture Debt These are loans (Chart 10) to early-stage firms backed by venture capital. Family businesses seeking capital, but not willing to surrender control and ownership, will opt for venture debt. The loan is usually secured by intellectual property, receivables, and other intangible assets such as trademarks and copyrights. Venture debt is typically raised immediately after an equity round in order to minimize borrowing costs. For every four-to-seven venture equity dollars, one dollar will be financed by venture debt. The core function of venture debt is to extend the "cash runway",16 thereby achieving the next milestone/valuation driver. There are two structures of venture debt financing: 1) receivables financing - a firm will borrow against its receivables (at a 15-20% discount) to meet cash flow needs; and 2) equipment financing - structured as a lease for the purchase of equipment. In the first case, investors can expect a higher risk-return profile compared to the second given the more unpredictable nature of cash flows. Return stream consists of cash interest, PIK income, and equity warrants. The equity kicker is generally 10-25% of the loan value which gives investors an option to participate in subsequent equity rounds. Another interesting feature is that capital distributions are reinvested and recycled, maximizing IRR over the fund's life. In short, investors can expect some private equity-like upside with a baseline return from a debt component. With private-equity upside comes similar downside. The business of venture lending is very cyclical since it involves young businesses. During tough times, additional rounds of equity injection might be required to reduce cash burn. Additionally, there exists tremendous variability across vintage years, therefore it is important for investors to pick the right time to enter this space. Special Situations Chart 11Special Situations Managers in this space do not have a specific mandate and can cover a wide range of complex strategies targeting specific industry or geographic opportunities (Chart 11). Deal sourcing is harder since most opportunities are event-driven. The more popular types include rescue financing, balance-sheet restructuring, and non-performing loans (NPLs). Generally, most attractive opportunities for special situations arise at the beginning of a distressed cycle. Special-situation funds can be thought of as liquidity providers in situations of both micro and macro dislocations. In the case of the recent energy crisis in 2015, managers provided bespoke restructuring solutions for oil producers' capital structures as their debt matured. On the other hand, managers could also acquire a diversified portfolio of NPLs across sectors. Given that deal flow is highly dependent on firm specific or aggregate industry dislocations, investors need to pick managers with strong performance across multiple economic cycles and across the entire capital structure. Key risks depends on the type of mandate. For a manager with a niche focus, investors need to be wary about the strategy attracting increased attention, eventually decreasing the range of opportunities. For managers with a broad mandate, the risk lies with miscalculating a new and unfamiliar opportunity. Business Development Companies (BDCs) - A Liquid Alternative To Direct Lending Chart 12BDCs: Higher Yield, Higher Volatility BDCs are U.S. closed-end exchange-traded investment vehicles with an aggregate market cap of $33 billion17 specialising in private non-syndicated secured and unsecured middle-market corporate debt with daily liquidity (Chart 12). These structures were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980 to stimulate private investment in middle-market firms which had suffered during the stagflation that followed the 1973-1974 recession. These entities have legal and tax similarities with real-estate investment trusts (REITs) and master limited partnerships (MLPs): 1) annual distribution of 90% of income to shareholders, and 2) preferential tax treatment. Underlying assets are mostly directly originated middle-market loans with an increased use of covenants. They tend to have an average maturity of five years with a floating-rate coupon and origination fees which give 0.25% in additional income. Additionally, the maximum debt-to-equity leverage allowed is 1:1. Finally, investors can expect a fee structure of 1.5%/20%, with an 8% hurdle rate. One of the biggest attractiveness of BDCs is the high dividend yield relative even to other high-yielding assets such as REITs and MLPs. Additionally, BDCs have a positive yield spread versus high-yield bonds despite holding higher quality assets. This in turn leads to lower loss rates for BDCs compared to high-yield credit. However the annualized volatility of BDCs is far greater than equities, corporate and junk bonds. Conclusion Creating a well-balanced private-debt program requires deploying capital across the credit/economic cycle. Investors should strategically deploy capital to generate a meaningful yield over cash, while retaining agility to be able to move into higher risk/return assets when market sentiment recovers and opportunities arise. In a late-cycle phase, investors should deploy capital to senior debt direct lending with attractive asset coverage and strong current income. In a recessionary phase, investors should move into distressed assets and into deeper parts of the capital structure which will benefit from future expansion as the cycle improves. In an early cycle phase, investors should move into mezzanine debt and other equity-linked strategies with the potential to deliver strong performance through capital appreciation. Aditya Kurian Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation adityak@bcaresearch.com Appendix 1 http://www.icgam.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Rise of Private Debt as an institutional asset class Amin Rajan GENERIC.pdf 2 American Society of Actuaries. 3 From 2012 to 2017, the middle market exhibited stronger revenue and employment growth than the S&P 500. In 2017, the average revenue growth rate for middle-market companies was 8% compared to 5.3% for the S&P 500. Source: National Center for the Middle Market. 4 Under PIK, interest is paid by increasing the principal amount through capitalization of interest when it is due. 5 "Cash pay component" is the part of the quarterly payments received by private debt investors that are in the form of cash. 6 Average loan size for middle-market direct lending is $20M - $30M. 7 Direct lending funding is provided in terms of either Debt/EBITDA or Net Debt/EBITDA so that investors can better analyze a borrower's repayment capacity. 8 With dry powder of $530 Bn, and assuming a 60% debt, 40% equity capital structure, this implies over $750 Bn of future financing opportunities in sponsored buyouts. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. 9 If a borrower takes an action (dividend payment, acquisition), the resulting position would need to remain in compliance with the loan agreement. 10 The borrower needs to meet certain financial tests every reporting period in order to remain qualified for the loan. 11 Mezzanine debt providers often have the option to convert to equity at a future date, thereby participating in any upside. 12 A variable payment calculated as a percent of the change in the value of the company over the duration of the mezzanine facility. 13 Source: The World Bank. 14 Investors buying distressed debt trading at a discount in the hope of selling it at par when the company recovers and its bonds return to face value. 15 When the total position in the firm is too small to gain board or management representation. 16 When funding each round, venture capitalists look at how much cash the company is expected to burn to reach the next milestone, with each round typically designed to fund 12 to 14 months. If this expected cash burn phase extends beyond that period and the firm runs out of cash, venture debt could be used as a cash runway until the next round of venture capital funding. 17 Source: http://cefdata.com/bdc/
Highlights Chart 1Risks To The Bond Bear Market Two weeks ago we flagged that large net short positioning and elevated growth expectations left the Treasury market primed to benefit from any disturbance in the economic outlook. Since then the 10-year yield fell from a peak of 3.06% to 2.77%, before climbing back to 2.92%. With positioning still deeply net short and strong odds of a further decline in the economic surprise index (Chart 1), we continue to see an elevated risk that yields move lower on a 0-3 month horizon. But beyond that, less nimble investors should remain positioned for higher yields on a 6-12 month timeframe. The major risks in the global economy - Eurozone sovereign credit concerns and a strong dollar weighing on emerging market demand - are unlikely to put the Fed off its "gradual" pace of one rate hike per quarter unless they lead to a significant risk-off event in U.S. financial markets. Absent that sort of shock, the Fed will continue to lift rates "gradually" toward a neutral level near 3%, and eventually into restrictive territory. This rate hike path is consistent with a cyclical peak in the 10-year Treasury yield between 3.30% and 3.80%, well above current levels. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 45 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -122 bps. Value has improved considerably since the start of the year. The 12-month breakeven spread for a Baa-rated corporate bond is back up to its 29th percentile relative to history (Chart 2). Market-derived inflation expectations also ebbed during the past month, with the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates now at 2.09% and 2.12% respectively. This is below the target range of 2.3% to 2.5% that would trigger a downgrade to our corporate bond allocation. The combination of more attractive value and a somewhat more supportive monetary environment (as evidenced by the decline in TIPS breakeven rates) increases the odds of near-term corporate bond outperformance, and we would not be surprised to see spreads tighten during the next few months. However, the longer run outlook for corporates remains negative. First quarter data showed a 5.7% annualized decline in pre-tax corporate profits, dragging the year-over-year growth rate down to 5.8% (bottom panel). As employee compensation costs accelerate in the second half of the year, we expect that corporate profit growth will fall sustainably below the pace of corporate debt growth leading to rising leverage (panel 4). Strong oil prices have caused the energy sector to outperform the overall index considerably since the middle of last year. Now, many energy sub-sectors no longer appear cheap on our model. We take this opportunity to downgrade a few energy sub-sectors from overweight to neutral, and adjust some other sector recommendations as well (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 65 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +36 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 24 bps on the month, and currently sits at 356 bps. High-yield spreads are increasingly at odds with Moody's default rate projections. The latter call for the 12-month speculative grade default rate to fall to 1.5% by next April. The current 12-month trailing default rate is 3.7% (Chart 3). Using the Moody's default rate projection, and our own forecast for the recovery rate, we calculate the excess spread available in the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index to be 284 bps (after accounting for expected default losses). This is somewhat higher than the historical average of 248 bps. The current excess spread means that in an unchanged spread environment we would expect a High-Yield excess return (relative to duration-matched Treasuries) of +278 bps during the next 12 months. If the index spread were to tighten by 100 bps, we would expect an excess return of +675 bps. If the index spread were to widen by 100 bps we would expect an excess return of -120 bps (panel 3). If the excess spread were to simply revert to its historical average, then it would imply an excess High-Yield return of +427 bps. At the sector level, Moody's expects that most defaults during the next 12 months will come from the Media: Advertising, Printing & Publishing sector, followed closely by the Durable Consumer Goods and Retail sectors. Much of the projected improvement in the overall default rate results from a continued decline in Oil & Gas sector defaults compared to the past few years. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -27 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread widened 4 bps on the month, driven entirely by a 4 bps increase in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The option-adjusted spread held flat at 32 bps. Value in the MBS sector is by no means exciting. The nominal spread on a conventional 30-year MBS is near its all-time low, the option-adjusted spread is close to one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean (Chart 4) and MBS no longer look very attractive compared to investment grade corporate credit (panel 3). The most compelling reason to hold agency-backed MBS is that mortgage refinancings are likely to remain very low, owing both to rising interest rates and the large number of homeowners that have already refinanced. Depressed refi activity should keep MBS spreads near historically low levels (bottom panel), even as stresses emerge in other spread product sectors, notably corporate bonds. We recently presented a method for calculating expected total returns for all different bond sectors, only using assumptions for the number of Fed rate hikes during the next 12 months and the expected change in spreads.1 Our results showed an expected total return of 2.9% for conventional 30-year MBS in a scenario where the Fed lifts rates by 100 bps and where spreads remain flat. The same scenario corresponds to 3.4% total return for the investment grade corporate index. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 33 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -40 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 158 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -242 bps. Foreign Agencies underperformed by 37 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -56 bps. Local Authorities underperformed by 22 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +37 bps. Supranationals underperformed by 2 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +2 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 7 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +7 bps. Global growth divergences and a stronger U.S. dollar weighed on Sovereign bond returns in May (Chart 5). While value in the sector improved somewhat as a result, it remains expensive relative to investment grade corporate credit (panel 2). With dollar strength likely to persist in the near-term, we remain underweight Sovereign bonds. Conversely, we reiterate our overweight recommendations on Foreign Agency and Local Authority bonds. Those sectors still offer compelling valuations and are less sensitive to a strong U.S. dollar than the lower-rated Sovereign sector. Supranationals and Domestic Agency bonds are low risk but do not offer sufficient spread to warrant much attention. Better low-risk spread product opportunities are available in the Agency CMBS and Consumer ABS sectors. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +110 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal/Treasury yield ratio declined 2% on the month and, at 86%, it is very close to its post-crisis low (Chart 6). It remains somewhat elevated compared to the average level of 81% that was observed in the late stages of the previous cycle, between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Technically, yield ratios have been supported by robust fund flows and subdued issuance (panels 2 & 3), while fundamentally our Municipal Health Monitor suggests that ratings upgrades will continue to outpace downgrades for the time being (not shown). The message from our Health Monitor is confirmed by the trend in state & local government net borrowing (bottom panel). First quarter data, released last week, showed a sizeable drop in net borrowing as state & local governments managed to grow revenues by $46 billion while growing expenditures by only $25 billion. This is consistent with governments working hard to repair their budgets, raising taxes and slowing spending growth, as we showed in a recent report.2 Given tight municipal valuations, we continue to see better opportunities in the corporate bond space than in municipal bonds. But we will look to upgrade munis at the expense of corporates as we approach the end of the credit cycle. Hopefully, from a more attractive entry point. Treasury Curve: Favor 7-Year Bullet Over 1/20 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-flattened in May. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 3 bps to end the month at 43 bps. The 5/30 slope held steady at 32 bps. The short-end of the Treasury curve is still not adequately priced for the Fed's likely pace of one 25 basis point rate hike per quarter. Such a pace translates to a level of 100 bps on our 12-month discounter, which currently sits at only 73 bps (Chart 7). Similarly, the long-end of the Treasury curve is not adequately priced for the likely trend in inflation. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is at only 2.09%, below the range of 2.3% to 2.5% that is consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations. We anticipate that higher TIPS breakevens at the long end of the curve will be roughly offset by loftier rate expectations at the short end of the curve, leaving the slope of the Treasury curve close to current levels during the next few months. In a recent report we introduced a framework for identifying the most attractively valued butterfly trades across the entire yield curve.3 The results, shown in Table 4, identify the 7-year bullet over the 1-year/20-year barbell as the most attractively valued butterfly trade that is geared toward curve steepening. According to our model, that trade is priced for 56 bps of 1/20 flattening during the next six months (panel 4). That seems excessive given the low level of long-maturity TIPS breakevens. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation (As Of June 4, 2018) TIPS: Overweight Chart 8Inflation Compensation TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 65 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +95 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 10 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.09%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 13 bps and currently sits at 2.12%. As we explained in a recent report, we view the first stage of the bond bear market as being driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations.4 We will consider inflation expectations well anchored when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are in a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, where they were the last time that inflation was well anchored around the Fed's target. Recent trends show that inflation is steadily making progress toward the Fed's 2% goal. The 12-month rate of change in the core PCE deflator is back up to 1.8%, from 1.5% in February. However, the core PCE deflator has only increased by 0.15% in each of the past two months. Consistent monthly prints above 0.165% are required to reach the Fed's 2% target (Chart 8). We expect tight labor markets and strong pipeline pressures (panel 3) to drive inflation higher in the months ahead. Although, as we discussed last week, the risk of a significant overshoot of the Fed's inflation target during the next 6-12 months is low.5 ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -3 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 1 bp on the month and now stands at 41 bps, 7 bps above its pre-crisis low. While consumer ABS offer reasonably attractive expected returns relative to other low-risk spread product (Agency CMBS, Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals), credit risk is slowly starting to build in the sector. The New York Fed's Household Debt and Credit report showed that the 90+ day credit card delinquency rate rose above 8% in Q1 for the first time since 2015. Meanwhile, the overall consumer credit delinquency rate continues to increase alongside a rising debt service ratio (Chart 9). On the supply side, banks reported tightening credit card lending standards for the fourth consecutive quarter in Q1, while auto loan lending standards were tightened for the eighth consecutive quarter. Periods of tightening lending standards tend to coincide with rising delinquencies and wider spreads (bottom panel). In a recent report we forecasted 12-month total returns for each U.S. fixed income sector using inputs only for the path of spreads and the number of Fed rate hikes during the next year. In a scenario where spreads remain flat and the Fed lifts rates four times next year, we would expect Aaa-rated credit card ABS to return 2.3% and Aaa-rated auto loan ABS to return 2.4%.6 Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 1 basis point in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +71 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 70 bps, close to one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean. Banks eased lending standard on nonfarm nonresidential loans in Q1 for the first time since 2015, and continued easing could signal lower delinquencies in the future (Chart 10). Easier lending standards could also support commercial real estate prices, which have decelerated recently and currently pose a risk for spreads (panel 3). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 1 basis point in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 48 bps. In a recent report we forecasted 12-month total returns for each U.S. fixed income sector using inputs only for the path of spreads and the number of Fed rate hikes during the next year. In a scenario where spreads remain flat and the Fed lifts rates four times next year, we would expect non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS to return 2.8% and Agency CMBS to return 2.6%.7 Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.54%. The drop in the model's fair value compared to last month stems from a decline in the global PMI from 53.5 to 53.1, and a rise in dollar bullish sentiment from 60% to 67%. While global growth has undoubtedly lost momentum in recent months, we also suspect that our 2-factor model is finally breaking down. The 2-factor model does not contain a variable to capture the degree of resource utilization in the economy. As resource slack dissipates, inflationary pressures mount and the same pace of global growth should be associated with a higher Treasury yield. This means that as we approach the end of the cycle, the 2-factor model will start producing fair value readings that are consistently too low. We can attempt to correct for this by incorporating a measure of resource slack into our model, in this case the employment-to-population ratio. A model for the 10-year Treasury yield based on the employment-to-population ratio and the Global PMI produces a fair value of 3.29% (Chart 11). As we move further toward the end of the cycle, and away from the zero-lower bound on the fed funds rate, we expect the regression coefficients shown in the bottom three panels will revert to their pre-crisis levels and Treasury fair value will revert closer to the one shown in the second panel. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Pulling Back And Looking Ahead", dated May 22, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Profiting From A Higher LIBOR", dated March 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "A Signal From Gold?", dated May 1, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Breaking Points", dated May 29, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Pulling Back and Looking Ahead", dated May 22, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Pulling Back and Looking Ahead", dated May 22, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of May 31, 2018. No significant changes in the model's allocation this month, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 111 bps in May, largely driven by Level 2 model which underperformed by 300 bps. The model's largest overweight, Italy, turned out to be the worst performer in May as a result of Italian politics, an event that is difficult for a quantitative model to capture. Level 1 model outperformed by only 7 bps in May. Consequently, since going live, the outperformance of the Level 2 model, which allocates funds among 11 non-U.S. countries, has reduced to 52 bps, while the overall model has performed in line with the MSCI World benchmark. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing The Developed Markets Country Allocation Model," dated January 29, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of May 31, 2018. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The largest shift was a move from underweight to overweight in the materials sector, driven by improving momentum. On the other hand, the overweight in energy was reduced by 1.7 percentage points. The aggregate model now has a small overweight on cyclicals versus defensives, although this is entirely in commodity-related cyclicals. The only other overweight sector is utilities, which saw a small decrease in its weight in the model. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," dated July 27, 2016, available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy A virtuous software capex upcycle will continue to bolster industry sales/profits in the coming months. We reiterate our high-conviction overweight recommendation on the S&P software index. Depressed relative valuations signal that the weak airline profit margin backdrop is baked in the cake. Rising load factors and the possibility of an easing in jet fuel prices compel us to put this transportation sub-index on our upgrade watch list. Recent Changes Put the S&P Airlines Index on upgrade alert. Table 1 Feature Stocks took it on the chin early last week as geopolitical risks resurfaced in a big way, but managed to bounce smartly and end the week on a high note. Not only did Trump slap new tariffs reigniting trade war fears, but Italian political instability rocked global bond and stock markets. While this mini 'risk-off' phase has rattled investors, the key question hanging over markets is: will the current global growth soft patch prove transitory or morph into a severe global growth deceleration? We side with the former. While it is too early to call the end of the global growth lull, there are high odds that the U.S. will lift the world out of its year-to-date mini-slump in the back half of the year. The third panel of Chart 1 shows that the IHS Markit U.S. manufacturing PMI has been steeply diverging from the J.P. Morgan-calculated global manufacturing PMI. The latter has ticked up recently, and given recent U.S. economic greenshoots and America's heavy weighting in global output, it should pull global growth higher. Chart 1Too Soon To Bail Chart 2Monitor The Greenback's Impact On Profits Importantly, this leading U.S. economic growth indicator is also signaling that SPX momentum will resume its ascent in the coming months, a message corroborated by the latest ISM manufacturing survey print (second panel, Chart 1). What could push our still constructive cyclical 9-12 month equity view offside is a surge in the U.S. dollar. The greenback's trough coincided with last year's peak in global growth (bottom panel Chart 1), and further dollar appreciation - resulting from either stress in emerging markets or a further flare-up of Eurozone breakup risk - would necessitate downward revisions to calendar 2019 sell-side earnings forecasts (Chart 2). We are closely monitoring Eurozone geopolitical risks, and are also awaiting the ECB's response. If persistent turmoil causes the ECB to stay easier for longer than the market expects, then the euro will come under downward pressure against the dollar, especially if the Fed continues to hike as we expect. Last week alone BCA's months-to-hike gauge for the ECB jumped by five months, implying the first hike moved to mid-year 2020 (second panel, Chart 3). We recently showed the U.S. tech sector's hefty foreign sales exposure of roughly 60% of total revenues, greater than for any other GICS1 sector by a wide margin (please refer to Chart 8 from the April 9, 2018 Weekly Report titled "Buying Opportunity?"). As such the technology sector's profits serve as a great leading indicator of any U.S. dollar appreciation related blues. Up to now, tech net EPS revisions have not been sniffing out any currency related earnings trouble that could infiltrate overall SPX EPS (U.S. trade-weighted dollar shown inverted, third panel, Chart 4). Similarly, relative tech sector stock momentum and our tech sector EPS growth model are not waving any yellow flags (Chart 4). Chart 3Steadfast ##br##SPX Chart 4Tech Stocks Will Be The First To Sniff ##br##Out U.S. Dollar Profit Woes Netting it all out, there are high odds that the U.S. will lead global growth higher in the coming quarters and result in a recoupling higher of global growth, assuming the greenback stops appreciating. This would support low double digit calendar 2019 SPX profit growth. Under such a macro backdrop, it still pays to maintain a cyclicals over defensives portfolio bent. This week we are revisiting one tech sector high-conviction overweight and putting a transport sub-index on upgrade watch. Stick With Software Stocks The S&P software index is on the cusp of breaching the 2000 relative performance all-time peak, and we reiterate the high-conviction overweight status of this key tech sub-index, that is up over 11% versus the SPX since the late-November inception.1 Although this may appear exuberant, from a longer-term perspective, relative share prices only recently reclaimed the upward sloping historical time trend mean (top panel, Chart 5). The implication is that more gains are in store prior to the end of the business cycle. BCA's synchronized global capex upcycle theme is the fundamental driver of our sanguine software industry view. In the aftermath of the dotcom bust, tech investment in general and software in particular, went into hibernation for a whole decade. Currently, software investment is outpacing overall capital outlays (middle panel, Chart 5). These software capex market share gains on the back of a growing overall capex pie bode well for relative profit growth. Animal spirits remain upbeat with both consumer and most importantly CEO confidence probing multi-year highs. Tack on the still buoyant message from our capex indicator and software spending has more room to grow (second & third panels, Chart 6). In addition, the government sector may also increase spending on IT/software services on the back of easing fiscal policy and beefing up on cybersecurity (Chart 7). Chart 5Buy The Breakout Chart 6Even Uncle Sam Is Buying Software Chart 7Margin Expansion Phase Has Legs While our S&P software EPS growth model corroborates this encouraging news (bottom panel, Chart 5), sell side analysts do not share our optimism. In fact, software profits are forecast to trail the broad market by 500bps, a rather low hurdle. On the operating front, sales are accelerating at a time when labor costs remain contained. Importantly, software prices are on the verge of exiting deflation, underscoring that software demand is robust. Moreover, the secular advance in cloud computing and SaaS represent a long-term positive demand backdrop. The upshot is that the mini margin expansion phase in place since early-2016 has more legs (Chart 7). Meanwhile, the S&P software index has a pristine balance sheet with virtually no net debt, a high interest coverage ratio and galloping higher free cash flow (Chart 8). Unsurprisingly, this cash rich tech subsector has also been in the middle of an M&A frenzy. This supply reduction is not only bullish for industry pricing power, and thus profit growth, but it has also led to hefty M&A premia and a significant valuation rerating (bottom panel, Chart 9). Chart 8Pristine Balance Sheet Chart 9Software Will Grow Into Pricey Valuations If our virtuous capex upcycle thesis further bolsters software sales/profits in the coming months, then more gains are in store for the S&P software index that will likely grow into its pricey valuations. Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight status in the S&P software index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT - MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, ATVI, INTU, EA, RHT, ADSK, CTXS, ANSS, SNPS, SYMC, TTWO, CDNS, CA. Could Jet Fuel Be The Tailwind Airlines Need? It is a well-established rule that where jet fuel prices go, airline stock prices will go the opposite direction. Thus it is no surprise that the most recent peak in the S&P airlines index coincided with the most recent trough in jet fuel prices in early 2017; the former has since fallen steeply as the latter has soared (top panel, Chart 10). This relationship has grown more acute as the industry, having been burned when fuel prices collapsed in 2014, has all but abandoned fuel hedging. The timing for rising jet fuel prices could scarcely be less opportune; historically, airlines have been able to pass through rising fuel costs. Now, in the midst of an industry price war, pricing power and fuel costs are diverging (second panel, Chart 10). The impact is apparent on industry margins, which have been in decline for nearly two years and more pain likely lies ahead (second panel, Chart 11). The head of airline industry group International Air Transport Association (IATA), recently noted that rising oil prices would significantly bite into airline profitability next year; IATA is widely expected to lower its industry benchmark profit forecast this week. Chart 10Mind The Gap Chart 11Acute Margin Trouble... The source of industry conflict has been an uptick in capacity growth. Airlines are adding capacity faster than the economy is growing (third and fourth panels, Chart 11) and the only relief valve to preserve market share is to cut prices. In this context, it is difficult to understand analysts' 20%+ EPS growth forecast for next year, significantly outpacing the S&P 500 (bottom panel, Chart 11). However, the news is not all bad. Despite the competitive headwinds, the industry has been successful at moving unit revenues higher and airlines have been doing so at an aggressive pace in 2018 (second panel, Chart 12). Further, industry load factors (in essence, the percentage of filled seats) are near their highest level ever, indicating capacity growth is being met with lower price-induced demand growth (bottom panel, Chart 12). Rising load factors are typically a precursor to price (and profit) increases. Investors appear to have capitulated. Airlines trade at roughly half the market multiple on an EV/EBITDA basis and a substantial discount on a price/book basis (second & third panels, Chart 13). From a valuation perspective, airlines look set to take off. Chart 12...But Demand is Firming... Chart 13...And Most Bad News Is Likely Priced In Easing oil prices are a likely catalyst for a significant rerating in depressed relative valuations. Fuel hedges no longer play a significant role in earnings and lower fuel costs would translate directly to the bottom line. As a reminder, nearly all major players reiterated their pledge to avoid kerosene hedging earlier this year. Adding it up, we think downside risks to airlines have abated considerably and are well reflected in beaten down valuations. We are therefore compelled to add this transportation sub-index to our upgrade watch list. If there is any letup in jet fuel prices, we would not hesitate to crystallize relative profits north of 21% since our underweight inception. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P airlines index for now, but put in on upgrade alert. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, AAL, UAL, ALK. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Recommended Allocation A Series Of Unfortunate Events Markets have taken a series of hits in recent months - sharp drops in emerging market currencies, a political crisis in Italy, and the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China - not to mention a slowdown in cyclical growth. But risk assets have been remarkably resilient: the U.S. stock market is in the middle of its year-to-date range, and U.S. small cap stocks (more attuned to domestic conditions) are at record highs (Chart 1). The uncertainty is set to continue for a while. But, with global growth likely to settle at an above-trend pace, fiscal and monetary policy still accommodative, and earnings continuing to grow strongly, the recent resilience says to us that risk assets are likely to grind higher and to outperform bonds over the next 12 months. A major underlying cause of the recent volatility has been the growing disparity between growth in the U.S. and in the rest of the world (Chart 2). This is partly due to the strength of the euro and yen last year, which is now dampening activity in these regions, but the slowdown in Chinese industrial growth and a higher oil price may also be having a disproportionate effect on growth outside the U.S. This growth disparity has widened interest rate differentials, which have again become the major driver of currencies, pushing up the U.S. dollar (Chart 3). Chart 1Small Cap Stocks At A Record High Chart 2Disparity Between The U.S. And The Rest... Chart 3...Means Dollar Has Further To Rise In combination with rising U.S. interest rates (the 10-year Treasury yield rose above 3% last month, before correcting a little), dollar appreciation is a threat for emerging markets. EM assets have long shown a consistently strong inverse correlation with the dollar (Chart 4). We expect the EM sell-off to continue. Further Fed hikes and rising inflation expectations in the U.S. (relative to the euro area and Japan) will increase interest-rate differentials and push the dollar up further: we forecast 1.12 for euro/dollar. Investors are still far from capitulating on EM assets after several years of large purchases (Chart 5). Many EM central banks are being forced to raise rates to defend their currencies, which will dent growth. Some may even be forced into reintroducing capital controls. Several emerging economies besides Argentina and Turkey remain vulnerable, having worryingly high amounts of foreign currency debt (Chart 6). Chart 4Strong Dollar Is Bad For Em Assets Chart 5Em Is Still A Consensus Favorite Chart 6Worrying Levels Of FX Debt Chart 7Not Surprising That Italians Are Fed Up Geopolitics is likely to remain a drag on markets for a while, too. Italy remains the biggest threat. The discontent of the Italian population is unsurprising given the country's stagnation since it joined the euro (Chart 7). The probable coalition government of the Lega and Five Star Movement would introduce aggressive fiscal stimulus, putting it in confrontation with the EU's budgetary rules. But BCA's geopolitical strategists see little risk of Italy exiting the euro in the next two years (though 10 years might be a different story).1 Political gyrations may continue for some months, particularly if the new government persists with its plan to blow the fiscal deficit out to 7% of GDP, but the sell-off in short-term Italian bonds looks to be overdone. Developments in trade tariffs, Iran and North Korea could also weigh on markets in coming months. But ultimately economic fundamentals almost always outweigh geopolitical risk. Global growth is slowing, but to an above-trend pace. Fiscal policy is particularly stimulative this year, with 17 of the 33 OECD countries undertaking large fiscal easing, and a further 11 some easing. The overall cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance in OECD countries is forecast to ease by 0.5% of GDP this year and 0.4% next (Chart 8). Monetary policy remains accommodative almost everywhere. The FOMC, in its May statement, by adding the word "symmetric" to describe its 2% inflation objective, was clearly emphasizing that it sees no need to accelerate the pace of rate hikes, despite the recent pickup in core PCE inflation. We expect the Fed to continue to raise rates once a quarter, meaning that monetary policy will not become restrictive until around Q1 next year. With inflation expectations not yet fully normalized (Chart 9), the Fed could still exercise its "put option" by holding for a quarter or two if global risk were to rise significantly. Italy's problems also make it more likely that the ECB will stay easier for longer, and the probability is rising of its deciding to extend asset purchases into next year. Chart 8Fiscal Stimulus (Almost) Everywhere Chart 9Inflation Expectations Have Further To Rise With the consensus already forecasting global GDP to grow 3.4% this year, and U.S. earnings by 22%, there is no obvious catalyst for risk assets to rebound sharply (Chart 10). However, we find it inconceivable that equity markets will not be higher in 12 months' time - and will not have outperformed bonds over that time - if the macro environment plays out as we expect. We, therefore, continue to recommend an overweight on equities and underweight on fixed income, but might start to turn more defensive around the end of the year if the signs are in place that the recession we expect in 2020 is still on the cards. Equities: For the reasons described above, we remain cautious on EM equities. Within EM, our preference would be for markets such as China, Korea and India, which are likely to be less affected by investors' concerns about current account deficits and foreign-currency denominated debt. In DM, our preference remains for late-cyclical sectors, especially energy, financials and industrials. We mainly view regional and country selection as a derivative of the sector call: this supports our preference for euro zone and Japanese stocks over those in the U.S. and U.K. Fixed Income: A combination of quarterly Fed rate hikes, a further normalization of inflation expectations, and moderate rises in the real rate and term premium are likely to push the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield up to 3.5% by year-end (Chart 11). We, therefore, remain underweight duration and prefer TIPs to nominal bonds. We keep our overweights on spread product within the fixed-income bucket, since it should continue to outperform for another couple of quarters. U.S. high-yield spreads are likely to remain steady, giving an attractive carry even after accounting for defaults; investment grade spreads might start to recover, given that the sell-off of quality bonds by companies repatriating short-term investments held offshore ($35 Bn from the 20 largest U.S. companies in Q1) is now mostly over (Chart 12). Chart 10Can Growth Beat These Expectations? Chart 11Treasury Yield To Rise To 3.5% Chart 12Selective Spread Product Remains Attractive Currencies: Interest-rate differentials, as described above, are likely to push the dollar up further, especially against the euro. This should continue until the effect of a strong dollar/weak euro starts to rebalance growth surprises back to the euro area, perhaps around the end of the year. We see less chance of dollar appreciation against the yen (which is still undervalued against its PPP value of 98, and may benefit from its safe-haven status) and against the Canadian dollar (given the Bank of Canada's hawkish stance). Commodities: Industrial commodities are likely to continue to struggle against headwinds from the appreciating dollar, and the continuing moderate slowdown in China (Chart 13). The oil price has become a tougher call recently, with talk that OPEC may agree later this month to bring back as much as 1 million barrels/day in production, but Venezuelan and Iranian supply likely to exit the market. BCA's energy strategists now forecast WTI and Brent to average $70 and $78 in 2H18, and $67/$72 in 2019, but expect higher volatility in the price over coming months (Chart 14).2 Chart 13Continuing Signs Of China Slowdown Chart 14Forecasting Oil Is Getting Harder Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Italy, Spain, Trade Wars... Oh My!," dated 30 May 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Guiding To Higher Output: Volatility Set To Rise ... Again," dated 31 May 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation