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Highlights Near record high levels for stocks are not an impediment to gains in the stock-to-bond ratio in the next 12 months. Minutes from June's FOMC meeting confirmed that policymakers agree that monetary policy should continue to normalize in the coming quarters. None of the main indicators that have provided some leading information in the past are warning of an equity bear market. Solid ISM and industrial production readings herald bullish profit growth in the second half the year. Treasury yields are headed higher in 2017, supporting our stocks over bond view. Within the U.S. bond market, we prefer short over long duration and investment-grade and high-yield bonds over high-quality debt; MBS will be hurt more than Treasuries as the Fed pares its balance sheet. Feature U.S. stocks will continue to reach all-time highs if inflation remains low, the economic backdrop fosters EPS growth and the Fed only gradually raises rates. We expect these conditions to stay in place in the second half of 2017 and into 2018, allowing stocks to outrun bonds. We note below that neither valuations nor technicals are flashing a red warning sign. Chart 1 shows that most of the time, even when equities are at record highs, valuations are above average (but not extreme) and the Fed is slowly removing accommodation, stocks can still rise. Moreover, none of the indicators that provided leading information in the past now warn of an equity bear market. Chart 1Macro Conditions Favorable For More Gains In Equities Chart 2Labor Market Strong But Wages Still Stagnant The June jobs report suggests that the environment of solid economic growth and still muted wage pressures remains in place, a positive backdrop for equity markets. The report showed that the economy added 222,000 jobs in June, well above the consensus forecast of 178,000. Prior months were also revised higher by 47,000 pushing the 3-month moving average up to 180,000 jobs per month. This is right in line with the 187,000 jobs per month averaged in 2016. Despite robust payroll gains, the unemployment rate actually ticked higher in June, from 4.3% to 4.4%, as previously sidelined workers were drawn back into the labor force. Meanwhile, wage growth continues to underwhelm, rising only 0.2% in June with the year-over-year growth rate holding steady at 2.5%. The deceleration in the 3 month change in average hourly earnings from 2.7% in December 2016 to 1.9% in June challenges the Fed's view on inflation (Chart 2). The recent moderation in wage growth is not yet severe enough to prevent the Fed from delivering one more rate hike before year-end. However, if the labor force participation rate continues to increase, and especially if this increase occurs alongside a rising unemployment rate, then the Fed's forecast of gradually accelerating wages will come into question. Fed Minutes: No Change To Our Base Case Minutes from June's FOMC meeting show that the debate among policymakers over monetary policy centers on the timing and pace of normalization in the coming quarters. The minutes did not provide any new insight about the Fed's plans to shrink its balance sheet. This will be done using caps on the monthly amount of principal repayments from the Fed's security holdings that will not be rolled over. These caps will rise over time on a pre-set path. The FOMC is still debating the timing of the start of this process. The FOMC was reasonably pleased with the tone of recent economic data, which support the view that GDP has bounced back from a soft patch in the first quarter. The June manufacturing and services ISM surveys, released since the FOMC meeting, undoubtedly reinforced policymakers' confidence in the underlying growth trajectory (see below for more details). The FOMC participants discussed at length the recent pullback in core measures of consumer price inflation. Most policymakers are willing for the time being to believe that inflation is driven primarily by temporary one-off factors. Others are worried that it will be more enduring. The moderation in three-month rates of change of prices this year was widespread across sectors of the CPI (i.e. it is not merely the result of one-offs). Inflation according to the Fed's favored measure, the core PCE price index, has also moderated this year although the disinflation has not been as broadly based as in the CPI (Chart 3). Much of the FOMC's debate focused on the relationship between labor market tightness and inflation. The doves want to see inflation rise closer to the 2% target before tightening even more. The hawks worry that the relationship could be non-linear, which means that a further undershoot of unemployment below estimates of full employment could suddenly generate a surge in inflation. At a minimum, an undershoot could boost risks to financial stability by promoting excess risk-taking in the financial markets. The minutes reveal that the worries about the impact of easing financial conditions on financial stability have intensified since the start of the year. Inflation forecasting has been particularly tricky since the Great Recession for both the Fed and other economic prognosticators. Admittedly, it is difficult to explain the sudden and broadly-based inflation deceleration, even in sectors that have nothing to do with oil prices, shifts in the currency or wage growth. That said, the model shown in the top panel of Chart 4 suggests that core CPI inflation will edge higher in the coming months. This reflects the acceleration in ECI wage growth (feeding into higher core services inflation) and in core goods inflation (reflecting rising import prices), which more than offset the slight moderation in our projection for shelter inflation. Chart 3Inflation Readings Must##BR##Improve In Next Few Months Chart 4Core CPI Should Edge Higher##BR##In Coming Months Bottom Line: The minutes did not change our base case outlook; the FOMC will announce in September that it will begin to shrink the Fed's balance sheet shortly thereafter. The next rate hike will occur in December. Nonetheless, this forecast hangs importantly on the assumption that core inflation edges higher in the coming months. We think it will, but uncertainty is high. Monitoring The Bear Market Barometer The FOMC's seeming determination to stick with the current tightening timetable raises question marks over the equity market, especially given elevated valuations. Chart 5Equity Bear Market Indicators BCA's Chief Economist, Martin Barnes, highlighted the best "equity bear market" indicators to watch in a 2014 Special Report1. He noted that no two bear markets are the same and that there are no indicators that have reliably heralded bear phases. Nonetheless, there are some common elements. The safest time to invest in the market is when monetary conditions are favorable, there are no signs of a looming economic downturn, extreme overvaluation is not present and technical indicators are not flashing red. Some indicators related to each of these fundamental factors are shown in Chart 5: Monetary Conditions: The yield curve is flat by historical standards, but it is far from inverted. Moreover, real short-term interest rates are usually substantially higher than today, and above 2%, when bear markets commence. Excess liquidity, which we define as M2 growth less nominal GDP growth, is also well above the zero line, a threshold that in the past has warned of a downturn in stock prices. Valuation: Our composite valuation indicator is still shy of the +1 standard deviation level that defines over-valued. However, this is due to the components that compare equity prices to bond yields. The other three components of the equity indicator, which are unrelated to bond yields, suggest that stock valuation is stretched. Economic Outlook: Economic data, such as the leading economic indicator and ISM, have been unreliable bear market signals. We do not see anything that indicates that a recession is on the horizon. U.S. growth will remain above-trend in the second half of the year based on its relationship with financial conditions. Technical Conditions: Sentiment is elevated, which is bearish from a contrary perspective. However, breadth, the deviation from the 40- week moving average and our composite technical indicator, all are not flashing red. Earnings: Trends in earnings and margins did not provide any additional reliable signals for timing equity market downturns in the past. Still, it is a bad sign when EPS growth tops out. This is often preceded by a peak in industrial production growth. We expect EPS growth to continue to accelerate for at least a few more months, but we are closely watching industrial production. Bottom Line: The equity market is vulnerable to unforeseen shocks given stretched valuation. Nonetheless, none of the indicators that have provided leading information in the past warn of an equity bear market. ISM Above 50 Supports 2H Profit Outlook The elevated level of ISM sets the stage for EPS growth to gather speed in the second half of 2017. Industrial production is a good proxy for sales of S&P 500 companies (Chart 6). A rollover in the 12-month change in IP would challenge our view. However, strong readings on the ISM, which tracks IP, suggest that IP should accelerate in the next six months (Chart 6, panel 1). Chart 6Solid Backdrop For Earnings And Sales At 57.8 in June, the ISM has rebounded from the recent low of 47.9 in 2015. Investors wonder if it will roll over again or simply fluctuate at a high level. The leading components of ISM, including the new orders index and the new orders-to-inventory ratio, indicate that the ISM will remain above 50 in the months ahead (Chart 7). Moreover, the new export orders component of the ISM has also surged. The implication is that foreign demand (rather than domestic consumer or business spending) is leading the U.S. manufacturing sector. In fact, the 3- and 12-month change in the industrial production indices in advanced economies outside the U.S. have outpaced domestic growth (Chart 8). Chart 7IP Poised To Accelerate Chart 8U.S. IP Lagging Other Developed Markets Bottom Line: Firm readings on ISM are an indication that our bullish profit story for 2017 remains intact. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds. Inflection Point The increase in Treasury yields since late June indicates that growth expectations had become overly pessimistic. Our assessment is that U.S. growth will remain above trend for the rest of 2017. The implication for investors is that Treasury bond yields will move higher, the yield curve will bear-steepen, and that credit will outperform Treasuries in the second half of 2017. Moreover, we expect MBSs to underperform. According to our U.S. Bond Strategy service2, Treasury yields are poised to follow the economic surprise index higher in the coming months. Extreme net long positioning in the futures market supports the view. The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.52%. Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.45% (Chart 9). Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. Small positive excess returns, consistent with carry, remain the most likely scenario for investment- grade credit, where we recommend an overweight. We do not see the potential for much spread tightening from current levels. However, a large spread widening would be equally unlikely given the favorable backdrop of steady growth and muted inflation. We recommend an overweight in the high-yield market. We expect the decline in the 12-month trailing speculative default rate to continue for the rest of the year, aided by a moderation in energy sector defaults (Chart 10, bottom panel). This means that the current compensation offered by junk spreads in excess of expected default losses stands at 221 bps, in line with its historical average (Chart 10, panel 3). In last week's Weekly Report3 our U.S. Bond Strategy team showed that a default-adjusted spread of 221 bps is consistent with excess returns close to 150 bps during the next 12 months. Chart 9Treasury Fair Value Models Chart 10High-Yield Market Overview Our Energy Sector Strategy team stated in a Weekly Report4 last week that our base case of $50-$60/bbl WTI crude oil prices by the end of 2017 should keep high-yield energy spreads contained. We remain underweight MBSs. Nominal MBS spreads are already very tight compared with previous levels, and they appear even tighter relative to trends in net issuance. While refinancing activity will remain depressed, we see potential for option-adjusted spreads to follow net issuance higher, even as the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) remains low. The Fed's exit from the MBS market, which could occur as early as September, represents an additional upside risk for spreads. Bottom Line: Rates have bounced up after undershooting between March and the end of June. Loftier inflation readings are needed to sustain the bounce. Higher rates in the rest of 2017 support our stocks-over-bond stance. Within the U.S. bond market, we favor short duration over long, and credit over high-quality. MBSs will be hurt more than Treasurys as the Fed begins to shrink its balance sheet. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report "Timing The Next Equity Bear Market, " dated January 24, 2014, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Inflection Point", dated July 5, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "HY Debt Update: Offshore Drilling & Transportation Getting Left Behind", dated July 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights EM equity breadth has moved into negative territory, DM-based excess liquidity measures are set to roll-over, and China-based liquidity measures are also weak. Individually, each of these factors are not enough to raise alarm bells, but together they point to a period of heightened risks for EM assets and commodity currencies. AUD/CAD and NZD/JPY are set to suffer in this environment. EUR/USD will rise to 1.15-1.16, but unlike in 2015, it should not receive much of a fillip from EM volatility. Feature Chart I-1Technical Risk In EM An interesting development has unfolded in emerging markets. While the pause in the EM rally has hit investors' radar screens, the more puzzling event concerns breadth. Not only has the advanced/decline line rolled over, but more worrisomely, it has recently moved into negative territory. Historically, when more stocks are declining rather than advancing, EM equities tend to experience sharp selloffs (Chart I-1). This development is important when put into a global context. EM stocks and related assets like commodity currencies have been buoyed by plentiful global liquidity conditions. However, global liquidity is set to deteriorate. A rocky second half may emerge in EM assets. Global Liquidity Is Slowing Following in the Federal Reserve's footsteps, DM central banks are moving away from monetary accommodation. Last week, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi made a speech that was interpreted as representing an abandonment of the ECB's dovish bias. With the anticipation that its bond-buying program will be tapered early in 2018 and reports that the ECB is having problems buying its quota of German and Finnish bonds, global bonds suffered, with Bund and T-Note yields moving up 33 and 23 basis points since June 27, respectively. The ECB is not the only central bank to have changed its tack. The Bank of Canada's communications have been crystal clear that it intends to increase rates this summer, or early fall at the latest. Even the perennially dovish Riksbank is moving away from its easy bias, as Sweden's resource utilization points to a continued acceleration in core inflation. But does this even matter? The global economy is strong, and beginning to remove accommodation is not quite the same thing as pushing rates into tight territory. The advanced economies are unlikely to suffer much from this development. However, the picture for EM is more concerning. Some key leading indicators of EM activity have already begun to roll over. For example, Taiwanese IP, a key bellwether of overall EM strength, is now contracting on a year-on-year basis (Chart I-2, top panel). Meanwhile EM PMIs rolled over three months ago and EM narrow money growth, a key forecaster of EM profits, is slowing sharply (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Despite these negative developments, EM stocks have remained resilient. The factor underpinning this impressive performance has been the rise in global liquidity. More technically, the rise in the global Marshallian K - the ratio of money to nominal GDP - over the past six months. Excess money has had to go somewhere. Among the many refuges, EM has been a key pole of attraction, with massive inflows supporting assets prices. The 8% appreciation in EM currencies versus the dollar since their January 2016 trough has been a vivid illustration of this phenomenon. The driver of the rise in excess money has been the ratio's numerator, dollar-based liquidity. The Fed's various QE programs were key determinants of dollar-based liquidity (Chart I-3). However, its tapering in late 2014 was enough to prompt a contraction of the measure. Now that the Fed is intent on decreasing its balance sheet while the ECB tapers and other smaller DM central banks begin increasing rates, the small improvement witnessed in the past three months is likely to end. The recent weakness in gold prices, despite the softness in the dollar, could be a sign that markets are beginning to sniff out the imminent tightening of global liquidity conditions. Chart I-2EM/China Profits Growth To Roll Over (I) EM Growth ##br##Has Deteriorated, Profits Will Suffer Chart I-3The Fed Balance Sheet Runoff ##br##Will Hurt Global Liquidity Additionally, not only are global central banks, led by the Fed, tightening or looking to tighten policy, they are doing so despite an absence of actual inflation. As a result, this means DM real yields are set to rise. As Chart I-4 illustrates, rising real DM yields have historically been a harbinger of poor EM bond performance. In fact, the action in DM real yields since mid-2016 already points to a problematic second half for EM bonds. As a result, EM bond investors are likely to suffer some losses in the coming months. Such losses would not only tighten EM financial conditions, but would also be symptomatic of capital leaving the region. Less money in those markets simply means less liquidity. With EM corporate spreads near historical lows, a repricing of credit risk on the back of softening global and EM liquidity is likely to prompt both a selloff in EM stocks and in EM currencies (Chart I-5). As a result, DM commodity currencies, the NZD and AUD in particular, could suffer. Chart I-4EM Financial Conditions##br## Are Set To Deteriorate Chart I-5If Liquidity Dries, Spreads Widen ##br##And EM Stocks Fall Bottom Line: In November 2016, a new leg of the EM rally began - a move driven by an expansion in global liquidity, even as a key bellwether of EM economic activity rolled over in the interim. Global excess liquidity is set to roll over as DM central banks abandon their dovish biases and the Fed begins to let its balance sheet run off. With EM weaker from a technical perspective, the second half of 2017 could be a tough environment for EM plays. Chinese Liquidity Joins The Fray In May 2015, EM equities in U.S.-dollar terms peaked just before global liquidity began to roll over. Compounding the risks, back then Chinese economic conditions were also problematic. Excess capacity and massive deflationary forces were wearing down on profits and investment. China is thus another key factor to watch. In this optic, beyond DM liquidity, a key driver of the rebound in EM last year was actually Chinese liquidity conditions. In the second half of 2015, China's own Marshallian K - based on M2 relative to nominal GDP growth - was rebounding sharply, as the PBoC was easing policy and the fiscal authorities were pressing on the gas pedal, expanding both public expenditures and pushing credit growth through the economy. However, that was then. Today, China has joined the tightening party. The quarterly moving average of Chinese interbank rates has increased by 100 basis points over the past year. Crackdowns on real estate and excess leverage have also resumed. Most importantly, the issuance of bonds by small and medium banks - a key source of grease to total social financing - has also massively decelerated, which points to a sharp slowdown and even a contraction in the Chinese credit impulse (Chart I-6). Thanks to this development, the Chinese Marshallian K is now in negative territory. The global impact of tighter Chinese monetary conditions is also flashing a red flag. Our indicator is based on the relative performance of Chinese bank stocks and USD/HKD. Underperformance of Chinese banks tends to send warning signs that tightening policy is beginning to negatively affect the outlook for Chinese credit growth. Additionally, USD/HKD is at an 18-month high because Hong Kong interest rates have not been able to follow U.S. ones, as loan demand by mainland-China entities has been poor. Most of the time, this indicator tends to move with EM stock prices, providing very little information. However, as Chart I-7 illustrates, this gauge is at its most useful when it diverges from EM equity prices. In each case, such as in 2007, 2011, and 2014, the divergences between the falling price-based Chinese liquidity indicator and rising EM stock prices was resolved by a correction in the latter. Today, the indicator points to a large amount of downside risk for EM stocks. Chart I-6Chinese Credit Impulse Will Slow Chart I-7A Worrying Divergence Again, it is important to reiterate that in and of itself, such a divergence is not enough to prompt investors to run for the hills and ditch EM stocks and related plays. However, when this happens as DM liquidity is also set to deteriorate, and most crucially, when EM breadth turns negative, decreasing EM exposure makes sense. Bottom Line: Chinese liquidity conditions are also deteriorating. The People's Bank of China may not want to push the economy into another slowdown cycle, which will most likely limit how far the Chinese central bank will tighten policy. However, this tightening has not been priced in by EM equities, and is happening as DM central banks are also reducing accommodation and as EM breadth has greatly deteriorated. A sizeable correction in EM plays is becoming increasingly likely. Investment Implications Chart I-8Global Liquidity Leads EM ##br##By More Than A Year A tightening of dollar-based liquidity and Chinese-based liquidity is a big problem for non-China EM economies. EM economies outside of China and OPEC nations still run an annual current account deficit of more than US$200 billion. They need liquidity. Moreover, they still have at least US$3.6 trillion in foreign-currency debt. With liquidity conditions deteriorating, we should expect a widening of EM spreads, falling EM stock prices and falling commodity currencies. In fact, we are today in the window of maximum risk. Chart I-8 shows the combined G7 and Chinese Marshallian K, standardized. This indicator tends to have long leads over EM equity prices. It turned negative in the summer of 2006, though EM stock prices did not peak until the fourth quarter of 2007. It turned negative again in the early days of 2010, but EM equity prices did not peak until April 2011. The indicator moved below zero in mid-2014, yet EM equities only sold off in the second quarter of 2015. This time around, the combined liquidity indicator became negative in early 2016, suggesting great risks for EM assets and related plays in the second half of 2017. High carry EM currencies like the BRL or the TRY are at risk. The ZAR looks especially poorly positioned as well but the RUB seems better cushioned against these risks. The MXN could suffer too as Mexico has a lot of U.S. dollar-denominated debt. Nonetheless, MXN remains much cheaper than the BRL and could still outperform its Brazilian brethren. The SGD is very sensitive to global liquidity conditions, as Singapore is a key banking center for EM, and could also suffer substantially against the USD. In terms of timing for the G10 currency markets, the deterioration of EM breadth has historically been a dangerous sign for commodity currencies (Chart I-9). This combination of deteriorating liquidity and breadth is often associated with a sharp selloff in NZD/JPY (Chart I-10). Investors should short this cross, and we are re-opening this trade this week. Chart I-9Commodity Currencies##br## Prefer A Fresh Breadth... Chart I-10...So Does ##br##NZD/JPY The dynamics highlighted above also explain why despite our positive stance on Canada and the CAD, we are not willing to chase the selloff in USD/CAD further, and prefer to play the CAD's strength through its crosses. The risk-reward ratio seems better this way, as we are not as negatively exposed to an EM selloff as we would be buying the CAD against the USD. Indeed, a cleaner way to play the BoC's change of tone while gaining exposure to an EM-risk off theme, is to short AUD/CAD, a trade that is already on our book. On the domestic front, this week the Reserve Bank of Australia disappointed markets and did not try to indicate a change in stance away from its dovish bias. Markets have taken notice, with the AUD incapable of rallying against a weak USD, despite very strong trade data yesterday. Meanwhile, the BoC is telegraphing a rate hike in the very near future. Additionally, an abnormal gap has emerged between AUD/CAD and AUD/USD. As Chart I-11 shows, historically, AUD/CAD and AUD/USD have tracked one another. This makes sense. The Australian economy is very levered to Asian growth and liquidity dynamics, while Canada is a crucial link in the North American supply chain. With the U.S. and Canadian business cycles so tightly integrated, the CAD tends to mimic the greenback when compared to non-USD currencies. Chart I-11AUD/CAD Is A Short The points in time when AUD/CAD has been much stronger than the AUD/USD deserve closer attention. They are periods of booms in EM Asia, such as the middle of the 1990s, or 2004 to 2005. Today, AUD/CAD is again out of line with AUD/USD, reflecting the boom in EM assets prices in 2016 and in the first half of 2017. However, if our view is correct that EM is entering a dangerous zone, AUD/CAD should weaken further. Chart I-12When Investors Are Short, ##br##EUR/USD Likes EM Selloffs Last but certainly not least the euro. EUR/USD has much momentum and could continue to rally into the 1.15-1.16 zone. In fact, historically, EM shocks have been able to lift the euro, albeit temporarily. This definitely was the case in 2015 when EM sold off: in April 2015, when EM began to weaken, in August 2015, when a temporary selling climax emerged after the Chinese floated the CNY, and in December 2015, after the Fed hiked. The euro spiked in all three instances. However, investors were very short EUR/USD entering each of these periods, and the ensuing rallies were short-covering rallies (Chart I-12). This time around, investors are very long the euro, suggesting that the euro has not been used as a funding vehicle to the same extent as it was in 2015. Additionally, in all these previous episodes, EUR/USD traded at a small discount to the fair value implied by real rate differentials, today it is trading at a premium. Thus, the same kind of short-covering rally is unlikely. As a result, we do not anticipate EUR/USD to break out of its range on the back of an EM risk-off event. That being said, EUR could outperform GBP in this type of environment. The pound remains very dependent on global liquidity conditions to finance its current account deficit of more than 4% of GDP. With big financial institutions announcing more divesture from the U.K., these hot-money flows could prove even more crucial. As a result, we are removing our call to short EUR/GBP if it moves above 0.88, and expect a move in EUR/GBP toward 0.92-0.93 in the second half of 2017. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The greenback slipped on weak as the ADP employment, the ISM-non manufacturing employment component, and continuing as well as initial jobless claims all underperformed expectations. While the dollar reacted negatively to this news, the Fed's hawkish stance should ultimately help the USD. Supplementing the increases in interest rates, are plans to reverse the multi-year quantitative easing program.The FOMC is also increasingly worried about the "quite high" stock valuations which, could lead to financial instability. U.S. 10-year yields have gone up 4 basis points following the release of the minutes, after the 20 bps spike following initial Fed comments on June 27. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro's strength extends as the union experienced strong services and composite PMI measures this Wednesday. While it is true that the ECB may be looking to draw back its excessively easy monetary policy, Draghi and Praet have highlighted that accommodative policy is still needed as inflationary pressures are not yet entrenched. The euro's recent appreciation and weak producer price numbers could vindicate this view. The euro's strength has also weighed on manufacturing activity, as PMIs underperformed expectations. This is likely to weigh on EUR/USD going forward, especially as European stocks have been underperofming U.S. ones in recent weeks. EUR/SEK can face considerable pressure ahead due to the Riksbank's change in rhetoric. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio - June 21, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: National inflation came in at 0.4%, while Tokyo ex fresh food and energy inflation contracted by 0.2%. Both of these measures underperformed expectations. On the other hand, Japan's job-to-applicant ratio continues to climb, coming in at 1.49, and outperforming expectations. This last data point is key, as it highlights that the Japanese labor market is very tight, and that the stage is set for inflation to come back to Japan. However, as evidenced by the recent disappointments in data, the currency holds the key to unleash inflation in Japan. Thus, not only is a selloff in the yen needed for inflation to remerge, but this selloff would feed on itself, as a falling currency and a tight labor market would raise inflation (and thus lower real rates, as Japanese 10-year rates are anchored at 0), which would push the yen down further. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Markit manufacturing PMI declined from last month's reading and also came in below expectations at 54.3. Construction PMI also declined and came in below expectations at 53.4 However credit had a strong showing as net lending to individuals, consumer credit and mortgage approvals all came in above expectations at 5.3 billion pounds, 1.73 billion pounds and 65 thousand respectively. Various BoE members have stated that rising interest rates might be necessary to keep a lid on the island's high inflation. Although there are still some voices within the BoE who are more cautious, given the uncertainty that Brexit poses, overall the BoE has shown a much more hawkish tone in recent weeks. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The AUD has experienced considerable weakness this week, following a drawback in inflation estimates for June by the TD Securities measure, of 2.3% from 2.8% and a less hawkish than anticipated RBA. While retail sales beat expectations of 0.2% - coming in at 0.6% - the pace of appreciation in the RBA Commodity Index in SDR terms continues to slow Nevertheless, these factors were not the only contributors to the recent AUD weakness. Australia remains highly levered to emerging markets, and the Fed tightening remains a major risk for the AUD. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The annual trade balance underperformed expectations, coming in at a deficit of 3.75 billion U.S. dollars. However the ANZ business confidence index continued climbing, and now stands at the highest level in 8 months Overall the New Zealand economy continues to be one of the best performing in the G10. If one were to be guided merely by domestic factors, the RBNZ should be the next central bank to hike after the Fed. However the picture is slightly more nuanced, as the RBNZ is still worried about foreign developments, particularly EM weakness. This justifies why they continue to state that "monetary policy will remain accommodative for a considerable period". Thus, we continue to be bullish on the NZD against the AUD, while we are shorting it against the JPY, as a mean to benefit from a potential EM dislocation. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 USD/CAD has broken down from a crucial technical level following Poloz's statements about the Canadian economy. He states that the "cuts have done their job". When asked about oil, the reply was reassuring, declaring that the expected level of WTI is at USD 40-50 bbl, which implies that fluctuations within that band should not influence movements the BoC path, helping the CAD in the process. He also suggested that "the adjustment we've been talking about... is largely complete now". While inflation is weak, the BoC governor highlighted that forward looking indicators for inflation should be monitored instead of current inflation. These variables are pointing to stronger growth, and are in line with the bank's expectations of a closing output gap in the first half of 2018. While this may be true, a strengthening CAD will remain a risk for inflation. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: Although real retail sales yearly growth came in negative at -0.3%, it outperformed expectations and was better than last month. Additionally, the SVME PMI came also blew away expectations, increasing from last month's 55.6 reading to 60.1. However Consumer price inflation came in at -0.1%, underperforming expectations. The Swiss economy continues to be haunted by the ghost of deflation. Nonetheless, some economic indicators appear to be ticking up, most likely as a result of the sharp rally in EUR/CHF. We continue to believe that a rally of EUR/CHF beyond 1.1 is unlikely, as most of the good news in the euro area are already priced into the euro. Furthermore, any disappointments, particularly in EM could trigger a selloff in this cross. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 The Labor Force survey, which measures the number of unemployed people as a percentage of the total civilian labor force came in at 4.6%, increased since last month. This measure shows that despite the increase in oil prices the Norwegian labour market continues to be tepid. The Norges Bank agrees with our assessment, as it lowered its projected near term policy rate path. Furthermore, they projected that rates in Norway will not rise until the beginning of 2019. The reasons for this are two fold: first, inflation should continue to remain weak, as the pass through from the collapse in the currency has faded. Additionally, bubbly real estate prices, which were the only factor, which could incite the Norges Bank to become more hawkish, have gone down, following reform in lending standards. Thus, despite its good value, the NOK will continue to underperform amongst commodity currencies. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 It is true that the Riksbank recently hinted towards a more neutral stance, acknowledging "that inflation has recently been slightly higher than expected", which has made it "less likely than before that the Riksbank will cut the repo rate in the near term". However, the Riksbank also highlighted the fact that the bank is "prepared to implement further monetary policy easing if necessary to stabilize inflation". A very nuanced statement referred to the exchange rate, which "is important that [it] does not appreciate too rapidly", further stating that "this could happen if, for example, the Riksbank's monetary policy deviates clearly from that of other countries." This conclusively highlights that the bank is wary of diverging rates lifting undesirably on the krona, which is a limiting factor for substantial krona strength in the near term. However, the change of guard at the helm of this central bank in early 2018 could change all this caution. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The rise in global bond yields has been largely "reflective" of stronger global growth rather than "restrictive." Stay cyclically overweight global equities. The Fed has more scope to raise rates than the ECB. Not only is labor market slack much higher in the euro area, but the neutral rate is considerably lower there too. Financial conditions have eased a lot more in the U.S. than in the euro area, which should support relative U.S. growth in the months ahead. U.S. inflation will bounce back in the second half of 2017, removing a key obstacle to further Fed rate hikes. Short-term momentum is working in the euro's favor, but we expect EUR/USD to fall to 1.05 by the end of the year. We are closing our short January 2018 fed funds futures trade for a gain of 11 basis points and rolling it into the June 2018 contract. Oil prices are heading higher. Go long the Russian ruble. Feature Bond Bulls Turned Into Steak Global bond yields continued to move up this week on the back of rising rate expectations (Chart 1). A brighter growth picture helped drive the bond selloff. The ISM manufacturing index jumped to a three-year high in June. The euro area manufacturing PMI clocked in at 57.4, the strongest level since April 2011. That solid PMI report follows on the heels of a record-high German Ifo reading last week. Central bankers are taking note of the better economic data. The FOMC minutes indicated that downside risks to growth have diminished and that the decline in core inflation is likely to be temporary. In fact, the Fed staff upgraded its inflation forecast from the May meeting to show an earlier return to 2%. On the other side of the Atlantic, the ECB minutes expressed confidence about the domestic growth outlook. The release of the minutes followed an upbeat speech by Mario Draghi in late June in which he noted that all signs point to "a strengthening and broadening recovery in the euro area" and that "the past period of low inflation is ... on the whole temporary." We expect ECB asset purchases to be scaled back at the start of next year. However, a full-fledged tightening cycle still looks to be some way off. Labor market slack in the euro area is 3.2 percentage points higher than it was in 2008 and 6.7 points higher outside of Germany (Chart 2). And even when the ECB does start hiking, it is doubtful that it will be able to raise rates all that much. This is because the neutral rate is extremely low in the euro area. Chart 1Rate Expectations Have Adjusted Higher Chart 2Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany The Importance Of The Neutral Rate Some commentators have alleged that the concept of a neutral rate is of little practical importance. They are wrong. At the start of 2010, 10-year German bund and U.S. Treasury yields stood at 3.4% and 4%, respectively. Much of the rally in bonds since then can be attributed to the slow realization among investors that the equilibrium interest rate in Europe and the U.S. has fallen. Those who understood this point at the outset made a lot of money. Why did the neutral rate decline? Part of the answer has to do with demographics. Slower labor force growth has reduced the incentive for companies to expand capacity. This has weighed on investment spending, leading to lower aggregate demand. Compared to the U.S., the euro area has been more afflicted by deteriorating demographics. For a while, the region was able to make up for the shortfall in population growth by expanding labor participation. But with participation rates in the euro area now higher than in the U.S., that avenue has closed (Chart 3). The end of the debt supercycle also caused the neutral rate to plummet around the world. Here again, Europe was disproportionately affected. Private-sector debt soared across the region in the years leading up to the Great Recession. This was particularly the case in the Mediterranean economies, which benefited from plunging real interest rates and a seemingly insatiable appetite for their debt among banks and foreign investors (Chart 4). When the music stopped, panic ensued. Greece was driven into default. Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Portugal survived by the skin of their teeth. Chart 3Rising Participation Boosted Euro Area Labor Force Growth Chart 4Private Debt Levels Soared In The Run-Up To The Great Recession True, financial stresses have receded since then. But all the spending that rising debt generated has not come back. This is a critical point and one that is often overlooked: If the ratio of private debt-to-GDP simply ends up being flat in the future - rather than rising by an average of 3.9 percentage points per year as it did in the euro area during the 2000s - this will still translate into significantly less demand than what the region was once used to.1 The ECB will need to offset this loss of demand by keeping interest rates lower for longer. Put differently, low rates in the euro area look to be more of a structural phenomenon than a cyclical one. The Shackles Of The Common Currency Chart 5Markets See Only A Small Gap In Neutral Rates Between The U.S. And The Euro Area The now all-too-evident drawbacks of euro area membership only amplify the need to keep rates low. As many European countries have discovered, loosening fiscal policy during a recession is nearly impossible when one loses guaranteed access to a central bank that can serve as a lender of last resort. The inability to devalue one's currency also means that competitive adjustments must occur through weak wage growth or even outright declines in nominal wages. Such outcomes can only occur in the presence of high unemployment. An economy which cannot respond effectively to adverse economic shocks with either fiscal easing or a cheaper currency is one that is likely to experience higher levels of labor market slack over the long haul. This, in turn, implies that interest rates will end up being lower than they would otherwise be. Has the market adequately discounted the fact that the neutral rate is lower in the euro area than in the U.S.? We don't think so. Chart 5 shows market estimates of the neutral real rate based on the difference between 5-year, 5-year forward interest rate index swaps and 5-year, 5-year forward CPI swap rates. The market is currently saying that the neutral rate is 26 basis points higher in the U.S. than in the euro area. We think the true gap is close to 100 basis points. A Higher Hurdle For The Euro Think about what this means for currencies. If interest rates are lower in one country than they are in another, investors will only purchase bonds in the low-yielding economy if they expect that country's currency to appreciate. What will cause them to expect a stronger currency? The answer is that the low-yielding currency has to first depreciate to a level below its long-term fair value. Consider a concrete example: German bunds and U.S. Treasurys. The latter yields 1.82% more than the former for 10-year maturities. This implies that investors expect the euro to appreciate by about 20% over the next decade. As such, whatever one thinks is the true long-term fair value for EUR/USD, the euro currently should trade at a substantial discount to that value. And, of course, the longer one thinks the neutral rate in the U.S. will exceed that of the euro area, the larger that discount should be. Thus, whenever someone tells you that it is "obvious" that the euro will strengthen over the long haul, ask them where they think the euro will be trading against the dollar in ten years' time. If their answer is less than 1.36, they will lose money by being long EUR/USD. Short-Term Momentum Favors The Euro, But The Cyclical Picture Is Still Dollar Bullish Ten years is a long time, of course. Over the next couple of months, we would not be surprised if investors extrapolate the euro area's economic recovery too far into the future, leading to higher bond yields across the region. In fact, BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy service downgraded core European bonds this week largely for this reason. If that were to happen, EUR/USD could move to as high as 1.18 over the next few weeks. Such euro strength, however, will not last. We are confident that the Fed will deliver more tightening than the ECB over a 12-month horizon compared to what investors are currently anticipating. Despite the decline in the euro area unemployment rate over the past four years, it is still five points higher than in the U.S., greater than at virtually any point during the 2000s! (Chart 6). U.S. financial conditions have eased substantially so far this year - indeed, considerably more so than in the euro area (Chart 7). Our empirical work has shown that financial conditions lead growth by about 6-to-9 months. This suggests that U.S. growth could trump growth in the euro area over the balance of the year, even on a per capita basis. Chart 6There Is More Slack In The Euro Area Chart 7Easier Financial Conditions Will Support U.S. Growth Over The Coming Months U.S. Inflation Will Rise U.S. inflation should also bounce back, removing a key obstacle to further Fed rate hikes. Chart 8 presents a breakdown of U.S. core PCE inflation based on its various components. A few points stand out: About one-third of the decline in core PCE inflation between January and April can be attributed to lower wireless data prices, partly reflecting recent methodological changes undertaken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to better measure inflation in this segment. We see this largely as statistical noise, which will wash out from the data over the next few quarters. Core goods inflation has been weighed down by the lagged effects of the dollar's appreciation in 2014-15. Given that the broad trade-weighted dollar has weakened by 4.3% this year, goods inflation should begin to move higher, as already foreshadowed by the jump in import prices (Chart 9). Health care inflation rose in the lead-up to the U.S. elections, reportedly because some health care providers feared they would not be able to jack up prices once Hillary Clinton became president. Thus, the ebbing in health care costs over the past few months is not too surprising. Going forward, health care inflation is likely to rise as insurers raise premiums, particularly for policies sold through the exchanges created under the Affordable Care Act. Service inflation has decelerated a notch. We do not expect this to last. Chart 10 shows that underlying wage growth has been accelerating on the back of a tightening labor market. Historically, wage growth has been the dominant driver of service inflation. The deceleration in rent inflation looks more durable, given rising apartment supply (Chart 11). However, one could argue that weaker rent growth could actually make the Fed more hawkish. After all, if builders are now churning out too many new apartments, keeping interest rates low would just encourage overbuilding. Chart 8U.S. Inflation Will Compel The Fed To Hike Rates Chart 9Goods Inflation Will Move Up Chart 10Deceleration In Service Inflation Will Not Last Chart 11Rent Inflation Has Peaked Investment Conclusions The jump in global bond yields in recent weeks raises the odds of a near-term pullback in stocks. Still, history suggests that equities almost always outperform bonds and cash outside of recessions. If global growth remains strong over the next 12 months, as we expect, stocks are likely to climb to new highs. Chart 12Euro Area Business Cycle Follows The U.S. The combination of faster U.S. growth and rising inflation should allow the Fed to raise rates at least three or four more times between now and next June. This is more than the 30 basis points of rate hikes that the market is currently pricing in over this period. We have been positioned for higher rate expectations by being short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract. We are closing this trade today for a gain of 11 basis points and rolling it into the June 2018 contract. While a somewhat more hawkish ECB will blunt the dollar's ascent to some extent, it will not fully counteract it. This is simply because the Fed wants to tighten financial conditions while the ECB does not. The ECB would be happy if the euro were to weaken. In contrast, further dollar weakness would cause the Fed to ramp up its hawkish rhetoric. This asymmetry means that it is the Fed, rather than the ECB, that is in the driver's seat when it comes to the outlook for EUR/USD. We expect the euro to weaken to 1.05 against the dollar by the end of the year, possibly reaching parity in early 2018. When will the dollar peak? The answer is when U.S. growth finally falters and the Fed stops raising rates. As we discussed last week in our Third Quarter Strategy Outlook, this could happen towards the end of 2018.2 Historically, the euro area business cycle has lagged the U.S. cycle by 6-to-12 months (Chart 12). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that euro area growth will remain resilient late next year, even if the U.S. economy begins to slip into recession. That is when the euro will finally take off. New Trade: Go Short EUR/RUB Chart 13Falling Oil Inventories Should Lead To Higher Crude Prices Until then, the euro will remain under pressure. In contrast, the Russian ruble is likely to strengthen over the next 12 months. Russian industrial production surprised to the upside in May, growing at the fastest pace since 2014. Retail sales also accelerated thanks to a pickup in wage growth. The growth revival should reduce the pressure on the Russian central bank to cut rates aggressively. A recovery in oil prices will also help the ruble. Our energy strategists expect global production to increase by only 0.7 MMB/d in 2017, compared to 1.5 MMB/d growth in consumption. While shale output continues to rise, this is largely being offset by falling production from conventional oil fields. Consequently, oil inventories should fall in the remainder of this year. If history is any guide, this will boost oil prices (Chart 13). With this in mind, investors should consider going short EUR/RUB. The ruble has lost 15% against the euro since April, making it ripe for a rebound. The juicy 9.4% in carry that the ruble currently offers over the euro should also benefit this trade. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 In equilibrium, aggregate demand must equal GDP. Since debt is a stock variable while GDP is a flow variable, it is the change in debt that influences GDP. Likewise, it is the change in the change in debt - the so-called "credit impulse" - which influences GDP growth. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull," dated June 30, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights With crude-oil inventory transfers from OPEC to western refining centers slowing, OPEC 2.0's production cuts will begin to show up in high-frequency OECD inventory data in the form of lower stock levels. The coalition has been bedeviled by higher production from Libya and Nigeria, and a push from Iraq asserting its right - in line with its huge reserves - to increase production. U.S. imports from Iraq are growing this year, even as other OPEC members slow shipments. In addition, Iraqi crude oil inventories also were increasing while other OPEC states were running their stocks down, which suggests Iraq may be preparing to lift production and exports in the near future. Energy: Overweight. Crude oil rallied sharply over the past week, despite reports of higher Libyan production. We remain long via Dec/17 $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl call spreads in Brent and WTI. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. reportedly is using a national security review of the U.S. steel industry, to determine whether it will impose tariffs on steel imports at this week's G20 meeting in Germany. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold recovered after selling off last week on the back of more aggressive guidance from central bankers. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's acreage reports for grains were less bearish than expected, rallying markets into this week. We remain bearish, but also recommend investors continue to avoid shorting these markets. Feature Chart of the WeekCrude Oil Prices Rally,##BR##Despite Reports Of Higher Production Oil rallied 9.6% over the past week from recent lows, despite news reports of Libya pushing crude oil production toward 1mm b/d by the end of this month, and further indications Iraq is gearing up to increase production and exports (Chart of the Week). We expect prices to continue to be well supported in 2H17, as the production cuts engineered by OPEC 2.0 - the OPEC and non-OPEC producers' coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, respectively - finally begin showing up in the high-frequency storage data for the U.S. and the OECD. This is because, we believe, the massive crude-oil inventory transfers between OPEC and OECD refining centers is winding down. OPEC Inventory Transfer Winding Down Crude oil inventories in major oil importers with significant refining capabilities - in particular, the U.S. and the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) refining center in the Netherlands and Belgium - grew by a bit more than 35mm barrels (bbl) year-on-year (yoy) on average over the January - April period, based on data from the Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI), a transnational group made up of producing and consuming interests headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The January - April period marked the first four months of the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting Agreement, in which OPEC pledged to reduce output by 1.2mm b/d, and non-OPEC obliged itself to cut an additional 600k b/d of production. The yoy builds in the U.S. and ARA inventories were a mirror-image of the average yoy inventory withdrawals occurring in OPEC states that reported their stock levels to JODI in the first four months of this year (Chart 2). The JODI inventory data indicates that even as OPEC 2.0 was cutting production in the first four months of the year - by some estimates by more than 100% of the pledged 1.8mm b/d of reductions - these states were draining stocks from inventories during this period to maintain sales to key clients. The declining trend in high-frequency U.S. inventory data from the EIA for the U.S. East coast (PADD 1), the Midwest (PADD 2), and the U.S. Gulf (PADD 3), and declining weekly import estimates support our contention that OPEC inventories will continue to decline, and that the production surge by OPEC in 4Q16 will finally be worked off (Chart 3). Given the downtrend in the weekly high-frequency crude oil import data for the U.S., we expect crude-oil shipments from OPEC to continue to slow as production cuts no longer are masked by inventory draws (Chart 4). Among the top 10 crude oil exporters to the U.S., KSA shipments are down an average 55k b/d in yoy 2Q17 vs. an increase of slightly more than 150k b/d in 1Q17. KSA shipped 1.09mm b/d to the U.S. in 2Q17 vs. 1.23mm b/d in 1Q17. The rates at which Iraq and Nigeria were shipping oil to the U.S. also slowed, but are still above year-ago levels, as is to be expected given the civil strife from which both are recovering - Iraq's 2Q17 exports to the U.S. were up 279k b/d vs. 316k in 1Q17 yoy at 663k and 592k b/d, while Nigeria's exports to the U.S. were up 67k b/d yoy in 2Q17 and 69k b/d in 1Q17, at 286k b/d and 270k b/d, respectively. Chart 2OPEC Inventory Transfer##BR##Winds Down In 2017 Chart 3Surge In 2H16 OPEC Production##BR##Is Being Worked Off Continued high levels of U.S. refining runs and exports of crude and products also will accelerate draws in the U.S., even though refining runs are not growing at rates seen last year when the overall level of refining was lower (Chart 5). Chart 4OPEC Exports To##BR##The U.S. Are Slowing Chart 5U.S. Refinery Runs And Exports##BR##Remain High Watch Iraq Chart 6Libya, Nigeria Increase Production,##BR##But The Big Story Will Be Iraq The OPEC 2.0 agreement has been bedeviled by higher-than-expected production from Libya, where officials claim they will be producing at 1.0mm b/d by the end of July, and Nigeria.1 In our balances, we have Libyan production up some 100k b/d from last month at ~ 800k b/d. Nigeria currently is producing ~ 1.5mm b/d, after falling to as low as 1.2mm b/d due to sabotage of its export facilities. But, without doubt, the OPEC state with the greatest potential for production growth is Iraq, which currently is producing ~ 4.5mm b/d (Chart 6). Iraqi local inventories were up 43% yoy in April at just over 11mm bbl. Iraqi exports to the U.S. were up more than 50% yoy to just over 640k b/d in June. Ordinarily, this would not warrant much attention, given the harmony that so far has characterized OPEC 2.0's performance since year-end 2016. However, Iraqi officials have begun advocating for higher production levels, which, in their protestations, would be consistent with their high reserve levels. Just this week, the country's oil minister, Jabar al-Luaibi, asked rhetorically, "Why should Iraq be deprived from increasing its production? Not to disturb or disrupt OPEC at all, or the prices, but it is our right to have our production that corresponds to our reserves."2 He observed, "We have gas, we have oil. We have the right to do well. As simple as that." Iraq certainly has the reserves necessary to increase production significantly, but would require significant time and capital to grow production materially above the record levels reached in Q4 2016, which were about 200,000-300,000 b/d above current levels. "Whatever It Takes" May Require KSA To Cut Again If Libya can hold to its higher production level, and even reach 1mm b/d, and Iraq decides to exercise its "right" to produce more, OPEC 2.0 will have to cut additional barrels from the coalition's production to accommodate the higher output. Given Russia's apparent reluctance to do so, this could mark the first significant test of the durability of the agreement that created OPEC 2.0. The stakes are high if these production cuts are not addressed. As Russians go to the polls in March 2018, and, later in the year, KSA seeks to IPO Aramco, multiple problems will present themselves: Another production free-for-all that collapses prices would trigger another round of high consumer-level inflation in Russia, as the rouble falls once again, and KSA's IPO would value Aramco far below the $2 trillion Saudi officials are hoping for. Our bullish price view - we're expecting Brent to trade to $60/bbl by year-end - will be deep-sixed if production cannot be controlled. As it stands, we have total OPEC crude production just over 32mm b/d in 2017, and slightly over 32.5mm b/d in 2018. Given the stout demand growth we expect this year and next, we expect close to 900k b/d more demand growth over supply growth, based on our modelling. Next year, we expect supply growth of 2.25mm b/d, and demand growth of 1.62mm b/d, so supply growth exceeds demand growth in 2018 by 630k b/d, moving oil markets from undersupplied to balanced/slightly over-supplied. Obviously, higher production would change these balances. The big questions for the market going forward: Will OPEC states that have drained inventories supporting sales to key clients maintain production discipline, allowing inventories in the U.S. and ARA to drain? Will OPEC 2.0 unravel under pressure from Russia and KSA assessments of the need for additional cuts? Can Libya and Nigeria maintain higher output? Libya is a failed state, and warring tribes almost surely will seek to take control over as much of the revenue-generating capacity of the oil-export facilities in the East and West of the country as possible. Nigeria, although not a failed state, faces similar difficulties containing the sabotage that has disabled export capacity on and off for the past few years. Whither Iraq? A price collapse would definitely reduce U.S. shale output, as the 2015 - 1H2016 experience demonstrated. If domestic U.S. prices stayed lower for longer, we would expect rig counts to decline, reducing the rate of growth in U.S., supply. Right now, we expect U.S. shale output to grow 340k b/d this year and by ~ 1mm b/d next year based on earlier, higher price levels. Our research has shown the very high correlation between U.S. shale output and WTI prices along the forward curve out to 3 years forward, and a low price definitely will lead to lower rig counts. Bottom Line: OPEC 2.0 still is holding together. Going into its ministerial meeting at the end of this month, it must provide clear guidance to the market over how it will handle a sustained increase in Libyan production. In addition, Iraq's intentions must be clear - otherwise, the market will assume the worst. We remain bullish, and continue to recommend low-risk long positions - we are long Dec/17 $50 vs. $55/bbl call spreads in Brent and WTI. Once markets are given greater clarity, we will look for higher-risk alternatives for putting new length on. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Libya's Oil Production Nears 4 Year High," in oilprice.com's June 29, 2017, online edition. 2 The minister's remarks were reported in the July 5, 2017, issue of, Iraq Daily Journal's online edition. Please see "Iraq Has Right To Achieve Oil Output In Line With Reserves - Minister." Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights The euro area's structural growth prospects (adjusted for demographics) are no different to any other developed economy such as the U.K., U.S. or Japan. Liberated from the headwinds of its own policy errors, the euro area's relative growth is now transitioning from a down-cycle to a multi-year up-cycle, and this brings three multi-year investment implications: Underweight German bunds and French OATs, both in a European bond portfolio and in a global bond portfolio. Overweight the euro, specifically euro/dollar and euro/yuan. Overweight euro area retailers versus U.S. retailers. Feature Over the past 20 years or so, every major European country has at one time or another been given the dubious title 'the sick man of Europe'. Chart of the Week AAfter 2008, Everybody Recapitalised Their Banks... Chart of the Week B...Except Italy Remarkable as it sounds today, in the early 2000s the sick man was Germany - whose economy suffered recurring stalls; in 2007 it was Portugal; then in the aftermath of the Great Recession the sick man title went at different points in 2009 to the U.K. and to Spain, as both economies struggled to bounce back from the downturn. Thereafter, the title has variously gone to Ireland, Finland, France, and Italy. In most cases, the sick man title mistakes a cyclical problem for a structural problem. So when the cyclical weakness ends, the country shakes off the dubious title. Another common mistake is rushing to judgement on the wrong analysis. The best example of this is Japan. You may be familiar with Japan's so-called 'lost decades' or the term 'Japanification' used as a pejorative. The trouble is that the perception of such lost decades is outright wrong! The truth is that over the past two decades Japan's growth in real GDP per head, at 34%, is the best among major developed economies, easily outperforming Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. (Chart I-2). Chart I-2What Lost Decades? Japan Has Outperformed Everybody Else The point is that to level the playing field for countries' different demographic profiles, it is important to compare growth on a per head basis. Real growth per head is what determines improvement in wellbeing and living standards and the best resolution of indebtedness for society as a whole. High nominal growth via inflation may sound appealing to a highly indebted society, but it is over-simplistic. One person's debt is another person's asset, so inflation reduces the burden on half of society - the debtors - by robbing the other half - the creditors. Which isn't necessarily good for society as a whole. Can Italy Recover? This brings us to Europe's current 'sick man', Italy. Some people claim that Italy has underperformed through the full 18 years of the euro. Not true. Based on the all-important real GDP per head metric, Italy was performing more or less in line with the other major developed economies until the Great Recession (Chart I-3). Still, an underperformance that started at the Great Recession means it has lasted almost nine years. So can Italy really be a cyclical 'sick man' - or in this case, is something structural at work? In The Euro's 18th Birthday: Why Isn't Italy Partying?1 we suggested that the root cause of Italy's nine year problem is its still undercapitalised and dysfunctional banking system. This has paralysed an economy heavily dependent on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and their access to bank financing. We can say this with conviction for two reasons. Can it really be just coincidence that Italy is the only major economy that has not recapitalised its banks after the 2008 crisis, and that its underperformance began at exactly the same moment (Chart of the Week)? And can it really be just coincidence that as soon as Spain substantially recapitalised its banks in 2013, the Spanish economy made a remarkable transformation from sick man to strapping health2 (Chart I-4)? To us, these are not coincidences. They pinpoint the root of Italy's problem and solution. Chart I-3Italy Did Not Underperform ##br##Until The Great Recession Chart I-4Spain Recovered Strongly As##br## Soon As Its Banks Were Recapitalised The good news is that Italy is progressing to a solution, albeit slowly. Last week's relatively trouble-free winding down of the failing Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Bank showed that the ECB, Brussels and the Italian government are on the same page. A pragmatic solution let institutional investors suffer losses while protecting 'widows and orphans' retail investors with public money. In Italy, with many retail investors owning banks' senior bonds, this is the politically acceptable way to go. And at the current rate of resolution, we estimate that the further €50-75 billion of recapitalisation required can be finished within a year. If Italy can get through its next general election without a shock, it will be on the road to a long-term recovery. Euro Area: Don't Mistake A Cyclical Problem For A Structural Problem To reiterate, one of the biggest mistakes in economics and investment is to mistake a cyclical problem for a structural problem. This is especially true when two cyclical downturns come in quick succession. The resulting extended period of poor performance inevitably feels like something structural rather than something cyclical. Many commentators regard the poor performance of the euro area economy since 2008 as evidence of a structural malaise. But the bigger picture does not support this thesis. Through the 18 year lifetime of the monetary union, the euro area and the U.S. have generated identical growth in real GDP per head (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Since The Euro's Birth, The Euro Area And##br## U.S. Have Produced Identical Growth Within this bigger picture, the euro area has underperformed through multi-year periods encompassing around half of the 18 years. And it has outperformed through the multi-year periods encompassing the other half. Seen in this light, the post-2008 phase of poor performance is really the impact of back to back recessions separated by an unusually short gap - with the second of the two recessions the direct result of policy errors specific to the euro area. First, the ECB resisted taking on its critical role as lender of last resort to solvent but illiquid sovereign borrowers, thereby enflaming a containable liquidity crisis into an almost uncontainable and catastrophic solvency crisis. Then, when the ECB ultimately relented, a protracted stress test of European banks forced lenders to shrink their assets, effectively paralysing an economy heavily dependent on bank finance. Still, the euro area does not have a monopoly when it comes to damaging policy errors and misanalysis. We tend to have short memories, but let's not forget former U.K. Finance Minister and Prime Minister Gordon Brown's claim that the boom-bust cycle had been abolished, justifying a much lighter touch regulation of the financial system through the early 2000s. Or Ben Bernanke's now infamous misanalysis of the U.S. housing market in 2005: "Well, I guess I don't buy the premise that U.S. house prices will come down substantially. It's a pretty unlikely possibility..." These observations are not meant to criticise, but just to illustrate that policymakers are not omniscient. They understand the economy and financial markets little more than we do. Furthermore, political constraints often limit their room for manoeuvre, forcing the policy errors. Policy Error Now More Likely Outside The Euro Area Looking ahead to the next few years, our sense is that the risk of policy error is now greater outside the euro area than inside. Specifically, the still uncertain trajectories of Brexit and of the Trump administration are likely to have their greatest disruptive impacts in the U.K. and U.S. respectively. Our broad thesis is that the euro area's structural growth prospects (adjusted for demographics) are no different to any other developed economy such as the U.K., U.S. or Japan. And liberated from the headwinds of its own policy errors, the euro area's relative growth is now transitioning from a down-cycle to a multi-year up-cycle. Which brings three multi-year investment implications: Underweight euro area government bonds, specifically German bunds and French OATs, both in a European bond portfolio and in a global bond portfolio (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Overweight the euro, specifically euro/dollar and euro/yuan. For equities, the translation to the headline euro area index, the Eurostoxx50 is somewhat complicated by its dominant sector skew (overweight banks, underweight technology) which tends to drive relative performance. Instead, we find that in recent years the relative performance of the more domestic-focussed retailers has closely tracked relative economic performance (Chart I-8). Hence, overweight euro area retailers versus U.S. retailers. Chart I-6Relative Bond ##br##Yields... Chart I-7...Must Follow Relative##br## Economic Performance Chart I-8Retailers Relative Performance Tracks##br## Relative Economic Performance Please note there will be no report next week. Our next report will come out on July 20. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Published on June 1, 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 Spain's real GDP per head has grown by over 12% since its trough in 2013. Fractal Trading Model* Long nickel / short palladium has achieved its 10% profit target, and is now closed, leaving four open positions. There are no new trades this week. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Special Report Highlights Unilateral economic sanctions show that geopolitical risks are rising in Asia Pacific; China is using sanctions to get its way with its neighbors; South Korea was the latest victim, and will be rewarded for its pro-China shift; Trump's Mar-a-Lago honeymoon with Xi Jinping is over; Tactically, go long South Korean consumers / short Taiwanese exporters. Feature Geopolitical risk is shifting to the Asia Pacific region - and the increasing use of economic sanctions is evidence of the trend. Korean stocks have rallied sharply since the leadership change from December 2016 through May of this year (Chart 1). The impeachment rally was entirely expected after a year of domestic political turmoil.1 The election is also eventually expected to decrease Korean geopolitical risks - the country's new President Moon Jae-in, of the left-leaning Democratic Party, aims to patch up relations with China and revive diplomacy with North Korea.2 Chart 1South Korean Impeachment Rally Over A key barometer of Moon's success will be whether he convinces China to remove economic sanctions imposed since last summer as punishment for his predecessor's agreement to host the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. Moon has suspended the system's deployment in a nod to China.3 South Korea is thus the latest example of an important trend in the region: China's successful use of "economic statecraft" to pressure wayward neighbors into closer alignment with its interests. Since 2014, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have each sought in different ways to reorient their foreign policies toward China, either to court Chinese assistance or get relief from Chinese pressure. Judging by our research below, the rewards are palpable, and a sign of Beijing's rising global influence. Because U.S.-China tensions are rising structurally, we see these country-by-country shifts toward China not as a decisive loss for the U.S. alliance but rather as the latest phase in a long game of tug-of-war that will intensify in the coming years.4 Hence the trend of unilateral economic sanctions will continue. Who is next on China's hit list? How will the U.S. respond? What countries are most and least likely to be affected? And what are the market implications? China's Economic Statecraft The United States launched a "pivot to Asia" strategy under the Obama administration to reassert American primacy in Asia Pacific and address the emerging challenge from China. The U.S.'s Asian partners largely welcomed this shift. Over the preceding decade, they had struggled with China's emergence as a military and strategic superior. The most prominent flashpoints came in the East and South China Seas. Beijing's newfound naval and air power caused regional anxiety. As the allies invited a larger U.S. role, Beijing began to assert its sovereignty claims over disputed waters and rocks, most ambitiously by creating artificial islands in the South China Sea and fortifying them with military capabilities. In three notable periods since the Great Recession, China's tensions with its neighbors have splashed over into the economic realm, prompting Beijing to impose punitive measures: Chart 2Japan's 2012 Clash With China Chart 3Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Japan 2010-2012: In 2010, China and Japan clashed as the former challenged Japan's control of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea. In the September-November 2010 clash, China notoriously cut off exports of rare earths to Japan.5 A greater clash occurred from July-November 2012. Chinese people rose up in large-scale protests, damaging Japanese and other foreign property and assets. Impact: The growth of Japanese exports to China slowed noticeably between the 2010 and 2012 clashes, underperforming both that of China's neighbors and Europe (Chart 2). In particular, Chinese consumers stopped buying as many Japanese cars and switched to other brands (Chart 3). Chinese investment in Japan, which is generally very small, fell sharply in the year after the major 2012 clash, by contrast with the global trend (Chart 4). Chinese tourism to Japan also fell sharply after both incidents, though only for a short period of time (Chart 5). Chart 4...And Cut Investments In Japan... Chart 5...While Tourists Went Elsewhere Philippines 2012-2016: Tensions between China and the Philippines over the contested Spratly Islands and other rocks in the South China Sea have a long history. The latest round began in the mid-2000s, and the two countries have skirmished many times since then, including in a major showdown at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 that required the intercession of the United States to be resolved. The pressure intensified after January 2013, when the Philippines brought a high-profile case against China's maritime-territorial claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The U.S. and the Philippines upped the ante in April 2014 by signing an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Ultimately, the court dealt a humiliating blow to China's maritime-territorial claims in July 2016, but a bigger confrontation was avoided because of what had happened in the remarkable May 2016 Philippine elections, which put China-friendly populist President Rodrigo Duterte in Manila on July 1. Impact: China tightened phytosanitary restrictions on Philippine bananas during the 2012 crisis and Philippine exports to China underperformed those of its neighbors after the onset of diplomatic crisis in 2013 (Chart 6). Nevertheless, the overall impact on headline exports is debatable. Tourism suffered straightforwardly both after the 2012 showdown at sea and after the new U.S.-Philippines military deal in 2014 (Chart 7). As with Japan, the impact was temporary. Chart 6Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Chart 7Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Vietnam 2011-14: China's quarrels with Vietnam go back millennia, but in recent years have centered on the South China Sea. As with the Philippines, frictions began rising in the mid-2000s and flared up after the global financial crisis. In the summer of 2012, Vietnam and China engaged in a dispute over new laws encompassing their territorial claims. In May 2014, the two countries fought a highly unorthodox sea-battle near the Paracel Islands. Anti-Chinese protests erupted throughout Vietnam, prompting China to restrict travel.6 Impact: It is not clear that China imposed trade measures against Vietnam - export growth was plummeting in 2012 because of China's nominal GDP slowdown as well - but certainly exports skyrocketed after the two sides began tothaw diplomatic relations in August 2014 (Chart 8).7 Direct investment from China into Vietnam fell in 2014, even as that from the rest of the world rose. Chinese tourism to Vietnam shrank in the aftermath. Chart 8Vietnam Reboots China Trade The above incidents complement a growing body of academic research demonstrating China's use of unilateral economic sanctions and their trade and market impacts.8 Bottom Line: China has employed unilateral, informal, and discrete economic sanctions and has encouraged or condoned citizen boycotts and popular activism against Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states since at least the early 2000s. Moreover, three international confrontations since 2010 suggest that China's foreign policy is growing bolder - it is not afraid to throw its economic weight around to get what it wants politically or to deter countries from challenging its interests. How Significant Is China's Wrath? Both our evidence and the scholarly literature reveal that China-inflicted economic damage tends to be temporary and sometimes ambiguous from a macro-perspective.9 For instance, if there were negative trade effects of Vietnam's 2014 clash with China, they were overwhelmed by Vietnam's rising share of China's market in the following years (Chart 9). And, as hinted above, Chinese sanctions on Philippine banana exports in 2012 can be overstated according to close inspection of the data.10 Nevertheless, since 2016, three new episodes have reinforced the fact that China's punitive measures are a significant trend with potentially serious consequences for Asian economies: Taiwan 2016: Taiwanese politics have shifted away from mainland China in recent years. The "Sunflower Protests" of 2014 marked a shift in popular opinion away from the government's program of ever-deeper economic integration with the mainland. Local elections later that year set the stage for a sweeping victory by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), taking both the presidency and, for the first time, the legislature, in January 2016.11 Tsai is a proponent of eventual Taiwanese independence and dissents from key diplomatic agreements with the mainland, the "One China Policy" and "1992 Consensus." Within six months of the election Beijing had cut off diplomatic communication. Impact: The number of mainland visitors has nosedived, by contrast with global trends (Chart 10). Taiwan's exports and access to China's market are arguably weaker than they would otherwise be. Given the historic cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, and the strong export growth in the immediate aftermath of that deal, it is curious that exports have been so weak since 2014 (Chart 11). Chart 9China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam Chart 10Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Chart 11So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? South Korea 2016-17: China and South Korea are on the cusp of improving relations after a year of Beijing-imposed sanctions. The former government of President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached in December 2016 and removed from office in March this year, moved rapidly with the U.S. to deploy the THAAD missile defense system on South Korean soil while her government was collapsing, so as to make it a fait accompli for her likely left-leaning (and more China-friendly) successor. Her government agreed to the deployment in July 2016 and since then China has exacted substantial economic costs via Korean exports and Chinese tourism.12 The new President Moon Jae-in is now calling on China to remove these sanctions, while initiating an "environmental review" that will delay deployment of THAAD, possibly permanently. Impact: South Korean exports to China have underperformed the regional trend throughout the downfall of the Park regime and its last-minute alliance-building measures with both the U.S. and Japan (Chart 12). South Korea has also lost market share in China since agreeing to host THAAD in July 2016 (Chart 13). Furthermore, Korean car sales on the mainland have deviated markedly both from their long-term historical trend and from Japan's contemporary sales (Chart 14), the inverse of what occurred in 2012 (see Chart 3 above). Chinese tourism to South Korea has sharply declined. Chart 12China Cools On Korean Imports Chart 13China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Chart 14Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump North Korea 2016-17: Ironically, China brought sanctions against both Koreas last year - the South for THAAD, the North for its unprecedented slate of missile and nuclear tests. These provoked the United States into pressuring China via "secondary sanctions." Impact: China's sanctions on the North - which include a potentially severe ban on coal imports - are limited so far, according to the headline trade data, as China is wary of destabilizing the hermit kingdom (Chart 15). But if China does grant President Trump's request and increase the economic pressure on North Korea, it will be no less of a sign of a greater willingness to utilize economic statecraft, especially given that the North is China's only formal ally. Other countries will not fail to see the implications should they, like either Korea, cross Beijing's interests. Bottom Line: Doubts about China's new foreign policy "assertiveness" are overstated. China is increasing its unilateral use of economic levers to pressure political regimes in its neighborhood, including major EMs like Taiwan and South Korea over the past year. Korean President Moon Jae-in's rise to power is likely to produce better Sino-Korean relations, but neither it nor Taiwan is out of the woods yet, according to the data. Moreover, the rest of the region may be cautious before accepting new U.S. military deployments or contravening China's demands in other ways. The Asian "Pivot To China" Over the past two years, several Asian states have begun to vacillate toward China, not because they fear American abandonment but because the U.S. "pivot" gave them so much security reassurance that it threatened to provoke conflict with China - essentially risking a new Cold War. They live on the frontlines and wanted to discourage this escalation. At the same time, the growth slump in China/EM in 2014 - followed by China's renewed stimulus in 2015 - encouraged these states to improve business with China. Thailand began to shift in 2014, when a military junta took power in a coup and sought external support. China's partnership did not come with strings attached, as opposed to that of the U.S., with its demands about democracy and civil rights.13 The rewards of this foreign policy shift are palpable (Chart 16). China signed some big investment deals and improved strategic cooperation through arms sales. It did the same with Malaysia for similar reasons.14 China's "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) economic development initiative provided ample opportunities for expanding ties. Chart 15No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet Chart 16China Opens Doors To Thai Junta The year 2016 was a major turning point. Three of China's neighbors - two of which U.S. allies - underwent domestic political transitions ushering in more favorable policies toward China: Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communist Party held its twelfth National Congress in January 2016. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a pro-market reformer from the capitalist south, failed to secure the position of general secretary of the party and retired. The incumbent General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong retained his seat, and oversaw the promotion of key followers, strengthening Vietnam's pro-China faction. Since then Trong has visited President Xi in Beijing and signed a joint communique on improving strategic relations. As mentioned above, Vietnamese exports to China have exploded since tensions subsided in 2014. South Korea: In April 2016, South Korean legislative elections saw the left-leaning Democratic Party win a plurality of seats, setting the stage for the 2017 election discussed above, when Korea officially moved in a more China-friendly direction under President Moon. The Philippines: In May 2016, the Philippines elected Duterte, a firebrand southern populist who declared that the Philippines would "separate" itself from the U.S. and ally with Russia and China. Though Duterte has already modified his anti-American stance - as we expected - he is courting Chinese trade and investment at the expense of the Philippines' sovereignty concerns.15 Trump's election contributed to this regional trend. By suggesting a desire for the U.S. to stop playing defender of last resort in the region, Trump reinforced the need for allies like Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea to go their own way. And by canceling the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump forced Malaysia and Vietnam to make amends with China, while vindicating those (like Thailand and Indonesia) that had remained aloof. Bottom Line: Having brandished its sticks, China is now offering carrots to states that recognize its growing regional influence. These do not have to be express measures, given that China is stimulating its economy and increasing outbound investment for its own reasons. All China need do is refrain from denying access to its market and investment funds. Whom Will China Sanction Next? Geopolitical risk on the Korean peninsula remains elevated given that North Korea remains in "provocation mode" and Trump has prioritized the issue. However, we expect that Moon will cooperate with China enough to give a boost to South Korean exports and China-exposed companies and sectors. With South Korea's shifting policy, Beijing has a major opportunity to demonstrate the positive economic rewards of pro-China foreign policy. If a new round of international negotiations gets under way and North Korean risk subsides for a time (our baseline view),16 then East Asian governments will turn to other interests. We see two key places of potential confrontation over the next 12-24 months: Taiwan is the top candidate for Chinese sanctions going forward. The cross-strait relationship is fraught and susceptible to tempests. The ruling DPP lacks domestic political constraints, which could be conducive to policy mistakes. Moreover, Trump has signaled his intention to strengthen the alliance with Taiwan, which could cause problems. China is likely to oppose the new $1.4 billion package of U.S. arms more actively than in the past, given its greater global heft. Trump's initial threat of altering the One China Policy has not been forgotten. In terms of timing, China may not want to give a tailwind to the DPP by acting overly aggressive ahead of the 2018 local elections, which are crucial for the opposition Kuomintang's attempt to revive in time for the 2020 presidential vote. But this is not a hard constraint on Beijing's imposing sanctions before then. Japan is the second-likeliest target of Chinese economic pressure. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is up for re-election no later than December 2018 and is becoming more vulnerable as he shifts emphasis from pocketbook issues to Japan's national security.17 Needless to say, the revival of the military is the part of Abe's agenda that Beijing most opposes. China would like to see Abe weakened, or voted out, and would especially like to see Abe's proposed constitutional revisions fail in the popular referendum slated for 2020. China would not want to strengthen Abe by provoking Japanese nationalism. But if Abe is losing support, and Beijing calculates that the Japanese public is starting to view Abe and his constitutional revisions as too provocative and destabilizing, then a well-timed diplomatic crisis with economic sanctions may be in order.18 Next in line are Hong Kong and Singapore, though Beijing has already largely gotten its way in recent disputes with the two city-states.19 Other possibilities on the horizon: The eventual return to a fractious civilian government in Thailand, or improved U.S.-Thai relations, could spoil China's infrastructure plans and sour its willingness to support an otherwise lackluster Thai economy. Also, a surprise victory by the opposition in Malaysian general elections (either this year or next) could see the recent rapprochement with China falter. The latter would be cyclical tensions, whereas suppressed structural tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines could boil back up to the surface fairly quickly at any time and provoke Chinese retaliation. Bottom Line: The most likely targets of Chinese economic sanctions in the near future are Taiwan and Japan. South Korea could remain a target if events should force Moon to abandon his policy agenda, though we see this as unlikely. Hong Kong and Singapore also remain in the danger zone, as do Vietnam and the Philippines in the long run. Investment Implications Cyclical and structural macro trends drive exports and investment trends in Asia Pacific. The biggest immediate risk to EM Asian economies stems not from Chinese sanctions - given that most of these economies have adjusted their policies to appease China to some extent - but from China's economic policy uncertainty, which remains at very elevated levels (Chart 17). It was after this uncertainty surged in 2015 that China's neighbors took on a more accommodating stance with a focus on economic cooperation rather than strategic balancing. Chart 17Chinese Economic Policy Uncertainty Still Asia's Biggest Risk Currently Chinese economic policy uncertainty is hooking back up as a result of the decision by state authorities to intensify their financial crackdown - the so-called "deleveraging campaign." BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out that China's slowing fiscal and credit impulse will drag down both Chinese import volumes and emerging market corporate earnings in the coming months (Chart 18). Already commodity prices and commodity currencies have dropped off, heralding a broader slowdown in global trade as a result of China's policy tightening. This trend will overwhelm the effect of almost any new geopolitical spats or sanctions. The same can be said for Chinese investment as for Chinese trade. Over the past couple of decades, China has emerged as one of the world's leading sources of direct investment (Chart 19). This is a secular trend. Thus while foreign relations have affected China's investment patterns - most recently in giving the Philippines a boost under Duterte - the general trend of rising Chinese investment abroad will continue regardless of temporary quarrels. This is particularly true in light of China's efforts to energize OBOR. Chart 18China: Stimulus Fading Chart 19China's Emergence As Major Global Investor The key question is how will China's political favor or disfavor impact neighboring economies on the margin, in relative terms, on a sectoral basis, or in the short term? The evidence above feeds into several trends in relative equity performance: China fights either Japan or Korea: Going long Korea / short Japan would have paid off throughout the major Sino-Japanese tensions 2010-12, and would have paid off again during the South Korean impeachment rally (Chart 20). Of course, geopolitics is only one factor. But even Japan's economic shift in 2012 (Abenomics) is part of the geopolitical dynamic. Chart 20China Fights Either Japan Or Korea Chart 21Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's loss is Japan's gain: China's measures against Japanese exporters from 2010-12 coincided with a period of intense cross-strait economic integration that benefited Taiwanese exporters. Then Japan adopted Abenomics and dialed down tensions with China, and Taiwan underwent a pro-independence turn, provoking Beijing's displeasure (Chart 21). If one of these countries ends up quarreling with China in the near future, as we expect, the other country's exporters may reap the benefit. If relations worsen with both, South Korea stands to gain. Favor EM reformers: Vietnamese and Philippine equities outperformed EM from 2011-16 despite heightened tensions in the South China Sea (Chart 22). During this time, we recommended an overweight position on both countries relative to EM, even though we took the maritime tensions very seriously, because we favored EM reformers and both countries were undertaking structural reforms.20 Later, in May 2016, we downgraded the Philippines to neutral, expecting a loss of reform momentum after Duterte's election. The Philippines has notably underperformed the EM equity benchmark since that time.21 The "One China Policy": We closed out our "long One China Policy" trade on June 14 as a result of China's persistence in its crackdown on the banks, which we see as very risky.22 However, we may reinitiate the trade in the future, as Hong Kong and Taiwan remain vulnerable both to the slowdown in globalization and to Beijing's sanctions over deepening political differences (Chart 23). Chart 22Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Chart 23The 'One China Policy' As A Trade From Sunshine to Moonshine: South Korea's Moon Jae-in has substantial political capital and we expect that he will succeed in boosting growth, wages, and the social security net, all of which will be bullish for South Korean consumer stocks. Yet we remain wary of the fact that North Korea is not yet falling into line with new negotiations. A way to hedge is to go long the South Korean consumer relative to Taiwanese exporters (Chart 24), which will live under the shadow of Beijing's disfavor at least until the 2020 elections, if not beyond. Taiwan has also allowed its currency to appreciate notably against the USD since Trump's post-election phone call with President Tsai, which is negative for Taiwanese exporters. Chart 24Go Long Korean Consumer /##br## Short Taiwanese Exporter China's sanctions are essentially a "slap on the wrist" in economic terms. But sometimes they reflect deeper structural tensions, and thus they may foreshadow far more damaging clashes down the road that could have longer term consequences, just as the Sino-Japanese incident of 2012 demonstrated. That is all the more reason to hedge one's bets on Taiwan today. These sanctions are bound to recur and will provide investors with trading opportunities, if not long-term investment themes. It will pay to capitalize quickly at the outset of any serious increase in tensions going forward. As a final word, the Trump administration's recent moves to impose economic penalties on China - namely through "secondary sanctions" due to North Korea, but also through potential trade tariffs and/or penalties related to human trafficking and human rights - highlight the fact that the use of unilateral sanctions is not limited to China. Geopolitical risk is rising in Asia as a result of actions on both sides of the Pacific. Sino-American antagonism in particular poses the greatest geopolitical danger to global markets, as we have frequently emphasized.23 And as Trump's domestic agenda struggles he will seek to get tougher on China, as he promised to his populist base on the campaign trail. In the event of a major geopolitical crisis in the region, we recommend the same mix of safe-haven assets that we have recommended in the past: U.S. treasuries, Swiss bonds, JGBs, and gold.24 Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our longstanding investment theme of rising geopolitical risk in East Asia, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, and Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Market Equity Sector and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Korea: A Comeback For Consumer Stocks?" dated June 27, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, Moon is walking a tight rope in relation to the United States. During his visit to Washington on June 29, he assured Congressman Paul Ryan among others that he did not necessarily intend to reverse the THAAD agreement as a whole. That would depend on the outcome of the environmental review and due legal process in South Korea as well as on whether North Korea's behavior makes the missile defense system necessary. Please see Kim Ji-eun, "In US Congress, Pres. Moon Highlights Democratic Values Of Alliance With US," The Hankyoreh, July 1, 2017, available at English.hani.co.kr. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Jeffrey R. Dundon, "Triggers of Chinese Economic Coercion," Naval Postgraduate School, September, 2014, available at calhoun.nps.edu. 6 For a very conservative estimate of China's actions during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident, please see Angela Poh, "The Myth Of Chinese Sanctions Over South China Sea Disputes," Washington Quarterly 40:1 (2017), pp. 143-165. 7 Please see "Vietnam Party official heads to China to defuse tensions," Thanh Nien Daily, August 25, 2014, available at www.thanhniennews.com. 8 Please see Faqin Lin, Cui Hu, and Andreas Fuchs, "How Do Firms Respond To Political Tensions? The Heterogeneity Of The Dalai Lama Effect On Trade," University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 628, August 2016, available at papers.ssrn.com. This study improves upon earlier ones, notably Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, "Paying A Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect On International Trade," Journal Of International Economics 91 (2013), pp 164-77. See also Christina L. Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson, "State Control And The Effects Of Foreign Relations On Bilateral Trade," October 16, 2016, MPRA Paper No. 74597, available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74597/ ; Yinghua He, Ulf Nielsson, and Yonglei Wang, "Hurting Without Hitting: The Economic Cost of Political Tension," Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers 14-484 (July 2015), available at econpapers.repec.org; Raymond Fisman, Yasushi Hamao, and Yongxiang Wang, "Nationalism and Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations," NBER Working Paper 20089 (May 2014) available at www.nber.org; Scott L. Kastner, "Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China's International Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 60:6 (2016), pp. 980-1007. 9 The "Dalai Lama effect," in which countries that host a visit from the Dalai Lama suffer Chinese trade retaliation, has been revised downward over the years - the trade costs are only statistically significant in the second quarter after the visit. Please see "How Do Firms Respond," cited in footnote 8. 10 See "Myth Of Chinese Sanctions," cited in footnote 6. Chinese sanctions on Norwegian salmon exports after Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 also fall under this category. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see Lee Ho-Jeong, "Thaad may lead to $7.5B in economic losses in 2017," Joongang Daily, May 4, 2017, available at www.joongangdaily.com. 13 Please see Ian Storey, "Thailand's Post-Coup Relations With China And America: More Beijing, Less Washington," Yusof Ishak Institute, Trends in Southeast Asia 20 (2015). 14 Malaysia began to move closer to China after its 2013 election, which initiated a period of political turbulence and scandal. This trend, along with economic slowdown, prompted the ruling coalition to turn to Beijing for support. 15 He is also, as current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), assisting China's negotiations toward settling a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea. This is not likely to be a binding agreement - China will not voluntarily reverse its strategic maritime-territorial gains - but it could dampen tensions for a time in the region and encourage better relations between China and Southeast Asia. For the 2016 Asian pivot to China discussed above, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 The LDP's dramatic defeat in Tokyo's local elections on July 2 is the first tangible sign that the constitutional agenda, Abe's corruption scandals, and the emergence of a competing political leader, Yuriko Koike, are taking a toll on the LDP. 18 Also, Beijing may at any point rotate its maritime assertiveness back to the East China Sea, where tensions with Japan have quieted since 2013-14. Further, Beijing will want to exploit worsening relations between Japan and South Korea, and drive a wedge between Japan and Russia as they attempt a historic diplomatic thaw. 19 Beijing is attempting to steal a march on these states, especially in finance, while putting pressure on them to avoid activities that undermine Beijing's regional influence. So far there is only small evidence that tensions have affected trade. First, Hong Kong saw a drop in tourists and a block on cultural exports amid the Umbrella Protests of 2014. China's central government has acted aggressively over the past year to suppress Hong Kong agitation, by excluding rebel lawmakers from office and by drawing a "red line" against undermining Chinese sovereignty. Yet agitation will persist because of the frustration of local political forces and the youth, both of which resent the mainland's increasing heavy-handedness. Meanwhile, China and Singapore are in the process this month of improving relations after the November-January spat relating to Singapore-Taiwanese military ties. But China's encroachment on Singapore's traditional advantages - finance, oil refining, freedom of navigation, strong military relations with the U.S. and Taiwan, political stability - is likely to continue. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, "Geopolitical Risk: A Golden Opportunity?" dated July 9, 2014, and "In Need Of Global Political Recapitalization," dated June 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report, "Buy Vietnamese Stocks," dated July 17, 2015, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk," dated June 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report Highlights Unilateral economic sanctions show that geopolitical risks are rising in Asia Pacific; China is using sanctions to get its way with its neighbors; South Korea was the latest victim, and will be rewarded for its pro-China shift; Trump's Mar-a-Lago honeymoon with Xi Jinping is over; Tactically, go long South Korean consumers / short Taiwanese exporters. Feature Geopolitical risk is shifting to the Asia Pacific region - and the increasing use of economic sanctions is evidence of the trend. Korean stocks have rallied sharply since the leadership change from December 2016 through May of this year (Chart 1). The impeachment rally was entirely expected after a year of domestic political turmoil.1 The election is also eventually expected to decrease Korean geopolitical risks - the country's new President Moon Jae-in, of the left-leaning Democratic Party, aims to patch up relations with China and revive diplomacy with North Korea.2 Chart 1South Korean Impeachment Rally Over A key barometer of Moon's success will be whether he convinces China to remove economic sanctions imposed since last summer as punishment for his predecessor's agreement to host the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. Moon has suspended the system's deployment in a nod to China.3 South Korea is thus the latest example of an important trend in the region: China's successful use of "economic statecraft" to pressure wayward neighbors into closer alignment with its interests. Since 2014, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have each sought in different ways to reorient their foreign policies toward China, either to court Chinese assistance or get relief from Chinese pressure. Judging by our research below, the rewards are palpable, and a sign of Beijing's rising global influence. Because U.S.-China tensions are rising structurally, we see these country-by-country shifts toward China not as a decisive loss for the U.S. alliance but rather as the latest phase in a long game of tug-of-war that will intensify in the coming years.4 Hence the trend of unilateral economic sanctions will continue. Who is next on China's hit list? How will the U.S. respond? What countries are most and least likely to be affected? And what are the market implications? China's Economic Statecraft The United States launched a "pivot to Asia" strategy under the Obama administration to reassert American primacy in Asia Pacific and address the emerging challenge from China. The U.S.'s Asian partners largely welcomed this shift. Over the preceding decade, they had struggled with China's emergence as a military and strategic superior. The most prominent flashpoints came in the East and South China Seas. Beijing's newfound naval and air power caused regional anxiety. As the allies invited a larger U.S. role, Beijing began to assert its sovereignty claims over disputed waters and rocks, most ambitiously by creating artificial islands in the South China Sea and fortifying them with military capabilities. In three notable periods since the Great Recession, China's tensions with its neighbors have splashed over into the economic realm, prompting Beijing to impose punitive measures: Chart 2Japan's 2012 Clash With China Chart 3Chinese Boycotted Japanese Cars... Japan 2010-2012: In 2010, China and Japan clashed as the former challenged Japan's control of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea. In the September-November 2010 clash, China notoriously cut off exports of rare earths to Japan.5 A greater clash occurred from July-November 2012. Chinese people rose up in large-scale protests, damaging Japanese and other foreign property and assets. Impact: The growth of Japanese exports to China slowed noticeably between the 2010 and 2012 clashes, underperforming both that of China's neighbors and Europe (Chart 2). In particular, Chinese consumers stopped buying as many Japanese cars and switched to other brands (Chart 3). Chinese investment in Japan, which is generally very small, fell sharply in the year after the major 2012 clash, by contrast with the global trend (Chart 4). Chinese tourism to Japan also fell sharply after both incidents, though only for a short period of time (Chart 5). Chart 4...And Cut Investments In Japan... Chart 5...While Tourists Went Elsewhere Philippines 2012-2016: Tensions between China and the Philippines over the contested Spratly Islands and other rocks in the South China Sea have a long history. The latest round began in the mid-2000s, and the two countries have skirmished many times since then, including in a major showdown at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 that required the intercession of the United States to be resolved. The pressure intensified after January 2013, when the Philippines brought a high-profile case against China's maritime-territorial claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The U.S. and the Philippines upped the ante in April 2014 by signing an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Ultimately, the court dealt a humiliating blow to China's maritime-territorial claims in July 2016, but a bigger confrontation was avoided because of what had happened in the remarkable May 2016 Philippine elections, which put China-friendly populist President Rodrigo Duterte in Manila on July 1. Impact: China tightened phytosanitary restrictions on Philippine bananas during the 2012 crisis and Philippine exports to China underperformed those of its neighbors after the onset of diplomatic crisis in 2013 (Chart 6). Nevertheless, the overall impact on headline exports is debatable. Tourism suffered straightforwardly both after the 2012 showdown at sea and after the new U.S.-Philippines military deal in 2014 (Chart 7). As with Japan, the impact was temporary. Chart 6Philippine Clash With China Over Sovereignty Chart 7Chinese Tourists Snub The Philippines Vietnam 2011-14: China's quarrels with Vietnam go back millennia, but in recent years have centered on the South China Sea. As with the Philippines, frictions began rising in the mid-2000s and flared up after the global financial crisis. In the summer of 2012, Vietnam and China engaged in a dispute over new laws encompassing their territorial claims. In May 2014, the two countries fought a highly unorthodox sea-battle near the Paracel Islands. Anti-Chinese protests erupted throughout Vietnam, prompting China to restrict travel.6 Impact: It is not clear that China imposed trade measures against Vietnam - export growth was plummeting in 2012 because of China's nominal GDP slowdown as well - but certainly exports skyrocketed after the two sides began tothaw diplomatic relations in August 2014 (Chart 8).7 Direct investment from China into Vietnam fell in 2014, even as that from the rest of the world rose. Chinese tourism to Vietnam shrank in the aftermath. Chart 8Vietnam Reboots China Trade The above incidents complement a growing body of academic research demonstrating China's use of unilateral economic sanctions and their trade and market impacts.8 Bottom Line: China has employed unilateral, informal, and discrete economic sanctions and has encouraged or condoned citizen boycotts and popular activism against Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states since at least the early 2000s. Moreover, three international confrontations since 2010 suggest that China's foreign policy is growing bolder - it is not afraid to throw its economic weight around to get what it wants politically or to deter countries from challenging its interests. How Significant Is China's Wrath? Both our evidence and the scholarly literature reveal that China-inflicted economic damage tends to be temporary and sometimes ambiguous from a macro-perspective.9 For instance, if there were negative trade effects of Vietnam's 2014 clash with China, they were overwhelmed by Vietnam's rising share of China's market in the following years (Chart 9). And, as hinted above, Chinese sanctions on Philippine banana exports in 2012 can be overstated according to close inspection of the data.10 Nevertheless, since 2016, three new episodes have reinforced the fact that China's punitive measures are a significant trend with potentially serious consequences for Asian economies: Taiwan 2016: Taiwanese politics have shifted away from mainland China in recent years. The "Sunflower Protests" of 2014 marked a shift in popular opinion away from the government's program of ever-deeper economic integration with the mainland. Local elections later that year set the stage for a sweeping victory by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), taking both the presidency and, for the first time, the legislature, in January 2016.11 Tsai is a proponent of eventual Taiwanese independence and dissents from key diplomatic agreements with the mainland, the "One China Policy" and "1992 Consensus." Within six months of the election Beijing had cut off diplomatic communication. Impact: The number of mainland visitors has nosedived, by contrast with global trends (Chart 10). Taiwan's exports and access to China's market are arguably weaker than they would otherwise be. Given the historic cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, and the strong export growth in the immediate aftermath of that deal, it is curious that exports have been so weak since 2014 (Chart 11). Chart 9China Flings Open Doors To Vietnam Chart 10Mainland Tourists Punish Rebel Taiwan Chart 11So Much For Cross-Strait Trade Deals? South Korea 2016-17: China and South Korea are on the cusp of improving relations after a year of Beijing-imposed sanctions. The former government of President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached in December 2016 and removed from office in March this year, moved rapidly with the U.S. to deploy the THAAD missile defense system on South Korean soil while her government was collapsing, so as to make it a fait accompli for her likely left-leaning (and more China-friendly) successor. Her government agreed to the deployment in July 2016 and since then China has exacted substantial economic costs via Korean exports and Chinese tourism.12 The new President Moon Jae-in is now calling on China to remove these sanctions, while initiating an "environmental review" that will delay deployment of THAAD, possibly permanently. Impact: South Korean exports to China have underperformed the regional trend throughout the downfall of the Park regime and its last-minute alliance-building measures with both the U.S. and Japan (Chart 12). South Korea has also lost market share in China since agreeing to host THAAD in July 2016 (Chart 13). Furthermore, Korean car sales on the mainland have deviated markedly both from their long-term historical trend and from Japan's contemporary sales (Chart 14), the inverse of what occurred in 2012 (see Chart 3 above). Chinese tourism to South Korea has sharply declined. Chart 12China Cools On Korean Imports Chart 13China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Chart 14Korean Car Sales And Tourist Sales Slump North Korea 2016-17: Ironically, China brought sanctions against both Koreas last year - the South for THAAD, the North for its unprecedented slate of missile and nuclear tests. These provoked the United States into pressuring China via "secondary sanctions." Impact: China's sanctions on the North - which include a potentially severe ban on coal imports - are limited so far, according to the headline trade data, as China is wary of destabilizing the hermit kingdom (Chart 15). But if China does grant President Trump's request and increase the economic pressure on North Korea, it will be no less of a sign of a greater willingness to utilize economic statecraft, especially given that the North is China's only formal ally. Other countries will not fail to see the implications should they, like either Korea, cross Beijing's interests. Bottom Line: Doubts about China's new foreign policy "assertiveness" are overstated. China is increasing its unilateral use of economic levers to pressure political regimes in its neighborhood, including major EMs like Taiwan and South Korea over the past year. Korean President Moon Jae-in's rise to power is likely to produce better Sino-Korean relations, but neither it nor Taiwan is out of the woods yet, according to the data. Moreover, the rest of the region may be cautious before accepting new U.S. military deployments or contravening China's demands in other ways. The Asian "Pivot To China" Over the past two years, several Asian states have begun to vacillate toward China, not because they fear American abandonment but because the U.S. "pivot" gave them so much security reassurance that it threatened to provoke conflict with China - essentially risking a new Cold War. They live on the frontlines and wanted to discourage this escalation. At the same time, the growth slump in China/EM in 2014 - followed by China's renewed stimulus in 2015 - encouraged these states to improve business with China. Thailand began to shift in 2014, when a military junta took power in a coup and sought external support. China's partnership did not come with strings attached, as opposed to that of the U.S., with its demands about democracy and civil rights.13 The rewards of this foreign policy shift are palpable (Chart 16). China signed some big investment deals and improved strategic cooperation through arms sales. It did the same with Malaysia for similar reasons.14 China's "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) economic development initiative provided ample opportunities for expanding ties. Chart 15No Chinese Embargo On North Korea... Yet Chart 16China Opens Doors To Thai Junta The year 2016 was a major turning point. Three of China's neighbors - two of which U.S. allies - underwent domestic political transitions ushering in more favorable policies toward China: Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communist Party held its twelfth National Congress in January 2016. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a pro-market reformer from the capitalist south, failed to secure the position of general secretary of the party and retired. The incumbent General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong retained his seat, and oversaw the promotion of key followers, strengthening Vietnam's pro-China faction. Since then Trong has visited President Xi in Beijing and signed a joint communique on improving strategic relations. As mentioned above, Vietnamese exports to China have exploded since tensions subsided in 2014. South Korea: In April 2016, South Korean legislative elections saw the left-leaning Democratic Party win a plurality of seats, setting the stage for the 2017 election discussed above, when Korea officially moved in a more China-friendly direction under President Moon. The Philippines: In May 2016, the Philippines elected Duterte, a firebrand southern populist who declared that the Philippines would "separate" itself from the U.S. and ally with Russia and China. Though Duterte has already modified his anti-American stance - as we expected - he is courting Chinese trade and investment at the expense of the Philippines' sovereignty concerns.15 Trump's election contributed to this regional trend. By suggesting a desire for the U.S. to stop playing defender of last resort in the region, Trump reinforced the need for allies like Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea to go their own way. And by canceling the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump forced Malaysia and Vietnam to make amends with China, while vindicating those (like Thailand and Indonesia) that had remained aloof. Bottom Line: Having brandished its sticks, China is now offering carrots to states that recognize its growing regional influence. These do not have to be express measures, given that China is stimulating its economy and increasing outbound investment for its own reasons. All China need do is refrain from denying access to its market and investment funds. Whom Will China Sanction Next? Geopolitical risk on the Korean peninsula remains elevated given that North Korea remains in "provocation mode" and Trump has prioritized the issue. However, we expect that Moon will cooperate with China enough to give a boost to South Korean exports and China-exposed companies and sectors. With South Korea's shifting policy, Beijing has a major opportunity to demonstrate the positive economic rewards of pro-China foreign policy. If a new round of international negotiations gets under way and North Korean risk subsides for a time (our baseline view),16 then East Asian governments will turn to other interests. We see two key places of potential confrontation over the next 12-24 months: Taiwan is the top candidate for Chinese sanctions going forward. The cross-strait relationship is fraught and susceptible to tempests. The ruling DPP lacks domestic political constraints, which could be conducive to policy mistakes. Moreover, Trump has signaled his intention to strengthen the alliance with Taiwan, which could cause problems. China is likely to oppose the new $1.4 billion package of U.S. arms more actively than in the past, given its greater global heft. Trump's initial threat of altering the One China Policy has not been forgotten. In terms of timing, China may not want to give a tailwind to the DPP by acting overly aggressive ahead of the 2018 local elections, which are crucial for the opposition Kuomintang's attempt to revive in time for the 2020 presidential vote. But this is not a hard constraint on Beijing's imposing sanctions before then. Japan is the second-likeliest target of Chinese economic pressure. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is up for re-election no later than December 2018 and is becoming more vulnerable as he shifts emphasis from pocketbook issues to Japan's national security.17 Needless to say, the revival of the military is the part of Abe's agenda that Beijing most opposes. China would like to see Abe weakened, or voted out, and would especially like to see Abe's proposed constitutional revisions fail in the popular referendum slated for 2020. China would not want to strengthen Abe by provoking Japanese nationalism. But if Abe is losing support, and Beijing calculates that the Japanese public is starting to view Abe and his constitutional revisions as too provocative and destabilizing, then a well-timed diplomatic crisis with economic sanctions may be in order.18 Next in line are Hong Kong and Singapore, though Beijing has already largely gotten its way in recent disputes with the two city-states.19 Other possibilities on the horizon: The eventual return to a fractious civilian government in Thailand, or improved U.S.-Thai relations, could spoil China's infrastructure plans and sour its willingness to support an otherwise lackluster Thai economy. Also, a surprise victory by the opposition in Malaysian general elections (either this year or next) could see the recent rapprochement with China falter. The latter would be cyclical tensions, whereas suppressed structural tensions with Vietnam and the Philippines could boil back up to the surface fairly quickly at any time and provoke Chinese retaliation. Bottom Line: The most likely targets of Chinese economic sanctions in the near future are Taiwan and Japan. South Korea could remain a target if events should force Moon to abandon his policy agenda, though we see this as unlikely. Hong Kong and Singapore also remain in the danger zone, as do Vietnam and the Philippines in the long run. Investment Implications Cyclical and structural macro trends drive exports and investment trends in Asia Pacific. The biggest immediate risk to EM Asian economies stems not from Chinese sanctions - given that most of these economies have adjusted their policies to appease China to some extent - but from China's economic policy uncertainty, which remains at very elevated levels (Chart 17). It was after this uncertainty surged in 2015 that China's neighbors took on a more accommodating stance with a focus on economic cooperation rather than strategic balancing. Chart 17Chinese Economic Policy Uncertainty Still Asia's Biggest Risk Currently Chinese economic policy uncertainty is hooking back up as a result of the decision by state authorities to intensify their financial crackdown - the so-called "deleveraging campaign." BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out that China's slowing fiscal and credit impulse will drag down both Chinese import volumes and emerging market corporate earnings in the coming months (Chart 18). Already commodity prices and commodity currencies have dropped off, heralding a broader slowdown in global trade as a result of China's policy tightening. This trend will overwhelm the effect of almost any new geopolitical spats or sanctions. The same can be said for Chinese investment as for Chinese trade. Over the past couple of decades, China has emerged as one of the world's leading sources of direct investment (Chart 19). This is a secular trend. Thus while foreign relations have affected China's investment patterns - most recently in giving the Philippines a boost under Duterte - the general trend of rising Chinese investment abroad will continue regardless of temporary quarrels. This is particularly true in light of China's efforts to energize OBOR. Chart 18China: Stimulus Fading Chart 19China's Emergence As Major Global Investor The key question is how will China's political favor or disfavor impact neighboring economies on the margin, in relative terms, on a sectoral basis, or in the short term? The evidence above feeds into several trends in relative equity performance: China fights either Japan or Korea: Going long Korea / short Japan would have paid off throughout the major Sino-Japanese tensions 2010-12, and would have paid off again during the South Korean impeachment rally (Chart 20). Of course, geopolitics is only one factor. But even Japan's economic shift in 2012 (Abenomics) is part of the geopolitical dynamic. Chart 20China Fights Either Japan Or Korea Chart 21Taiwan's Loss = Japan's Gain Taiwan's loss is Japan's gain: China's measures against Japanese exporters from 2010-12 coincided with a period of intense cross-strait economic integration that benefited Taiwanese exporters. Then Japan adopted Abenomics and dialed down tensions with China, and Taiwan underwent a pro-independence turn, provoking Beijing's displeasure (Chart 21). If one of these countries ends up quarreling with China in the near future, as we expect, the other country's exporters may reap the benefit. If relations worsen with both, South Korea stands to gain. Favor EM reformers: Vietnamese and Philippine equities outperformed EM from 2011-16 despite heightened tensions in the South China Sea (Chart 22). During this time, we recommended an overweight position on both countries relative to EM, even though we took the maritime tensions very seriously, because we favored EM reformers and both countries were undertaking structural reforms.20 Later, in May 2016, we downgraded the Philippines to neutral, expecting a loss of reform momentum after Duterte's election. The Philippines has notably underperformed the EM equity benchmark since that time.21 The "One China Policy": We closed out our "long One China Policy" trade on June 14 as a result of China's persistence in its crackdown on the banks, which we see as very risky.22 However, we may reinitiate the trade in the future, as Hong Kong and Taiwan remain vulnerable both to the slowdown in globalization and to Beijing's sanctions over deepening political differences (Chart 23). Chart 22Reforms Pay... Even During Island Tensions Chart 23The 'One China Policy' As A Trade From Sunshine to Moonshine: South Korea's Moon Jae-in has substantial political capital and we expect that he will succeed in boosting growth, wages, and the social security net, all of which will be bullish for South Korean consumer stocks. Yet we remain wary of the fact that North Korea is not yet falling into line with new negotiations. A way to hedge is to go long the South Korean consumer relative to Taiwanese exporters (Chart 24), which will live under the shadow of Beijing's disfavor at least until the 2020 elections, if not beyond. Taiwan has also allowed its currency to appreciate notably against the USD since Trump's post-election phone call with President Tsai, which is negative for Taiwanese exporters. Chart 24Go Long Korean Consumer /##br## Short Taiwanese Exporter China's sanctions are essentially a "slap on the wrist" in economic terms. But sometimes they reflect deeper structural tensions, and thus they may foreshadow far more damaging clashes down the road that could have longer term consequences, just as the Sino-Japanese incident of 2012 demonstrated. That is all the more reason to hedge one's bets on Taiwan today. These sanctions are bound to recur and will provide investors with trading opportunities, if not long-term investment themes. It will pay to capitalize quickly at the outset of any serious increase in tensions going forward. As a final word, the Trump administration's recent moves to impose economic penalties on China - namely through "secondary sanctions" due to North Korea, but also through potential trade tariffs and/or penalties related to human trafficking and human rights - highlight the fact that the use of unilateral sanctions is not limited to China. Geopolitical risk is rising in Asia as a result of actions on both sides of the Pacific. Sino-American antagonism in particular poses the greatest geopolitical danger to global markets, as we have frequently emphasized.23 And as Trump's domestic agenda struggles he will seek to get tougher on China, as he promised to his populist base on the campaign trail. In the event of a major geopolitical crisis in the region, we recommend the same mix of safe-haven assets that we have recommended in the past: U.S. treasuries, Swiss bonds, JGBs, and gold.24 Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our longstanding investment theme of rising geopolitical risk in East Asia, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, and Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Emerging Market Equity Sector and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "South Korea: A Comeback For Consumer Stocks?" dated June 27, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, Moon is walking a tight rope in relation to the United States. During his visit to Washington on June 29, he assured Congressman Paul Ryan among others that he did not necessarily intend to reverse the THAAD agreement as a whole. That would depend on the outcome of the environmental review and due legal process in South Korea as well as on whether North Korea's behavior makes the missile defense system necessary. Please see Kim Ji-eun, "In US Congress, Pres. Moon Highlights Democratic Values Of Alliance With US," The Hankyoreh, July 1, 2017, available at English.hani.co.kr. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Jeffrey R. Dundon, "Triggers of Chinese Economic Coercion," Naval Postgraduate School, September, 2014, available at calhoun.nps.edu. 6 For a very conservative estimate of China's actions during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 incident, please see Angela Poh, "The Myth Of Chinese Sanctions Over South China Sea Disputes," Washington Quarterly 40:1 (2017), pp. 143-165. 7 Please see "Vietnam Party official heads to China to defuse tensions," Thanh Nien Daily, August 25, 2014, available at www.thanhniennews.com. 8 Please see Faqin Lin, Cui Hu, and Andreas Fuchs, "How Do Firms Respond To Political Tensions? The Heterogeneity Of The Dalai Lama Effect On Trade," University of Heidelberg Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series 628, August 2016, available at papers.ssrn.com. This study improves upon earlier ones, notably Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, "Paying A Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect On International Trade," Journal Of International Economics 91 (2013), pp 164-77. See also Christina L. Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson, "State Control And The Effects Of Foreign Relations On Bilateral Trade," October 16, 2016, MPRA Paper No. 74597, available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74597/ ; Yinghua He, Ulf Nielsson, and Yonglei Wang, "Hurting Without Hitting: The Economic Cost of Political Tension," Toulouse School of Economics Working Papers 14-484 (July 2015), available at econpapers.repec.org; Raymond Fisman, Yasushi Hamao, and Yongxiang Wang, "Nationalism and Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-Japanese Relations," NBER Working Paper 20089 (May 2014) available at www.nber.org; Scott L. Kastner, "Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China's International Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 60:6 (2016), pp. 980-1007. 9 The "Dalai Lama effect," in which countries that host a visit from the Dalai Lama suffer Chinese trade retaliation, has been revised downward over the years - the trade costs are only statistically significant in the second quarter after the visit. Please see "How Do Firms Respond," cited in footnote 8. 10 See "Myth Of Chinese Sanctions," cited in footnote 6. Chinese sanctions on Norwegian salmon exports after Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 also fall under this category. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see Lee Ho-Jeong, "Thaad may lead to $7.5B in economic losses in 2017," Joongang Daily, May 4, 2017, available at www.joongangdaily.com. 13 Please see Ian Storey, "Thailand's Post-Coup Relations With China And America: More Beijing, Less Washington," Yusof Ishak Institute, Trends in Southeast Asia 20 (2015). 14 Malaysia began to move closer to China after its 2013 election, which initiated a period of political turbulence and scandal. This trend, along with economic slowdown, prompted the ruling coalition to turn to Beijing for support. 15 He is also, as current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), assisting China's negotiations toward settling a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea. This is not likely to be a binding agreement - China will not voluntarily reverse its strategic maritime-territorial gains - but it could dampen tensions for a time in the region and encourage better relations between China and Southeast Asia. For the 2016 Asian pivot to China discussed above, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 The LDP's dramatic defeat in Tokyo's local elections on July 2 is the first tangible sign that the constitutional agenda, Abe's corruption scandals, and the emergence of a competing political leader, Yuriko Koike, are taking a toll on the LDP. 18 Also, Beijing may at any point rotate its maritime assertiveness back to the East China Sea, where tensions with Japan have quieted since 2013-14. Further, Beijing will want to exploit worsening relations between Japan and South Korea, and drive a wedge between Japan and Russia as they attempt a historic diplomatic thaw. 19 Beijing is attempting to steal a march on these states, especially in finance, while putting pressure on them to avoid activities that undermine Beijing's regional influence. So far there is only small evidence that tensions have affected trade. First, Hong Kong saw a drop in tourists and a block on cultural exports amid the Umbrella Protests of 2014. China's central government has acted aggressively over the past year to suppress Hong Kong agitation, by excluding rebel lawmakers from office and by drawing a "red line" against undermining Chinese sovereignty. Yet agitation will persist because of the frustration of local political forces and the youth, both of which resent the mainland's increasing heavy-handedness. Meanwhile, China and Singapore are in the process this month of improving relations after the November-January spat relating to Singapore-Taiwanese military ties. But China's encroachment on Singapore's traditional advantages - finance, oil refining, freedom of navigation, strong military relations with the U.S. and Taiwan, political stability - is likely to continue. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, "Geopolitical Risk: A Golden Opportunity?" dated July 9, 2014, and "In Need Of Global Political Recapitalization," dated June 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report, "Buy Vietnamese Stocks," dated July 17, 2015, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Has Europe Switched From Reward To Risk," dated June 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Chart 1Too Pessimistic On Growth Treasury yields bounced sharply last week and the yield curve steepened. As a result the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index posted a negative return in June, only the second month of negative Treasury returns so far in 2017. Last week's increase in yields could signal that growth expectations have finally become overly pessimistic. Our U.S. Investment Strategy service has calculated that after the U.S. Economic Surprise Index rises above 40, its average peak to trough decline lasts 90 days. Given that the surprise index peaked above 40 in mid-March, a bottoming-out in the coming weeks would be right on schedule (Chart 1). Net speculative positioning in the futures market has also capitulated, swinging sharply from net short to net long. In recent years, extreme net long positioning has led to higher Treasury yields during the following three months (bottom panel). Our assessment is that U.S. growth will remain above trend for the remainder of the year, and the Treasury curve will continue to bear-steepen as the economic data start to outperform downbeat expectations. Stay at below-benchmark duration, in curve steepeners, overweight spread product versus Treasuries, and overweight TIPS versus nominals. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 50 basis points in June. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 4 bps to end the month at 109 bps. Though below its historical mean, the investment grade spread is actually somewhat elevated compared to the early stages of prior Fed tightening cycles (Chart 2). We calculate that in the early stages of the past two tightening cycles (February 1994 to July 1994 & June 2004 to December 2005), the index option-adjusted spread averaged 90 bps and traded in a range between 66 bps and 107 bps. While spreads are currently more attractive than is typical for this stage of the cycle, there is good reason for investors to demand some extra risk premium. In a recent report1 we observed that non-financial corporate debt as a percent of GDP is already as high as it was during the past two recessions. Further, the majority of this debt has been issued to finance direct payments to shareholders (dividends & buybacks) as opposed to capital investment. This unfavorable shift in corporate capital structures means that bond investors should demand somewhat greater compensation. All in all, we do not see potential for much spread tightening from current levels. However, a large spread widening would be equally unlikely given the favorable back-drop of steady growth and muted inflation. Small positive excess returns, consistent with carry, remains the most likely scenario. Energy debt underperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 12 bps in June. The sector still looks cheap after adjusting for credit rating and duration (Table 3), and our commodity strategists remain bullish on oil. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 35 basis points in June. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp to end the month at 364 bps, 20 bps above its 2017 low. Energy sector spreads widened sharply in June, alongside falling oil prices, once again de-coupling from the overall index spread (Chart 3). Junk-rated energy credits underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 190 bps in June, while the High-Yield index excluding energy outperformed by 70 bps. In a report published today,2 our Energy Sector Strategy service takes a detailed look at credit risk among high-yield energy issuers, concluding that while the worst of the energy bankruptcy cycle is behind us, $23 billion of high-yield energy debt remains in distress. 91% of that distressed debt is in the Exploration & Production and Offshore Drilling & Transportation sectors. The continued moderation in energy sector defaults will ensure that the overall speculative grade default rate trends lower for the rest of the year, probably settling below 3% (bottom panel). The decline in defaults means that the current compensation offered by junk spreads in excess of expected default losses stands at 221 bps, right in line with its historical average (panel 3). In last week's report,3 we showed that a default-adjusted spread of 221 bps is consistent with excess returns close to 150 bps during the next 12 months. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in June, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -20 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 11 bps on the month, driven by a 7 bps increase in the rate component and a 6 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS). This was partially offset by a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). In last week's report,4 we examined the risk/reward trade-off in different Aaa-rated spread products. We found that despite some recent widening in MBS OAS, you still need to move into 4% coupons or higher to find competitive spreads relative to Aaa-rated corporates, consumer ABS, agency CMBS and non-agency CMBS. Further, MBS OAS are still too tight compared to the trend in net issuance (Chart 4), and even though depressed refi activity will continue to hold down the option cost component of spreads, it is unlikely that a lower option cost will be able to completely offset wider OAS during the next 12 months. The Fed released more details about its balance sheet run-off plan at the June FOMC meeting. We now know that the Fed will start by allowing only $4 billion of MBS per month to run off its balance sheet, but this cap will increase by $4 billion every 3 months until it reaches $20 billion per month. This means that even if the Fed starts to wind down its balance sheet following the September meeting, which is our base case expectation, then it will still be some time before a significant amount of extra supply shifts into the private market. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +107 bps. Sovereigns and Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 65 bps and 73 bps, respectively. The low-beta Supranational and Domestic Agency sectors outperformed by 2 bps and 10 bps, respectively. The Foreign Agency sector underperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 4 bps, alongside the dip in oil prices. A weakening U.S. dollar has led to the outperformance of USD-denominated sovereign debt so far this year. Year-to-date, the Sovereign index has outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 300 bps. This is better than the equivalently-rated Baa U.S. Corporate index, which has outperformed by 195 bps year-to-date. However, there are already signs that the trade-weighted dollar is starting to moderate its downtrend (Chart 5), and we expect the trade-weighted dollar will strengthen as the economic data surprise to the upside in the back half of the year, as discussed on the first page of this report. Granted, the Mexican peso continues to strengthen versus the dollar (panel 3) and this currency pair is particularly important since Mexico is the largest issuer in the Sovereign index. On the heels of its recent outperformance, the Sovereign sector once again looks expensive compared to U.S. corporate sectors, after adjusting for credit rating and duration. Meanwhile, the Local Authority and Foreign Agency sectors continue to look cheap. Supranationals and Domestic Agencies offer very little additional compensation relative to Treasuries, and as we discussed last week,5 there are better options available for investors in need of high-quality spread product. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 18 basis points in June (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Last month we observed that Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratios had become very tight, and we advised reducing municipal bond exposure to underweight. The average M/T yield ratio ticked higher in June, but at 85%, it remains more than one standard deviation below its post-crisis average (Chart 6). There is more compensation available at the long-end of the muni curve than at the short-end (panel 2), and investors should continue to favor long maturities over short maturities on the Aaa Muni curve. The National Association of State Budget Officers recently released its Fiscal Survey of the States and it showed that overall general fund expenditures are expected to increase by only 1% in the 2018 fiscal year, the slowest rate of growth since 2009/10. Meanwhile, 23 states have already enacted mid-year budget cuts in 2017. Budget cutting measures are clearly a response to disappointing tax revenues, which should bounce back somewhat in fiscal year 2018.6 This will help reduce net borrowing, though probably not by enough to justify current municipal bond valuations (panel 3). The state of Illinois avoided a ratings downgrade to junk this week, as the State House of Representatives voted to approve an income tax increase. This measure will keep the rating agencies at bay for now, but a downgrade is still possible in the coming months if the state fails to pass a budget for fiscal year 2018. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-flattened for most of June, before suddenly reversing course and bear-steepening late in the month. The 2/10 slope flattened 15 basis points between the end of May and June 26, and then steepened 15 bps between June 26 and the end of the month. All told, the 2/10 slope was unchanged in June, while the 5/30 slope flattened 17 bps. The abrupt transition from bull-flattening to bear-steepening was prompted by comments from European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi that suggested a much more hawkish bias from the ECB. Higher rate expectations in the rest of the world should put downward pressure on the U.S. dollar, and historically, bearish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar has led to a steeper U.S. yield curve (Chart 7, bottom panel). This correlation has not held up so far this year, and we suspect this is because a weaker dollar has not translated into higher U.S. inflation and inflation expectations, as it usually does. We have previously made the case that inflation and inflation expectations, and not Fed tightening, are the main determinants of the slope of the yield curve (panel 4).7 As such, we attribute the bulk of this year's curve flattening to disappointing core inflation which has dragged TIPS breakevens lower. This should reverse in the coming months.8 Investors should continue to position for a steeper curve by favoring the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 86 basis points in June. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate fell 8 bps on the month and, at 1.75%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. In a recent report9 we outlined three possible scenarios for Treasury yields between now and the end of the year based on the interaction between incoming inflation data and Fed policy. In our base case scenario inflation will start to rebound in the coming months, heeding the message from our Phillips Curve model (Chart 8), leading to wider TIPS breakevens and keeping the Fed on its current tightening path. Even if realized inflation remains depressed, the next most likely scenario is that the Fed will capitulate later this year and adopt a shallower expected rate hike path. Such a dovish reaction from the Fed would lend support to long-maturity breakeven wideners, even though real yields would decline. The least likely scenario, in our view, is one where realized inflation remains low but the Fed sticks to its hawkish rhetoric. This is also the scenario that would lead to the most downside in the cost of inflation protection. May PCE inflation data were released last Friday, with year-over-year core PCE decelerating from 1.50% to 1.39%, and trimmed mean PCE decelerating from 1.70% to 1.66% (panel 4). One bright spot is that our PCE Diffusion Index swung sharply into positive territory. Historically, this index has a strong track record signaling turning points in core inflation (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +54 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 2 bps on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. Despite low spreads relative to history, in a recent report10 we showed that Aaa-rated ABS appear quite attractive compared to other Aaa-rated spread product. Specifically, Aaa consumer ABS offer greater compensation per unit of duration than Agency bonds, agency MBS and Aaa Credit. They offer similar compensation per unit of duration to Agency CMBS, but less than non-Agency Aaa CMBS. Within consumer ABS, auto loan-backed securitizations offer slightly greater compensation than the credit card-backed variety (Chart 9). However, we still prefer credit card ABS over auto loan ABS. While credit card charge-offs remain historically low, auto net loss rates are rising. Auto lending standards also moved deeper into "net tightening" territory in the first quarter, according to the Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey, while credit card lending standards dipped back into "net easing" territory (bottom panel). We continue to recommend that investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans within an overall overweight allocation to consumer ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +57 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 1 bp on the month, and remains below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). In last week's report,11 we showed that non-agency CMBS offer by far the most compensation per unit of duration of any Aaa-rated spread sector. However, we are concerned that non-agency CMBS spreads will widen on a 6-12 month horizon. Commercial real estate lending standards are tightening and property prices are decelerating. Both of these developments tend to correlate with wider spreads. Despite lower spreads, we are much more comfortable in the Agency CMBS market. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in June, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +54 bps. Agency CMBS offer somewhat lower spreads than their non-agency counterparts, but this sector should be more insulated from spread widening in the months ahead. Not only do these securities benefit from agency backing, but they also mostly comprise multi-family loans. Multi-family property prices have been stronger than those in the retail and office sectors, and delinquencies have been lower (bottom 2 panels). Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.52% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.45%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound. The U.S. PMI has dipped lower in recent months, but remains firmly entrenched above the 50 boom/bust line. Meanwhile, the Eurozone PMI continues to surge ahead. China's PMI sent a worrying signal when it dipped below 50 in May, but it bounced back to 50.4 last month (bottom panel). Overall, the Global PMI came in at 52.6 in June, no change from the prior month. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.35%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "HY Debt Update: Offshore Drilling & Transportation Getting Left Behind", dated July 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will The Fed Stick To Its Guns?", dated May 16, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk Rally Extended", dated June 27, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of June 30th, 2017. The model has continued to reduce its allocation to the U.S. and now for the first time the U.S. allocation is slightly below benchmark. Within the non-U.S. universe of the 11 countries, the model has also made significant adjustments to shift weights to Italy (now the largest overweight) and Australia (now for the first time it is overweight by the model), while underweight Germany and France. These adjustments are mainly due to liquidity and technical indicators, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 14 bps in June, largely due to the underperformance of Level 2 model where the overweight of the Euro area v.s. the underweight of Australia and Canada hurt the performance. Since going live, the overall model has outperformed its benchmark by 139 bps. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model". http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of June 30, 2017. Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The model continues to overweight cyclicals versus defensives. Additionally, the model has turned overweight financials and underweight consumer discretionary on the back of momentum. This overweight in financials is now in line with our global sector recommendations published yesterday. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Central Banks: The sharp sell-off in global bond markets last week was triggered by more upbeat comments on growth and inflation by several major central bankers, most notably ECB President Mario Draghi. ECB Tapering: Draghi's positive views on the European economy are generally accurate, which puts the ECB on a path to taper its asset purchases next year. Bunds vs. JGBs: Bund yields have more upside in the next 3-6 months as the market reprices a smaller amount of ECB bond buying. Downgrade core European government bonds to underweight (2 out of 5) and upgrade low-beta Japan to maximum overweight (5 out of 5). Feature "The threat of deflation is gone and reflationary forces are at play." - Mario Draghi Chart of the WeekA Co-Ordinated Tightening On The Horizon? Bond market volatility awoke with a vengeance last week, as investors digested a string of hawkish comments from previously dovish central banks. A surprisingly optimistic speech from European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi set the tone, triggering the biggest single day rise in German bond yields in over two years. This was followed up by comments from Bank of England (BoE) Governor Mark Carney and Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz suggesting that higher rates may be needed soon in the U.K. and Canada, triggering sell-offs in Gilts and Canadian bonds. Even U.S. Treasury yields rose alongside the global move, without any positive U.S. data or more hawkish Fed commentary. This move to a more hawkish tone - or, at least, a less dovish message - is consistent with the current strength of the global economy, as well as the robust performance of risk assets so far in 2017. Policymakers are now being forced to adjust their biases to reflect the more positive backdrop, forcing a repricing of interest rate expectations with most developed economies hovering around full employment (Chart of the Week). A "coordinated" move to tweak policy rates higher suggests bond yields have more room to rise - especially after the decline since March that has driven most government bond yields to expensive levels. The bigger risk for global bonds, however, will come from a likely shift in ECB policy towards a reduction in the size of their current bond purchase program. As we saw last week, even a mere mention of a need to shift to a less accommodative monetary stance was enough to cause Bund yields to nearly double in a matter of days. We have been positioned for a renewed rise in bond yields through our recommended below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. We are also positioned for a bear-steepening of government bond yield curves in our model bond portfolio, as our recommended duration exposures are concentrated in shorter-maturity bonds. With central banks only looking to catch up to the underlying state of the global economy, rather than aiming to more aggressively tighten policy to cool off growth, there is more potential for longer-dated bond yields to rise relative to shorter-maturity debt - especially with market-based inflation expectations now looking too low in most countries. In other words, expect more bear-steepening of global yield curves (ex-Japan) in the next few months. Dissecting Draghi's Speech The jump in global yields last week was broad based, both across countries and when broken down into valuation components. The "high-yielders" among developed markets (U.S., Canada, U.K.), saw modest increases in inflation expectations and term premia, while rate hike expectations jumped sharply in Canada and the U.K. (Chart 2). Among the "low-yielders" (Germany, Japan), the 22bps jump in Bund yields came through higher term premia, with only very modest moves higher in rate hike or inflation expectations (Chart 3). Japanese yields didn't move at all, consistent with the view that the Bank of Japan is the one central bank that does not need to become less accommodative with Japanese core inflation back down to 0%. Chart 2Global Yields Starting To Perk Up A Bit... Chart 3...Led By Europe Mario Draghi's speech, which set off last week's yield spike, was such a shock to markets because of the upbeat description of the underlying strength of the Euro Area economy. It is important to consider where this speech was given - in front of global policymakers at the annual ECB Forum on Central Banking in Portugal (the ECB equivalent to the Fed's annual Jackson Hole conference). The head of the central bank that has been providing the highest degree of monetary stimulus among the major economies over the past couple of years told his global peers that the need for such an extreme accommodative policy stance was now diminished. This is a message shared by the BCA Central Bank Monitors, which are pointing to a need for tighter monetary policy everywhere except Japan (Chart 4). Chart 4Tighter Monetary Policy Is Required Is such a high-conviction view from the ECB justified? Let's do a little "truth check" on some of Draghi's most relevant comments from his speech: "All the signs now point to a strengthening and broadening recovery in the Euro Area." TRUE. Most reliable cyclical indicators - PMIs, consumer confidence, business confidence - are all at, or beyond, pre-2008 crisis levels (Chart 5). The German IFO index hit a record high in June, while data has been strengthening across all the major Euro Area economies (even Italy). "We can be more assured about the return of inflation to our objective than we were a few years ago. [However,] inflation dynamics are not yet durable and self-sustaining. So our monetary policy needs to be persistent." TRUE. The Euro Area unemployment rate at 9.5% now sits within hailing distance of the OECD's estimate of the full employment "NAIRU" rate of 9%. Already, core inflation and wage growth are stabilizing in the Euro Area (Chart 6), suggesting that the estimated full employment rate may be an accurate measure. The ECB is forecasting that the unemployment rate will fall to 8.4% by 2019, which would be below the OECD NAIRU level, and the ECB is now forecasting that Euro Area core inflation will rise to 1.8% within two years. That would likely be close enough to the ECB's official inflation target (headline inflation at or just below 2%) for a potential rate hike by then, but not before. Chart 5European Growth Looks Very Healthy Chart 6Full Employment Is In Sight "The past period of low inflation is [...] on the whole temporary and should not cause inflation to deviate from its trend over the medium term." MOST LIKELY TRUE. The steep fall in European inflation in 2014 triggered deflation fears, and prompted the ECB to finally engage in an asset purchase program just as the Fed was ending its' own "QE". Much of that decline was related to the sharp downturn in global energy prices. Draghi also noted in his speech that, by the ECB's own estimates, around two thirds of the undershoot of Euro Area inflation in 2015/16 came from the impact of lower energy prices. He also mentioned that past fall in oil prices and other "global shocks" are likely to still be restraining core inflation to some degree via pass-through effects in parts of the economy that are more energy-intensive. Draghi did also point out that the current low oil prices are mainly supply driven (a view that BCA's commodity strategists whole-heartedly agree with) and, therefore, can be "looked through" by a central bank. That may be dangerous view to take with wage inflation still subdued in Europe, but it seems clear that core inflation has indeed bottomed out and is in the process of a slow grind higher (Chart 7). This is also helping to stabilize inflation expectations in Europe to some degree, although it is far too early for the ECB to declare victory over "low-flation." "Political winds are becoming tailwinds. There is newfound confidence in the reform process, and newfound support for European cohesion, which could help unleash pent-up demand and investment." TRUE. The 2017 political calendar appeared daunting at the start of the year, with elections scheduled in the Netherlands, France and Germany anti-euro candidates scoring better-than-expected in the polling data. The ECB even cited political uncertainty as one of the reasons for extending its asset purchase program to the end of 2017, in case there was a surprise win by a "Euro-skeptic" party. The electoral losses by Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Marine Le Pen in France were strong signals that the anti-establishment wave that had washed over the U.K. and U.S. last year would not spill over into Europe. There is a new potential risk in Italy, where fresh parliamentary elections are expected to be called sometime in the first half of 2018. The polling numbers are tight there, with pro- and anti-euro parties showing roughly equal levels of support. Yet with the Italian economy showing some improvement alongside the rest of Europe, and with Italian banks under less immediate pressure after some successful recent rescue packages for struggling lenders (Chart 8), there is less risk of an anti-euro uprising in the polls in Italy next year. Chart 7From Deflation Fears To Reflation Cheers Chart 8Italy Is No Constraint To An ECB Taper At a minimum, the ECB likely would not factor politics into any decision on tapering its asset purchases starting in 2018. Chart 9Taper Tantrum 2.0? "As the economy continues to recover, a constant policy stance will become more accommodative, and the central bank can accompany the recovery by adjusting the parameters of its policy instruments - not to tighten the policy stance, but to keep it broadly unchanged." TRUE. The Fed was making similar arguments when they moved away from QE bond purchases and, eventually, the timing of the first rate hike. Using words like how the U.S. economy had "healed" from the financial crisis by enough to start removing some policy accommodation. In some respects, the European economy is in much better shape than when the Fed began its own taper in 2014. In Chart 9, we present an idea that we published earlier this year, showing the comparison of Europe now versus the U.S. pre-Fed taper. This is a "cycle-on-cycle" analysis, where the European and U.S. data are lined up to the peak of our months-to-hike indicator, noting the timing of the first rate hike priced into OIS curves after the period of 0% policy rates. The chart shows that the current Euro Area economy is about two percentage points closer to full employment than the U.S. was just before the infamous 2013 Taper Tantrum. The Fed began signaling that major policy shift with core inflation below its 2% target, at similar levels to the current European core inflation rate. A look at the subsequent moves in bond yields and term premia (bottom two panels) suggests that Europe could be on the verge of its own Taper Tantrum in the next few months. Summing it all up, we conclude that the optimism on the European growth and inflation outlook expressed by Draghi is justified. Barring a sudden collapse in the economy or inflation over the summer, the ECB looks to be on course to announce a tapering of its bond purchases, starting in 2018, at the upcoming September policy meeting. Bottom Line: The sharp sell-off in global bond markets last week was triggered by more upbeat comments on growth and inflation by several major central bankers, most notably ECB President Mario Draghi. We see Draghi's positive views on the European economy to be generally accurate, which puts the ECB on a path to taper its asset purchases next year. Downgrade Core European Government Bonds To Underweight Our expectation heading into 2017 was that core European bonds would outperform U.S. Treasuries in the first half of the year as the Fed delivered more rate hikes and the ECB maintained a highly dovish tone at least through the April/May French presidential elections.1 After that, assuming the French election went according to our expectations with a Le Pen loss, the ECB would then turn its attention to potential "taper talk" that would trigger an underperformance of core Europe versus Treasuries. The U.S. Treasury rally since March defied our forecast, even though the Fed did actually hike rates twice! While we still see more Fed tightening and higher U.S. yields as the base case in the latter half of the year, the European story is playing out as we expected. We are sticking to our plan after last week's developments, and we are downgrading core European bonds (Germany, France, Italy) to a recommended underweight ranking (2 out of 5). Importantly, we've likely seen the low in European yields even if there is no tapering in 2018. In Chart 10, we update an analysis we did earlier this year, looking at the projected size of the ECB's monetary base under various asset purchase scenarios for next year: The ECB stops "cold turkey" on December 31 and buys no additional bonds in 2018; The ECB tapers its €60bn/month of bond buying to zero by June 2018; The ECB tapers its €60bn/month of bond buying to zero by December 2018; The ECB announces no taper and keeps on buying at €60bn/month throughout 2018. In the bottom two panels of Chart 10, we show the growth rate of the ECB's monetary base versus the German Bund yield and the term premium. The projections for the growth rates are based off the four scenarios laid out above. In all cases, the growth in the expansion of the ECB monetary base (and its balance sheet) will slow next year - even if there is no tapering. Importantly, the euro is unlikely to spike versus the U.S. dollar in the event of a tapering, as relative money supplies and policy interest rates will remain USD-bullish (Chart 11). Chart 10The ECB Effect On Bunds Will Soon Fade Chart 11A Taper-Fueled Rise In The Euro Has Its Limits This is the dirty little secret about central bank asset purchase programs. They must be delivered in even bigger sizes than before to have the same impact on asset prices and, eventually, economic growth and inflation. Chart 12UST-Bund Spread Looks Too Low We now feel comfortable shifting to a reduced recommended country allocation to core Europe in our model bond portfolio. We have been maintaining a below-benchmark duration stance in core Europe for the past couple of months, by placing less recommended exposure in the longer maturity "buckets" in our portfolio and overweighting the shorter-maturity buckets. Now, we are comfortable cutting the allocation to core Europe across all buckets based on our views on the ECB. What should be upgraded if we are downgrading Europe? As mentioned, we had expected to upgrade U.S. Treasuries at this point in the year, but the disappointing run of U.S. data (especially versus Europe) drove the Treasury-Bund spread sharply lower (Chart 12). Given our view that the U.S. economy and inflation will rebound in the latter half of this year and prompt the Fed to deliver more hikes, we see the Treasury-Bund spread as too low to recommend shifting out of core Europe into the U.S. Instead, we see a better case to upgrade the most defensive country in the developed bond universe - Japan. There is a clear divergence between recent growth and inflation data in the Euro Area versus Japan, most notably with core inflation returning to 0% in Japan (Chart 13). The JGB-Bund spread looks to be at critical support levels that could trigger a quick tightening, especially if there are more upside data surprises in Europe or disappointments in Japan (Chart 14). Chart 13Europe & Japan Are Diverging Chart 14Reduce Core European Exposure In Favor Of JGBs Bottom Line: Bund yields have more upside in the next 3-6 months as the market reprices a smaller amount of ECB bond buying. Downgrade core European government bonds to underweight (2 out of 5) and upgrade low-beta Japan to maximum overweight (5 out of 5). Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "How To Think About Global Bond Investing In 2017", dated December 20 2016, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 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