Financials

Highlights Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the FTSE100 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the pound? Stay neutral in the Eurostoxx600 versus the FTSE100. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the Nikkei225 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the yen? Overweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the Nikkei 225. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the S&P500 reduces to: will European Banks outperform U.S. Technology? Underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Feature 2016 is the year of the political shock. But for investors, some things have stayed faithfully the same. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx Vs. Nikkei Reduces To: Will Euro/Yen Weaken? Last week's report From Berlin Wall To Mexican Wall explained how the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a great era of globalization - an era in which goods, services, capital and people have moved around the world more and more freely. Chart I-2The Globalization Of Stock Markets For investors, one major upshot is that the world's biggest companies have also become more and more globalized. The leading European stock market indexes - Eurostoxx600, FTSE100, DAX30, CAC40 and many other national indexes - are now just a collection of multinational companies with a global footprint. The same applies to major indexes outside Europe, such as the Nikkei225 and S&P500. Before the era of globalization, many companies had little exposure to economies outside their country or region of domicile. Unsurprisingly, in the 1980s, a German bank share price was more correlated with the rest of the German stock market than it was with a U.S. bank share price. But today, a large proportion of sales and profits are sourced globally. The German bank share price is now more correlated with the U.S. bank share price than it is with the rest of the German stock market! (Chart I-2) This begs the question: if Brexit and President-elect Trump are ushering in a great era of anti-globalization, will the major indexes become parochial once again? The answer is perhaps, but it will be a slow process - even assuming that the anti-globalization rhetoric does fully materialize. Sometimes, Stock Market Allocation Reduces To A Currency View For the time being, one obvious distinction between the major indexes will remain instrumental in driving performance differences. The Eurostoxx600 is denominated in euros, the FTSE100 in pounds, the Nikkei225 in yen, and the S&P500 in dollars. However, the constituent companies' sales and profits are denominated in a mixture of major global currencies, or in dollars. So all else being equal, if the local currency weakens - in other words, if other global currencies strengthen versus the local currency - then index profits will rise in local currency terms. Meaning the index value must go up. And if the local currency strengthens, the index value must go down. Simplistic as it sounds, some important asset allocation decisions just reduce to a bi-lateral currency view. Chart I-3 clearly shows that Eurostoxx600 versus FTSE100 relative performance reduces to a simple question: will the euro weaken against the pound? If so, the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the FTSE100. And vice-versa. Clearly, the outlook for euro/pound has been an important question this year, and will be an equally important question next year. Chart I-3Eurostoxx Vs. FTSE Reduces To: Will Euro/Pound Weaken? Likewise, the Chart of the Week clearly shows that Eurostoxx600 versus Nikkei225 relative performance reduces to a similar simple question: will the euro weaken against the yen? If so, the Eurostoxx600 will outperform the Nikkei225. And vice-versa. Sometimes, Stock Market Allocation Reduces To A Sector View But in the case of the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500, relative performance does not reduce to the direction of euro/dollar. Since mid-2014, the euro has weakened substantially versus the dollar, yet the Eurostoxx600 has underperformed the S&P500. This is because another factor drives this relative performance pair (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-4Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Does Not ##br##Depend On Euro/Dollar... Chart I-5...Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Does Depend ##br##On Banks Vs. Technology Although major indexes are a collection of multinational companies, it doesn't follow that the sector exposures of these indexes will be the same. Comparing the Eurostoxx600 with the S&P500, the Eurostoxx600 has a marked overexposure to Banks and an especially marked underexposure to Technology (Table I-1). Table I-1Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 = Overweight##br## Banks, Underweight Technology Banks comprise 13% of the Eurostoxx600 market capitalization but only 6% of the S&P500. On the flipside, Technology comprises just 4% of the Eurostoxx600 market capitalization but a very substantial 21% of the S&P500. To repeat, multinational company share prices today are more correlated with their global sector than with their domestic stock market of listing. Recently, this has been true even for U.S. Banks - which amazingly have shown a higher correlation with European Banks than with the rest of the U.S. stock market. It follows that when two indexes are distinguished by large sector skews, these sector skews will drive relative performance. Our Special Reports Picking Countries The Right Way 1 Parts 1, 2 and 3 showed that this is the case for most head to head stock market comparisons within Europe. It is also the case for the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Put simply, for the Eurostoxx600 to outperform the S&P500 on a sustained basis, Banks must outperform Technology on a sustained basis. Or to be more precise, European Banks must outperform U.S. Technology (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Eurostoxx Vs. S&P500 Reduces To: Will European Banks Outperform U.S. Technology? Applying Reductionism To The Eurostoxx600 We can now apply investment reductionism to position the Eurostoxx600 against three other major indexes: the FTSE100, the Nikkei225 and the S&P500. 1. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the FTSE100 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the pound? For the foreseeable future, the euro/pound exchange rate hinges on the perceived severity of Brexit. In this regard, there is unlikely to be meaningful new information until the U.K. Supreme Court delivers its verdict on the legal process that the U.K. government must follow. The verdict is due in January. So for the time being, it is appropriate to stay neutral in the Eurostoxx600 versus the FTSE100. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the Nikkei225 reduces to: will the euro weaken against the yen? 2. The euro/yen exchange rate hinges on ECB/BoJ relative monetary policy. Given that the BoJ made its bold policy move a few months ago, the focus now is on whether the ECB will continue with QE beyond March 2017. Chart I-7European Banks Do Not Offer An Especially##br## Large Discount To U.S. Technology The minutes of the ECB's most recent policy meeting provide some clues. On the one hand, the central bank cautioned on the unintended consequences of extended QE: "The possible side effects of the low interest rate environment and the range of non-standard measures in place on the longer-term intermediation capacity of banks and other financial institutions had to be further examined" On the other hand, the ECB emphasised: "(QE) was set to run... in any case until the ECB saw a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim... underlying inflation, however, continued to lack clear signs of a convincing upward trend." On this basis, it seems that the ECB will extend its QE program beyond March 2017, as well as give a strong commitment to keep policy rates anchored. But the recent underperformance of the Eurostoxx600 versus Nikkei225 has discounted a sizable strengthening of euro/yen. It is appropriate to lean against this and overweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the Nikkei225. Eurostoxx600 outperformance versus the S&P500 reduces to: will European Banks outperform U.S. Technology? Again, the minutes of the ECB's most recent policy meeting perfectly summarized the environment for European banks: "Ongoing structural challenges to banks' balance sheets, notably arising from still high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) in parts of the euro area banking sector, in conjunction with regulatory challenges (BRRD), and the weakness in profitability were seen to pose a risk to the transmission of monetary policy and a further recovery in credit dynamics" Or as we recently put it,2 European bank investors are fighting three long-term headwinds: BRRD, NPLs and NIRP. Yet on a price to forward earnings multiple, European Banks do not offer an especially large discount to U.S. Technology (Chart I-7). Therefore, investment reductionism says it is appropriate to underweight the Eurostoxx600 versus the S&P500. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the three European Investment Strategy Special Reports 'Picking 5 European Countries The Right Way' November 13, 2014, 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 2' March 26, 2015 and 'Picking Countries The Right Way: Part 3' November 12, 2015, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "All Roads Lead To Banks", dated October 6, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* The recent sharp moves in markets offer another opportunity for a long plantinum / short palladium pair-trade. A similar opportunity on October 6 successfully signaled a 13% countertrend move. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Highlights A central bank cannot control/target the quantity and price of money simultaneously. For the past few years, China's central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth toward targeting interest rates. As such, the reserve requirements imposed on banks have not and will not be a constraint on Chinese commercial banks' ability to lend and create money if the PBoC continues to supply banks with reserves "on demand." China's banks have created too many RMBs (broad money/deposits) and the PBoC has accommodated them. Such enormous supply of RMBs and mainland households' and companies' desire to get rid of their RMBs will lead to further yuan depreciation. Continue shorting the RMB and Asian currencies versus the U.S. dollar. Re-instate a short Colombian peso trade; this time against an equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. Feature Following our October 26 Special Report titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses",1 some clients have asked us how our analysis squares with fact that the People's Bank of China (PBoC) conducts its monetary policy using a reserve requirement ratio. The relevant question being, why would the PBoC's reserve requirements not limit commercial banks' ability to create money/credit? In that Special Report, we wrote: "A commercial bank is not constrained in loan origination by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) to commercial banks "on demand." Given PBoC lending to banks has surged 5.5-fold over last three years (Chart I-1), we concluded that the reserve requirement ratio had, for all intents and purposes, lost its meaning in China. In this week's report we elaborate on this issue in detail. The main implication of our analysis today reinforces our conclusion from the previous report: namely, China's commercial banks have expanded credit enormously, and the PBoC has accommodated it. With respect to financial market implications, there are simply too many RMBs (broad money/deposits) in the system (Chart I-2). Chinese households and companies can instinctively sense this, and are opting to move their wealth into real assets, such as real estate, or foreign currencies. Hence, the oversupply of RMBs will continue to weigh on China's exchange rate, which will depreciate much further. We expect the US$/CNY to reach 7.8-8 over the next 12 months. Chart I-1The PBoC Has Provided Banks With Liquidity 'On Demand' Chart I-2There Are Too Many RMBs Floating Around Targeting Either The Quantity Or The Price Of Money Any central bank can target and control either the quantity of money or the price of money, but not both simultaneously. This holds true for any monopolist supplier of any good/service that does not have control over the demand curve. A demand curve for money is the function that ties the quantity demanded at various price points (the price being interest rates). Central banks - being monopolist suppliers of money, but unable to control money demand - must choose between controlling either the quantity of money or the price of money. The system of required reserves (RR) is a tool to control money supply (the quantity of money). When central banks reinforce the RR ratio, interbank interest rates typically swing enormously and often deviate considerably from the target policy rate (Chart 1). For example, when commercial banks expand loans too much and lack sufficient reserves at the central bank, they must borrow from the interbank market and thereby bid up interbank rates- i.e., short-term interest rates rise. This in turn restrains credit demand or the willingness to lend, and eventually reduces money growth. The opposite also holds true. When a central bank wants to target interest rates (the price of money), it cannot control money supply. To ensure that interbank/money market rates stay close to the policy rate - i.e., to reinforce its interest rate target - a central bank should provide the banking system with reserves "on demand." In other words, when interbank rates rise above the target policy rate, a central bank should inject sufficient liquidity into the system to bring interest rates down. Similarly, when interbank rates fall below the target policy rate, a central bank should withdraw enough liquidity from the banking system to assure interbank rates rise converging to its target policy rate. By supplying commercial banks with reserves (high powered money) "on demand" - i.e., providing as much reserves as they need - a central bank is de facto failing to enforce reserve requirements. As such, the central bank is giving up control over money creation. By and large, RRs lose their effectiveness if a central bank provides commercial banks with as much reserves as they request. In short, when a central bank opts for targeting interest rates, it cannot steer monetary aggregates - i.e., RRs and RR ratios lose their meaning. In the 1970s and 1980s, most central banks in advanced countries targeted money supply to achieve their policy goals such as inflation and sustainable economic growth. However, starting in the early 1990s, developed nations' central banks (the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank and others) began to move away from controlling money supply (monetary aggregates) and toward targeting interest rates. Individual banks' limitations to borrow from the central bank often rests with the availability of collateral. So long as a commercial bank has eligible collateral (often government bonds), it can access central bank funding. This is true for Chinese commercial banks too. Bottom Line: Monetary authorities cannot control/target the quantity and price of money simultaneously. The Money Multiplier In An Interest Rate Targeting System When a central bank opts for targeting interest rates, commercial banks can originate an unlimited amount of loans and demand the central bank provide additional reserves, as long as they have eligible collateral. This corroborates our point from our previous report that a commercial bank's loan origination is not constrained by its reserves at the central bank if the latter supplies liquidity (reserves) "on demand." In a fractional reserve system, the ability of commercial banks to create loans/money is defined by a money multiplier. A potential ceiling for a money multiplier (MM) is calculated as: MM = (1 / RR ratio) For example, when the RR ratio is 10%: The money multiplier MM = (1 / 0.1) = 10 In effect, the banking system can create up to 10 times more money/loans/deposits per one dollar of reserves. Under the current system of interest rate targeting – which has prevailed among most developed countries since the early 1990s and more recently in China (more on China below) – we can think of the RR ratio as heading towards zero because central banks provide banks with almost unlimited liquidity (reserves). The RR ratio is not zero because there are still limitations on banks' ability to borrow from central banks due the availability (or lack thereof) of eligible collateral or compliance with Basel III requirements. Yet as the RR ratio gets smaller in size, its reciprocal (1 / RR ratio) becomes very large (not infinite, but a plausibly very large number). Overall, when a central bank targets interest rates, the ceiling of the money multiplier is not set by the central bank. Rather, the money multiplier is de facto determined by commercial banks' willingness to originate loans. Thus, the money multiplier can potentially be very high when animal spirits among bankers and borrowers run wild. Consequently, the points discussed in our Special Report titled, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses"2 - namely that commercial banks create loans/money/deposits out of thin air - holds, and is relevant in a system where central banks target/control interest rates. Bottom Line: When central banks opt to control short-term interest rates, they must provide commercial banks with as much liquidity as the latter demands. In such a case, RRs and the RR ratio become almost irrelevant. Therefore, in an interest rate targeting system, banks' ability to originate loans/create money and deposits is not contingent on their reserves at the central bank. This point is greatly relevant to China. The PBoC: Shifting From Money To Interest Rate Targeting For the past few years, China’s central bank has silently moved away from controlling money growth to targeting interest rates. As a result, nowadays the PBoC has very little quantitative control over money/credit creation by commercial banks or the money multiplier. It is Chinese commercial banks that effectively drive money/credit/deposit creation. Chart I-3SHIBOR Crises In 2013 Forced PBoC ##br##To Start Targeting Interest Rates We suspect this shift in China's monetary policy management has been occurring since early 2014 on the heels of the so-called SHIBOR crisis, which erupted in June 2013 when interbank rates surged and was followed by another spike in interbank rates in December 2013 (Chart I-3). During these episodes, the PBoC enforced reserve requirements and thus did not provide liquidity to banks that were running short on it. In essence, it did whatever a central bank targeting money growth via control over RR would do. However, as interbank rates surged and banks complained, policymakers backed off, and provided banks with as much liquidity as they demanded. This stabilized interbank rates and, importantly, appears to have marked the PBoC's shift toward interest rate targeting. Thus, by de facto moving to a monetary system of targeting interest rates, the PBoC cannot effectively reinforce reserve requirements because it must supply any amount of reserves that commercial banks require to preclude a major spike in interbank rates. A few points illustrate that in fact the PBoC has been targeting short-term money market rates, and banks have expanded loans enormously despite their excess reserves being flat: Volatility in interbank rates has dropped substantially (Chart I-4), as the PBoC's claims on commercial banks has exploded 5.5-fold since the early 2014. Even though commercial banks' excess reserves have been flat, their lending has been booming - i.e., the money/credit multiplier has been rising (Chart I-5). This is only possible when the PBoC has been supplying reserves "on demand" or when it cuts the RR ratio. Since the RR ratio has not been cut over the past two years, it means that the former is true. Chart I-4Interbank Rate Volatility Has Fallen As ##br##PBoC Injected A Lot Of Liquidity Chart I-5China's Money/Credit Multiplier##br## Has Been Rising Just like central banks in advanced economies, the only way the PBoC can alter money/credit growth is if it lifts or cuts its interest rate target. Barring any changes to its policy rate, commercial banks, not the PBoC, determine money/loan/deposit creation in China. As to other factors that determine the amount of credit/money creation by commercial banks in China, we elaborated on these in the above-mentioned report. Bottom Line: It appears the PBoC has shifted toward targeting interest rates. Consequently, the PBoC cannot pretend to control money/credit origination unless it changes its interest rate target. Moreover, we reiterate that China's abnormal credit growth has been the result of speculative behavior among Chinese banks and borrowers, and not the natural result of the country's high savings rate. Oversupply Of RMBs = A Lower Currency As China's central bank has been printing RMBs and commercial banks have been "multiplying" them at a high rate (by originating loans), the supply of RMBs has continued to explode. Such an oversupply of local currency will continue to depress the value of the nation's exchange rate. The PBoC's liquidity injections have exploded in recent years (Chart I-6). The central bank has not only been offsetting the liquidity withdrawal due to its currency foreign exchange market interventions, but it has also been providing banks with as much liquidity as they require. The objective seems to have been to avoid a rise in interbank rates when corporate leverage is extremely high and banks are overextended. Since February 2015, the PBoC's international reserves have dropped by US$0.9 trillion, or 4.2 trillion RMB (Chart I-7). This means that the PBoC has withdrawn 4.2 trillion RMBs from the system. If the central bank did not re-inject these RMBs into the financial system, interbank rates would have skyrocketed. As the PBoC has injected RMBs into the system, it has effectively undone its RMB defense. The whole point of defending the exchange rate from falling or depreciating too fast is to shrink local currency liquidity. Yet, naturally, that would also lead to higher interbank rates. If the central bank chooses not to tolerate higher interest rates and continues to inject local currency into circulation, the RMB's depreciation will likely continue and accelerate. By injecting RMBs into the system, the monetary authorities have allowed banks to continue to lend, thereby creating enormous amounts of money and deposits. Banks create deposits when they lend. The Chinese banking system has a lot of deposits partially because commercial banks have lent too much. In short, the supply or quantity of money (RMBs) has continued to explode, despite massive capital outflows. Notably, if the PBoC did not lend RMBs to commercial banks, the latter's excess reserves would have plunged by 4 trillion RMB (Chart I-8) and banks would have been forced to pull-back their lending. Chart I-6PBoC's Liquidity Injections Have ##br##Exploded Since Early 2014 Chart I-7China: Foreign Exchange##br## Reserve Depletion Chart I-8China: What Would Have Banks' Excess Reserves##br## Been Without Borrowing From PBoC? Overall, in the current fiat money system, when a central bank targets interest rates, the monetary authorities can print unlimited high-powered money (bank reserves) and commercial banks can multiply it by creating enormous amounts of loans/deposits.3 However, there is no free lunch - no country can print its way to prosperity (otherwise all countries would have been very rich already). The negative ramifications of unlimited money creation are numerous, but this report focuses on the exchange rate implications. The growing supply of RMBs will lead to a much further drop in China's exchange rate. It seems Chinese retail investors and companies intuitively sense this, and are eager to get rid of their RMBs. This also explains Chinese investors' desire to overpay for any real or financial asset, domestically or abroad. We expect growing downward pressure on the RMB as capital outflows accelerate anew. Although China’s foreign exchange reserves are enormous in absolute U.S. dollar terms, they are low relative to money supply (Chart 9). The ratio of the central bank’s international reserves-to-broad money is 15% in China and it is relatively low compared with other countries (Chart 10). Chart I-9China: International Reserves Are Not##br## High Relative To Broad Money Chart I-10International Reserves-To-Broad##br## Money Ratio As a final note, the oversupply of local currency has not created inflation in the real economy because of massive overcapacity following years of booming capital spending. However, continued money creation will eventually lead to higher inflation. This does not seem imminent but we will be monitoring these dynamics carefully going forward. Bottom Line: China's banks have created too much RMBs and the PBoC has accommodated them. Such enormous supply of RMBs and mainland households' and companies' desire to get rid of their RMBs will lead to further yuan depreciation. Investment Implications: A Free-Fall For RMB And Asian Currencies The RMB's value versus the U.S. dollar will drop much further. Our new target range for US$/CNY is 7.8-8 over the next 12 months, or 11-14% below today's level. The forward market is discounting only 2.8% depreciation in the next 12 months (Chart I-11). We maintain our short RMB / long U.S. dollar trade (via 12-month NDF). A persistent relapse in the RMB's value will drag down other Asian currencies. In particular, the Korean won and the Taiwanese dollar have failed to break above important technical levels (their long-term moving averages), and have lately relapsed (Chart I-12). Chart I-11RMB Will Depreciate Much More##br## Than Priced In By Forwards Chart I-12Asian Currencies:##br##More Downside Ahead For the Korean won, we believe there is considerable downside from current levels. Consistently, we recommended shorting the KRW versus the THB trade on October 19.4 Chart I-13EM ex-China Currencies Total Return##br## (Including Carry): Is The Rally Over? Traders who believe in continued U.S. dollar strength, like we do, should consider shorting the KRW versus the U.S. dollar outright. For DM currencies, this means that the drop in the JPY has further to go. In emerging Asia, we are also shorting the MYR and the IDR versus the U.S. dollar and also versus Eastern European currencies such as the ruble and the HUF, respectively. As emerging Asian currencies depreciate versus the U.S. dollar, other EM currencies will likely follow. It is hard to see the RMB and other Asian currencies plunging and the rest of EM doing well. The total return (including the carry) of the aggregate EM ex-China exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar (equity market-cap weighted index) has failed to break above a critical long-term technical resistance, and has rolled over (Chart I-13). This is a bearish technical signal, implying considerable downside from these levels. As such, we maintain our core short positions in the following EM currencies outside Asia: TRY, ZAR, BRL and CLP and add COP to this list today. This is based on an assumption of diminished foreign inflows to EM and lower commodities prices. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Colombia: Headed Toward Recession In our May 4 Special Report on Colombia,5 we argued that despite a bright structural backdrop this Andean economy was headed for a growth recession (i.e. very weak but still positive growth). Domestic demand has buckled and now we believe the nation could be on the verge of its first genuine recession in two decades (Chart II-1). Colombia's Achilles heel is its low domestic savings rate, reflected by a still large current account deficit financed by FDI and portfolio capital inflows (Chart II-2). As a result, low oil prices and rising global interest rates have exposed the nation's main cyclical vulnerability. Given the trade deficit is still large (Chart II-3) and our bias is that oil prices will be flat-to-down, a further retrenchment in domestic demand is unavoidable. Chart II-1Colombia's First Recession##br## In 20 Years? Chart II-2Colombia's Lingering Balance Of ##br##Payments Vulnerability Chart II-3A Weaker COP Will Force The ##br##Necessary Adjustment Going forward, the external funding constraint will continue to bite. Moreover, policymakers are trapped and will be unable to prevent growth from contracting. The central bank is stuck between the proverbial rock and hard place. Cutting interest rates will undermine the appeal of the peso to foreign investors. Raising rates to prop up the currency, however, will exacerbate the economy's downward momentum. In the end, downward pressure on the exchange rate and still high inflation mean the central bank will not cut rates soon (Chart II-4). Tight monetary policy in turn means that private sector credit will decelerate much more (Chart II-5). Chart II-4High (Well Above Target) Inflation Limits##br## Central Bank's Ability To Ease Chart II-5Colombia: Credit Growth Is ##br##Headed Much Lower Our marginal propensity to consume proxy, an excellent leading indicator for household spending, signals consumption is set to weaken even further (Chart II-6). Facing weakening demand, investment is set to continue contracting (Chart II-7) and, ultimately, unemployment will be much higher, reinforcing the downtrend in consumer expenditures. Chart II-6Colombian Domestic Demand##br## To Retrench Further Chart II-7Contracting Investment Bodes ##br##Poorly For Employment Meanwhile, fiscal policy will remain tight as Colombia's orthodox policymakers struggle to adjust the fiscal accounts to the structurally negative terms-of-trade shock in this oil-dependent economy. The current fiscal reform effort is very positive for sustainable long-run dynamics, as influential central bank board members have highlighted.6 Yet particular parts of the reform, such as raising VAT taxes from 16% to 19%, will almost inevitably lead to a drop in consumer demand. Furthermore, nominal government revenues are already contracting and a slumping economy means that the total fiscal effort will need to be greater than currently envisioned. Overall, with monetary and fiscal policy stimulus hamstrung by the nation's low domestic savings rate (i.e. large current account deficit), a mild recession seems very likely. And while a lot of weakness has already been priced into the nation's financial markets, we think there is still more downside ahead. For instance, the Colombian peso may be cheap in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, but it is highly vulnerable due to the nation's still wide current account deficit. This week we recommend re-instating a short position in the peso; this time against an equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble.7 Turning to equities, Colombian stocks have fallen sharply since 2014, mostly a reflection of the collapse of the nation's energy plays. At present bank stocks account for 60% this nation's MSCI market cap, and though we believe they will fare better than many other EM banking systems,8 they will not go unscathed by a recession. Still, orthodox policymaking should limit the downside in the performance of this bourse and sovereign credit (U.S. dollar bonds) relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Meanwhile, fixed-income investors should continue to bet on yield curve flattening by paying 1-year/ receiving 10-year interest rate swaps, a trade we have recommended since September 16, 2015.9 The recent steepening in the yield curve will prove unsustainable as the economy tanks. Bottom Line: Colombia is probably headed toward recession and policymakers are straightjacketed and cannot ease monetary and fiscal policies to prevent it. As such, the currency will be the main release valve and it will depreciate further. Go short the COP versus an equal-weighted basket the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. Dedicated EM equity and credit investors should maintain a neutral allocation to Colombia within their respective EM benchmarks. Continue to bet on flattening in the yield curve by paying 1-year/ receiving 10-year interest rate swaps. Santiago E. Gomez Associate Vice President santiago@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016. 3 As we argued in Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses", dated October 26, 2016, it is new loans that create new deposits and vice versa. 4 Please refer to the section on Thailand in our Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled " The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016. 5 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Special Report titled, "Colombia: A Cyclical Downturn Amid Structural Strength," dated May 4, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Cano, Carlos Gustavo "Monetary Policy in Colombia: Main Challenges 2016 -2017" Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Small Talks Symposium, October 7, 2016, Washington DC http://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/publicaciones/archivos/cgc_oct_2016.pdf 7 For more on the ruble please refer to the section on Russia in our Emerging Markets Weekly Report, dated November 16, 2016, titled, "Russia: Overweight Equities; Reinstate Long RUB / Short MYR Trade". 8 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Special Report titled, "Colombia: A Cyclical Downturn Amid Structural Strength" dated May 4, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 9 Please refer to the section on Colombia in our Emerging Markets Weekly Report, dated September 15, 2015, titled "Colombia: An Incomplete Adjustment", available at ems.bcareseach.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Financials have celebrated the modest upshift in the interest rate structure and hopes for a reversal of the regulatory framework that has been a structural noose on profitability, and risk premiums. These factors, along with our domestic vs. global bias, pushed us to move up to a neutral sector weighting. As part of this shift, we moved to an overweight stance in the asset management and custody bank (AMCB) group. Even modestly higher interest rates would reduce a major profit impediment. Fees on funds held in trust have been decimated by ZIRP, underscoring that the latest uptick in short-term Treasury yields is a plus. Relative performance had already diverged negatively from the stock-to-bond ratio, the equity risk premium and global economic sentiment. This gap could close if the rate outlook has firmed. There is still structural downward pressure on fees as low cost ETFs gain market share, but that is being partially offset by renewed growth in total mutual fund assets. If flows into bonds shift into higher margin equity products, this will provide another offset to the structural downward pressure on fees. In sum, despite our concerns about overall financial sector productivity growth, we lifted sector weightings to neutral and the sub-component S&P AMCB index to overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AMGT - BK, BLK, STT, AMP, TROW, NTRS, BEN, IVZ, AMG, LM.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Retail food stocks are deep into the buy zone. Deflating food costs augur well for profit margins in the coming quarters. Lift the financial sector to neutral, via the asset manager and investment bank indexes. Recent Changes S&P Financials Sector - Raise to neutral, recording a loss of 8%. S&P Asset Manager & Custody Bank Index - Raise to overweight from underweight, locking in a profit of 5%. S&P Investment Bank & Brokerage Index - Raise to neutral, recording a loss of 3%. Table 1Sector Performance Returns (%) Equity markets celebrated the surprise Republican U.S. election victory. Investors believe the regime shift will entail fiscal stimulus and a lifting in regulatory constraints that stir animal spirits and lift the economy out of its growth funk. The reality is that it is premature to make long-term assumptions. Meanwhile, the underlying fragility of the U.S. economic expansion will be tested in the coming quarters. Indeed, it is easy to envision a hit to business confidence, causing delays in decision making and investment, especially given Trump's anti-trade rhetoric and penchant for profligacy. Policy uncertainty and confidence have been reliable leading indicators for valuations, and slippage would put upward pressure on the Equity Risk Premium (Chart 1). It will be critical to monitor aggregate financial conditions. The Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions index has tentatively edged up (Chart 1), and if corporate bond spreads, long-term yields and the U.S. dollar move much higher, upside risks will intensify. The low level of overall potential growth has made the economy increasingly sensitive to swings in financial conditions and deflationary impulses from abroad. Both the high yield and investment-grade corporate bond index are languishing, perhaps picking up on the deflationary signal from U.S. dollar strength and growth drag from higher Treasury yields (Chart 2, bottom panel). It is notable that emerging markets currencies have pulled back. These exchange rates are typically pro-cyclical. Sustained currency weakness typically leads to domestic corporate bond spread widening (Chart 2, CDX spreads shown inverted). In the past five years, it has paid to bet on defensive over cyclical sectors when EM currencies weaken and CDX spreads are this tight, i.e. contrarians should take note. At a minimum, it may be a signal that global growth is less robust than the rise in global bond yields implies. As a result, forecasts for double-digit profit growth in the next twelve months look very aggressive, even if our economic outlook proves too cautious. The tentative trough in third quarter S&P 500 profits has not yet been validated by other indicators. For example, tracking tax revenue provides a good real-time gauge on corporate sector cash flows. Federal income tax receipts have dropped into negative territory. Corporate income taxes are contracting. Previous major and sustainable overall profit recoveries have been either led by, or coincident with, corporate income tax growth (Chart 3). This argues against extrapolating positive third quarter earnings growth in the S&P 500. Chart 1Watch Confidence And Financial Conditions Chart 2Don't Get Caught Up In The Hype Chart 3Taxes And Profits Rather than get overly excited about the potential for a new fiscal spending impulse, it may be more appropriate to view the latter as truncating downside economic risks, given that the corporate sector remains a key headwind to stronger growth, even excluding its balance sheet stress. Consequently, we still expect undervalued defensives to retake a leadership role from overvalued cyclical sectors and we also retain a domestic vs. global bias. If the U.S. dollar breaks above its recent trading range, the odds of the broad market making further liquidity fueled gains will diminish significantly. Importantly, the last few days of market moves have been massively exaggerated, as industrials and materials have rallied as if fiscal stimulus is about to hit next month. Even when implemented, it is not a panacea for sector earnings. Drug and biotech stocks have soared as if pricing pressures will evaporate, when in reality price pressures emerged prior to any political interference. Tech stocks have been crushed because of fears they will be forced to move production back to the U.S. All of these knee-jerk reactions should be treated with caution, with the exception of financials, where a step function reduction in the risk premium may be underway. There Is A New Sheriff In Town: Lift Financials To Neutral Financials have celebrated the modest upshift in the interest rate structure and hopes for a reversal of the regulatory framework that has been a structural noose on profitability, and risk premiums. These factors, along with our domestic vs. global bias, argue against maintaining a below benchmark weighting on a tactical basis. As discussed last week, our view on banks remains cautious, however, asset managers and investment banks have lower odds of falling back toward recent lows even after election euphoria inevitably fades. The largest earnings drags from the past year have eased. M&A activity has troughed. New and secondary stock offerings have hooked back up and margin debt is back to new highs, suggesting that investor risk appetites have stopped shrinking (Chart 4). Thus, capital formation is unlikely to dry up, even if upside is limited given poor corporate sector balance sheet health and an upward creep in the cost of capital. In terms of asset managers and custody banks (AMCB), even modestly higher interest rates would reduce a major profit impediment. Fees on funds held in trust have been decimated by ZIRP, underscoring that the latest uptick in short-term Treasury yields is a plus. Relative performance had already diverged negatively from the stock-to-bond ratio, the equity risk premium and global economic sentiment (Chart 5). This gap could close with a prospective thawing in relations between lawmakers and the industry. There is still structural downward pressure on fees as low cost ETFs gain market share, but that is being partially offset by the renewed growth in total mutual fund assets (Chart 4, bottom panel). Bear in mind that both groups tend to do well when the stocks outperform bonds, as seems likely in the near run given creeping protectionism. In sum, despite our concerns about overall financial sector productivity growth, mainly owing to rising bank cost structures, and the risks of a renewed deflationary impulse from U.S. dollar strength, we are lifting sector weightings to neutral. This will put us onside with the objective message from our Cyclical Macro Indicator, the buy signal from our Technical Indicator (Chart 6) and our broader theme of favoring domestic vs. global industries. Chart 4Earnings Drivers Have Stabilized Chart 5Recovery Candidate Chart 6Following Our Indicators Bottom Line: The Republican victory has provided a fillip to the financials sector, and underweight positions putting underweight positions offside. We are lifting allocations to neutral, via the S&P AMCB and S&P investment banks & brokerage indexes. AMCB moves to overweight, and the latter to neutral, with an eye to downgrading again once euphoria fades and investor focus returns to economic durability. Food Retailers: Too Cheap To Overlook Food retailers offer attractive value, defensive and domestic equity exposure with the potential for upside profit surprises. This group will benefit if U.S. wage inflation persists. The latter would boost consumer purchasing power and could lead to tighter financial conditions, either through U.S. dollar strength and/or a tighter Fed. The defensive appeal of retail food equities would shine through under that scenario. The starting point for grocery stocks is extremely appealing. The price ratio is extraordinarily oversold. It fell farther below its 200-day moving average than at any time since 2002, before recently bouncing (Chart 7). Valuations are cheap, return on equity is solid and share prices have diverged negatively from a number of macro indicators. For instance, relative performance has been tightly linked with the U.S. dollar, but the former plunged even as the currency firmed (Chart 8, top panel). A strong exchange rate will keep a lid on imported food costs, boost the allure of domestically-oriented industries while lifting consumer spending power. Chart 7Extraordinarily Oversold Chart 8Top-Line Improvement Ahead Outlays on food products have climbed as a share of total spending in the past six months, reversing a long-term downtrend (Chart 8). If consumer confidence stays firm as a consequence of rising wage growth and a positive wealth effect, then it is conceivable that store traffic and total grocery spending will accelerate. The surge in capital spending in recent years reflects store upgrades and a refreshed shopping experience, which could also translate into faster sales growth. Now that capital spending growth is cooling, it will reduce a profit margin drag. Profitability should also benefit from cost deflation. The food manufacturing PPI is contracting, reflecting shrinking raw food prices (Chart 9, top panel, shown inverted). It is normal for food stocks to outperform when raw food prices fall. Importantly, capacity utilization rates in the packaged food industry are very low (Chart 9), which augurs well for ongoing pricing pressure among suppliers. Tack on deflation in industry wage inflation, and it is no wonder profit margins have been able to grind back toward previous highs without a strong sales impulse. If sales rebound, as seems likely given evidence of market share gains away from hypermarkets (Chart 10, bottom panel), then grocery stores should continue to demonstrate decent pricing power gains (Chart 10, middle panel). Chart 9Cost Deflation Chart 10Gaining Market Share Adding it up, the ingredients for a powerful rally in the S&P retail food store index exist, with good downside protection should the economy disappoint on the back of tighter financial conditions. Bottom Line: We recommend an overweight position in the S&P retail food store index (BLBG: S5FDRE - KR, WFM). Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and growth over value.

Highlights Most narratives surrounding G7 bond yields, the U.S. dollar, Chinese credit/fiscal impulses, and the RMB exchange rate - which justified the EM rally from February's lows - have been overturned. To be consistent, this warrants a relapse in EM risk assets. In China, recent property market and marginal credit policy tightening will weigh on growth. Feature The more recent strength in Chinese and emerging markets' (EM) manufacturing PMI indexes as well as the bounce in industrial metals prices have gone against our negative view on EM/China growth and related markets. While it is hard to predict market patterns over the next several weeks, we maintain that the EM rally is on borrowed time, and that the risk-reward profile for EM risk assets (stocks, credit markets and currencies) remains very unfavorable. Tracking Correlations And Indicators The overwhelming majority of indicators and variables that supported the rally in EM since February have reversed in recent months. Specifically: China's credit and fiscal spending impulses have rolled over (Charts I-1 and Chart I-2, on page 1). This will likely lead to a rollover in mainland industrial activity early next year (Chart 1, top panel). Similarly, this bodes ill for much-followed Chinese ex-factory producer prices - i.e., producer price deflation will probably recommence early next year (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Chart I-1China: Industrial Sectors To Retreat? Chart I-2China: Credit And Fiscal Impulses In a nutshell, the strong credit and fiscal impulses of late 2015 and early 2016 explain the stabilization and mild improvement in the Chinese economy during the past few months. However, these same impulses project renewed weakness/rollover in the economy in early 2017. If financial markets are forward looking, they should begin pricing-in deteriorating growth momentum sooner than later - especially as Chinese policymakers are announcing marginal tightening policies (see below for more details). One of the narratives that triggered the EM and global equity rally in February was speculation that there was a "Shanghai accord" between global central banks. According to this narrative, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) promised not to devalue the RMB in exchange for the Federal Reserve not hiking rates. Since then, the RMB has continued to depreciate, both versus the greenback and the CFETS1 basket. Yet EM and global stocks have completely disregarded the RMB depreciation (Chart I-3). We do not have good explanation as to why. Indeed, the RMB has weakened meaningfully, despite the PBoC's massive currency defense: the latter's foreign exchange reserves have shrunk further since then (Chart I-4), as capital flight has exceeded the enormous current account surplus by a large margin. Chart I-3Investors Are ##br##Complacent About RMB Chart I-4China: Foreign Exchange ##br##Reserves Still Shrinking Chart I-5PBoC Liquidity Injections ##br##Have Been Enormous The PBoC's selling of U.S. dollars to prop up the yuan has drained domestic currency liquidity and one would expect interbank rates to rise. However, the PBoC has been re-injecting RMBs into the system to keep interest rates low (Chart I-5). Such RMB liquidity proliferation makes further declines in the currency's value all the more likely. We expect the RMB to continue depreciating. Yet global financial markets have become extremely complacent about the potential for additional RMB depreciation. After having been bullish on U.S./G7 bonds for the past several years, in our July 13 Weekly Report,2 we highlighted that U.S./G7 bond yields would rise and closed our strategic short EM equities/long 30-year U.S. Treasurys position. Even though U.S./G7 bond yields have risen since July, EM equities have not declined. Given that falling G7 bond yields were used as justification for the EM rally, the opposite should also hold true. We expect U.S. bond yields to rise further. Our EM Corporate Health Monitor - constructed using bottom-up financial variables of companies with outstanding U.S. dollar corporate bonds - points to a reversal in the EM corporate credit market rally (Chart I-6). Furthermore, EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads have tightened considerably and are now very overbought and expensive. As we argued in our Special Report titled EM Corporate Health Is Flashing Red3 that introduced the EM Corporate Financial Health (CFH) Monitor, EM corporate credit spreads are as expensive as they were before they began widening in 2013 and 2014 (Chart I-7). Chart I-6EM Corporate Bond Rally To Reverse? Chart I-7EM Corporate Spreads Are Too Tight Finally, the U.S. dollar sold off early this year, but it has held firm in recent months. Nevertheless, EM risk assets have not retreated, despite the greenback's strength (Chart I-8). Few would argue that sharp U.S. dollar appreciation is negative for EM risk assets, but there is a debate among investors and analysts about whether EM risk assets can rally amidst a gradual appreciation in the U.S. dollar. Turning to the empirical evidence, Chart I-9 reveals that in the past 30 years any U.S. dollar appreciation - whether gradual or not - even versus DM currencies has coincided with weakness in EM share prices. Chart I-8EM Investors Have ##br##Ignored U.S. Dollar Strength Chart I-9EM Equities And ##br##U.S. Dollar: A 30 Year History Bottom Line: The majority of narratives that justified the EM rally from February's lows have been overturned. To be consistent, this warrants a relapse in EM risk assets. China's Credit And Property Tightening In recent weeks, there have been numerous policy tightening efforts in China. In particular: At the annual World Bank/IMF meetings in Washington last month, PBoC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan stated that once markets stabilized there would no longer be additional large increases in bank credit. His exact words were: "With the gradual recovery of the global economy, China will control its credit growth".4 As U.S. and European PMIs have firmed up and U.S. employment and wage growth is robust, Chinese policymakers will be emboldened to moderate unsustainable credit growth and not to repeat the massive fiscal push of early this year. In a bid to curb excessive bank credit growth and discourage "window dressing" accounting, the PBoC announced on October 255 that going forward it will include off-balance-sheet wealth management products (WMPs) in the calculation of banks' quarterly Marco Prudential Assessment ratios, starting from the third quarter. The clampdown on WMP accounting will reduce banks' capital adequacy ratios (CARs). One key reason that banks had aggressively boosted the size of their off-balance-sheet WMP assets was that they were not required to have capital charges against them, helping banks extend more credit while complying with CARs. In short, Chinese banks' CARs are inflated. This policy measure along with provisioning and writing-off non-performing loans, if reinforced, could meaningfully reduce the CARs of all Chinese banks, especially small- and medium-sized ones, as well as force them to reduce the pace of credit expansion. Given that the majority of medium and small banks have been more aggressive than the country's five biggest banks in expanding credit in recent years, this may have a damping effect on credit growth in 2017. In fact, the 110 medium and small banks retain 60% of on- and off-balance-sheet credit claims on companies, while the five largest banks hold 40% (Table I-1). Hence, credit trends in small and medium banks are at least as important as those among large banks. Table I-1China: Five Largest Banks Hold Only 40% Of Credit Assets Finally, a number of cities have announced various tightening measures on property markets of late, including the re-launch of house purchasing restrictions and increases in minimum down payments. Similar restrictions on home purchases served as an efficient tool for curbing property purchases in 2013-14, and there is no reason why it will be different this time around. This is especially true given the market is more expensive than it was back in 2013. In addition, the government has curbed financing for property developers. The biggest economic risk remains construction activity. Even though housing sales and prices have skyrocketed by 20-40% in the past 12 months (Chart I-10, top and middle panels), residential floor space started has been very timid - it has in fact failed to recover (Chart I-10, bottom panel). As residential property sales contract again due to new purchasing restrictions, property developers will certainly curtail new investment, and housing construction activity will shrink anew. The same is true for commercial properties (Chart I-11). Chart I-10China's Residential Market: ##br##Demand, Prices And Starts Chart I-11China's Non-Residential ##br##Market: Demand And Starts An interesting question is why property starts have been so weak, as indicated in the bottom panels of Chart I-10 and Chart I-11 - particularly when both floor space sold (units) and property prices have surged exponentially in the past 12 months. Our view is that there is a large hidden inventory overhang in the Chinese property market. For example, government data on residential floor space started, completed and under construction attest that there is still a large gap between floor space started versus completed (Chart I-12). From these data/charts and the enormous leverage carried by property developers, we infer the latter have been accumulating / carrying on their balance sheets vast amounts of inventory in excess of what market-based sources suggest, and what is widely followed by analysts. It is very hard to make sense of the Chinese property inventory data, but we suspect these market-based data sources may track only inventories that have been completed and released to the market - and do not account for inventories classified as "under construction". For residential housing, according to government data the "under construction floor space" is 5 billion square meters (Chart I-13, top panel), which is equal to 3.5-4 years of sales at the fervent pace of the past 12 months (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Another way to assess this is as follows: Assuming an average construction cycle of three years, there will be supply of new housing in amounts of 16.7 units in each of the next three years. This compares with sales of 13.3 million units in the past 12 months that occurred amid a buying frenzy and booming mortgage lending. Faced with a potential drop in sales due to the recent purchasing restrictions, elevated inventories, enormous leverage (Chart I-14), and tighter financing, property developers will most likely curtail new starts. In turn, a reduction in property starts means less construction activity next year, and weak demand for commodities. Consistent with the rollover in the fiscal spending impulse, infrastructure spending will likely also lose its potency in early 2017. Chart I-12China's Residential ##br##Market: Hidden Inventories Chart I-13Chinese Real Estate: Massive ##br##Volumes Under Construction Chart I-14Leverage Of Chinese ##br##Listed Property Developers Bottom Line: Recent property market and marginal credit policy tightening will weigh on construction activity and depress Chinese demand for commodities and industrial goods next year. Confirmation Bias, Or Bias Based On Fundamentals? Why did we not follow the indicators discussed above from February through June, when the EM rally emerged and these indicators bottomed? Do we have a confirmation bias? We did not recommend playing the EM rebound early this year because we did not believe the rally would last this long or go this far. If we had had conviction about the duration and magnitude of the rally, we would have changed our strategy - tactically upgrading EM risk assets despite our negative structural and cyclical views. Simply put, we were wrong on strategy. In our April 13, 2016 Weekly Report,6 we argued that based on China's injection of massive amounts of fiscal and credit stimulus, growth would marginally improve in the months ahead. Yet, we stopped short of recommending chasing the EM rally given the menace of numerous cyclical and structural negatives surrounding the EM/China growth outlook. As to the reasons why we put more emphasis on some indicators and less on others at various times, we have the following points: We are biased in so far as our assessment and analysis of EM/China is based on fundamentals. In this sense, we are biased towards centering our investment strategy on fundamentals. Specifically, given our view/analysis that EM/China have credit bubbles/excesses, rapidly falling or weak productivity growth and record-low return on capital (Chart I-15), we cannot help but to have a fundamentally bearish bias on EM. This, in turn, means that we view any rally in EM risk assets or uptick in EM/China economic indicators with suspicion and likely as unsustainable. The opposite also holds true. All in all, if we are wrong on our fundamental view and analysis, we will be wrong on financial markets. When investors expect a bear market, they are better off selling rallies and not buying dips. When an asset class is in a multiyear bull market, it pays off to buy dips rather not sell rallies. Unless one can time market swings well, it is hard to make money on the long sides of bear markets. Similarly, it is difficult to profit from short positions in bull markets. In brief, countertrend moves are about timing. Timing does not depend on fundamentals. It is often a coin toss. Typically we do not recommend clients invest based on a coin toss. For example, it is impossible to rationalize why the EM rally did not begin following the August 2015 selloff, but instead started in February 2016. In late August 2015, with carnage in EM risk assets pervasive, it was clear that Chinese policymakers would stimulate and in fact the massive fiscal stimulus was initiated in August/September 2015 not in 2016. Similarly, China's manufacturing PMI bottomed in September 2015, not in 2016 (Chart I-16). Chart I-15EM Non-Financial Return ##br##On Equity Is At All Time Low Chart I-16China's Manufacturing PMI ##br##Bottomed In October 2015 In September 2015, EM and global equities rebounded, but chasing momentum at that time did not pay off as risk assets cratered in the following months. This is all to say that timing markets is often a random walk. We do attempt to time market moves that go along with our fundamental bias, but prefer not to time market moves that go against the primary trend. We assume any countertrend move is typically short-lived and unsustainable. That said, we also realize these moves can be very painful for investors if they last long enough, like this EM rally. Finally, we often get questions on fund flows. We do not make investment recommendations based on fund flows - even though we recognize they are very important in driving markets. The reason is that there is no comprehensive data on global fund flows that one can analyze and make reasonably educated bets. The often-cited EPRF dataset only tracks inflows and outflows of mutual funds and ETFs. It does not account for flows and positioning of various asset managers, sovereign funds, pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds and private wealth managers, among many others. What's more, the EPRF dataset only covers the funds located in advanced countries and offshore jurisdictions, but not emerging countries where investment pools have become large and important. In brief, the available investment flow and portfolio positioning data are not comprehensive at all, and they cannot be relied upon too much to make investment recommendations. In this vein, a question arises: Why can't flows into EM sustain the current rally for a while even though it is not based on fundamentals? In this context, let's consider the case of the rally in euro area share prices when markets sensed the arrival of the European Central Bank's quantitative easing efforts at the beginning of 2015. There was a fervent rush to buy/overweight euro area stocks heading into the QE announcement by the ECB. European bourses surged. Nevertheless, euro area equity prices have been sliding and massively underperforming the global equity benchmark since March 2015 (Chart I-17). The reason the ECB's QE has not helped euro area stocks is because their fundamentals were bad - profits have been shrinking despite the ECB's QE. We suspect EM stocks and currencies will have a similar destiny: EM profits will disappoint considerably, and the current rally will prove unsustainable. Notably, net EPS revisions have so far failed to move into the positive territory (Chart I-18). Chart I-17Euro Area Stocks And EPS: ##br##Why The QE Rally Proved To Be Bogus Chart I-18EM Stocks And EPS: ##br##Earning Revisions Are Still Contracting Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy & Frontier Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China Foreign Exchange Trading System. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Risks To Our Negative EM View," dated July 13, 2016; a link is available on page 15. 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "EM Corporate Health Is Flashing Red," dated September 14, 2016; a link is available on page 15. 4 Please see http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3155686/index.html 5 Please see http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3183204/index.html 6 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Revisiting China's Fiscal And Credit Impulses," dated April 13, 2016; a link is available on page 15. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Regardless of who wins the U.S. election, the gaping mismatch between fundamentals and broad market valuations remains intact, but will be in jeopardy of re-converging should the Fed signal an intention to tighten monetary conditions through next year. As previously outlined, our view is that the economy, particularly the corporate sector, will struggle further if financial conditions become more restrictive and/or election uncertainty persists. The non-financial corporate sector's return on equity has already fallen to its lowest level in more than 60 years. Yet the median price/sales and price/earnings ratios are flirting with all-time highs. That divergence is not sustainable, given the direct link between ROE, profit growth and valuations. Central bank benevolence has underwritten this gap, and any ebbing in financial liquidity is a potential catalyst for it to close.

Bank stocks have moved higher, following the sell-off in global bond markets and steepening in yield curves sparked initially by the Bank of Japan's curve targeting shift and a reversal of incremental easing expectations from the Bank of England. However, we are not convinced that the relative performance bear market is over. Bank profits have not been able to outpace the broad corporate sector since the beginning of 2015, even though loan growth has been healthy and overall earnings were crushed by the implosion in commodity prices during that period, allowing most other sectors to show earnings outperformance. Now loan growth is rolling over and credit quality is beginning to erode. Perhaps more worrying is that banks are no longer pruning cost structures, which is unusual given that credit standards are tightening on most credit products outside of traditional mortgages. In the last 25 years, or as far back as we have the data, bank stocks lagged the broad market after bank employment started rising. The only exception was in the aftermath of the tech bubble, when all non-TMT sectors outperformed. If banks continue to expand their wage bill, without a widening in net interest margins and/or reversal in increased loan loss reserving, bank profits will fail to match the growth rate of the overall S&P 500. We recommend selling into strength.

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Bank profits are unlikely to match those of the broad market if the Fed hikes interest rates and loan demand cools. Sell into strength. Gold shares are looking increasingly attractive, but we will refrain from upgrading until the U.S. dollar is closer to a peak. Drug pricing power is worse than government data suggests, warranting a downshift in our previously upbeat view toward pharmaceutical equities. Recent Changes S&P Health Care - Removed from our high conviction list. Upgrade Alert Gold Shares - Currently neutral. Downgrade Alert S&P Pharmaceuticals Index - Currently overweight. S&P Biotech Index - Currently overweight. Table 1 Feature Chart 1From Greed To Fear The gaping mismatch between fundamentals and broad market valuations remains intact, but will be in jeopardy of re-converging should the Fed signal an intention to tighten monetary conditions through next year. As previously outlined, our view is that the economy, particularly the corporate sector, will struggle further if financial conditions become more restrictive and/or election uncertainty persists. Indeed, investors have been scrambling to buy protection, aggressively bidding up near-term VIX contracts, especially relative to longer-term contracts. While it is tempting to view this increase in fear as a contrary positive, this measure typically sinks lower when investors turn cautious. Chart 1 shows that tactical broad market vulnerability still exists. On a more fundamental basis, the non-financial corporate sector's return on equity has already fallen to its lowest level in more than 60 years (Chart 2). Yet the median price/sales and price/earnings ratios are flirting with all-time highs (Chart 2). That divergence is not sustainable, given the direct link between ROE, profit growth and valuations. Central bank benevolence has underwritten this gap. Third quarter earnings have failed to impress thus far, keeping the equity market locked in a tight range. So far, one nascent trend is that domestic and consumer-linked equities appear to be gaining traction at the expense of global, business-dependent sectors. We expect the complexion of earnings contributions to become more lopsided in the quarters ahead, in support of most of these budding trend changes. The inevitable upshot of a strong U.S. dollar is deteriorating profit breadth. Chart 3 shows that the number of industry groups experiencing rising forward earnings estimates is likely to erode as the currency strengthens. Clearly, industries most reliant on exports and/or capital spending are most vulnerable. The corporate sector has run up debt levels and is struggling to generate profit growth. In turn, business spending has been compromised, as measured by the contraction in core durable goods orders (Chart 3). On the flipside, consumers have rebuilt their savings and are enjoying the benefits of a positive wealth effect. The increase in real wage and salary growth is underpinning real median household income. The latter surged 5.2%, posting the largest percentage increase in the history of the data. Consumer income expectations are well supported (Chart 3, top panel). The implication is that consumption-oriented plays should be well positioned to deliver profit outperformance, even if the labor market slows. From an investment theme perspective, the upshot is domestic-oriented areas are poised to make a comeback relative to globally-exposed sectors after a burst of speed in recent months (Chart 4). Net earnings revisions are already shifting in that direction, with more upside ahead based on U.S. dollar strength, as well as dirt cheap relative valuations (Chart 4). Chart 2A Disturbing Mismatch Chart 3Consumers Are Stronger Than Corporates Chart 4Favor Domestic Vs. Global One exception is the banking sector, where there is limited scope for earnings outperformance and/or valuation expansion. Bank Stocks Are Showing Signs Of Life, But... Bank stocks have moved higher, following the sell-off in global bond markets and steepening in yield curves sparked initially by the Bank of Japan's curve targeting shift and a reversal of incremental easing expectations from the Bank of England. However, we are not convinced that the relative performance bear market is over. A Special Report published on October 3 surveyed the performance of banks during Fed tightening cycles, to help put context around the widely held view that Fed rate hikes will bolster bank stocks on a sustained basis. History shows there has been only a loose relationship between the Fed funds rate and net interest margins. It would take rising rate expectations within the context of a steeper yield curve, improving credit quality and rapid loan growth to justify an optimistic profit outlook. Bank profits have not been able to outpace the broad corporate sector since the beginning of 2015 (Chart 5, top panel), even though loan growth has been healthy and overall earnings were crushed by the implosion in commodity prices during that period, allowing most other sectors to show earnings outperformance. Will another 25 bps interest rate hike remedy this? The Fed is keen to hike rates partially because it views them as being overly accommodative for an economy operating close to full employment, and is keen to reestablish firepower in advance of the next economic downturn. But there is scant evidence of economic overheating to support the view that rates have been 'too low'. Inflation and inflation expectations, while up from very depressed levels, are still historically low and the economy is struggling to grow at, let alone above, trend. Consequently, a strident Fed would boost the odds of a policy mistake. The market appears to share that view, given the failure of the yield curve to stop narrowing since the taper talk started, notwithstanding the recent blip up (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 5Why Would Bank Profits Outperform Now? Chart 6Beware U.S. Dollar Strength Now that the USD is strengthening anew, the odds of imported deflation have climbed, to the detriment of corporate profits and bank stock relative performance (Chart 6, top panel). While nominal yields have backed up, real 2-year yields have declined, which is not consistent with an upgrading in economic expectations. Indeed, C&I loan growth has dropped sharply in recent weeks (Chart 6). By extension, it is hard to envision long-term yields rising much, if at all, which will keep net interest margins thin. Furthermore, if overall earnings remain stuck in neutral, corporate credit quality will undoubtedly worsen given the debt binge in recent years. Non-performing loans have only just begun to increase. Higher interest rates will not solve these problems. Instead, the downturn in credit quality could accelerate via more onerous debt servicing requirements, given the lack of a corporate sector balance sheet cushion. Perhaps more worrying is that banks are no longer pruning cost structures, which is unusual given that credit standards are tightening on most credit products outside of traditional mortgages. In the last 25 years, or as far back as we have the data, bank stocks lagged the broad market after bank employment started rising. The only exception was in the aftermath of the tech bubble, when all non-TMT sectors outperformed (Chart 7). If banks continue to expand their wage bill, without a widening in net interest margins and/or reversal in increased loan loss reserving, bank profits will fail to match the growth rate of the overall S&P 500. The optimal, but not exclusive, time for banks to outperform is typically exiting recession, when policy is easing and the yield curve is steepening, and in the late innings of an expansion. In fact, productivity is sagging throughout the financial sector. Financial sector employment is probing new highs (Chart 8), reflecting a more onerous cost structure required to meet regulatory obligations. Employment is now growing faster than sales, a reliable indication of flagging productivity. The implication is that financial sector profits will continue to lag those of the broad market. Chart 7Beware Rising Bank Employment Chart 8Sectoral Productivity Drain Bottom Line: Strength in bank stocks is a chance to sell. Is It Time To Buy Back Gold Shares? Gold shares are bouncing after having been punished in the last few months. Overheated technical conditions and prospects for a more hawkish Fed led us to recommend taking profits in August, despite a positive long-term outlook. Indeed, the likelihood of a prolonged period of negative to ultra-low real interest rates is high given startlingly low potential GDP growth in most of the developed world. Gold shares typically do well in the aftermath of a debt binge, as proxied by our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM, shown advanced, Chart 9). It is unnerving that the CHM has suffered such a broad-based deterioration without any back up in interest rates. Low interest rates and tight credit spreads have cushioned what has otherwise been a stark erosion in debt servicing capabilities: there is little scope for a parallel upshift in the global interest rate structure. These are bullish conditions for gold shares, as captured by the upbeat reading in our Cyclical Gold Indicator (Chart 9, top panel). As such, when we took profits we advised that we would look to return to an overweight position once tactical downside risks had been reduced. Are we there yet? Chart 10 suggests that extreme bullishness toward the yellow metal has not yet fully unwound. While the share price ratio has dropped back to its 200-day moving average, cyclical momentum remains elevated, as measured by the 52-week rate of change. Sentiment in the commodity pits is still elevated, flows into gold ETFs are still strong and net speculative positions have not yet made a full retreat (Chart 10), especially in view of the recent politically-motivated pop in market volatility. The implication is that there could be additional selling pressure in the coming weeks. Chart 9Cyclically Appealing, But... Chart 10... Still Tactically Frothy Chart 11The Currency Is Critical In terms of potential buy triggers, anything that causes the U.S. dollar to lose its bid is a strong candidate. Ironically, a Fed rate hike could produce such an outcome, contrary to popular wisdom. In our view, the U.S. (and global) economy cannot handle tighter financial conditions, and a rise in interest rates would need to be offset by a weaker currency. Gold shares perform well when economic expectations are faltering (Chart 11, shown inverted), and a hawkish Fed would likely raise global economic fears. On the flipside, a go-slow Fed could keep the currency bid. That would allow the economy more time to heal and recover, and possibly overheat, thereby potentially boosting future returns on capital, certainly relative to other countries where output gaps remain larger. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on gold stocks, but put them on upgrade alert in recognition that an upgrade back to overweight could occur sooner rather than later, i.e. by yearend, depending on macro dynamics. What To Do With Drug Stocks? A number of drug wholesalers reported earnings misses and provided disappointing guidance, specifically citing worse than expected generic pricing pressure, enough to offset ongoing branded drug price increases. In the current environment of political uncertainty toward health care companies, the knee jerk reaction has been to abandon all pharmaceutical-related equities, regardless of exposure to branded or generic medicines. Our pharmaceutical equity view has noted that the time to worry about the pace of drug price increases would be if they sparked a change in consumption patterns and/or buyer behavior. The fact that major buying groups such as health insurers and pharmacy benefit managers are balking at generic drug price increases constitutes such a shift. Consumer spending on drugs has slowed, albeit that has not been confirmed by neither strong retail drug store sales nor booming hospital employment (Chart 12). Nor is there an unwanted inventory build (Chart 12). Nevertheless, in light of new information, which implies that company-reported pricing pressure is worse than current government data shows, we are downgrading our outlook for drug-related shares. Still, rather than sell after the index has already taken a large hit, pushing relative performance to oversold and undervalued levels (Chart 12), we will await a more opportune moment to lighten positions, especially in view of our preference for defensive equities. Keep in mind that the drug price increases are still well in excess of the overall rate of inflation as branded drug prices continue to rise (Chart 13), and earnings stability should be increasingly desirable as the U.S. dollar climbs. In the meantime, drug-related shares are now on downgrade alert and the overall health care sector is off our high-conviction list. The good news is that other parts of the health care sector should benefit if drug inflation cools. For instance, a reduction in the rate of drug price increases, and in the case of generics, outright price cuts, is a blessing for the S&P managed care industry. Cost inflation had been perking up, but should ease in the coming quarters as drug expenses abate. Health insurance premiums are growing at a faster rate than overall inflation, while job growth remains decent (Chart 14), underscoring that top-line growth is still outpacing that of the overall corporate sector. If cost inflation eases while revenue climbs, the index should move to at least a market multiple from its current discounted valuation. Importantly, technical readings have improved. Chart 12Under The Gun... Chart 13... But Pricing Power Remains Strong Chart 14Celebrating Reduced Cost Inflation Cyclical momentum has begun to reaccelerate from neutral levels after unwinding overbought conditions (Chart 14), suggesting that a breakout to new relative performance highs is in the offing. Bottom Line: The pain in drug-related shares should provide a gain to health care insurers. Stay overweight the S&P managed care index. However, look to lighten the S&P pharmaceutical and biotech indexes on a relative performance bounce in the coming weeks, both are now on downgrade alert. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and growth over value.

Financial stocks have risen in sympathy with the back up in global bond yields, but that likely represents position squaring more so than a sustained shift into the sector. Financial profits will continue to be challenged by a downturn in the credit cycle, both in terms of quality and loan creation, given the negative global credit impulse and flattening yield curve (shown inverted and advanced, bottom panel). Importantly, productivity is waning. Financial sector employment is probing new highs, reflecting a more onerous cost structure required to meet regulatory obligations. Employment is now growing faster than sales (third panel), a reliable indication of flagging productivity. The implication is that financial sector profits will continue to lag those of the broad market. We continue to view cheap financial sector valuations as a trap, and recommend below benchmark positions.

Special Report

Highlights Lesson 1: Don't fear the end of the debt super cycle. Lesson 2: The ECB will ultimately target the long-term bond yield. Lesson 3: Financials will structurally underperform. Lesson 4: Personal Products (Beauty) will structurally outperform. Feature Striking similarities exist between the post debt super cycle economies in the euro area and Japan. Feature ChartPersonal Products Will Outperform Structurally... Financials Will Not In many regards, the euro area looks remarkably like Japan with a 17 year lag. Line up the 2007 peak in the euro area credit boom with the 1990 peak in the Japan credit boom - and the subsequent evolutions of many economic and financial metrics also line up almost perfectly: for example, the policy interest rate; the 10-year bond yield; inflation; and nominal GDP (Chart I-2, Chart I-3, Chart I-4, Chart I-5). Chart 2Striking Similarities Between The Euro Area... Chart 3...And Japan, Advanced By 17 Years Chart I-4Striking Similarities Between The Euro Area... Chart I-5...And Japan, Advanced By 17 Years This is very useful because if the euro area continues in Japan's footsteps, Japan's experience can teach us several important lessons about the euro area economy and financial markets out to the year 2034. Lesson 1: Don't Fear The End Of The Debt Super Cycle Does the euro area economy have "lost decades" ahead of it? Not exactly. Japan's so-called lost decades describe its stagnant nominal GDP since the mid-1990s. But this emphasis on nominal income is misleading (Chart I-6). The average citizen's standard of living does not depend on nominal GDP or even on real GDP. What truly matters is real GDP per head combined with the absence of extreme income inequality. Real incomes must grow and the growth must be reasonably distributed across society. On both counts, the euro area can be encouraged by Japan's experience. Since the late 1990s, Japan's real GDP per head has averaged close to 1% growth a year, broadly in line with the expected real productivity growth in a developed economy. This is exactly the real growth rate to be expected when there is no artificial and unsustainable tailwind from credit expansion. It is an economy's natural state of growth when the debt super cycle comes to an end, as it did in Japan more than 20 years ago.1 And it is good growth because it comes entirely from productivity improvements. Mankind's persistent ability to learn, experiment, and innovate produces more and/or better output from a fixed set of inputs. Furthermore, unlike other major economies, income inequality in Japan has not increased through the past 20 years and remains amongst the lowest in the developed world (Chart I-7). Again, this is not surprising. It is credit expansions that inflate bubbles in financial assets and exacerbate income and wealth inequalities. Therefore, unlike bad growth fuelled by credit booms, real growth that comes from productivity improvements is sustainable and unpolarising. The first lesson from Japan is that the euro area can expect structural growth in real GDP per head of around 1% a year. Chart I-6What ##br##"Lost Decades"? Chart I-7Income Inequality In Japan ##br##Has Not Increased Lesson 2: The ECB Will Ultimately Target The Long-Term Bond Yield One objection to Lesson 1 is that in a highly indebted economy, nominal GDP growth does matter. As debt is a nominal amount, it is nominal incomes that determine the ability to service and repay the high level of debt. So given a free choice, policymakers would prefer to have inflation at 2% or 4% rather than at -1%; and nominal GDP growth at 3% or 5% rather than zero. Unfortunately, policymakers do not have this free choice. Contrary to what central bankers promise, inflation and nominal GDP growth cannot be dialled up or down at will to hit a point-target. As we explained in The Case Against Helicopters,2 inflation is a notoriously non-linear phenomenon which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control. As a reminder, look at the standard identity of monetary economics: MV = PT M is the broad money supply, V is its velocity of circulation, P is the price level and T is the volume of transactions. PT is effectively nominal GDP. The big problem is that both the broad money supply M and its velocity V - whose product determines nominal GDP - are highly non-linear. M is non-linear because the commercial banking system money multiplier - the ratio of loans to reserves - is non-linear (Chart I-8). At a tipping point of inflation, the onus suddenly flips from lending as little as possible to lending as much as possible. Chart I-8The Money Multiplier Is Non-Linear Admittedly, the central bank (in cahoots with the government) could by-pass the commercial banking system to control the money supply M directly. But it can do nothing to change the extreme non-linearity of the other driver of nominal GDP, the velocity of money V. Again, at a tipping point of inflation, the onus suddenly flips to spending money - both newly created and pre-existing balances - as fast as possible. At which point, nominal GDP growth and inflation suddenly and uncontrollably phase-shift from ice to fire with little in between. Therefore in the highly indebted euro area economy with near-zero inflation, the prudent course of action is not to risk uncontrolled inflation with so-called "helicopter money". Instead, the second lesson from Japan is to expect the ECB ultimately to emulate the BoJ and target the long-term bond yield. But which bond yield? Most likely, it would be the euro area synthetic 10-year yield, which the ECB already calculates and publishes, or a close proxy. In combination with the ECB's (as yet unused) OMT program - whose mere presence limits individual sovereign yield spreads - expect euro area government bond yields to remain structurally well anchored. Lesson 3: Financials Will Structurally Underperform Japanese financial sector profits today stand at less than half their level in 1990. For euro area financial sector profits, the concerning thing is that their evolution is tracking the Japanese experience with a 17 year lag. If euro area financial profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect no sustained growth over the next 17 years (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Euro Area Financial Profits May Experience No Sustained Growth In a post debt super cycle world, banks lose the lifeblood of their business: credit creation. And this becomes a multi-decade headwind to financial sector profit growth and share price performance. Euro area financials face two other headwinds similar to those in post debt super cycle Japan. As explained in Lesson 2, high indebtedness makes the economy hyper-sensitive to rising bond yields. The upshot is that the interest rate term-structure, which drives banks' net lending margins, cannot sustainably steepen. Also, just like Japan's 'zombie' banks, many European banks will take a long time to fully recognise the extent of their non-performing loans. The consequent squeeze on new lending combined with a requirement for additional capital further weighs down banks' return on equity. So the third lesson from Japan is that euro area financials is not a sector to buy and hold for the long term. Rather, it is a sector to play for periodic strong countertrend rallies. Now is not the time for such a play. Lesson 4: Personal Products (Beauty) Will Structurally Outperform Over the past 20 years, Japan's nominal GDP has gone sideways. But over this same period, the sales of skin cosmetics and beauty products have almost tripled (Chart I-10). This has helped the personal products sector to outperform very strongly. While Japanese financial profits have halved since 1990, Japanese personal products profits have quintupled (Feature Chart). Once again, the useful thing is that euro area personal product profits are uncannily tracking the Japanese experience with a 17 year lag. If euro area personal product profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect them to almost triple over the next 17 years (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Beauty Sales Have Boomed In Japan Chart I-11Euro Area Personal Products Profits Might Triple The very strong growth in beauty sales and profits in Japan is an extended example of the phenomenon known as the lipstick effect. Our Special Report Buy Beauty: The Lipstick Effect Stays Put3 provides the detail. But in a nutshell, the demand for beauty products and cosmetics - epitomised by lipstick - experiences a surge when the economic environment feels harsh. For many people, the post debt super cycle world of 1% real income growth with high indebtedness and no more bingeing on credit does feel like an extended hangover - at least compared to the spendthrift era that preceded it. Hence, it creates the ideal backdrop for an extended play of the lipstick effect, as witnessed in Japan. The fourth lesson from Japan is that euro area personal products is a sector to buy and hold for the long term. Expect profits to trend up at around 6% a year, and the sector to strongly outperform the broader market. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Admittedly, after the debt super cycle ended in Japan, government levering was needed to counter the impact of aggressive de-levering in the private sector. But in the euro area, this will not be needed to the same extent as the de-levering in the private sector is not as aggressive. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'The Case Against Helicopters' published on May 5, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Buy Beauty: The Lipstick Effect Stays Put' published on April 14, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model This week's recommended trade is to go short French banks versus the CAC40. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. 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