Fixed Income
Highlights 2018 Model Bond Portfolio Positioning: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. Country Allocations: Divergences in likely central bank policy moves in 2018 will lead to more cross-country bond market investment opportunities. In our model portfolio, we are maintaining underweight positions in the U.S., Canada and the Euro Area, keeping a moderate overweight in low-beta Japan, and adding small overweights in the U.K. and Australia (where rate hikes are unlikely). Spread Product: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Feature Two weeks ago, we published our "Key Views" report, outlining the main fixed income investment implications deriving from the 2018 BCA Outlook.1 In this, our final report of 2017, we translate those Key Views into direct allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. As we always remind our clients, our model portfolio is intended as a vehicle to communicate our opinions on the relative attractiveness and trade-offs between fixed income countries and sectors. That is to say, the portfolio not only includes our traditional individual country and sector recommendations, but attaches actual weightings to those views within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. The main takeaway from our Key Views is that bond market performance, and ideal asset allocation, is likely to look very different as the year progresses (Table 1). The first half of the year will see continued strong global growth and slowly rising inflation, but with central banks only slowing shifting to a less accommodative policy stance. This will create an environment where global bond yields will rise but with credit markets outperforming government bonds. The story will play out differently in the latter half, however, as worries over global growth expectations for 2018 will create more market volatility - albeit with lower cross-asset correlations as central banks act in a less-coordinated fashion than in recent years. Table 1A Pro-Risk Recommended Portfolio In H1/2018, Looking To Get Defensive Later In The Year Top-Down Bond Portfolio Implications Of Our Key Views The main predictions for 2018 in our Key Views report from December 5th were the following: A more bearish backdrop for bonds, led by the U.S.: Faster global growth, with rebounding inflation expectations, will trigger tighter overall global monetary policy. This will be led by Fed rate hikes and, later in 2018, ECB tapering. Global bond yields will rise in response, primarily due to higher inflation expectations. Growth & policy divergences will create cross-market bond investment opportunities: Global growth in 2018 will become less synchronized compared to 2016 & 2017, as will individual country monetary policies. Government bonds in the U.S. and Canada, where rate hikes will happen, will underperform, while bonds in the U.K. and Australia, where rates will likely be held steady, will outperform. The most dovish central banks will be forced to turn less dovish: The ECB and BoJ will both slow the pace of their asset purchases in 2018, in response to strong domestic economies and rising inflation. This will lead to bear-steepening of yield curves in Europe, mostly in the latter half of 2018. The BoJ could raise its target on JGB yields, but only modestly, in response to an overall higher level of global bond yields. The low market volatility backdrop will end through higher bond volatility: Incremental tightening by central banks, in response to faster inflation, will raise the volatility of global interest rates. This will eventually weigh on global growth expectations over the course of 2018, and create a more volatile backdrop for risk assets in the latter half of the year. The first step in translating these themes into allocations into our model bond portfolio is to determining the ideal top-down asset allocation parameters for the start of the 2018: Maintain a moderate overall level of portfolio risk. Both bond yields (Chart 1) and credit spreads (Chart 2) are at the low end of their historical ranges since 2000. This suggests that bond market returns will be much lower than in recent years, simply because initial valuations are not cheap. Coming at a time when bond volatility is also at historically depressed levels, and with central banks starting to slowly take away the monetary punch bowl, keeping overall portfolio risk at modest levels is prudent. Within the GFIS model bond portfolio, that means keeping our tracking error versus our custom benchmark performance index well below our maximum target level of 100bps (Chart 3). Chart 1Historical Range Of Bond Yields For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 Chart 2Historical Range Of Global Credit Spreads, 2000-2017 Maintain a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration. The combination of solid global growth, rising inflation and a slower pace of bond buying by the major central banks all suggest that bond yields will move higher in 2018. We will continue to target a recommended portfolio duration that is one year short versus our benchmark index (Chart 4). Chart 3Maintain Moderate Overall Portfolio Risk Chart 4Stay Cautious On Duration Risk Maintain an overweight stance on corporate credit over government bonds, focusing on the U.S. Although spreads are tight in so many asset classes, the global growth and monetary backdrop remains supportive for the outperformance of credit over government bonds. We recommended focusing on U.S. corporate credit, both Investment Grade (IG) and High-Yield (HY), where growth momentum remains solid and Fed policy is not yet restrictive. After setting those broad portfolio parameters, our recommendations get more interesting in terms of country allocations. Bond yields within the developed markets have become highly correlated to inflation expectations in the past few years (Chart 5). This is no surprise given how strongly central banks have tied their monetary policy decisions to their own inflation forecasts, and to market-based and survey-based inflation expectations. Inflation is likely to move higher next year alongside tight global labor markets and higher oil prices. If the bullish views on oil from BCA's commodity strategists comes to fruition, this implies that both market-based inflation expectations can rise and yield curves can bear-steepen. The key to the latter will be how fast central banks respond to faster rates of inflation. Yield curve steepness remains highly correlated to the level of REAL interest rates. Curves steepen when real interest rates decline and vice versa. Lower real rates can happen in two ways - bullishly, if central banks cut policy rates faster than inflation is falling; or bearishly, if central banks do not hike rates as fast as inflation is rising. We see the latter as being the likely story in 2018, which will lead to steeper government bond yield curves but through higher yields and rising inflation expectations. In Chart 6, where we plot the level of real central bank policy rates (deflated by 10-year CPI swaps as a measure of inflation expectations) vs. the 2-year/10-year bond yield curves. If global inflation expectations merely follow the path implied by our bullish oil forecast (Brent crude average $65/bbl in 2018), and central banks did not respond with rate hikes, then this would generate lower real interest rates (the "x" in each panel of the chart) and steepening pressure on yield curves. Chart 5Bond Yields In 2018 Will Be Driven More##BR##By Inflation Expectations Chart 6Steepening Pressure On Yield Curves##BR##From Inflation In 2018 We don't see all central banks responding the same way to an oil-driven move higher in inflation. Lower unemployment rates, and other measures of diminished economic slack, will be needed to give policymakers confidence that their economies can tolerate higher interest rates. Judging central banks along these lines will create more interesting country bond allocation decisions in 2018 (Chart 7). Specifically, we see a greater likelihood that the Fed and Bank of Canada (BoC) can actually raise interest rates next year. It will be much harder for the Bank of England (BoE) to raise rates given sluggish domestic economic growth, lingering Brexit uncertainty and the fact that market-based inflation expectations have already peaked. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will also be unable to hike rates next year given the lack of core inflation pressures and with an unemployment rate that is still much higher than previous cyclical troughs. This leads us to add moderate portfolio overweights in the U.K. and Australia to the government bond portion of our model bond portfolio, while maintaining our current underweight stances for the U.S. and Canada (Chart 8). The ECB and Bank of Japan (BoJ) will be nowhere near a point where interest rate hikes would be considered, although the decisions those banks make with their asset purchase programs will be a bigger issue for their bond markets in 2018. Chart 7Tight Labor Markets Will##BR##Influence Bond Returns Chart 8Monetary Policy Divergences##BR##Will Drive Country Allocation Bottom Line: Translating our 2018 key global fixed income views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following: target a moderate level of portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration and overweights on corporate credit versus government debt. These allocations will shift later in the year as central banks shift to a more restrictive monetary policy stance and growth expectations for 2018 become more uncertain. The Asset Allocation Implications Of Slower Central Bank Asset Purchases The big risk factor for global bonds in 2018 will be how markets respond to less buying from the Fed, ECB and BoJ. As the growth rate of the expansion of the major balance sheets slows, bond yields have the potential to rise through two channels: higher term premia on longer maturity bonds and the market pulling forward the expected future path of interest rates. This will become a major issue for Euro Area bond markets in the 2nd half of 2018, as the ECB will be forced by strong domestic growth and rising inflation pressures to announce a full taper of its asset purchase program by the end of 2018. This will come on top of a slower pace of buying by the BoJ (who is now targeting a price target on bond yields rather than a quantity target), and the Fed allowing some run off of its massive balance sheet. The result is that the growth rate of the major developed market central bank balance sheets is likely to slow to a low single-digit pace in 2018 (Chart 9), creating upside potential for global yields. The case for significant underweights in Euro Area fixed income will be much stronger later next year when the ECB will be forced to prepare the market for a taper. But in the first half of 2018, the impact of the ECB's purchases will continue to dampen Euro Area bond yields. At the same time, Japanese yields will remain pegged near 0% by BoJ buying. In terms of our model bond portfolio, we are maintaining an overweight stance on low-beta Japan given our views on rising global bond yields, while keeping aggregate Euro Area bond weightings close to neutral (and looking to go more aggressively underweight later in the year as the ECB taper talk ramps up). Bond markets that are less propped up by ultra-accommodative central banks will create a more volatile market backdrop for global fixed income as the year progresses. That is hardly a provocative statement, of course, given the starting point of utterly low realized bond market volatility (Chart 10). As discussed earlier, our views for 2018 lead us to recommend a more moderate portfolio risk level in 2018. The potential for higher central-bank driven market volatility fits with that expectation. Chart 9Global Yields Will Rise As##BR##Central Banks Buy Fewer Bonds Chart 10The Low Bond Vol Regime##BR##Looks Stretched A slower pace of central bank bond buying also has another implication for portfolio construction. With the wave of central bank liquidity becoming a less dominant factor, cross-asset correlations should diminish. We can see that by looking at the average correlation between sectors within our model bond portfolio benchmark index (Chart 11). We have found that the correlation is itself highly correlated to the breadth of global economic growth, as measured by our leading economic indicator diffusion index (top panel). But the average correlation is also linked to the growth rate of central bank balance sheets (bottom panel), which is a by-product of massive asset purchases reducing global macroeconomic risks and forcing investors to plow into similar asset classes to chase acceptable returns. Slightly less coordinated global growth, and less active central banks, should result in lower market correlations in 2018. At the same time, as central banks shift to a less accommodative stance - especially in the U.S. - the uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart 12). This will likely lead us to cut our recommended overweight allocations to U.S. IG and HY corporate debt in our model portfolio later in 2018. To begin the year, however, we are keeping an overweight stance until the Fed is forced to signal a shift to a more hawkish stance because of rising U.S. inflation. Chart 11Expect Lower Global Bond##BR##Correlations In 2018 Chart 12The Link Between U.S. Growth,##BR##Bond Vol & Credit Spreads Bottom Line: Slower bond buying by central banks will result in a more volatile bond backdrop later in 2018, which will impact credit spreads. Stay overweight in the first half of the year, however, until higher inflation forces the hand of central banks. Summing It All Up Chart 13Aiming For Moderate Carry##BR##In Our Model Portfolio On Page 12, we show our model bond portfolio allocations after making some changes to reflect our key views for 2018. We are doing some tweaks to our existing recommendations: modestly increasing our overweight U.S. IG corporates allocation at the expense of U.S. Treasuries; reducing our underweight in the Euro Area by reducing the large Italy underweight; adding exposure to the U.K. and Australia; while cutting our large overweight in Japan. The latter was there as a desire to get more defensive on the portfolio's duration stance, but having such a large allocation has left our portfolio with no yield advantage versus the custom benchmark index (Chart 13). With the changes we are making this week, the model bond portfolio will have a yield that is 12bps over that of our custom index. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "2018 Key Views: BCA's Outlook & What It Means For Global Fixed Income Markets", dated December 5th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights BCA expects the 2/10 curve to steepen in 1H in 2018, then flatten in 2H. U.S. equities, the stock-to-bond ratio and oil thrive when the curve is flat. Small caps struggle. Record household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Feature Wrangling over the GOP's tax plan and the Federal Open Market Committee's final meeting of 2017 provided the backdrop for financial markets last week. The dollar was the big loser, as investors doubted the ability of the Republican leadership in Congress to find the votes needed to pass the bill. BCA's view remains that Congress will pass a tax cut package by the end of Q1 2018. Even though inflation missed the Fed's forecast in 2017 (Chart 1), the FOMC left its inflation and interest projections unchanged for the next two years given its outlook for stronger growth and lower unemployment. Inflation will reach the 2% target by the end of 2019. As a consequence, the Fed expects to lift interest rates three more times in 2018 and another two times in 2019 (Chart 2). Chart 1Persistent Inflation Shortfall Chart 2The FOMC's Latest Forecasts The economy is now expected to grow 2.5% in 2018, up from the Fed's previous forecast of 2.1%. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for three years. The Fed nudged its forecasts for the unemployment rate down by 0.2% for the next three years, based on the higher growth projections. The jobless rate is now expected to dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. Importantly, the Fed left its estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%. Therefore, the labor market is expected to tighten further beyond full employment. Consequently, wage gains should accelerate and allow inflation to return to the Fed's 2% target in 2019. We don't have any major disagreements with the Fed's interest rate forecasts for 2018, but inflation must turn higher. The Fed has raised rates five times over the last two years, but CPI inflation has made no progress toward the 2% objective. However, the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge continues to move steadily higher (Chart 1, panel 1). Nevertheless, the real Fed funds moved closer to its neutral level and the yield curve has continued to flatten (panel 3). Bottom Line: BCA expects the yield curve to steepen in the first half of 2018, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. However, a flat curve is not the death knoll for risk assets. The yield curve will not invert until inflation has recovered to the Fed's target. This means that a period of modest curve steepening is likely, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. Powell Versus The Market BCA's view is that the current paths of inflation and the yield curve are unsustainable. If the Fed continues to hike rates, but inflation fails to rise, then the yield curve will invert in the coming months. The inversion would signal that bond investors anticipate a recession and the Fed has not achieved its inflation target. Such an obvious policy error will not be permitted to occur, which leaves three possible outcomes for Fed policy and the Treasury curve during the next six months.1 1) The Fed Is Right In this scenario, inflation would rebound in the coming months, pushing up the compensation for inflation protection embedded in long-dated bond yields. This would cause an increase in long-maturity nominal yields and probably impart a steepening bias to the yield curve, depending on how quickly the Fed lifts rates. BCA's Outlook for 2018 makes a case why inflation will likely bottom in the coming months. Therefore, we view the "Fed is Right" scenario as the most probable outcome.2 2) The Fed Is Proactive In another scenario, the Fed recognizes there is a risk of tightening the yield curve into inversion - and the economy into recession - if inflation stays low. Therefore, the Fed may proactively adopt a more dovish policy stance to prevent the yield curve from inverting. The yield curve would also steepen, but this time it would be a bull-steepener where short-maturity yields fall more than long-maturity yields. This outcome would be the least likely of our three scenarios. The Fed will cling to its forecast that inflation will climb, given that economic growth is accelerating. If inflation fails to respond, then risky assets will eventually sell-off. 3) The Fed Is Reactive The Fed has a strong track record of reacting to tighter financial conditions and risk-off periods in equities and credit markets. If the yield curve continues to flatten, then we will soon see credit spreads widen and equities sell-off. At that stage, the Fed would almost certainly respond by signaling a slower pace of rate hikes. This would steepen the curve and ease pressures on risky assets. We view this development as more likely than the one where the Fed is proactive. Trouble With The Curve BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy team expects that the 2/10 yield curve will languish between 0 and 50 bps in 2018. The curve will steepen from 53 bps in mid-December 2017 through mid-year 2018, and then flatten into year-end. Which asset classes would benefit if BCA's curve call is accurate? Charts 3 through 7 show how several key financial markets have performed in previous yield curve environments. Chart 3A shows that the S&P 500 performs best when the curve is flat (between 0 and 50 bps), with average annualized returns of 22% and median annualized returns of 21%. Moreover, S&P 500 returns are negative less than 5% of the time when the curve is flat, but are negative 25% of the time when the curve is very steep (+100 to +150 bps) (Chart 3B). In general, Chart 3A demonstrates that returns diminish as the curve climbs. Chart 3AS&P 500 Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 3BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P 500 Returns (1988- Present) A flat slope of the 2/10 curve is also the sweet spot for the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 4A). Treasuries outperform stocks only in 5% of months when the 2/10 Treasury curve is flat (Chart 4B). As with stocks, the performance of the stock-to-bond ratio deteriorates as the curve steepens. The stock-to-bond ratio declines more than a third of the time when the curve is very steep. A 2/10 slope of +100 to +150 bps is the worst backdrop for the stock-to-bond ratio. Stocks underperform bonds 40% of the time in this situation. Chart 4AStock-To-Bond Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988 - Present) Chart 4BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##Stock-To-Bond Total Return (1988 - Present) However, a flat curve is a poor setting for small-cap excess performance (Chart 5A). Small caps underperform large caps nearly 80% of the time when the curve is flat (Chart 5B). The average underperformance is 600 bps. Moreover, a flat curve is the most unhealthy climate for small-cap excess returns, even poorer than when the curve inverts. A precipitous curve is the best environment for small caps, with small caps outperforming large by 400 bps on average. Small caps beat large caps 60% of the time when the curve is between 100 and 150 bps. Chart 5AS&P Small/Large TOTAL Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 5BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P Small/Large Total Return (1988- Present) Our U.S. Bond Strategy colleagues note that the flatter the curve, the higher the risk of a sell-off in high-yields relative to Treasuries.3 Junk bonds underperform Treasuries 48% of the time when the curve is flat, which we expect in 2018 (not shown). The implication for investors is that the first half of 2018 will be the best period for junk bond returns. Investment-grade corporates have a similar return profile relative to the curve. Oil performs best when the 2/10 curve is inverted (Chart 6A). However, WTI oil returns an annualized 10-15% when the curve is between 0 and 100 bps. Plus, oil is higher 75% of the time when the curve is between 50 and 100 bps, which is the environment we expect in the first half of next year (Chart 6B). Chart 6AWTI Crude Oil Price Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 6BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##WTI Crude Oil Price Return (1988- Present) Forward earnings per share perform well with a flat curve, but earnings growth is optimal when the curve is inverted. The steeper the curve, the bigger the headwind for EPS. Since 1988, earnings growth has been positive when the curve inverts and is positive 95% of the time when the curve is flat. Chart 7 provides the historical context for a flat yield curve (0 to 50 bps) in terms of the performance of stocks, Treasury bonds, the stock-to-bond ratio, small caps and oil. The Appendix (see page 13) also includes three other charts that provide a perspective on asset class performance when the curve is moderately steep (50 to 100 bps), steep (100 to 150bps) and above 150 bps. Chart 7Stocks, Treasuries, Small Caps And Oil When The Curve Is Flat Bottom Line: BCA expects that the yield curve will first steepen in 2018, then become flatter, ultimately spending most of the year between 0 and 50 bps. A flat curve is the ideal environment for the S&P 500 and the stock-to-bond ratio. However, small cap stocks struggle when the curve is flat; BCA's view is that small caps will outperform large caps in 2018. A flat yield curve raises the risk of a sell-off in high yield, but provides a favorable grounding for oil, which is in line with BCA's fundamental view. BCA expects EPS growth will be positive next year; earnings growth is higher 75% of the time when the curve is flat. Household Net Worth Loses Influence Chart 8The Consumer Is In Good Shape U.S. consumer health has improved markedly since early this year, driving BCA's Consumer Health Indicator into positive territory (Chart 8). These elevated readings should bolster household consumption well into 2018. The improvement supports BCA's view of a stronger U.S. economy alongside a global synchronized recovery, at least over the next 12 months. Real consumer spending is underpinned by advances in real disposable income stemming from increasingly healthy labor market. Moreover, household net worth has continued to soar to an all-time high in 2017Q3 as equity markets remain frothy and house prices stable. However, net worth's direct influence on overall household consumption is not as significant as before the Great Recession. During the housing bubble in the early 2000s, U.S. households leveraged their spending through extensive mortgage refinancing and mortgage equity withdrawal. Real estate was the principal holding on most households' balance sheets. However, as the Great Recession unfolded, household net worth suffered with a collapse in both house prices and equity markets. By 2009, U.S. households were tapped out and grossly over-indebted. Deleveraging is now over, U.S. households have re-fortified their balance sheets and consumer spending is back in line with income growth. In the long term, inflation-adjusted disposable income is more highly correlated with inflation-adjusted consumer spending growth than real household net worth (Chart 9). Positive momentum should continue to support further real consumer spending over the next few quarters, given that unemployment is at a 17-year low and consumer confidence is at a 17-year high, and also given elevated consumers' expectations of real income gains over the next year or two. Chart 9Consumer Spending More Correlated With Income Than Net Worth Household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Chart 10 shows the inverse relationship between net worth and the saving rate. Empirical research has demonstrated the risk that the structural decline (since the mid-1990s) in personal savings has on consumer spending and the overall economy. An often cited conclusion drawn by the investment community is that a lower savings rate raises the risk of consumer retrenchment.4 Chart 10Low Savings Rate, Record High Household Net Worth And Rising Income Expectations Even though the personal savings rate can be considered a contrarian measure for consumer spending, like many measures from the BEA national accounts (NIPA), it is subject to regular revisions. Over the long-term, according to the BEA, the level of the savings rate is often revised upwards but the trend over the last 45 years remains unchanged. There was a downtrend path to revisions in the mid-2000s housing bubble, but there has been a subtle uptrend since 2008 (Chart 11). Even so, in the long run, BCA views the low personal savings rate as a potential headwind for consumer spending as it cannot sustainably remain at its recovery low of 3.2%. However, rising income expectations and a sturdy labor market are offsets to depressed savings and will ensure that the economic expansion remains sustainable and, therefore, less vulnerable to volatile saving patterns. Does record high net worth alter the risks to the FOMC's goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth? In a recent research paper, the Federal Reserve of St-Louis looked at the most exuberant peaks in the ratio of household net worth to income in 1999 and 2006, which occurred before collapses in asset prices and recessions. Although caution is prescribed as household net worth keeps making new highs, the report noted that the composition of households' balance sheet is less alarming today than prior peaks, as equities and real estate relative to household income or total assets are more reasonable. Debt levels are also much more tame today than in 2006. With more immune balance sheets, households may be less vulnerable to unexpected shocks in the future (Chart 12).5 BCA's view is that financial vulnerabilities from the household sector are well contained. Outside of subprime auto loans, household borrowing is increasing modestly at an annual pace of 3.6%, in stark contrast with a 12.9% rate in the early-to-mid 2000s. Broad measures of household solvency, such as the household debt-to-income ratio, is within the range of the past few years and back to pre-recession levels. Furthermore, liquidity buffers (liquid assets to liabilities) are almost as high as the levels that preceded the equity market boom/bust in 1999-2000 (Chart 13). Chart 11Savings Rate Level Often Revised Upwards Chart 12Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Chart 13Household Sector Buffers Are Solid BCA expects the Fed to remain vigilant about financial stability.6 Policymakers will take comfort that household liquidity and solvency ratios have improved dramatically in the past nine years, aided by the cumulative gains in housing and financial assets. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. consumer is bright as incomes continue to improve amid tight labor market conditions. However, record household net worth is more relevant today for savings than for consumption. The Fed should remain committed to gradual rate hikes, but the central bank's quandary will be to determine the optimal pace to foster maximum employment and price stability. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's "2018 Outlook Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course ," published December 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 "Should The Decline In The Personal Savings Rate Be A Cause For Concern?", Alan C. Garner, The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2006Q2; and "The Decline in the U.S. Personal Savings Rate: Is It Real and Is It A Puzzle?", Massimo Guidolin and Elizabeth A. La Jeunesse, The Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, November/December 2007. 5 "Household Wealth Is At A Post-WW II High: Should We Celebrate or Worry?", William R. Emmons and Lowell R. Ricketts, Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, In the Balance, Perspectives on Household Balance Sheets, May 2017. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Powell's In Power," published on November 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart 14U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 50 And 100 Bps Chart 15U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 100 And 150 Bps Chart 16U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Steeper Than 150 Bps
Recommended Allocation Highlights We are late cycle. Strong growth could turn in 2018 from a positive for risk assets into a negative. More risk-averse investors may thus want to turn cautious. But the last year of a bull run can be profitable, and we don't expect a recession until late 2019. For now, therefore, our recommendations remain pro-risk and pro-cyclical. We may turn more defensive in 2H 2018 if the Fed tightens above equilibrium. We expect inflation to pick up in 2018, which will lead the Fed to hike maybe four times. This will push long rates to 3%, and strengthen the U.S. dollar. Equities should outperform bonds in this environment. We prefer euro zone and Japanese equities over U.S., and remain underweight EM. Late-cycle sectors such as Financials and Industrials, should do well. We also favor corporate bonds and private equity. Feature Overview Fin de cycle Global economic growth in 2017 was robust for the first time since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 1). Forecasts for 2018 put growth slightly lower, but are likely to be revised up. However, as the year rolls on, the strong economic momentum may turn from being a positive for risk assets into a negative. U.S. output is now above potential, according to IMF estimates. As Chart 2 shows, historically recessions - and consequently equity bear markets - have usually come within a year or two of the output gap turning positive. With the economy operating above capacity, inflation pressures force the Fed to tighten monetary policy, which eventually causes a slowdown. Chart 1Growth Finally On A Firm Footing Global Growth Has Accelerated Chart 2Recessions Follow Output Gap Closing That is exactly how BCA sees the next couple of years panning out, leading to a recession perhaps in the second half of 2019. U.S. inflation was soft in 2017, but underlying inflation pressures are picking up, with core CPI inflation having bottomed, and small companies saying they are raising prices (Chart 3). Add to that wage pressures (with unemployment heading below 4% in 2018), tax cuts (which might boost growth by 0.2-0.3% points in their first year) and a higher oil price (we expect Brent to average $67 a barrel during the year), and core PCE inflation is likely to rise to 2%, in line with the Fed's expectations. This means the market is too sanguine about the risk of monetary tightening in the U.S. It has priced in less than two rates hikes in 2018, compared to the Fed's three dots, and almost nothing after that (Chart 4). If inflation picks up as we expect, four rate hikes in 2018 could be on the cards. Chart 3Inflation Pressures Picking Up Chart 4Market Still Underpricing Fed Hikes The consequences of this are that bond yields are likely to rise. Despite a significant market repricing since September of Fed behavior, long-term rates have not risen much, leading to a flattening yield curve (Chart 5). The market has essentially priced in that inflation will not rebound and that, consequently, the Fed will be making a policy mistake by hiking further. If, therefore, we are correct that inflation does reach 2%, the yield curve would be likely to steepen over the next six months, with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield reaching 3% by mid-year. Other developed economies, however, have less urgency to tighten monetary policy and we, therefore, see the U.S. dollar appreciating. The only other major economy with a positive output gap currently is Germany (Chart 6). However, the ECB will continue to set policy for the weaker members of the euro area, and output gaps in France (-1.8% of GDP), Italy (-1.6%) and Spain (-0.7%) remain significantly negative. In the absence of inflation pressures, the ECB won't raise rates until late 2019. Japan, too, continues to struggle to bring inflation up the BOJ's 2% target and the Yield Curve Control policy will therefore stay in place, meaning that a rise in global rates will weaken the yen. Chart 5Is Fed Making A Policy Mistake? Chart 6Still A Lot Of Negative Output Gaps This sort of late-cycle environment is a tricky one for investors. The catalysts for strong performance in equities that we foresaw a few months ago - U.S. tax cuts and upside surprises in earnings - have now largely played out. Global earnings will probably rise next year by around 10-12%, in line with analysts' forecasts. With multiples likely to slip a little as the Fed tightens, high single-digit performance is the best that investors should expect from equities. The macro environment which we expect, would be more negative for bonds than positive for equities. That argues for the stock-to-bond ratio to continue to rise until closer to the next recession (Chart 7). And, for now, none of the recession indicators we have been consistently monitoring over the past months is flashing a warning signal (Chart 8). Chart 7Stock-To-Bond Ratio Likely To Rise Further Chart 8Recession Warning Signals Still Not Flashing More risk-averse investors might chose to reduce their exposure to risk assets now, given how close we are to the end of the cycle. But this would be at the risk of leaving some money on the table, since the last year of a bull run can often be the most profitable (remember 1999?). We, therefore, maintain our recommendation for pro-cyclical and pro-risk tilts: overweight equities versus bonds, overweight credit, overweight higher-beta equity markets and sectors, and a preference towards riskier alternative assets. We may move towards a more defensive stance in mid to late 2018, when we see clearer signs that the Fed has tightened above equilibrium or that the risk of recession is rising. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking What Will Be The Impact Of The U.S. Tax Cuts? It is not a done deal, but it still seems likely (notwithstanding the Democratic victory in Alabama) that the U.S. House and Senate will agree a joint tax bill to pass before the end of the year. Since the two current bills have only minor differences, it is possible to make some estimates of the macro and sector impacts of the tax reform. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the cuts will reduce government revenue by $1.4 trillion over 10 years - or $1 trillion (5% of GDP) once positive effects on growth are accounted for. The Treasury argues that tax reform (plus deregulation and infrastructure development) will push GDP growth to 2.9% and therefore government revenues will increase by $300 billion. BCA's estimate is that GDP growth will be boosted by 0.2-0.3% in 2018 and 2019.1 For businesses, the key tax changes are: 1) a reduction in the headline corporate rate from 35% to 21%; 2) immediate expensing of capital investment; 3) a limit to deduction of interest expenses to 30% of taxable income; 4) a move to a territorial tax system from a worldwide one, with a 10% tax on repatriation of past profits held overseas; 5) curbs for some deductions, such as R&D, domestic production and tax-loss carry-forwards. Corporate tax cuts will give a one-off boost to earnings, since the effective tax rate is currently over 25% (Chart 9, panel 1), with telecoms, utilities and industrials likely to be the biggest beneficiaries. This is not fully priced into stocks, since companies with high tax rates have seen their stock prices rise only moderately (Chart 9, panel 2). BCA's sector strategists expect that capex will especially be boosted: they estimate that the one-year depreciation increases net present value by 14% (Table 1).2 This should be positive for the Industrials sector (supplying the capital goods) and for Financials (which will see increased demand for loans). We are overweight both. Chart 9Tax Cuts Should Boost Earnings Table 1 Is Bitcoin A Bubble, And What Happens When It Bursts? The recent surge in prices (Chart 10) of virtual currencies has pushed Bitcoin and aggregate cryptocurrency market cap to $275 billion and $500 billion respectively. The recent violent run-up certainly bears a close resemblance to classic bubbles, but the impact of a sharp correction should be minimal on the real economy and traditional capital markets. As mentioned above, the market cap of cryptocurrencies has reached $500 billion. Globally, there is about $6 trillion in currency3 outstanding, so the value of virtual currencies is now 8% that of traditional fiat currency. Additionally, an estimated 1000 people own about 40% of the world's total bitcoin, for an average of about $105 million per person. At the moment, the macro impact has been constrained by the fact that most people are buying bitcoins as a store of value (Chart 11) or vehicle for speculation, rather than as a medium of exchange. However, when the public begins to regard them as legitimate substitutes for traditional fiat currencies, their impact will be felt on the real economy. Chart 10A Classic Bubble Chart 11Bitcoin Trading Volume By Top Three Currencies That would raise the issue of regulation. The U.S. government generates close to $70 billion per year as "seigniorage revenue." Governments across the world have no intention of losing this revenue, and would most likely introduce their own competitors to bitcoin. Until then, the biggest potential impact of these private currencies might be to spur inflation in the fiat currencies in which their prices are measured. That would be bad for government bonds, but potentially good for stocks. A further risk - and a similarity with the real estate bubble of 2007 - is the use of leverage. The news of a Tokyo-based exchange (BitFyler) offering up to 15x leverage for the purchase of bitcoins has spooked investors. However, the U.S. housing market is valued at $29.6 trillion, almost 60 times that of cryptocurrencies. Finally, the 19th century free banking era in the U.S., which at one point saw 8000 different currencies in circulation, experienced multiple banking crises. A world with myriad private currencies all competing with one another would be similarly unstable. Why Did The U.S. Dollar Weaken In 2017, And Where Will It Go In 2018? Chart 12Positioning And Relative Rates Supportive For USD We were wrong to be bullish on U.S. dollar at the start of 2017. We think the dollar weakness during most of the year can be attributed to the fact that investors were massively long the dollar at the end of 2016 (Chart 12, panel 2), which made the market particularly vulnerable to surprises. Several surprises did come: inflation softened in the U.S. but strengthened in the euro area. There were also positive geopolitical surprises in Europe - for example the victory of Emmanuel Macron in the French presidential election - while the failure to repeal Obamacare in the U.S. raised investors' concerns on the administration's ability to undertake fiscal stimulus. As a result, the U.S. dollar depreciated against euro despite widening interest rate differentials (Chart 12 panel 4) in 2017. Chart 13late Cycle Outperformance Since investors are now aggressively short the dollar, the hurdle for the greenback to deliver positive surprises is much lower than a year ago. Since the Senate passed the Republican tax bill in early December, we have already seen some recovery in the dollar (Chart 12, panel 1). As the labor market continues to firm, with GDP running above potential, U.S. inflation should finally start to pick up in 2018, which will allow the Fed to hike rates, possibly as many as four times during the year. This will contrast with the macro situation overseas: Japan and Europe are likely to continue loose monetary policy to maintain the momentum in their economies. All this should be supportive of the dollar. Are Convertible Bonds Attractive Over The Next 12 Months? With valuations for traditional assets expensive and investors' thirst for yield continuing, the market is in need of alternative sources of return. Convertible bonds offer a hybrid credit/equity exposure, giving investors the option to participate in rising equity markets but with less risk. An allocation to convertibles could prove attractive for the following reasons: Convertible bonds typically outperform high-yield debt in the late stages of bull markets, because of their relatively lower exposure to credit spreads. Junk spreads have a history of starting to widen before equity bear markets begin. Fifty percent of the convertibles index comprises issuance from small-cap and mid-cap firms. Although equity valuations are expensive, prices should continue to rise as long as inflation stays low. Additionally, our U.S. Investment Strategy service thinks that small-cap equities will outperform large caps in the coming months, partly because the likely cuts in U.S. corporate taxes will disproportionately benefit smaller companies. Convertible bonds do appear somewhat cheap relative to equities (Chart 13, panel 3) but, on balance, there is not a strong valuation case for the asset class. Equities appear fairly valued relative to junk bonds, and convertibles are trading at an elevated investment premium. However, valuation is not likely to be a significant headwind to the typical late-cycle outperformance of convertibles versus high yield. biggest near-term risk for convertibles relative to high yield stems from the technology sector, which makes up 35% of the convertibles index. Technology convertible bonds have strongly outperformed their high-yield counterparts in recent months (Chart 13, panel 4), and are possibly due for a period of underperformance. We recommend investors stay cautious on technology convertibles. Other Than U.S. Tips, What Other Inflation-Linked Bonds Do You Like? Our research shows that inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) are a good inflation hedge in a rising inflationary environment.4 With our house view of rising inflation in 2018, we have been overweight U.S. Tips over nominal Treasury bonds as the U.S. is the most liquid market for inflation-linked bonds, with a market cap of over US$ 1.2 trillion. Outside the U.S., we favor ILBs in Japan and Australia, while we suggest investors to avoid ILBs in the U.K. and Germany (even though the U.K. linkers' market is the second largest after the U.S.), for the following two key reasons: First, even though inflation is below target in Japan, Australia and the euro area, while above target in the U.K., in all of these markets, inflation has bottomed, as shown in Chart 14. Second, our breakeven fair-value models, which are based on trade-weighted currencies, the Brent oil price in local currencies, and stock-to-bond total-return ratios, indicate that ILBs are undervalued in Japan and Australia, while overvalued in the U.K. and Germany, as shown in Chart 15. Chart 14Inflation Dynamics Chart 15Where to Buy Inflation? The shorter duration (in real terms) of ILBs are an added bonus which fits well with our overall underweight duration positioning in the government bond universe. Global Economy Overview: Growth in developed economies remains strong and there is little in the data to suggest it will slow. This is likely to push up inflation and interest rates, especially in the U.S., over the next six to 12 months. Prospects for emerging markets, however, are less encouraging given that China is likely to slow moderately as it pushes ahead with reforms. U.S.: U.S. growth momentum remains very strong. GDP growth in the past two quarters has come in over 3%, and NowCasts for Q4 point to 2.9-3.9%. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 16, panel 1) has surged since June, and the Manufacturing ISM is at 53.9 and the Non-Manufacturing at 57.4 (panel 2). The worst that can be said is that momentum will be unable to continue at this rate but, with business confidence high, wage growth likely to pick up in 2018, and some positive impacts from tax cuts, no significant slowdown is in sight. Euro Area: Given its stronger cyclicality and ties to the global trade cycle, euro zone growth has surprised on the upside even more strongly than in the U.S. The Manufacturing PMI reached 60.6 in December (its highest level since 2000), and GDP growth in Q3 accelerated to 2.6% QoQ annualized. The euro's strength in 2017 seems to have done little to dent growth, and even weaker members of the euro zone such as Italy have seen improving GDP growth (1.7% in Q3). With the ECB reining back monetary easing only slightly, and banking problems shelved for now, growth should remain resilient in early 2018. Japan: Retail sales saw some weakness in October (-0.2% YoY), probably because of bad weather, but elsewhere data looks robust. Q3 GDP came in at 1.3% QoQ annualized and export growth remains strong at 14% YoY. There are even some signs of life in the domestic economy, with wages finally picking up a little (+0.9% YoY), driven by labor shortages among part-time workers, and consumer confidence at a four-year high. Inflation has been slow to rise, but at least core core inflation (the Bank of Japan's favorite measure) is now in positive territory at +0.2%. Emerging Markets: Chinese credit and monetary series, historically good lead indicators for the real economy, continue to decline (M2 growth in October of 8.8% was the lowest since data started in 1996). But, for now, economic growth has held up, with the Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing PMIs both stably above 50 (Chart 17, panel 3). Key will be how much the government's moves to deleverage the financial system and implement structural reform in 2018 will slow growth. Elsewhere in emerging markets, economic growth remains sluggish, with GDP growth in Brazil barely rebounding to 1.4% YoY, Russia to 1.8%, and India slowing to 6.3% (down from over 9% in early 2016). Chart 16Growth Momentum Very Strong Chart 17Will China And EM Slow in 2018? Interest rates: We expect U.S. inflation to pick up in 2018, as the lagged effects of 2017's stronger growth and the weak dollar start to come through, amid higher oil prices and rising wages. We, along with the Fed, expect core PCE inflation to rise to 2% during the year. This means the Fed is likely to raise rates four times, compared to market expectations of twice. Consequently, we see the 10-year Treasury yield over 3% by mid-year. In the euro zone, the still-large output gap means inflation is less likely to surprise on the upside, allowing the ECB to keep negative rates until well into 2019. The Bank of Japan is unlikely to alter its Yield Curve Control, given the signal this would send to the market when inflation expectations are still well below its 2% target (Chart 17, panel 4). Chart 18Equities: Priced for Perfection Global Equities Still Cautiously Optimistic: Our pro-cyclical equity positioning in 2017 worked very well in terms of country allocation (overweight euro zone and Japan in the DM universe) and global sector allocation (favoring cyclicals vs defensives). The two calls that did not pan out were underweight EM equities vs. DM equities, which was partially offset by our positive stance on China within the EM universe, and the overweight of Energy, which was the worst performing sector of the year. The stellar equity performance in 2017 was largely driven by strong earnings growth. Margins improved in both DM and EM; earnings grew in all sectors, and analysts remained upbeat (Chart 18). Another important contributor to 2017 performance was the extraordinary performance of the Tech sector, especially in China: globally, tech returned 41.9%, outperforming the MSCI all country index by 18.9%. GAA's philosophy is to take risk where it is mostly likely be rewarded. In July, we took profits in our Tech overweight and used the funds to upgrade Financials to overweight from neutral. Then in October we started to reduce tracking risk by scaling down our active country bets, closing our overweight in the U.S. to reduce the underweight in EM. BCA's house view is for synchronized global growth to continue in 2018, but a possible recession in late 2019. We are a little concerned that equity markets are priced for perfection, given that our earnings model indicates a deceleration in the coming months mostly due to a base effect. As such, our combination of "close to shore" country allocation and "pro-cyclical" sector allocation is appropriate for the next 9-12 months. Country Allocation: Still Favor DM Over EM Chart 19China: From Tailwind to Headwind for EM ? Our longstanding call of underweight EM vs. DM since December 2013 was gradually reduced in scale, first in March 2016 (to -5 percentage points from -9) and then in October 2017 (further to -2 points). Going forward, investors should continue to maintain this slight underweight position in EM vs. DM. First, our positive stance on China proved to be timely as shown in Chart 19, panel 4, with China outperforming EM by 54.1% since March 2016, and by 18.8% in 2017. Back then our positive stance on China was supported by attractive valuations (bottom panel) and our view that Chinese politics would be supportive for global growth in the run up to the 19th Party Congress. Now BCA's Geopolitical Strategists think that "China politics are shifting from a tailwind to a headwind for global growth and EM assets".5 In addition, Chinese equities are no longer valued at a discount to the EM average (bottom panel). Second, BCA's currency view is for continued strength in the USD, especially against emerging market currencies. This does not bode well for EM/DM performance in US dollar terms (Chart 19, panel 1). Third, EM money growth leads profit growth by about three months (Chart 19, panel 2). The rolling over in money growth indicates that the currently strong earnings growth may lose steam going forward, while relative valuation is in the fair-value zone (Chart 19, panel 3). Sector Allocation: Stay Overweight Energy Our pro-cyclical sector positioning has worked well in aggregate as the market-cap-weighted cyclical index significantly outperformed the defensive index in 2017. This positioning is also in line with BCA's house view of synchronized global growth and higher inflation expectations, which translates into two major sector themes: capex recovery and rising interest rates. (Please see detailed sector positioning on page 24.) Within the cyclical space, however, the Energy sector did not perform as expected in 2017 (Chart 20). It returned only 3.4%, underperforming the global aggregate by 19.6%. For the next 9-12 months, we recommend investors to stay overweight this underdog of 2017. Chart 20Energy Stocks Lagging Oil Price First, the energy sector is a major beneficiary from a capex recovery. There are already signs of a recovery in basic resources investment in the U.S.6 Second, the energy sector's relative return lagged oil price performance in 2017. Given the generally close correlation between earnings and the oil price, and between analyst earnings revisions and OECD oil inventory growth, earnings in the sector should outpace the broad market. Third, based on price-to-cash earnings, the energy sector is still trading at about a 30% discount to the broad market, and offers a much higher dividend yield (about 1.2 points higher) than the broad market. Even though these discounts are in line with historical averages, they are still supportive of an overweight. Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight Duration. One important theme for 2018 will be a resumption of the cyclical uptrend in inflation.7 The implications are that both nominal bond yields and break-even inflation rates will be higher in 2018. We have been underweight duration in government bonds since July 2016. Now with the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield at 2.35%, much lower than its fair value of 2.81%, there is considerable upside risk for global bond yields from current low levels. Investors should continue to underweight duration in global government bonds Maintain Overweight Tips Vs. Treasuries. The base-case forecast from our U.S. bond strategists is that the Tips breakeven rate will rise to 2.4-2.5% as U.S. core PCE reaches the Fed's 2% target, probably sometime in the middle of 2018. Compared to the current level of 1.87%, 10-yr Tips would have upside of 33-38 bps, an important source of return in the low-return fixed-income space (Chart 21, bottom panel). In terms of relative value, Tips are now slightly cheaper than nominal bonds, also supportive of the overweight stance. Underweight Canadian Government Bonds. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy has taken profits in their short Canada vs. U.S. and U.K. tactical position, as the market has become too aggressive in pricing in more rate hikes in Canada. Strategically, however, the underweight of Canada (Chart 22) in a hedged global portfolio is still appropriate because: 1) the output gap has closed in Canada, according to Bank of Canada estimates, and so any additional growth will translate into higher inflation; and 2) the rising CAD will not deter the BoC from more rate hikes if the oil prices remain strong. Chart 21U.S. Bond Yields Have Further To Rise Chart 22Strategic Underweight Canadian Bonds Corporate Bonds Our overweights through most of 2017 on spread product worked well: U.S. investment grade (IG) bonds returned around 290 bps over Treasuries in the year to end-November, and high-yield bonds almost 600 bps. Returns over the next 12 months are unlikely to be as attractive. Spreads (Chart 24) are now close to historic lows: the U.S. IG bond spread, at 90 bps, is only about 30 bps above its all-time record. High-yield valuations look a little more attractive: based on our model of probable defaults over the next 12 months, the default-adjusted spread over U.S. Treasuries is likely to be around 240 bps (Chart 25). In both cases, however, investors should expect little further spread contraction, meaning that credit is now no more than a carry trade. However, in an environment where rates remain fairly low and investors continue to stretch for yield, that pick-up will remain attractive in the absence of a significant turn-down in the economic cycle. The key to watch is the shape of the yield curve. An inverted yield curve in history has been an excellent indictor of the end of the credit cycle. We expect the yield curve to steepen somewhat in H1 2018, before flattening again and then inverting late in the year. Spread product is likely, therefore, to produce decent returns until that point. Thereafter, however, the deterioration of U.S. corporate health over the past three years (Chart 23) could mean a sharp sell-off in corporate bonds. This might be exacerbated by the recent popularity of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs: a small widening of spreads could be magnified by a panicked sell-off in such funds. Chart 23Rising Leverage May Worsen Sell-Off Chart 24Credit Spreads Close To Record Lows Chart 25But Default - Adjusted, Junk Still Looks Attractive Commodities Energy: Bullish Energy prices performed strongly in H2 2017, and we expect bullish sentiment to continue. OPEC 2.0 is likely to maintain production discipline, and will maintain its promised 1.8mm b/d production cuts through the end of 2018. Our estimates for global demand growth are higher than those of other forecasters. This, along with potential unplanned production outages in Iraq, Libya and Venezuela (together accounting for 7.4mm b/d of production at present), drives our above-consensus price forecast of $67 a barrel for Brent crude during 2018. Industrial Metals: Neutral Since China accounts for more than 50% of world base-metal consumption, prices will continue to be highly dependent on developments there. (Chart 26, panel 4). Since the government is trying to accelerate environmental and supply-side reforms, domestic production capacity for base metals will shrink, which will be a positive for global metals prices. However, a focus on deleveraging in the financial sector and restructuring certain industries could slow Chinese GDP growth, reducing base-metal demand. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold has risen by 12% in 2017, supported by an uncertain geopolitical environment coupled with low interest rates. We believe that geopolitical uncertainties will persist and may even intensify, and that inflation may rise in the U.S., which would be positives for gold (Chart 26, panel 3). Based on BCA's view that stock market could be at risk from the middle of 2018,8 a moderate gold holding is warranted as a safe-haven asset. However, rising interest rate and a potentially stronger U.S. dollar are likely to limit the upside for gold. Currencies USD: The currency is down over 6% on a trade-weighted basis over the past 12 months (Chart 27). Looking into 2018, the USD is likely to perform well in the first half. U.S. inflation should gather steam in the first two to three quarters, and the Fed will be able at least to follow its dot plot - something interest rate markets are not ready for. As investors remain short the USD, upside risk to U.S. interest rates should result in a higher dollar. Chart 26Bullish Oil, Neutral Metals Chart 27Dollar Likely To Appreciate EM/JPY: Carry trades are a key mechanism for redistributing global liquidity, and they have recently begun to lose steam. A crucial reason for this has been the policy tightening in China which has been the key driver of growth in EM economies. Additionally, Japanese flows have been chasing momentum into EM assets. Further tightening in EM could reverse the flows and initiate a flight to safety, favoring the yen relative to EM currencies. CHF: The currency continues to trade at a 5% premium to its PPP fair value against the euro. However, after considering Switzerland's net international investment position at 130% of GDP, the trade-weighted CHF trades in line with fair value. The CHF will continue to behave as a risk-off currency, and so long as global volatility remains well contained, EUR/CHF will experience appreciating pressure. GBP: Sterling continues to look cheap, trading at an 18% discount to PPP against the USD. However, Brexit remains a key problem. If future immigration is limited, the U.K. will see lower trend growth relative to its neighbors, forcing its equilibrium real neutral rate downward. Consequently, it will be more difficult to finance the current account deficit of 5% of GDP. Until negotiations with the EU come closer to completion, the pound will continue to offer limited reward and plenty of volatility. Alternatives Chart 28Favor Private Equity and Farmland Alternative assets under management (AUM) have reached a record $7.7 trillion in 2017. Lower fees and a broader range of investment types have helped attract more capital. Private equity remains the most popular choice,9 driven by its strong performance and transparency. Many investors have also shifted part of their allocations toward potentially higher-return private debt programs. Return Enhancers: Favor Private Equity Vs. Hedge Funds In 2017 so far, private equity has returned 12.1%, whereas hedge funds have managed only a 5.9% return (Chart 28). We expect private-equity fund-raising to continue into 2018, but with a larger focus on niche strategies with more favorable valuations. Additionally, deploying capital gradually not only provides for vintage-year diversification, but also creates opportunities for investors to benefit from potential market corrections. We continue to favor private equity over hedge funds outside of recessions. During a recession, we recommend investors take shelter in hedge funds with a macro mandate. Inflation Hedges: Favor Direct Real Estate Vs. Commodity Futures In 2017 to date, direct real estate has returned 5.1%, whereas commodity futures are down over 3.7%. Direct real estate as an asset class continues to provide valuable diversification, lower volatility, steady yields and an illiquidity premium. However, a slowdown in U.S. commercial real estate (CRE) has made us more cautious on the overall asset class. With regards to the commodity complex, the long-term transition of the global economy to a more renewables-focused energy base will continue the structural decline in commodity demand. We continue to stress the structural and long-term nature of our negative recommendation on commodities. Volatility Dampeners: Favor Farmland & Timberland Vs. Structured Products In 2017 to date, farmland and timberland have returned 3.2% and 2.1% respectively, whereas structured products are up 3.7%. Farmland continues to outperform timberland. The slow U.S. housing recovery has added downward pressure to timberland returns. Investors can reduce the volatility of a traditional multi-asset portfolio with inclusion of farm and timber assets. For structured products, low spreads in an environment of tightening commercial real estate lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, warrant an underweight. Risks To Our View We think upside and downside risks to our central scenario for 2018 - slowing but robust economic growth, and continuing moderate outperformance of risk assets - are roughly evenly balanced. On the negative side, perhaps the biggest risk is China, where the slowdown already suggested in the monetary data (Chart 29) could be exacerbated if the government pushes ahead aggressively with structural reforms. Geopolitical risks, which the market over-emphasized in 2017, seem under-estimated now.10 U.S. trade policy, Italian elections, and North Korea all have potential to derail markets. Also, when the U.S. yield curve is as flat as it is currently, small risks can be blown up into big sell-offs. This is particularly so given over-stretched valuations for almost all asset classes. Chart 29China Monetary Conditions Suggest A Slowdown Table 2How Will Trump Try To Influence The Fed? The most likely positive surprise could come from a dovish Fed. New Fed chair Jay Powell is something of an unknown quantity, and the White House could use the three remaining Fed vacancies to push the Fed to keep rates low, so as not to offset the positive effect of the tax cuts. Without these new appointees, the Fed would have a slightly more hawkish bias in 2018 (Table 2). The intellectual argument for hiking only slowly would be, as Janet Yellen said last month: "It can be quite dangerous to allow inflation to drift down and not to achieve over time a central bank's inflation target." The Fed has missed its 2% target for five years. It is possible to imagine a situation where the Fed increasingly makes excuses to keep monetary policy easy (encouraged, for example, by a short-lived sell-off in markets or a slowdown in China) and this causes a late-cycle blow-out, similar to 1999. 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017 available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here - Sector Implications," dated December 12, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 CBNK Survey: Monetary Base, Currency in Circulation. Source: IMF - International Financial Statistics. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Two Virtuous Dollar Circles," dated October 28, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated 20 November 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 Source: BNY Mellon - The Race For Assets; Alternative Investments Surge Ahead. 10 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "From Overstated To Understated Risks," dated November 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights Yield Curve & Fed: The yield curve will not invert until inflation has first recovered to the Fed's target. This means that a period of curve steepening is likely, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. Corporate Sectors: Expect less extra compensation from increasing the riskiness of corporate bond portfolios in 2018. The Energy, Communications, Basic Industry, Financial and Technology sectors offer the best risk-adjusted value. Economy & Inflation: All signs are that economic growth has accelerated in recent months. Decelerating consumer credit growth and rising consumer delinquency rates do not yet pose a risk to future spending. Feature Long-term interest rates have trended lower in recent months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. [...] The broadly anticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum. - Alan Greenspan, February 20051 By the end of the week the Fed will have raised interest rates by 125 basis points since December 2015, yet the 10-year Treasury yield has risen only 7 bps (Chart 1). But unlike in 2005, there is no bond conundrum. On the contrary, the reason for low long-maturity Treasury yields is easily understood. Chart 1What Conundrum? Quite simply, the Federal Reserve has been lifting interest rates in-line with its projections for rising inflation, but markets are trading off the fact that this inflation has yet to materialize. The compensation for inflation protection embedded in 10-year yields is only 1.88%. Historically, when core inflation is close to the Fed's 2% target, compensation for inflation protection has traded in a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. Essentially, Fed rate hikes have lifted short-maturity yields but low inflation is keeping long-maturity yields depressed. The result is that the 2/10 Treasury slope has flattened all the way down to 58 bps from 128 bps in December 2015 (Chart 1, bottom panel). What should be clear is that the current paths of inflation and the yield curve are unsustainable. If the Fed continues to hike rates but inflation fails to rise, then the yield curve will invert in the coming months - a signal that bond investors anticipate a recession - and the Fed will have not achieved its inflation target. Such an obvious policy error will not be permitted to occur, which leaves us with three possible outcomes for Fed policy and the Treasury curve during the next six months. 1) The Fed Is Right In this scenario inflation starts to rebound in the coming months, pushing the compensation for inflation protection embedded in long-dated bond yields higher (Chart 2). This would certainly cause long-maturity nominal yields to increase and would probably impart a steepening bias to the yield curve, depending on how quickly the Fed lifts rates.2 BCA's Outlook for 2018 makes the case for why inflation is likely to bottom in the coming months, and we view the "Fed is Right" scenario as the most likely outcome.3 Chart 2Fed Expects Higher Inflation 2) The Fed Is Proactive In this scenario the Fed recognizes there is a risk of tightening the yield curve into inversion - and the economy into recession - if inflation stays low. It therefore proactively adopts a more dovish policy stance to prevent the yield curve from inverting. The likely first step would be signaling a slower pace of rate hikes in this week's Summary of Economic Projections. The yield curve would also steepen in this scenario, but this time a bull-steepening where short-maturity yields fall more than long-maturity yields. At least one FOMC member already seems worried enough to take this sort of action. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard said two weeks ago that: "Given below-target U.S. inflation, it is unnecessary to push normalization to such an extent that the yield curve inverts".4 But other policymakers are less concerned. Cleveland Fed President Loretta Mester downplayed the flat yield curve in a recent interview.5 We view this outcome as the least likely of our three scenarios. With economic growth accelerating (see Economy & Inflation section below), the Fed will likely cling to its forecast that inflation will move higher. If inflation fails to respond, then risky assets will eventually sell off. This brings us to the final scenario. 3) The Fed Is Reactive The Fed does not have a strong track record of proactively responding to low inflation readings, but it does have a strong track record of reacting to tighter financial conditions and risk off periods in equities and credit markets. What's more, if the yield curve continues to flatten, then we are very likely to see credit spreads widen and equities sell off quite soon. At that point the Fed would almost certainly respond by signaling a slower pace of rate hikes. That would steepen the curve and ease the pressure on risky assets. We view this third scenario as more likely than the one where the Fed is proactive. In fact, we observe that the yield curve is already flat enough that the chances of a sell-off in High-Yield corporate bonds relative to Treasuries are high. Using monthly data going back to 1988, we see that a flatter 2/10 Treasury slope is consistent with lower monthly excess returns from High-Yield (Chart 3). We also see that a flatter yield curve is consistent with more frequent risk-off periods (Chart 4). Chart 3Junk Monthly Excess Returns & ##br##Yield Curve (1988-Present) Chart 4% Of Months With Negative High-Yield ##br##Excess Returns (1988- Present) This makes sense intuitively. An inverted yield curve is a well-known recession indicator. This means that when the yield curve is very flat investors are obviously nervous that any new piece of bad news could tip the curve into inversion and signal an end to the economic recovery. In other words, a risk-off episode in junk bonds, like the one witnessed in early November, would be less likely to occur if the yield curve were steeper.6 We would recommend buying the dips on any near-term correction in junk bonds, because the Fed would then be forced to get more dovish and support the credit markets. But unless inflation returns and steepens the Treasury curve from current levels, the risk of just such an episode is high. Corporate Sector Year-In-Review With 2017 nearly in the books, this week we take a quick look back at the performance of the 10 main investment grade corporate bond sectors during the year. Chart 5 shows the excess return for each sector relative to its duration-times-spread (DTS) from the beginning of the year. DTS is a common measure of risk for corporate bonds, and can be thought of much like an equity's beta. When the overall corporate bond market is rallying, then high-DTS sectors tend to perform better. Conversely, when corporate bonds underperform Treasuries, then high-DTS sectors tend to lose more than the low-DTS alternatives. As can be seen in Chart 5, given that 2017 was a risk-on year, high-DTS sectors tended to outperform low-DTS sectors with a few exceptions. The Basic Industry sector and Financials performed much better than their DTS alone would have predicted, while the Communications sector performed much worse than its DTS would have predicted. Looking ahead into 2018, we make the following observations: Excess returns for investment grade corporate bonds are likely to be lower in 2018 than in 2017.7 In turn, this means that the Credit Risk Premium - the extra return earned for taking an additional unit of DTS risk - will also be lower. We calculated the Credit Risk Premium for each year since 2000 by performing a regression of annual excess returns for each of the 10 major sectors versus their beginning-of-year DTS. The beta from that regression represents the additional return earned that year from taking an extra unit of DTS risk. Chart 6 shows that this Credit Risk Premium is an increasing function of excess returns for the overall corporate sector. Logically, if the year ahead is likely to deliver lower excess returns for the overall index, then we should also expect less additional return from increasing the DTS risk of our corporate bond portfolios. Chart 52017 Corporate Sectors ##br##Excess Returns* Vs DTS** Chart 6Excess Returns* Vs ##br##Credit Risk Premium Second, we use our corporate sector model - a model that adjusts each sector's spread by its average credit rating and duration - to identify sectors that have the potential to outperform their DTS in the coming months. This model is updated each month in our Portfolio Allocation Summary.8 The most recent update shows that the high-DTS Energy, Basic Industry and Communications sectors are all attractively valued. The most attractive low-DTS sectors are Financials and Technology (Chart 7). Chart 7Risk-Adjusted Value In Corporate Sectors* Bottom Line: Expect less extra compensation from increasing the riskiness of corporate bond portfolios in 2018. The Energy, Communications, Basic Industry, Financial and Technology sectors offer the best risk-adjusted value. Economy & Inflation Does Consumer Credit Growth Put The Recovery At Risk? Last week's employment report showed a sharp increase in aggregate hours worked and suggests that U.S. economic growth has indeed shifted into a higher gear. We use a combination of year-over-year growth in aggregate hours worked and average quarterly productivity growth since 2012 to get a rough tracking estimate for U.S. real GDP growth. After last Friday's report this proxy is up to a healthy 3.1% (Chart 8). Last Friday's Consumer Sentiment data also suggest that consumer spending, the largest component of U.S. GDP, will stay firm in the coming months (Chart 9). While consumer credit growth has started to slow (Chart 9, panel 2) and consumer delinquencies are starting to rise (Chart 9, bottom panel), we are not yet inclined to view those trends as risks to the economic recovery. Chart 8Growth Tracking Well Above Trend Chart 9Credit Growth Falling & Delinquencies Rising First, notice that prior to the onset of recession, consumer spending growth tends to decline while consumer credit growth accelerates. It is only well after the recession begins that consumer credit growth follows spending growth lower. This chain of events is highly logical. In the late stages of the recovery households first start to see their incomes decline and then turn to credit to support their spending needs. Eventually, banks make consumer credit less available and consumer credit growth also decelerates, but we are already well into the recession by then. Chart 10Bank Lending Standards In fact, judging by the patterns observed in the lead up to the last two recessions, the warning sign for the economic recovery would be if consumer credit growth is rising while consumer spending growth is falling. So far this pattern has not been observed. Potentially more troubling is the increase in the consumer credit delinquency rate. Delinquencies do tend to rise prior to the onset of recession, although at the moment delinquencies are rising off an extremely low base. It is possible that after having kept lending standards very stringent for several years after the Great Recession, an uptick in delinquencies off historically low levels simply reflects a return to "business-as-usual" for banks. In fact, the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey showed a large tightening of consumer lending standards during the crisis, but then a moderate easing from 2010 until quite recently (Chart 10). Further, the most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey showed an increase in banks' willingness to extend consumer installment loans. Historically, this has been associated with falling consumer delinquency rates (Chart 10, bottom panel). Bottom Line: All signs are that economic growth has accelerated in recent months. Decelerating consumer credit growth and rising consumer delinquency rates do not yet pose a risk to future spending. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2005/february/testimony.htm 2 For a look at what different combinations of Fed rate hikes and long-maturity yields mean for the slope of the yield curve please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Special Report, "Outlook 2018: Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course", dated November 20, 2017, available at www.bcaresearch.com 4 https://www.stlouisfed.org/from-the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2017/assessing-yield-curve 5 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-01/fed-s-mester-shrugs-off-flattening-yield-curve-in-call-for-hikes 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Junk Bond Jitters", dated November 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 For the most recent update please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "A Higher Gear", dated December 5, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights The November jobs report keeps the Fed on track. Despite rising government debt levels, crowding out is not a significant threat. Capex as a share of GDP rises the year before a tax cut and falls in the year after. Holiday spending on track, boosted by tax bill. Feature Last week, investors assessed the ramifications of the OPEC meeting and the Senate's passage of the tax plan. The dollar was noticeably higher, and oil moved lower during the week, but other financial markets ended little changed. Chart 1 shows that the Trump trades are making a comeback, providing ample opportunity for investors who may have missed the trade the first time around. In this week's report, we examine the impact of the tax bill on the debt, deficit, and capital spending and more importantly on corporate balance sheets and financial markets. BCA's view is that the risk that rising government debt levels will crowd out private borrowing is low and that the tax cut will provide a tiny boost to an already robust capital spending environment. We also examine what signal the equity markets are sending about household spending in the holiday season. Chart 1Markets Responding To GOP Tax Plan Living In Paradise The November employment report, released last Friday, paints a Goldilocks-type macro environment for U.S. assets. Strong economic growth, muted inflation, and a go-slow Fed should prolong the bull market in U.S. equities. The economy added 228K in net new jobs, and the unemployment rate held steady at 4.1% in November. With the average work week rising by 0.1 hours, aggregate hours worked rose by a solid 0.5% m/m. Even if hours worked hold flat in December, the average for Q4 will be up 2.6% at an annualized rate from Q3. The November payroll data are easily consistent with about 3.5% GDP growth in Q4. BCA expects above-potential real GDP growth to persist well into 2018. Despite the strong growth and tight labor market, wage pressures remain contained. Average hourly earnings rose just 0.2% m/m in November, which followed a downwardly revised 0.1% m/m decline last month. Annual wage inflation is running at 2.5% (Chart 2). Last week's report will not dissuade the Fed from raising rates again next week. As long as GDP growth remains above trend and the labor market is tightening, the Fed will remain somewhat confident that wages will accelerate and inflation will gradually return to the target level. However, there is no reason yet for the Fed to turn more aggressive for fear of falling behind the curve. Chart 2November Jobs Report Keeps Fed On Track It's Getting Mighty Crowded The recently passed U.S. Senate tax reform bill has to be reconciled with the House bill, but it appears that the Republicans may meet their Christmas deadline after all. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has consistently expected a tax package to pass by the end of Q1 2018 at the latest.1 Although some technical differences between the two versions remain, the two bills are close enough that compromise should not be difficult. The Republicans are under pressure to deliver a "win" ahead of the 2018 mid-term elections. Most of the tax adjustments will occur early next year, except for a reduction in the corporate tax rate that may be delayed until 2019. The Senate version, if passed, would decrease individual taxes by about $680 billion over 10 years, trim small business taxes by just under $400 billion, and reduce corporate taxes by roughly the same amount (including the offsetting tax on currently untaxed foreign profits). The direct effect of all the tax cuts will probably boost real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. However, much depends on the ability of the tax changes and immediate capital expensing to lift animal spirits in the business sector and bring forward investment spending. The total impact - at this stage - is difficult to estimate. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), by the end of 2027 the legislation will add $1 trillion to the debt, including the effects of dynamic scoring. Without the boost from faster economic activity due to the tax changes, the deficit is expected to be $1.4 trillion higher than the CBO's baseline projection for 2027. While nominal economic growth would increase under the plan, the debt-to-GDP ratio would climb to 95% of GDP by 2027, up from 91% under current law (Chart 3). Chart 3Federal Debt As A Share Of GDP Set To Rise Sharply In Coming Decades So far, the Treasury market has shown little reaction to the passage of the Senate bill. Fixed-income investors do not appear to be overly concerned about the implications of the size of the public debt and do not believe that the tax changes alter the Fed's calculations. BCA is also not concerned about the size of public debt in the near term but thinks the tax changes will alter the Fed's forecasts. Nonetheless, more government red ink is likely to raise equilibrium bond yields in the long term. The Fed estimates that the equilibrium 10-year bond yield would rise on a structural basis by 3-4 basis points for each percentage point increase in the Federal government's debt-to-GDP ratio, and by 25 basis points for every percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio.2 The implication is that if the GOP plan becomes law, then the 10-year yield will be 12-16 bps higher than under current legislation. Nonetheless, there is only a modest risk that mounting U.S. government debt will crowd out private borrowing and choke off investment on a 12-month horizon. Crowding out occurs when soaring government debt sparks competition between the public and private sectors for available savings. Increased demand for private credit, a narrowing output gap, and elevated interest payments as a percentage of GDP, are all preconditions for crowding out. While the output gap has closed, demand for private credit is mixed, at best, and federal interest payments will remain in check. Private credit demand has rebounded from the recession, but it is still tepid. At 2% of corporate sales, nonfinancial corporate borrowing is at the lower end of its post-crisis range and has downshifted since 2015 (Chart 4). Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there was a tight relationship between corporate demand for funds and Treasury yields. Since 2009, the link has weakened; credit demand snapped back, but Treasury yields stayed low. Soft C&I loan demand also indicates less of a risk for crowding out (panel 3). Interest payments on the Federal debt are expected to climb, but remain well below all-time highs set in the early 1990s (Chart 5). The CBO's baseline projects that interest payments on the debt as a share of nominal GDP will more than double from 1.4% in 2017 to 2.9% in 2027. These payments will triple in absolute terms from $300 billion in 2017 to more than $800 billion in 2027. The GOP tax plan will boost the 2027 projection, but the CBO has not yet released a new estimate. In a study prepared prior to the passage of the tax bill, the OECD forecast that the federal government's interest payments would climb to 2.9% by 2019. Chart 4Private Credit Demand Has Rebounded,##BR##But Remains Tepid Chart 5Gradual Rise in Net Interest Payments##BR##Not A Crowding Out Threat Moreover, the Tax Policy Center, a center-left think tank, also concluded that interest costs will move up under the new tax law.3 On balance, interest payments on federal debt obligations as a share of the economy are expected to escalate in the next 10 years to 2.5-3%. This reading is in line with the average in the past 20 years, but is still below the 4-4.5% average reached in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the 3.5-4% range observed from 1970-2000. If nothing else changes, higher federal interest payments would absorb funds that could instead be used for areas that add to the productive capacity of the economy, such as education, training and technical innovation. That said, the impact on long-term growth from "crowding out" may only represent a partial offset to the supply-side benefits of the fiscal package to the extent that the business sector lifts capex spending as a result of a lower corporate tax rate and immediate expensing (see below). Bottom Line: Tax cuts are bond bearish but support our overweight stance on equities on the surface. The effective corporate tax rate could decline by about two percentage points, which would boost after-tax cash flows by roughly 2½%. While this is not trivial, much of the good news already appears to be discounted in the S&P 500. Moreover, to the extent that faster growth in 2018 may bring forward hikes in the Fed funds rate, the equity market will have to contend with rising bond yields next year. Investors are also wondering about the tax plan's potential impact on capital spending and corporate balance sheets. Tiny Steps As discussed above, the fiscal package has the potential to generate significant supply side benefits, to the extent that the business sector turns on the capex taps. The JCT estimates that the tax bill will boost U.S. capital stock by 1.1% in 2027, an increase of about 0.1% a year. However, it is uncertain if corporations will permanently boost capex due to increased allowances for capital spending or if the tax shift will merely bring forward future spending. BCA's view is closer to the latter. We expect higher budget and trade deficits in the coming decade as a result of the Senate plan. These deficits will limit the ability of domestic saving to fund needed capital spending projects. Foreign saving will fill the gap. U.S. domestic saving is below the low end its 1960-2008 range (Chart 6). Chart 7 shows that since 1960, there have been four distinct periods of expanding net saving by foreigners. Nominal 10-year Treasury yields rose in three of the four intervals. However, real yields declined in the 1960s, rose in the mid-1970s and early 1980s as foreign saving increased, and then fell in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, a rise in the share of foreign saving led to higher capex in the mid-1960s and 1980s, but lower business expenditures in the 1990s (Chart 8). Chart 6Foreigners Will Finance Capex As##BR##Domestic Saving Declines Chart 7Interest Rates As##BR##Foreign Saving Rises Setting aside who will finance the spending, history suggests that business capital spending tends to climb faster in the 12 months prior to a period of rising fiscal thrust than it does in the 12 months following (Chart 9 and Tables 1 and 2). Note that our analysis shows that recessions occurred in five of the seven episodes of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Chart 8Capex And Rising Foreign Saving Chart 9Capex During Periods Of Fiscal Stimulus In addition, as fiscal thrust escalates, stocks in the industrial and technology sectors underperform the broad market. Small caps generally beat large caps. Since 2000, the fed funds rate fell during periods of fiscal stimulus. Prior to that, the Fed both eased and tightened policy during these episodes (not shown). Table 1Business Spending 12 Months Before Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy Table 2Capex In The Year After Stimulative Fiscal Policy Is Enacted BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) has a tendency to improve during phases of increased fiscal thrust; Chart 10 shows that the CHM improved in five of the seven periods. Free cash flow and return on capital are the best performers during these intervals. In contrast, corporate leverage is apt to shoot up as fiscal policy takes hold. Chart 10Stimulative Fiscal Policy And The Corporate Health Monitor Our fiscal thrust measure includes both personal and corporate tax cuts, and along with increases in government spending. We use fiscal thrust as a proxy because there are a very limited number (just 3 since 1970) of corporate tax cuts to analyze. The paragraphs below covers the impact of corporate tax cuts on capital spending, capital spending-related financial metrics and corporate balance sheets. Capital spending is inclined to rise faster in the 12 months before a corporate tax cut than in the year afterward. The caveat is that there have been only 3 corporate tax cuts in the past 50 years. Charts 11 and 12 and Tables 3 and 4 examine the impact of previous corporate tax reductions on nonresidential fixed investment (and its components) as a share of GDP and on several capex-related metrics in the financial market. Chart 11Corporate Tax Cuts And Capital Spending Chart 12Corporate Tax Cuts And Financial Markets Moreover, industrial stocks underperform the broad market after a tax cut, while tech stocks outperform (Chart 12 again). Small-cap performance is mixed. Both the Fed funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield rise after corporate tax decreases take effect. Table 3Capex The Year Before A Corporate Tax Cut Table 4Capex In The Year After A Corporate Tax Cut Corporate health weakens in the year before a business tax cut is enacted, but then it improves modestly in the ensuing year. Chart 13 and Tables 5 and 6 examine the significance of previous corporate tax cuts on BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) and several of its components. The interest coverage ratio deteriorates, on average, both before and after a corporate tax reduction, but leverage increases substantially in the 12 months following a corporate tax cut. Free cash flow deteriorates in the year prior to a drop in the business tax rate, but is little changed in the subsequent year. Chart 12Corporate Tax Cuts And Financial Markets Chart 13Corporate Tax Cuts And The Corporate Health Monitor Bottom Line: Business capital spending was already on the upswing and the output gap was already closed before the tax cut was passed. Accelerated depreciation allowance may pull capex ahead, but not materially change its trajectory over the long term. Corporate tax cuts and fiscal stimulus, in general, boost capex and corporate health, and support BCA's view that credit will outperform Treasuries in 2018. Table 5BCA's Corporate Health Monitor A Year Before A Corporate Tax Cut... Table 6...And In The 12 Months After Boxing Day The critical holiday spending season is in full bloom. Holiday retail sales make up the bulk of total consumer spending, representing about 20% to 30% of total annual retail sales (and about 40% of total personal consumption expenditures). Moreover, according to the National Retail Federation (NRF), although 54% of consumers surveyed expect to spend the same amount in this year's holiday season as in 2016, 24% are prepared to spend more. The NRF forecasts that holiday sales will increase between 3.6% and 4.0%, exceeding last year's 3.6% rate and the 5-year average forecast of 3.5%. Holiday retail sales have faded in nominal and real terms from an average of 4.9% in the 1993-1999 period to 3.7% pre-2008 (2000-2007) and to an average of 3.3% post-2008 GFC (2009-2016). However, the baseline trend, based on average annual growth rates, remains stable at 3%, with upside potential of as much as 6% during robust economic growth phases(mid 2000s) and downside risk to as low as -4% in recessions (2008) (Chart 14). Chart 14Holiday Sales: Strong Tailwinds Intact Holiday sales this season may just get an unexpected boost from stout consumer finances. The implication is that U.S. economic growth should remain above potential well into 2018. Solid consumer balance sheets remain a tailwind even at this late stage of the business cycle. Household balance sheets have been repaired in an optimal way and household net worth continues to soar to new highs. The implication is that households are much less likely to forego holiday spending this season than in periods where household net worth is under downward pressure. Furthermore, stock market returns for the U.S. consumer discretionary sector, measured between the mid-September to mid-December period, are well correlated with holiday spending trends (Chart 15). The 8.6% rise in the consumer discretionary sector since mid-September heralds another healthy holiday spending season. However, global consumer discretionary retailers are a better predictor of holiday sales than domestic consumer discretionary retailers. Prices here are up 6.6% since mid-September. Chart 15Trends Of Holiday Sales And Equity Returns Furthermore, expectations of tax reform legislation becoming law by the end of the year will incentivize low income households to spend more this holiday season. This cohort is apt to pay for holiday purchases with cash. The NRF has likened the benefit of the tax plan to a "free Christmas".4 The NRF suggests that the cumulative savings from the tax package for an average household will offset the $967.13 projected to be spent this year by the average household in the holiday season. Moreover, a 2016 Fed study finds that the financing for holiday spending varies by income. Low income households have a tendency to source holiday spending from savings/income rather than borrowing, and if access to credit is not readily available, they simply will not spend on holiday shopping.5 To ensure that a majority of U.S. households contribute towards a robust holiday spending season, strong employment growth alongside stable wage growth (and higher real income expectations) and sturdy consumer confidence is required. With an already tight labor market and the underemployment rate (U-6) close to pre-recession lows, solid consumer fundamentals remain intact. Bottom Line: A robust holiday shopping season is likely in 2017, supported by stout consumer balance sheets, the new tax bill, and rising wages and incomes. The 8.6% run up in consumer discretionary stocks also suggests that a happy holiday for retailers is in prospect. BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy service has a neutral rating on the Consumer Discretionary sector, but recommends an overweight the advertising, home improvement retail and leisure products industry groups. Additionally, BCA maintains an overweight to the holiday-sensitive Air Freight and logistics industry within the Industrial sector.6 Strong personal spending will support above potential GDP growth in Q4 and into 2018, eliminate the output gap, push the unemployment rate further below NAIRU and push up inflation and ultimately bond yields. Stay short duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Xi Jinping: Chairman Of Everything," October 25, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 "New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt", Thomas Laubach, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 2003. https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200312/200312pap.pdf 3 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/148841/2001606-macroeconomic-analysis-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-as-passed-by-the-house-of-representatives_1.pdf 4 https://nrf.com/media/press-releases/retailers-say-senate-passage-of-tax-reform-could-give-shoppers-free-christmas 5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2016/holiday-spending-and-financing-decisions-in-2015-survey-of-household-economics-and-decisionmaking-20161201.html 6 https://uses.bcaresearch.com/trades/recommendations
Highlights Chart 12017 Bond Returns Treasuries sold off for the third consecutive month in November (Chart 1), and with Congress about to deliver tax cuts and core inflation showing signs of bottoming, the bond bear market is poised to shift into a higher gear. At the moment, the biggest upside risk for bonds is that the Fed continues its hawkish posturing but inflation refuses to comply. That combination would put downward pressure on TIPS breakeven inflation rates and cause the yield curve to flatten further. A flat yield curve increases the odds of a risk-off episode in equities and credit spreads, with a consequent flight into the safety of Treasuries. We do not think the Fed will get it wrong and expect TIPS breakevens to widen alongside rising inflation, easing the flattening pressure on the yield curve. Investors should maintain a below-benchmark duration stance and an overweight allocation to spread product on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to 285 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 2 bps on the month and now sits at 97 bps. Spreads gapped wider early in the month but then reversed course, ending November not far from where they began. In other words, investment grade corporate bonds remain extremely expensive. We calculate that Baa-rated spreads can only tighten another 39 bps before reaching the most expensive levels since 1989. This represents 3 months of historical average spread tightening. Corporate bonds are essentially a carry trade at this stage of the cycle, but should continue to deliver positive excess returns to Treasuries until inflation pressures mount and the credit cycle comes to an end. We expect the credit cycle will end sometime in 2018.1 Last week's profit data showed that our measure of EBITD increased at an annualized rate of 4% in Q3 (Chart 2), solidly above zero but significantly slower than the 12% registered in Q2. If corporate debt grows by more than 4% in the third quarter, our measure of gross leverage will tick higher (panel 4). As we have shown in prior reports, this would bring the end of the credit cycle closer.2 Quarterly corporate debt growth has averaged just under 6% (annualized) since 2012, so higher leverage in Q3 is likely (Table 3). Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to 578 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 6 bps on the month, and currently sits at 349 bps. Excess returns were negative in November for only the fourth month since spreads peaked in February 2016. In a recent Special Report we argued that last month's sell-off would prove fleeting, but also cautioned that excess returns are likely to be low between now and the end of the credit cycle.3 The report flagged five reasons why investors might be nervous about their high-yield allocations. The two most important being that spreads are very tight and the yield curve is very flat. Tight spreads imply that investors should not expect much in the way of further capital gains, insofar as much further spread tightening would lead to historically expensive valuations. In a baseline scenario where spreads remain flat, we forecast excess returns to junk of 246 bps (annualized) (Chart 3). An inverted yield curve signals that investors believe the Fed will be forced to cut rates in the future. This makes it an excellent indicator for the end of the credit cycle. When the yield curve is very flat investors are more inclined to view any negative development as a signal that the cycle is about to turn. This leads to more frequent sell-offs. A period of curve steepening led by higher inflation would mitigate the risk. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 35 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread was flat on the month, as a 2 bps widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS) was offset by a 2 bps decline in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). Agency MBS OAS continue to look reasonably attractive, especially relative to Aaa-rated credit. And with the pace of run-off from the Fed's balance sheet already well telegraphed, there is no obvious catalyst for further OAS widening. In addition, mortgage refinancings are unlikely to spike any time soon. This will ensure that nominal MBS spreads remain capped at a low level (Chart 4). If bond yields rise during the next 6-12 months, as we expect, then higher mortgage rates will be a drag on refinancings. However, as we showed in a recent report, even if rates move lower, the coupon and age distribution of outstanding mortgages has made refi activity much less sensitive to rates than in the past.4 All in all, with OAS more attractive than they have been for several years, Agency MBS are an alluring alternative for investors looking to scale back exposure to corporate bonds. We anticipate shifting some of our recommended spread product allocation out of corporate bonds and into MBS once we are closer to the end of the credit cycle, likely sometime in 2018. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 28 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 221 bps. Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 39 bps and 34 bps, respectively. Meanwhile, Sovereign bonds delivered a stellar 93 bps of outperformance. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 4 bps, while Supranationals underperformed by 1 bp. We continue to hold a negative view of USD-denominated Sovereign debt. Not only is valuation unattractive compared to similarly-rated U.S. corporate bonds (Chart 5), but historically, periods of sovereign bond outperformance have coincided with falling U.S. rate hike expectations.5 Our Global Fixed Income Strategy team flagged similar concerns in a recent Special Report on the merits of USD-denominated EM debt (both corporate and sovereign).6 The recent moderation in Chinese money and credit growth also heightens the risk of near-term Sovereign underperformance.7 We remain overweight Local Authorities and Foreign Agencies. Year-to-date, those sectors have delivered 256 bps and 402 bps of excess return, respectively, and continue to offer attractive spreads after adjusting for credit rating, duration and spread volatility. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in November (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio moved sharply higher in November, with short maturities bearing the brunt of the sell-off. But even after November's weakness, the average M/T yield ratio remains below its average post-crisis level, and long maturities continue to offer a significant yield advantage over short maturities. Both the Senate and House have already passed their own versions of a tax bill, which now just need to be reconciled before new tax legislation is signed into law. Judging from the two versions of the bill, the following will likely occur: The Muni tax exemption will be maintained, the top marginal tax rate will remain close to its current level, the corporate tax rate will be reduced substantially, the state & local income tax deduction will be at least partially eliminated, the tax exemption for private activity bonds might be removed, and advance refunding of municipal bonds will be outlawed or severely restricted. Last month's poor Muni performance was driven by a surge in supply (Chart 6), almost certainly issuers trying to get their advance refundings done before the passage of the final bill. Given that the other provisions in the bill should not have a major impact on yield ratios (any negative impact from lower corporate tax rates should be mitigated by stronger household demand stemming from the removal of the state & local tax deduction), this back-up in yield ratios could present a tactical buying opportunity in Munis once the bill is passed. Stay tuned. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-flattened in November, as investors significantly bid up the expected pace of Fed rate hikes but did not correspondingly increase their long-dated inflation expectations. The sharp upward adjustment in rate hike expectations means that investors are now positioned for 69 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months (Chart 7). Similarly, the July 2018 fed funds futures contract is now priced for 52 bps of rate hikes between now and next July. Even if the Fed lifts rates in line with its dots, we would only see 75 bps of rate hikes between now and next July. Since there are strong odds that the Fed will proceed more gradually, this week we close our short July 2018 fed funds futures position for an un-levered profit of 21 bps. In a Special Report published last week, we presented several scenarios for the slope of the 2/10 yield curve based on different combinations of Fed rate hikes and future rate hike expectations.8 We also noted that the positive correlation between long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates and the slope of the nominal 2/10 yield curve has remained intact this cycle. We conclude that the 2/10 slope will steepen modestly in the first half of 2018, before transitioning to flattening once TIPS breakevens level-off at a higher level. With the 2/5/10 butterfly spread now discounting some mild curve flattening (panel 4), investors should remain long the 5-year bullet versus the duration-matched 2/10 barbell. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 15 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -84 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 2 bps on the month and, at 1.86%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. As was detailed in last week's Special Report, one of our key views for 2018 is that core inflation will resume its gradual cyclical uptrend, causing long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates to return to their pre-crisis trading range between 2.4% and 2.5%.9 A wide range of indicators, such as our own Pipeline Inflation Indicator and the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge, already suggest that TIPS breakevens are biased wider (Chart 8). Even more encouragingly, both year-over-year core CPI and core PCE inflation have printed higher in each of the last two months. But even if inflation remains stubbornly low, we think any downside in long-maturity breakevens will prove fleeting. We are quickly approaching an inflection point where if inflation does not rise, the Fed will have to adopt a more dovish policy stance. A sufficiently dovish policy response would limit any downside in breakevens. According to our model, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently trading in-line with other financial market variables - oil, the trade-weighted dollar and the stock-to-bond total return ratio (panel 2). ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 92 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps and non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 30 bps. The index option-adjusted spread (OAS) for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 3 bps on the month and, at 31 bps, it remains well below its average pre-crisis trading range. The value proposition in Aaa-rated ABS is not what it once was. At 31 bps, the average index OAS is only 1 bp greater than the average OAS for a conventional 30-year Agency MBS. Agency CMBS are even more attractive, offering an index OAS of 44 bps. Further, the credit cycle is slowly turning against consumer debt. Delinquency rates are rising, albeit off a very low base, but this has caused banks to start tightening lending standards on consumer credit (Chart 9). Tight bank lending standards typically coincide with wider spreads. Importantly, while lending standards are tightening they are not yet very restrictive in absolute terms. In response to a special question from the July 2017 Fed Senior Loan Officer's Survey, banks reported (on net) that lending standards are tighter than the midpoint since 2005 for subprime auto and credit card loans, but are still easier than the midpoint since 2005 for credit card and auto loans to prime borrowers. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 1 basis point in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to 180 bps. The index option-adjusted spread (OAS) for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 3 bps in November, but is still about one standard deviation below its pre-crisis average (Chart 10). With spreads at such low levels in an environment of tightening commercial real estate (CRE) lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, we continue to view the risk/reward trade-off in non-Agency CMBS as quite unfavorable. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 112 bps. The index OAS for Agency CMBS tightened 2 bps on the month but, at 44 bps, the sector continues to offer an attractive spread pick-up relative to other low-risk spread product. The Aaa-rated consumer ABS OAS is only 31 bps, and the OAS on conventional 30-year Agency MBS is a mere 30 bps. Such an attractive spread pick-up in a sector that benefits from Agency backing is surely worth grabbing. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.81% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model (not shown), which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.79%. The Global Manufacturing PMI edged higher once more in November, up to 54 from 53.5 in October. It is now at its highest level since March 2011. Meanwhile, sentiment toward the dollar remains significantly less bullish than it was in 2015 and 2016 (bottom panel). A higher PMI reading and less bullish dollar sentiment both lead to a higher fair value in our model. At the country level, both the Eurozone and Japanese PMIs ticked higher in November. The Eurozone PMI broke above 60 for the first time since April 2000. The U.S. and Chinese PMIs both moved modestly lower. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.39%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Won't Back Down", dated September 26, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Junk Bond Jitters", dated November 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: Yet Another Update", dated October 10, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Living With The Carry Trade", dated October 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Examining The Role Of EM Hard Currency Debt In Global Bond Portfolios", dated October 31, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "2018 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income", dated November 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights A more bearish backdrop for bonds, led by the U.S.: Faster global growth, with rebounding inflation expectations, will trigger tighter overall global monetary policy. This will be led by Fed rate hikes and, later in 2018, ECB tapering. Global bond yields will rise in response, primarily due to higher inflation expectations. Growth & policy divergences will create cross-market bond investment opportunities: Global growth in 2018 will become less synchronized compared to 2016 & 2017, as will individual country monetary policies. Government bonds in the U.S. and Canada, where rate hikes will happen, will underperform, while bonds in the U.K. and Australia, where rates will likely be held steady, will outperform. The most dovish central banks will be forced to turn less dovish: The ECB and BoJ will both slow the pace of their asset purchases in 2018, in response to strong domestic economies and rising inflation. This will lead to bear-steepening of yield curves in Europe, mostly in the latter half of 2018. The BoJ could raise its target on JGB yields, but only modestly, in response to an overall higher level of global bond yields. The low market volatility backdrop will end through higher bond volatility: Incremental tightening by central banks, in response to faster inflation, will raise the volatility of global interest rates. This will eventually weigh on global growth expectations over the course of 2018, and create a more volatile backdrop for risk assets in the latter half of the year. Feature BCA's annual Outlook report, outlining the main investment themes that will drive global asset markets in 2018, was sent to all clients in late November.1 In this Weekly Report, we drill down into the specific implications of those themes for global bond markets over the next year. In a follow-up report to be published in two weeks, we will discuss how to piece together those implications into an effective fixed income portfolio for 2018. A More Bearish Backdrop For Bonds, Led First By The U.S., Then By Europe The first major takeaway for bond investors from the BCA Outlook is that the current bullish global backdrop of easy monetary policy, solid growth and low inflation is going to change in the coming year. A robust global economy with broadening inflation pressures will force the major central banks to continue incrementally moving away from extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy settings. This will set up an eventual collision between policy and the markets, the latter of which have benefitted so much from the support of the former during the current bull run for risk assets. The changing monetary backdrop will essentially split 2018 into two halves. The current pro-risk backdrop will be maintained in the first half of the year, with continued above-potential global growth and higher realized inflation in the major developed economies at a time when monetary policy is still too accommodative (Chart 1). This will put upward pressure on global bond yields. There is potential for a significant move higher, as real yields now are too low relative to robust global growth and market-based inflation expectations remain well below central bank inflation targets (Chart 2). Chart 1Central Banks Are##BR##Lagging The Cycle Chart 2Both Global Real Yields AND Inflation##BR##Expectations Are Too Low The trend of rising bond yields will be most acute in the U.S., at least in the first half of 2018. The economy is already operating above potential (Chart 3), and this is before factoring in any impact from the tax cut plan currently being finalized in the U.S. Congress. This fiscal stimulus risks overheating the U.S. economy and will likely encourage the Fed to hike interest rates in 2018 by at least as much as it is currently projecting (75bps after the almost certain rate hike later this month). A faster growth trajectory, combined with a rebound in realized inflation after the 2017 slump, will restore investors' belief that U.S. inflation can move back to the Fed's 2% target. The latter can boost the inflation expectations component of the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury yield by as much as 60bps next year. The Fed will feel more emboldened to continue delivering rate hikes if inflation expectations are closer to the central bank's target, thus providing an additional boost to Treasury yields. We project that the 10-year Treasury yield can rise up into the 2.9-3% range, well above the current market forwards. The pressure on global bond yields will not only come from the U.S., according to the BCA Outlook. The booming European economy, freed from the years of fiscal austerity after the Euro Debt Crisis and supported by hyper-easy monetary policy from the European Central Bank (ECB), will continue to grow at an above-trend pace in 2018. Japan is enjoying a very powerful cyclical move (by its own modest post-bubble standards) that should continue given very easy monetary policy, robust profit growth and a historically tight labor market. While China is expected to slow on the back of tighter monetary policy and less fiscal stimulus, growth is still expected to be above 6% in 2018. For all of these economies, inflation is expected to rise alongside growth (to varying degrees) given tight labor markets and diminished levels of global spare capacity. Higher oil prices will also boost global inflation and raise the inflation expectations component of global bond yields, given BCA's above-consensus view on oil prices in 2018 (Chart 4). This will also put bear-steepening pressure on many developed market government bond yield curves as inflation expectations increase, particularly with so many countries operating without much economic slack. This argues for being long inflation protection (i.e. inflation-linked bonds vs. nominals or CPI swaps) in 2018, particularly in the U.S., Euro Area and Japan where inflation expectations are well below central bank targets. Chart 3The Global Output Gap Is Closed Chart 4Rising Oil Will Boost Inflation Expectations The BCA Outlook noted that government bond valuations are poor in most countries, with inflation-adjusted (real) yields well below long-run historical averages (Chart 5). We see higher inflation expectations translating directly into higher global bond yields next year, with little room for real yields to decline as an offset. Chart 5Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets The latter half of 2018 will see increased worries about future U.S. growth after the Fed has delivered a few more rate hikes and U.S. monetary policy potentially shifts into restrictive territory. At the same time, the strength in global growth and, especially, inflation will cast doubts on the need for continued aggressive bond buying by the ECB and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). Unlike last year, the ECB will be unable to wiggle its way out of the politically difficult decision to begin tapering its asset purchases when the latest program ends in September. Even the BoJ may be forced to alter its current "yield curve control" strategy by raising the target on longer-term JGB yields in response to pressures from better domestic growth and rising global bond yields. Thus, the pressures for higher bond yields will rotate away from the U.S. in the latter half of 2018 towards Europe and possibly Japan. Other developed economy central banks, like the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Canada (BoC), the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and the Swedish Riksbank will also be faced with decisions on dialing back monetary accommodation in 2018. Although we anticipate that only the BoC and the Riksbank could credibly deliver on monetary tightening given robust growth and, in the case of Sweden, rapidly rising inflation. Which leads to the second major takeaway from the BCA 2018 Outlook ..... Growth & Policy Divergences Will Create Cross-Market Bond Investment Opportunities The BCA Outlook noted that growth expectations for 2018 still look too cautious in many countries. For example, the IMF is forecasting growth in the developed economies will slow from 2.2% to 2% next year, led by decelerations in the Euro Area, Japan, the U.K., Canada and Sweden (Table 1). At the same time, growth in the emerging economies is optimistically projected to accelerate to a 4.9% pace in 2018, even as China's economy cools to 6.5%. Inflation is expected to modestly increase across most of the world, but remain below central bank targets in many countries. So upside growth surprises, particularly in the U.S. and Europe, will continue to be a major investment theme in 2018. Table 1IMF Global Growth & Inflation Forecasts For 2018 Are Too Pessimistic The growth trends, however, may be more divergent than seen in 2017. This leads to potential cross-market bond trading opportunities by playing relative central bank expectations. The OECD's leading economic indicators are accelerating in the U.S., Europe and Japan; potentially peaking at a very high level in Canada; and outright slowing in the U.K. and Australia (Chart 6). When looking at our central bank discounters, which measure the amount of interest rate changes that are currently priced into money market curves, there are some notable discrepancies with the leading indicators (Chart 7). Chart 6More Divergent##BR##Growth... Chart 7...Will Lead To More Divergent##BR##Monetary Policies The market is now pricing in multiple rate hikes in 2018 from the Fed and BoC, modest increases from the BoE and RBA, and no move from the ECB and BoJ. Given the trends in the leading indicators, rate hikes from the Fed and the BoC are likely, while the BoE and RBA will be hard pressed to raise rates at all next year. Thus, U.S. Treasuries and Canadian government bonds are likely to underperform in 2018, while U.K. Gilts and Australian government bonds can be relative outperformers against a backdrop of rising global bond yields. The outlook for the ECB and BoJ, and the implications for bond yields in Europe and Japan, are a special case that represents the third major takeaway from the BCA Outlook ... The Most Dovish Central Banks Will Be Forced To Turn Less Dovish Chart 8ECB Will Fully Taper By The End Of 2018 The BCA Outlook noted that growth in both the Euro Area and Japan has done very well versus the U.S. over the past four years, essentially matching U.S. growth on a per capital basis (i.e. adjusting for faster population growth in the U.S.). In the Euro Area, an end to the painful fiscal austerity after the 2011-13 sovereign debt crisis was a big driver of the economic strength. The BCA Outlook noted that the drag from tighter fiscal policy during the crisis years was equivalent to around 10% of GDP in Greece and Portugal and 7% of GDP in Ireland and Spain. There has been little fiscal tightening in the following three years, which allowed growth in those economies to catch up rapidly. Add in extremely easy financial conditions - low borrowing rates, a cheap euro, and booming European equity and credit markets - and it is no surprise that the Euro Area economy has enjoyed robust growth over the past couple of years. Looking ahead to 2018, the outlook for Euro Area growth still looks very positive. The OECD leading indicator is rising steadily (Chart 8, top panel). The stock of non-performing loans that has clogged up banking systems in the Peripheral European economies is being whittled down - even in Italy where efforts to fix the many problems of its banks are starting to bear fruit (second panel). At the same time, there will be continued upward pressure on Euro Area inflation in 2018. This will mostly come from higher headline inflation related to higher oil prices (third panel), but also from a grind higher in core inflation and wage growth with the Euro Area unemployment rate already at the OECD's estimate of full employment (bottom panel). The Euro Area economy is likely to expand at an above-potential pace over 2% in the first half of 2018, while headline inflation is set to accelerate back towards the ECB's 2% target. This means that the ECB will have to go through another long conversation with the markets about the future of the asset purchase program. Only the outcome will be different than in 2017 as the economic and inflation arguments for continuing with ECB bond buying will be much harder to justify - especially to the hard money core of the ECB led by Germany. Already, the reduced pace of ECB bond buying set for next year, with the monthly purchases cut in half to €30bn/month, implies a significant slowing of Euro Area monetary liquidity (Chart 9). This will put upward pressure on German Bund yields, but with the move being more concentrated in the latter half of the year as the talk of a true ECB taper, perhaps as soon as the end of 2018, builds. Thus, we see Euro Area government debt being an outperformer in the first half of 2018 and an underperformer in the second half. A move in the benchmark 10-year German Bund yield to the 0.8-1.0% range by year-end is a reasonable target. This would reflect the rise in global bond yields that we expect (i.e. the 10-year U.S. Treasury pushing close to 3%), more normalization in Euro Area inflation expectations and the market pulling forward the timing of future ECB rate hikes. Our base case is still that the ECB will not hike policy interest rates until late 2019, however, which will limit the upside for Euro Area yields next year to some degree. In Japan, the BoJ will continue with its current yield curve targeting regime, aiming to cap 10-year JGBs yields through its bond purchases. This is the most effective way to try and boost Japanese inflation through a weaker yen (Chart 10). The BoJ hopes that this will then lead to rising wage growth as workers demand more pay in response to higher realized inflation. Only if there is a pickup in core/wage inflation in Japan can the BoJ have any chance of reaching its 2% inflation target. Chart 9ECB Tapering Will Put European Yields##BR##Under Upward Pressure Chart 10BoJ Will Keep Rates Low To Boost Inflation##BR##Through A Weaker Yen The current BoJ yield target is around 0% on the 10-year JGB. There has been talk of late from some BoJ officials that the yield target could be raised in response to the strengthening Japanese economy. This is likely just talk to placate BoJ board members who were against the yield curve targeting regime in the first place (it was a very close 5-4 vote to implement the new policy framework in September 2016). Yet the BoJ could conceivable raise the yield target by a modest amount in the context of a bigger move higher in global bond yields. According to a simple econometric model of the 10-year JGB yield unveiled by the BoJ in 2016, a 10bp move higher in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield would raise the fair value of the JGB yield by 2.7bps (Table 2).2 That model currently shows that JGB yields are about 8bps above fair value (around 0%) at the moment. If the 10yr U.S. Treasury yield were to rise to 3%, however, the current level of the JGB yield would be 7bps too low, which would represent the limit of "overvaluation" on this model since 2013 (Chart 11). Under such a scenario, the BoJ raising the yield target to 0.2%, for example, would not be an unusual response - and it would still be consistent with keeping yield differentials wide enough to generate a weaker yen. Table 2Bank Of Japan 10-Year##BR##JGB Yield Model Chart 11BoJ Could Face Pressure To Raise##BR##The Yield Target If UST Yields Rise In any event, the boost to global monetary liquidity from the asset purchases of the ECB and BoJ will fade next year as both central banks will buy a smaller number of bonds than in 2017. Which brings us to the final main takeaway from the 2018 BCA Outlook .... The Low Market Volatility Backdrop Will End Through Higher Bond Volatility The Outlook noted that the conditions underpinning the growth and liquidity driven bull markets for risk assets will start to turn more negative by mid-2018. Tightening financial conditions, especially as the Fed delivers more rate hikes, will eventually start to weigh on global growth expectations. There is even a very real possibility that the Fed will engineer a U.S. recession in 2019 through tighter monetary policy. At the same time, the Fed will be in the process of its balance sheet runoff, while the ECB and BoJ will be buying smaller amounts of bonds. As we have noted many times this year in Global Fixed Income Strategy reports, a slower growth rate of central bank balance sheets will weigh on the performance of risk assets in 2018 (Chart 12). Add in the risk of growth expectations starting to deteriorate in response to tighter monetary policy in the U.S. (and in China, as well), and markets may become increasingly more volatile later next year - starting with more volatile government bond yields (Chart 13). Chart 12Central Bank Liquidity Tailwind To##BR##Risk Assets Will Fade In 2018 Chart 13The Low Market Vol Backdrop Will End##BR##Through Rising Bond Vol A higher volatility backdrop raises the risk for so many global fixed income markets that have benefitted from investors stretching for yield in order to try and achieve adequate returns. In Chart 14, we show the historical range of yields for global government bonds and spread product (using the benchmark indices for each country or sector) dating back to 2000. The gray dots in the chart represent the current yield for each fixed income category and shows how yields are at historic lows in all markets. Chart 14Historical Range Of Bond Yields For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 In Chart 15, we present the historic range of volatility-adjusted yields (the same yields from the previous chart, divided by the trailing 12-month realized index total return volatility of each sector). In this chart, the gray dots again represent the current readings. The blue squares show how volatility-adjusted yields would look if the median volatility of each asset class since 2000 was used in the denominator instead of the latest low level of volatility. Chart 15Historical Range Of VOLATILITY-ADJUSTED Bond Yields##BR##For Various Fixed Income Markets, 2000-2017 As can be seen in the chart, many of the sectors that currently have reasonably attractive volatility-adjusted yields, like U.S. Investment Grade, U.S. High-Yield, and hard-currency Emerging Market debt, will look much less compelling if volatility were to increase to more "normal" levels. The market response will be typical in such a higher volatility environment, as yields would increase to compensate for the greater volatility of returns. The current low volatility regime will end when higher inflation and less accommodative central banks raise interest rate volatility and, eventually, future growth uncertainty. We see that inflection point occurring sometime next year, leading to a more challenging environment for global fixed income "carry trades" that are also focused on global growth, like developed market corporate bonds and emerging market debt. In terms of the investment strategy implications, we end this report with a quote taken directly from the 2018 BCA Outlook: "Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018." Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the December 2017 edition of The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course", available at bca.bcaresearch.com and gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 The model can be found in this report: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/rel160930d.pdf The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns