Geopolitics

Highlights The macro environment remains positive for risk assets. Nonetheless, the shadow of the '87 stock market crash is a reminder that major market corrections can occur even when the earnings and economic growth backdrop is upbeat. Our base case remains that global growth will stay reasonably firm in 2018, although the composition of that growth will shift towards the U.S. thanks to the lagged effects of easier financial conditions and the likelihood of some fiscal stimulus next year. Positive U.S. economic growth surprises and the disappearing output gap will allow the Fed to raise rates more than is discounted by the markets, providing a lift to the dollar and widening U.S. yield spreads relative to its trading partners. The momentum in profit growth, however, will favor Japan relative to the U.S. and Europe. Investors should overweight Japanese equities and hedge the currency risk. There is still more upside for oil prices, but we are not playing the rally in base metals. The Chinese economy is performing well at the moment, but ample base metal supply and a rising dollar argue against a substantial price rise from current levels. Emerging market equities should underperform the developed markets due to a rising U.S. dollar and the largely sideways path for base metals. Our macro and profit views are consistent with cyclicals outperforming defensive stocks. Investors should also continue to bet on higher inflation expectations and be overweight corporate bonds (relative to governments). High-yield relative value is decent after accounting for the favorable default outlook. It is too early to fully retreat from risk assets and prepare for the next recession. Nonetheless, the market has entered a late cycle phase. Investors appear to have shed fears of secular stagnation, and have embraced a return to a lackluster-growth version of the Great Moderation. The risk of disappointment is therefore elevated. Low levels of market correlation and implied volatility can perhaps be justified, but only if there are no financial accidents on the horizon and any rise in inflation is gradual enough to keep the bond vigilantes at bay. Investors with less tolerance for risk should maintain an extra cash buffer to protect against swoons and provide dry powder to boost exposure after the correction. Feature The October anniversary of the '87 stock market crash was a reminder to investors that major market corrections can arrive out of the blue. With hindsight, there were some warning signs evident before the crash. Nonetheless, the speed and viciousness of the correction caught the vast majority of investors by surprise, in large part because the economy was performing well (outside of some yawning imbalances such as the U.S. current account deficit). Many worried that the 20% drop in the S&P 500 would trigger a recession, but the economy did not skip a beat and it was not long before the equity market recouped the losses. We view the '87 crash as a correction rather than a bear market. BCA's definition of a bear market is a combination of magnitude (at least a 15% decline) and duration (lasting at least for six months). Bear markets are usually associated with economic recessions. Corrections tend to be short-lived because they are not associated with an economic downturn. None of our forward-looking indicators suggest that a recession is in the cards in the near term for any of the major economies. Even the risk of a financial accident or economic pothole in China has diminished in our view. As discussed below, the global economy is firing on almost all cylinders. Chart I-1Valuation Today Is Very Stretched Vs. 1987 Nonetheless, there are some parallels today with the mid-1980s. A Special Report sent to all BCA clients in October provides a retrospective on the '87 crash.1 One concern is that the proliferation of financial computer algorithms and derivatives is a parallel to the popularity of portfolio insurance in the 1980s, which was blamed for turbocharging the selling pressure when the market downturn gathered pace in October. My colleague Doug Peta downplays the risks inherent in the ETF market in the Special Report, but argues that automatic selling will again reinforce the fall in prices once it starts. It is also worrying that equity valuation is much more stretched than was the case in the summer of 1987 based on the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (CAPE, Chart I-1). The CAPE is currently at levels only previously reached ahead of the 1929 and 2000 peaks. In contrast, the CAPE was close to its long-term average in 1987. Quantitative easing and extremely low interest rates have pulled forward much of the bond and stock markets' future returns. It has also contributed to today's extremely low readings on implied volatility. The fact that the Fed is slowly taking away the punchbowl and that the ECB is dialing back its asset purchase program only add to the risk of a sharp correction. The Good News For now though, investors are focusing on the improving global growth backdrop and the still-solid earnings picture. While the S&P 500 again made new highs in October, it was the Nikkei that stole the show among the major countries. Impressively, the surge in the Japanese stock market was not on the back of a significantly weaker yen. As we highlighted last month, risk assets are being supported by the three legged stool of robust earnings growth, low volatility and yield levels in government bonds, and the view that inflation will remain quiescent for the foreseeable future. The fact that the global growth impulse is broadly-based is icing on the cake because it reduces lingering fears of secular stagnation. Even emerging economies have joined the growth party, while a weak U.S. dollar has tempered fears of a financial accident in this space. Our forward-looking growth indicators are upbeat (Chart I-2). Our demand indicators in the major economies remain quite bullish, especially for capital spending (not shown). Animal spirits are beginning to stir. Moreover, financial conditions remain growth-friendly, especially in the U.S., and subdued inflation is allowing central banks to proceed cautiously for those that are tightening or tapering. The global PMI broke to a new high in October, and the economic surprise index for the major economies has surged in recent months. Our global LEI remains in a strong uptrend and its diffusion index shifted back into positive territory, having experiencing a worrisome dip into negative territory earlier this year. We expect the global growth upturn will persist for at least the next year. The U.S. will be the first major economy to enter the next recession, although this should not occur until 2019. It is thus too early to expect the equity market to begin to anticipate the associated downturn in profit growth. Earnings: Japan A Star Performer It is still early days in the Q3 earnings season, but the mini cyclical rebound from the 2015/16 profit recession in the major economies is still playing out. The bright spots at the global level outside of energy are industrials, materials, technology and consumer staples (Chart I-3). All four are benefitting from strengthening top line growth and rising operating margins. Chart I-2Upbeat Global Economic Indicators Chart I-3Global Earnings By Sector The U.S. is further advanced in the mini-cycle and EPS growth is near its peak on a 4-quarter moving total basis. The expected topping out in profit growth is more a reflection of challenging year-on-year comparisons than a deterioration in the underlying fundamentals. The hurricanes will take a bite out of third quarter earnings, but this effect will be temporary. Moreover, oil prices are turbocharging earnings in the energy patch and we expect this to continue. Our commodity strategists recently lifted their 2018 target price for both Brent and WTI to $65/bbl and $63/bbl, respectively. The global uptick in GDP growth, along with continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 are the principal drivers of our revised outlook. We expect the fortuitous combination of fundamentals to accelerate the drawdown in oil inventories globally, which also will be supportive for prices. While U.S. financials stocks have cheered the prospects that Congress may pass a tax bill sometime in early 2018, sell-side analysts have been brutally downgrading financial sector EPS estimates. This has dealt a blow to net earnings revisions in the sector. Expected hurricane-related losses are probably the main culprit, especially in the insurance sector. Nonetheless, our equity sector strategists argue that such indiscriminate downgrades are unwarranted, and we would lean against such pessimism.2 Recent profit results corroborate our positive sector bias, although we are still early in the earnings season. European profits will suffer to some extent in the third quarter due to the lagged effects of previous euro strength. The same will be true in the fourth quarter, although we expect this headwind to diminish early in 2018. That leaves Japan as the star profit performer among the majors in the near term. The recent surge in foreign flows into the Japanese market suggests that global investors are beginning to embrace the upbeat EPS story. Abe's election win in October means that the current monetary stance will remain in place. The ruling LDP's shift away from austerity (e.g. abandoning the primary balance target) may also be lifting growth expectations. A Return To The Great Moderation? Chart I-4Market Correlation And The ERP A lot of the good news is already discounted in equity prices. The depressed level of the VIX and the drop in risk asset correlations this year signal significant complacency. Large institutional investors are reportedly selling volatility and thus dampening vol across asset classes. But there is surely more to it. It appears that investors believe we have returned to the pre-Lehman period between 1995 and 2006 when the Great Moderation in macro volatility contributed to low correlations among stocks within the equity market (Chart I-4). The idea is that low perceived macroeconomic volatility during that period had diminished the dispersion of growth and inflation forecasts, thereby trimming the variance of interest rate projections. This allowed equity investors to focus on alpha rather than beta, given less uncertainty about the macro outlook. Of course, the Great Recession and financial market crisis brought the Great Moderation to a crashing end. Correlations rocketed up and investors demanded a higher equity risk premium to hold stocks. Today, dispersion in the outlooks for growth and interest rates have fallen back to pre-Lehman levels, helping to explain the low levels of implied volatility and correlation in the equity market (Chart I-5). Some of this can be justified by fundamentals. The onset of a broadly-based global expansion phase has likely calmed lingering fears that the global economy is constantly teetering on the edge of the abyss. Investor uncertainty regarding economic policy has moderated as well (bottom panel). Historically, implied volatility tended to fall during previous periods when global industrial production was strong and global earnings were rising across a broad swath of countries (Chart I-6). Our U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service points out that, during the later stages of the cycle, equity sector correlations tend to fall as earnings fundamentals become more important performance drivers and sector differentiation generates alpha, as the broad market enters the last stage of the bull market. Similarly, the VIX can fluctuate at low levels for an extended period when global growth is broadly based. Chart I-5A Less Uncertain Macro Outlook? Chart I-6Broad-Based Growth Lower Implied Volatility Still, current levels of equity market correlation and the VIX are unnerving given a plethora of potential geopolitical crises and the pending unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet. Moreover, any meaningful pickup in inflation would upset the 'low vol' applecart. Table I-1 shows the drop in the S&P 500 index during non-recession periods when the VIX surges by more than 10% in a 13-week period. The equity price index fell by an average of 7% during the nine episodes, with a range of -3.6 to -18.1%. Table I-1Episodes When VIX Spiked The Equity Risk Premium Chart I-7Still Some Value In High-Yield On a positive note, the equity risk premium (ERP) is not overly depressed. There are many ways to define the ERP, but we present it as the 12-month forward earnings yield minus the 10-year Treasury yield in Chart I-4. It has fallen from about 760 basis points in 2011 to 310 basis points today. We do not believe that the ERP can return to the extremely low levels of 1990-2000. At best, the ERP may converge with the level that prevailed during the last equity bull market, from 2003-2007 (about 200 basis points). The current forward earnings yield is 550 basis points and the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.4%. The ERP would need to fall by 110 basis points to get back to the 2% equilibrium. This convergence can occur through some combination of a lower earnings yield or higher bond yield. If the 10-year yield is assumed to peak in this cycle at about 3% (our base case), then this leaves room for the earnings yield to fall by 50 basis points. This would boost the forward earnings multiple from 18 to 20. However, a rise in the 10-year yield to 3½% would leave no room for multiple expansion. We are not betting on any further multiple expansion but the point is that stocks at least have some padding in the event that bond yields adjust higher in a gradual way. It is the same story for speculative-grade bonds, which are not as expensive as they seem on the surface. The average index OAS is currently 326 bps, only about 100 bps above its all-time low. However, junk value appears much more attractive once the low default rate is taken into account. Chart I-7 presents the ex-post default-adjusted spreads, along with our forecast based on unchanged spreads and our projection for net default losses over the next year. The spread padding offered by the high-yield sector is actually reasonably good by historical standards, assuming there is no recession over the next year. We are not banking on much spread tightening from here, which means that high-yield is largely a carry trade now. Nonetheless, given a forecast for the default and recovery rate, we expect U.S. high-yield excess returns to be in the range of 2% and 5% (annualized) over the next 6-12 months. The bottom line is that the positive growth backdrop does not rule out a correction in risk assets, especially given rich valuations. But at least the profit, default and growth figures will remain a tailwind in the near term. The main risk is a breakout in inflation, which financial markets are not priced for. Inflation And Hidden Slack The September CPI report did little to buttress the FOMC's view that this year's inflation pullback is temporary. The report disappointed expectations again with core CPI rising only 0.13% month-over-month. For context, an environment where inflation is well anchored around the Fed's target would be consistent with core CPI prints of 0.2% every month, roughly 2.4% annualized. The inflation debate continues to rage inside and outside the Fed as to whether the previous relationship between inflation and growth have permanently changed, whether low inflation simply reflects long lags, or whether it will require tighter labor markets in this business cycle to fuel wage and price pressures. We back the latter two of these three explanations but, admittedly, predicting exactly when inflation will pick up is extremely difficult and we must keep an open mind. A Special Report in the October IMF World Economic Outlook sheds some light on this vexing issue.3 Their work suggests that the deceleration in wage growth in the post-Lehman period in the OECD countries can largely be explained by traditional macro factors: weak productivity growth, lower inflation expectations and labor market slack. The disappointing productivity figures alone account for two-thirds of the drop in wage growth. However, a key point of the research is that the headline unemployment figures are not as good a measure of labor market slack as they once were. This is because declining unemployment rates partly reflect workers that have been forced into part-time jobs, referred to as involuntary part-time employment (IPT). The rise in IPT employment could be associated with automation, the growing importance of the service sector, and a diminished and more uncertain growth outlook that is keeping firms cautious. The IMF's statistical analysis suggests that the number of involuntary part-time workers as a share of total employment (IPT ratio) is an important measure of slack that adds information when explaining the decline in wage growth. Historically, each one percentage point rise in the IPT ratio trimmed wage growth by 0.3 percentage points. Chart I-8 and Chart I-9 compare the unemployment rate gap (unemployment rate less the full-employment estimate) with the deviation in the IPT ratio from its 2007 level. The fact that the IPT ratio has had an upward trend since 2000 in many countries makes it difficult to identify a level that is consistent with full employment. Nonetheless, the change in this ratio since 2007 provides a sense of how much "hidden slack" the Great Recession generated due to forced part-time employment. Chart I-8Measures Of Labor Market Slack (I) Chart I-9Measures Of Labor Market Slack (II) For the OECD as a whole, labor market slack has been fully absorbed based on the unemployment gap. However, the IPT ratio was still elevated at the end of 2016 (latest data available), helping to explain why wage growth has remained so depressed across most countries. The IPT ratio is still above its 2007 level in three-quarters of the OECD countries. Of course, there is dispersion across countries. Japan has no labor market slack by either measure. In the U.S., the unemployment gap has fallen into negative territory, but only about half of the post-2007 rise in the IPT ratio has been unwound. For the Eurozone, the U.K. and Canada, the unemployment gap is close to zero (or well into negative territory in the U.K.). Nonetheless, little of the under-employment problem in these economies has been absorbed based on the IPT ratio. Our discussion in last month's report highlighted the importance of the global output gap in driving inflation in individual countries. Consistent with this, the IMF finds that there have been important spillover effects related to labor market slack, especially since 2007. This means that wage growth can be held down even in countries where slack has disappeared because of the existence of a surplus of available labor in their trading partners. Phillips Curve Is Not Dead That said, we still believe that the U.S. is at a point in the cycle when inflationary pressures should begin to build, even in the face of persisting labor market slack at the global level. Chart I-10 shows the ECI and the Atlanta Fed wage tracker, which are the best measures of wages because they are less affected by composition effects. Both have moved higher along with measures of labor market tightness. Wage and consumer price inflation have ebbed this year, but when we step back and look at it over a longer timeframe, the Phillips curve still appears to be broadly operating. Moreover, inflation is a lagging indicator. Table I-2 splits the post-war U.S. business cycles into short, medium, and long buckets based on the length of the expansion phase. It presents the number of months from when full employment was reached to the turning point for consumer price inflation in each expansion. There was a wide variation in this lag in the short- and medium-length expansions, but the lags were short on average. Chart I-10Phillips Curve Still (Weakly) Operating Table I-2Inflation Reacts With A Lag It is a different story for long expansions, where the lag averaged more than two years. We have pointed out in the past that it takes longer for inflation pressures to reveal themselves when the economy approaches full employment gradually, in contrast to shorter expansions when momentum is so strong the demand crashes into supply constraints. The fact that U.S. unemployment rate has only been below the estimate of full employment for eight months in this expansion suggests that perhaps we and the Fed are just being too impatient in waiting for the inflection point. Turning to Europe, the IPT ratio confirms the ECB's view that there is an abundance of under-employment, despite the relatively low unemployment rate. This suggests that the Eurozone remains behind the U.S. in the economic cycle. As expected, the ECB announced a tapering in its asset purchase program to take place next year. While policymakers are backing away from QE in the face of healthy growth and a shrinking pool of bonds to purchase, they will continue to emphasize that rate hikes are a long way off in order to avoid a surge in the euro and an associated tightening in financial conditions. U.S./Eurozone bond yield spreads are still quite wide by historical standards and thus it is popular to bet on spread narrowing and a stronger euro/weaker dollar. However, some narrowing in short-term rate spreads is already discounted based on the OIS forward curve (Chart I-11). The real 5-year, 5-year forward OIS spread - the market's expectation of how much higher U.S. real 5-year rates will be in five years' time relative to the euro area - stands at about 70 basis points. This spread is not wide by historical standards, and thus has room to widen again if market expectations for the fed funds rate moves up toward the Fed's 'dot plot' over the next 6-12 months. While market pricing for the ECB policy rate path appears about right in our view, market expectations for rate hikes in the U.S. are too complacent. This implies that long-term spreads could widen in favor of the U.S. dollar over the coming months, especially if U.S. growth accelerates while euro area growth cools off a bit. The fact the U.S. economic surprise index has turned positive is early evidence that this process may have already begun. Moreover, the starting point is that the dollar has been weaker than interest rate differentials warrant, such that there is some room for the dollar to 'catch up', even if interest rate differentials do not move (Chart I-12). We see EUR/USD falling to 1.15 by the end of the year. Chart I-11Room For U.S./Eurozone Spreads To Widen... Chart I-12...Giving The Dollar A Lift A New Fed Chair? Our forecast for yield spreads and currencies is not overly affected by the choice of Fed Chair for next year. President Trump's meeting with academic John Taylor reportedly went well, but we think the President will prefer someone with a less hawkish bent. Keeping Chair Yellen is an option, but she has strong views on financial sector regulation that Trump does not like. The prevailing wisdom is that Jerome Powell is a moderate who is only slightly more hawkish than Yellen. But the truth is that we don't really know where he stands because he has no academic publication record and has generally steered clear of taking bold views on monetary policy. In any event, the organizational structure of the Fed makes it impossible for the chair to run roughshod over other FOMC members. This suggests that no matter who is selected, the general thrust of monetary policy will not change radically next year. As discussed above, uncertainty is elevated, but our base case sees inflation rising enough in the coming months for the Fed to maintain their 'dot plot' forecast. The market and the Fed are correct to 'look through' the near-term growth hit from the hurricanes, to the rebound that always follows the destruction. The U.S. housing sector is a little more worrying because some softness was evident even before the hurricanes hit. Since the early 1960s, a crest in housing led the broader economic downturn by an average of seven quarters. Nonetheless, we continue to expect that the housing soft patch does not represent a peak for this cycle. Residential investment should provide fuel to the economy for at least the next two years as pent up demand is worked off, related to depressed household formation since the 2008 financial crisis. Affordability will still be favorable even if mortgage rates were to rise by another 100 basis points (Chart I-13). Robust sentiment in the homebuilder sector in October confirms that the hurricane setback in housing starts is temporary. China And Base Metals Turning to China, economic momentum is on the upswing. Real-time measures of economic activity such as electricity production, excavator sales, and railway freight traffic are all growing at double-digit rates, albeit down from recent peak levels (Chart I-14). Various price indexes also reveal a fairly broadly-based inflation pickup to levels that will unnerve the authorities. Growth will likely slow in 2018 as policymakers continue to pare back stimulus. We do not foresee a substantial growth dip next year, but it could be hard on base metals prices. Chart I-13Housing Affordability Outlook Housing ##br##Affordability Under Various Rate Assumptions Chart I-14China: Healthy ##br##Growth Indicators Policy shifts discussed in Chinese President Xi's speech in October to the Party Congress are also negative for metals prices in the medium term. The speech provided a broad outline of goals to be followed by concrete policy initiatives at the National People's Congress (NPC) in March 2018. He emphasized that policy will tackle inequality, high debt levels, overcapacity and pollution. Globalization will also remain a priority of the government. The supply side reforms required to meet these goals will be positive in the long run, but negative for growth in the short run. Restructuring industry, deleveraging the financial sector and fighting smog will all have growth ramifications. The government could use fiscal stimulus to offset the short-term hit to growth. However, while overall growth may not slow much, the shift away from an investment-heavy, deeply polluting growth model, will undermine the demand for base metals. Our commodity strategists also highlight the supply backdrop for most base metals is not supportive of an extended rally in prices. The implication is that investors who are long base metals should treat it as a trade rather than a strategic position. Despite our expectation that policy will continue to tighten, we believe that investors should overweight Chinese stocks relative to other EM markets. Investment Conclusions: Our base case remains that global growth will stay reasonably firm in 2018, although the composition of that growth will shift towards the U.S. thanks to the lagged effects of the easing in U.S. financial conditions that has taken place this year and the likelihood of some fiscal stimulus next year. The U.S. Congress has drawn closer to approving a budget resolution for fiscal 2018 that would pave the way for tax legislation to reach President Donald Trump's desk by the end of the first quarter of next year. Surveys show that investors have all but given up on the prospect of tax cuts, which means that it will be a positive surprise if it finally arrives (as we expect). Positive U.S. economic growth surprises and the disappearing output gap will allow the Fed to raise rates more than is discounted by the markets, providing a lift to the dollar and widening U.S. yield spreads relative to its trading partners. The momentum in profit growth, however, will favor Japan relative to the U.S. and Europe. Investors should favor Japanese equities and hedge the currency risk. There is still more upside for oil prices, but we are not playing the rally in base metals. The Chinese economy is performing well at the moment, but ample base metal supply and a rising dollar argue against a substantial price rise from current levels. Emerging market equities should underperform the developed markets due to a rising U.S. dollar and the largely sideways path for base metals. Our macro and profit views are consistent with cyclicals outperforming defensive stocks. Investors should also continue to bet on higher inflation expectations and be overweight corporate bonds (relative to governments) in the major developed fixed-income markets. Our base-case outlook implies that it is too early to fully retreat from risk assets and prepare for the next recession. Nonetheless, the market has entered a late-cycle phase. Calm macro readings and still-easy monetary policy have generated signs of froth. Investors appear to have shed fears of secular stagnation, and have embraced a return to a lackluster-growth version of the Great Moderation. Low levels of market correlation and implied volatility can perhaps be justified, but only if there are no financial accidents on the horizon and any rise in inflation is gradual enough to keep the bond vigilantes at bay. Upside inflation surprises would destabilize the three-legged stool supporting risk assets, especially at a time when the Fed is shrinking its balance sheet. Black Monday is a reminder that major market pullbacks can occur even when the economic outlook is bright. Thus, investors with less tolerance for risk should maintain an extra cash buffer to protect against swoons, and to ensure that they have dry powder to exploit them when they materialize. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst October 26, 2017 Next Report: November 20, 2017 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "Black Monday, Thirty Years On: Revisiting The First Modern Global Financial Crisis," October 19, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Banks Hold The Key," October 24, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 Recent Wage Dynamics In Advanced Economies: Drivers And Implications. Chapter 2, IMF World Economic Outlook. October 2017. II. Three Demographic Megatrends Dear Client, This month's Special Report is written by my colleague, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist. Peter highlights three key demographic trends that will shape financial markets in the coming decades. His non-consensus conclusions include the idea that demographic trends will be negative for both bonds and equities over the long haul, in part because the trends are inflationary. Moreover, continuing social fragmentation will not be good for business. Mark McClellan Megatrend #1: Population Aging. Aging has been deflationary over the past few decades, but will become inflationary over the coming years. Megatrend #2: Global Migration. International migration has the potential to lift millions out of poverty while boosting global productivity. However, if left unmanaged, it poses serious risks to economic stability. Megatrend #3: Social Fragmentation. Rising inequality, cultural self-segregation, and political polarization are imperilling democracy and threatening free-market institutions. On balance, these trends are likely to be negative for both bonds and equities over the long haul. In today's increasingly short-term oriented world, it is easy to lose track of megatrends that are slowly shifting the ground under investors' feet. In this report, we tackle three key social/demographic trends. Chart II-1Our Aging World Megatrend #1: Population Aging Fertility rates have fallen below replacement levels across much of the planet. This has resulted in aging populations and slower labor force growth (Chart II-1). In the standard neoclassical growth model, a decline in labor force growth pushes down the real neutral rate of interest, r*. This happens because slower labor force growth causes the capital stock to increase relative to the number of workers, resulting in a lower rate of return on capital.1 The problem with this model is that it treats the saving rate as fixed.2 In reality, the saving rate is likely to adjust to changes in the age composition of the workforce. Initially, as the median age of the population rises, aggregate savings will increase as more people move into their peak saving years (ages 30 to 50). This will put even further downward pressure on the neutral rate of interest. Eventually, however, savings will fall as these very same people enter retirement. This, in turn, will lead to a higher neutral rate of interest. If central banks drag their feet in raising policy rates in response to an increase in r*, monetary policy will end up being too stimulative. As economies overheat, inflation will pick up, leading to higher long-term nominal bond yields. Contrary to popular belief, spending actually increases later in life once health care costs are included in the tally (Chart II-2). And despite all the happy talk about how people will work much longer in the future, the unfortunate fact is that the percentage of American 65 year-olds who are unable to lead active lives because of health care problems has risen from 8.8% to 12.5% over the past 10 years (Chart II-3). Cognitive skills among 65 year-olds have also declined over this period. We are approaching the inflection point where demographic trends will morph from being deflationary to being inflationary. Globally, the ratio of workers-to-consumers - the so-called "support ratio" - has peaked after a forty-year ascent (Chart II-4). As the support ratio declines, global savings will fall. To say that global saving rates will decline is the same as saying that there will be more spending for every dollar of income. Since global income must sum to global GDP, this implies that global spending will rise relative to production. That is likely to be inflationary. Chart II-2Savings Over The Life Cycle Chart II-3Climbing Those Stairs Is ##br##Getting More And More Difficult Chart II-4The Ratio Of Workers To ##br##Consumers Has Peaked The projected evolution of support ratios varies across countries. The most dramatic change will happen in China. China's support ratio peaked a few years ago and will fall sharply during the coming decade. Nearly one billion Chinese workers entered the global labor force during the 1980s and 1990s as the country opened up to the rest of the world. According to the UN, China will lose over 400 million workers over the remainder of the century (Chart II-5). If the addition of millions of Chinese workers to the global labor force was deflationary in the past, their withdrawal will be inflationary in the future. The fabled "Chinese savings glut" will eventually dry up. Chart II-5China On Course To Lose More ##br##Than 400 Million Workers Rising female labor force participation rates have blunted the effect of population aging in Europe and Japan. This has allowed the share of the population that is employed to increase over the past few decades. However, as female participation stabilizes and more people enter retirement, both regions will also see a rapid decline in saving rates. This could lead to a deterioration in their current account balances, with potential negative implications for the yen and the euro. Population aging is generally bad news for equities. The slower expansion in the labor force will reduce the trend GDP growth. This will curb revenue growth, and by extension, earnings growth. To make matter worse, to the extent that lower savings rates lead to higher real interest rates, population aging could reduce the price-earnings multiple at which stocks trade. This could be further exacerbated by the need for households to run down their wealth as they age, which presumably would include the sale of equities. Megatrend #2: Global Migration Economist Michael Clemens once characterized the free movement of people across national boundaries as a "trillion-dollar bill" just waiting to be picked up from the sidewalk.3 Millions of workers toil away in poor countries where corruption is rife and opportunities for gainful employment are limited. Global productivity levels would rise if they could move to rich countries where they could better utilize their talents. Academic studies suggest that less restrictive immigration policies would do much more to raise global output than freer trade policies. In fact, several studies have concluded that the removal of all barriers to labor mobility would more than double global GDP (Table II-1). The problem is that many migrants today are poorly skilled. While they can produce more in rich countries than they can back home, they still tend to be less productive than the average native-born worker. This can be especially detrimental to less-skilled workers in rich countries who have to face greater competition - and ultimately, lower wages - for their labor. Chart II-6 shows that the share of U.S. income accruing to the top one percent of households has closely tracked the foreign-born share of the population. Table II-1Economic Benefits Of Open Borders Chart II-6Immigration Versus Income Distribution Low-skilled migration can also place significant strains on social safety nets. These concerns are especially pronounced in Europe. The employment rate among immigrants in a number of European countries is substantially lower than for the native-born population (Chart II-7). For example, in Sweden, the employment rate for immigrant men is about 10 percentage points lower than for native-born men. For women, the gap is 17 points. The OECD reckons that a typical 21-year old immigrant to Europe will contribute €87,000 less to public coffers in the form of lower taxes and higher welfare benefits than a non-immigrant of the same age (Chart II-8). Chart II-7Low Levels Of Immigrant Labor Participation In Parts Of Europe Chart II-8Immigration Is Straining Generous ##br##European Welfare States All of this would matter little if the children of today's immigrants converged towards the national average in terms of income and educational attainment, as has usually occurred with past immigration waves. However, the evidence that this is happening is mixed. While there is a huge amount of variation within specific immigrant communities, on average, some groups have fared better than others. The children of Asian immigrants to the U.S. have tended to excel in school, whereas college completion rates among third-generation-and-higher, self-identified Hispanics are still only half that of native-born non-Hispanic whites (Chart II-9). Across the OECD, second generation immigrant children tend to lag behind non-immigrant students, often by substantial margins (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Hispanic Educational Attainment Lags Behind Chart II-10Worries About Immigrant Assimilation Immigration policies that place emphasis on attracting skilled migrants would mitigate these concerns. While such policies have been adopted in a number of countries, they have often been opposed by right-leaning business groups that benefit from cheap and abundant labor and left-leaning political parties that want the votes that immigrants and their descendants provide. Humanitarian concerns also make it difficult to curtail migration, especially when it is coming from war-torn regions. Chart II-11The Projected Expansion ##br##In Sub-Saharan Population Europe's migration crisis has ebbed in recent months but could flare up at any time. In 2004, the United Nations estimated that sub-Saharan Africa's population will increase to 2 billion by the end of the century, up from one billion at present. In its 2017 revision, the UN doubled its projection to 4 billion. Nigeria's population is expected to rise to nearly 800 million by 2100; Congo's will soar to 370 million; Ethiopia's will hit 250 million (Chart II-11). And even that may be too conservative because the UN assumes that the average number of births per woman in sub-Saharan Africa will fall from 5.1 to 2.2 over this period. For investors, the possibility that migration flows could become disorderly raises significant risks. For one, low-skill migration could also cause fiscal balances to deteriorate, leading to higher interest rates. Moreover, as we discuss in greater detail below, it could propel more populist parties into power. This is a particularly significant worry for Europe, where populist parties have often pursued business-sceptic, anti-EU agendas. Megatrend #3: Social Fragmentation In his book "Bowling Alone," Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam documented the breakdown of social capital across America, famously exemplified by the decline in bowling leagues.4 There is no single explanation for why communal ties appear to be fraying. Those on the left cite rising income and wealth inequality. Those on the right blame the welfare state and government policies that prioritize multiculturalism over assimilation. Conservative commentators also argue that today's cultural elites are no longer interested in instilling the rest of society with middle-class values. As a result, behaviours that were once only associated with the underclass have gone mainstream.5 Technological trends are exacerbating social fragmentation. Instead of bringing people together, the internet has allowed like-minded people to self-segregate into echo chambers where members of the community simply reinforce what others already believe. It is thus no surprise that political polarization has grown by leaps and bounds (Chart II-12). When people can no longer see eye to eye, established institutions lose legitimacy. Chart II-13 shows that trust in the media has collapsed, especially among right-leaning voters. Perhaps most worrying, support for democracy itself has dwindled around the world (Chart II-14). Chart II-12U.S. Political Polarization: Growing Apart Chart II-13The Erosion Of Trust In Media It would be naïve to think that the public's rejection of the political establishment will not be mirrored in a loss of support for the business establishment. The Democrats "Better Deal" moves the party to the left on many economic issues. Nearly three-quarters of Democratic voters believe that corporations make "too much profit," up from about 60% in the 1990s (Chart II-15). Chart II-14Who Needs Democracy When You Have Tinder? Chart II-15People Versus Companies The share of Republican voters who think corporations are undertaxed has stayed stable in the low-40s, but this may not last much longer. Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and the rest of the corporate establishment tend to lean liberal on social issues and conservative on economic ones - the exact opposite of a typical Trump voter. If Trump voters abandon corporate America, this will leave the U.S. without any major party actively pushing a pro-business agenda. That can't be good for profit margins. The fact that social fragmentation is on the rise casts doubt on much of the boilerplate, feel-good commentary written about the "sharing economy." For starters, the term is absurd. Uber drivers are not sharing their vehicles. They are using them to make money. Both passengers and drivers can see one another's ratings before they meet. This reduces the need for trust. As trust falls, crime rises. The U.S. homicide rate surged by 20% between 2014 and 2016 according to a recent FBI report.6 In Chicago, the murder rate jumped by 86%. In Baltimore, it spiked by 52%. Chart II-16 shows that violent crime in Baltimore has remained elevated ever since riots gripped the city in April 2015. The number of homicides in New York, whose residents tend to support more liberal policing standards for cities other than their own, has remained flat, but that is unlikely to stay the case if crime is rising elsewhere. The multi-century decline in European homicide rates also appears to have ended (Table II-2). Much has been written about how millennials are flocking to cities to enjoy the benefits of urban life. But this trend emerged during a period when urban crime rates were falling. If that era has ended, urban real estate prices could suffer tremendously. It is perhaps not surprising that the increase in crime rates starting in the 1960s was mirrored in rising inflation (Chart II-17). If governments cannot even maintain law and order, how can they be trusted to do what it takes to preserve the value of fiat money? The implication is that greater social instability in the future is likely to lead to lower bond prices and a higher equity risk premium. Chart II-16Do You Still Want To Move Downtown? Table II-2Crime Rates Are Creeping Higher In Europe Chart II-17Homicides And Inflation Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy 2 Another problem with the neoclassical model is that it assumes perfectly flexible wages and prices. This ensures that the economy is always at full employment. Thus, if the saving rate rises, investment is assumed to increase to fully fill the void left by the decline in consumption. In the real world, the opposite tends to happen: When households reduce consumption, firms invest less, not more, in new capacity. One of the advantages of the traditional Keynesian framework is that it captures this reality. And interestingly, it also predicts that aging will be deflationary at first, but will eventually become inflationary. Initially, slower population growth reduces the need for firm to expand capacity, causing investment demand to fall. Aggregate savings also rises, as more people move into their peak saving years. Globally, savings must equal investment. If desired investment falls and desired savings rises, real rates will increase. At the margin, higher real rates will discourage investment and encourage saving, thus ensuring that the global savings-investment identity is satisfied. As savings ultimately begins to decline as more people retire, the equilibrium real rate of interest will rise again. 3 Michael A. Clemens, "Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?" Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 25, no.3, pp. 83-106 (Summer 2011). 4 Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: The Collapse And Revival Of American Community," Simon and Schuster, 2001. 5 Charles Murray has been a leading proponent of this argument. Please see "Coming Apart: The State Of White America, 1960-2010," Three Rivers Press, 2013. 6 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Crime In The United States 2016" (Accessed October 25, 2017). III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equity markets partied in October on solid earnings and economic growth figures, and the rising chances of a tax cut in the U.S. among other bullish developments. The Nikkei has been particularly strong in local currency terms following the re-election of Abe. Our equity indicators remain upbeat on the whole, although the rally is looking stretched by some measures. The BCA monetary indicator is hovering at a benign level. Implied equity volatility is very low, investor sentiment is frothy and our Speculation Indicator is elevated. These suggest that a lot of good news is already discounted. Our valuation indicator is also closing in on the threshold of overvaluation at one standard deviation. Our technical indicator is rolling over, although it needs to fall below the zero line to send a 'sell' signal. On a constructive note, the solid rise in earnings-per-share is likely to continue in the near term, based on positive earnings surprises and the net revisions ratio. Moreover, our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) continued on its bullish equity signal in September for the third consecutive month. We introduced the RPI in the July report. It combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The U.S. and European WTPs rose in October after a brief sideways move in previous months, suggesting that equity flows have turned more constructive. But the Japanese WTP is outshining the others. Given that the Japanese WTP is rising from a low level, it suggests that there is more 'dry powder' available to purchase Japanese stocks, especially relative to the U.S. market. We favor Japanese stocks relative to the other two markets in local currency terms, as highlighted in the Overview section. Oversold conditions for the U.S. dollar have now been absorbed based on our technical indicator, but there is plenty of upside for the currency before technical headwinds begin to bite. The greenback looks expensive based on PPP, but is less so on other measures. We are positive in the near term. Our composite technical indicator for U.S. Treasurys has moved above the zero line, but has not reached oversold territory. Bond valuation is close to fair value based on our long-standing valuation model. These factors suggest that yields have more upside potential before meeting resistance. Other models that specifically incorporate global economic factors suggest that the 10-year Treasury is still about 20 basis points on the expensive side. Stay below benchmark in duration. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market ##br##And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights Our out-of-consensus call on oil prices - Brent and WTI are expected to trade to $65 and $63/bbl, respectively, next year - has the most upside risk from unplanned production outages in Iraq and Venezuela. The potential for export losses from Libya, while not as acute, remains high. Downside price risks - e.g., a meaningful softening of demand, or sharply higher U.S. shale-oil production - are not as elevated as upside price risks, in our view. Favorable global macro conditions will continue to support the synchronized global upturn in GDP, keeping oil demand growth on track. The strained balance sheets of many U.S. shale-oil producers and deepwater-producing Majors likely will limit their ability to fund drilling, as recent earnings calls from oil-services companies attest.1 We continue to monitor global monetary conditions, particularly in the U.S. With global oil markets tightening as supply contracts and demand expands, the broad trade-weighted USD will become more of a factor in oil-price determination next year. Energy: Overweight. Our long $55/bbl WTI calls vs. short $60/bbl WTI call spreads in Jul/18 and Dec/18 recommended last week are up 9.3% and 5.8%, respectively. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper has been well bid, and is up 8.5% since the beginning of the month. The proximate cause of the price strength is investor optimism regarding global growth, particularly in China. However, following their biannual meeting earlier this week, the International Copper Study Group kept its projected 2017 deficit unchanged, and downgraded their 2018 projection to 105k MT, from 170k MT. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is under pressure as markets weigh the possibility President Trump will appoint a more hawkish Fed Chair to succeed Janet Yellen. Ags/Softs: Neutral. Following a backlash from Midwestern politicians, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) abandoned proposed changes to the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard. The EPA also will keep 2018 renewable fuel volume mandates at or above current proposed levels. Corn gained 2.4% since this announcement last week. Our corn-vs.-wheat spread is up 1.6% since inception. Feature Our out-of-consensus call on Brent and WTI prices for next year has a significant amount of daylight between the prices we expect - $65 and $63/bbl for Brent and WTI, respectively - and price estimates we derive using the U.S. EIA's supply, demand and inventory expectations, which are $15.1 and $13.8/bbl lower (Chart of the week). Chart of the WeekPrices Derived Using BCA And EIA##BR##Global Balance Estimates Our bullish oil price call is predicated on stronger global demand growth than EIA and other forecasters' estimates (Chart 2 & Table 1), and an extension of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts to end-June 2018 (Chart 3).2 These fundamentals combine to sustain a supply deficit for the better part of 2018 (Chart 4), which results in stronger inventory draws in the OECD (Chart 5). Net, we expect OECD stocks to fall below their five-year average level by year-end 2018. Chart 2Stronger Global Demand Growth ... Chart 3...And Continued OPEC 2.0 Discipline... Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Chart 4...Produce A Supply Deficit For Most Of 2018... Chart 5...Leading To OECD Inventory Normalization Upside Price Risks Dominate In 2018 In assessing the "known unknown" risks to our call, those on the upside clearly dominate in 2018. Chief among these risks are unplanned production outages, which have been somewhat under control versus the past two years (Chart 6). Nonetheless, we believe the risk of unplanned outages within OPEC - in Iraq and Venezuela, in particular - are elevated. The potential for export losses from Libya, while not as acute, remains high (Chart 7). Chart 6Unplanned Outages Are Down ... Chart 7...But Key States Are At Risk The risk of unplanned outages is highest in Iraq, where production is running at ~ 4.5mm b/d in 3Q17 (Chart 7, panel 1). Exports on the Ceyhan pipeline from Iraq's northern Kurdish region through Turkey to the Mediterranean fell by more than half to as low as 225k b/d, following a non-binding independence referendum in Iraq's restive Kurdistan region at the end of September. This led to armed conflict between Iraqi and Kurdish forces.3 Independence for the semi-autonomous region was supported by more than 90% of Iraqi Kurds. However, the Iraqi government in Baghdad, along with its neighbors in Turkey and Iran, opposed the referendum, as did the U.S. This lack of support likely prompted the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) offer to "freeze" the referendum this week, and to seek immediate cease-fire talks with Baghdad. Export flows from Kirkuk and the Kurdish region have been restored this week to ~ 300k b/d, or half of the volumes exported prior to the referendum, according to Bloomberg.4 Even with the offer to freeze the referendum - presumably, this means the semi-autonomous Kurdish government will abstain from pressing for independence if its offer is accepted and Baghdad agrees to negotiate an immediate cease-fire - this issue is far from settled. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy noted last month, the critical issue for the oil market remains sustained conflict between the Iraqi central government and the KRG. The question that cannot be answered yet is what "would (a conflict) do to future efforts to boost Iraqi production. Iraq is the last major oil play on the planet that can cheaply and easily, with 1920s technologies, access significant new production. If a major war breaks out in the country, it is difficult to see how Iraq would sustain the necessary FDI inflows to develop its fields to boost production, even if the majority of production is far from the Kurdish region. Given steady global oil demand, the world is counting on Iraq to fill the gap with cheap oil. If it cannot, higher oil prices will have to incentivize tight-oil and off-shore production."5 A huge "known unknown" resides in Venezuela, where we have production running at ~ 1.96mm b/d in 3Q17, sharply down from 2.4mm b/d during 2011-2015. The state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, SA, or PDVSA, is struggling to amass enough cash to meet critical near-term international interest and debt payment obligations, and can no longer afford to buy the chemicals and equipment required to make the country's heavy oil suitable for refining. This lack of cash is causing oil quality from Venezuela to deteriorate, as more exports are showing up with high levels of water, salt or metals. This is raising the odds refiners from the U.S. to China could turn barrels away in the near future unless the situation is reversed.6 Indeed, Reuters reported Phillips 66, a U.S. refiner, cancelled "at least eight crude cargoes because of poor oil quality in the first half of the year and demanded discounts on other deliveries, according to ... PDVSA documents and employees from both firms. The cancelled shipments - amounting at 4.4 million barrels of oil - had a market value of nearly $200 million." Venezuela's financial condition has steadily worsened following the collapse of oil prices at the end of 2014. Production is at its lowest level in 30 years, and banks have stopped extending letters of credit, which are critical to trading in the international oil market, in the wake of U.S. sanctions ordered by President Trump, as Reuters notes. In addition, PDVSA has been denied access to storage facilities in St. Eustatius terminal, because it owes the owner of the facility, Texas-based NuStar Energy, some $26 million in fees.7 Markets will be watching closely to see if Venezuela performs on $2 billion in USD-denominated bond payments, one of which is due tomorrow, and the other due next week (November 2). Venezuela missed debt coupon payments of some $350mm earlier this month, and has a total outstanding obligation for this year of $3.4 billion.8 In all likelihood, Venezuela will once again turn to Russia for additional financial support, which has stepped in as a "lender of last resort" replacing China.9 Venezuela owes Russia some $17 billion. Of this, Rosneft Oil Co., a Russian oil company, has loaned PDVSA $6 billion.10 In Libya, where we have production at 910k b/d in 3Q17 (Chart 7, panel 3), the risk of unplanned production outages is not as acute as the risks in Iraq and Venezuela, but important nonetheless. As a failed and fractured state, Libya faces particular challenges in maintaining production. Wood Mackenzie believes Libyan production likely has plateaued. The oil consultancy believes Libya's max production is limited to 1.25 million b/d.11 However, "Reaching this would be quite an achievement, given ongoing challenges, including international oil companies' reluctance to recommit capital and expertise, a national oil company starved of funding - and, not least, the propensity for violence to flare up and armed groups to hinder oil output." Downside Price Risks Less Daunting In 2018 Chart 8The USD Will Become More Important##BR##As Oil Markets Tighten Next Year Downside price risks - e.g., a meaningful softening of demand, or sharply higher U.S. shale-oil production - are not as elevated as risks to the upside, in our view. The favorable global macro conditions we discussed in last week's forecast will continue to support the synchronized global upturn in GDP. This will keep global oil demand growing at ~ 1.67mm b/d on average in 2017 and 2018, based on our estimates. We expect U.S. shale production to increase to 5.17 mm b/d in 2017 and to 6.09 mm b/d next year, as higher prices incentivize renewed drilling activity. However, the strained balance sheets of many shale-oil producers and a renewed - although perhaps only temporary - push from equity investors for shale producers to focus on improving economic returns rather than merely pursuing maximal production growth, likely will limit their ability to fund drilling, as recent earnings calls from oil-services companies attest. Away from fundamentals, we are monitoring U.S. monetary policy closely, given the potential for the USD to become a headwind once again for commodity prices generally, and oil prices in particular. As we noted last week, we expect the tightening of oil markets globally to restore the linkage between the USD and oil prices - i.e., the inverse correlation between them (a stronger USD is bearish for crude oil prices, and vice versa). The transitory noise surrounding the next Fed Chair will dissipate within the next few weeks, allowing the U.S. central bank and markets to focus on the evolution of monetary policy next year, following a widely expected rate hike in December. During the transitional phase the oil market is currently passing through - falling supply and stout demand are tightening the market globally - the USD's importance will increase as a determinant of oil prices (Chart 8). Bottom Line: Our oil-price call for next year - $65/bbl for Brent and $63/bbl for WTI - is predicated on stronger global demand growth, and an extension of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts to end-June 2018. These fundamentals will produce stronger inventory draws in the OECD, and bring stocks below their five-year average by year-end 2018. In our view, upside price risks clearly dominate in 2018. Chief among these risks are unplanned production outages in key OPEC states - Iraq, Venezuela and Libya - which account for ~ 7.4mm b/d of production at present. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report "Oilfield Service Quarterly Update: U.S. Stagnation," published October 25, 2017. It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the producer coalition lead by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. Please see last week's feature article in Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Oil Forecast Lifted As Markets Tighten," for a discussion of our assumptions, models and estimates. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see "Update 2 - Iraqi Kurdistan faces first major oil outage since referendum," published by uk.reuters.com October 18, 2017. See also "Iraq's NOC vows to maintain Kirkuk oil flows after ousting Kurds," published by S&P Global Platts October 17, 2017, for additional background. 4 Please see "Iraqi Kurds Offer To Freeze Independence Referendum Results," published October 25, 2017, by Bloomberg.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Iraq: An Emergent Risk," p. 23 in the September 20, 2017 issue. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see "Venezuela's deteriorating oil quality riles major refiners," published by reuters.com October 18, 2017. 7 Please see "Exclusive: PDVSA blocked from using NuStar terminal over unpaid bills," published by uk.reuters.com October 20, 2017. 8 Please see "Venezuela is blowing debt payments ahead of a huge, make-or-break bill," published by cnbc.com on October 20, 2017. 9 Please see "Special Report: Vladimir's Venezuela - Leveraging loans to Caracas, Moscow snaps up oil assets," published by reuters.com on August 11, 2017. 10 Rosneft's majority owner is the Russian government. See "Glencore sells down stake in Russia's Rosneft," published by telegraph.co.uk on September 8, 2017. Glencore's 14.6% stake in Rosneft was sold to CEFC China Energy, according to the Telegraph. 11 Please see "WoodMac: Libya's oil production might have reached near-term potential," in the October 20, 2017, issue of Oil & Gas Journal. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights China's ascendancy will increase U.S.-China tensions in the medium and long term; "Xi Jinping Thought" is China's rejection of Soviet-style collapse; Xi's new policies face very few domestic political constraints; Xi is playing down GDP targets and playing up centralization; Tax cuts are still coming to the U.S. Feature Global risk assets continue to rally despite an apparent loss of faith in world leaders. In Spain, the showdown between Catalonia and Madrid is escalating as Spanish lawmakers vote to withdraw aspects of self-rule from the wealthy northeastern province. In the U.K., the Brexit negotiations are floundering, causing the Labour Party to raise the alarm against a "no deal" exit from the European Union. In Brazil, the interim president is under legislative scrutiny for corruption; in South Africa, the ruling party is grasping at government employees' pension funds to keep a struggling state airliner afloat. However, policymakers are not always as incompetent as investors (and the financial media) like to think. In China, President Xi Jinping has turned himself into the highest authority since Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. And the country has sprung back from the 2015-16 deflationary spiral so well that financial authorities are tightening financial controls and contemplating interest rate hikes (Chart 1). In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has won a two-thirds supermajority in the House of Representatives for the second time, giving him a mandate to continue his "Abenomics" agenda (Chart 2). With unemployment already exceedingly low at 2.8%, Abe could make history. He could rouse the country out of both its deflationary and pacifist slumber in the face of the historic challenges posed by a rising China and multipolar world. Less grandiose, but still highly market-relevant, the U.S. Congress has drawn closer to approving a budget resolution for fiscal 2018 that would pave the way for tax legislation to hit President Donald Trump's desk by the end of the first quarter of next year. This development is in marked contrast to informal surveys of investors around the world, including at BCA's annual New York Conference last month. The market has hardly reacted to the positive news (Chart 3). Chart 1Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Chart 2Shinzo Abe Does It Again Chart 3Market Still Doubts Trump In this report, we focus on China and the United States. Our recent assessments of Spain and Japan are on track - the former is an overstated risk, the latter an opportunity now largely priced in.1 It is the "G2" that poses the biggest risk of negative surprises over the next 12 months. First Take On The Party Congress China's nineteenth National Party Congress will conclude just as we go to press. Our assessment of the line-up of the new Politburo and specific changes to the Communist Party's constitution will have to wait for a Special Report next week. We can still draw some preliminary conclusions, however.2 First, Xi Jinping's induction into the Communist Party's constitution, under the slogan "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," makes him second only to Chairman Mao as a philosophical guide in the party. This says as much about the spirit of the age as about Xi's (formidable) power. It is an era of "charismatic authority," in which populations are restless and political elites either adopt populist tactics (like Xi), or are populists themselves.3 The Communist Party wanted a new Mao and Xi obliged them. Why is this the case in China? The Communist Party has based its legitimacy on economic growth since Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978. But economic growth is slowing as a result of irreversible, secular trends. The party needs a new source of legitimacy, and Xi has offered a "synthesis" of Mao and Deng: he promises to preserve the Communist regime above all, yet also to continue Deng's pragmatic use of the market to strengthen the fundamentally socialist economy. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Xi's focus remains on power, namely reinforcing China's ruling institutions and asserting its international influence.4 We will take the latter first, as it is the biggest source of change in the world and a key driver of market-relevant geopolitical risk. Multipolarity Chart 4U.S. Decline Vis-à-Vis China The most important takeaway from the party congress is that it perfectly captures our long-term investment theme of global multipolarity. This describes a world run by multiple independent powers as American power declines in relative terms.5 The erosion of U.S. global dominance is most striking in relativity to China (Chart 4).6 Xi has declared that it is time for China to take "center stage" in world affairs. He also modified an earlier goal to say that China will become a "leading global power" by 2050. China is unified under a single leader and a single party, its economy has been robust, and it is therefore feeling confident in its ability to take action in the global arena. The implications are disruptive over the long run: Assertive foreign policy will continue: China will continue with the bolder foreign policy it has demonstrated over the past ten years. China's military expenditures, which are widely believed to be larger than official statistics reveal, will continue to drive regional security dynamics (Chart 5).7 Maritime tensions still matter: China's "core interests" in separatist-prone regions like Tibet and Xinjiang have become more secure, whereas its interests in Taiwan and the South China Sea are less secure because of increasing pushback from the U.S. and its allies. The South China Sea is still a potential flashpoint as it governs the vital supply lines of China's major regional rivals and $4 trillion in trade (Diagram 1).8 Diagram 1The South China Sea: Still A Risk Economic statecraft is the new norm: China is using its economic heft to fill spaces left void by the United States. The U.S. is perceived across the region as relying increasingly on "hard power," ceding ground to China to create "soft power" relationships through trade and investment. Beijing is launching its own system of multilateral trade and finance that could someday operate as a sphere of influence in Asia outside of U.S.-led international norms - such as Xi's "Belt and Road Initiative," which was also enshrined in the Communist Party constitution (Chart 6). Moreover, Beijing is using its growing economic leverage to achieve political goals, having imposed informal sanctions on Japan, both Koreas, Vietnam, Taiwan and others in recent years.9 Chart 5China Raises Asian Security Fears Chart 6China's Belt And Road Club These trends were all reaffirmed at the party congress, confirming our view that U.S.-China frictions are a serious geopolitical risk. Fortunately, neither Xi nor China is a loose cannon. Most of these trends are developing over the long run. With Xi Jinping overseeing an extensive overhaul of the People's Liberation Army, there is less reason to suppose that the PLA will act aggressively independent of civilian leadership (as was a concern under the previous administration). One would also think that a transition across the armed forces is an inopportune time to instigate conflicts. Notably, the Xi administration has also tactically adopted a milder diplomatic approach since President Trump's coming to power with an arsenal of threats aimed at China. This approach is evident with Japan, India, and Southeast Asian neighbors. Trump's perceived belligerence gives China the ability to play a mediating role and promote trade and investment with other powers looking to hedge against the U.S. Finally, Beijing appears to have domestic unrest in check, at least for now. Public security disturbances have been elevated in the wake of the global financial crisis, but have declined since 2011 (Chart 7). This is a positive sign for markets because China will have greater ability to push domestic reforms - and less reason to be aggressive abroad - if unrest is subdued. Official statistics suggest that China spends about as much on public security as national defense, revealing a key vulnerability to the state (Chart 8). Chart 7Domestic Unrest Down, Though Not Out Chart 8Domestic Unrest A Risk To The State Bottom Line: The party congress has highlighted China's rising global influence. This ultimately creates higher geopolitical risk, especially in U.S.-China relations. China also has greater control over domestic factors that could instigate conflicts, at least for the time being. Thus the U.S.'s next moves will be critical. Reform And Opening Up The second major takeaway is that the Xi administration is still officially committed to the reform agenda laid out in the 2012 party congress, the 2013 Third Plenum, and the supply-side structural reforms announced in 2015. Xi's work report calling for "sustained and sound" growth is a nod to the need to reduce capital intensity and systemic risks. He also said that supply-side structural reform would be the "main task" for economic policy for the foreseeable future. His economic reform slogans also made it into the party's constitution. Significantly, there are no more GDP targets beyond 2020. Broadly, we have defined Xi's reform agenda as a combination of centralizing control, improving governance, and streamlining the economy.10 Centralization is not necessarily market-positive, but under the Xi administration it has coincided with efforts to improve governance (fighting corruption, reining in provincial freewheeling, and reducing pollution). This is a sign of growing policy responsiveness to public demands and as such is marginally positive. The clear takeaway from the congress is that the anti-corruption campaign will be institutionalized across the country through new "supervisory commissions." This campaign should improve the legitimacy of the party-state and the implementation of central government policies. We have always been skeptical of progress on structural economic reforms, but the party congress marks a new phase in the political cycle: Xi is in a better position than any Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping to launch significant reforms. He has increased his political capital massively over the past few years, as illustrated by the dotted line in our "J-Curve of Structural Reform" (Diagram 2). Cyclically, the next opportunity for China to undertake bold reforms may not occur until 2027. Hence it is either now or never for reform. The policy focus is supposed to push along China's economic transition from investment- to consumption-led growth (Chart 9). Importantly, Xi declared that the "principle contradiction" in Chinese society has changed since the 1980s. The principle contradiction used to be that of a poor, economically and technologically "backward" country trying to meet the basic material needs of the population. Now the contradiction is that of an "imbalanced" and under-developed economy trying to provide people with "better lives." These goals can be put into perspective by comparison with South Korea, which reveals both how far China has come and how far it has to go (Chart 10). Xi's statement points to an overall shift in policy toward addressing imbalances and improving quality of life. Diagram 2The J-curve Of Structural Reform Chart 9Changing The Economic Model Chart 10From Basic Needs To 'Better Lives' To put a time frame on many of these reforms, Xi created a new long-term deadline of 2035 to become a fully "modernized" economy, which is smack in the middle of the country's previously declared two "centenary goals" of 2020 (middle income status) and 2050 (global prominence). The interim deadline includes a target for narrowing regional and income disparities. Wealth inequality in China has become extreme and ultimately poses a threat to the regime (Chart 11). Such a goal will require serious redistributionist policies as well as ongoing efforts to build a better social safety net. As expected, Xi reaffirmed China's embrace of globalization, claiming that the door of trade "will only open wider." The financial sector is likely to be at the forefront of any new opening measures - top financial officials claim that a package of reforms is forthcoming. The developed world has begun to doubt China's commitment to financial reform given the closing of the capital account last year and other negative trends, like the persistently low (and falling) share of foreign banks in domestic lending. Only recently have foreign banks begun lending again after withdrawing funds in preceding years (Chart 12). Foreign ownership of domestic equities, which is tightly controlled, has also fallen in importance (Chart 13). Chart 11Inequality: A Liability For The Party Chart 12Banks Shying Away From China Chart 13Foreign Investors Limited In China The centralization of power should speed up policy implementation, but it also raises risks. The important thing is whether we see hard evidence that Xi's "absolute power" is corrupting absolutely. This would present a new structural risk to the Chinese system, even if markets initially cheered. Why? Because an administrative (as opposed to propagandistic) turn in China in favor of a "cult of personality" as opposed to "collective leadership" would increase the odds of policy mistakes, set off factional struggle in the Communist Party, increase policy uncertainty for the foreseeable future, and jeopardize the smooth transition of power in 2022 ... or whenever "Chairman Xi" outwears his welcome. Therefore, the implementation of policy, the grooming of "heirs apparent," the position of the opposing faction in the party, and the upkeep of rules and norms will be important to monitor - not just after the party congress, but over the next five years. Bottom Line: Xi has reaffirmed formal structural economic goals like consumer-led growth and a commitment to globalization and has signaled that more reforms are in the works. Policy implementation will improve. Stay overweight H-shares within EM equities. However, excessive concentration of power in Xi himself is a serious political risk. It is only a positive in the long term if Xi uses his authority to build institutions rather than personalize them. Principal Contradictions China's declared goals are, of course, riddled with contradictions. As expected, Xi has tried to be everything to everyone. This leaves investors with a number of missing pieces to try to fit together. For example, the slogan indicating Xi's governing philosophy is a revision of Deng Xiaoping's market-oriented slogan, "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (Table 1). Xi is announcing that China has entered a "New Era" that will redefine Deng's formulation. Thus, by quoting Deng, he is reaffirming China's need to continue reforming and opening up. But by simultaneously qualifying Deng, he is reasserting the primacy of the state.11 Table 1Xi Jinping Thought What matters are the concrete policies China actually enacts. Nowhere are the contradictions clearer than in the party's constant assurances that it will both intensify reforms and keep the economy stable. Beijing continues to stress that it will deleverage the financial sector, restructure industry, eliminate overcapacity, and fight smog, all without any negative impact to growth. Given the sharp deceleration in the growth of China's monetary aggregates, we expect a significant slowdown in the coming year.12 "Reform" will in large part consist of demonstrating a higher-than-usual tolerance for slower growth so as to impose market discipline. Authorities will, as always, inject further stimulus if necessary to avoid a hard landing. A key risk to global markets, as discussed last week, is that fiscal spending may not offset a crunch in credit growth next year, should one occur. This is increasingly the case because the composition of fiscal spending in China is shifting as the country focuses more heavily on social stability and economic transition. Education, social security, worker training and relocation, and other public services are simply not as capital intensive as building railroads, urban infrastructure, and houses (Chart 14). Moreover, a critical test of the reform-stimulus trade-off will be Beijing's tolerance for failing companies. Bankruptcies have risen over the past year in China, which suggests that market forces are being given wider scope and that the central government is laying down the legal framework to make bankruptcy more acceptable (Chart 15), a notable reform. This is a clear sign of "short-term pain, long-term gain," but it remains to be seen how far it will go. Chart 14China's Fiscal Spending Is Becoming Less Capital Intensive Chart 15Creative Destruction At Long Last? It is also unclear whether failures will be allowed among state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are the least profitable and most indebted Chinese companies. The future of SOE reform is no clearer than before the congress: Xi promised both to restructure the sector and to enlarge and strengthen it. The principle is in alignment with the Jiang Zemin administration's maxim, "grasp the large, let go of the small," and does not mean that reform is doomed. More than a fourth of SOEs are under water and the government is already committed to cutting the number of centrally administered SOEs in half. There are now several pilot projects for allowing partial privatization, or creating state holding companies, that can be rolled out nationally. And there are a range of perfectly un-strategic sectors (retail, chemicals, real estate, electronics, et al) that have substantial state ownership that could be liquidated. Judging by listed Chinese firms, those that are deemed to be strategic will not likely see their state share diluted much beneath 80% of ownership; yet those that are designated for partial privatization and mixed ownership could see the state share dwindle to less than 10% of ownership (Table 2). This implies that sweeping changes could occur if the government prioritized SOE reform. (This is true despite the fact that the state's hand would still be obtrusive overall.) Table 2Plenty Of Room For Privatization Bottom Line: Deleveraging and bankruptcies are a key aspect of reform but pose headwinds to growth. The profile of China's fiscal spending is changing to become less capital intensive, which will mean less stimulus for China's aging industries if reforms are pursued. This underscores a real risk to Chinese growth, capex, and imports, and hence to EM. There is no clarity on SOE reform, but it would have far-reaching consequences if prioritized in Xi's second term, given his soaring political capital. Tax Blues In The USA: Are Tax Cuts Really Coming? On the other side of the Pacific, investors remain highly skeptical that tax reform is on the legislative menu (Chart 16). This is after both houses of Congress passed their version of the budget resolution, containing reconciliation instructions for tax reform. Once the House of Representatives passes the Senate version of the budget resolution - which we assume will be swift - the reconciliation process will kick off.13 The Senate version of the budget resolution instructs the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Ways and Means Committee to limit the increase in the budget deficit to no more than $1.5 trillion through 2027.14 The resolution also instructed the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) to consider "to the greatest extent practicable... the budgetary effects of changes in economic output, employment, capital stock, and other macroeconomic variables resulting from such major legislation." In plain English, this refers to "dynamic scoring," macroeconomic modeling that takes into account the revenue-raising potential of major tax cuts. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has harped on "dynamic scoring" since last November. The tool is a favorite of Republican legislators when passing tax legislation. It allows them to cut taxes and then score the impact on the budget deficit holistically, taking into consideration the supposed pro-growth impact of the legislation. Democrats banned this practice when they took back the Senate in the Obama years, but the GOP promptly re-authorized it in January 2015. Fast forward a year later and two core conclusions of our November 2016 forecast on tax policy are now coming true.15 First, the tax bill will not be revenue neutral, except in the imagination of macroeconomic modeling pursued by Republican economists. The bill will be mildly stimulative, to the tune of $100-150 billion per year over the next decade. The numbers are modest, but given that the U.S. is close to full employment and wage pressures are certain to build up (Chart 17), any additional tax relief is bound to be stimulative for the economy. Chart 16High-Tax Firms Not Outperforming (Yet) Chart 17Inflation Coming Even Without Tax Cuts Second, Republican legislators are not fiscally conservative. The House budget resolution authorizing a $1.5 billion hole in the budget was passed with 18 Republicans dissenting, but 11 of them were from highly-taxed "blue states." Their contention with the bill was not that it would be profligate, but that it would do away with state and local tax deductions in order to pay for the likely $5-$6 trillion price tag. As such, they voted not to make tax cuts less, but rather more, profligate. Going forward, the real threat to the proposed tax bill is in the Senate, where Republicans hold only a slim 52-48 majority. This threat is a surprise, as 12 months ago the question was how a profligate bill would pass the supposedly conservative House. Three risks lurk in the Senate: Alabama: Judge Roy Moore, a highly conservative candidate for the December 12 special election, is holding onto a relatively slim lead against Democrat Doug Jones. A recent Fox News poll shows the two tied in public opinion. Even if the poll is unreliable, other polls suggest that Jones has narrowed the gap to single digits. This is remarkable because Alabama Republicans have defeated their Democrat opponents by an average of 36% in Senate races over the past decade.16 If Moore were to lose, the Republican majority in the Senate would fall to 51. This would leave room for only one defection in passing legislation. The Corker-Flake-McCain Axis: Senators Bob Corker (R - Tennessee), Jeff Flake (R - Arizona), and John McCain (R - Arizona) have all voted in favor of the Senate budget resolution authorizing reconciliation instructions for tax legislation. On that basis, there should be no problem. However, Corker and Flake have announced their retirement, in our view because they plan to challenge President Trump in the 2020 Republican primary. Furthermore, Corker has said in the past that he would not vote for a tax bill that is not revenue neutral. We think that Corker and Flake will ultimately vote for tax cuts, if only because their chances of successfully challenging Trump in 2020 will be higher if they stick to Republican orthodoxy. However, these three Senators are risks to our view as they have the freedom not to care about the 2018 midterms. God: The death of Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy on August 25, 2009 greatly changed the fortunes of President Barack Obama, who at the time was enjoying a 60-seat majority in the Senate.17 Democrats failed to move quickly on the Affordable Care Act, assuming that a Democrat would win the special election in staunchly liberal Massachusetts. (If the parallels with Alabama today seem eerie, it is because they are.) But the January 2010 election cost Democrats the 60th seat in a shocking upset. These things can happen again, especially given that the average age of a senator is 103.18 Any one of these factors could reduce the Republican majority in the Senate to 51, forcing President Trump to rely on vociferous critics McCain and Corker. The latter, by the way, is also a likely 2020 primary challenger against Trump. Could a Democrat come to the president's aid? The short answer is yes. The 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, the first of two Bush-era tax cuts, passed with 58 votes in favor, including 12 Democrats. Of the 12 that voted with Republicans, only three were from blue states, while the other nine were from red states that President Bush had carried in 2000. The 2003 tax-cut bill, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, also passed with Democratic support with only 51 votes in favor. Senators Bayh (D - Indiana), Miller (D - Georgia), and Nelson (D - Nebraska), all crossed the aisle. Bayh was facing reelection in 2004, as was Nelson in 2006, in their respective red states, while Zell Miller of Georgia effectively ceased to be a Democrat and endorsed President George W. Bush reelection at the 2004 Republican National Convention. Ominously for today's efforts, John McCain voted against both versions. Given that he is unlikely to campaign again due to terminal cancer, and given his vociferous opposition to President Trump, we have to assume that he will vote against the tax bill as well. Which Democrats could potentially cross the aisle with this year's reconciliation bill? Table 3 lists the 2018 Senate races to watch, particularly the vulnerable Democrats campaigning in red states that President Trump carried in 2016. Particularly vulnerable are Senators Nelson (D - Florida), Donnelly (D - Indiana), McCaskill (D - Missouri), Tester (D - Montana), Heitkamp (D - North Dakota), Brown (D - Ohio), and Baldwin (D - Wisconsin). That makes seven potential votes for the Trump tax cut, plenty of "slack" for the Republicans in Senate to lose one or two votes on the tax bill. Table 32018 Senate Races To Watch As far as the timing of the bill is concerned, we are sticking with our updated view that the end of Q1 2018 is far more likely for passage of tax legislation than the end of 2017. There are simply too many things on the legislative agenda between now and the end of the year, including a potential government shutdown and an immigration fight. Bottom Line: The market remains unconvinced that Republicans can pass tax legislation through Congress. However, the tax process has played out thus far almost exactly as we expected last year (aside from starting later). Republicans have proposed a profligate tax bill and are using dynamic scoring to get it through Congress. Going forward, we think that GOP can afford to lose one or two votes, as it did in 2003 with the highly controversial Bush tax cuts. This is because there are up to seven Democratic Senators who can pick up the slack. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Is King Dollar Back?" dated October 4, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech," dated October 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategy Outlook 2015 - Paradigm Shifts," dated January 21, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Xi is also overhauling the armed forces to imitate modern American joint operations and combatant commands (as opposed to the army-centric Soviet system). 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?" March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Does It Pay To Pivot To China?" July 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 See note 4 above. 11 Whether Xi is mentioned specifically, and described as the founder of a school of "Thought," or a lesser "Theory," or something else, will be a notable watchword. 12 Please see note 2 above, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech," and BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Deflation Or Inflation?" October 4, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep," dated May 31, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see S.Con.Res.25, available at congress.gov. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcareserach.com. 16 Current U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, whose retirement from the Senate has prompted the current special election, ran unopposed in 2014 and garnered 97.25% of the vote! 17 Democrats picked up eight seats in the Senate in the watershed 2008 election, boosting their majority to 57, with two Independents caucusing with the Democrats. Shortly after the election, Pennsylvania Republican Arlen Spector changed parties, giving Democrats the 60-seat, filibuster-proof, majority. 18 It is actually 62, but we wanted to make sure you were still reading. Geopolitical Calendar

Special Report

Highlights Chinese politics is shifting from a tailwind to a headwind for the economy; Policy implementation should improve in Xi's second five-year term; Tighter financial and environmental controls will continue to bite next year; Key internal and external risks are structural in nature - volatility will rise; Re-initiate our long China volatility and long Big Bank trades; stay overweight Chinese H-shares in EM portfolios Feature Xi Jinping is slated to deliver his "work report" as we go to press, at the opening of China's nineteenth National Party Congress.1 The speech will be filled with communist slogans and jargon and will not give clear "answers" to the questions so heavily debated about China. But it will be the most authoritative distillation of the party's thinking in five years and will bear Xi Jinping's imprimatur as the "core" of the Communist Party. Hence investors will need to read the tea leaves to try to get a sense of the country's policy preferences over the next five years. In this Special Report, we offer a guide to interpreting the work report and the likely changes to the party constitution. Broadly, we think the party congress will herald a period of more effective domestic policy reforms in 2018-19. The nature of these reforms is an open question, but they likely entail that government policy will shift from being a tailwind for Chinese growth, as it has been since 2015, to being a headwind. While the party will aim to maintain stability as always, more effective policy execution will in itself probably increase the risks to stability. At present levels, Chinese political risks are understated by the market (Chart 1). The Stability Imperative Xi's speech is an authoritative party document drafted over the past year. It will be part of the running narrative laid out by his predecessors, particularly former President Hu Jintao's report at the eighteenth party congress in 2012, which Xi himself drafted and which marked the transition of power from Hu to Xi.2 Going back to 1992, the reports tell a story of China's shift from focusing on rapid, market-oriented "catch-up" economic growth to focusing on social stability and consumer-led growth. Analysis of the words most often used in the speeches reveals this critical policy evolution, with terms like "rural" and "security" gaining considerable ground recently (Chart 2). Chart 1Stability Achieved For Party Congress Chart 2The Shifting Emphasis In Key Speeches Broadly, Xi is pre-committed to the following key points about the economy: Primacy of the party and state: The idea of building a "socialist market economy" means maintaining the primacy of the party and the state in the economy. State resources will still be used to prop up economic growth and public ownership will remain dominant in strategic industries. Any debate about reform must occur within this context. Reform and opening up: The period after Chairman Mao is broadly defined as a period of market reform and globalization. China, as a major exporter and growing global investor and consumer, continues to benefit from these forces, as Xi highlighted in his speech at the Davos Forum earlier this year.3 Recently, however, productivity growth has declined, and foreign companies and governments have grown resentful of China's attempts to protect its market while encroaching on their markets and capturing their technology. Foreign direct investment is at the lowest point since the height of the global financial crisis.4 Xi's administration will re-commit to reform and opening up, but the proof will be in the actual policies issued forth in the coming months. Two "Centenary Goals": China has long committed to two overriding "centenary goals" of building a "moderately prosperous society" by 2020 and becoming a "modern socialist" developed country by 2049. The essence of these goals is not only to meet middle-income GDP and income targets by 2020 (Chart 3) but also to avoid getting stuck in the "middle-income trap." The first deadline coincides with the end of the thirteenth Five-Year Plan and is integral to the symbolic hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021 - another politically sensitive year in which economic stability will be paramount.5 China's global influence: China's global influence is rising along with its economic and military heft. Hu Jintao's 2012 party congress report was the first to emphasize China's emerging status as a "maritime power" and to introduce the concept of a "new type of great power relations."6 The latter would require the U.S. to concede a much greater global leadership role for China in order to avoid conflicts as China carves out a sphere of influence. The 2012 report also focused on building closer economic ties with Asia and the emerging world. Xi is doubling down on these global trends, notably by his assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea and promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative.7 He may make tactical adjustments but the strategic path is set for him. Maintaining stability and balance: China had a tumultuous history under foreign domination and Maoist revolution for most of the past two centuries. Whatever new initiatives its policymakers undertake, they will stress the need to keep the ship of state on an even keel. This applies to the nature of the policies themselves (e.g. rebalancing growth away from investment toward consumption) as well as to the principle of cautious execution. What is the economic implication of these inherited party goals? Looking at the low growth rate in China's various monetary aggregates presents a risk that the country could face a cyclical slowdown next year (Chart 4).8 This risk could be compounded by Xi's tougher policy stance this year (for instance, his imposing curbs on the property market).9 Yet the next politically sensitive deadline is not until 2020-21, implying that Xi still has some wiggle-room to push "reforms," which for us means deleveraging and industrial restructuring. Chart 3Political Deadlines For Xi Jinping Chart 4Money Growth In China Is Slowing Over the long term, the "Socialist Put" will remain in place and growth rates will not be allowed to collapse, as long as the party can help it.10 If policy continues tightening in 2018, as we expect, it will become more accommodative as the 2020 political deadline approaches. Bottom Line: Xi's speech will not change the fact that the Communist Party remains committed to regime survival and national stability above all. The Evolution Of The Anti-Corruption Campaign The consensus view of the current party congress is that it marks Xi's consolidation of power. This is true, but it only matters if policymaking becomes more purposeful and effective. If so, then the market is in for some surprises next year, as Xi's policy agenda is ambitious. Chart 5Anti-Corruption Campaign Still Going Events over the past year suggest that surprises are coming. First, Xi has continued the sweeping anti-corruption campaign that defined his first five years. This campaign - more so than Xi's accrual of official titles - epitomizes his consolidation of power over the party and military. The latest probes culminated with the sacking of Politburo member Sun Zhengcai, heretofore the likeliest candidate to succeed Premier Li Keqiang in 2022.11 Thus Xi is actively manipulating the post-2022 leadership of China, and this process will continue in the coming years. Regardless of whether Xi overstays his term in office in 2022, he is lining himself up to be the most powerful man in China well into the 2020s. Second, while the anti-corruption campaign appears, on paper, to have passed peak intensity (Chart 5), it is apparently morphing into broader policy enforcement.12 In particular, Xi is using the Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC), the party's anti-corruption watchdog, to supercharge his policy efforts in financial and environmental regulation. Since last fall, Xi has launched a series of financial tightening and anti-pollution efforts that have proved to be fairly aggressive, especially given the need for overall stability ahead of the party congress. This aggressiveness is partly because of his use of the CDIC, and it looks to be part of the game plan for next year: Anti-corruption officials appointed to top financial regulatory bodies: In late September, the leadership put two leading anti-corruption officials in charge of overseeing anti-corruption efforts within the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC).13 These are two of the three top financial regulating bodies (the other being the China Securities Regulatory Commission). The timing of these appointments, along with other key appointments earlier this year, suggests that the "financial regulatory crackdown" will continue apace in 2018.14 Local government officials to be held accountable for debt: In June and July, Chinese authorities, including Xi, highlighted that local government officials should be held accountable for excessive debt creation - not only in their current office but over the course of their entire lives.15 The implication is that they could get expelled from the party or even imprisoned, rather than simply demoted. Moreover, officials could be punished for accruing illegal debts, and promotions could be tied to fiscal sustainability rather than just economic growth. The implication is that there will be legal ramifications, as well as financial restrictions, for local government officials who add to the country's systemic risks. Tackling systemic financial risk is a clear policy priority. Xi emphasized this at an extraordinary Politburo meeting in April as well as at the National Financial Work Conference in July.16 Not only has China accumulated more debt as a share of its GDP than any other country since the global financial crisis, but also it has done so faster than most other countries (Chart 6 A&B). Regardless of China's high national savings rate, China's top leadership sees leverage as a threat to stability and is taking action. Chart 6AChina Has Added Massive Debt... Chart 6B... And Done So Faster Than Others Something similar is taking place in the realm of environmental regulation. This is also a clear priority for the party: Hu Jintao included an "ecological" section in the work report for the first time in 2012; environmental spending grew faster than any other central government category in the beginning of Xi's first five years (Table 1). Table 1Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents Here again, the powers that Xi amassed in his anti-corruption campaign are paying off. In August, the anti-pollution teams that fanned out across the country to enforce tougher environmental standards included anti-corruption watchdogs as well. This helps explain why production cuts and factory closures have been so effective in recent months, for instance cutting steel supply (Chart 7). Managers are not only facing environmental fines but also arrest and jail time. Meanwhile, ministerial-level ranking officials accompanied each environmental inspection team, giving them greater clout.17 It is unclear, so far, whether the CDIC or other tools will be brought to bear on the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOE reform is one of the major unknowns of Xi's second term. So far, it has moved slowly, with the 2013 broad overview only put into a concrete plan in late 2015, which has since resulted in pilot projects of questionable value and little general implementation. The 2015-16 stimulus gave state companies some breathing space, as they were at last able to build up cash faster than they were borrowing it (Chart 8); but this period has ended and they are still plagued with inefficiencies (Chart 9). Chart 7Cutting Steel Supply, And Iron Demand Chart 8Stimulus Helped Corporate Balance Sheets... Chart 9...But SOEs Are Still Inefficient Chinese authorities have recently been emphasizing that reform is set to "deepen."18 If this effort is to have any teeth, it must include real encouragement to private and foreign capital, as well as real creative destruction - the sale of loss-making assets plus bankruptcies and layoffs (however carefully managed by the state). It will not suffice merely to continue the ongoing process of debt-for-equity swaps, mergers and acquisitions, and the creation of national champions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that bankruptcies are rising, but the proof will be in the pudding.19 What are the macro implications of the above? Assuming that we are right and deleveraging intensifies, the standard policy move in China would be to boost fiscal spending at the National People's Congress in March in order to compensate for the resulting slowdown in credit growth (Chart 10). This is precisely how President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji approached the negative growth effects of supply-side structural reforms after the fifteenth party congress in 1997: more fiscal spending. Xi's recent emphasis on poverty alleviation would seem to call for such spending as part of the broader effort to build a social safety net, reinforce social stability, and boost consumption as a driver of growth (Chart 11). There is a risk, however, as our colleagues at BCA's Emerging Market Strategy have argued, that fiscal spending may not offset a significant drop in credit growth in China. This is not the baseline case of China Investment Strategy, but it is a legitimate concern: it is not clear that any decrease in credit growth will go off seamlessly (Chart 12).20 Chart 10Two Sides Of The Same Coin Chart 11High Savings Rate Suppresses Consumer Demand Chart 12Credit Growth As Large As Government Spending If Xi seriously addresses China's long-festering financial systemic risks he could create a drag on growth that would be negative for emerging markets and certain commodity prices, like copper and iron ore.21 More broadly, the gradual transition away from China's investment-led growth model toward consumption-led growth is a headwind for the economies that have benefited the most from the status quo over the past two decades. Bottom Line: Xi's anti-corruption campaign is the clearest measure of his consolidation of power, and the party congress puts the capstone on it. Policy implementation will be more effective going forward. If Xi continues to prioritize deleveraging and industrial-environmental restructuring next year, he could create a drag on growth that is negative for the assets of EM exporters and key commodity producers. Xi Jinping Theory... What Does It Mean? Aside from Xi's big speech, the Communist Party will amend its constitution at the party congress. It is not clear what amendments may be made. The current debate is about whether and how Xi Jinping's ideas will be incorporated into the constitution and what this might mean for policy. Currently, the party constitution highlights the thinking of Marx and Lenin as well as China's top leaders since 1949. Each of China's leaders is said to have contributed something essential to the party's guiding philosophy: namely, "Mao Zedong Thought," "Deng Xiaoping Theory," "the important thinking of the Three Represents" (Jiang Zemin's contribution), and "the Scientific Outlook on Development" (Hu Jintao's contribution). These theories are outlined in Table 2. Table 2Xi Jinping Theory It is hard to draw strict correlations between these theories and economic policy, but the broad trends are well enough known: Mao founded the People's Republic and put a personal stamp on its Marxist-Leninist foundations. Deng Xiaoping brought pragmatism, enabling China to pursue a "socialist market economy," or "socialism with Chinese characteristics," thus opening the door to private and foreign capital, and profit incentives for households and businesses. National and household income surged (Chart 13). Jiang Zemin brought entrepreneurialism, building on Deng's achievement, particularly by phasing out many of the bloated SOEs and "command-style" economic controls and opening the real estate sector for consumers to buy houses (Chart 14). Hu Jintao brought social responsibility into greater focus, emphasizing the need to invest in infrastructure in undeveloped regions, reduce rural and urban disparities, and build out the social safety net (Chart 15). Chart 13Deng Unleashed China's Economic Potential Chart 14Jiang Rebooted Growth, Launched Housing Boom Chart 15Hu Jintao Sought 'Harmonious Society' If Xi's ideas are incorporated into this section, it will be notable since that honor usually occurs at the end of a general secretary's term. The precise wording will be heavily studied: e.g. whether Xi is named personally (like Mao and Deng), whether his ideas are referred to as "Thought" or "Theory" (like Mao or Deng respectively), which of his slogans are included, and what they actually mean. The real takeaway for investors is that the party is demanding a return to centralization and Xi is fulfilling this demand.22 Structurally, Xi's anti-corruption campaign has put him at the top of a more disciplined party. He has simultaneously reasserted the party's primacy over the military, which has been extensively reshuffled and reformed, and civil society, which has been muzzled. Re-centralization is also apparent in fiscal and financial management. The previous administration decentralized economic control in order to accelerate growth in the face of the global recession. This specifically meant freeing up the state banks and the provincial governments to borrow, invest, and build to their heart's content. Comparing the trajectory of central and local government spending, it is clear that Xi is overseeing a marginal re-concentration of taxation and spending into the hands of the central government vis-à-vis the provincial governments (Chart 16 A&B). Chart 16ALocal Government Gap Widened Post-Crisis... Chart 16B...But Gap Narrowed Under Xi Jinping Similarly, he is overseeing a marginal re-concentration of lending back into traditional state-owned bank loans, after nearly a decade of rapid growth in the non-bank, "shadow lending" sub-sector (Chart 17 A&B). Chart 17AShadow Loans Outpaced Bank Loans... Chart 17B...But Gap Has Narrowed Under Xi However, re-centralization is not the result of any "coup" by Xi Jinping so much as the Communist Party's strategic response to the fact that the country stands at a historic juncture with serious systemic risks: The "Thucydides Trap": The world has not seen the contest of a fully established world empire (the U.S.) and a newly emergent peer competitor (China) since the Cold War, and strictly speaking since the late 1800s, when Germany emerged as a challenger to the U.K. (Chart 18). The CPC's founding myth is the rejection of a "century of humiliation" at the hands of western powers, so there is no moment more critical than now, when China is emerging as a rival to the greatest western power. Economic reform: China's economic model is slowly evolving, and the outgoing model has left imbalances that are key vulnerabilities to China and could undermine its global emergence. The corporate debt pile is the clearest, but by no means the only, example of this internal threat (Chart 19). Lack of political reform: The country faces an inherent contradiction between its single-party system and the emergent middle class, which is still denied political participation (Chart 20). This is a source of socio-political imbalances that could also undermine China's emergence. Chart 18The 'Thucydides Trap' Chart 19An Outstanding Economic Imbalance Chart 20Not Your Father's China True, China has a single authoritative leader (with no alternative) at the head of a unified ruling party (with no alternative). Thus, it faces fewer domestic political constraints, in the strict sense, than any major country in the world. Nevertheless, the challenges themselves are structural and could outstrip any leadership's ability to address them. The policy responses to the crises of 2015-16 - when Beijing committed a series of blunders - do not suggest that Xi is nearly as omnipotent or omniscient as the media will make it sound this week.23 Of crucial importance going forward will be the deteriorating U.S.-China relationship, since the next 12 months will provide at least two major occasions for clashes: North Korea, where diplomacy is balking, and Trump's need to look tough on China ahead of midterm elections.24 Bottom Line: The possible incorporation of Xi's ruling philosophy into the Communist Party's constitution would be a symbolic nod to the concrete executive power that Xi has already achieved. However, only when new structural risks materialize will Xi's capabilities - and the Communist Party's capabilities as a ruling party - truly be put to the test in a way that yields significant information for investors. Investment Conclusions On the brink of the party congress, Xi looks to be continuing his double game of centrally driven internal reforms and external assertiveness. But between these, the key to watch is the extent to which he re-emphasizes internal reforms. Over the next few years, rebooting reforms could help Xi to waylay the Trump administration's threatened punitive measures; to use Trump as a foil to excuse the painful consequences of necessary reforms at home; and to win goodwill among other countries, which would see greater opportunities in a China that is recommitting to opening up to them (and investing more in them). Our "Reform Reboot" checklist, which focuses on deleveraging, is designed for the post-party congress period. As such, most of the points are yet to be determined (see Appendix). We would remind readers to watch for the following: Chart 21Volatility Will Go Up The composition of the next Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, and Central Committee, expected to be revealed on October 25, for a sense of whether reformers will hold key posts and whether Xi's faction will gain the upper hand - we will report on this in subsequent weeks;25 Post-party congress leaks or discussions in state media covering new policy priorities, particularly on financial regulation, the property sector, and SOE reform; Any hints at who will replace Zhou Xiaochuan as governor of the central bank, who will be the first head of the new Financial Stability and Development Committee, and how the National Financial Work Conference's goals are implemented; Outcomes of U.S. President Donald Trump's visit to China and Asia Pacific, November 3-14 - particularly on North Korea and trade frictions; How far the latest property market curbs advance, and whether recently promised "long-term" curbs are implemented, including any nationwide property tax; Whether the financial crackdown spreads further into state-owned and domestic-oriented financial institutions; When and how the tougher scrutiny on local government debt is implemented - and whether local government budget balances rise or fall after the congress; Whether SOE "mixed ownership" and "state capital management" reforms accelerate - and whether asset sales and operational restructuring begin occurring more frequently across multiple provinces; How the party implements its recent proposals to increase the role of entrepreneurs and provide easier access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises; Priorities for domestic reforms, especially those affecting household registration (hukou) reforms, the urbanization rate, social safety net expansion, and household credit; How foreign investment is attracted, including the implementation of the nationwide foreign investment negative list; When and how capital controls will be lifted; if the government wants "de-risking" reforms in the financial sector, it will have to do that first, before pursuing any capital account reforms. We continue to believe that Xi's second term provides a window of opportunity for rebooting reforms, within the Communist Party's stability constraint, due to his consolidation of power and the currently robust domestic and global economic backdrop. This window will likely close as the term progresses due to political deadlines in 2020 and the likelihood of the external backdrop worsening. Both internal and external risks will rise from here (Chart 21). Xi's initial attack over the next six-to-eight months will determine whether we remain optimistic about incremental progress on reforms. We are re-initiating our long China CBOE volatility ETF trade, and our long Big Five banks relative to smaller banks trade. We also remain overweight Chinese equities versus EM equities. We are adjusting this trade to include Chinese H-shares only. Xi's political recapitalization lessens domestic political constraints, and China's shift to more domestically driven growth will disfavor China-exposed, export-reliant, and commodity-producing EMs. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer," dated September 13, 2017. 2 For this transition, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Xi Jinping, "Jointly Shoulder Responsibility Of Our Times, Promote Global Growth," dated January 17, 2017, available at america.cgtn.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Moreover, Xi's term officially ends the following year, in 2022, which will require arrangements for a smooth transition regardless of whether Xi retains power. 6 The term is not used precisely in this way in the report but has been developed in official policy outlets since then. Please see Hu Jintao, "Firmly March On The Path Of Socialism," Report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, November 8, 2012, available at www.china.org.cn, and Timothy Heath, "The 18th Party Congress Work Report: Policy Blueprint For The Xi Administration," China Brief 12:23, Jamestown Foundation, November 30, 2012, available at jamestown.org. 7 Please see BCA Frontier Markets Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown?" dated September 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Deflation Or Inflation?" dated October 4, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Real Estate: Which Way Will The Wind Blow?" dated September 28, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For our take on factional struggles in anticipation of Sun's fall, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 There is much speculation about whether anti-corruption chief Wang Qishan will make it onto the next Politburo Standing Committee (to be revealed around October 25) despite having passed the retirement age. This topic is a red herring: age limits have always been arbitrarily enforced, while Xi will maintain a hardline toward corruption even if he replaces Wang. If Xi wishes to stay in power beyond 2022, it will not depend on Wang. 13 Please see Wu Hongyuran, Yang Qiaoling and Leng Cheng, "Two Determined Graft-Busters Put In Senior Posts At Banking, Insurance Watchdogs," Caixin, dated October 11, 2017, available at www.caixinglobal.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see Huang Ge, "China's First Lifelong Accountability System To Prevent Local Officials From Accruing Mountainous Debt," Global Times, dated July 24, 2017, available at www.globaltimes.cn. 16 Notably, authorities pledged to give the People's Bank of China greater regulatory powers going forward, coinciding with a generational change at the top of the central bank. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 See Barry Naughton, "The General Secretary's Extended Reach: Xi Jinping Combines Economics And Politics," dated September 11, 2017, available at www.hoover.org. 18 Please see Fran Wang, "China To Take Flexible Approach To SOE Reform," Caixin, September 29, 2017, available at www.caixinglobal.com. 19 See "China bankruptcies rise steadily in 2017 amid 'zombie firm' crackdown," August 3, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 20 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Revisiting China's Fiscal And Credit Impulses," dated April 13, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Slow-Down In China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore In 2018," dated September 7, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 22 We have long highlighted this theme as critical to Xi's reforms, along with governance and productivity. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Annus Horribilis," dated January 20, 2016, and "China: Eye Of The Storm," dated September 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 25 This will be the subject of our party congress post-mortem pieces in coming weeks. Appendix

Highlights Tipping points tend to occur when too many long-term value investors are uncharacteristically behaving like short-term momentum traders. Long IBEX35 versus Eurostoxx50 constitutes a good tactical trade. The underperformance of Spanish equities appears excessively pessimistic. Euro/dollar is technically extended by about 4 cents. The near term event risk is the ECB meeting on October 26, when a taper of asset purchases which extends well beyond 12 months might be regarded as dovish. But in the medium term, euro/dollar will head well north of 1.30. Underweight Basic Materials equities relative to the market as a tactical trade. Feature Spain: Red Herring Or Red Flag? Long Spanish equities is an excellent tactical trade provided that the imbroglio in Catalonia turns out to be a red herring. The IBEX35 index is at a classic tipping point of excessive short-term (negative) groupthink and herding (Chart of the Week). Chart Of The WeekThe Underperformance Of Spanish Equities Seems Excessive But is the imbroglio in Catalonia a red herring? Most likely, yes. As my colleague Marko Papic, BCA Chief Geopolitical Strategist points out, any unilateral declaration of independence from Catalonia would be vacuous if it lacked international legitimacy, or the ability to enforce it with arms. German sociologist Max Weber famously defined a nation's sovereignty as a "monopoly over the use of legitimate force." Unlike the Basque separatists, Catalan separatists have never resorted to force. A descent into violence remains unlikely because the Catalan independence movement is mainly a bourgeois, middle and upper class intellectual vision. The majority of Catalonia's working class are neither Catalan, nor support independence. Any unilateral declaration of independence would also lack political credibility because the opponents of independence largely boycotted the recent referendum to avoid giving it legitimacy. The vote for independence comprised only 37% of the electorate, meaning that popular support for independence remains questionable. The real (and unspoken) reason for the independence referendum was that it was the only glue holding together the Junts Pel Si (Together For Yes) four party coalition forming Catalonia's regional government. Without this glue, the two nationalist parties from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum would not be in bed with each other. And it is unclear whether this unholy alliance can stay entwined. To sum up, Catalan independence is an intellectual vision which at the moment lacks political and implementation credibility. For the imbroglio to become a full-blown crisis, the Catalan government, or militant groups, or the Spanish government would have to escalate tensions with the use of force. We do not expect this to happen. So the underperformance of Spanish equities appears excessively pessimistic, and long IBEX35 versus Eurostoxx50 constitutes a good 3-month trade (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2The IBEX 35 And Euro Stoxx 50 Have Parted Company Chart I-3The IBEX 35 Has Catch-Up Potential Identifying Tipping Points Of Price Trends Let's take this opportunity to review how we identify such tipping points of excessive groupthink and herding. Tipping points tend to occur when too many long-term value investors are uncharacteristically behaving like short-term momentum traders. Instead of dispassionately investing on the basis of value, long-term investors get sucked into chasing a price trend, and thereby amplify it. These price trends reach exhaustion when there are no more value investors left to suck in, and at the margin, someone wants to get out. The following analysis describes the tipping point of a price uptrend, but exactly the same analysis applies in reverse to the tipping point of a price downtrend. When a financial asset price starts to rise, the momentum trader's natural inclination is to chase the price rise, and buy. Conversely, the long-term value investor's natural inclination, ordinarily, is to lean against the price rise, and sell. The two investors interpret the same information in polar opposite ways because they have very different time horizons. Importantly, their different interpretations of the same information - stemming from their different time horizons - allow the momentum trader and the value investor to trade with one another in very large volume at the current price. This is what creates a healthy market with plentiful liquidity. Now consider what happens when a long-term value investor flips out of character and acts like a momentum trader. With the numerical balance shifting to the momentum traders, the price has to move up to balance buy and sell orders. As more and more value investors defect to momentum trading, the price uptrend gathers steam. This uptrend is exhausted when the long-term value investors have all joined the trend. Regular readers know that we identify these tipping points by comparing the behaviour of investors with 'short-term' 1-day horizons and investors with 'long-term' 65-day horizons. For any financial asset, a near term price reversal is likely to occur when its 65-day fractal dimension hits a lower limit of 1.25 (Chart I-4), which we have found to be the 'universal constant of finance'.1 Chart I-4When The Valuation Framework Changes, It Is More Difficult To Assess Tipping Points At this remarkably consistent limit, the long-term investor reverts back to character, realises the stock is now overvalued and wants to sell. The trouble is that everybody has already joined the trend. To sell, there needs to be a buyer. But who will buy at the current price? Usually, the answer is nobody. The marginal buyer will be a new category of investor: an 'ultra-long term' value investor - let's say, with a 130-day horizon - who stayed true to character and refused to join the uptrend. As this investor knows that the stock is overvalued at the current price, he will only provide liquidity at the 'correct' lower price. So this is the tipping point at which the price trend reverses. Occasionally, there is another possibility. The ultra-long term value investor could also join the trend at the current price. This might happen when the valuation framework for an investment is especially uncertain, leaving long-term value investors extremely disoriented and unable to assess the 'correct' price. An important conclusion is that when the valuation framework for an investment is undergoing a major change, it is much more difficult to assess the tipping point of a price trend. Which brings us to the euro. Is The Euro Overbought? Through the second half of 2014 and early 2015, the euro was in a major downtrend as the ECB first signalled and then implemented its QE program. On several occasions, the 65-day downtrend seemed technically exhausted but after only minor reversals, the downtrend continued (see Chart I-4 again). Even after the 130-day downtrend seemed exhausted at the start of 2015, it persisted into the spring (Chart I-5). The reason was that as the ECB moved into the uncharted territory of QE, ZIRP and NIRP, the valuation framework for the euro also moved into uncharted territory. Without a reliable valuation anchor, longer and longer term investors jumped on the euro bear bandwagon. Chart I-5The Euro Is Overbought, But The Reversal Might Be Minor Today, we face the mirror-image situation. The euro has been in a major uptrend for most of 2017 as the ECB has signalled a recalibration of its extraordinary monetary easing. But though the 65-day uptrend seemed exhausted in the early summer, the uptrend continued as longer term investors joined the trend. Just as in 2014-15, the question today is: at a major turning point in ECB policy, what is the most reliable valuation anchor? For us, the best explanatory model for euro/dollar is the expected difference in ECB versus Fed policy rates 5 years ahead. As this differential compressed from -230 bps to -160 bps, euro/dollar rallied in perfect lockstep from 1.03 to 1.15. However, the subsequent rally has deviated from the expected policy rate differential, suggesting that the euro's uptrend is indeed overdone by about 4 cents. But in the medium term, the much bigger question is: what will happen to the expected policy rate differential? As we explained in Positioning For A Sea-Change2 the differential must eventually compress to around -40 bps, because this is the mid-point of a very well established multi-decade cycle (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). In which case, euro/dollar must eventually head well north of 1.30 (Chart I-8). Chart I-6The Euro Area - U.S. Average ##br##Interest Rate Differntial = -40 bps... Chart I-7...Because The Euro Area-U.S. ##br##Inflation Differential = -40 bps Chart I-8An Expected Interest Differential ##br##Of -40 bps Means EUR/USD Goes North Of 1.30 To be clear, north of 1.30 is the medium term direction of travel, and the journey will not be a straight line. The near term event risk is the ECB meeting on October 26, when the central bank will very likely announce a recalibration of its monetary policy. A taper of asset purchases which extends well beyond 12 months might be regarded as dovish, as it would delay the timing of policy rate normalisation. In which case, euro/dollar could retest 1.15. Finally, and very briefly, Chart I-9 shows the major equity sector most at risk of a price trend reversal is Basic Materials. Although global growth seems healthy and synchronized, materials equities seem to have run much too far ahead, especially relative to other cyclical equity sectors. We recommend tactically underweighting Basic Materials relative to the market. Chart I-9Tactically Underweight Basic Materials Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Universal Constant Of Finance," September 25 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Published on September 7 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* As decribed in the main body of this report, this week’s new trade recommendation is to go long Spain’s IBEX35 versus the Eurostoxx50 with a profit target/stop loss of 2.5%. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Looking into 2018, the major risk factors driving gold - inflation and inflation expectations; fiscal and monetary policy; and geopolitics - will, on balance, continue to favor gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. We expect gold will provide a good hedge against rising inflation. However, this will be partially mitigated by Fed rate hikes next year. On the back of tighter U.S. monetary policy, our macroeconomists expect a recession by 2H19, possibly earlier in 2019, which likely would be sniffed out by equity markets as early as 2H18. Our analysis indicates gold will provide a good hedge against this expected recession and the associated equity bear market.1 Lastly, geopolitical risks from (1) U.S.-North Korea tensions, (2) trade protectionism of the Trump administration and (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East will support gold prices next year, given the metal's safe-haven properties. Energy: Overweight. At the end of 3Q17, our open energy recommendations were up 45%, led by our long Dec/17 WTI $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl Call spread. We closed out our long Brent recommendations in 3Q17 for an average gain of 116%. (Please see p. 13 for a summary of trades closed in 3Q17). Base Metals: Neutral. Our tactical short Dec/17 copper position ended 3Q17 up 6%. We are placing a trailing stop at $3.10/lb. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge ended 3Q17 up 4.3%. The balance of risks continues to favor this as a strategic position, which we discuss below. Ags/Softs: Neutral. We lifted our weighting on ags - particularly grains - to neutral last week. Our long corn/short wheat position is up 1.2%. Feature Chart of the WeekInflation And U.S. Financial Variables##BR##Explain Gold Prices Inflation and U.S. financial variables - particularly the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB), and real rates - are the main factors explaining the evolution of gold prices (Chart of the Week).2 Subdued inflation and low unemployment - a decoupling of the so-called Phillips Curve relationship that drives central-bank models of the macroeconomy - have dominated the macro landscape this year (Chart 2). We expect that current low inflation, positive growth, and low interest rates will remain in place for the next 12 months (Chart 3). Although economies such as the U.S. are growing above trend, inflation has remained weak due to a redistribution of demand through imports from countries with spare capacity, according to BCA's Global Investment Strategy.3 This is expected to continue in the near term to end-2018. However, we expect the USD to gradually strengthen, as the Fed cautiously normalizes policy rates, while other systemically important central banks remain accommodative relative to the U.S. central bank (Chart 4). Further falls in the unemployment rate will push the U.S. economy into the steep end of the Phillips Curve. Weak capex in the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) era means demand for labor will increase as low unemployment - and associated higher wages - encourage higher consumer spending. This will cause inflation to lift next year or early 2019. Chart 2A Decoupling Of The Phillips Curve Relationship? In such an environment, any U.S. tax cuts - which we still expect by the end of 1Q18 - will simply add fuel to the inflationary fire, and lift inflation expectations for next year and beyond. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team puts it, the tax cuts are a "form of modest stimulus ... (which), this far into the economic cycle, could have a significant effect."4 With unemployment at or below levels consistent with full employment in the U.S. and little slack of any sort, it would not take much in the way of fiscal stimulus to further pressure inflation. Chart 3No Pressure From Inflation Or U.S. Financial##BR##Variables...For Now Chart 4A Strengthening U.S. Dollar Will##BR##Keep The Pressure Off Gold Inflation vs. Fed Hikes In the face of the rising inflation we expect next year, gold's appeal will increase. As our previous research reveals, gold's correlation with inflation is strengthened during periods of low real rates, i.e., the difference between nominal rates and inflation. This is a perfect context for gold. However, gold's ability to hedge inflation risks to portfolios will be partially hampered by a more-hawkish Fed. As inflation finally takes off, the Fed will feel confident to hike rates more aggressively. More than anything, this will put a bid under the USD, as U.S. interest-rate differentials vs. other currencies rise in favor of the dollar. In addition, real rates will rise as the Fed gains confidence it can lift policy rates without doing serious harm to the U.S. economy, and follows thru with its normalization. Thus, the gold market will be facing two opposing forces: On the one hand, gold will be an attractive inflation hedge as inflationary pressures build up. On the other, as the Fed begins to tighten to respond to those inflationary pressures, gold will lose its appeal in the face of rising real rates and a strong dollar. Chart 5Fed Will Ease Pressure Off Gold##BR##If It Gets Ahead Of Inflation The timing of the Fed's rate hikes will be critical to the evolution of gold prices next year and beyond. We previously assumed that rate hikes will remain behind wage growth, which would be supportive of gold prices as inflation picks up. However, if the Fed begins hiking ahead of any realized uptick in inflation, this would create a stronger-than-expected headwind for gold (Chart 5). While we expect inflation to take off in 2H18, our House view calls for 2 to 3 hikes by then. This is a risk to our gold view. Longer term, Fed rate hikes could trigger a feedback loop that will make it difficult for the U.S. central bank policy to support low unemployment rates. As real rates rise, increased unemployment will lead households to spend less. Lower demand will force firms to reduce hiring. The accompanying slowing of U.S. growth will disseminate to the rest of the world, pushing the global economy into a shallow recession as early as 2H19. In all likelihood, this higher-inflation/higher-policy-rate period will be sniffed out by equity markets before the economy actually enters a recession, leading to a bear market. Somewhat counterintuitively, this will favor gold as a portfolio hedge, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: As U.S. unemployment continues falling, inflation will re-emerge, as predicted by the Philips Curve trade-off so important to central-bank policy. Gold then will face two opposing forces. Its inflation hedging properties will be partially hamstrung by rising real U.S. rates and a strengthening USD. Nevertheless, we will turn bullish gold towards the end of next year as signs of an equity bear market emerge. Gold Will Outperform In An Equity Bear Market Our modelling indicates gold is an exceptional safe-haven during downturns in equity markets.5 It is especially attractive in equity bear markets because its returns during such episodes are negatively correlated with the U.S. stock market. This relationship with equities does not hold in bull markets -- gold prices typically rise during such periods, but at a slower rate than equities (Table 1). Table 1Gold's Ability To Hedge U.S. Equities In a Special Report titled "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?" BCA's Global Asset Allocation Strategy team looked at the performance of nine safe-haven assets and found, on average, they are negatively correlated with equities in every bear market since 1972.6 Although the current equity bull market still has room to run, recessions and bear markets tend to coincide (Chart 6). If the economy goes into recession in 2H19, equities could peak as early as the end of next year.7 Chart 6Bear Markets Usually Precede Recessions Gold's role as a global portfolio hedge during bear markets would thus support the hypothesis that the metal could enter a bull market as soon as end-2018 when equity markets start pricing in a recession (Chart 7). Things could get interesting at this point, since a clear indication the economy is entering into a recession likely will cause "traumatized" central bankers to turn overly dovish. This would add support to the gold market longer term.8 Chart 7Gold Outperforms During Recessions##BR##And Geopolitical Crises Correlations between safe havens decline during bear markets, as our GAA strategists found when they compared correlations by dividing the assets into three "buckets": currencies, inflation hedges, and fixed-income instruments. In this analysis, our GAA team found that gold outperformed TIPS and Farmland in the inflation-hedge bucket.9 Bottom Line: Gold is an exceptional hedge against downturns in equity markets. The bear market preceding the late-2019 recession we expect will put a bid under gold. The eventual turn to the dovish side by central bankers will further support the metal. Gold Will Hedge Geopolitical Risks A confluence of elevated geopolitical risks next year will drive part of gold's performance. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) group has highlighted the following three themes investors need to track going into next year: U.S.-China Tensions: Our geopolitical strategists believe that the Korean conflict is a derivative of a more important secular trend of U.S.-China tensions. They estimate the risk of total war on the Korean peninsula at less than 3% and believe that the market impact of North Korea's provocations has peaked in the late summer. Nevertheless, they warn against complacency, as the underlying tensions over Pyongyang's nuclear program remain unresolved and North Korea could break with its past patterns.10 If the North stages attacks against U.S. or Japanese assets, or international shipping or aircraft, for instance, it could cause a larger safe-haven rally than what we witnessed earlier this year. At the very least, geopolitically induced volatility may return as U.S. President Trump tries to convince the world that war is a real option - a critical condition for establishing a "credible threat" of war with which to influence North Korean behavior - and as the U.S. and China spar over other issues. Trump's protectionism: Trump's campaign promised significant trade-protectionism. While he has not yet acted on those promises, the risk is that he returns to them next year.11 These policies could impact the gold market by: a. Feeding fears that the United States is abandoning the global liberal order; b. Intensifying U.S. trade tensions and strategic distrust with China; c. Pressuring U.S. domestic inflation via higher import prices. This risk will become even more elevated if the Trump administration and Congress fail to pass any tax legislation this year. Our geopolitical strategists believe that such a failure, while not their baseline scenario, would drive Trump to focus on his foreign policy and trade agenda more intently, especially ahead of the midterm elections in November next year, which would increase safe-haven flows. 3. Mideast Troubles: While we are not alarmist about the Middle East, the risk of market-relevant conflicts will be higher over the coming 12 months than over the previous year, following the fall of ISIS. The latter gave reason for various regional powers to cooperate, while its absence will revive their grievances with each other. Kurdish assertiveness is a key consequence, highlighted by last month's Kurdish independence referendum.12 Iraqi forces have pushed ISIS out of major Iraqi cities and the slowdown in the fight against ISIS could push Iraqi forces to focus on regaining the province of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, which is home to major oil fields and reserves, has been under Kurdish control since 2014 when the Peshmerga forces there captured it from ISIS. As ISIS ceases to be a threat, Baghdad will try to regain control of these precious oil fields. The Kurdish conflict, as well as Trump's pressure tactics against Iran, will increase geopolitical risks in oil-producing (hence market-relevant) areas. Chart 82017 Risks Were Overstated In a recent study investigating how different "safe-havens" assets react to political and financial events, our GPS colleagues found that gold provides the best average returns following a major geopolitical event (Chart 7).13 Our House geopolitical view has maintained that political risks in 2017 were overstated. This was particularly the case in Europe, where much of the risk was exaggerated and merely the product of linear extrapolation from the outcomes of the U.K. referendum on EU membership and the U.S. presidential election. As such, we do not expect any European break-up risk to support gold prices next year. Although elevated Italian Euroscepticism is one lingering European risk that could impact gold markets, we see this as a long-term risk rather than a market catalyst arising from the Italian general election in May next year. Reflecting our view, the policy uncertainty index has fallen drastically in the last two months (Chart 8). Bottom Line: Elevated political risks in 2018 will further support the gold market. Most notable on our geopolitical strategists' minds are continued U.S.-China tensions (most notably over Korea), Trump's protectionist policies, and potential conflicts in the Middle East. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Go Long Gold As A Strategic Portfolio Hedge," dated May 4, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Our results show 1% increase in U.S. YoY CPI, 5 year real rates, and USD TWI are associated with a 4% increase, 0.18% decline and a 0.21% decline in gold prices, respectively. The adjusted R2 is 0.88. 3 Please see the Global Investment Strategy Outlook "Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," dated October 4, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Is King Dollar Back," dated October 4, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 We use the S&P 500 Total Return (TR) index as a proxy for U.S. equities. 6 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?," dated April 21, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, dated October 2, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see the Global Investment Strategy Outlook "Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," dated October 4, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?," dated April 21, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Armed conflict in the Middle East usually lead to a sharp rally in gold prices. Please see Table 1 from Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?," dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Dear Client, This week, in addition to this regular Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, we decided to send you a collaborative report we penned with BCA's Energy Sector Strategy. My colleague Matt Conlan runs the service, which blends BCA's macroeconomic framework with his bottom-up expertise in the energy sector. Matt's service is one of the few that our firm publishes with specific company recommendations. In the report titled "King Salman Goes To Moscow, Bolsters OPEC 2.0," Matt argues that the emerging détente between Russia and Saudi Arabia will strengthen OPEC 2.0 and provide a structural tailwind for BCA's bullish view on energy. I highly recommend that you check out the research Matt and his team produce at nrg.bcaresearch.com. All the very best, Marko Papic Senior Vice President, Geopolitical Strategy Highlights Easier fiscal policy and tighter monetary policy is bullish for U.S. equities; The Dec. 12 Alabama Senate race could be a game changer in U.S. politics; Trump's anti-immigration policies could boost inflation; Our Catalan view is bearing out. Go long Spain's IBEX 35 / short Eurostoxx 50. Separately, book profits on our China volatility trade and our long China big bank trade. Feature "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" has been our mantra throughout the summer. Despite the doom and gloom in the media surrounding the Mueller investigation, North Korea, Trump's legislative agenda, the French elections, Brexit, and so on, the S&P 500 is up 16% and global equities are up 10.8%. Our April 23 Weekly Report bearing the same cheery title focused on three overstated risks:1 European politics - massively overstated; U.S. politics - all noise, no signal; Brexit - irrelevant for global investors. We have also cautioned investors throughout the year to worry, but not to obsess, about North Korea. Yes, it is a risk.2 Yes, it will continue to buoy safe haven assets on occasion.3 But it is extremely unlikely to produce total war and therefore has lost some market relevance as assets have adjusted to the higher geopolitical volatility on the Korean Peninsula under the Trump regime.4 We are not reiterating these calls just to pat ourselves on the back. Rather, our point is to emphasize that there is nothing supernatural about the ongoing bull market. It has not "ignored" geopolitical risks. Rather, geopolitical risks on hand have not developed in a market-relevant way. The bottom line here is that geopolitics is not voodoo. It is not an "error term," a disturbance in an elegant model that can go awry at any moment because "one cannot forecast politics." Investors can systematically analyze geopolitics just as they do the economy or the markets. When geopolitical risks are overstated, as they have been since the beginning of the year, recognizing the mispricing can generate significant alpha. Going forward, however, geopolitics will likely play a headwind for the market. We are particularly concerned with three dynamics: The upcoming party congress in China may signal a shift towards more growth-stalling reforms, as we have been writing all year. The Trump administration could make a hard turn towards a more populist agenda, particularly on trade, if it fails to enact any legislative successes this year. A plethora of political risks in emerging markets (EM) - with the usual suspects of Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey on top of our list - could re-surface in 2018 if China is not firing on all cylinders. We will be focusing on these three risks to markets until the end of 2017 and beyond. This week, however, we focus on upcoming tax legislation in the U.S. First, a reason to be optimistic ("easier fiscal policy, tighter monetary policy" is a winning policy combination). Then, a reason to be pessimistic (Alabama). Finally, a few words about inflation from a political perspective and a quick word on Catalonia. Easy Fiscal, Tighter Monetary Policy Mix - What Does It Mean? If our base case view on tax legislation is correct, U.S. equities should gain double-digit returns from current levels. Our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy, believes that the passage of stimulative tax legislation would serve as a catalyst to further fuel the blow-off phase in equities. In his latest Weekly Report, Anastasios presents empirical evidence suggesting that easy fiscal policy outweighs the drag from Fed interest rate tightening.5 Filtering the post-World War Two era for periods of easing fiscal and tightening monetary policies during economic expansions is revealing. Anastasios defines easy fiscal policy as periods with a positive fiscal thrust and tight monetary policy as a rising fed funds rate. Fiscal thrust is the year-over-year change in the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance as a percentage of potential GDP (shown inverted on the bottom panel of Chart 1). While such a policy mix is a rare occurrence, it has happened seven times since the mid-1950s (shaded areas, Chart 1).6 All iterations resulted in positive returns, with the SPX rising on average by over 16%. Table 1 details all seven periods that have an average duration of 16 months. For sectoral implications of such an "easier fiscal, tighter monetary" policy mix, we encourage our clients to peruse the work of BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy. On the other hand, the demand for fiscal stimulus usually rises during times of high volatility, unlike today (Chart 2). Investors have become acutely aware of the political difficulties of stimulating the economy late in the economic cycle. We now turn to some emerging risks to our sanguine view on tax policy. Chart 1Easy Fiscal + Tight Money##br## = Buy SPX Table 1SPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Chart 2Fiscal Stimulus Usually##br## Comes With High Volatility Bottom Line: If our base case view holds, and Republicans pass mildly stimulative tax legislation, the blow-off phase in equities should continue. "Alabama, You Got The Weight On Your Shoulders" The market continues to doubt that the Trump administration can pass significant tax legislation over the next six-to-nine months. The gap in the probabilities assigned to such an outcome by the market and ourselves has narrowed over the past two weeks, generating alpha on several of our "Trump Reflation" trades (Chart 3). But skepticism abounds. Chart 3Signs Of Life For 'Trump Reflation' Trades We have spent the entire year pushing against the skepticism, but there is now an actual reason to worry. The December 12 Alabama Senate special election - being held to elect a replacement for former Senator Jeff Sessions, now the U.S. Attorney General - has become a premier league event. Former Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore won the Republican primary against a candidate backed by the Republican establishment and President Trump. The reason the Alabama special election is of global significance is because the Republicans are already down to essentially 50 votes in the Senate. The rhetorical war between President Donald Trump and Senator Bob Corker (R - Tennessee) has reached epic proportions, with the latter insinuating via twitter that the president was an adult baby. Corker has announced his retirement from the Senate, which increases the probability that he will go out by refusing to support the president's agenda across all fronts.7 This now makes two GOP senators that want nothing to do with President Trump's agenda. John McCain (R - Arizona) has harbored ill will since the presidential campaign and has twice played the spoiler in the effort to repeal Obamacare. Further complicating matters is the role of former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, who strongly backed Moore when nobody in the Republican establishment would. If Moore should remain loyal to Bannon beyond the election, it would mean that Trump's former campaign strategist would become the kingmaker on tax legislation. Bannon's departure from the White House was cheered by the markets, as it signaled victory for the "Goldman Sachs clique" and the trio of generals managing President Trump's foreign policy over Bannon's populist "Breitbart clique." We do not think that Bannon is opposed to stimulative tax policy. Yes, he has branded his ideology "economic nationalism," but his media empire, Breitbart, has so far stayed away from attacking the Republican tax plan. Instead, Bannon and Moore could hold out on supporting tax policy until they see movement on other pillars of the populist agenda, namely on immigration policy. As such, Moore's Alabama victory would complicate the horse-trading surrounding tax legislation, and elevate Bannon's standing on Capitol Hill, but it would not be a death knell for stimulus. The actual death knell for tax reform would be if Moore actually lost the December 12 Alabama special election. Moore's views are generally considered to be staunchly conservative, even for Alabama, and therefore a shock defeat cannot be ignored.8 Polls are limited, but most show Moore leading the Democratic candidate Doug Jones by only 5%-8%. This in a state where Republican Senate candidates have defeated their Democrat counterparts by an astounding average of 36% in the last decade! If Jones were to win, Republicans would be down to 51 Senators. Given the staunch opposition to Trump by Corker and McCain, this would effectively end the tax legislation push. Not all is negative for the tax push in Washington. The U.S. House of Representatives has passed a budget resolution that includes steep spending cuts as well as reconciliation instructions for tax legislation. This now sets in motion the reconciliation process by which Republicans can pass tax legislation with merely 51 votes in the Senate. Of the 18 GOP representatives who voted against the budget resolution, only three were from the 31-member Freedom Caucus, which is rhetorically committed to fiscal conservativism. This is very bullish for tax cuts as it means that the Freedom Caucus is toeing the line of its Chair Mark Meadows (R - North Carolina) who has been hinting since the spring that he would have no problem with budget-busting tax cuts. The majority of Republicans who voted against the budget resolution were from highly-taxed "Blue States," suggesting that the real point of contention for Republicans in the House was the proposal to end the state and local tax deduction. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has already signaled that the White House is willing to compromise on this particular revenue offset. Bottom Line: The December 12 Alabama special election now has global market relevance. A defeat for GOP candidate Roy Moore would be a massive game changer. It would reduce the Republican majority in the Senate to 51 votes, putting in danger President Trump's tax agenda given the staunch opposition from Senators Corker and McCain. What Can Politics Do To Inflation? The greatest surprise to the markets this year has been lackluster inflation data in the U.S. Both headline and core data have been disappointing (Chart 4). This is particularly puzzling as the U.S. has closed its output gap and unemployment has fallen below the low reached in 2007 (Chart 5). Chart 4U.S. Inflation Has Disappointed... Chart 5...Which Is Puzzling At Full Employment One possible explanation is that the U.S. has been importing deflation from abroad. The U.S. imports around 12.5% of GDP worth of goods and 2.8% of GDP worth of services (Chart 6). However, the import price deflator has been growing at 2.7% so far this year and yet inflation has been nonexistent (Chart 6, bottom panel). Export prices have grown by 5% in 2017, from the lows of -15% amidst the commodity bust in 2015 (Chart 7). Chart 6The U.S. Is Not Importing Deflation Chart 7Global Export Prices Are Rising Another explanation is that structural changes in the labor market - globalization and the fall in the unionization rate - have eroded the bargaining power of workers (Chart 8). When combined with the shock of the 2008 Great Recession, workers may simply be happy to have a job and are therefore delaying asking of a raise or switching to a higher-paying, but higher-risk, job. As a result, the economy may have closed its output gap, but with no inflationary effects coming from the low unemployment figures. Chart 8Globalization Suppressed U.S. Wages Further restricting wage gains may be the high number of migrants - legal or illegal (Chart 9). The foreign born population in the U.S. is at an all-time high of 43.2 million, although unauthorized migration has come down from around 12 million prior to the GFC to 11.3 million in 2016. The conventional wisdom is that most immigrants are uneducated, competing with blue collar laborers and suppressing wages at the lower income levels. However, this is a stereotype stuck in the 1980s. Today's migrants are as educated as Americans: 29.7% have a Bachelor's degree or higher, compared with just over 30% Americans in general (Chart 10). Chart 9Immigration Helps Explain Weak Wage Growth Chart 10Immigrants Not Stealing Low-Skill Jobs The point is that immigration has evolved along with the U.S. economy. With 78% of the U.S. economy based in services, the modern migrant has had to keep up with the educational requirements of the American job market. The Trump administration could be a game-changer for the skilled, legal immigration into the U.S. First, President Trump ordered a full review of the high-skilled, H-1B immigration visa in April. Second, President Trump asked Congress in August to curb legal migration by sharply curtailing family reunification while keeping immigration based on job skills roughly the same. Third, anti-immigrant rhetoric - as well as restrictions to family reunification down the line - could influence highly-skilled migrants to choose job opportunities in countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, instead of in the U.S. Bottom Line: Investors often think of fiscal policy as the main vehicle through which politicians can influence inflation. However, the U.S. economy has been enjoying, since the 1980s, the combined effect of rapidly expanding immigration and a parallel increase in the educational attainment of incoming migrants. In a way, the influx of skilled migrants has been an important supply side reform for the U.S. economy. The Trump administration could influence immigration either directly, through policies to curb it, or indirectly, through creating a general atmosphere that redirects some of the flows to other developed economies. Spain: Fade Catalan Risks As we have expected since 2014, the prospects for Catalan independence remain slim.9 As we go to press, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont has backed away from his earlier hints toward a unilateral declaration of independence. Instead, he has succumbed to domestic and international pressure and told the regional parliament that he has "suspended" any declaration in order to begin negotiations with Madrid. Puigdemont's decision to suspend something that has not happened is not only illogical but also ineffectual. The Catalan pro-independence government is trying to force Madrid to be the "bad guy" and refuse negotiations; Spain has refused any discussion of independence. But slight narrative shifts and "gotcha" politics will not work in this case. While Puigdemont is playing checkers with Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, the rest of Europe is playing chess. International recognition of Catalan independence is not forthcoming. And without it, Catalonia will not become independent. As we have extensively written, we strongly believe that investors should fade secessionism risk in Spain. First, the independence process in Catalonia falls far short of the democratic ideals established in similar referendums in the developed world, particularly in Scotland (2014), Montenegro (2006), and Quebec (1980 and 1995) (Table 2). The pro-independence government has been unable to significantly boost turnout figures from 2014, no doubt due to interference by the federal authorities. However, even if the pro-independence Catalans were to receive mediation from the EU, the outcome would likely be to strengthen Madrid's hand. For example, when the EU negotiated the 2006 divorce between Serbia and Montenegro, it required a supermajority of 55% in order to recognize the result of the Montenegro independence referendum. As an integrationist project, the EU has an anti-secession bias. Table 2Catalan Independence Demand Exaggerated By Low Voter Turnout Second, the French government has come out forcefully against Catalan independence, as we suspected it would. This is particularly important for Catalonia as it is nestled between Spain and France.10 It is quite likely that, were Catalans somehow to enforce their independence, both European powers would close their borders to Catalan travel and trade. In addition, French European Affairs Minister Nathalie Louiseau has repeated Madrid's assertion that by choosing independence Catalonia would automatically be kicked out of the EU. Third, Madrid is unlikely to make another mistake as the disastrous attempt to disrupt the independence referendum. Images of civilians being dragged through the streets of an advanced European economy while attempting to vote - even if the referendum was constitutionally illegal - shocked the world. Spanish officials have already offered rather tepid apologies for the police action, suggesting that a re-run of the heavy-handed actions is not to be expected. For investors who disagree with us, we suggest an empirical way to test our thesis. Chart 11 shows that only 34.7% of Catalans support independence. These are not pro-Madrid polls. They are the product of the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, which is affiliated with the Catalan (currently staunchly pro-independence) government and has been conducting polls on the issue of independence since 2005. Even if the level of support for independence is off in this data, the direction gives us valuable insight into the support for secession. The data clearly suggests that (A) the majority of Catalans have never supported independence and that (B) support for independence peaked in 2013, at the height of Spain's economic crisis, and has been in steady decline since then. That said, Chart 11 also shows that the other 57.5% of Catalans are not necessarily "pro-Spain." In fact, 30.5% support Catalonia remaining in its current form of an autonomous region, with considerable sovereignty devolved to the province. Another 21.7% favor a federal state, which would be a step in the direction of even greater sovereignty. Investors should watch the polls to see whether voters who previously favored federal or autonomous status have begun to shift towards independence, especially in light of the crackdown against the referendum by Madrid. Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió normally releases its third series of polls in October, which would mean that investors will have an update from the official polling agency soon. That said, we are willing to put our geopolitical views on the line. An unwarranted selloff in Spanish equities on the back of increased Catalonia-related geopolitical risk has created an opportunity for a market neutral trade: long Spanish IBEX 35/short Eurostoxx 50. This is a market neutral way to express our view that Catalonia does not pose a grand geopolitical risk as it will remain an integral part of Spain and thus the EU. Importantly, adding a hedge to this pair trade would also make sense for certain investors. Chart 12 shows that EUR/USD and relative Spanish equity performance are joined at the hip. Currently an uncharacteristically wide gap has opened. Thus, putting on this equity pair trade and simultaneously going short EUR/USD on the expectation of a convergence, should generate alpha, as the geopolitical dust settles. Chart 11The Silent Majority Fears Independence Chart 12Expect A Convergence Bottom Line: Fade geopolitical risks in Spain. For those with risk appetite, buy Spanish equities at any sign of geopolitical risk premium. Housekeeping With the Communist Party convening for the nineteenth National Party Congress over the next week, we think the time is opportune to book profits on two trades: our long China ETF volatility index, for a gain of 17.72%, and our long Chinese Big Five state-owned banks versus small and medium-sized banks, for a gain of 11.63%. We will revisit these trades in an upcoming report. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day," dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?" dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?" dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Omitted from the sample are brief periods in the early-1960s, early-1970s, and twice in the early-1980s as they were very close to the end of recessions. 7 We suspect that Senator Corker is planning a centrist challenge to President Trump in the 2020 GOP presidential primaries. 8 "Staunchly conservative" does not do justice to Moore's ideological orientation. He was removed from his position as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court twice for failing to follow federal law. In both cases, Moore chose to inform his actions as the Chief Justice through Biblical scripture, rather than the U.S. Constitution. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Secession In Europe: Scotland And Catalonia," dated May 14, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Yes, we are aware that Catalonia also borders Andorra. However, given that French President Emmanuel Macro is the co-prince of Andorra, and that Andorra is a microstate, this fact is largely irrelevant and would in no way aid Catalan independence. However, you have now learned that the French President is automatically a co-prince of another country. And that there is such a thing as a "co-prince." Therefore, this footnote has not been a complete waste of your time.

Special Report

Highlights China's growth momentum is unlikely to continue to accelerate, but the downside risk is low. Some more recent developments suggest economic momentum remains fairly robust. The heated debate on a "soft or hard landing" in recent years has disproportionally diverted investors' attention to China's cyclical growth fluctuations, while some larger picture changes have gone unnoticed. The Chinese economy will undoubtedly continue to experience cyclical swings; it is equally important to keep in mind some mega trends that hold the potential to reshape the world in profound ways. Feature The Chinese economy has likely ended the third quarter on a slightly higher note, according to "nowcast" types of models using high-frequency data (Chart 1). The latest PMI surveys, focusing on both the manufacturing and service sectors, accelerated in September from the prior month, and remain comfortably in expansionary territory, heralding positive surprises in the macro numbers to be released in the coming weeks. China's mini-cycle acceleration since early last year has been fairly modest by historical standards, but it has been a key component driving synchronized improvement in global growth. Moreover, the resilience of the Chinese economy has led to a quick repricing of risk assets that were deeply depressed in previous years due to China "hard landing" concerns. Stock prices of both Chinese investable equities and the emerging market benchmark have rallied massively since the 2016 bottom. Total returns of Chinese equities and EM stocks, price appreciation and dividend payments combined, have both broken out to all-time highs (Chart 2). Chart 1Chinese Q3 GDP Should Have Remained Strong Chart 2Breakout In China And EM Equities Looking forward, Chinese growth momentum is unlikely to continue to accelerate, but the downside risk remains low in the near term, as we have argued in recent months. In fact, some more recent developments suggest economic momentum remains fairly robust. More importantly, the heated debates among investors and analysts in recent years on China's macro stability have disguised some dramatic changes in the Chinese economy, which will have a profound and long-lasting impact on the global economy and financial markets from a big-picture standpoint. Given China's rising economic significance, getting China right will become all the more important for investors going forward. Near-Term Growth Outlook Remains Solid The Chinese economy will likely continue to surprise to the upside in the coming months. First, there is little risk of aggressive policy tightening that would prematurely choke off the economy, as economic growth is within the government's target, consumer price inflation is exceedingly low and financial excesses have been reined in.1 The latest decision of the People's Bank of China (PBoC) to lower reserve requirement ratios (RRR) for banks offering loans to small-sized enterprises should not be confused as a broad attempt to boost credit and growth. The move certainly reflects the authorities' preference for offering credit to smaller private borrowers, but it also reflects the PBoC's continued fine-tuning of its liquidity management.2 The PBoC has significantly ramped up direct lending to banks since 2015 to offset the liquidity drainage from capital outflows from the country's financial sector - the pace of PBoC direct lending has slowed since early this year (Chart 3, top panel). This means that the central bank will need to resort to other tools to manage interbank liquidity should stress increase - releasing required reserves being one of them. Taken together, the PBoC's liquidity injection has almost precisely matched the liquidity withdrawal due to capital outflows, as can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 3. The key point here is that the PBoC's latest decision is not to encourage a lending spree, but it certainly does not indicate intentions of aggressive tightening. Second, some view China's lukewarm industrial activity as a sign of weak growth momentum, and argue for a pending relapse. In fact, some sectors have been under strict government scrutiny to cut capacity and production in recent years - a key reason behind the exceptional weakness in these industries despite massive improvement in their sales, pricing power and profits. In other words, these sectors have not been responding to market signals due to government restrictions of "supply side reforms" to cut excess capacity and reduce pollution. For example, some sectors that are subject to "supply side" constraints such as coal, base metals and cement producers have chronically underperformed in recent years, and have also hurt the overall performance of the industrial sector (Chart 4). Similarly, capital spending in the mining sector, historically highly sensitive to moves in global metals prices, have continued to contract, despite the sharp increase in metals prices since 2016. Without these regulations, the performance of the industrial sector should have been a lot stronger. In addition, without aggressive expansion in the "good times," the odds of another major relapse in these highly cyclical industries when the "bad times" do come are also lower. Chart 3The PBoC Liquidity Operation Chart 4Policy Constraints Weigh Heavy On Some Sectors Third, the Chinese authorities' tightening measures on the real estate sector pose a growth risk, and should continue to be monitored; the impact is unlikely to be significant, as discussed in detail in last week's report.3 Developers have also been subject to "supply side" constraints and have not increased construction in this cycle, despite rising home prices, increasing transactions and booming profits (Chart 5). Tighter policies imposed by local governments will probably keep developers in dormancy, but a major downturn is highly unlikely, simply because there is not much excess to begin with. Finally, while China has been a key component of the synchronized global growth improvement, the country has also benefited from a pickup in global demand.4 Korean exports, a harbinger of global trade, jumped by a whopping 35% in dollar terms in September versus a year ago. It is certainly unrealistic to expect such strong momentum to last, but the benign global demand situation is unlikely to immediately falter without some sort of extreme external shock. Similarly, our model expects Chinese export growth to moderate, but there are no signs of a sharp contraction anytime soon (Chart 6). Chart 5Real Estate Investment May Surprise To The Upside Chart 6Exports: Moderating, Not Relapsing Bottom Line: China's near-term growth outlook will remain resilient, providing a supportive macro backdrop for global risk assets. The China Debate: Seven Years On Ever since the Chinese economy recovered from the aftermath of the global financial crisis, with the help of a massive government stimulus package, investors' opinions on China's macro situation have been deeply divided.5 To be sure, sensational predictions of an imminent China collapse have always existed, ever since the country's economic reform, but they were mostly rooted in ideological bashing and were largely ignored by global investors. In recent years, however, predictions of a Chinese "hard landing" have been taken much more seriously by the mainstream media, as well as investors and policymakers. Amid mounting doubts about its long term sustainability, the Chinese economy has experienced some remarkable achievements and dramatic changes in the past several years. The Chinese economy continues to gain global significance, accounting for 16% of global economic output currently versus 9% in 2010. More importantly, its contribution to global economic growth is far larger, given its faster growth rate (Chart 7). China's nominal GDP currently stands at about US$11.5 trillion, a distant second to the mighty US$19.2 trillion U.S. economy. However, 7% of nominal growth in China feasibly amounts to an increase of US$800 billion in gross output, compared with US$770 billion for the U.S., assuming the latter is to grow by 4% in nominal terms. Although China's growth rate has downshifted since the global financial crisis, the increase in the country's total output in value terms has become even greater, given the economy's much larger size. China remains the dominant factor in driving global commodities demand, especially base metals. China's base metals consumption accounts for over 50% of the global total, higher than the rest of the world combined (Chart 8). More importantly, China's base metal consumption has continued to climb in recent years, while demand from the rest of the world has stagnated. In recent years, "sluggish" Chinese metals consumption has been blamed for commodities woes by some analysts; in reality, the country has been the only source of demand increase for base metals. China's role in driving the supply/demand balance of raw materials has increased significantly since the global financial crisis. Chart 7China's Growing Significance In World Economy Chart 8China And Base Metals The country's heavy investment on infrastructure has massively changed its urban landscape, leading to a significant improvement in the country's transportation system, with massive expansion in high-speed railway, urban metro and light-rail system, and further extensions of the highway network (Chart 9). This has significantly narrowed the country's infrastructure gap with more advanced countries, facilitating both international trade and domestic demand (Chart 10). Chinese car sales have jumped from about 10 million per year in 2010 to 25 million currently, by far the largest car market in the world. Without improvement in logistical infrastructure, there is little doubt the country's growth trajectory would have faced severe bottlenecks. Chart 9Massive Expansion Of ##br##Transportation Infrastructure... Chart 10...Has Narrowed The Gap ##br##With Developed Economies Finally, the impact of Chinese consumers has become all the more visible on the global stage. Even though China still ranks as a middle-income country with a per-capita GDP of about US$8000, a fraction of the US$57,000 in the U.S., the sheer size of the Chinese population, the rapid increase in household income and the country's very high savings rate have fundamentally shifted the wealth distribution of the global population. Currently, only about 20% of the world population has a per-capita GDP higher than China, a rapid change within a short period of time (Chart 11). This dramatic shift has profoundly redefined the global economic landscape, affecting the spectrum of essentially all businesses, from manufacturers' cost structures to luxury goods markets to tourism and education to financial services. Chart 11China's Rising Income In Perspective The list can easily be extended, but the point here is that the heated debate on a "soft or hard landing" in recent years has disproportionally diverted investors' attention to China's cyclical growth fluctuations, while some larger picture changes have gone unnoticed. Of course, financial markets are an emotional discounting mechanism, and stock prices always exaggerate any subtle changes in growth fundamentals, which can in turn impact economic reality through a complex web of reflexivity relationships. Chinese equities lagged significantly behind developed markets, particularly the U.S. bourses, between 2011 and 2015, which apparently validated the bears' views. In reality, however, multiples of Chinese equities, and emerging market in general, were deeply compressed compared with their developed market peers (Chart 12). In other words, it is largely multiples compression associated with heightened risk aversion and greater risk premium that was behind the woes of Chinese and EM markets before 2015. Since 2016, China's mini-cycle upturn has progressively raised investors' risk appetite towards China and EM, lifting their multiples and prices - essentially a positive re-rating of these markets. Chart 12Positive Rerating Of China ##br##And EM Has Further To Run The debate on China's growth sustainability will likely remain firmly in place in the coming years, which will continue to create cross-currents and outsized volatility. As an investor, it is futile to argue with "Mr. Market." Even with strong convictions on the fundamental case, investors should be nimble and avoid standing in front of an oncoming train - however ill-informed the market consensus could be. For now, Chinese and EM equities are still much more attractively valued compared with the developed world, and the train of the positive re-rating of these bourses will likely have further to run. It is too soon to bet on a trend reversal. Whither China: The Big Picture Fundamentally the China debate boils down to the country's growth model, which invests a much greater share of its output than most other major economies. The "bears" conclude this amounts to capital misallocation and propose a "rebalancing" towards consumption. Some even claim China's massive savings, essential for financing domestic capital spending, are byproducts of banks' "out of thin air" money printing - to me, if "thin air" money was indeed such a magical silver bullet, the world would have solved its poverty problems a long time ago. Over the years I have argued firmly against these assertions. In economics, it is well known that a country's income level is fundamentally determined by its productivity, which is in turn determined by the level and sophistication of its capital stock. Chart 13 shows a clear positive correlation between a country's per capita output, a measure of productivity, and its per capita capital stock. In general, industrialized countries enjoy much higher levels of per capita capital stock than developing economies, leading to much higher productivity, income as well as living standards. Therefore, the industrialization process, by definition, is the process of accumulation of capital stock through investment, which has been proven by many economies that have successfully industrialized. China's growth path in the past several decades is simply repeating these success stories. As shown in Chart 14, despite some remarkable achievements, the productivity level of the average Chinese worker is still just a fraction of the level in more advanced countries. If China remains on the path of accumulation of capital stock through savings and investment, the country will continue to progress on the productivity and income ladder. If, however, it abandons its current growth model and "rebalances" towards a consumption-driven one, odds are much higher that the country will stagnate and fail to advance beyond the "middle income trap." Chart 13Productivity Is Positively ##br##Correlated With Capital Stock Chart 14China's Catchup Process ##br##Has A Lot Further To Run In my 15 years of covering China for BCA, the country has dramatically shifted beyond recognition - the pace of changes are still accelerating. Looking forward, the Chinese economy will undoubtedly continue to experience cyclical swings; it is equally important to keep in mind some mega trends that hold the potential to reshape the world in profound ways. The following are a few worth highlighting. Chart 15China's Tech Boom The first mega trend is the explosive growth of the Chinese technology sector, which will increasingly challenge players in more advanced economies. The tech boom is reflected in the dramatic expansion of e-commerce and mobile payments, spectacular price gains in the BAT giants (Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent) and surging patent applications among the corporate sector (Chart 15). With a massive and homogenous domestic market and increasingly affluent consumers, China has rapidly become the testing ground of all new high-tech sectors - from big data and artificial intelligence to industrial robotics and additive manufacturing, to genetic analysis and quantum computing - with numerous startups and venture capitalists as well as government support on basic research and development. This is bound to create exciting investment opportunities with winners and losers far beyond Chinese borders. The second major development is the "Belt & Road Initiative" (BRI), also known as "One Belt One Road," or OBOR, that links China with some less developed nations. The project, initially proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 but met with heavy doubts, has been quietly gaining momentum. Some commentators have viewed the BRI as an attempt by the Chinese authorities to export excess domestic industrial capacity and have tried to quantify the impact, which is shortsighted and likely useless. China's vision of the BRI is an ambitious open-ended geo-strategic, economic and social undertaking to promote globalization with distinct "Chinese characteristics." There is no doubt that BRI will face tremendous challenges, and its ultimate destiny is simply an "unknowable unknown" at the moment. However, some solid progress has been made, and foreign authorities are increasingly taking the BRI seriously. Even with limited success, the BRI holds the promise of redefining the balance of geopolitics, global trade and international finance. The role of the RMB in international finance will inevitably grow at the expense of other majors, particularly the dollar. Investors will be well served to closely follow this mega development. Finally, how China's governance and political system will evolve remains a major question mark for investors, especially from a long-term perspective. Democracy has increasingly become the norm of world politics since the early 1990s, with over half of the global population currently living in democratic regimes, while China's political system is decisively foreign (Chart 16). Investors are ideologically skeptical on the long-term sustainability of China's essentially meritocratic authoritarian regime. Investors mostly see democracy as China's ultimate future, and expect the country to progressively move in this direction, along with rising economic prosperity. In reality, however, the ruling Communist Party has tightened its grip over the country in recent years, apparently reverting the trend of political liberalization that was underway in previous years. Chart 16Is Democracy China's Future? In essence, China, with over 20% of the world population, is conducting a mega-political experiment by searching for an alternative to open democracy, the prospect of which remains unknown. The majority of the Chinese population have been content with the existing system, and have been adapting to drastic social and economic changes with ease in the past several decades. Numerous previous predictions of an imminent collapse of the Chinese regime have repeatedly proven wrong, but the underlying anxiety will remain, especially when China's economic growth further downshifts. Political and social stability is crucial for the country's continued economic development. A major social upheaval, on the other hand, would have devastating consequences, not only for China but also for the entire world. Stay tuned. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Chinese Financial Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength," dated June 22, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Chinese Real Estate: Which Way Will The Wind Blow?" dated April 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Outlook: A Mid-Year Revisit," dated July 13, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The China Debate," dated April 14, 2010, and China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The China Debate: Four Years On," dated April 30, 2014, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Expect Spain's strong growth to fade somewhat as its credit impulse appears to have peaked. The Catalan independence debate is an inconvenience but not a long term tail-risk. Expect Italy's growth to pick up as the Italian banking system is repaired. Brave investors could go long Italian bonds versus Spanish bonds now. More cautious investors might wait until after the Italian election in the first half of next year. France's CAC40 is our preferred mainstream euro area equity market right now. Feature Recent history teaches us that to leave the European Union is inconvenient, but to leave the euro is disastrous. To leave the EU means redefining laws, institutions and trading relationships, but to leave the euro means redenominating the entire banking system's assets and liabilities into different currencies - leading to bank runs and chaotic insolvencies. For this reason, even tiny Greece chose to suffer an extended depression rather than to leave the euro. Chart of the WeekSpain Fixed Its Banks In 2013, Italy Is Fixing Its Banks Now Leaving The EU Is Inconvenient, Leaving The Euro Is Disastrous To leave the EU, there is a broadly defined process but the process is inconvenient and protracted, as the United Kingdom is now discovering. The U.K. will technically leave the EU on March 31 2019, but Prime Minister May has proposed a further transition period of "around two years." Therefore the U.K. will remain in the European single market and customs union - and fully subject to EU laws and regulations - until at least 2021, five years after the U.K. voted to leave the EU. This protraction of the exit process creates a tasty irony. Not long after the U.K. fully leaves in 2021, the Leave vote's 1.25 million majority will have disappeared - counting those who voted in 2016 who are still alive. This is because out of the 0.625 million deaths in the U.K. in each of the coming years, there is a very heavy skew to Leave's much older voters1 (Chart I-2). As the U.K is not in the euro there is no secondary issue of whether to leave the single currency. But this does raise an interesting hypothetical question. If a euro area country - or region like Catalonia - inconveniently left or was ejected from the EU, does it follow that it must also crash out of the euro? No. Several non-EU countries already use the euro. There are the European microstates of Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City. More significantly, Montenegro and Kosovo have adopted the euro as their de facto currency. To be clear, we do not expect Catalonia to secede. Polls consistently show a significant majority in Catalonia do not want full independence (Chart I-3). The unionists mostly boycotted the independence referendum because Madrid deemed it illegal. Given the low turnout, the 89% vote for independence equalled just 37% of eligible voters. Chart I-2The Vote For Brexit Was ##br##Driven By Older Voters Chart I-3A Significant Minority In Catalonia##br## Do Not Want Full Independence But even if Catalonia did become independent, this hypothetical eventuality would not involve a catastrophic exit from the euro. Catalonia, in its economic interest, would want to keep the euro, and the EU would let it. The Spain/Italy Conundrum The much bigger threat would be if a major euro area country felt that the single currency was not in its economic interest, and decided to jettison the euro. In this regard, the problem - at first sight - appears to be Italy. Through the 19 years of the euro, Italy's real GDP per head has grown by just 6%, substantially less than any other major economy. If the single currency is to blame for the significant underperformance of its third largest economy with 60 million people, then the euro's long-term viability has to be in question. But it is hard to blame the euro per se for Italy's painful underperformance. For the first half of the euro's life, 1999-2007, Italian real GDP per head performed more or less in line with the United States, Canada and France (Chart I-4) - even without a substantial tailwind from a credit-fuelled boom which the other economies had. Then, in the post-2007 years, there was little to distinguish the economic performances of Italy and Spain until 2013 (Chart I-5). At which point, Spain took off, with real GDP per head subsequently expanding by 15%. Whereas Italy struggled to grow. The conundrum is: what explains this stark recent difference between Spain and Italy? Chart I-4Through 1999-2007, Italy Grew In Line ##br##With Other Major Economies Chart I-5Post-Crisis, There Was Little To Distinguish##br## Italy and Spain Until 2013 The start of Italy's underperformance in 2008 and the start of Spain's strong recovery in 2013 provide the solution to the conundrum. Following the global financial crisis in 2008, Italy has still to repair its banking system. Whereas Spain fixed its banks in 2013. Significantly, Spain ring-fenced bad assets within a bad bank while recapitalising good banks. In effect, it finally did what other economies - most notably the U.S., U.K. and Ireland - had done several years earlier in response to their own housing-related banking crises. Therefore in 2013, Spanish banks' aggressive deleveraging ended. The result was that Spain's credit impulse - which measures the change in bank credit flows - rebounded very sharply and has remained positive for four years. This explains Spain's remarkably strong recovery (Chart I-6). In contrast, Italy's still dysfunctional banking system means that its own credit impulse has been much more muted and barely positive over the past four years (Chart I-7). Begging the question: why has Italy been so slow to fix its dysfunctional banking system? One reason is that Italy's banking malaise has built up stealthily, generating frequent financial tremors but without an outright crisis. In contrast, the credit booms in the U.S., U.K., Ireland and Spain did eventually cause housing busts and full-blown banking crises, requiring urgent policymaker response. A second reason is that the Italian government is more highly indebted than other governments, making it more difficult to raise public funds to fix the banking system. The good news is that the Italian government, the EU and the ECB are now on the same page and finally progressing to repair the banking system. Italian banks' equity capital is rising (Chart I-8), their solvency is improving, and the share of non-performing loans has fallen sharply this year (Chart of the Week). Chart I-6Spain's Credit Impulse Rebounded Sharply Chart I-7Italy's Credit Impulse Has Been More Muted Chart I-8Italian Banks Are Raising Equity Capital Moreover, the recent smooth winding down of the failing Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Bank showed that the EU's new rules for resolving failing banks is working. Admittedly, the rules mean that institutional investors could still suffer losses. But a pragmatic solution will permit public funds to protect 'widows and orphans' retail investors. Some Investment Thoughts As the Italian banking system is repaired, there will be a pickup in Italy's growth just as there was in Spain. However, the strong tailwind to Spain's growth that started in 2013 is now fading given that Spain's credit impulse has peaked. This suggests that the yield spread between Italian BTPs and Spanish Bonos - which measures the extra risk premium in Italy - is at a cyclical peak from which it is likely to compress (Chart I-9). Brave investors could go long Italian bonds versus Spanish bonds now. More cautious investors might wait until after the Italian election in the first half of next year. On the face of it, a fading risk of euro breakup should also boost euro area equity relative performance. The trouble is that the relative performance of the broad Eurostoxx50 index is entirely at the mercy of its major sector skews - specifically, a huge underweighting to Technology and an overweighting to Banks (Chart I-10). The way around this dilemma - to like euro area equities but to dislike the overall sector skew - is to steer towards mainstream indexes which have less of a distorting skew. On this basis, the mainstream euro area equity market we would pick right now is France's CAC40 (Chart I-11). Chart I-9The Yield Spread Between Italian And ##br##Spanish Bonds Is At A Cyclical Peak Chart I-10Eurostoxx50 Relative Performance Is ##br##At The Mercy Of Its Sector Skews Chart I-11Prefer the CAC40 To##br## The Eurostoxx50 Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 In the U.K. around 625,000 people die every year and the vast majority of these are aged over 65. But in this older age cohort, 64% voted Leave (source: YouGov). So we can infer that of the 625,000 deaths, about 400,000 voted Leave and 225,000 voted Remain, eroding the Leave majority who are still alive by 175,000 every year. Fractal Trading Model This week, we note that the Canadian 10-year government bond is oversold and due a trend reversal. We prefer to express this as a new relative trade: long Canadian 10-year bond / short 10-year German bund with a profit target / stop-loss of 1% and double position size. In other trades, long USD/CAD hit its 2.5% profit target - the second success in this specific trade in the last three months. We now have three open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Catalonia is a red herring - stay focused on U.S. tax cuts; Tax cuts are on track and will swell the budget deficit; The dollar is poised for a comeback; Believe the Phillips Curve, not the "Amazon effect"; Shinzo Abe's gamble is bullish; go long USD/JPY. Feature Global investors woke up on Monday to shocking news of a mass shooting in Las Vegas and police brutality in Catalonia, where Spain's federal law enforcement attempted to break up the October 1 independence referendum. According to final figures, nearly 92% of those who voted chose to separate from Spain, setting the stage for a unilateral declaration of independence. Our views on the Catalan independence "struggle" are well known to our clients.1 We will only briefly recap them here. Instead, we focus this Weekly Report on the prospects for the U.S. dollar and on Japan's snap election. Catalan Independence: Indignation Is Not A Strategy Why are we so dismissive of the imbroglio in Catalonia? Five reasons: Police "brutality" is overstated: Catalan officials reported that 844 people had been hurt in clashes, but the BBC noted that the "majority had minor injuries or had suffered from anxiety attacks."2 Not the first referendum: The turnout was only 42.34%, as many voters refused to participate. Given that the latest polls show that only 34.7% of Catalans actually want independence, the result was unsurprising (Chart 1).3 Those who oppose independence from Spain stayed home, as they did in 2014. In fact, Table 1 shows that there were about 100,000 less "yes" voters in 2017 than three years ago. Catalonia is not Catalan: According to the latest data from the Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya, only 31% of the population identifies Catalan as their "first language," compared with 55% who identify with Spanish. This is a product of decades of migration from within Spain which has diluted Catalonia's homogeneity. For the most part, the non-Catalans belong to the working class and do not get involved in independence protests or in breathlessly tweeting about the return of dictatorship to Madrid. But if they sense that independence is being imposed on them by an elitist minority, they could let their voice be heard. A declaration of independence means nothing: A unilateral declaration without international support, or the ability to enforce it with arms, is vacuous. U.S. President Donald Trump lent his support to Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy ahead of the vote, while French President Emmanuel Macron reiterated his support for Madrid following the referendum violence. The EU has made it clear that an independent Catalonia would have to go through the accession process in order to enter the EU, which means it would not have access to the Common Market post-independence. Catalans will not resort to force en masse: Our expectation is that Catalans will not resort to force in order to breakaway from Spain. German sociologist Max Weber famously defined sovereignty as a "monopoly over the use of legitimate force" in a defined geographical territory. If a Catalan minority is unwilling to wrestle control of borders from Spain, its declarations will be irrelevant. Chart 1Catalonia: A Revolt By The Minority Table 1What Has Changed Since 2014? There is more to the referendum than the government in Catalonia is letting on. The Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes) coalition of four parties is unified only by its stance on independence. But the main two nationalist parties that make up the government are on the opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. Without the independence push, the regional government would lose its raison d'être and fall. From the market perspective, the situation in Catalonia would become relevant if the Catalan government, or militant groups in the region, decided to step up tensions by employing force. This could derail Spain's economic recovery, especially since so much of it was centered on manufacturing in the region. We do not see this as likely. First, there are no "militant groups" in Catalonia. Second, throughout the half-century long Basque conflict - which saw over thousand people killed between 1959 and 2011 - Catalonia never experienced violent unrest. Catalan extremists never got inspired by the militant Basque group ETA on any significant scale. Why? Because the independence movement in Catalonia is mainly a bourgeois, middle and upper class, "struggle" for independence that is unlikely to descend into violence. Yes, there are some farmers and blue-collar supporters of independence. But the majority of Catalonia's working class are actually not Catalan. They are either recent migrants from the rest of Europe or migrants from poorer regions of Spain. Not only are they opposed to independence, but they are openly hostile to a bourgeois minority lording their Catalan ethnic superiority over the recently arrived migrants. With Catalan tensions, the ongoing North Korean saga, and the recent tragedy in Las Vegas, there is plenty to distract investors from the most investment-relevant political issue: U.S. tax policy. Bottom Line: As we noted in February, European assets will continue to "climb the wall of worry," which includes Catalan tensions.4 Investors should fade any market reaction to the crisis in Catalonia, which is sure to dominate the news flow for at least the entirety of Q4 2017. Do Republican Voters Want Tax Cuts? The market was shocked at the end of September by President Donald Trump's tax reform plan. After months of doubting whether Republican policymakers can accomplish anything, the market reacted positively to the announcement (Chart 2). And yet a lot of skepticism remains. Primarily, the fear is that fiscally conservative Republicans in the House and Senate will stand in opposition to the plan. After all, Republicans have just failed to repeal and replace Obamacare. Why should tax policy be any different? Chart 2Sign Of Life For 'Trump Reflation' We have argued since November that Republicans in Congress are actually not fiscally responsible.5 Not now and not ever. As if on cue, this spring, the leader of the Tea Party-linked Freedom Caucus, Mark Meadows (R, NC) said that the upcoming tax reform effort did not have to be "revenue-neutral," a claim he repeated on NBC's Meet The Press this weekend. If the leader of the single-most fiscally conservative grouping in Congress is okay with profligacy, who is left to oppose it?!6 Republican voters might have something to say about deficit-busting tax legislation. But GOP legislators are not the only ones willing to compromise on their austerity rhetoric. Republican voters are just as comfortable with profligacy. Chart 3 speaks volumes. It shows that Americans become a lot more comfortable with a bigger government providing more services when Republican presidents are in power. Given Democrats' stable preference for more spending, the movement in the poll is mainly due to Republican and independent voters. There are two ways to interpret the data: Republican voters do not mind a profligate government, as long as the spending is aligned with their priorities. Republican voters do not actually disagree with Democrats on spending priorities, but merely doubt that Democratic policymakers can deliver on those priorities in a fiscally sustainable manner. Whatever the explanation, Chart 3 is clear evidence that the American public grows more comfortable with profligacy when Republicans are in charge. But do voters want tax cuts? The latest polls show that Americans no longer think that they pay too much in taxes (Chart 4). Republican and Republican-leaning voters do not have a problem with how much they pay in taxes, but they do have a problem with the complexity of the tax code (Chart 5). Chart 4American Voters Think Taxes Are Fair... Chart 5...But Republican Voters Think They Are Too Complex The charge that the Trump tax legislation will be a massive tax cut for the wealthy and corporations could stick with some voters, we think primarily with Democrats. Pew research polling consistently shows that Democrats, across the income brackets, agree by 70%-80% that corporations and wealthy people pay too little tax. Republican voters could be susceptible to the same argument, given that around 35%-45% of them agree with Democrats on this issue. To preempt the debate, the Trump administration is focusing heavily on tax complexity. In addition, Trump left the proposed surcharge on the wealthy - a fourth income bracket in the new plan - as yet undefined. This is on purpose. It allows the White House and Congressional GOP legislators to respond to the criticism as it develops. What could be the stumbling blocks going forward? A "Breitbart clique" revolt: A populist revolt against tax cuts for the rich could turn skittish Republicans in Congress against the legislation. The recent electoral defeat for the political establishment in the Alabama Senate primary has shown off the power of the "Breitbart clique" in itself, independent of Trump. However, a quick survey of Breitbart.com shows that the former White House Chief Strategist and Rabble-Rouser-in-Chief Steve Bannon has not unleashed his media machine against the tax plan. In fact, the only prominent Breitbart piece on the tax plan thus far has excoriated the mainstream media for misinterpreting the comments of Gary Cohn, the White House's chief economic adviser, on middle class tax cuts.7 It may be the first time that the website has ever written anything positive about Cohn. Blue State Republicans: There are 29 Republican representatives facing tough reelection campaigns next year who are based in states that voted for Secretary Hillary Clinton in 2016. These Republican representatives will staunchly oppose any proposal to end the state and local tax deduction, given that their voters will be subjected to higher rates of state and local taxes.8 These "Blue State Republicans" could scuttle the current tax blueprint in the House. Anticipating the problem, Gary Cohn has said that the removal of the deduction is not a "red line" for the administration. Senators: Republicans have only a slim margin for error in the Senate. Senators Bob Corker (R, TN) and John McCain (R, AZ) could be the two staunchest opponents to the tax reform effort. The former is a deficit hawk and critic of the president, the latter is a maverick and firmly opposed to the president. On the other hand, the usual thorn in the side of the GOP establishment, Rand Paul (R, KY), could be brought around to support the proposal. Moderates like Susan Collins (R, ME) and Lisa Murkowski (R, AK) should be watched carefully. Investors should expect more Republicans to come out in opposition to certain provisions of the proposed tax legislation. However, the path of least resistance is not for the entire effort to fail, but rather for it to become more profligate. For example, the White House has already gestured towards a compromise with Blue State Republicans on the state and local tax deduction that would increase the deficit. Furthermore, we continue to stress that the failure of the Obamacare repeal and replace bill is not a good guide for what will happen with tax legislation. Taking away an entitlement program is politically challenging. Tax cuts, on the other hand, are generally not. Bottom Line: President Donald Trump is an economic populist. Our research into international comparisons shows that populists tend to get what they want, which is primarily higher nominal GDP growth (Chart 6). We therefore continue to expect the roughly $1.5 trillion tax cut effort - which may or may not deserve the title of tax reform - to pass. Is King Dollar Primed For A Rally? Investors should consider the proposed tax legislation a form of modest stimulus. If we assume that the $1.5 trillion in tax cuts will be offset with a combination of revenue-raising policies to the tune of 50%, it still leaves roughly $750 billion in new deficit spending (stimulus) over the next ten years. A more reasonable figure for total revenue offsets is around $400 billion, which would put the cost of stimulus at roughly $1.1 billion.9 This is not extraordinary large, but even a modest effort this far into the economic cycle could have a significant effect. BCA's Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin, believes that inflation is around the corner.10 So why the delay in the data? Peter points out that while the Phillips Curve has gotten a lot flatter over the past four decades (Chart 7), it remains a curve. Once the economy reaches full employment - as it has done in the U.S. (Chart 8) - the curve steepens much faster. As Peter puts it: Chart 6Populists Deliver (Nominal) GDP Growth Chart 7The Phillips Curve Has Gotten Flatter Chart 8U.S. Economy At Full Employment The idea that the Phillips curve steepens at low levels of unemployment is very intuitive: If excess capacity is high to begin with, a modest decline in slack will still leave many workers idle. In such a setting, inflation is unlikely to rise. However, once the output gap is fully closed, any further decline in slack will cause bottlenecks to emerge, pushing wages and prices higher. The empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Chart 9 shows that U.S. wage growth has tended to accelerate once the unemployment rate falls into the range of 4%-5%. Chart 9Watch Out For The 'Kink' In The Phillips Curve When we present Peter's argument to clients, many retort that "this time is different," namely because of phenomena like the "Amazon effect." To put that argument to rest, our colleague Mark McClellan has penned a Special Report titled, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?"11 Mark shows that while e-commerce is undoubtedly increasing its share of retail sales (Chart 10), its contribution to annual headline CPI is modest. For example, Chart 11 shows that online prices fell relative to the overall CPI for most of the time since the early 1990s. However, e-commerce only contributed about -0.15 percentage points to annual CPI in June 2017, and has never contributed more than -0.3 percentage points. Chart 10E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share Chart 11Online Price Index To further test the impact of e-commerce on inflation, Mark focused on the parts of the CPI that are most exposed to it. If online shopping is having a significant deflationary impact on overall inflation, we should see large and persistent negative contributions from these parts of the CPI. He therefore combined the components of the CPI that most closely matched the sectors that have high e-commerce exposure (Chart 12). Again, the contribution of e-commerce-heavy sectors to annual CPI is minimal. Chart 12Electronic Shopping Price Index Chart 13BCA E-Commerce Proxy Price Index Chart 14BCA E-Commerce Adjusted Proxy Price Index Mark finally recalculated the e-commerce proxy using only the sectors displaying the most relative price declines - clothing, computers, electronics, furniture, sporting goods, air travel, and other goods - and assumed that all other sectors actually deflated at the average pace of the entire index. The adjusted e-commerce proxy suggests that online pricing reduced overall CPI by about 0.1-0.2 percentage points in recent years (Chart 13 & Chart 14). We find Mark's work intuitive. The "Amazon effect" is a great example of fitting a broad theory to a particular set of data, a common error in the investment community. The weak inflation print - which is a "Summer of 2017" phenomenon - is being extrapolated into a decade-long theme. But the data is clear: the deceleration of inflation since the Great Financial Crisis has been in areas unaffected by online sales, chiefly energy, food, and shelter costs. High corporate profit margins in the retail sector also argue against the idea that e-commerce represents a large positive macro supply shock. In fact, today's creative destruction in retail may be no more deflationary than the shift to "big box" stores in the 1990s. Putting it all together, the three above views provide a fairly clear signal in terms of asset implications: Geopolitical Strategy Tax Policy View: Tax legislation is a form of modest stimulus enacted by a populist White House in search of higher nominal GDP growth, and it will pass; Global Investment Strategy Phillips Curve View: The Phillips Curve is not dead, just dormant, and will steepen as the U.S. unemployment rate declines further below the equilibrium level; The Bank Credit Analyst "Amazon Effect" View: There is no "Amazon Effect." Pro-cyclical fiscal stimulus in the U.S. should be bullish for the U.S. dollar, bullish for U.S. small caps relative to large caps, and bearish for U.S. 10-year Treasuries. We are already long USD against EUR by recommending that our clients go long Euro Area equities relative to the S&P 500 with a currency hedge.12 We think there may be more upside for the USD against the yen, especially given our view of the upcoming general election in Japan below. What are the risks to a bullish USD view? Continued strong global growth is the main risk (Chart 15). Global data is improving to the point that even moribund Italy is now on fire (Chart 16). However, the positive data may be peaking. European data, in particular, looks like it is reaching its absolute highs (Chart 17). Chart 15Can Global Growth Get Any Higher? Chart 16Italy Is On Fire... Chart 17...As Is Europe Overall Particularly concerning from the global perspective is the ongoing slowdown in the pace of expansion of Chinese money and credit, which we have been arguing for almost a year is policy induced.13 Our colleague Arthur Budaghyan, Chief Strategist of BCA's Emerging Market Strategy has flagged that the official M2, as well as BCA's own custom version of broad money M3, are slowing down to new lows (Chart 18). From the broad money M3, Arthur and his team construct the M3 impulse, which leads both the Chinese leading economic indicator and the well-known "Li Keqiang index" (a growth proxy) by six months (Chart 19).14 Most importantly from the global perspective, the slowdown in Chinese money and credit growth ought to negatively impact demand for imports from China-exposed export sectors in Asia and Europe (Chart 20). Chart 18But Credit Growth In China Is Slowing Chart 19Chinese Credit Leads The Domestic Economy... Chart 20...As Well As Exports To China The policy-induced crackdown against money and credit growth in China should be particularly pertinent in Europe. BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy has noted how the close trading relationship between China and Europe influences the growth delta between Europe and the U.S.15 Given the potential slowdown in China, and subsequent impact on EM economies, bullishness on Europe could be peaking. Bottom Line: Our view that a modest fiscal stimulus may be afoot is only a small part of a wider BCA bullish-USD narrative. We think it is once again time to turn bullish towards the greenback. We are opening a long USD/JPY recommendation. Our colleague Mathieu Savary, Chief Strategist of BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy, has been long since USD/JPY hit 109 on August 11. Japan: Abenomics Will Survive Abe Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's snap election on October 22 took us by surprise. Not because of the timing, which was telegraphed by rumors in the press, but because, for Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the upside risk is limited while the downside is unlimited. Since May 24 we have argued that Abe's political capital has peaked, based on the empirically grounded expectation that his pursuit of constitutional changes to legitimize Japan's defense forces would erode his popular support.16 This view received confirmation in early July, when Yuriko Koike, a former LDP politician, led an insurgency against the LDP in the Tokyo metropolitan elections and dealt them a historic blow in that region. At that time, we argued that Abe would not lose power anytime soon: he maintained his two-thirds supermajority in the lower house (and virtual supermajority in the upper house), did not face an election until December 2018, and could thus double down on reflationary economic policies in order to rebuild popular support.17 Chart 21An Upstart Party Challenges The LDP Now, Abe has made a risky decision to move the general election forward 14 months. He wants to capitalize on Japan's recent strong economic performance, the peaking of North Korean tensions (which are likely to decline by late next year), and an uptick in approval ratings. Last but not least, he wants to take the fight to the political opposition at a time when the rival Democratic Party is in total collapse and Governor Koike, his chief antagonist, is unready to wage a national campaign. The timing was shrewd but comes at a cost. Koike announced a new political party, the Party of Hope, just hours before Abe called the early election. In the first set of opinion polls it has sprung up to 15% approval, only nine points shy of the LDP. True, this is still 14 points short of the ruling coalition (Chart 21). But crucially, the collapse of the Democratic Party prompted its leader, Seiji Maehara, to declare that his party would not contest the new elections. This leaves its members free to join Koike's party; it also partly obviates the problem of the Democratic Party and Party of Hope stealing each other's votes.18 Throughout Abe's term we have compared his approval ratings to those of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the LDP's last heavyweight leader, to test whether he retains political capital (Chart 22). According to this measure, he does. Yet, given Abe's long tenure and gradually declining support, this comparison only works as long as there is no viable alternative. That is because Abe's net approval rating, as well as his ability to bring star-power to the LDP, has been fading in recent years (Chart 23). Now he has called an election at the very moment that a possible alternative has emerged!19 Chart 22Abe Losing Favor Over Time Chart 23Abe Becoming A Liability However, we say a possible alternative for a reason: Koike herself, as yet, is refusing to run for the prime minister's slot. She is in a "dilemma of irresponsibility" in which, having just become governor of Tokyo on the pledge to put "Tokyo First," she will be criticized for flagrant ambition and flip-flopping if she abandons that post to run against Abe directly.20 As long as Koike remains on the sidelines, Abe will retain his absolute majority. It would be very difficult for a new party that is struggling to field candidates across the whole country, lacks a clear prime minister candidate, and faces competition with other opposition parties to deprive an incumbent coalition of 85 seats. (Depriving the LDP of its 50-seat party majority alone would be momentous, though conceivable.) The LDP has fallen out of power on only two previous occasions since 1955: once, briefly, in 1993, in the wake of the collapse of Japan's Heisei bubble, and once in 2009, in the wake of the global financial crisis (Chart 24). And the LDP has never lost more than 22 seats in an election year, like this year, in which economic growth is faster than the preceding year. That size of loss would leave Abe wounded but still in control.21 Chart 24The LDP Seldom Loses Elections In Japan On the other hand, if Koike changes her mind and throws herself headlong into competition with Abe, it is possible, albeit still highly unlikely, that she could pull off a historic upset.22 Currently the number of undecided voters is high at about 43%. In recent years, these voters have tended to correlate negatively with LDP support (Chart 25), meaning that LDP voters grew dissatisfied and "undecided" but then came crawling back when the party wooed them. However, Koike could change this dynamic - not only because she apparently has momentum, but also because her background and platform are substantially similar to Abe's, yet with a fresh face.23 Chart 25Undecided Voters Often Return To LDP Koike must make her decision by October 10. It is unlikely that she will join or that her party will field enough competitive candidates - in this respect, Abe gambled correctly in calling the election now. Barring her entrance, what is at stake is Abe's 6-seat "supermajority" in the lower house. Abe is likely to lose this advantage simply based on the Party of Hope's strength in Greater Tokyo and the Kanto Plain, augmented as it is by collaboration with the Democratic Party. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that Koike could easily deprive Abe of this supermajority. Assuming that the Party of Hope performs in line with Koike's performance in the Tokyo/Kanto region in July, gaining 39% of the seats (34% of the popular vote), implies that the Party of Hope could steal as many as 47 seats from the ruling coalition on October 22 (Table 2). This is a generous estimate in giving Koike's party strong support, but a conservative estimate in assuming that it will not win a single seat outside the Tokyo/Kanto region.24 Losing this supermajority would be a big loss of momentum for Abe and the LDP that would carry over into the legislative process (where Abe would struggle to control the LDP factions and fend off corruption allegations) and future elections (where the LDP would be more vulnerable). It would sow the seeds for a leadership challenge against Abe in the LDP next September. But it keeps the LDP in power for the next four years. And its direct impact on passing bills is limited. A lower house majority would still be under the LDP leader's control, and the LDP would still have a near-supermajority in the upper house, removing any risk that it would delay bills. The only initiative likely to suffer would be Abe's treasured constitutional revisions, and yet even those would still have a fighting chance of passing the Diet. The important thing for investors to realize is that a setback or defeat for Abe will not be the death of Abenomics.25 Reflation will continue and Japanese risk assets will continue to outperform on a currency-hedged basis. Why? Table 2The Party Of Hope Threatens The LDP Supermajority From Its Base In The Tokyo/Kanto Region Abenomics is already bearing fruit: Inflation remains weak, but Japan's output gap is closing and unemployment gap is gone (Chart 26). It is only a matter of time before supply constraints put more upward pressure on prices, lowering real rates and easing financial conditions for the economy as a whole. Koike, who styles herself as a pro-business Thatcherite, will not stand in the way of growth. Monetary policy will remain dovish: The dovish shift in the Bank of Japan in 2013 was a regime change within the institution itself. Governor Haruhiko Kuroda was the leader of the change, but since then the entire policy board has been staffed with doves. In fact, in the board's recent minutes, the only dissenting voice argued for more stimulus.26 Kuroda can legally be reappointed for governor for another five years. If not, his replacement will likely perpetuate his legacy, as neither Abe nor Koike have given any hint at wanting more hawkish monetary policy. The market is right to expect barely any rate hikes over the next year and for the BoJ to continue suppressing yields even as other DM central banks become more hawkish (Chart 27). Chart 26Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Chart 27Monetary Policy Will Remain Easy Fiscal policy will ease further: We have shown Chart 28 again and again to clients: the main failure of Abenomics so far has been Abe's own fiscal responsibility. Upon calling the election, he yet again pitched himself to voters on the basis of fiscal irresponsibility. He offered a new 2 trillion yen stimulus package and suspended his pledge to balance the budget by 2020. And while he pledged to pay for education and elderly care by raising the consumption tax from 8% to 10% as scheduled in October 2019, few doubt that he will delay a tax hike (as in 2015) if it threatens to upset his economic recovery. Meanwhile, Koike is running on a platform of easier fiscal policy: she has outright opposed the consumer tax hike, saying that to do so would be to "throw cold water on the still-intangible economic recovery." She wants more earthquake-resistant infrastructure and more social spending (e.g. childcare). She wants measures to boost the female participation rate further (Chart 29).She is hardly likely to boost consumption without continuing Abe's quest to lift wages overall (Chart 30). And in her most significant difference from Abe, she hopes to do away with nuclear power and turn Japan into a renewable energy powerhouse (inevitably requiring large-scale government subsidies and investment). Foreign policy will remain hawkish: Koike is a conservative who is in favor of constitutional revisions to normalize Japan's military. Her Party of Hope could even vote with the LDP on this issue, for a price. While it may be somewhat more China-friendly than Abe (possibly a boon for exports), it would not be willing or able to break Japan's recent trend of rising defense spending and economic diplomacy. Chart 28Fiscal Policy Will Get Easier Chart 29Abe And Koike Want Women Workers Chart 30Abe And Koike Want Higher Wages Moreover, given that Japan has a much higher ratio of public investment to private investment than other comparable countries, and that fiscal spending is limited by a massive debt load, Koike would be committed to boosting private investment just like Abe (Chart 31). Indeed, judging solely by key policy planks, the Party of Hope could almost become an LDP coalition partner. It cannot win a majority without Koike as frontrunner, and even if it did, it would lead to a fractious parliament where it would be forced to cooperate with the LDP in order to pass bills through the LDP-dominated upper house. Koike's sudden emergence does not represent a shift in national trends but rather a confirmation of the post-2011 Japanese political consensus in favor of a dovish central bank, dovish fiscal policy, and hawkish foreign policy. Chart 31Abe And Koike Want Private Investment Chart 32Not Abandoning Nuclear Power Anytime Soon Bottom Line: As things stand, Abe will probably lose his supermajority yet retain his majority in the lower house. This will cause some volatility and policy uncertainty in Japan. Nevertheless, the outlook is still highly reflationary. Koike reveals that the median voter favors pushing Abenomics even further. Should Koike make a dash for the prime minister's slot, she does have a small chance of coming to power. It is hard to put a probability on it until more polling data is available. The biggest policy consequence of a Party of Hope-led government would be her energy agenda of weaning Japan off of nuclear power, which would in the first instance shrink the current account surplus, as during the nuclear shutdown following the Tohoku earthquake in 2011 (Chart 32). However, a Koike majority is unlikely to materialize as things stand, and the LDP in the upper house would be a check on such policies. Go long USD/JPY in expectation of more reflation. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jim Mylonas, Vice President Client Advisory & BCA Academy jim@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Secession In Europe: Scotland And Catalonia," dated May 14, 2014, and BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Equities And Bonds Continue To Rally?" dated September 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BBC, "Catalan referendum: Catalonia has 'won right to statehood,'" dated October 2, 2017, available at bbc.com. 3 We are referencing poll numbers collected by the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, which is run by the pro-independence government of Catalonia. In other words, if biased, the polls should be biased towards independence. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Climbing The Wall Of Worry In Europe," dated February 15, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Apparently, the Democrats! Democratic leaders in Congress oppose tax reform policy that is not revenue-neutral. However, the GOP can ignore them as they plan to use the reconciliation procedure to pass tax policy. 7 Please see John Carney, "Mainstream Media Distort Every Single Thing Gary Cohn Says About GOP Tax Plan," dated September 30, 2017, available at breitbart.com. 8 The announced tax reform plan does not include such a proposal - nor does it provide any detail on how tax cuts would be paid for - but it has been floated as a possibility. This is because it could save the government nearly $370 billion by 2020, according to a report from the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation. 9 For revenue offsets that are likely to pass, we combine the repatriation of foreign earnings ($138 billion over the next decade), the repeal of certain corporate tax breaks ($138 billion), and the repeal of certain individual tax expenditures ($385 billion). We roughly estimate that the offset would total $400 billion, as horse-trading in Congress is likely to reduce the eventual size of overall revenue-offsets. The path of least resistance in Congress is towards more deficit spending, not less. 10 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Is The Phillips Curve Dead Or Dormant?" dated September 22, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?" dated August 31, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 12 We recently closed our recommendation of being long Euro Area equities relative to the U.S. in an unhedged position for a 7.88% gain. 13 Please see "China: Xi Is A 'Core' Leader ... So What?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016; "China: How Far Will Deleveraging Go?" in Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017; and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "Copper Versus Money/Credit In China - Which One Is Right?" dated September 6, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "ECB: All About China?" dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 The problem still partially exists, as the opposition remains divided by various parties, and left-wing members of the Democratic Party have formed a new Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan that will contest the election and compete with the Party of Hope as well as the ruling LDP. 19 Incidentally, she is one of Koizumi's disciples who can count on his support. 20 According to Shinjiro Koizumi, "If she runs it's irresponsible, if she doesn't run it's irresponsible ... she's in a 'dilemma of irresponsibility.'" Quoted in Robin Harding, "Yuriko Koike hits trouble in Japan election campaign," Financial Times, October 2, 2017, available at www.ft.com. 21 The 22-seat loss referred to above occurred under the leadership of Takeo Miki in 1976. 22 There have been only two occasions in which a multi-term prime minister like Abe lost power due to holding a general election - 1960 and 1972. In the latter, comparable case, Eisaku Sato, who had been in power for eight years, lost power despite the fact that economic growth had recovered from a slight slowdown in 1971. In other words, the lack of enthusiasm for Abe amid a recovering economy is an important warning sign, which we discussed in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - Asia," dated August 30, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 It will also be important to see if leading politicians continue to defect from other parties and flock to her ranks. Especially politicians from the LDP, and especially those who are not worried, like Mineyuki Fukuda, about losing their seats anyway. 24 It also neglects recent reforms to the electoral system that will eliminate ten seats, only one of which is likely to go to the Party of Hope. 25 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 26 Please see Bank of Japan, "Summary Of Opinions At The Monetary Policy Meeting," September 20-21, 2017, p. 5, available at www.boj.or.jp/en.