Geopolitics

Special Report

Highlights Brazilian President Michel Temer has been accused of crimes much worse than what got his predecessor impeached; Further instability is likely, with low probability that Temer's impeachment would restart reforms; Only a technocratic government, or brand new election, could produce a market-friendly outcome. Odds are that Brazil's public debt load will continue to escalate, and that in two years or so the debt-to-GDP ratio will spiral out of control. Without structural reforms and higher commodities prices, Brazilian financial markets are looking into the abyss. Stay put on Brazilian financial markets. Feature Investors cheered the impeachment of Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff, bidding up Brazilian assets for over a year despite the challenging macroeconomic context. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy services have repeatedly cautioned investors not to buy the hype. Brazil was already "priced for political perfection" on May 12, 2016 when Rousseff was removed from office to face trial by the senate over fiscal accounting irregularities.1 And yet, the political context has been far from perfect. As we wrote last May: "It is highly unlikely that the political dysfunction within Brazil's political class will end with a Temer administration, at least not anytime soon." The latest corruption revelations have directly implicated acting president Michel Temer of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) as well as Senator Aecio Neves, the leader of centrist and investor-friendly Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and a key Temer ally in Congress. The market has placed a massive bullish bet in the abilities of the tentative Temer-Neves (PMDB-PSDB) entente cordiale to push through largely unpopular fiscal reforms through Congress. These reforms, none of which have passed yet (!), are now likely to stall until either an early election is called (best case scenario) or until the current government's mandate expires in October 2018. We have expected Brazil's political rally to dissipate. As we argued in 2016, without a new election, the interim government has no mandate for painful structural reforms. We are sticking to this view today. What Is Going On In Brazil? According to revelations in the Brazilian press, President Temer was caught in an audio recording asking the chairman of JBS Group - the world's largest meatpacker - to continue making payments to the former President of the Chamber of Deputies Eduardo Cunha, who was jailed for corruption in 2016. Cunha, a former Temer ally and member of PMDB, was indicted in the large scale "Operation Car Wash" corruption scandal involving the state-owned oil company Petrobras. The payments by JBS were allegedly meant to ensure that Cunha did not spill the beans on his co-conspirators. Cunha had previously disclosed that he possessed compromising information about several senior politicians linked to the Petrobras scandal. JBS Chairman Joesley Batista, himself under investigation, recorded a conversation with Temer on March 7 as part of his plea bargain negotiations with law enforcement officials. According to press reports, Temer asked Batista to continue payments to ensure Cunha's silence. As part of the same investigation, Senator Aecio Neves - the darling of the Brazilian investment community who narrowly lost the presidential election to Rousseff in 2014 - was filmed soliciting two million reals ($638,000) from Batista. This is not his first brush with the law, Neves was also under corruption investigation when he was the governor of the state of Minas Gerais. Neves's apartment has since been raided by the police as the corruption probe against Brazilian politicians reaches a fever pitch. How serious are the charges against the Temer and his ruling coalition? They are deadly serious. As an aside, we have been puzzled that investors have never posed the following question: how was it possible that the entire political and especially congressional system is so corrupt but Temer - the long-serving head of the largest party in the congress and one of the most shrewd politicians in Brazil - has not been involved in this corruption scheme. President Dilma Rousseff, former leader of the left-wing Workers Party (PT) and successor to President Inácio "Lula" da Silva, was impeached and removed from power for a lot less. There was never any actual evidence that Rousseff was personally involved in Operation Car Wash, at least at the time of her impeachment. In fact, the strongest legal case against Rousseff was that she failed to uphold the so-called Fiscal Responsibility Law. Essentially, Rousseff was impeached and removed from power because she stimulated the economy for political gain. A charge that practically every president in Brazil's history has been guilty of (if not every leader in the world!). Temer and Neves are accused of much greater crimes. If the reporting of the Brazilian press is accurate, Neves personally profited and continues to profit from Operation Car Wash. And Temer is then directly involved, to this day, in obstruction of justice and witness intimidation. These are not crimes by association or mere technicalities resulting from politically charged fiscal profligacy. Rather, they are serious crimes that could end with lengthy jail terms, let alone removal from power. Rousseff claimed that her removal from power was a coup d'état. She was correct to characterize it as such. Unlike in the U.S., where a president removed from power is replaced with the vice president from the same party, in Brazil vice presidents are often appointed from a coalition partner. As such, Vice President Temer replaced Rousseff and proceeded to alter Brazilian policy in a dramatic fashion. He abandoned the PMDB legislative alliance with left-wing PT, turned to the centrist PSDB for votes in Congress and proceeded to enact orthodox, conservative, supply-side reforms. While these are absolutely the reforms that Brazil needs, we never accepted the view that they are reforms that Brazilians want. In fact, Rousseff won the 2014 election against Neves, with Temer as her running mate, by campaigning on a populist platform against precisely these types of supply-side reforms. Bottom Line: We hate to tell our clients "we told you so," but Temer's 180-degree turn in policy was never going to work. Not without an election that bolsters his political mandate to enact painful structural reforms. We also cautioned our clients that corruption in Brazilian Congress was endemic and severe and would therefore not magically disappear with Rousseff's removal from power. As such, "impeachment was no panacea,"2 especially not when many members of Congress voting against Dilma were under investigation for corruption themselves! The high level of corruption is not because of a moral failing particular to Brazilian mentality. Rather, corruption is a feature of Brazil's fractured and regionalized politics that depend on side-payments and pork barreling to grease the wheels of legislative process. Rousseff's crimes appear paltry when compared to the (yet unproven) allegations against Temer and Neves. J-Curve Of Structural Reforms Amidst the 2016 political crisis, we argued that the only positive outcome for Brazilian politics and markets in the long-term would be a new election (Figure I-1).3 Why? Because we understood how painful fiscal reforms would have to be to deal with Brazil's disastrous fiscal position (Chart I-1). Without a new election, the interim Temer administration would not have the political capital to enact painful reforms. Figure I-1Brazil: Our Take On Possible Political Scenarios ##br##Before Former President Rousseff Was Impeached Chart I-1Brazil's Fiscal Position The market has disagreed with us for a full year now. However, the rally based on political hopes was always unsustainable. First, investors have misunderstood the nature of political corruption in Brazilian politics and just how intrinsic the problem has been. In retrospect, Rousseff may have been the least corrupt major politician in Brazil! Second, investors have ignored the message of our J-Curve of structural reforms (Diagram I-1). Diagram I-1Structural Reforms Are Painful: ##br##Stylized Representation Reform is always and everywhere painful, otherwise it would be the form. Every government pursuing reforms has to get through the "danger zone" on our J-curve of structural reform. As reforms are passed and enacted, they begin to "bite." This is when the protests against reforms mount and the government loses its political capital. If the policymakers in charge of the reform effort are already starting with low political capital - as the Temer and his congressional coalition most certainly did in August 2016 - than the "danger zone" is essentially insurmountable. We have disagreed with the market as it has confused Rousseff's removal from power with widespread support for reforms that amount to economic austerity. As we often repeated in client meetings, "a vote for impeachment is not a vote for austerity." With general election only roughly one year away in October 2018, we doubted that the Temer administration would have the political capital to push through such reforms. After all, every government wants to be reelected and pursuing painful reforms ahead of the elections is not feasible election winning strategy. What has the Temer coalition managed to do thus far? It must have done a lot, given the positive market performance over the past 12 months? False. The market has rallied despite remarkably shoddy evidence of actual reforms. As we predicted in our analyses throughout 2016, the post-Rousseff Brazilian policymakers have been dogged by lack of political capital. Out of five major reform efforts, only two have passed - oil-auction legislation (Production Sharing Agreement Bill) and a fiscal-spending cap. We do not wish to claim that the latter is insignificant but as we discuss below they are insufficient to stabilize Brazil's public debt load. The main three reform efforts that would have significant long-term effect on Brazil's fiscal sustainability - social security reform, labor reform, and tax reform - have stalled and are now likely to fail (Table I-1). Table I-1President Temer's Proposed Structural Reforms & Their Status Brazilian Senator Ricardo Ferraço, of the centrist PSDB, in charge of drafting the labor reform report for the Senate, has already canceled the work on the proposal. Ferraço issued a statement that said, "the institutional crisis we are facing is devastating and we need to prioritize finding a solution. Everything else is secondary now." This is a major blow against labor reforms, which already passed the lower house in April. We suspect that it will largely be impossible to restart and, more importantly, pass the reforms without an election that gives a new government a political mandate. Alternatively, a technocratic government led by technocrats without political ambitions, could try to enact reforms until the next election. Without a new election or a technocratic government, members of centrist PSDB and center-left PMDB will start to distance themselves from the allegedly corrupt Temer administration. It makes no political sense for Congressmen like Ferraço to sacrifice their own political capital on the cross of austerity just a year from the start of the electoral campaign in the summer of 2018. Bottom Line: The results made clear by Figure I-1 are not surprising and were eminently forecastable. However, the market ignored the structural realities of Brazilian politics, as well as the theoretical foundation of successful structural reforms, and charged ahead regardless. Without fiscal reforms outlined in Table I-1, however, Brazil will likely end up in a debt trap very soon. A Perilous Fiscal Situation Brazil's fiscal position and public debt remain on an unsustainable trajectory. In fact, there has been limited fiscal improvement compared to what financial markets have priced in. In particular: The constitutional amendment by Brazilian President Michel Temer's government that introduced a cap on government spending was a dilution of the Fiscal Responsibility Law adopted in 2000 which stipulated that the government had to run primary fiscal surpluses. Capping government expenditure growth to the inflation rate de facto represents a relaxation of structural fiscal policy. Under the new fiscal rules, the government is targeting not the primary fiscal deficit (and, by extension, public debt), but only government expenditures. This implies that in a case where government revenues fall short of projections, the government is not obliged to rein in spending. On the whole, Temer's government has relaxed rather than tightened structural fiscal rules. While this makes sense because the economy is in a depression and needs fiscal relief, it has been bad news for government creditors. As a final point, the former President Dilma Rousseff was impeached for violating this exact same law that the current government has now relaxed. The fiscal balance has stabilized around 9% of GDP in the past year, but this has been due to one-off temporary measures. With nominal GDP growth at around 5%, the bulk of the 16% rise in collected income taxes from a year ago came from one-off measures such as the repayment of funds by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to the government, taxes on foreign asset repatriation and other temporary actions (Chart I-2). In short, Temer's government has resorted to one-off measures to improve the country's fiscal position. Unless the economy and tax collection recover strongly in the next 12 months, Brazil's fiscal position will worsen substantially, and public debt servicing will become unsustainable. Furthermore, the federal government's transfers to states have surged as the latter are facing their own fiscal crises due to revenue shortfalls. Local governments are reluctant to curb spending amid the ongoing depression, and will continue to pressure the federal government for more transfers. This will worsen public debt dynamics. Importantly, the social security deficit, presently at 2.4% of GDP, will continue to escalate without meaningful reforms (Chart I-3). According to IMF estimates,4 the social security deficit will reach 14% of GDP by 2021 if no reforms are implemented. This is assuming robust economic recovery this year and solid growth in the years ahead. Given social security reforms are unlikely to occur and economic growth will continue to underwhelm amid heightened political uncertainty, odds are that the impact of the social security deficit on the public debt dynamics will be worse than the IMF projections suggest. Moreover, the gap between local currency interest rates and nominal GDP growth remains extremely wide (Chart I-4). To offset this, the government has to run primary surpluses. The primary deficit is currently 2.3% of GDP. Chart I-2Income Tax Collection Has Been ##br##Boosted By One-Off Measures Chart I-3Brazil's Social Security System ##br##Is On Unsustainable Track Chart I-4An Untenable Gap That said, tightening fiscal policy amid the ongoing economic depression is politically suicidal. Finally, our public debt simulation suggests that unless economic growth recovers strongly, Brazil's public debt-to-GDP ratio will rise above 90% of GDP by the end of 2019 - in both our baseline and most pessimistic scenarios. Notably, our baseline scenario assumes nominal GDP growth of 5.5% in 2017, and 7% in both 2018 and 2019 (Table I-2). These are not bearish assumptions, but and could prove optimistic given the escalating political crisis. This debt simulation assumes that interest rates will stay above 10%, but it also assumes no bailout for public banks and state-owned companies, or a rise in transfers to state governments. Table I-2Brazil: Public Debt Sustainability Scenarios 2017-2019 Bottom Line: Odds are that Brazil's public debt load will continue to escalate, and that in two years or so the debt-to-GDP ratio will spiral out of control. The Economy, Corporate Profits And Markets There has been no recovery in either the economy or corporate profits (excluding commodities companies). Brazilian share prices have rallied massively in the past 17 months, yet profits in companies leveraged to the domestic business cycle have continued to shrink. Specifically, EPS for consumer staples companies and banks have dropped a lot in local currency terms, despite the equity market rally (Chart I-5). It is normal that share prices lead profits by six to 12 months, but the current rally in Brazil is already 16 months old. In short, the discrepancy between share prices and EPS is unprecedented and unsustainable. Ongoing profit weakness is consistent with a lack of recovery in domestic demand, which is corroborated by the macro data: retail sales volumes, manufacturing production and capital goods imports have not grown at all; their pace of contraction has simply moderated (Chart I-6). Chart I-5No Recovery In Corporate Profits ##br##In Non-Commodities Sectors Chart I-6No Recovery In Economy In Brazil, key to its financial markets is the exchange rate. If and when the currency appreciates, interest rates will decline and share prices will rally and the economy will eventually revive - and vice versa. In turn, the exchange rate is driven not by the interest rate differential versus the U.S., as shown in Chart I-7, but by commodities prices, with which it strongly correlates (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Interest Rate Differential And ##br##Exchange Rate: No Correlation Chart I-8BRL Is Sensitive To Commodities Prices BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team believes commodities prices have peaked and will decline in the months ahead. This, along with renewed political turmoil, warrants a bearish stance on the Brazilian currency. While the central bank has large foreign currency reserves and could sell U.S. dollars to support the real, this cannot preclude a selloff in the nation's financial markets. Selling foreign currency by a central bank entails withdrawing local currency from the banking system, tighter local liquidity and higher interest rates. Hence, a central bank can defend the exchange rate from depreciation if it tolerates higher interbank rates. Higher interest rates will, however, be devastating for Brazil. If the central bank of Brazil, having used its international reserves to defend the currency, decides to inject local currency liquidity into the system to bring down local rates, the outcome will be currency depreciation. In a nutshell, a central bank cannot control both the exchange rate and local interest rates if the nation has an open capital account structure. Remarkably, Chart I-9 contends that in Brazil, the exchange rate correlates with central bank lending to commercial banks. If the central bank lends to commercial banks, the currency depreciates, and vice versa. Facing the choice between currency depreciation and higher local rates, the Brazilian central bank will choose the former because of its perilous public debt situation as well as the imperative of a revival in credit growth. Hence, the Brazilian central bank is unlikely to defend the currency on a sustainable basis. If the currency depreciates, local bonds, sovereign and corporate U.S. dollar credit and share prices will sell off too. Bottom Line: Without structural reforms and higher commodities prices, Brazilian financial markets are looking into the abyss. Investment Recommendations Politics has fueled the rally in Brazilian assets since early 2016, and now politics taketh away. With the political tailwinds reversing, investors will have nothing left to base their decisions on but the terrible macroeconomic picture. We maintain our bearish stance on Brazilian financial markets: We continue to short the BRL versus both the U.S. dollar and the Mexican peso. The real is not cheap at all while the peso offers good value (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Central Bank's Liquidity Provision ##br##To Banks Vs. Exchange Rate Chart I-10BRL Is Not Cheap, MXN Is Dedicated EM equity and credit investors should continue underweighting Brazil in their respective portfolios. Finally, local rates will be under upward pressure as the currency depreciates. We remain offside this market. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Santiago E. Gomez, Consulting Editor santiago@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Brazil: Priced For Political Perfection," dated May 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Brazil: Impeachment Is No Panacea," dated April 26, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Brazil's Political Honeymoon Is Over," dated August 18, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Cuevas et al., IMF Working Paper: Fiscal Challenges of Population Aging in Brazil, March 2017

Highlights U.S. fiscal stimulus will be priced back into markets; Northeast Asia is consumed with domestic politics for now; China's financial crackdown raises risks, but so far looks contained; South Korea's relief rally will lead to buyer's remorse; Japan's constitutional reforms portend more reflation. Feature The market has lost faith in U.S. fiscal stimulus. The bond market has given back all of the expectations of faster growth and higher inflation (Chart 1). Hopes of populist, budget-busting tax cuts appear to have been dashed by the Putin-gate scandal and alleged White House obstruction of justice. As a result, the DXY has fallen to pre-election levels, while the Goldman Sachs high tax-rate basket of equities has fallen to its lowest level relative to the S&P 500 since February 2016 (Chart 2). We continue to believe that tax reform, or just tax cuts, will happen this year or early next year and that the market will have to re-price fiscal stimulus and budget profligacy at some point this year.1 As such, we are not ready to close our tactical recommendations of going long the high-tax rate basket relative to S&P 500 (down 1.62% since April 5) or playing the 2-year / 30-year Treasury curve steepener (down 11.4 bps since November 1). Republicans in Congress will push through tax reforms or cuts for the sake of remaining competitive in the upcoming midterm elections. And we doubt their commitment to budget discipline. That said, it is not clear that the equity market needs tax reforms to continue its upward trajectory. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is predicting growth of 4.1% in the second quarter while the NY Fed's Nowcast is forecasting 2.3%. BCA U.S. Equity Strategy's earnings model continues to predict continued healthy profit growth for the remainder of the year both in the U.S. and abroad (Chart 3).2 In fact, if expectations of stimulus in the U.S. fully dissipate, the USD will take a breather - giving global stocks a boost - and the Fed will be able to take it easy on tightening U.S. rates, easing global monetary conditions. Chart 1Market No Longer##br## Believes In Trump Stimulus... Chart 2...Or Trump ##br##Tax Cuts Chart 3Corporate Profit ##br##Outlook Still Strong Perhaps far more important for global and U.S. risk assets is global growth. And the fulcrum of global growth has been China's economic performance. As the only country willing to run pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy, China has had a disproportionate impact on global growth since 2008. As such, we turn this week to the geopolitics and politics of Northeast Asia. China: How Far Will Deleveraging Go? Chinese financial policy tightening caught the market by surprise this year. The running assumption was that policy would be fully accommodative in order to ensure stability ahead of the all-important nineteenth National Party Congress in October or November.3 However, it is possible that the assumption is flawed. First, as we have pointed out in the past, China does not have a record of proactive economic stimulus ahead of party congresses (Chart 4). Second, President Xi Jinping may be far more secure in his position than is understood. Chart 4Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Mid-Term Party Congresses In China The crackdown on the financial sector in recent months suggests that Xi's administration has a greater appetite for risk ahead of the party congress than is generally believed: The administration is continuing to tamp down on the property sector. The PBoC has drained liquidity and allowed interbank rates to rise (Chart 5). The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has launched inspections and new regulations on wealth management products and the shadow lending sector. The China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) has imposed new restrictions, including preventing insurers from selling new policies. One can make a good case that these measures will be limited so as not to cause excessive disruption in the financial system. All of the key Communist Party statements, from Premier Li Keqiang's recent comments to those made by the economic leadership in December, at the beginning of this tightening cycle, have emphasized that stability remains the priority.4 The PBoC's measures have been marginal; other measures have mostly to do with supervision. Notable personnel changes affecting the top economic and financial government positions fall under preparations for the party congress and do not necessarily suggest a new ambitious policy initiative is under way.5 Moreover, the government has already stepped back a bit in the face of the liquidity squeeze. One of the signs of the PBoC's tighter stance was its discontinuation of its Medium-Term Lending Facility in January, but this has since been reinstated.6 And throughout May the PBoC has injected increasing amounts of liquidity into the interbank system, marking an apparent tactical shift (Chart 6). Furthermore, government spending is already growing again after a brief contraction. Chart 5People's Bank Tightens Marginally... Chart 6...But Keeps Interbank Rates On A Leash In light of these decisions, it seems policy tightening is intended not to be stringent but merely to keep the financial sector - especially the shadow banking sector - in check during a year in which the assumption is that regulators' hands are tied. After all, an unchecked expansion of leverage throughout the year could interfere with the stability imperative. There are two major risks to this view. First, there is the danger of unintended consequences: China is overleveraged: The fundamental problem for China is that there is too much leverage in the system and there has not been a bout of deleveraging for several years (Chart 7). Much of the leverage is off-balance sheet as a result of the rapid growth in shadow lending. There are complex and opaque webs of counterparty risk. When authorities crack down, they cannot be certain that their actions will not spiral out of control. Recently, heightened scrutiny of "mutual guarantees," a type of shadow lending between corporations, led to the default of a company in Shandong that prompted a local government bailout, and more such credit events have occured.7 Policymakers are human: It is a fallacy to assume that Chinese policymakers are omnipotent. The mishaps of 2015-16 put a point on this. A state-backed newspaper has recently reiterated that its "deleveraging" campaign is not finished - the government could accidentally push too far.8 The rise in bond yields has already inverted the yield curve, causing the five-year bond yield to rise higher than the ten-year (Chart 8). This is a red flag and warrants caution.9 Quick fixes have negative side-effects: China escaped the last round of financial jitters, in 2015-16, by using its time-tried technique of credit and fiscal spending to boost the property market and build infrastructure, while imposing draconian capital controls. The growth rebound came at the expense of more debt, less economic rebalancing, and less financial openness. Chart 7China Is Massively Overleveraged Chart 8China's Yield Curve Has Inverted Second, there is the risk that Xi Jinping's calculus ahead of the party congress is not knowable. It may well be the case that Xi's position in the party is strengthened by a disruptive financial crackdown. The party congress is already under way: The party congress runs all year; it is not merely a one-off event this fall. Senior party officials will come up with a list of candidates for promotion in June or July. Then the PSC and former PSC members will likely meet behind the scenes to hash out their final list, which the Central Committee will ratify in the fall. If financial jitters were supposed to be strictly avoided for the party congress, then the current crackdown would never have begun. The outcomes are uncertain: The negotiations for the Politburo and PSC are not a foregone conclusion no matter how well positioned Xi appears to be as the "core" of the Communist Party. A simple assessment of the current Politburo suggests that the factions are evenly balanced when it comes to the current Politburo members capable of filling the five positions on the new PSC. Two of these positions should go to President Xi's and Premier Li Keqiang's successors, likely to be of opposing factions, while there will probably be three remaining slots that will have to be divvied up among an equal number of candidates from the two main factions (Table 1). Xi may still need to win some battles for influence behind the scenes in order to stack the Central Committee, Politburo, and PSC with his people for 2017 and beyond.10 His anti-corruption campaign has slowed down but is not over (Chart 9). This is all the more imperative for him since his retirement could be rattled by future enemies, given that he has removed the longstanding impunity of former PSC members. Table 1Lineup Of New Politburo Standing Committee Yet To Take Shape - Factions Evenly Balanced Despite these risks, we still tend to think that for China, as for the world, political risks are overstated in 2017 and understated in 2018.11 If Xi deliberately courts instability this year, as opposed to merely staying vigilant over the financial sector, then it will mark a major break from the norms of Chinese politics. The true risk to China's stability - aside from the unintended consequences discussed above - arises after the party congress, when Xi's political capital is replenished and he can attempt to reboot his policy agenda. Previous presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin both launched reform pushes after their midterm congresses in 2007 and 1997, respectively. Hu's reform drive was cut short by the global financial crisis, while Jiang's was large-scale and disruptive and paved the way for a decade of higher potential GDP. Having consolidated power in the party, bureaucracy, and military, and tightened controls over the media, Xi Jinping will be in a position in 2018 to launch sweeping reforms should he choose to do so. Presumably these reforms would follow along the lines of those he outlined in the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee back in 2013 - they would be pro-market reforms focused on raising productivity by transferring more wealth to households and SMEs at the expense of state-owned enterprises and local governments.12 To illustrate the process of structural reform, we have often used the notion of the "J-Curve" in Diagram 1. This shows that painful reforms deplete political capital, creating a "danger zone" for political leaders in which they lose popularity as economic pain hurts the public. Xi's work over the past five years to fight corruption and rebuild the party's public image have given him the ability to start the J-Curve process from a higher point than otherwise would have been the case. He will start at point D in the diagram, instead of point A, which means that the low point E may not embroil him as deeply in the danger zone of serious political instability as point B. Chart 9Embers Still Burning In ##br##Anti-Corruption Campaign Diagram 1The J-curve Of##br## Structural Reform But there is still no guarantee that he intends to expend his political capital in this way. The current round of financial tightening could be preliminaries for bigger moves next year - or it could be just another mini-cycle in the ongoing process of "managing" China's massive leverage. If China decides to execute a major deleveraging campaign, either now or next year, it will have a negative effect on global commodity demand (particularly base metals), on commodity exporters, on emerging markets in general, and ultimately on global growth. It would be beneficial for Chinese growth in the long run but negative in the short run, and in terms of Chinese domestic risk assets would open up opportunities for investors to favor "new (innovative) China" versus "old (industrial) China." Bottom Line: We remain long Chinese equities versus Taiwanese and Hong Kong equities for now, but are wary of any sign of doubling down on policy tightening in the face of more frequent and intense credit events. That would indicate that the Chinese leadership has a higher risk appetite than anyone expects and may be willing to induce serious financial disruption before the party congress. Korea: Drunk On Moonshine The Korean election is over and with it much of the heightened uncertainty that accompanied the impeachment and removal from office of President Park Geun-hye over the past year. The new president, Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party, performed right around the polled expectations at 41% of the vote (Table 2). His competitor on the right wing, Hong Jun-pyo, outperformed expectations, though he still trailed well behind at 24%, giving Moon a large margin of victory by Korean standards that will help provide him with political capital (Chart 10). Table 2South Korean Presidential Election Results Chart 10Moon Will Have A Honeymoon Moon's election will bring relief to markets on both the domestic and geopolitical front. On the domestic front, he is proposing a series of policies that will cumulatively boost fiscal thrust and growth. On the geopolitical front, he will revive the "Sunshine Policy" (now "Moonshine Policy") of engagement with North Korea, reducing the appearance that the peninsula is slipping into war.13 The power vacuum in South Korea was a key driver of North Korea's belligerence in 2016, as the lead-up to South Korean elections has been in the past (Chart 11). South Korean presidents typically enjoy a substantial honeymoon period in which they are able to drive policy. The fact that the election occurred seven months early, as a result of the impeachment, gives Moon a notable boost to this period - he has seven months longer than he would have had before he faces any potential check from voters in the 2020 legislative elections. That is not to say that Moon has free rein. Ahn Cheol-soo's People's Party holds 40 seats in the National Assembly and is therefore in a "kingmaker" position - able to provide either the ruling Democratic Party or the fractured right-wing opposition with a majority of seats (Diagram 2). The People's Party is already criticizing Moon's call for increasing government spending by around 0.7% of GDP to fulfill his campaign pledges. True, the People's Party leans to the left and rose to power as a result of the median voter's shift to the left in the 2016's legislative elections. This may limit its ability to obstruct Moon's agenda at first. Nevertheless, it poses a substantial constraint on Moon's agenda through 2020. Chart 11Bull Market For##br## North Korean Threats Diagram 2Center-Left People's Party##br## Is The Korean Kingmaker Markets are relieved but not ebullient. The impeachment rally is over and eventually markets will realize that while Moon's agenda is pro-growth, it is not necessarily pro-corporate profits (Chart 12). He is promising to introduce a higher minimum wage, to convert temporary labor contracts into permanent ones, to increase social spending, and to toughen up labor and environmental regulation (Table 3). He has also appointed the so-called "chaebol sniper" as his point man in leading the reform of the country's chaebol industrial giants. On one hand, South Korea definitely needs corporate governance reform; on the other, the process will add uncertainty and Moon's approach may not be market-positive.14 Chart 12Relief Rally Likely To Disappoint Table 3South Korean President's Campaign Proposals To get an indication of what kind of impact Moon's economic agenda may have, it is helpful to compare that of his mentor, Roh Moo-hyun, president from 2002-7. Roh gave a boost to consumption, both government and private, and saw a relative drop off in fixed capital accumulation, which fits with the broad agenda of supporting workers and households and removing privileges for Korea's traditional export-oriented industrial complex (Chart 13). Roh proved very beneficial for the financial sector, wholesale and retail trade, and health and social work. Education and public administration received some support but were flat overall (Chart 14 A & B). If Moon follows in Roh's footsteps, he will be beneficial for the domestic-oriented economy. Chart 13South Korea's Left Wing##br## Boosts Domestic Consumption Chart 14ASouth Korea's Left Wing Boosts Finance,##br## Domestic Trade, And Health Care (I) Chart 14BSouth Korea's Left Wing Boosts Finance,##br## Domestic Trade, And Health Care (II) Abroad, the Moonshine Policy is likely to have some success, at least in the medium term. The Trump administration is pursuing a strategy comparable to the U.S.'s nuclear negotiations with Iran from 2011-15, in which it tries to rally a coalition to impose tougher sanctions on the rogue state with the purpose of entering into a new round of negotiations that will actually generate concrete results. The "arc of diplomacy" will take time to get going and could last several years - it is essentially a last-ditch effort to convince North Korea to pause its nuclear and missile advances. The tail risk of conflict on the Korean peninsula will be moved out to the end of this effort, perhaps around the end of Trump's term.15 Meanwhile, Moon is already patching up trade relations with China, according to reports, after the latter imposed sanctions on Korea for deploying the U.S. THAAD missile defense system (Chart 15). He will also seek joint infrastructure projects with China and Russia to connect the peninsula. China has a vested interest in Moon's success because it is attempting to demonstrate to the Trump administration that it is cooperating on North Korean security. Chart 15China Likely To Ease##br## Sanctions On South Korea Chart 16South Korean Inflation##br## And Credit Impulse Weak The geopolitical risk to markets is, first, that North Korea miscalculates the threshold of other nations' patience, continues with provocations, and eventually causes an incident that derails the new negotiations. This is possible given the North's record of belligerent acts and the fact that both the Trump administration and the Abe administration could cut diplomacy short in the face of a truly disruptive provocation for domestic political reasons. Second, there is a risk that Trump decides to escalate North Korean tensions again, whether to distract from domestic scandals or to reinforce the military deterrent in the event that China and South Korea appear to be giving North Korea a free pass in another round of useless talks. If Moon pursues a unilateral détente with North Korea, without adequate coordination with the U.S., and pushes for the removal of THAAD missiles, then the U.S. and South Korea are headed for a period of higher-than-normal alliance tensions that could become market-relevant.16 Bottom Line: We remain short KRW/THB. Core inflation and domestic demand remain weak in Korea, which reinforces the central bank's recent decision to stick to an accommodative monetary policy. Credit growth is cyclically weak, which reinforces the fact that rate cuts are still on the table (including the possibility of a surprise rate cut like in mid-2016) (Chart 16). Finally, the KRW has been relatively strong compared to the currencies of Korea's competitors (Chart 17). Chart 17South Korean Won Has Outpaced The Yuan And Yen In terms of equities, the top six chaebol have come under scrutiny, but Samsung has rallied despite lying at the center of the corruption scandal. The others have not performed well amid the economic slowdown. We see no opportunity at present to short the chaebol in relation to the broader market. Broadly, however, Moon's policies will add burdens to large internationally competitive industrials while boosting small and medium-sized enterprises. We also remain short the Korean ten-year government bond versus the two-year (see Chart 12, panel three, above). Moon's policy bent will subtract from a 1% budget surplus (2016) and worsen the long-term trajectory of the country's relatively low public debt (39% of GDP). Insofar as his foreign policy succeeds, it entails a larger future debt burden as a result of efforts to integrate with North Korea, which is relevant to long-term bonds well before reunification appears anywhere on the horizon. At bottom, we are structurally bearish South Korea because of rising headwinds both to U.S.-China relations and to the broader globalization process that has benefited South Korea so much in the recent past. Japan: Is Militarism The Final Act Of Abenomics? Japan has reached peak political capital under Shinzo Abe. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, with its New Komeito coalition partner, continues to play in a totally different league from its competitors - there is no political alternative at the moment (Chart 18). The ruling party has a de facto two-thirds supermajority in both houses of the Diet. Abe himself is more popular than any recent prime minister, and has retained that popularity over a longer period of time (Chart 19). He has secured permission from his party to stay on as its president until 2021, though he faces general elections in December 2018 to stay on as prime minister. Chart 18Japan: Liberal Democrats Still Supreme Chart 19Shinzo Abe Remains The Man Of The Hour Political capital is a fleeting thing, so Abe must use it or lose it. This is why we have insisted that he would press forward rapidly with attempts to revise Japan's constitution, his ultimate policy goal, which he has now confirmed he will do. His proposed deadline is July 2020 for the new provisions coming into force.17 Constitutional revision is not only about enshrining the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) so as to normalize the country's defense policy. It is also about Japan becoming an independent nation again, capable of forging its own destiny outside of the one foreseen by the American framers of the post-WWII constitution. Though Abe has specific constitutional aims, any change to the constitution will demonstrate that change is possible and break a taboo, advancing Abe's broader goal of nudging the Japanese public toward active rather than passive policies.18 Hence Japanese politics are about to heat up in a big way. Abe has already done a trial run in his passage of a new national security law in September 2015. This law allowed the government to reinterpret the constitution so as to achieve many of his chief military-strategic aims (e.g. allowing the JSDF to come to the aid of allies in "collective self-defense"). Over the course of that year, Abe's popularity flagged, as public opinion punished him for shifting attention away from the economic reflation agenda that got him elected so as to focus on his more controversial, hawkish security agenda (Chart 20). Nevertheless, Abe stuck to the security agenda, in the face of some of the largest protests in Japan's post-Occupation history, and managed to shift back to the economy in time to notch another big victory in the upper house elections of 2016. We expect a similar process to unfold this time, though with bigger stakes and far less of a chance that Abe can "pivot" again. Under no circumstances do we see him reversing the constitutional drive now that he has the rare gift of supermajorities in the Diet; rather, he is going to spend his political capital. After all, there is no telling what could happen in the 2018 election. What are the market implications of this agenda? There may be some hiccups in consumer and business sentiment as a result of the rise in activism, political opposition, and controversy that is already beginning and will intensify as the process gets under way. Abe will be accused of putting the economy on the backburner. Abenomics is already of questionable success (Chart 21) and it will come under greater criticism as Abe shifts attention elsewhere, especially if global headwinds gain strength. Chart 20Abe Loses Support When He Talks##br## Security Instead Of Economy Chart 21Abenomics: ##br##Progress Is Gradual However, we recommend investors fade this narrative and buy Japan. Abe's constitutional changes must receive a simple majority in a nationwide popular referendum in order to pass - and Abe does not clearly have what he needs at the moment (Chart 22). This means that he cannot, in reality, afford to put Abenomics on the back burner, but instead must err on the side of monetary dovishness, fiscal stimulus, and reflation in order to win support for the non-economic agenda. There has been virtually no talk of fiscal stimulus this year, yet the policy setting is conducive to increasing spending as necessary. The Bank of Japan has explicitly embraced a monetary regime designed to allow for greater "coordination" with fiscal policy (Chart 23).19 There is no reason whatsoever to believe Abe is backing away from this stance. (Incidentally, the next consumption tax hike is not slated until October 2019, and could be delayed again.) Geopolitics are also fairly supportive of the Abe administration. First, the Korean situation is currently alarming enough to help justify the constitutional changes yet not alarming enough to provoke outright conflict. Abe is also making headway toward a historic improvement of relations with Russia, allowing Japan's military to pivot from the north to the south and west (i.e. China and North Korea). The chief risk for Abe is if North Korea surprises on the dovish side and new international diplomatic efforts appear so fruitful as to reduce domestic support for remilitarization. China, South Korea, and possibly North Korea will encourage the latter dynamic, while drumming up global criticism of Japan for warmongering. Meanwhile Japan will try to remind the domestic public and the U.S. that North Korea remains a clear and present danger and tends to take advantage of negotiations. Given the relatively positive geopolitical backdrop for Abe, the biggest risk to his agenda is an exogenous economic shock. Even then, if that shock stems from China and causes Beijing to rattle-sabers as a domestic distraction, then it will benefit Abe's remilitarization agenda. What would hurt Abe is if global growth sags but China and North Korea lay low. It is too soon to say that they will do this, but it is unlikely. Trump is also a wild card whose threats of "tough" policy toward China and North Korea may reemerge in 2018, in time to help Japan make constitutional changes that the U.S. generally supports. Bottom Line: Go long Japan. While there is no correlation between Japan's defense-exposed equity sector performance and the current government's remilitarization efforts, there is a clear case to be made that nominal GDP and defense spending will both be going up as a result of constitutional and economic policies (Chart 24). Abe will double down on reflation for at least as long as is necessary to maintain popular approval of his government ahead of a historic constitutional referendum. Chart 22Revise The Constitution? Yes.##br## End Pacifism? Maybe. Chart 23Japanese Reflation ##br##Will Continue Chart 24Expect Higher Nominal##br## Growth And Defense Spending Housekeeping: Play Pound Strength Through USD, Not EUR We are closing our short EUR/GBP position, open since January 25, for a loss of 1.77%. This trade has largely been flat. We put it on as a way to articulate our view that Brexit political risks are overstated and that the pound bottomed on January 16. The political call was right, but the pound has largely moved sideways versus the euro since then. We maintain our short USD/GBP, which is up 4.63% since March 29, as a way to articulate the same view that Brexit (and the upcoming U.K. elections) are not a risk. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump Thumps The Markets," dated May 19, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 The party congress, which occurs every five years and marks the "midterm" of President Xi Jinping's administration, will see a sweeping rotation of Communist Party officials, including on the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). 4 Please see "China able to keep its financial markets stable, Premier Li says," Reuters, May 14, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. For the December meeting, see "China's monetary policy to be prudent, neutral in 2017," Xinhua, December 16, 2016, available at www.chinadaily.com. 5 Finance Minister Xiao Jie, Commerce Minister Zhong Shan, NDRC Chairman He Lifeng, and China Banking Regulatory Commission Chairman Guo Shuqing have all recently been appointed, but they replaced leaders due to retire as part of the party congress reshuffle. Only the new China Insurance Regulatory Commission Chairman Xiang Junbo and the new Director o f the National Bureau of Statistics Wang Baoan were replaced for reasons other than retirement, having been stung by the anti-corruption campaign. By March 2018 the world should have a better sense of Xi's economic and financial "team" for 2018-22. 6 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Financial Crackdown And Market Implications," dated May 18, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Zouping government, in Shandong, intervened into the case of Qixing aluminum company's insolvency in order to transfer control to Xiwang, a corn oil and steel producer that had given a mutual guarantee to Qixing. The Zouping authorities arrested the son of Qixing's chairman to force the transfer. Please see "Bond Buyers Blacklist Some Chinese Provinces After Run Of Defaults," Bloomberg, April 26, 2017, available at www.bloomberg.com. 8 Please see "China Deleveraging To Continue As Goals Not Yet Achieved: State Paper," Reuters, May 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 9 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Signs Of An EM/China Growth Reversal," dated April 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com, and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Signal From Commodities," dated May 19, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Xi may yet go after another big "tiger," Zeng Qinghong, the right-hand man of former President Jiang Zemin. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated in 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com, and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Tracking The Reform Progress," dated October 22, 2014, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 13 "Moonshine Policy" is a phrase we regrettably did not coin, but we discussed its coming in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "What About Emerging Markets?" dated May 3, 2017, and "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Moon has nominated Kim Sang-jo, a professor of economics at Hansung University in Seoul, to head his Fair Trade Commission. Kim is a long-time advocate for shareholders against the family-controlled chaebol and led a prominent law suit against Samsung. Past efforts at reforming the chaebol led by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun focused on improving balance sheets, protecting minority shareholders' rights, limiting the total amount of investment, and improving corporate management and accountability. It remains to be seen how Moon (and Kim Sang-jo, assuming his nomination is confirmed) will proceed, but the effort will bring domestic challenges to the top industrial conglomerates' operating environment at least initially. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 South Korea's special envoy Hong Seok-hyun claims that Trump told him at the White House that he will work closely with Moon and is willing to try engagement with Pyongyang, conditions permitting, though he is not interested in talks for the sake of talks. This fits with our view that the U.S. saber-rattling this year was designed to make the military option more credible before pursuing a new round of diplomacy. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, and Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 So, for instance, if it should happen that, over the course of the coming debates, Abe is forced to drop his proposed revisions to the pacifist Article 9, he may still achieve changes to the amendment-making procedure in Article 96. The latter would be even more important for Japan's future, since it would make it easier for Japan to change the constitution for whatever reason in the coming decades. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "King Dollar: The Agent Of Righteous Retribution," dated October 12, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights U.S. Politics: We recommend that investors look through the political noise in D.C., which is unlikely to arrest the current cyclical economic upturn. Maintain a pro-growth asset allocation within fixed income portfolios: below-benchmark duration, favoring corporate credit over government bonds, especially in the U.S. Duration Checklists: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop remains conducive to rising Euro Area bond yields, while the upward pressures on U.S. yields have diminished somewhat. The majority of the indicators, however, continue to point to higher U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Europe: Reduce European duration exposure, but wait for wider spread levels before moving out of European government bonds into U.S. Treasuries. Feature The Economy Trumps Politics Chart of the WeekHas Anything Really Changed? A whiff of panic swept across global financial markets last week, as the political risk bugaboo came back with a vengeance. In the U.S., the deepening morass surrounding President Trump's decision to fire former FBI Director Comey, and the potential links to the ongoing investigation of the White House's ties to Russia, raised concerns that Trump's ambitious pro-growth policy agenda would never make it out of Congress. Even this year's darling in the Emerging Markets, Brazil, suffered a huge financial rout after news broke of corruption allegations against the current president. Amid growing talk of a potential impeachment of Trump, the market action was a classic risk-off move, with equity markets falling, the VIX finally waking from its slumber and safe-haven assets like gold, U.S. Treasuries and the Japanese yen rallying. The euro climbed to new 2017 highs versus the U.S. dollar, without any changes in expectations about potential policy moves from the European Central Bank (ECB), as the market knocked down the probability of a June Fed rate hike (Chart of the Week). Some creative commentators called these market moves "the Trump fade" - the beginnings of a reversal of the so-called "Trump trade" that has sent U.S. equity prices and bond yields higher since the U.S. election on expectations of a large U.S. fiscal stimulus. We remain skeptical, however, that expectations of tax cuts and increased government spending have been the main drivers of the post-election boost in U.S. stock prices and Treasury yields, as the current cyclical upturn in global growth was already underway before Trump's election victory. Our colleagues at the BCA Geopolitical Strategy service note that, despite Trump's terrible overall approval ratings (Chart 2), his support among his Republican voters remains strong (Chart 3). Thus, an impeachment is only likely if the Republicans were to lose control of the House of Representatives in next year's U.S. midterm elections. Fear of that outcome should motivate the GOP to try and push through tax and healthcare reform well ahead of the 2018 midterms, in order to present a positive economic message to voters.1 Unless the evidence against Trump becomes so damning that even the Republicans in Congress have to focus on impeachment instead of policy, investors should ride out any market volatility associated with worries that the Trump economic agenda is at risk. Chart 2Trump's Support Abysmal Chart 3GOP Not Yet Willing To Impeach Trump Even without a boost to growth from D.C., however, we continue to expect the U.S. economy to grow above 2.5% in 2017. This above-trend pace will keep the Fed in play for at least two additional rate hikes before year-end, as it would give policymakers confidence that U.S. inflation expectations would return back the Fed's 2% target. In addition, as we discuss in the next section, the cyclical upturn in the Euro Area economy is showing no signs of cooling off, which will put more pressure on the ECB to begin preparing the markets for an eventual tapering of its asset purchases. The recent decline in bond yields is unlikely to persist much longer. Bottom Line: We recommend that investors look through the political noise in D.C., which is unlikely to arrest the current cyclical economic upturn. Maintain a pro-growth asset allocation within fixed income portfolios: below-benchmark duration, favoring corporate credit over government bonds, especially in the U.S. Checking In On Our Duration Checklists In a Special Report published back in February, we introduced a list of indicators to follow to assess the likely direction of U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields.2 We called these our "Duration Checklists", incorporating data on economic growth, inflation, investor risk aversion and market technicals to judge whether our bias to maintain a below-benchmark duration stance should be maintained. This week, we provide an update on those Checklists. The current message from the Checklists is that there is reduced upward pressure on bond yields from the overall strength of the global economy than existed four months ago. Domestic forces, however, are still pointing to higher yields in the U.S. and, especially, the Euro Area (Table 1). Specifically: Table 1A More Bond-Bearish Backdrop For Bunds Than USTs Global economic activity indicators have lost some momentum. While the global leading economic indicator (LEI) is still rising, our global LEI diffusion index has fallen sharply and is now below the 50 line, indicating that a more countries now have a falling LEI. In addition, the global ZEW index has drifted a touch lower, global data surprises are no longer positive, and the global credit impulse has ticked downward (Chart 4). Only the rising LEI warrants a "check" in our Checklists (i.e. justifies our current below-benchmark duration stance). U.S. & European domestic economic activity remains in good shape. Consumer and business confidence remains at strong levels on either side of the Atlantic, with corporate profit growth still accelerating (Charts 5 & 6). Only the modest decline in the U.S. manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) is worthy of an "x" in our U.S. Checklist, although the index remains well above 50 and is not pointing to a more serious deterioration in the U.S. economy. Chart 4Global Growth Backdrop Has##BR##Turned Less Bond-Bearish Chart 5U.S. Economic Strength##BR##Still Supports Higher UST Yields Chart 6Euro Area Growth Is##BR##Gaining Upward Momentum Inflation pressures have eased a bit, especially in the U.S. The slowing momentum in global energy prices has taken some of the steam out of headline inflation in both the U.S. and Europe. Wage inflation has eased up a bit in the U.S., even with the labor market running at full employment (Chart 7). Wage growth and core inflation have recently ticked higher in the Euro Area, however, while the unemployment rate there has fallen to within less than a percentage point away from the OECD estimate of the NAIRU (Chart 8).3 The only indicators worthy of a "check" are the unemployment gap in both the U.S. and Euro Area, although we will give a potential "check" (with a question mark) to European wage inflation. If the recent uptick gains additional momentum, the case for the ECB to begin moving to a less accommodative policy stance will be much stronger. Chart 7Inflation Pressures On UST Yields Have Eased Chart 8Core Inflation & Wages Bottoming Out In Europe? There is still a pro-risk bias among global investors. U.S. and Euro Area equity markets are still in bullish trends, trading well above their 200-day moving averages. At the same time, corporate credit spreads remain tight and option-implied equity volatility is very low (even after last week's pop in the U.S. on the Trump drama). All indicators are worthy of a "check", suggesting that easier financial conditions can lead to higher bond yields (Charts 9 & 10). We are, however, giving an "x" to the European Checklist for the deviation of the Stoxx 600 from its moving average, as it is now at the +10% extreme that we defined as being potentially bond-bullish as it could foreshadow a near-term correction of an overheated stock market. Chart 9Still Generally A Risk-Seeking Backdrop In The U.S. Chart 10Strong Risk-Seeking Behavior In Europe Bond markets no longer look technically stretched. The sharp move higher in yields at the end of 2016 left all our indicators of yield momentum at bearish extremes (for bond prices). With bond yields pulling back from 2017 highs, however, the momentum measures all look neutral at the moment and are not an impediment to higher yields (Charts 11 & 12). The same goes for duration positioning in the U.S., with the net longs on 10-year Treasury futures now at the highest level since 2007. All of the technical indicators in our Checklists warrant an "check". Chart 11UST Technicals No##BR##Longer Stretched Chart 12Technicals Are No Impediment##BR##To Higher Yields In Europe Summing it all up, our Duration Checklists show that the majority of indicators are still pointing to higher bond yields in the U.S. and Europe, although not as decisively as when we first published the Checklists in February. There are more "check" on the European side of the ledger, however, suggesting that there is more room for European government bond yields to rise relative to U.S. Treasuries. This would indicate a potential trade opportunity to cut allocations to Europe and raise allocations to the U.S. Chart 13UST-Bund Spread Is Now Too Low The recent decline in U.S. yields, however, has narrowed the U.S. Treasury/German Bund spread to levels that make putting on a tightening trade unattractive on a tactical basis. (Chart 13). The gap between the data surprise indices in the U.S. and Euro Area already reflects the recent soft patch for the U.S. economy (middle panel). That spread in the surprise indices now at historically wide levels, suggesting more potential for Treasury yields to rise if the U.S. data begins to rebound soon, as we expect. Also, the gap between U.S. and Euro Area inflation expectations has narrowed alongside the recent downtick in U.S. core inflation (bottom panel), although we expect the decline in U.S. core inflation to be short-lived given the persistent tightness of the U.S. labor market. Net-net, we would prefer to see a wider Treasury-Bund spread before making switching our country exposure out of Europe and into the U.S. We can, however, listen to the message from our Checklists and reduce our duration exposure in Europe. Specifically, we are cutting our allocations to the longer maturity buckets (5 years out to 30 years) by 50% in our model portfolio for Germany, France and Italy, putting the proceeds into the 1-3 year buckets (see the table on Page 12). This will reduce our overall recommended portfolio duration by just over 1/10th of a year, as well as put an additional bear-steepening curve tilt within our European government allocations. We are comfortable with that bias, given the growing risk that the ECB will soon begin signaling a tapering of asset purchases once the current program expires at the end of the year. Bottom Line: An update of our Duration Checklists shows that the backdrop remains conducive to rising Euro Area bond yields, while the upward pressures on U.S. yields have diminished somewhat. The majority of the indicators, however, continue to point to higher U.S. Treasury and German Bund yields. Reduce European duration exposure, but wait for wider spread levels before moving out of European government bonds into U.S. Treasuries. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment", dated May 17 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A Duration Checklist For U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds", dated February 15 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3 Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate Of Unemployment. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Dear Client, In addition to this abbreviated Weekly Report, I am sending you a Special Report discussing the signals being sent from recent movements in commodity prices. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature You want a friend in Washington? Get a dog! - President Harry S. Truman There are no friends in Washington; only enemies and accomplices. Donald Trump has been finding this out the hard way over the past few months. We won't get into the merits (or lack thereof) of the latest allegations of malfeasance against the president. That's for the talking heads on the cable news shows to debate. We will stick with the markets. For now, we are not too concerned about the growing risk that President Trump will be impeached. The U.S. has experienced three impeachment crises over the past 100 years: The Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974), and President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999). Only the Watergate crisis was accompanied by a bear market in stocks, and that was largely a function of the fact that the U.S. was going through one of the deepest recessions in the post-war era at the time (Chart 1). Things do not look nearly so grim today. After a weak start to the year, activity has rebounded in the second quarter. The Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model is predicting growth of 4.1% while the NY Fed's Nowcast is calling for 1.9%. The first quarter earnings season was a strong one. Our model predicts continued healthy profit growth for the remainder of the year in the U.S. and abroad (Chart 2). As long as corporate earnings are rising, investors will largely overlook the drama in Washington DC. Chart 1Equities Amid Three U.S. Scandals Chart 2Upbeat U.S. Earnings Model Moreover, we are not convinced that the litany of scandals afflicting the Trump administration will derail large parts of Trump's market-friendly policy agenda. Trump desperately needs a win, and tax reform and deregulation are two key areas where the president and congressional Republicans see eye to eye. We still think that there is a good chance that the contours of an agreement to substantially cut taxes will take shape by the end of the year. The prospect of such a deal should be enough to buoy investor sentiment. Thus, while equities are likely to remain under pressure in the near term, the outlook for the next 9-to-12 months is still reasonably good.1 Our worries are more focused on what happens as next summer approaches. As we discussed last week, U.S. growth may begin to stall out in late-2018 as the economy runs out of spare capacity and the impact of Fed rate hikes becomes more apparent. Politics are also likely to turn even more volatile. A simple majority vote in the House of Representatives is all it takes to impeach a sitting president. There aren't enough votes in the House right now, but there could be if the Democrats make a strong showing in the November 2018 midterm elections - something that current polls suggest is quite likely (Chart 3). If the Democrats end up winning the House, Marko Papic, our chief geopolitical strategist, believes that it is nearly 100% certain that they will vote to begin impeachment proceedings.2 Chart 3Challenging Outlook For Republicans In 2018 Chart 4The GOP Base Still Supports Trump The good news for Trump is that even then, it would take a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate to oust him from office. Realistically, this cannot happen without significant Republican support. The bad news is that there are plenty of Republican senators who would be more than happy to stick a long sharp dagger into Trump's back and replace him with Mike Pence, Trump's more reliable and less drama-prone vice president. What is preventing them from doing so is the fear of a backlash from the white, working-class voters who got Trump elected. The only way this fear will go away is if the Republican base turns against Trump. So far that hasn't happened: Trump still commands the support of 84% of Republican voters (Chart 4). The risk, however, is that his base will desert him as the administration goes from one scandal to the next. Trump knows this, which is why come next year, he is likely to dial up his populist rhetoric. And unlike in the past, confident promises will not be enough. Trump's voters will be looking for concrete actions on hot-button issues like trade and immigration. At a time when growth is likely be slowing of its own accord, the specter of such measures could be enough to pull the rug out from risk assets. 1 We are currently short the S&P 500 as a tactical hedge, reflecting the bearish near-term signals being sent by our Stock Market Timing model. Cyclically, however, the model still points to slightly above-average returns for U.S. stocks. For further details, please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Stock Market Timing Model," dated May 5, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The political theater in Washington has caused the last inning of the dollar correction to materialize. The U.S. economy remains at full employment, growth will stay above trend, and the Fed will be capable of hiking rates by more than the 66 basis points priced into the OIS curve over the next 24 months. It is time to buy the DXY. Investors are too optimistic on the euro and too negative on the CAD, short EUR/CAD as a tactical bet. The Swedish economy continues to improve. Yet, the SEK has limited upside as the Riksbank continues to find excuses to justify its dovishness. The downside for EUR/SEK is limited to 9.3. Feature Chart I-1Trump Rally Is Gone Four weeks ago, we wrote that the U.S. dollar correction was entering its last inning and recommended investors should wait a few more weeks before betting on renewed dollar strength.1 We think the time to bet on this rebound is now. To begin with, the dollar index has now erased all the gains accumulated since Trump's electoral victory, suggesting that all the hope of fiscal stimulus, deregulation, and tax cuts have now been priced out of the greenback (Chart I-1). In fact, at this point in time we think too many risks have been priced into the dollar. For one, the market is overemphasizing the likelihood of a Trump impeachment. While our Geopolitical Strategy group does think the likelihood of an impeachment procedure is near 100% if the democrats win the House in 2018, the likelihood remains much lower in 2017.2 Simply put, Trump remains a very popular president among republican voters (Chart I-2). Most problematic for many republicans that would like to see Trump out of office, is that his popularity is particularly strong among the "Tea Party" districts and voters (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Trump Still Popular With Republicans Chart I-3Trump Is Popular In Tea Party Territory Second, the chance that tax cuts are part of the upcoming budget negations is high. Tax cuts are espoused by the entire GOP caucus. Additionally, Republicans know that in order to avoid losing the Senate or the House of Representatives, or both, they have to do something popular with voters. Tax cuts definitely fit the bill. This simple political assessment points toward a likely passage of stimulus in the coming quarters despite Trump's personal woes. Finally, if Trump were to be stabbed in the back by the GOP establishment, what would the impact be on the dollar? Would the U.S. default? No. Would the economy enter a recession? No. Would the Fed become dovish? Neither. If anything, a potential removal of Trump from the oval office reduces the risk that he appoints a super-dove at the helm of the Fed, a risk that would have been very negative for our positive dollar cyclical stance. Regarding the economics behind the dollar rally, our positive cyclical stance on the USD predates the election of Trump, and in fact relied on the underlying shifts in the U.S. economy.3 These dynamics are still intact: While wage growth remains anemic, this partly reflects the fact that the long-term determinant of wage growth, productivity growth, is low. When this is taken into account, productivity-adjusted wage growth is in line with levels that in the past have prompted the Fed to tighten policy in order to combat potential inflationary dynamics (Chart I-4). Nonetheless, the risk is that wages begin accelerating going forward. The labor market is at full employment, with the U-3 unemployment rate standing 0.3 percentage points below the Fed's estimate of the neutral unemployment rate. Additionally, hidden labor market slack has also greatly dissipated (Chart I-5), with the U-6 unemployment rate, the number of workers in part-time jobs for economic reasons, and the amount of workers outside of the labor force but that would still like to have a job if economic conditions warranted it all back to levels where historically wage growth has gained momentum. Chart I-4Without Productivity Gains, Current Wage##br## Growth Is Enough For A Tighter Fed Chart I-5U.S. Labor Market##br## Is Tight Moreover, the outlook for consumption remains sturdy. Overall household income growth remains supported by elevated levels of job creation, and our indicator for real household disposable income growth continues to point up. Additionally, Federal income tax withholdings are accelerating, a sign of more robust consumption to come (Chart I-6). With consumer confidence at 17-year highs, positive income developments are likely to be translated into consumption. The outlook for capex is also bright. CEO confidence and capex intentions have all rebounded sharply, moves whose genesis predate Trump's election (Chart I-7). Moreover, elements are in place for these positive feelings to be catalyzed into actual investment. On the back of rebounding revenue growth, thanks to nominal GDP growth exiting levels historically associated with recessions, profit growth will receive a fillip, which should boost capex in the current context (Chart I-8). Chart I-6Income Tax Receipts Points ##br##To Healthy Consumption Chart I-7Capex Intentions Point ##br##To Higher Growth Chart I-8Revenue Growth Exiting ##br##Recessionary Levels Finally, when all major indicators are aggregated, real GDP growth looks set to accelerate. BCA's Beige Book diffusion index, based on the distribution of positive and negative mentions about the state of the economy in the Fed's Beige Book, is pointing to an acceleration in activity (Chart I-9). This suggests that the collapse in U.S. economic surprises may be toward its tail end. With this in mind, we continue to expect the Fed to increase rates more than the 66 basis points currently anticipated in the OIS curve over the next two years, as such, this supports our bullish stance on the dollar. In terms of tactical developments, the recent selloff has brought the DXY toward the levels congruent with the end of the correction.4 Additionally, based on our Intermediate-term timing model, the USD is now cheap enough to justify taking a long bet on the currency. The deeply oversold levels reached by our Intermediate-term momentum oscillator supports this message (Chart I-10). Finally, the Swedish Krona seems to be confirming these signposts. USD/SEK has historically displayed one of the strongest betas to the trade-weighted dollar's movements. The fact that this pair has not been able to break down below a long-term upward slopping trend line put in place since 2014, and that it also managed to stay above its 2015 peaks, gives us more confidence that the dollar correction is likely to have run its course (Chart I-11). Chart I-9BCA's Beige Book Monitor ##br##Improves Growth Will Strengthen Chart I-10Dollar Is ##br##Oversold Chart I-11USD/SEK Giving A Hopeful##br## Signal For DXY Bottom Line: The dollar has taken a beating in the wake of the scandals emerging out of the White House. In our view, these developments were only the catalyst that crystalized the last leg of the USD correction that begun in late 2016/early 2017. Ultimately, the bull case for the dollar predates Trump and rests on the dissipating slack in the U.S. economy. These developments are intact, even with Trump's fiascos in the foreground. Tactically, the dollar is now cheap enough and oversold enough to justify investors buy the DXY again. We are opening a long DXY trade this week. We remain long the dollar against most commodity currencies and EM currencies. The yen may continue to benefit if the budding weaknesses in the EM space gather further momentum. EUR/CAD Is A Short At this juncture, it would be natural for us to begin shorting the EUR against the USD. In fact, we believe the recent spike in the EUR has created a good shorting opportunity against the European currency. While we worry investors are becoming too pessimistic on the U.S., we believe investors are too optimistic regarding the capacity of the ECB to increase rates. Investors moved away from deep short positions on the euro and are now net long this currency. Also, while in July 2016 investors expected the first ECB rate hike to materialize in more than five years' time, they are now expecting the first repo rate hike to happen in just 24 months (Chart I-12). This looks premature. For comparison's sake, in the U.S. we are only seeing the early signs of labor market tightness, despite the last recession ending in the summer of 2009. Europe was victim to a double-dip recession, the last leg of which ended in 2013. This decreases the likelihood of Europe being at full employment today. More concretely, there remains plenty of hidden labor market slack in the euro area. In Europe, the main form of slack exists among workers hired under contracts, contracts that do not offer the same level of benefits and protections as regular employment. The euro area increasingly has a dual labor market, a condition that has weighed on wage growth for more than two decades in Japan. Today, as a result of such dynamics, the level of labor underutilization in Europe is still very elevated, which will continue to limit wage growth going forward (Chart I-13). Hence, core inflation dynamics in Europe are likely to prove disappointing and they will keep the ECB on a more dovish path than investors currently appreciate. Chart I-12Investors Too Optimistic On The ECB Chart I-13Labor Market Slack In The Euro Area Remains High For now we are electing to profit from this view by tactically shorting the euro against the CAD. We do believe there are problems in Canada, a topic we discussed a few weeks ago.5 But at this juncture, these worries seem well digested by markets. The Home Capital Group debacle has been front page news for weeks, but the aggregate banking sector remains strong, especially as loses on the mortgage holdings of Canadian banks will ultimately be passed on to the government through the insurance provided by the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Additionally, in the wake of the deepening trade dispute on softwood lumber, the fears of a disintegration of NAFTA have hit Canada especially violently, with the CAD falling 16% against the peso since January 2017. Chart I-14EUR/CAD Is Toppy Tactically, the pieces are falling into place to favor the CAD over the EUR. Our Commodity and Energy group remains positive on the outlook for oil prices. The continuation of the output controls by OPEC and Russia remains binding as oil producers want to further curtail elevated oil inventories. Therefore, oil prices have little downside and may even experience further upside, helping the CAD in the process. Additionally, investor positioning is very skewed. Investors are massively short the CAD, especially when compared to the euro, which historically has provided a signal to short EUR/CAD (Chart I-14). This is re-enforced by our Intermediate-term technical indicator which shows EUR/CAD as massively overbought. Shorter-term momentum measures such as the RSI or the MACD have also been forming negative divergences with actual prices in recent days. Bottom Line: The euro is likely to suffer if the USD correction is indeed finishing. Hidden labor market slack remains a much deeper problem in Europe than in the U.S. and will limit the capacity of the ECB to increase rates in the next two years, as investors are currently expecting. For now, we are electing to short the euro against the CAD instead of against the USD. The Canadian dollar is oversold and oil prices have limited downside from here as supply adjustments remain positive. Moreover, investors are at record shorts on the CAD, especially when compared to the euro. Sweden Is Strong, But The Riksbank Still Haunts The SEK The long-term outlook for both Sweden and the Swedish krona remain bright but the ultra-dovish stance of the Riksbank remains a potent short-term hurdle. To begin with, the SEK offers great value. Not only is it trading at 24% and 8% discounts to its PPP fair value against the USD and the EUR, respectively, but the trade-weight SEK is also trading at a near one-sigma discount against our long-term fair value models (Chart I-15). Chart I-15SEK Is Cheap... But Is It Enough? Additionally, Sweden's net international investment position has moved back in positive territory in 2014, and now stands 16.4% of GDP (Chart I-16). This is not only a reflection of the weakness in the SEK since 2014, but is first and foremost the end-result of more than two decades of accumulated current account surpluses. This development is crucial. Not only does the positive income balance generated by assets in excess of international liabilities put a floor under the current account; historically, currencies with positive and growing net international investment positions tend to exhibit an upward bias. In terms of economic developments, employment growth in Sweden remains steady. Unemployment has been in a protracted downtrend, falling 2.9 percentage points since 2008 (Chart I-17). Yet, despite being well into full employment territory, wage growth has been absent. To a large degree, this reflects entrenched deflationary pressures in the Swedish economy. However, deflationary forces are abating. Chart I-16A Long-Term Driver Pointing North Chart I-17Swedish Labor Market At Full Employment To begin with, Sweden's output gap has recently entered positive territory, which historically has been a reliable indicator of inflationary pressures in this country (Chart I-18). Also, monetary aggregates, M1 in particular, continue to point toward higher inflation in Sweden. This means that with the employment market being at full capacity, the conditions for higher inflation in Sweden are emerging. Our expectation of an upcoming upturn in the Swedish credit impulse - which until now has been contracting and exerting deflationary forces on the economy - reinforces confidence in our inflation view. Credit growth tends to lag industrial activity, but our industrial production model for Sweden is perking up. Improving industrial variables suggest that credit will move from depressing demand back to supporting demand, further rekindling inflationary forces (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Swedish Inflation Is Set To Pick Up Chart I-19Swedish Credit Impulse Will Rebound With this positive backdrop for prices, should investors buy the SEK right now? The Riksbank continues to represent a great hurdle for SEK bulls. The Swedish central bank has one of the strongest dovish biases amongst global monetary guardians. Against expectations, it recently increased the duration of its asset purchase program, giving markets a strong signal that it is unlikely to increase rates soon. This means that the Riksbank is unlikely to tighten policy until it sees the "whites of inflation's eyes". While we are moving in the right direction, we are not there yet. Officially, the Riksbank targets CPIF, which currently clocks in at 2%. Yet, the emphasis of the central bank on domestic price dynamics implies that adjustment away from dovishness will only occur when core inflation itself moves to 2% (Chart I-20). This means that gains in the SEK will be limited. To begin with, EUR/SEK does have downside, and our view that the euro is getting overextended highlights that EUR/SEK could fall toward 9.3. However, beyond this level, gains should prove limited as Sweden is a small open economy and EUR/SEK plays a big role in tightening monetary conditions for that country. As a result, any move in EUR/SEK below 9.3 is likely to be unwelcomed by the Riksbank until core inflation moves closer to 2%. Versus the USD, it will be even more difficult for the SEK to rally. Historically, the SEK has been one of the most sensitive currencies to the dollar's trend, implying that strength in DXY could be magnified in USD/SEK. In fact, the absence of breakdown in USD/SEK in the face of violent dollar selling pressures this week suggests that the SEK could be a serious casualty of a rebounding dollar. Additionally, real rate differentials continue to move in favor of the U.S. dollar, with U.S. 2-year real rates now 180 basis points above that of Sweden (Chart I-21). With the Intermediate-term technical indicator for USD/SEK now hitting oversold levels, the downside for USD/SEK is very limited, further supporting the idea that any rebound in DXY could lead to significant weaknesses in SEK. Chart I-20Core Inflation Needs To Rise Chart I-21Rates Differentials Support A Lower SEK Bottom Line: The Swedish economy has adjusted and several factors are pointing toward a pickup in core inflation in the coming quarters. However, the Riksbank has maintained a strong dovish bias. We need to see an actual pick up in core inflation itself before the central bank moves away from its dovish bias. While EUR/SEK could weaken toward 9.3, more gains for the krona against the euro will prove elusive until the Riksbank sees firmer inflation. USD/SEK is a buy at current levels. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant HaarisA@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report titled “Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment”, dated May 17, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “Dollar: The Great Redistributor”, dated October 7, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction”, dated April 21, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled “AUD and CAD: Risky Business”, dated March 10, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 The past week has been quite eventful for the greenback, slipping almost 2.3%. Most of the downside is owed to markets revising down rate expectations, on the basis of weak growth numbers and political scandals. The 10-year yield dropped, gold rose, and equities fell. There was also a large sell-off in EM currencies and a sharp appreciation in the yen. Furthermore, the soft patch in U.S. data continued as housing starts and building permits came in especially weak in April: 1.172 million and 1.229 million respectively, both underperforming consensus. Nevertheless, markets calmed after the release of stronger employment numbers with initial and continuing jobless claims beating expectations. The upswing in the Philly Fed index also helped revive sentiment. The dollar picked up Thursday morning following these releases. Interestingly, the DXY is at pre-election levels, which suggests that the dollar is nearing its bottom. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 The euro has enjoyed significant upside as a result of Macron's victory and the dollar's drubbing. Weak data in the U.S. caused markets to revise growth expectations, pressuring the dollar downwards and the euro up. Further lifting the euro were comments by ECB President Mario Draghi, who highlighted that growth in the euro area is performing well. However, he also reiterated that "it is too early to declare success". These forces have lifted the euro to expensive levels on a tactical basis, suggesting the path of least resistance is most likely down as the ECB will find it hard to tighten policy and the dollar resumes its bull market. Data in the euro area has been mixed as of late without too much disappointment, and inflationary pressured remain unchanged. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 After coming slightly above 114, USD/JPY has plunged by more than 3%, as a result of the market pricing increasing odds that president Trump will get impeached. Although we believe that the correction of the dollar has run its course, the end of the Trump trade might have triggered the sell-off we have been expecting in emerging markets. Thus we like to play this risk off period by shorting NZD/JPY. On the data side, news have mostly been negative: Machinery orders contracted by 0.7% YoY, underperforming expectations. Consumer confidence came in lower than last month at 43.2. Bank lending grew by a measly 3% YoY underperforming expectations. However, real GDP for Q1 came in at 0.5% QoQ, beating expectations. This was dampened by the weak GDP deflator, which contracted by tk%. We continue to be yen bears on a cyclical basis, as the fed will raise rates more than the markets expects, while the BoJ will continue anchoring 10-year yields around zero. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K has been mixed: Industrial Production growth came in at 1.4%, underperforming expectations. However retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel growth came in at 4% and 4.5% respectively, both outpacing expectations. Crucially, both core and headline inflation came above expectations at 2.4% and 2.7% respectively. This surge in inflation is important as it raises the odds of a BoE hike this year, especially as the economy remains resilient. Moreover, as long term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored consumption is likely to continue to surprise as households are looking through the inflation caused by the depreciation in the pound. Overall, we continue to be positive on GBP against all other currencies but the U.S. dollar, given that the British economy will likely stay more resilient than investors are anticipating. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 The RBA shed some light on the Australian economy through its most recent Minutes, highlighting that monetary policy needs to remain accommodative to support economic trends. It noted the negative hit to terms of trade as a result of Cyclone Debbie curtailing coking coal exports. China's housing market was also identified as a risk to Australia's exports and terms of trade. Nevertheless, this week the AUD was buoyant, helped by a weaker greenback. However, the factors above paint a bleak picture for the AUD's future. The very important employment figures depicted a similar trend to that of last year, with full-time employment in fact contracting while part-time employment picked up. Unemployment also declined by 0.2% to 5.7%, however, wages remain subdued. This corroborates the weaker core CPI measure of 1.5%, while the strong headline figure of 2.1% is likely to be transitory when the recent commodity-prices weakness kicks in. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The RBNZ continues to much more accommodative than warranted. The monetary policy report highlighted that the recent surge in inflation is mainly attributable to tradables, and that non-tradable inflation is bound to increase very gradually. We continue to believe that the RBNZ is understating the inflationary pressures in the economy, as core inflation is already higher than 2%. Additionally, retail sales are growing at 10-year high and nominal GDP growth has skyrocketed to 7.5%, by far the highest in the G10. Right now, the market expects the first rate hike to come in 9 months. We believe that a rate hike at this point would be the bare minimum for the RBNZ to avoid an overheating in the economy. Thus expectations have nowhere to go than up and the NZD now has considerable upside against the AUD. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat - March 31, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 USD/CAD has been somewhat weaker this past week as oil prices rebounded and the dollar fell. Oil prices are likely to see further upside as OPEC and Russia are likely to agree to another supply cut to support oil prices. Domestically, the economy is improving as unemployment is declining and PMIs are perking up. The BoC also identified the output gap to close earlier than expected in its last meeting. The almost 4% depreciation in the CAD in the past month has made the oil-based currency considerably cheap. When looking at EUR/CAD, the depreciation has been around 7.5%. With the euro now sitting in expensive territory, the ECB is unlikely to change its stance any time soon as inflation has not yet rooted itself, while peripheral economies' inflation remain weak. The CAD, however, is likely to see further upside on the back of increasing oil prices and a strengthening economy. These factors warrant a short EUR/CAD trade. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 And CAD: Risky Business -AUD March 10, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Following the election of Emmanuel Macron as the new president of France EUR/CHF skyrocketed, coming close to hitting 1.1. At this point EUR/CHF is a very attractive short, given that good news for the euro are likely to tapper now that the French election is behind us. When it comes to inflation, the ECB will likely focus on the lowest denominator, because in spite of higher inflation in some countries like Germany or Austria, inflationary pressures remain muted in most other economies. This will prevent the ECB from tightening monetary policy as fast as the market expects. Meanwhile, the possibilities that the SNB takes the floor off EUR/CHF at the end of this year or the beginning of 2018 are rising given that inflation and economic activity are slowly coming back to Switzerland. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has depreciated in the past weeks thanks to the fall in the dollar as well as rising oil prices. Additionally, the fall in inflation is slowing down, with core and headline inflation coming in at 1.7% and 2.2% respectively. Is it time to become bullish on the NOK against the U.S. dollar? We do not believe this is the case. While inflation might be close to bottoming it is unlikely to surpass the Norges Bank target in the coming years, given that inflationary pressures remain muted in Norway. Furthermore, given that USD/NOK is more sensitive to real rate differentials than oil prices, the effect of a dovish Norges Bank on USD/NOK will be much stronger than the impact of rising oil prices. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 We expect the SEK to experience limited upside in the next 3-6 months. The Greenback is bottoming and we expect USD/SEK to pick up on the back of the dollar bull market. Furthermore, EUR/SEK has limited downside as the RIksbank wants to keep monetary conditions easy. Indeed, the Swedish central bank is also planning to officially target CPIF instead of the CPI. While both of these measures are near 2%, the behavior of the Riksbank suggests that it is in fact targeting core inflation. Core inflation itself is still somewhat depressed, as consumer activity remains weak. However, we expect core inflation to pick up on the back of a higher credit impulse and money supply growth, which should help the Riksbank exit its dovish tilt later this year. Report Links: Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Venezuela's economic implosion accelerated with the oil price crash. The petrodollar collapse is suffocating consumption as well as oilfield investment, creating a "death spiral" of falling production. The military has already begun assuming more powers as Maduro becomes increasingly vulnerable, and will likely take over before long. OPEC's cuts may help Maduro delay, but not avoid, deposition. Civil unrest/revolution could cause a disruption in oil production, profoundly impacting oil markets. Feature The wheels on the bus go round and round, Round and round, Round and round ... The story of Venezuela's decline under the revolutionary socialist government of deceased dictator Hugo Chavez is well known. The country went from being one of the richest South American states to one of the poorest and from being reliant on oil exports to being entirely dependent on them (Chart 1). The straw that broke the back of Chavismo was the end of the global commodity bull market in 2014 (Chart 2). Widespread shortages of essential goods, mass protests, opposition political victories, and a slide into overt military dictatorship have ensued.1 Chart 1Venezuela Suffers Under Chavismo Chart 2Commodity Bull Market Ended The acute social unrest at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 raises the question of whether Venezuela will cause global oil-supply disruptions that boost prices this year.2 One of the reasons we have been bullish oil prices is the fact that the world has little spare production capacity (Chart 3). This means that political turmoil in Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, or other oil-producing countries could take enough supply out of the market to accelerate the global rebalancing process and drawdown of inventories, pushing up prices. The longer oil prices stay below the budget break-even levels of the politically unstable petro-states (mostly $80/bbl and above), the more likely some of them will be to fail. Venezuela, with a break-even of $350/bbl, has long been one of our prime candidates (Chart 4).3 Venezuela is on the verge of total regime collapse and a massive oil production shutdown. This is not a low-probability outcome. However, the fact that the military is already taking control of the situation, combined with our belief that OPEC and Russia will continue cutting oil production to shore up prices, suggest that the regime may be able to limp along. Therefore a continuation of the gradual decline in oil output is more likely than a sharp cutoff this year. Investors should stay short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds and be aware of the upside risks to global oil prices. A Brief History Of PDVSA State-owned oil company PDVSA is the lifeblood of Venezuela. It once was a well-run company that allowed foreign investment with a reasonable government take, but now it is shut off from direct foreign investment. In 1996-1997, prior to Chavez being elected in late 1998, Venezuela was a rampant cheater on its OPEC quota, producing 3.1-3.3 MMB/d versus a quota of ~2.4 MMB/d in 1996 and ~2.8 in 1997. The oil-price crash that started in late 1997 and bottomed in early 1999 (remember the Economist's "Drowning In Oil" cover story on March 4, 1999 predicting $5 per barrel crude prices?) was a critical event propelling the rise of Chavez (Chart 5). One of the planks in Chavez's platform was that Venezuela had to stop cheating on OPEC quotas because that strategy had helped cause the oil-price decline and subsequent economic misery. Without the oil-price crash, Chavez would not have had such strong public support in the run-up to the 1998 elections, which he won. Chavez did in fact rein in Venezuela's production to 2.8 MMB/d in 1999, which had a positive impact on oil prices and reinforced OPEC. In 2002 and 2003, there were two labor strikes at PDVSA and a two-day coup that displaced Chavez. When Chavez returned to power, he fired 18,000 experienced workers at PDVSA and replaced them with political loyalists. Since then, the total number of employees at PDVSA has swelled from about 46,000 people in 2002, when PDVSA was producing 3.2 MMB/d, to about 140,000 people today, when it is producing slightly below 2 MMB/d. Average oil revenue per employee was over $500,000/person in 2002 at $20 oil, versus about $100,000/person today at $50 oil. Suffice it to say, PDVSA is stuffed to the gills with political patronage, and a strike or a revolution inside PDVSA against President Nicolas Maduro is unlikely. However, if opposition forces manage to seize control of government, the Chavistas in control of PDVSA may attempt to shut down operations to deprive them of oil revenues and blackmail them into a better deal going forward. Chart 5Oil Bust Catapulted Chavez Venezuela is estimated to have the world's largest proved oil reserves at about 300 billion barrels (Chart 6). In addition, there are 1.2-1.4 trillion barrels estimated to rest in heavy-oil deposits in the Orinoco Petroleum Belt (at the mouth of the Orinoco river) that is difficult to extract and has barely been touched. Chart 7Venezuela Cuts Forced By Economic Disaster These reserves are somewhat similar to Canada's oil sands. It is estimated that 300-500 billion barrels are technically recoverable. In the early 2000s, there were four international consortiums involved in developing these reserves: Petrozuata (COP-50%), Cerro Negro (XOM), Sincor (TOT, STO) and Hamaca (COP-40%). However, Chavez nationalized the Orinoco projects in 2007, paying the international oil companies (IOCs) a pittance. XOM and COP contested the taking and "sued" Venezuela at the World Bank. XOM sought $14.7 billion and won an arbitrated decision for a $1.6 billion settlement in 2014. Venezuela continues to litigate the case and the amount awarded to investors has apparently been reduced by a recent ruling. Over the past decade, as Venezuelan industry declined due to dramatic anti-free market laws, including aggressive fixed exchange rates absurdly out of keeping with black market rates, the government nationalized more and more private assets in order to get the wealth they needed to maintain profligate spending policies. The underlying point of these policies is to garner support from low-income Venezuelans, the Chavista political base. In addition to the Orinoco nationalization, the government appropriated equipment and drilling rigs from several oilfield service companies that had stopped working on account of not being properly paid. In 2009, Petrosucre (a subsidiary of PDVSA) appropriated the ENSCO 69 jackup rig, although the rig was returned in 2010. In 2010, the Venezuelan government seized 11 high-quality land rigs from Helmerich & Payne, resulting in nearly $200MM of losses for the company. These rigs were "easy" for Venezuela to appropriate because they did not require much private-sector expertise to operate. As payment failures continued, relationships with the country's remaining contractors continued to be strained. In 2013, Schlumberger (SLB), the largest energy service company in the world, threatened to stop working for PDVSA due to lack of payment in hard currency. PDVSA paid them in depreciating Venezuelan bolivares, but tightened controls over conversion into U.S. dollars. Some accounts receivables were partially converted into interest-bearing government notes. Promises for payment were made and broken. SLB has taken over $600MM of write-downs for the collapse of the bolivar (Haliburton, HAL, has taken ~$150MM in losses). With accounts receivable balances now stratospherically high at approximately $1.2 billion for SLB, $636 million for HAL (plus $200 million face amount in other notes), and $225 million for Weatherford International, the service companies have already taken write-offs on what they are owed and have refused to extend Venezuela additional credit. Unlike the "dumb iron" of drilling rigs, the service companies provide highly technical proprietary goods and services, from drill bits and fluids to measuring services. The lack of these proprietary technical services diminishes PDVSA's ability to drill new wells and properly maintain its legacy production infrastructure. Venezuela's production started falling in late 2015 - well before OPEC and Russia coordinated their January 2017 production cuts (Chart 7). Drought contributed to the problem in 2016 by causing electricity shortages and forced rationing of electricity (60-70% of Venezuela's electricity generation is hydro); water levels at key dams are still very low, but the condition has eased a bit in 2017. After watching crude oil production fall from 2.4 MMB/d in 2015 to 2.05 MMB/d in 2016, OPEC gave Venezuela a production quota of 1.97 MMB/d for the first half of 2017, which is about what they were expected to be capable of producing. In essence, Venezuela was exempt from production cuts, like other compromised OPEC producers Libya, Nigeria and Iran. So far, Venezuela has produced 1.99 MMB/d in the first quarter, according to EIA. Venezuela's falling production is not cartel behavior but indicative of broader economic and political instability. Venezuela is losing control of oil output, the pillar of regime stability. Bottom Line: The double-edged sword for energy companies is that if the regime utterly fails, the country's 2MM b/d of production may be disrupted. However, if government policy shifts - whether through the political opposition finally gaining de facto power or through the military imposing reforms - Venezuela could ramp up its production, perhaps by 1MMB/d within five years, and more after that if Orinoco is developed. How Long Can Maduro Last? Chavez's model worked like that of Louis XIV, who famously said, "après nous, le déluge." Chavez benefited from high oil prices throughout his reign and died in 2013 just before the country's descent into depression began (Chart 8). He won his last election in 2012 by a margin of 10.8%, while Maduro, his hand-picked successor, won a special election only half a year later by a 1.5% margin, which was contested for all kinds of fraud (Chart 9). Chart 8A Hyperflationary Depression Thus Maduro has suffered from "inept successor" syndrome from the beginning, compounding the fears of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) that the succession would be rocky. Maduro lacked both the political capital and the originality to launch orthodox economic reforms to address the country's mounting inflation and weak productivity, but instead doubled down on Chavez's rapid expansion of money and credit to lift domestic consumption (Chart 10).4 Chart 10Excessive Monetary And Credit Expansion Chart 11Exports Recovered, Reserves Did Not The economic collapse was well under way even before commodities pulled the rug out from under the government.5 Remarkably, the recovery in export revenue since 2010 did not occasion a recovery in foreign exchange reserves - these two decoupled, as Venezuela chewed through its reserves to finance its growing domestic costs (Chart 11). This means Venezuela's ability to recover even in the most optimistic oil scenarios is limited. Another sign that the economic break is irreversible is the fact that, since 2013, private consumption has fallen faster than oil output - a reversal of the populist model that boosted consumption (Chart 12). Chart 12Consumption Falls Faster Than Oil Output Chart 13Oil-Price Crash Hobbles Maduro Critically, the external environment turned against Maduro and PSUV as oil prices declined after June 2014. In November 2014 Saudi Arabia launched its market-share war against Iran and U.S. shale producers, expanding production into a looming global supply overbalance. Brent crude prices collapsed to $29/bbl by early 2016 (Chart 13). This pushed Venezuela over the brink.6 First, hyperinflation: Currency in circulation - already expanding excessively - has exploded upward since 2014. The 100 bolivar note has exploded in usage while notes of lower denominations have dropped out of usage. Total deposits in the banking system are growing at a pace of over 200%, narrow money (M1) at 140%, and consumer price index at 150% (see Chart 10 above). Real interest rates have plunged into an abyss, with devastating results for the financial system. The real effective exchange rate illustrates the annihilation of the currency's value. Monetary authorities have repeatedly devalued the official exchange rate of the bolivar against the dollar (Chart 14). However, the currency remains overvalued, which creates a huge gap between the official rate and the black market rate, which currently stands at about 5,400 bolivares to the dollar. Regime allies have access to hard USD, for which they charge high rents, and the rest suffer. Chart 14Official Forex Devaluations Chart 15Domestic Demand Collapses Second, the real economy has gone from depression to worse: Exports peaked in October 2008, nearly recovered in March 2012, and plummeted thereafter. Imports have fallen faster as domestic demand contracted (Chart 15). Venezuela must import almost everything and the currency collapse means staples are either unavailable or exorbitantly expensive. Venezuelan exports to China reached 20% of total exports in 2012 but have declined to about 14% (Chart 16). This means that Venezuela has lost a precious $10 billion per year. The state has also been trading oil output for loans from China, resulting in an ever higher share of shrinking oil output devoted to paying back the loans, leaving less and less exported production to bring in hard currency needed to pay for production, imports, and debt servicing. Both private and government consumption are shrinking, according to official statistics (Chart 17). Again, the consumption slump removes a key regime support. Chart 16Chinese Demand Is Limited Chart 17Public And Private Consumption Shrink Third, Venezuela is rapidly becoming insolvent: Venezuela's total public debt is high. It stood at 102% of GDP as of August 2014, and GDP has declined by 25%-plus since then. Total external debt, which becomes costlier to service as the currency depreciates, was about $139 billion, or 71% of GDP, in Q3 2015 (Chart 18). It has risen sharply ever since the fall in export revenues post-2011. The destruction of the currency by definition makes the foreign debt burden grow. Chart 18External Debt Soars... Chart 19...While Forex Reserves Dwindle The regime's hard currency reserves are rapidly drying up - they have fallen from nearly $30 billion in 2013 to just $10 billion today (Chart 19). Without hard cash, Venezuela will be unable to meet import costs and external debt payments. In Table 1, we assess the country's ability to make these payments at different oil-price and output levels. Assuming the YTD average Venezuelan crude price of $44/bbl, export revenue should hit about $32 billion this year, while imports should hover around $21 billion, leaving $11 billion for debt servicing costs of roughly $10 billion (combining the state's $8 billion with PDVSA's $2 billion). Thus if global oil prices hold up - as we think they will - the regime may be able to squeak by another year. In short, the regime could have about $11 billion in revenues left at the end of the year if the Venezuela oil basket hovers around $44/bbl and production remains at about 2 MMB/d. That is a "minimum cash" scenario for the regime this year, though it by no means guarantees regime survival amid the widespread economic distress of the population. Chart 20Foreign Asset Sales Will Continue If production drops to 1.25 MMb/d or lower as a result of the economic crisis - or if Venezuelan oil prices settle at $28/bbl or below - the regime will be unable to meet its import costs and debt payments. It will have to sell off more of its international assets as rapidly as it can (Chart 20), restrict imports further, and eventually default. Moreover, the calculation becomes much more negative for Venezuela if we assume, conservatively, $10 billion in capital outflows, which is far from unreasonable. Outflows could easily wipe out any small remainder of foreign reserves. So far, the government has chosen to deprive the populace of imports rather than default on external debt, wagering that the military and other state security forces can suppress domestic opposition for longer than the regime can survive under an international financial embargo. This strategy is fueling mass protests, riots, and clashes with the National Guard and Bolivarian colectivos (militias). An extension of the OPEC-Russia production cuts in late May, which we expect, will bring much-needed relief for Venezuela's budget. Thus, there is a clear path for regime survival through 2017 on a purely fiscal basis, though it is a highly precarious one - the reality is that the state is bound to default sooner or later. Moreover, the socio-political crisis has already spiraled far enough that a modest boost to oil prices this year will probably be too little, too late to save Maduro and the PSUV in its current form. As we discuss below, the question is only whether the military takes greater control to perpetuate the current regime, or the opposition is gradually allowed to take power and renovate the constitutional order. Bottom Line: Even if oil production holds up, and oil prices average above $44/bbl as we expect, the country's leaders will have to take extreme measures to avoid default. Domestic shortages and military-enforced rationing will compound. As economic contraction persists, social unrest will intensify. Will The Military Throw A Coup? Explosive popular discontent this year shows no sign of abating. It is a continuation of the mass protests and sporadic violence since the economic crisis fully erupted in 2014. However, as recession deepens - and food, fuel, and medicine shortages become even more widespread - unrest will spread to a broader geographic and demographic base. Protests since September 2016 have drawn numbers in the upper hundreds of thousands, possibly over a million on two occasions. Security forces have increasingly cracked down on civilians, raising the death toll and provoking a nasty feedback loop with protesters. Reports suggest that the poorest people - the Chavista base - are increasingly joining the protests, which is a new trend and bodes ill for the ruling party's survival. Already the public has turned against the United Socialist Party, as evinced by the December 2015 legislative election results and a range of public opinion polls, which show Maduro's support in the low-20% range. In the 2015 vote, the opposition defeated the Chavistas for the first time since 1998. The Democratic Unity Roundtable won a majority of the popular vote and a supermajority of the seats in the National Assembly. Since then, however, Maduro has used party-controlled civilian institutions like the Supreme Court and National Electoral Council - backed by the military and state security - to prevent the opposition's exercise of its newfound legislative power. Key signposts to watch will be whether Maduro is pressured into restoring the electoral calendar. The opposition has so far been denied local elections (supposedly rescheduled for later this year) and a popular referendum on recalling Maduro. So it has little reason to expect that the government will hold the October 2018 elections on time. The government is likely to keep delaying these votes because it knows it will lose them. In the meantime, the opposition has few choices other than protests and street tactics to try to pressure the government into allowing elections after all. Further, oil prices are low, so the regime is vulnerable, which means that the opposition has every incentive to step up the pressure now. If it waits, higher prices could give Maduro a new infusion of revenues and the ability to prolong his time in power. The question at this point is: will the military defect from the government? The military is the historical arbiter of power in the country. Maduro - who unlike Chavez does not hail from a military background - has only managed to make it this far by granting his top brass more power. Crucially, in July 2016, Maduro handed army chief Vladimir Padrino Lopez control over the country's critical transportation and distribution networks, including for food supplies. He has also carved out large tracts of land for a vast new mining venture, supposed to focus on gold, which the military will oversee and profit from.7 What this means is that the government and military are becoming more, not less, integrated at the moment. The army has a vested interest in the current regime. It is also internally coherent, as recent political science research shows, in the sense that the upper-most and lower-most ranks are devoted to Chavismo.8 Economic sanctions and human rights allegations from the U.S. and international community reinforce this point, making it so that officials have no future outside of the regime and therefore fight harder for the regime to survive.9 Still, there are fractures within the military that could get worse over time. Divisions within the ranks: An analysis of the Arab Spring shows that militaries that defected from the government (Egypt, Tunisia), or split up and made war on each other (Syria, Libya, Yemen), exhibited certain key divisions within their ranks.10 Looking at these variables, Venezuela's military lacks critical ethno-sectarian divisions, but does suffer from important differences between the military branches, between the army and the other state security forces, and between the ideological and socio-economic factions that are entirely devoted to Chavismo versus the rest. Thus, for example, it is possible that Bolivarian militias committing atrocities against unarmed civilians could eventually force the military to change its position to preserve its reputation.11 Popular opinion: Massive protests have approached 1 million people by some counts (of a population of 31 million) and have combined a range of elements within the society - not only young men or violent rebels/anarchists. Also, public opinion surveys suggest that supporters of Maduro have a more favorable view of the army, and opponents have a less favorable view.12 This implies that Maduro's extreme lack of popular support is a liability that will weigh on the military over time. Military funds shrinking: Because of the economic crisis, Maduro has been forced to slash military spending by a roughly estimated 56% over the past year (Chart 21). The military may eventually decide it needs to fix the economy in order to fix its budget. Autonomous military leader: That General Lopez has considerable autonomy is another variable that increases the risk of military defection or fracture. As the country slides out of control Lopez will likely intervene more often. He already did so recently when the Chavista-aligned Supreme Court tried to usurp the National Assembly's legislative function. The attorney general, Luisa Ortega Diaz, broke with party norms by criticizing the court's ruling. Maduro was forced to order the court to reverse it, at least nominally restoring the National Assembly's authority. Lopez supposedly had encouraged Maduro to backtrack in this way, contrary to the advice of two notable Chavistas, Diosdado Cabello and Vice President Tareck El Aissami. Ultimately, military rule for extended periods is common in Venezuelan history. Chavez always deeply integrated the party and military leadership, so the regime could persist through greater military assertion within it, or the military could take over and initiate topical political changes. Finally, if Lopez is ready to stage a coup, he may still wait for oil prices to recover. It makes more sense to let the already discredited ruling party suffer the public consequences of the recession than to seize power when the country is in shambles. Previous coup attempts have occurred not only when oil prices were bottoming but also when they bounded back after bottoming (Chart 22). It would appear that the Venezuelan military is as good at forecasting oil prices as any Wall Street analyst! For oil markets, the military's strong grip over the country suggests that even if Maduro and the PSUV collapse, the party loyalists at PDVSA may not have the option of going on strike. The military will still need the petro dollars to stay in power, and it will have the guns to insist that production keeps up, as long as economic destitution does not force operations to a halt. Bottom Line: There is a high probability that the military will expand its overt control over the country. As long as the leaders avoid fundamental economic reforms, the result of any full-out military coup against Maduro may just mean more of the same, which would be politically and economically unsustainable. Chart 22Coups Can Come After Oil Price Recovers Chart 23Stay Short Venezuelan Sovereign Bonds Investment Implications Any rebound in oil prices as a result of an extension of OPEC's and Russia's production cuts at the OPEC meeting on May 25 will be "too little, too late" in terms of saving Maduro and the PSUV. They may be able to play for time, but their legitimacy has been destroyed - they will only survive as long as the military sustains them. To a great extent, the ruling party has already handed the keys over to the military, and military rule can persist for some time. Hence oil production is more likely to continue its slow decline than experience a sudden shutdown, at least this year. This is because it is likely that military control will tighten, not diminish, when Maduro falls. Incidentally, the military is also more capable than the current weak civilian government of forcing through wrenching policy adjustments that are necessary to begin the process of normalizing economic policy - such as floating the currency and cutting public spending. But any such process would bring even more economic pain and unrest in the short term, and it has not begun yet. Even if the ruling party avoids defaulting on government debts this year - which is possible given our budget calculations - it is on the path to default before long. We remain short Venezuelan 10-year sovereign bonds versus emerging market peers. This trade is down 330 basis points since initiation in June 2015, but Venezuelan bonds have rolled over and the outlook is dim (Chart 23). Within the oil markets, our base case is that global oil producers have benefitted and will benefit from the marginally higher prices derived from Venezuela's slow production deterioration. Should a more sudden and severe production collapse occur, the upward price response would be much more acute. A sustained outage of Venezuelan production would send oil prices quickly towards $80-$100/bbl as a necessary price signal to curb demand growth, creating a meaningful recessionary force around the globe. Oil producers, specifically U.S. shale producers that can react quickly to these price signals, would stand to benefit temporarily from the higher prices, but would again suffer from falling oil prices in the inevitable post-crisis denouement. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com 1 For the military takeover, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late," in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Energy Spring," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com; BCA Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com; and Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "The Other Guys In The Oil Market," dated April 5, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Venezuelan Chavismo: Life After Death," dated April 2, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, and Monthly Report, "The Reflation Era," dated December 10, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing Political And Financial Landscapes In Argentina, Venezuela And Brazil," dated January 6, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 For Lopez's taking control, please see "Venezuelan Debt: The Rally Is Late" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: From Liquidity To Growth?" dated August 24, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. For the gold mine, please see Edgardo Lander, "The Implosion of Venezuela's Rentier State," Transnational Institute, New Politics Papers 1, September 2016, available at www.tni.org. 8 The junior officers have advanced through special military schools set up by Chavez, while the senior officials have been carefully selected over the years for their loyalty and ideological purity. Please see Brian Fonseca, John Polga-Hecimovich, and Harold A. Trinkunas, "Venezuelan Military Culture," FIU-USSOUTHCOM Military Culture Series, May 2016, available at www.johnpolga.com. 9 Please see David Smilde, "Venezuela: Options for U.S. Policy," Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, available at www.foreign.senate.gov. 10 Please see Timothy Hazen, "Defect Or Defend? Explaining Military Responses During The Arab Uprisings," doctoral dissertation, Loyola University Chicago, December 2016, available at ecommons.luc.edu. 11 Civilian deaths caused by the National Guard and Chavez's loyalist militias triggered the aborted 2002 military coup. Please see Steven Barracca, "Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela," Third World Quarterly 28: 1 (2007), pp. 137-54. 12 See footnote 8 above.

Special Report

Highlights Impeachment is a political, not legal, process; The House of Representatives decides what is impeachable; The Senate is judge, jury, and executioner; Democrats will impeach Trump if they take the House in 2018; Republicans will not impeach, unless there is a "smoking gun." Markets will look through impeachment risks to tax cuts, for now. Feature "An impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office." - Representative Gerald Ford, April 15, 1970 Chart 1Trump's Support Abysmal Since the election of President Donald Trump we have been inundated with client questions regarding the probability of impeachment. We have hesitated to put our thoughts on paper due to the fact that the House of Representatives plays a crucial role in impeachment proceedings and that the Republican Party enjoys a comfortable 21-seat majority in that legislative chamber. Since the election, however, President Trump has continued to confound supporters and critics alike with controversial moves. His firing of FBI Director James Comey, reportedly without consulting any of his political advisors, is the latest in a string of unorthodox decisions. Leaks and accusations are swirling in the aftermath. In addition, his overall approval numbers continue to languish at historically abysmal levels for the start of a presidency (Chart 1), which portends a tough midterm election for the Republican Party in the House of Representatives (Chart 2). The American political context remains as polarized as ever, with the quantitative measure of ideological polarization at a record high (Chart 3).1 This dataset treats the North-South division of the Civil War differently from ideological polarization; the current level of ideological polarization is the highest since the post-Civil War period. In this environment, we suspect that, were the Democrats to win a majority in the House of Representatives, the probability of impeachment would be very high. Trump would have to hope that Republican Senators have his back, which at that point is by no means a foregone conclusion.2 Chart 2Republicans Heading For Huge Defeat In 2018 Chart 3Record-High Polarization In U.S. Politics According To Key Quantitative Measure We will not get into the "merits" of a case against President Trump. It suffices to repeat Gerald Ford's quip from the top of this report: "an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be." Given the vitriol and polarization of American politics at the moment, we therefore suspect that impeachment will almost certainly occur if the House falls to the Democrats. Otherwise, for the Republicans to impeach one of their own, even one as loosely allied with the GOP as Trump, would require "smoking gun" evidence of the president's direct hand in a grave scandal. A Guide To Impeaching The President Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution says, "the President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." This is a low bar for impeachment, not a high bar. "Misdemeanors" is a slippery term and the House of Representatives determines what it means. There is no appeals process and no interjection by the Supreme Court. The most important point about the U.S. impeachment process is that the "House decides." Decides what? Everything. Hence impeachment proceedings can be started by the House for whatever crime the legislative body deems worthy of impeachment proceedings. Once the House approves the "articles of impeachment," the Senate must hold a trial and vote on whether to remove the president from office by a two-thirds majority (67 votes). Historically the first presidential impeachment was that of President Andrew Johnson, who assumed the presidency following the assassination of President Lincoln in 1865. Johnson was a Democrat who ran with Republican President Lincoln on a National Union ticket. Johnson was impeached on the grounds that he violated the Tenure of Office Act (which is no longer applicable) by firing his Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. But the real political backdrop to the proceeding was that Johnson, a Southern Democrat, favored quick restoration of state rights to the rebellious South and was firing members of the Lincoln cabinet whom he deemed too abolitionist. Johnson was ultimately acquitted in the Senate by just one vote. President Bill Clinton was the second U.S. president to be impeached, with the GOP-held House of Representatives largely voting along party lines on the two articles of impeachment: perjury and obstruction of justice. The Senate failed to get the 67 votes required for conviction, with Republican Senators from the Northeast (Rhode Island, Maine, and Vermont) and Pennsylvania siding with the Democrats. Both the Johnson and Clinton impeachment were more about the deeply polarized environment in Washington and the country at large than about actual crimes. Only the impeachment proceedings initiated against President Nixon provide a clear example of high crimes and misdemeanors. However, President Nixon was never actually impeached as he resigned before the House of Representatives could consider the articles of impeachment against him. He had been warned he would not survive, given the "smoking gun" evidence of his direct personal involvement in the Watergate break-in scandal, and he did not want to be the first president to be removed from office. Thus, as far as a U.S. president is concerned, the House of Representatives is the accuser and the Senate is the judge, jury, and the executioner. Because the bar for adopting impeachment articles in the House is so low (simple majority), we are almost certain that a Democratic-held House would find a reason to impeach President Trump. Whether the Senate then removes President Trump would depend on the severity of his alleged crimes, which we have no way to assess at this point in time. One crucial point to note - particularly in the case of President Trump - is that the House of Representatives can vote on articles of impeachment that deal with alleged crimes committed prior to coming to the office. Again, the Supreme Court has ruled that the House decides and there is no appeals process.3 Therefore, if the House decides that the president can be impeached for alleged crimes and misdemeanors committed before or outside of his office, then he can. Bottom Line: Impeachment is an intrinsically political process. As such, the legal merits of the accusations matter less than the political context in which the House considers impeaching the president. Given the historically high level of political polarization in the U.S., the extremely low levels of Trump's popularity, and his unorthodox policymaking process, we expect that there is a high probability that a Democratic-held House would impeach President Trump on some grounds. Whether President Trump would then be removed from office would depend on whether the accusations of the House of Representatives have sufficient merit - both in terms of the weight of the crimes and the political interests - for Senate Republicans to abandon the president. A Guide To A Constitutional Coup D'état Intriguingly, the U.S. Constitution provides for a procedure by which the president can be removed from office even without an impeachment process.4 The 25th Amendment, passed following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, gives the Vice President and the Cabinet the authority to remove the president from power. Section 4 of Article 25 states: Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments [Cabinet members] or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. If the above paragraph sounds like a constitutional coup d'état, that is because it is one. If the president challenges the argument that he is "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office," then the issue goes before Congress, where it would require two-thirds of each legislative body to vote to remove the president. As such, the 25th Amendment has a higher hurdle than the impeachment process in Congress, but it could be a quicker way to remove a sitting president who is incapacitated for health reasons, becomes mentally unstable, or broadly-speaking loses touch with reality.5 Chart 4GOP Not Yet Willing To Impeach Trump In the case of President Trump, this process would require a complete loss of confidence in his leadership by Vice President Pence, the Cabinet, and Republican members of Congress. Given Trump's high level of support with Republican voters (Chart 4), we are nowhere close to the risk of the 25th Amendment being invoked. However, if Trump's popularity declines precipitously, his own Cabinet has the ability to eject him from the Oval Office without any accusation of legal misconduct. Presumably Trump would have taken concrete action that proved plainly detrimental to the national interest in order to set this process in motion - at which point any number of earlier erratic behaviors or statements could come into play against him. Bottom Line: Impeachment is not the only process by which a sitting U.S. president can be removed from office. Article 25 of the Constitution, Section 4, offers a constitutional coup d'état process that avoids the messiness of a Senate trial. However, the legislative hurdle for this procedure is even higher than the impeachment process. As such, it would require Donald Trump to completely lose the faith of Republican voters and legislators. Signposts To Impeachment We do not intend to prosecute claims against President Trump in this or any future report. First, we are not legal experts. Second, we do not have access to full information. Third, as we pointed out above, the impeachment process is a highly political process. As such, key triggers are political, and only minimally criminal. First, either Democrats win the House of Representatives, or GOP voters turn against President Trump in large numbers. As such, investors should keep close attention to Chart 4 data, at least until the midterm elections. Second, President Trump has to lose the confidence of Republican legislators, particularly in the Senate. Nonetheless, there are several other, more specific, issues we will watch carefully. Special investigation: In both Nixon's and Clinton's scandals, a special committee investigated executive wrongdoing. In Nixon's case this was the Senate Watergate Committee; in Clinton's case it was the special investigation led by independent counsel Kenneth Starr. Starr's investigation initially focused on the suicide of deputy White House counsel Vince Foster and the Whitewater real estate investments by Bill Clinton. But the trail led elsewhere. Ultimately, the "Starr Report" alleged that Clinton lied under oath regarding his extramarital affair with Monica Lewinsky. Why it matters today? The precedent of special investigations and committees is strong in American politics. It will be difficult for President Trump to deny the public a special investigation of his campaign team's dealing with Russian officials. The Clinton example illustrates the danger of such investigations: what began as an investigation into a suspicious real estate deal concluded with perjury accusations on a completely unrelated matter. In other words, once independent investigators start digging, there is no telling what skeletons they will exhume. Subpoenas: Congressional committees investigating impropriety can subpoena individuals or physical evidence to appear before the committee. Such subpoenas can reveal potential crimes and misconduct only tangentially related to the original investigation. The Watergate Tapes were critical to the eventual resignation of President Nixon. The White House challenged their subpoena, but the Supreme Court ruled in U.S. vs. Nixon, July 1974, that executive privilege did not allow President Nixon to deny the release of the tapes. Why it matters today? Currently, the Senate Intelligence Committee is investigating Russian interference in the 2016 election and has issued a subpoena to former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn for documents regarding his interactions with Russian officials. President Trump will not be able to claim ignorance if sufficient members of his inner circle are found to have colluded with a foreign power. It didn't work for President Nixon. Furthermore, it should worry President Trump that three Republicans on the Senate Intelligence Committee are either former GOP primary opponents (Marco Rubio of Florida) or vocal critics (Susan Collins of Maine and Tom Cotton of Arkansas). Law enforcement: The President, as the head of the executive and as the attorney general's direct superior, is in charge of all U.S. federal law enforcement agencies. He therefore has the constitutional prerogative of summarily firing various members of the Justice Department and law enforcement agencies. However, this does not mean that those same agencies will stay loyal and not collude with the opposition or the press to undermine the president's authority. In the Watergate scandal, Associate Director of the FBI, Mark Felt, was the "Deep Throat" source that fed Washington Post journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein the information that ultimately led to President Nixon to resign. Felt's actions were by no means selfless. Why it matters today? President Trump has fired FBI Director James Comey under unorthodox circumstances. While the official reason is that Comey mishandled the investigation into Secretary Hillary Clinton's email scandal, sources close to Comey (read: Comey) argue that it was because the FBI Director wanted to expand the agency's investigation into Russian interference in the U.S. election. Trump also seems to have feared that Comey was after him personally. Given the penchant of U.S. intelligence agencies to leak embarrassing information on members of Trump's inner circle - e.g. the transcript of Flynn's conversation with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak - we assume that members of the FBI who remain loyal to Comey could leak further information. In other words, President Trump has from the beginning of his presidency made powerful enemies in U.S. law enforcement agencies. If there is any evidence of wrongdoing on any front, we suspect that it will leak. Bottom Line: Once congressional committees begin investigating, subpoenaing documents and witnesses, there is no telling where or how the process ends. What begins as an investigation into Russian interference in the U.S. election can end up somewhere completely different. Given that the Senate Intelligence Committee is already holding investigations and that President Trump has made powerful enemies in the U.S. law enforcement and intelligence community, we have to accept that there is a high probability that the investigations into impropriety expand. Whether they expand to the point of causing the impeachment preconditions listed above is anyone's guess at this point. Investment Implications Of Impeachment Given the small number of cases, it is difficult to rely on historical precedents to make broader conclusions on how the market would react to impeachment or severe political scandal in the White House. Chart 5 looks at market performance during the Teapot Dome Scandal (April 1922 to October 1927), Watergate (February 1973 to August 1974), and President Clinton's Lewinsky Affair (January 1998 to February 1999). Of the three, Teapot Dome did not result in impeachment proceedings, but only because President Harding died in office in 1923 - and neither his death nor the unfolding scandal prevented the stock market from "roaring" through the mid-1920s.6 Chart 5AEquities Amid Three U.S. Scandals Chart 5BVolatility Amid Three U.S. Scandals The market reaction to the Lewinsky Affair was also highly muted. Like Teapot Dome, it occurred amidst one of the greatest bull markets in U.S. history. Of course, U.S. equities did fall 19% mid-way through the Clinton impeachment process. Watergate appears to have affected both equity markets and volatility. The S&P 500 fell 39% from February 7, 1973 - when the Senate established a select committee to investigate Watergate - to Nixon's resignation on August 9, 1974. That said, the scandal alone did not cause the correction, but rather it was a combination of factors, including the second devaluation of the dollar, rapid increases in price inflation, and a massive insurance fraud. Writing in the summer of 1973, BCA's own Tony Boeckh remarked that a speculative, "Watergate-inspired," attack on the dollar further contributed to a short-term capital outflow, but that the macro-fundamentals of the economy would ultimately persevere: Particularly in recent weeks, the Watergate affair has had an effect on the market much like a slow presidential assassination might... The Watergate affair, while primarily of psychological importance in the short run, clearly has had the effect of sustaining the weakness in the dollar and adding greatly to an already deeply negative psychology. If one can see these basic factors as temporary, then the whipsaw possibilities are obvious.7 Tony's analysis ultimately proved prescient, with stocks rallying briskly from Nixon's resignation in August 1974 and throughout 1975. What would happen this time around? If scandals surrounding Russian interference in the election grow over the next several months, the market may begin to price in a loss of the House in November 2018, which would obviously stall Trump's populist, "pump-priming" agenda. We think that the market could fret if the scandals worsen for three main reasons: Legislative agenda - An embattled White House would be a distracted White House. It is difficult to see how the White House could provide leadership on health and tax reform. The seriousness of the alleged crimes - President Clinton was impeached for having an extra-marital workplace affair and lying about it. If the Russian electoral interference charges stick, the Trump administration would be essentially accused of treason. The White House lashes out - An embattled President Trump could shift gears from domestic to foreign policy, as he faces few constitutional constraints on the latter. President Clinton faced off against Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic mid-way through the impeachment process, finally ordering NATO air strikes on the heels of his acquittal by the Senate. President Trump could shift his focus on North Korea, Iran, or "unfair" trading partners. Despite good reasons to worry that impeachment will become a possibility after the midterm elections, we think the market will continue to focus on the prospects for tax reform. And on that front, it is highly unlikely that a growing scandal in the Trump administration would matter. Provided, of course, that there is not some material evidence that accelerates the crisis and forces even a GOP-controlled House to focus on impeachment instead of tax reform. We would therefore largely look through the risks of impeachment - as our predecessors at BCA did amidst the Watergate scandal - at least until the months before November 6, 2018 (midterm election date). In particular, there are three main reasons to fade any near-term equity market volatility: President Mike Pence - Under both impeachment rules and the 25th amendment, the U.S. president would be replaced by the Vice President. Vice President Pence's approval rating largely tracks that of President Trump and is in the 40% area, but investors should note that he once stood at nearly 60% during the campaign (Chart 6). As such, the worst case scenario for investors in case of a post-midterm impeachment is that Trump is replaced by Mike Pence, an orthodox Republican, and that Pence has to deal with a split Congress. It would grind reforms to a halt, but at least tax reform would be out of the way by then. Given the market's focus on tax reforms, it is difficult to see why this tail-risk would have to be priced in over the next 12 months. Midterm Election - If the Trump White House becomes engulfed in scandal, Republicans in the House will fear losing their majority. Yes, the partisan drawing of electoral districts - "gerrymandering" - has reduced the number of competitive U.S. House districts from 164 in 1998 to 56 in 2016 (Chart 7). But the Democrats managed to win the House in 2006 and the Republicans managed to take it back in 2010, so there is no reason the roles cannot be reversed yet again. However, this is not a risk, it is an opportunity. It will motivate the GOP in Congress to lock in tax and healthcare reform well ahead of the midterm elections. Given that they plan to use a FY2018 budget reconciliation bill to pass tax reform, it means that passage by April or May of 2018 is highly likely. Then they can campaign all summer on how they kept their promises to give tax relief and create jobs. Counter Revolution - With Trump embattled and facing impeachment, the market may give a sigh of relief because it would mark a clear defeat of populist politics in the U.S. Much as with electoral outcomes in Europe, investors may want to cheer the defeat of an unorthodox, anti-establishment movement in the U.S.8 Chart 6Could Be Worse Than Pence Chart 7Gerrymandering Reduces ##br##Competitive House Seats As such, we would push against any "Russia scandal"-induced volatility in the U.S. markets, at least until the midterm election. We think the market would digest the volatility and realize that Trump's impeachment, were it to occur post-midterm elections, would not arrest the Republican agenda before the midterms. After all, the GOP has waited over 15 years to make Bush-era tax cuts permanent and the opportunity to do so may evaporate within the next 12 months. The one risk we do not account for here is that a "smoking gun" of Trump campaign collusion with Russia is unearthed well before the midterm election. This could force the GOP in the House to focus on impeachment instead of tax reforms. We do not expect this to happen, but we also have no evidence to support our view. At this point, however, there is absolutely no proof that the Trump campaign colluded with Russia. Do we agree that Trump's impeachment would signal the end of populism? No. As our colleague Peter Berezin has repeatedly said - and our clients ought to listen given that he correctly predicted Trump's victory in September 20159 - American voters voted for "Trumpism," not Trump. As Peter recently pointed out, "either Trump will start delivering on the promises that endeared him to blue-collar workers in states such as Ohio and Pennsylvania, or he will go down in flames in the next election."10 Of course, if Trump "goes down in flames" in an impeachment scenario, Peter's point about blue-collar workers still stands. The next election, in 2020, will still feature populism, especially if the U.S. experiences a recession in the meantime and if Trump's policies do not help the median voter by that time. In that case, the election in 2020 will not feature moderates such as Pence, but rather unorthodox policymakers from both the left and the right. We intend to publish a report on populism in America over the next several weeks and elucidate our pessimistic view of politics, the economy, and the markets after 2017. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 The data for polarization analysis uses "nominate" (nominal three-step estimation), a multidimensional scaling method developed to analyze the preference and choice of legislators based on their roll-call voting record in the U.S. Congress. According to empirical work by political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, polarization in Congress is at its highest level ever. Their research shows that the "primary dimension of polarization," the liberal-conservative spectrum on the basic role of the government in the economy, explains approximately 93% of all roll-call voting choices and that the two parties are drifting further apart on this crucial dimension. Please see Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal, "D-Nominate After 10 Years: A Comparative Update To Congress: A Political-Economic History Of Roll-Call Voting," Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26 No. 1 (Feb. 2001), pp. 5-29. 2 Especially when one considers that President Trump's fate may at some point in the near future be in the hands of Senators "Lyin' Ted" and "Little Marco." 3 Please see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), a United States Supreme Court decision that upheld the jurisdiction of the Senate in the impeachment proceedings and confirmed that no judicial appeals process exists. As a side point, the case had nothing to do with former President Richard Nixon, but rather was brought against the Chief Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Walter Nixon. 4 We thank our former colleague, and expert on the U.S. Constitution, Mike Marchio for pointing out this loophole. 5 The only time the Section 4 of the 25th Amendment was seriously contemplated was in 1987, due to President Ronald Reagan's growing "inattentiveness" and "laziness" (probably early signs of Alzheimer disease). Incoming Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker Jr. was asked by his predecessor Donald Regan to carefully examine whether President Reagan was capable of performing his duties. President Reagan passed the test. Please see Jason Linkins, Huffington Post, "Happy 50th Birthday To The 25th Amendment To The Constitution!" dated February 10, 2017, available at huffingtonpost.com. 6 "Teapot Dome" was for decades the largest corruption scandal in U.S. history. It involved President Warren G. Harding, his Secretary of the Interior, other officials, and a number of oil companies that were given extremely favorable leases to drill oil on federal land in Wyoming. Investigations and prosecutions lasted through 1927. 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Stock Market And Business Forecast," June 1973 - Vol. XXIV No.12 and July 1973 - Vol. XXV No. 1, copies available on request. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Stick To The Macro(n) Picture," dated May 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trumponomics: What Investors Need To Know," dated September 4, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Establishment Strikes Back," dated April 28, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The risk asset friendly outcomes in the French and South Korean elections are the latest examples of fading geopolitical risk, and we expect that to continue over the remainder of 2017. Although it has been well over a year since the last 10% pullback, the U.S. equity market is not "due" for a correction. For many investors, the drop in commodity prices has replaced geopolitics as the most likely cause of the next equity market correction. What is Dr. Copper's diagnosis? We re-examine our Yield and Protector portfolios to find out which assets will hold up best if there is a correction. Many investors cite the monthly report on average hourly earnings as evidence that the Fed has it wrong on the economy and the labor market. We disagree. Feature U.S. stock prices remain within striking distance of their all-time highs and many investors continue to worry about the next correction. The risk asset friendly outcomes in the French and South Korean elections are the latest examples of fading geopolitical risk, and we expect that to continue over the remainder of 2017. The market has all but ignored the recent political turmoil in Washington. For many investors, the drop in commodity prices has replaced geopolitics as the most likely cause of the next equity market correction, while others note that it's been more than 15 months since the last 10%+ correction and that we are "due" for one. But is Dr. Copper still a reliable indicator of equity market tops? And if a correction is at hand, which assets would hold up best on the way down? We also review yet another disconnect between the Fed and the market: average hourly earnings. Geopolitical Risk Continues To Fade As A Market Concern Emmanuel Macron's victory was a resounding one as French voters rejected Le Pen's anti-Europe message in last week's election. Removing the possibility of a French President that is dedicated to exiting the eurozone is obviously positive for European stocks and investor risk appetite the world over. Next up are the two rounds of legislative elections in June. Polls are sparse, but they support the view that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Republicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature. A Macron presidency supported by Les Republicains in the National Assembly would be a bullish outcome for investors, according to our geopolitical strategists. On the international stage - where the president has few constraints - France will be led by a committed Europhile willing to push Germany towards a more proactive policy. On the domestic stage - where the National Assembly dominates - Macron's cautiously pro-growth agenda will be pushed further to the right by Les Republicains. Such an election outcome would make possible the passage of genuine structural reforms that would suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive. The presidential election result in South Korea last week was exactly what the market expected, and should help to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. For now, the situation in Washington around President Trump's firing of FBI Director Comey has not had a major impact on markets. If the Democrats win the House of Representatives in 2018, our geopolitical team believes that impeachment proceedings will begin against Trump. On one hand, this means that polarization in the U.S. is about to reach record-high levels. On the other, it should motivate the GOP to get tax reform done before it is too late. Bottom Line: Investors may be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus, but that is a risk for 2018. We expect market-friendly policies emerging from Washington this year, although the Comey affair highlights that the road will be anything but smooth. Corrections And Pullbacks In Context Geopolitical risk appear to have faded for now, but with U.S. equities at or close to all-time highs, talk of a correction is hard to avoid. We continue to favor stocks over bonds this year and suggest that any sell-off in equities will be bought not sold. A hard landing in China, major disappointment on the Trump legislative agenda, a prolonged spell of weakness in the U.S. economic data1, and an overly aggressive Fed in 2017 may all serve as catalysts for a pullback. Above average PE ratios and measures of market volatility that are at cycle lows have only added to the chorus of those saying we are "due" for a correction. History suggests otherwise. From the end of WWII through 2009, the S&P 500 has experienced, on average, two 10% corrections and 10 corrections of 5% of more during equity bull markets. Since the start of the current bull market in March 2009 we've had 22 pullbacks of 5% or more and six corrections of more than 10% (using market closing prices) Table 1. This suggests that the market has seen its fair share of pullbacks and corrections since 2009, and isn't really "due". Chart 1 takes a different approach, but reaches the same conclusion. At 15 months (325 days) since the end of the last 10% correction, the current bull market is right of the middle of the pack of all bull markets since 1932. Table 1Six S&P 500 Corrections Of 10% Or More Since March 2009: We're Not "Due" Chart 1Current Equity Bull Market Is Not Long In The Tooth Our view remains that any pullback in U.S. equities will be bought, not sold, and we favor stocks over bonds in 2017. There are few notable imbalances in the U.S. or global economies and we see an acceleration in both over the remainder of 2017. The Fed will raise rates gradually this year, and there is general agreement between the Fed and the market on the pace of hikes at least for 2017. The Fed and the market remain far apart on hikes in 2018. Our view of the economy and labor market suggests that the market will ultimately move toward the Fed's view. The U.S. corporate earnings outlook remains solid, after a very good Q1 earnings season and favorable guidance for Q2 2017 and beyond. Bottom Line: Equity pullbacks - even during bull markets - are normal and healthy. We do not believe that the market is especially "overdue" for a pullback, but when the inevitable pullback or correction occurs, we expect that investors will take the opportunity to add to equity positions and not turn the pullback into a bear market. Dr. Copper? Chart 2Metals Prices Are Rolling Over...##BR##But Is It A Signal? The recent setback in the commodity pits has added to investor angst regarding global growth momentum. The LMEX base metals index is up almost 20% on a year-ago basis, but has fallen by 8% since February (Chart 2). From their respective peaks earlier this year, zinc and copper are down about 10%, nickel has dropped by 22% and iron ore has lost almost half of its value. Is the venerable "Dr. Copper" sending an important warning about world growth? Some of our global leading economic indicators have edged lower this year, as we have discussed in recent Weekly Reports. Nonetheless, the decline in base metals prices likely has more to do with other factors, such as an unwinding of the surge in speculative demand that immediately followed the U.S. election last autumn. Speculators may be disappointed by the lack of progress on Republican promises to cut taxes and boost infrastructure spending. The main story for base metals demand and prices, however, is the Chinese real estate sector. China accounts for roughly 50% of world consumption for each of the major metals. The Chinese authorities are trying to cool the property market and transition to a more consumer spending-oriented economy, thereby reducing the dependence on exports, capital spending and real estate as growth drivers. Fiscal policy tightened last year and new regulations were introduced to limit housing speculation. The effect of policy tightening can be seen in our Credit and Fiscal Spending Impulse indicator, which has been softening since mid-2016 (Chart 3). The economy held up well last year, but the policy adjustment resulted in a peaking of the PMI at year-end. Growth in housing starts also appears to be rolling over (annual growth is shown on a 12-month moving-average basis in Chart 4 because of the extreme volatility in the series). Both the PMI and housing starts are correlated with commodity prices. Chart 3China is The Main Story##BR##For Base Metals Demand Chart 4Direct Fiscal Spending And Infrastructure##BR##Have Picked Up Recently The good news is that BCA's China Investment Strategy service does not expect a major downshift in Chinese real GDP growth this year, which means that commodity import demand should rebound: Chart 5Dr. Copper Is Not Signaling##BR##A Slowdown in Global Growth There is no incentive for the authorities to crunch the economy given that consumer price inflation is still low and the surge in producer price inflation appears to have peaked. Monetary conditions have tightened a little in recent months, but overall conditions are not restrictive. Moreover, both direct fiscal spending and infrastructure investment have picked up noticeably in recent months (Chart 4). Export growth will continue to accelerate based on our model (not shown). The upturn in the profit cycle and firming output prices should boost capital spending. Robust demand will ensure that housing construction will continue to grow at a healthy pace. Households' home-buying intentions jumped to an all-time high last quarter. Tighter housing policies in major cities will prevent a massive boom, but this will not short-circuit the recovery in housing construction. This all adds up to a fairly benign outlook for base metals. Our commodity strategists do not see the conditions for a major bull or bear phase on a 6-12 month horizon. Within commodity portfolios, they recommend a benchmark allocation to base metals, an underweight in agricultural products and an overweight in oil. We intend to update our view on oil prices in the May 22, 2017 edition of this report. Bottom Line: From a broader perspective, our key message is that "Dr. Copper" is not signaling that global growth will soften significantly this year. Chart 5 highlights that the LMEX base metals index has a high positive correlation with the U.S. stock-to-bond total return ratio on a daily change basis. However, in terms of trends and turning points, base metals are far from a reliable indicator for the stock-to-bond ratio. Where To Hide In A Stock Market Correction Over the past several years, BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy service has periodically recommended that investors add a variety of investments as portfolio "insurance" to help guard against the possibility of a material correction in equities. More recently, we have highlighted two specific forms of insurance: our yield and protector portfolios. We last discussed the protector portfolio in the October 17, 2016 and November 7, 2016 Weekly Reports2, and in today's report we revisit the issue by comparing both portfolios to a more common form of insurance: shifting from cyclical to defensive stocks within an equity allocation. Charts 6, 7, and 8 show a breakdown of the relative performance of S&P 500 defensives along with our yield and protector portfolios. Panels 2 and 3 of Charts 6, 7 and 8 present the rolling 1-year beta and alpha of each strategy vs. the S&P 500. Here, we present alpha as the difference between the actual year-over-year excess return of the portfolio (vs. short-term Treasury bills) and what would have been expected given the portfolio's beta. This measure is sometimes referred to as "Jensen's alpha". Chart 6A Modestly Low-Beta Option Chart 7A Lower Beta Than Defensives Chart 8A Negative Beta, And Positive Alpha There are several noteworthy observations from the charts: Based on the historical beta of the three portfolios vs. the S&P 500, defensive stocks are the most correlated with the overall equity market. Our protector portfolio has a negative correlation to the broad market, and our yield portfolio is somewhere in between, with a positive but relatively low beta. This is consistent with the equity composition of the three portfolios (shown in Table 2); with our protector portfolio composed entirely of non-equity assets. Table 2A Breakdown Of Three##BR##Portfolio Insurance Options After accounting for their lower beta, all three portfolios have tended to outperform the S&P in risk-adjusted terms since the onset of the global economic recovery. But this outperformance has been more significant for our yield and protector portfolios: the top panel of Charts 7 and 8 highlight that both portfolios have generated essentially the same return as equities have since the end of the recession (since the relative profile has been flat), despite exhibiting considerably less volatility than stocks. All three portfolios have experienced a relative decline vs. the S&P 500 since the election, but this has largely occurred due to passive rather than active underperformance. In other words, they have underperformed due to a failure to keep up with the S&P 500 rather than because of losses in absolute terms. There are two important conclusions from Charts 6, 7 and 8 for U.S. multi-asset investors. First, the lower beta of our yield and protector portfolios compared with S&P defensives means that the former represent a better insurance bet against a sell-off in the equity market than the latter. Second, the persistently positive volatility-adjusted returns for our insurance portfolios highlights an investor preference for these assets over the past few years, which is likely to persist over the coming 6-12 months. But investors should also recognize that this preference could eventually be subject to a reversal if the long-term economic outlook significantly improves, an event that could be catalyzed either by organic economic developments or policy decisions by the Trump administration. For now, our investment bias towards equities over government bonds makes us less inclined to favor a low beta position within a balanced portfolio. But our analysis suggests that clients who anticipate the need for portfolio insurance over the coming year should favor our yield and protector portfolios over a defensive sector allocation within an equity portfolio, and we are likely to recommend an allocation to these portfolios for all clients were we to see any material progression towards the sell-off triggers that we identified earlier in the report. Bottom Line: Investors seeking some protection against a potential equity market sell-off should favor our yield and protector portfolios over defensive sector positioning. We do not currently recommend these portfolios for all clients, but we are likely to do so if our key sell-off trigger "red lines" are breached. What's Up With Wage Growth? On the surface, the April jobs report-released in early May seemed to send mixed signals to investors and the Fed about the health of the labor market3. Our view remains that the economy is growing fast enough to tighten the labor market, push up wages and ultimately inflation, which will lead the Fed to raise rates twice more in 2017. But even though the economy is very close to full employment and the output gap has nearly closed, patience is required. Although it's a close call, the next hike is likely to come next month. Markets remain somewhat skeptical of this view, and have only priced in 39 bps of tightening by the end of the year, and have not yet fully priced in a June rate hike. The lack of wage growth (up just 2.5% year-over-year in April according to average hourly earnings (AHE)) remains a key source of the market's skepticism about the pace and timing of Fed rate hikes. Many investors cite the monthly report on average hourly earnings as evidence that the Fed has it wrong on the economy and the labor market. Does the Fed see something the market does not? Or is it the other way around? Markets tend to focus on data that are timely. That requirement certainly fits the AHE. The monthly wage measure is the most timely data point on labor compensation. While timeliness is an important factor when assessing the health of the labor market, it is also critically important to watch what the Fed watches. Investors should note that the AHE data is only one of at least four measures of labor compensation the Fed mentions in its Semi Annual Monetary Report to Congress. Since Fed Chair Yellen took office in 2014, the Fed has specifically referenced (and charted together) three measures of labor compensation in the report: Average hourly earnings Employment Cost Index and Compensation per Hour in the nonfarm business sector, and Chart 9The Fed Tracks All Four Of##BR##These Compensation Measures The Atlanta Fed's Wage Tracker was mentioned in the June 2016 Monetary Policy Report, and the Fed added it to the chart of the other three metrics in the most recent report, released in February 2017. As Chart 9 shows, all have moved higher in recent years, although it is clear that AHE has lagged the others. Given the attention it receives in the financial news media on and just after "Employment Friday" each month, it may surprise investors to learn that neither AHE nor wages were directly mentioned in any of the FOMC statements since Yellen took charge. However, wage growth (or lack thereof) has been a topic of discussion at all but a few of the 13 post FOMC press conferences Yellen has held. When asked about wages, she is careful to note that the Fed watches a wide range of indicators of labor compensation, but has lamented the lack of progress on wages. In her most recent press conference, Yellen noted that "I would describe some measures of wage growth as having moved up some. Some measures haven't moved up, but there's some evidence that wage growth is gradually moving up, which is also suggestive of a strengthening labor market." Average hourly earnings are routinely mentioned in the FOMC minutes, but only alongside mentions of the other metrics noted above. On balance, average hourly earnings are viewed by the Fed - and therefore should be viewed by the market - as one of several indicators of the health of the labor market, but not the only indicator. Chart 10 shows that only a third of industries have seen an acceleration in wage increases over the past year, which supports the market's view that the economy is not growing quickly enough to push up wages and inflation. A recent report by the Kansas City Fed4 takes a different view. Using a bottom-up approach, the author points out that only a few industries (mostly in the goods producing sector of the economy) have accounted for much of the rise in wages, notably manufacturing, construction and wholesale trade. Financial services, retail trade, professional and business services and leisure and hospitality - all service sector industries - have been the laggards. The study done by the economists at the Kansas City Fed shows that although earnings growth has lagged in those more service-oriented industries since 2015, hours worked have seen faster growth than in the mainly goods producing sector (chart not shown). This suggests to the author - and we concur - that labor demand has been strong in the past few years in areas that have not seen much wage growth. As the labor market continues to tighten, wages in these industries may accelerate, but patience may be required. Chart 11 shows that it takes two to three years after a bottom in the output gap for a decisive turn higher in ECI or AHE. While this cycle has seen a more shallow recovery - especially in AHE - both have moved higher since the output gap bottomed out in 2009/2010. Chart 10Only 33% Of Industries Have Seen##BR##Wage Acceleration Over The Past 12 Months Chart 11Measures Of Labor Compensation Move##BR##Higher After Output Gap Bottoms Out Bottom Line: Investors are always wise to watch what the Fed watches. The evolution of wage growth will be critical to FOMC policymakers, because a clear acceleration will confirm that the economy is truly at full employment and, thus, at risk of overheating. We do not expect a surge in wages, but a steady upward trend will keep the Fed on a gradual tightening path. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Growth, Inflation And The Fed", dated May 8, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Reports "Portfolio Insurance: What, How, When?", dated October 17, 2016 and "Policy, Polls, Probability", dated November 7, 2016, both available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Growth, Inflation And The Fed" dated May 8, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 See "Wage Leaders and Laggards; Decomposing the Growth in Average Hourly Earnings" The Macro Bulletin, February 15, 2017; Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Highlights ECB policy is set to become less dovish relative to other central banks. Stay long the euro; stay underweight German bunds within a global bond portfolio; and overweight euro area Financials within a global Financials portfolio. Female labour participation is surging. The state of the euro area labour market is not nearly as bad as many pessimists would have you believe. Play the mega-trend of rising female labour participation with a structural overweight in the Personal Products sector. Allowing for euro break-up risk, European equities are fairly valued - rather than cheap - versus U.S. equities. Prefer to gain exposure via a 50:50 combination of Germany (DAX) and Sweden (OMX). Feature "Domestic sources of risk to euro area growth have diminished while global, geo-global sources of risk have increased." - Mario Draghi The Cleanest Dirty Shirt Since the end of 2014, an unspectacular 1.9% growth rate1 has been enough to make the euro area the world's top-performing major economy - bettering the U.S., U.K. and Japan (Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekThe Percentage Of The French Population In Employment Is At An All-Time High Chart I-2The Euro Area Is The Top-Performing Economy The euro area economy has achieved this outperformance with exceptionally low volatility. For eight consecutive quarters, growth2 has remained within a very tight 1.2-2.2% band, less than half of the equivalent volatility in the U.S., U.K. and Japan. And growth is now "solid and broad", meaning that it includes all countries. The ECB's dispersion index of value-added growth in different countries stands at a historical minimum. We expect the euro area to remain the cleanest dirty shirt. As Draghi points out, the ECB is less worried about domestic risks and more worried about global risks. Specifically: "Markets are in the course of reassessment of U.S. fiscal policy" - Trumponomics will not be nearly as stimulative as first thought. "How the U.K. economy does post-Brexit has a channel of economic consequences for the euro area." "Possible negative surprises in some emerging market economies" - notably China. If any of the global risks do flare up, the ECB will sit pat, but other central banks will have to become more dovish relative to current expectations. If the risks do not flare up, the ECB will start to reduce its own extreme dovishness - at least with words, if not actions. Either way, ECB policy is set to become less dovish relative to other central banks. And the investment implications are: stay long the euro; stay underweight German bunds within a global bond portfolio; and overweight euro area Financials within a global Financials portfolio. Female Labour Participation Is Surging Chart I-3Rising Participation Boosts Employment As Emanuel Macron prepares to become the twenty fifth President of the French Republic, he can take heart from a statistic which may surprise you: The percentage of the French population in employment has never been this high. (Chart of the Week). How can this be when the French unemployment rate is still hovering around 10%? The answer is: as millions of formerly inactive French citizens have entered the labour market, it has lifted the percentage of the population with jobs to an all-time high (Chart I-3). But the flip side of rising participation is that it has kept the unemployment rate elevated - because some citizens who were formerly 'uncounted inactive' are now 'counted unemployed'. Remember that to count as unemployed, a person has to be in the labour market available for work. Some argue that French citizens have simply flooded into the labour market to claim generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits. This argument might hold during downturns, but it cannot explain the 25-year uptrend which also includes economic booms. Unpalatable as it might be to the pessimists, we are left with a more optimistic explanation. France has raised activity levels in the working age population with policies that encourage much greater female participation in the labour market. The important lesson is that when labour participation is rising or falling, we must interpret the headline unemployment rate with extreme care.3 If a country's unemployment rate is high because labour participation has increased - as in France - the labour market is not quite as bad as the high unemployment rate might suggest.4 Conversely, if a country's unemployment rate is low because labour participation has decreased - as in the U.S. (Chart I-4) - the labour market is not quite as good as the low unemployment rate might suggest. Counted unemployment has just been replaced with uncounted inactivity. We propose that the percentage of the working age population in employment is the truer measure of labour utilisation. With surging female participation boosting employment in France and most other European countries (Chart I-5), the state of the euro area labour market is not nearly as bad as many pessimists would have you believe. Chart I-4Participation Down In The U.S.,##br## But Up In Europe... Chart I-5...Led By ##br##Women Play the mega-trend of rising female labour participation with a structural overweight in the Personal Products sector. Political Risk Is Correctly Priced Many people saw the Brexit and Trump victories as the leading edge of a wave of economic nationalism. However, subsequent election results in the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Bulgaria and now France have seen economic nationalists consistently underperforming their expectations. In hindsight, the Brexit and Trump victories were idiosyncratic. Both the Remain and Clinton campaigns were lacking in personality or a strong emotional message, and this proved to be their undoing. Nowadays, many voters care about personalities more than policies; emotional appeal matters more than rational appeal. Behavioural psychologist and Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman calls the emotional way of thinking "System 1", and the colder rational way of thinking "System 2". Crucially, in a tight contest, both the Brexit and Trump campaigns resonated with the emotional System 1 with passionate pleas such as "Take Back Control" and "Make America Great Again". By contrast, the Remain and Clinton campaigns tried to appeal mainly to the rational System 2. But as Kahneman explains, when rational System 2 competes with emotional System 1, emotional System 1 almost always wins. Chart I-6Euro Break-Up Probability = 5% A Year In more recent elections, candidates and parties opposing the nationalists - including Emanuel Macron - have used a good balance of System 1 and System 2 arguments, thereby helping to prevent shock outcomes. This is also likely to be case in the two round French legislative elections on June 11 and 18 which we do not expect to impact financial markets significantly. Does this mean that political risk is over in Europe? No. Until the euro area turns into a permanent and irreversible political union, there has to be a probability of euro break-up. To value euro area assets, investors must ask: what is this break-up probability? The sovereign bond market says it is 5% a year (Chart I-6). This shows up in a discount on German bund yields, because after a euro break-up a new deutschmark would rise; and a symmetrical premium on Italian BTP yields, because a new lira would fall. For the aggregate euro area bond, the risk largely cancels out because intra-euro currency redenomination would be zero sum. But European equities must trade at a discount for this tail-event. At the peak of the euro debt crisis in 2011, the Eurostoxx600 underperformed the S&P500 by 25% in one year. In an outright break-up, the underperformance would almost certainly be worse, let's conservatively say 30-40%. So assuming the tail-event probability is 5% a year, European equities must compensate with a valuation discount which allows a 1.5-2.0%5 excess annual return over U.S. equities. Today, the valuation discount on European equities relative to U.S. equities implies an excess annual return of 1.8%.6 This makes European equities cheap versus U.S. equities only if the annual probability of euro break-up is less than 5%. Our assessment is that a 5% annual risk is about right. Therefore, European equities are fairly valued - rather than cheap - versus U.S. equities. But to avoid the undesirable sector skews in the Eurostoxx600, a much better way to gain long-term exposure to European equities is via a 50:50 combination of Germany (DAX) and Sweden (OMX) (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Prefer A DAX/OMX Combo To The Eurostoxx50 Or Eurstoxx600 Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 At an annualized rate. 2 At an annualized rate. 3 Geek's note: the unemployment rate can be expressed as: 100*(participation rate - employment to population rate) / (participation rate). Hence, all else being equal, a rising participation rate will raise the unemployment rate and a falling participation rate will depress the unemployment rate. 4 This lesson applies equally to any studies of labour market slack such as this one: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ebbox201703_03.en.pdf that do not take into account the dynamics of participation rates. 5 5% multiplied by 30-40% equals 1.5-2.0% 6 Through the next ten years. Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "Markets Suspended In Disbelief" dated April 13, 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model The rally in the CAC40 after the French election is technically extended. The recommended technical trade is to short the CAC40 versus the Eurostoxx600. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-8 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Macron has won in France; Economic reforms are forthcoming; Euroskeptic parties are moving to the center; Yet Italy remains a real risk; Stick to long French industrials versus German; stay long EUR/USD for now. Feature "A chair, a table, or a bench would be elected rather than her [Le Pen] in this country." - Jean-Luc Mélenchon Third-party candidate Emmanuel Macron is the new president of France following his win over populist and nationalist Marine Le Pen (Table 1). The victory was resounding, with polls underestimating support for the centrist, and vociferously Europhile, Macron (Chart 1). Macron's victory was all the more impressive given the low turnout, which should have favored Le Pen. Table 1Results Of French Presidential Election Chart 1Underestimating Emmanuel There are numerous narratives competing to make sense of the election in France. Our conclusion is simple: Marine Le Pen got trounced by a 39-year old political neophyte with no party organization and an investment-banking background. Le Pen wasn't so much defeated as she was routed, in a veritable Battle of Sedan for the European populists. What does this mean for investors? First, European assets are about to "rip." Second, the EUR/USD may have some more upside in the short term. Third, investors remain overly complacent about Italy, which we think has a good chance of breaking the trend of victories for the centrist forces in Europe. However, this is a story for 2018 and thus off the radar screen for investors at the moment. Le Pen Loses More Than Macron Wins Left-wing firebrand, and surprise first-round performer, Jean-Luc Mélenchon forecast in April that "a chair, a table, or a bench" would defeat Le Pen head-to-head. Naturally, the comment was self-serving for Mélenchon as he was trying to convince swing voters to support his campaign. Nonetheless, we fully agree with his assessment! Not only did Le Pen lose, but she lost to a political neophyte with investment banking on his resume. In France... In 2017... Chart 2Le Pen's Flaw Is The Euro So what happened? It is not a coincidence that Le Pen got precisely the same proportion of voters as the percent of the French public that does not support the euro, around 30-35%. Le Pen's popularity has in fact closely mirrored French Euroskepticism for years, peaking in 2013. Chart 2 essentially illustrates that Le Pen's ceiling is determined by the Euroskeptic mood of the country. We have stressed to clients since the December 2015 regional elections that Le Pen's Euroskpeticism is a major handicap to her political fortunes. In that election, her Front National (FN) was massacred in the second round despite a highly favorable context for an anti-establishment, nationalist party. The election took place on the heels of an epic migration crisis and a massive terrorist attack (which occurred just 23 days before the election).1 The Front National was defeated in all 13 mainland French regions, despite leading in six following the first round. As such, investors should ignore both the positive and negative hype surrounding the media coverage of Macron. The main lesson of the French election is that Euroskepticism does not pay political dividends, not that Le Pen still has a chance in the next election or that Macron has pulled off an extraordinary victory. The upcoming legislative elections - set for two rounds on June 11 and 18 - will cement our call on Le Pen and FN. Polls are sparse, but what we have thus far suggests that Macron's En Marche and the center-right Les Républicains will capture the vast majority of seats in the legislature (Table 2). We do not have enough polling data to gauge the reliability of this forecast, but it does make sense given FN's previously weak electoral performances in legislative and regional elections. In fact, following Macron's strong performance on May 7, we would be surprised if FN gets more than 15-20 seats in the National Assembly. Table 2Macron May Have To Work With The Republicans What matters for investors is the likely strong performance in the legislative elections for the center-right Les Républicains. Its presidential candidate François Fillon was the leading centrist candidate to get into the second round for most of early 2017 and only faded due to his corruption scandal (Chart 3). His primary challenger - Bordeaux mayor and former conservative Prime Minister Alain Juppé - in fact was comfortably leading all candidates before he was bested by Fillon in late November in party primaries (Chart 4). Chart 3Scandal, Not Policies, Killed Fillon Chart 4Juppe Led The Race Before Fillon Took Over A Macron presidency supported by Les Républicains in the National Assembly could be the best outcome for investors. On the international stage - where the president has no constraints - France will be led by a committed Europhile willing to push Germany towards a more proactive - rather than merely reactive - policy. On the domestic stage - where the National Assembly dominates - Macron's cautiously pro-growth agenda will be pushed further to the right by Les Républicains. In our view, the best outcome would be either genuine "cohabitation," where Macron's En Marche does not get a majority and he is forced to cohabitate with a center-right prime minister, or an En Marche sweep. The worst outcome would be a hung parliament, where Les Républicains refuse to cooperate with En Marche so as not to give Macron any further political wins. We continue to believe that the context is ripe for genuine structural reforms. We expanded on this topic in a February report titled "The French Revolution" and will not repeat the arguments here.2 Suffice it to say that a "silent majority" in France appears ready to incur the pain of reforms (Chart 5). As a play on the reform theme, we have been long French industrial equities / short German industrial equities on a long-term horizon (Chart 6). The idea is that French reforms should suppress wage growth and make French exports more competitive vis-à-vis their main competitor, Germany (Chart 7). Chart 5"Silent Majority" Wants Reform Chart 6France Will Revive, Germany Is Peaking Chart 7Reforms Could Close This Gap Bottom Line: As we have expected for years, Marine Le Pen is unelectable due to her opposition to European integration. At the minimum, this should allay the fears of many investors that Frexit is a possibility. It has never even been close.3 At its most optimistic, Macron's victory will usher in a period of economic reforms in France. The Big Picture: Europe's Populists Defeated In April 2016 - ahead of the U.K. EU referendum and the U.S. general election - we made a controversial call: Anglo-Saxon populists would surprise to the upside in the upcoming plebiscites, whereas continental European would underperform.4 The U.K. has subsequently chosen Brexit and the U.S. electorate has chosen Donald Trump, both outcomes that we noted were more likely than the consensus expected. On the other side of the ledger, populists were defeated in two Spanish elections (December 2015 and June 2016), the Austrian presidential election in December 2016, and the Dutch general election in April 2017. The latest defeat for the anti-globalization populists is surprising because it happened in France, a country with a long tradition of both. One cannot blame relative economic performance for the outcome, as France has clearly underperformed the U.S. on both the growth and employment fronts (Chart 8). Nor can it be blamed on a more sanguine security situation: since 2015, France has experienced far more tragedy due to terrorist attacks than the U.S. and has been in a state of emergency since the November 2015 terror attack (Chart 9). And while France has largely avoided the 2015 European migration crisis, it was at least far more threatened by it than the U.S. due to mere geography. Chart 8Economic Woes Not Lacking In France... Chart 9... Nor Is Threat Of Terrorism In our view, the long-term socio-economic context is more important than the day-to-day economic and security situation in explaining the success of populists. The French social welfare state - which is onerous, inefficient, and clearly in need of reform (Chart 10) - has nonetheless played a crucial role in tempering the appeal of anti-establishment politics. Chart 10France: Welfare State Needs Reform Chart 11Anti-Establishment Candidates Win... Unlike the U.S. - which has seen the real median household income decline over the past two decades and grow much slower than the economy (Chart 11) - European countries have redistributed the gains of globalization in such a way as to ensure that more people benefit from it (Chart 12). Income inequality has grown in Europe regardless, but to a much lower level - and by a lower magnitude - than in the U.S. (Chart 13). This is perhaps most pronounced in France, where the top 10% of households by income retain much the same share of the economy as they did in 1950 (Chart 14). Chart 12Redistributing Globalization's Gains Chart 13U.S. & U.K.: Outliers On Inequality Chart 14France: Inequality Flat For 70 Years Many of our clients in the U.S. and the U.K. have reacted negatively to our view above. Our analysis is not meant to endorse French levels of social welfare spending. In fact, we are bullish on France precisely because we expect Emmanuel Macron to reduce French state largesse over time. We merely point out that the political effect of a redistributive socio-economic system is greater stability and centrism of the voting public in the midst of a painful socio-economic context. The median voter in Europe is simply not as angry as the median voter in the U.S. This is not by chance, but rather by design. Europe's "socialism" is a relatively modern development and a product of Europe's disastrous inter-war period, which instilled a fear of a populist backlash against failed economic policies of the time. The inter-war period saw the rise of both left- and right-wing extremism, which fed on each other with increasing intensity. These included a failed communist revolution in Germany (1918-1919), a failed Nazi coup in Germany (1923), a fascist takeover of Italy (1925), a Nazi takeover in Germany (1933), far-right unrest in France (1934), and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). These political upheavals were a product of both the Great Depression and the First World War. But they were also colored by Europe's socio-economic context at the time: very high wealth inequality at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, Europe had a much higher starting level of wealth concentration than the U.S., resulting in a much sharper correction during the inter-war period (Chart 15). What most commentators who forecast Europe's doom after the Great Recession missed is that the socio-economic context matters. It is the reality through which voters filter contemporary events. In Europe's case, the median voter was in a much better place to deal with the post-2008 economic and financial crises because Europe's "socialism" had dampened the negative consequences of globalization. In the U.S., and we would argue in the U.K. to a much lesser extent, the median voter was far more exposed to the vagaries of globalization and thus was (and remains) more open to anti-establishment political outcomes. This is the great paradox of the past 18 months: that the two best performing economies in the developed world - the U.S. and the U.K. - experienced the greatest level of populism. To us, it is not much of a paradox. Economic performance is by nature a study of the mean performance, whereas political forecasting deals with the median outcomes. This is not to say that the French are not angry with elites. After all, nearly 50% of the votes cast in the first round of the election went to anti-establishment candidates (Chart 16). However, French voters are not angry enough to want a dramatic reordering of their society, particularly in terms of their support for European institutions. What about other countries in Europe? A trend is emerging across the continent where anti-establishment parties are retaining their commitment to economic redistribution, anti-immigrant sentiment, or unorthodox foreign policy, but abandoning their Euroskepticism for the sake of competitiveness. The best examples of this trend are Spain's Podemos and Greece's SYRIZA, which have evolved in a short period of time into mainstream left-wing parties. Meanwhile, parties that retain an official strategy of Euroskepticism are increasingly finding out that the "Euroskeptic ceiling" is real. As such, these parties are struggling between remaining politically competitive and staying true to their Euroskeptic ideals: Germany: The German Euroskeptic Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD) party has been beset by massive internal conflict and identity crisis. Ousted leader Frauke Petry tried to move the party towards the center, but was rebuked at an April party congress. The AfD is still polling just under 10% (Chart 17), and will therefore enter the Bundestag in the September 24 election, but its leadership is torn between openly embracing the German alt-right and setting a course as a conservative alternative to Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union. We would expect the party to enter the Bundestag, but only just, in the upcoming election. Chart 15U.S. And France: Different ##br##Starting Points Of Inequality... Chart 16French Voters##br## Are Angry Chart 17German Euroskeptics To ##br##Squeak Into Bundestag, At Best Austria: The presidential candidate of the anti-establishment Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), Norbert Hofer, tried mightily to soften his Euroskepticism ahead of the December 2016 elections. He failed and lost the election despite a solid lead in the polls for much of the year. Austria is set to hold general elections by October 2018 and support for the FPO has clearly peaked (Chart 18). Given that all other parties in Austria are pro-EU, the FPO is likely to remain isolated. Finland: The "True Finns," since rebranded as just "The Finns," were once the only competitive Euroskeptic party in northern Europe. They did very well in the 2015 general election and entered the governing coalition. To do so, they compromised on their Euroskeptic positions and became largely irrelevant, with a big dip in support (Chart 19). April municipal elections went terribly for The Finns, with the Europhile Green League emerging as the big winner. An upcoming party congress in June will determine the future of the party and whether it swings towards populism or centrism. Chart 18Austrian Anti-Establishment Has Peaked Chart 19Finnish Anti-Establishment Has Peaked Italy: The one party to watch over the next several months is Italy's Five Star Movement (5SM). There is evidence that 5SM is itself riven by internal conflict over how far to take its Euroskepticism. And several moves by party leadership - including attempting to leave the legislative alliance with UKIP at the European Parliament level - appear designed to pursue the political center. The problem, however, is that there is little evidence that the Italian median voter is as committed to European integration. This remains the key risk for Europe going forward. Bottom Line: Populism has underperformed in continental Europe, much to the surprise of most commentators. Europe's economic redistribution has dampened demands for anti-establishment outcomes. Evidence suggests that Euroskeptic parties will continue to migrate to the center, at least as far as European integration is concerned, in the near future. One outlier to this view is Italy, which we elaborate on below. Investment Implications European risk assets should continue to outperform the U.S. in the coming months. The European economy continues to fire on all cylinders, whereas the U.S. appears to have hit a soft patch, according to the sharply divergent Economic Surprise Indexes (Chart 20).5 The euro may benefit from the reduction in risk premia for the time being. We will retain our long EUR/USD for now, but look to close it over the summer as we doubt the ECB's commitment to a hawkish turn in monetary policy ahead of critical risks in 2018. At the forefront of those risks is the upcoming Italian election. As we have argued repeatedly for two years, the Italy's Euroskeptic turn is real and underpinned by data. Whereas the median European has been far less Euroskeptic than the conventional wisdom has held, the median Italian is becoming more Euroskeptic. We spent a week in Europe warning clients in London, Paris, and Zurich of the upcoming Italian risks. There was little appetite for our bearish view. Even clients in the U.K. who previously held deeply skeptical views of the Euro Area's ability to survive have changed their view on Italy. Why such complacency? The oft-repeated refrain was that Italian politics have always been a mess. The election, which is highly likely to produce either a weak coalition or a hung parliament, will therefore not produce a definitive outcome worthy of risk premia. We highly disagree with this view. Our concern with Italy is not the current polling of Euroskeptic parties, but rather the underlying turn in the Italian electorate towards greater acceptance of a future outside of Europe (Chart 21). If the median voter is more willing to entertain Euroskeptic outcomes, than the Euroskeptic parties will not be forced to adopt a centrist position, as they have done in the rest of Europe. Chart 20U.S. Economy Hits A Soft Patch Chart 21Italy: The Real Risk To Euro Area Nonetheless, investor complacency tells us that European asset outperformance could last well into late 2017. There will be no immediate risk rotation from the French election to the Italian one. The market will have to be shocked into pricing greater odds of Euro Area dissolution when Italy comes back into focus, likely in Q1 2018. Until then, the party will continue. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2016: Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Breakout," dated May 5, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com.