Global

OPEC 2.0 is building physical optionality, to deal with different possible moves the U.S. can make on Iranian oil export sanctions and waivers. This comes despite an apparent break in the sense of urgency Saudi Arabia and Russia feel re production cuts. The coalition’s market monitoring committee meets in April, followed by a full gathering in May, when U.S. waivers expire. If the U.S. extends waivers, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts; if it doesn’t, it can add supply as needed.1 On the demand side, markets appear to be overly concerned about a sharper-than-expected slowdown in China, which, if borne out, would restrain EM growth. We believe these fears are overdone, and expect a slight improvement in EM demand generally this year and next. In our new balances estimates, we see the OECD commercial oil inventory overhang clearing in 1H19, on the back of resilient demand, OPEC 2.0 discipline, and a more moderate level of growth in U.S. shale oil output. This keeps Brent on track to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI trading $74/bbl this year, and $82/bbl next year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Mandatory cuts of 325k b/d, coupled with additional exports of ~ 190k b/d due to additional train and pipeline capacity out of Canada, will drain the 35mm barrels of excess crude oil inventories targeted by the Alberta government in December by 1H19. The WCS – WTI spread narrowed to -$10/bbl from -$50/bbl on these mandatory cuts. By 2H19, we expect Canadian production cuts to average 95k b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum output in China surged 11.3% y/y in December, hitting 3.05mm MT, according to Metal Bulletin. Total output for 2018 was 35.8mm MT, a 7.4% y/y increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is holding its recent gains, as markets become more comfortable with the Fed pausing on its rates-normalization policy until 2H19. Agriculture: Underweight. Hot and dry weather in Brazil is threatening crop yields there. The unfavorable weather is expected to affect three-quarters of cotton-growing regions, half of sugar areas, a third of first-crop corn acreage, and a quarter of soy regions. Feature The first signs of fraying in the relationship between the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which cut production ~ 450k b/d m/m in December, and Russia, which raised output – are emerging, as world leaders meet in Davos. While this casts doubt on the leadership’s carefully cultivated amity, and their shared willingness to abide by the recently agreed output cuts, we do not believe it signals the end of the historic cooperation between these states. Total OPEC output – estimated by production-tracking sources outside the Cartel – stood at 31.6mm b/d in December, a prodigious 751k b/d reduction m/m. We expect continued oil production cuts from core OPEC states and decline-curve losses among non-Gulf OPEC and non-OPEC states within the coalition this year to remove at least 1.2mm b/d from the market, per the quotas agreed by members in December (Chart of the Week, Table 1). On top of this, mandatory Canadian production cuts of 325k b/d in 1H19 and 95k b/d in 2H19 will keep average production cuts at ~ 1.4mm b/d this year. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production CutsTable 1OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Could Exceed Quotas OPEC 2.0’s cuts could persist into 2020, depending on how the U.S. deals with Iranian oil-export sanctions and waivers. Even though KSA and Russia apparently do not share the same sense of urgency re production cuts right now, we believe OPEC 2.0 is committed to draining oil inventories, particularly in the OECD.2 To do so, they’re increasing their operational flexibility – creating physical options, in a manner of speaking – to deal with a range of uncertain outcomes when U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions expire in May. Sanctions And OPEC 2.0’s Physical Options Despite the waivers granted to its eight top consumers shortly after U.S. sanctions took effect in November, Iranian exports plunged below 0.5mm b/d in December. As of December, China had substituted almost all of its Iranian imports for alternative barrels.3 This coincided with a production surge by OPEC 2.0 at the behest of the U.S. leading up to the November sanctions deadline of November 4, 2018, which swelled OECD inventories and took them above their rolling 5-year average level (Chart 2). India retained 30% of its May import levels from Iran, while Europe complied at 100% with U.S. sanctions (Table 2). Chart 3 shows the decrease in exports in preparation for the sanctions over the course of 2018. Chart 2OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick InTable 2Iran Exports By Destination 2018 (‘000 b/d) Whether or not the waivers are extended is anyone’s guess. It is possible waivers will be extended for 90 or 180 days, as a way to counter OPEC 2.0 production cuts, and to offset the lag between filling new pipeline takeaway capacity in the Permian. We expect importers to queue up for Iranian barrels as the market tightens in 1H19. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee will meet in April, followed by a ministerial meeting in May, just ahead of the expiration of the waivers.4 If the U.S. extends them, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts after it meets in May; if waivers are not extended, the Cartel can calibrate an appropriate supply response. Either way, we expect OPEC 2.0 will closely align its production schedule with any U.S. action on the sanctions and waivers. This will, we believe, keep change in the overall market’s supply side relatively constant, except for the month or two required to adjust OPEC 2.0 output. Permian Will Drive OPEC 2.0 Policy The larger issue for OPEC 2.0 comes in 4Q19, when ~ 2mm b/d of new pipeline takeaway capacity comes on line in the Permian Basin in West Texas. With additional takeaway capacity due to come on in 2020, the Cartel will have its work cut out for it next year.5 Our models show a slight decrease then flattening in U.S. rig counts over the coming months, as a result of the 4Q18 sell-off in WTI, with a rebound around mid-year (Chart 4). This is because rig count lags oil prices by ~4 months. Chart 4U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) We are expecting production in the Big 5 shale basins to average 8.4mm b/d in 2019 and 9.0mm b/d next year, a somewhat higher level than projected by the EIA. Growth in the shales accounts for close to 80% of the 2.3mm b/d of growth in the U.S. over 2019 – 2020. Globally, U.S. shales will continue to provide the bulk of y/y crude oil production growth, accounting for 73% of the 2.5mm b/d of growth we will see over the next two years. Given the near-death experience OPEC 2.0 member states had in the price collapse of 2014 – 2016, we remain convinced OPEC 2.0 member states will once again have to embark on a strategy to backwardate the Brent forward curve as they did in 1H18, to moderate the growth of shale-oil production in the U.S. (Chart 5). Reducing production in the short term will force refiners to draw inventories to supply their units and produce products like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and a wide range of petrochemicals. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards This will backwardate the Brent forward curve – i.e., prompt-delivery barrels will be more expensive than deferred-delivery barrels. A backwardated forward curve means OPEC 2.0 member states with term contracts indexed to spot prices receive higher prices for their oil than shale producers hedging 2 years forward, all else equal. The trick for OPEC 2.0 will be to keep the Brent forwards backwardated when the Permian takeaway capacity starts to fill, and exports from the U.S. rise in the early 2020s, as deep-water harbors are brought on line. If OPEC 2.0 is successful in keeping the Brent forwards in backwardation, this will, over time, moderate the growth of shale production: Hedgers’ revenue is constrained by lower forward prices.6 We would not be surprised if OPEC 2.0 states started announcing final investment decisions on select investments in spare capacity to augment existing resources, so they are able to quickly bring production to market in the event of unplanned outages that could lift the entire forward curve and incentivize hedging at higher prices. Demand Still Looks Good Oil markets continue to fret over a possible hard landing in China – resulting either from an internal policy error or a ratcheting up of tensions in the Sino – U.S. trade war. This is causing markets to extrapolate into the wider EM space, and take oil-demand projections lower on an almost-daily basis. In a word, markets are overwrought. Chinese policymakers are sensitive to the tight financial conditions that prevailed in 2H18, which, along with the trade war with the U.S., slowed growth and fostered uncertainty among households and firms in China. We agree with our Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy groups that presidents Trump and Xi are pragmatists dealing with restive populations, and want to deliver a deal ahead of U.S. elections and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021.7 We’ve been expecting the government to deploy a modest amount of stimulus in 1H19, which will begin having an effect on the Chinese economy in the second half of this year. Toward the end of the year and into 2020, we expect the larger stimulus to be deployed in the run-up to put a bid under industrial commodities – oil, base metals and bulks in particular. Overall, we are seeing signs global growth may be reviving over the next few months via an apparent bottoming in our Global LEI Diffusion index (Chart 6). The diffusion index measures the proportion of countries where Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs) are rising relative to those in which LEIs are falling. As is apparent in Chart 6, the diffusion index suggests the downturn in the global LEI has bottomed. The index leads the global LEI by a few months. Chart 6BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming In our latest supply-demand balances, we are expecting Chinese oil demand to average 14.3mm b/d this year, and 14.8mm b/d next year. Along with India – expected to consume 5.0mm b/d this year, and 5.2mm b/d next year – these two states account for 36% of the total 54.3mm b/d of EM demand we expect in 2019 and 2020 (Table 3).8 Table 3BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Overall EM demand, the powerhouse of global oil-demand growth led by China and India, is expected to increase 1.1mm b/d this year – slightly more than we estimated last month – and 1.3mm b/d in 2020. DM demand growth, as always, comes in lower, at 390k b/d this year and 280k b/d next year. Oil Supply-Demand Balances Will Tighten We expect global oil production to average 100.9mm b/d this year and 102.9mm b/d in 2020. Consumption is expected to average 101.8mm b/d this year and 103.4mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 7). This puts OECD inventories back on a downward trajectory, as storage draws resume (Chart 2). Chart 7Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening On the back of these estimates, we expect Brent to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI averaging $74/bbl and $82/bbl, respectively. Given our expectation for higher prices in Brent and WTI, we continue to favor being long crude oil exposure. We are long outright WTI spot futures; long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent; long call spreads along the 2019 forward Brent curve, and long the S&P GSCI. Bottom Line: Markets will continue to tighten as a combination of lower supply growth and rising consumption allows OECD commercial oil inventories to resume their downward trajectory. The apparent lack of a shared sense of urgency by OPEC 2.0’s leaders – KSA and Russia – will be resolved, in our view. OPEC 2.0 will once again focus on backwardating the Brent forward curve, in order to gain some control over the rate at which U.S. shale oil production grows. We continue to favor long exposures to the crude oil futures.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      In last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy we noted these upcoming meetings, and OPEC 2.0’s resolve to drain the market.  Please see “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2      Bloomberg reported this week KSA’s and Russia’s oil ministers cancelled a planned meeting in Davos, following al-Falih’s criticism of the pace at which Russian oil production is being cut.  Please see “Saudi, Russian Energy Ministers Cancel Planned Davos Meeting,” published by bloomberg.com January 22, 2019.  KSA cut its crude oil output 450k b/d m/m in December to 10.64mm b/d from 11.09mm b/d in November.  Russia increased crude and liquids production to a record 11.65mm b/d in December, an 80k b/d increase m/m, according to OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published January 17, 2019.  OPEC expects Russian oil output to average 11.47mm b/d in 1H19, and 11.49mm b/d in 2019.  We are carrying something close to this in our balances (11.51mm b/d) for 2019 and 2020. 3      China imported 10.3mm b/d of crude oil in December after posting a record 10.4mm b/d of imports in November 2018, just as sanctions were kicking in. 4      In our base case estimate, we assume Iran’s crude oil output will average ~ 2.8mm b/d, down ~ 1.0mm b/d from its 3.8mm b/d production level in 1H18, which was prior to the U.S.’s announcement it intended to re-impose export sanctions.  One way or another, we expect OPEC 2.0 to adjust production to compensate for whatever production is lost due to sanctions.  5      Please see “Permian tracker: Production growth slowing as pipeline race still on,” published by S&P Global Platts July 2, 2018, for a discussion of the new takeaway capacity planned for the Permian Basin by midstream companies in 2019 and 2020. 6      The Permian basin is closely tied to hedging activity in the WTI futures market.  It is the only basin for which WTI commercial short open interest is an explanatory variable for rig counts in our modeling.  Commercial short open interest in the WTI futures also Granger causes Permian rig counts. 7      Please see the Special Report entitled “Is China Already Isolated,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy January 23, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com and cis.bcaresearch.com. 8      Our EM demand assumptions are driven by the IMF and World Bank EM GDP forecasts. This week the IMF lowered its global growth forecast for 2019 and 2020 by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points to 3.5% and 3.6%, respectively. This is only slightly down from our lower estimate last month, but still above the World Bank’s expectation. We are using these variables directly in regressions to estimate prices and EM consumption. This replaced our earlier income-elasticity models used to calculate EM oil consumption.  We proxy EM demand with non-OECD oil consumption. We discuss this in “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Insert table images here Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018

Highlights 2018 Performance Breakdown: Our recommended model bond portfolio generated a modest outperformance versus the custom benchmark index of +6bps for all of 2018. Winners & Losers: The outperformance of our model bond portfolio in 2018 mostly came from country selection on our government bond portfolio (underweight U.S. Treasuries, overweight the U.K. and Australia). However, our below-benchmark overall duration stance, as well as our bias favoring U.S. credit over non-U.S. corporates, were drags on performance during the risk-off moves at the end of 2018. Scenario Analysis For 2019: The tactical upgrade to global corporates that we initiated last week is projected to generate outperformance versus the model portfolio benchmark index in the next six months - both from below-benchmark duration positioning and higher exposure to U.S. corporates. Feature 2019 has gotten off to a very busy start, with significant news and market moves forcing us to devote our first two Weekly Reports of the year to analysis and even changes to our views. This week, we belatedly take care of one final piece of housekeeping for 2018 – reporting the performance of the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio for the fourth quarter and for the entire calendar year. We also present an updated scenario return analysis for the next six months after the tactical upgrade to global corporate bonds that we initiated last week.1 As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), the model portfolio is a part of our service that complements the usual macro analysis of global fixed income markets. The portfolio is how we communicate our opinion on the relative attractiveness between government bond and spread product sectors. This is done by applying actual percentage weightings to each of our recommendations within a fully invested hypothetical bond portfolio. A Quick Summary Of The Full Year Performance For 2018 The 2018 performance of the model portfolio can really be broken up into two periods: the first ten months of the year and November/December. This is an unsurprising consequence of the severe market moves around year-end that went contrary to our two most significant recommendations – maintaining a below-benchmark stance on overall portfolio duration and overweighting U.S. investment grade corporate debt versus non-U.S. equivalents in Europe and emerging markets (EM). The overall portfolio return in 2018 was +1.10% (hedged into USD), which outperformed our custom benchmark index by +6bps (Chart of the Week).2 That outperformance was considerably higher before the year-end plunge in global bond yields, reaching a peak of +32bps on November 20. In terms of the breakdown of outperformance, our recommended positioning on government bonds (duration and country allocation) contributed +22bps, while our credit tilts (by country and broadly defined credit sectors) were a drag on performance to the tune of -16bps. Chart of the WeekA Small Gain For 2018 After A Q4 Round-Trip The full breakdown of the full-year 2018 performance can be found in the Appendix tables and charts on Pages 14-16. For the government bond portion of the portfolio the full-year outperformers by country were the U.S. (+18bps), Germany (+10bps), Australia (+4bps) and the U.K. (+3bps). These are in line with our long-standing underweight position on the U.S. versus Germany, and our recommended overweights on Australia and the U.K. The laggards were relatively modest, led by our overweight stance on Japan (-4bps) and underweights on France (-3bps) and Italy (-3bps). For the credit portion of the portfolio, the winners were EM USD-denominated corporates (+7bps), U.S. B-rated high-yield (HY) corporates (+3bps) and U.S. Caa-rated high-yield (HY) corporates (+2bps). This was in line with our long-standing bias to favor U.S. junk bonds over EM credit. The losers were our overweights on U.S. investment grade (IG) financials (-15bps), U.S. IG industrials (-8bps), U.S. Ba-rated HY (-4bps), and euro area IG corporates (-2bps). Our overweight tilts on U.S. IG were the issue here. Q4/2018 Model Portfolio Performance Breakdown: A “Risk-Off” Hit To Our Core Recommendations The detailed data on our model bond performance for Q4/2018 only can be found in Table 1. Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q4/2018 Overall Return Attribution The total return of the GFIS model bond portfolio was +1.5% (hedged into USD) in Q4, which underperformed the custom benchmark index by a mere -1bp. The main cause for the slight underperformance is from our below-benchmark duration positioning with the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury Index yield falling by 20bps over the full quarter. In terms of the specific breakdown between the government bond and spread product allocations in our model portfolio, the former generated -2bps of underperformance versus our custom benchmark index while the latter outperformed by just +1bp. The bar charts showing the total and relative returns for each individual government bond market and spread product sector are presented in Charts 2 and 3.   The main individual sectors of the portfolio that drove the excess returns were the following: Biggest outperformers Underweight U.S. government bonds with maturities between 5-7 years (+12bps) Overweight Japanese government bonds (JGBs) with maturities between 7-10 years (+5bps) Underweight Germany government bonds with maturities between 7-10 years (+3bps) Overweight U.K. government bonds with maturities between 5-7 years (+2bps) Biggest underperformers Overweight Japanese government bonds (JGBs) with maturities beyond 10 years (-15bps) Underweight U.S. government bonds with maturities beyond 10 years (-8bps) Underweight Italy government bonds with maturities beyond 10 years (-3bps) Underweight France government bonds with maturities beyond 10 years (-2bps) Chart 4 presents the ranked benchmark index returns of the individual countries and spread product sectors in the GFIS model bond portfolio for Q4/2018. The returns are hedged into U.S. dollars (we do not take active currency risk in this portfolio) and are adjusted to reflect duration differences between each country/sector and the overall custom benchmark index for the model portfolio. We have also color-coded the bars in each chart to reflect our recommended investment stance for each market during Q4/2018 (red for underweight, blue for overweight, gray for neutral). Government bonds are dominating the left half of the chart, as yields declined in the final months of 2018. This was a drag on our model portfolio performance. However, the best performing sector was U.K. government bonds, generating a total return of 4.7% in Q4/2018 (on a currency-hedged and duration-matched basis). The GFIS model portfolio benefited from this move, given our long-standing overweight bias for U.K. Gilts. The right side of Chart 4 is occupied by global spread product, where currency-hedged returns were flat-to-negative in Q4. This was due to credit spread widening as investors feared both slower global growth and additional Fed tightening. The riskier parts of the corporate bond universe – high-yield, EM corporates – suffered the largest losses. The total return of Bloomberg Barclays U.S. High-Yield Index (currency-hedged into USD) for Q4 was -2.7%, as the option-adjusted spread (OAS) widened by +206bps. Unfortunately for our model portfolio, our preference for U.S. corporate bonds over European and EM credit hurt performance, although not by as much as the below-benchmark duration stance. We are disappointed by the final result for the year, although we are still pleased to generate even a small positive outperformance given the ferocity of the market moves seen at the end of 2018. We can attribute that to lingering gains from good calls made earlier in 2018, but also from our recommended cautious stance on overall portfolio risk (i.e. tracking error) in a more-volatile investment environment. Bottom Line: The outperformance of our model bond portfolio in 2018 mostly came from country selection on our government bond portfolio (underweight U.S. Treasuries, overweight the U.K. and Australia). However, our below-benchmark overall duration stance, as well as our bias favoring U.S. credit over non-U.S. corporates, were drags on performance during the risk-off moves at the end of 2018. Future Drivers Of Portfolio Returns Looking ahead, the performance of the model bond portfolio will benefit from two main factors: our below-benchmark duration bias and our underweight stance on global government bonds versus corporate debt. In terms of specific weighting in the GFIS model bond portfolio, we now have a tactical bias favoring global corporate debt over government debt coming on top of our below-benchmark duration stance (Chart 5). We are sticking with the latter position, about one full year short of the duration of our benchmark index, with global yield curves priced for inflation expectations that are too low and with no rate hikes discounted for 2019 in all major developed markets. Chart 5Portfolio Duration: Staying Below-Benchmark However, we are also keeping our current country allocations on the government bond side of the model portfolio, even after our tactical credit upgrade. That means staying underweight countries where policymakers are only pausing on rate hiking cycles (U.S. and Canada), while overweighting countries that are likely to keep rates on hold for all of 2019 (Japan, U.K., Australia). Our decision to upgrade global credit exposure helps boost the yield of our model portfolio (Chart 6). However, the portfolio is still yielding less than the benchmark thanks to our bear-steepening bias on government yield curves that involves underweights to longer-maturity bonds with higher yields. Chart 6Portfolio Yield: Credit Upgrade Helps Offset Defensive Duration Tilt Importantly, all the changes that were made to our portfolio allocations last week – raising weights on all global corporate bond markets, cutting exposure to government debt in the U.S., Germany and France – did not materially change the tracking error (relative volatility versus the benchmark) of the model portfolio. We do not see the current backdrop as being conducive to taking high levels of overall portfolio risk, even given our tactical view that the U.S. monetary policy will be on hold for the next 3-6 months. We prefer to recommend more relative value positioning via country and credit allocations that help dampen overall portfolio risk and reduce exposure to the kind of volatility spikes that became more frequent in 2018. Thus, we will continue to target a tracking error for the model portfolio of 40-60bps, well below our self-imposed 100bps ceiling (Chart 7). Chart 7Portfolio Risk Budget Usage: Staying Cautious Scenario Analysis & Return Forecasts In April 2018, we introduced a framework for estimating total returns for all government bond markets and spread product sectors, based on common risk factors.3 For credit, returns are estimated as a function of changes in the U.S. dollar, the Fed funds rate, oil prices and market volatility as proxied by the VIX index (Table 2A). For government bonds, non-U.S. yield changes are estimated using historical betas to changes in U.S. Treasury yields (Table 2B). This framework allows us to conduct scenario analysis of projected returns for each asset class in the model bond portfolio by making assumptions on those individual risk factors.   In Tables 3A & 3B, we present three differing scenarios, with all the following changes occurring over a six-month horizon. Note that this differs from how we have typically presented these scenario analyses, with projections over the subsequent twelve months. Given that the changes to our recommended allocations introduced last week were tactical in nature (i.e. up to six months), we are shortening our forecast window for this particular scenario analysis to line up with that shorter investment horizon.   The scenarios are all driven by what we believe will be the most important driver of market returns in 2019 – the path of U.S. monetary policy. Our Base Case: the Fed stays on hold, the U.S. dollar remain flat, oil prices rise by +10%, the VIX index falls to 15, and there is a bear-steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve. This scenario is the one we laid out in last week’s report, with the Fed taking a pause through at least the March FOMC meeting, allowing market volatility to drift lower as U.S. monetary and financial conditions ease. A Very Hawkish Fed: the Fed does a surprise +25bps rate hike in March, the U.S. dollar rises by +5%, oil prices increase +20%, the VIX index climbs to 25 and there is a sharp bear-flattening of the U.S. Treasury curve. This would be the case if the U.S. economy maintains firm growth, the global growth downturn stabilizes, U.S. inflation expectations increase and market volatility increases from a surprisingly hawkish Fed. A Very Dovish Fed: the Fed cuts the funds rate by -25bps, the U.S. dollar falls by -5%, oil prices decline -20%, the VIX index increases to 35 and there is a sharp bull steepening of the U.S. Treasury curve. This is a scenario where U.S./global growth slows rapidly from the current pace and the Fed has no choice but to ease monetary policy as market volatility surges alongside elevated recession risks. The model bond portfolio is expected to outperform the custom benchmark index by +19bps in our Base Case scenario. This comes from the relative outperformance of credit versus government bonds in an environment of rising bond yields (which also benefits our below-benchmark duration stance), and tighter credit spreads. In the Very Hawkish Fed scenario, our model portfolio is expected to outperform the benchmark by +29bps. This is not only due to our duration tilt and our corporates-versus-governments bias. As in the Base Case, the relative stance favoring U.S. corporates over EM credit would benefit from a backdrop of tightening U.S. monetary conditions and rising market volatility (Chart 8) – both of which are worse for EM credit. Chart 8Risk Factors Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis In the Very Dovish Fed scenario, our portfolio is projected to underperform the benchmark index by -26bps, with falling bond yields (Chart 9) hitting both our defensive duration bias and the overweight on corporates relative to governments. Chart 9UST Yield Assumptions For The Scenario Analysis In all three scenarios, there is a drag on expected performance from the relative carry of the model portfolio versus the benchmark (-17bps). This comes mostly from the below-benchmark overall duration stance that involves reduced exposure to longer-maturity government bonds with higher yields. The drag on carry also comes from the underweight positioning on high-yielding EM debt. We are maintaining that tilt given our concerns that China’s policymakers will be unable to provide enough stimulus to benefit EM economies through greater Chinese demand. Importantly, our recommended allocations win in scenarios that do not involve Fed rate cuts, a very low probability outcome in 2019, in our view. Thus, we expect our current allocations to generate alpha in the first half of the year, even if the Fed returns to a hawkish bias faster than we currently anticipate. Bottom Line: The tactical upgrade to global corporates that we initiated last week is projected to generate outperformance versus the model portfolio benchmark index in the next six months - both from below-benchmark duration positioning and higher exposure to U.S. corporates.   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Enough With The Gloom: Upgrade Global Corporates On A Tactical Basis”, dated January 15th 2019, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. 2 The GFIS model bond portfolio custom benchmark index is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index, but with allocations to global high-yield corporate debt replacing very high quality spread product (i.e. AA-rated). We believe this to be more indicative of the typical internal benchmark used by global multi-sector fixed income managers. 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Q1/2018 Performance Review: A Rough Start”, dated April 10th 2018, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. Appendix     Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights MLPs’ one-of-a-kind legal structure offers investors gaudy distribution yields and tax-saving advantages. They boomed alongside fracking, enjoying spectacular growth between 2009 and 2014. MLPs used to exhibit a high correlation with utilities, but since the 2014 oil bust, they have performed in step with the rest of the energy sector. Improved valuations have recently put MLPs back on investors’ radar. However, structural impediments and heterogeneous balance-sheet quality argue against broad index exposure. Investors would be better served by concentrating their efforts on picking individual stocks. Opportunities reside within smaller-cap MLPs and MLPs exposed to the Permian basin. Feature Dear Client, In place of a Weekly Report written from South Africa, where I have been meeting with clients, we are sending you this Special Report on Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs), written by my colleague Jennifer Lacombe.* Like mortgage REITs, which U.S. Investment Strategy followed from 2011 to 2013, MLPs are a yield play that investors might find to be an appealing bond alternative. We trust that you will find this report interesting and informative. Best regards, Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy * This report was initially published by our Global ETF Strategy service on November 15, 2018. It has been lightly revised to update charts and reflect subsequent market developments.   Q: What are MLPs and their tax benefits? Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) are publicly listed partnerships involving two classes of partners. A General Partner (GP) controls the assets and manages the daily operations of the business. Limited Partners (LPs) - and public investors - provide the capital and collect cash flow distributions. Unlike corporations, which pay corporate taxes on their income, MLPs have the ability to pass through all of their income to their owners, along with deductible items like amortization and depreciation expenses. MLP investors, in turn pay income tax at their own individual marginal tax rates. MLP owners are thereby shielded from the double taxation that would otherwise apply when the corporation paid taxes on its income, and the shareholder paid taxes on the dividend distributed from the corporation’s income. Q: Why are they predominantly found in the energy sector? Concerns about the potential loss of federal income led Congress to limit MLP eligibility to companies in the energy and real estate sectors when it overhauled the tax code in 1986. Since the 1986 Act took effect, MLPs have had to generate at least 90% of “qualifying income” from their energy or real estate operations. Section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code defines “qualifying income” as income derived from exploration, development, mining or production, processing, refining, transportation or marketing of any mineral or natural resource, as well as certain passive-type income including interest, dividends and real property rents. Over the years, the shale revolution and the rise of new technologies, such as horizontal drilling and fracturing, created elevated demand for energy infrastructure. Today, MLPs almost exclusively operate in the natural resources space (Chart 1). Q: Why did MLPs outperform assets of all stripes following the Great Financial Crisis? A combination of several factors led MLPs to record stunning returns between 2009 and 2014. The Alerian MLP Total Return Index grew by a whopping annualized rate of 38% during that time. Decreasing interest-rate environments are typically supportive of yield plays’ outperformance. Powered by high single-digit to double-digit distribution yields, MLPs led Treasuries, utilities stocks, high-yield bonds and even the S&P 500 over that six-year stretch (Chart 2). With the shale revolution in full swing, sustaining strong demand for pipelines and other energy infrastructure, investors’ funds flowed abundantly into the energy MLP space (Chart 3). Prices - a mathematical function of multiples and earnings - soared as money kept pouring in and P/E tripled in the first 7 years following the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 4). Chart 2Decreasing Interest Rates Are A Boon To Yield Plays   Chart 3Horizontal Drilling Attracted A Lot Of Money...   Chart 4...Sending Multiples Soaring Q: Why has such outperformance not attracted more institutional and foreign investors? Because of U.S. tax rules, MLPs are relatively unattractive to tax-exempt investors and non-U.S. investors. The tax rule for U.S. tax-exempt investors – institutional investors such as pension funds, university endowments, charities and IRAs – treats MLP earnings as unrelated business taxable income (UBTI), making them subject to income tax. Moreover, to retain their own pass-through status and tax shield, open-ended funds – like many mutual funds and ETFs – can allocate no more than 25% of their total holdings to MLPs, and no more than 10% to a single MLP. U.S. tax rules consider foreign owners of MLPs to be engaged in a business in the U.S., and require them to file and pay U.S. federal income tax. Therefore, only U.S. individuals can truly reap the full benefits of the MLP structure. Though they easily access these securities on public exchanges, the tax shield comes at the price of convoluted accounting treatments. Unitholders receive Schedule K-1 tax forms that can be complicated enough to result in significant accounting costs. They are most suited for high net worth investors’ portfolios, although smaller investors who are not daunted by accounting burdens have also embraced the vehicle. Q: Why are MLP yields so high? The typical MLP partnership agreement incentivizes a GP to distribute all available cash to unitholders, after retaining reserves for business operations and liabilities. Not only does the corporate tax exemption increase the amount of available cash, but the General Partner also has wide discretion over the amount of retained reserves. Because distributions are the main determinant of any yield play’s performance, GPs have historically emphasized distribution yields – sometimes at the expense of retained earnings. The more assurance investors have that they will receive reliable cash flows, the better the MLP will perform in the market. Q: Do MLPs trade like other bond proxies? The distribution model worked beautifully during the shale-oil boom. Low retained reserves never became an issue because MLPs collected steady revenues – a function of prices and volumes of oil or gas processed - and could fund distributions in excess of operating cash flow by issuing new debt or equity. Investors were so eager to invest that GPs found themselves at the controls of a positive feedback loop in which the more cash they distributed to investors, the more capital flowed in to fund even higher distributions. The infrastructure-heavy business model and high payout ratios echoed companies in the utilities sector and, indeed, MLP returns correlated strongly with utilities stocks. However, the discretion embedded in the MLP model reached a breaking point soon after the oil bust arrived in mid-2014. The price-led decline in revenues necessitated distribution cuts and severed the correlation with utilities (Chart 5). Chart 5A Utilities Proxy No More... Q: Were MLPs immune to energy price swings before the 2014 bust? Conventional investor wisdom maintains that MLPs are immune to commodity price swings in the aggregate because of their utility-like characteristics and because long-term contracts lock in selling prices. Actually, however, MLP revenue structures differ greatly from one line of activity to the other. Natural gas pipeline transportation accounts for a quarter of aggregate MLP activity. Prices per unit of volume transited are contractually locked in 5-to-20-year contracts, providing immunity to spot price moves during the entire duration of the contract. Storage (natural gas not immediately needed, or crude oil waiting to be refined) accounts for another quarter of aggregate activity and is subject to a similar pricing model as natural gas pipelines. Only the contract lengths are much shorter, ranging from 1 to 5 years. Petroleum pipeline transportation accounts for 44% of MLP activity. Contracts locking prices over the long run are not typical in this line of business. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) also imposes a yearly price increase amounting to the Producer Price Index for Finished Goods, plus a 1.23% adjustment. MLP revenue structures are therefore varied, and only natural gas pipeline transportation’s revenue streams - a quarter of the sector – are truly immune to fluctuations in spot prices, thanks to their long-term contracts. It follows that MLPs in aggregate are indeed correlated with energy price swings and trade closely in line with energy stocks (Chart 6). Chart 6...An Energy Proxy Instead Up until recently, their correlation to spot oil prices in particular was even more striking. However, they failed to match the 2017-18 recovery in oil markets (Chart 8). Because cash flow reliability is a key driver of the investment decision for any yield play, distribution cuts are bound to make any MLP investors skittish, and oil prices may have to enter an extended bull market before they overcome their fears (Chart 7).   Chart 8...Kept MLPs Depressed In Spite Of Oil Price Recovery Q: So, how cheap are they now? Since its peak in the summer of 2014, the Alerian MLP Total Return index has declined by 38% and is now flirting with the two-standard-deviation-cheap zone (Chart 9). Their profit margins have also strongly recovered (Chart 10). Chart 9Cheap Valuations...   Chart 10...Amid Recovering Profit Margins Because of the infrastructure-heavy nature of MLPs, traditional valuation metrics such as price-to-earnings can be misleading. High depreciation charges have significant impacts on earnings. Cash flows are an appropriate measure as they best inform a firm’s ability to maintain its distributions. Q: Great! So which ETF should I buy? The Alerian MLP index’s low multiples and recovering profit margins are not sufficient endorsements in themselves. An index is not an investible vehicle and even the best of index-tracking instruments can only imperfectly replicate an exposure. In the MLP space in particular, structural impediments reduce the attractiveness of exchange-traded products. Because ETFs are subject to the previously mentioned 25% cap on MLP holdings, many supplement their portfolios with regular pipeline or infrastructure stocks. Although the overall fund provides a decent exposure to the energy infrastructure sector, the diluted MLP exposure does not offer distribution yields anywhere comparable to the yields direct MLP owners receive. An alternative is to opt for a C-corporation structure. The flagship Alerian MLP ETF (ticker: AMLP) falls into this category. This structure allows for an undiluted exposure to MLPs, all the while relieving an ETF shareholder from having to deal with the complicated and costly accounting treatment that direct MLP ownership involves. However, C-corporations are subject to corporate income taxes, which cancels out the tax benefits of investing in MLPs in the first place. The resulting cumulative tax drag on returns can become substantial over time (Chart 11). Investors seek MLP exposure for the high distribution yields made possible by tax advantages. A fund will indeed provide diversification and accounting relief, but at the cost of surrendering either some yield or some of the tax advantages. This is not to mention that the bulk of the exchange-traded vehicles are Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs). Unlike ETFs, they do not own any underlying shares or units of securities. Instead, they are instruments issued and backed by financial institutions. Even in the case of well-established lending institutions, we shy away from these types of products, as we are not keen on taking unnecessary counterparty risk. Many MLP exchange-traded products are also illiquid, or have not gathered a significant mass of assets under management. The expense ratios are also high in the MLP exchange-traded product space, a result of the complicated accounting treatment of K-1 forms that are borne by the ETF or ETN sponsor (Table 1). Table 1ETNs Constitute Two Thirds Of A Relatively Illiquid Universe Q: What about the flagship Alerian MLP ETF? It’s clearly well-established. The flagship Alerian MLP ETF (ticker: AMLP) tracks the Alerian MLP Infrastructure Index and has gathered close to USD 10bn of AUM under its belt since its inception in 2010. Amid all the above limitations, it is the only viable option. However, it comes with its own set of yellow flags. Because it tracks a market-capitalization weighted index, half of the fund’s assets under management are concentrated in its five largest holdings. As we go to press, these are Magellan Midstream Partners LP, Enterprise Products Partners LP, Energy Transfer LP, Plains All American Pipeline LP and MPLX LP. These companies’ distribution yields have recovered since the 2014 oil crash, but the question of the sustainability of these cash flows is of utmost importance. Although retained earnings are at all-time highs, so is the level of debt (Chart 12). The fact that 50% of the fund is concentrated in these top 5 constituents dilutes the diversification benefits of index investing. Chart 12Distributions Are Financed By Cash Flows...And A Lot Of Debt Q: So, what are my options? The MLP universe is heterogeneous. Wide disparity in valuation (Chart 13), debt levels (Chart 14) and performance (Chart 15) indicate that opportunities reside further down the capitalization scale.     Because an index is a weighted average, a heterogeneous market does not warrant broad-index exposure, especially when the smallest constituents offer the best opportunities. Amalgamation is always a process of blending wheat and chaff together, but in this case it disproportionately favors the chaff. Stock picking thrives against this backdrop. Our expertise does not extend to evaluating individual energy MLPs. We leave the honor of recommending the best-in-class opportunities to the professional bottom-up analysts, backed by thorough and diligent review of company fundamentals and management capabilities. Where we can add value is in the analysis of economic cycles and secular macroeconomic forces. Despite the sharp fall in prices over the past two months, brought about by the surprise eleventh-hour waivers granted to Iranian oil importers, BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service believes the global oil market remains tight. Our strategists expect that oil prices will recover in 2019 as OPEC producers, Russia, and Canada reduce output by an aggregate 1.4 million barrels a day, and the Iran-driven supply glut is worked off. While a 2019 oil spike would be a tailwind to petroleum pipeline MLPs, surging production in U.S. shales – led by the Permian Basin in West Texas – means the new pipeline capacity being built to accommodate higher output will find a ready market. Regardless of what happens with prices, our energy strategists foresee a localized surge in demand for transportation and other midstream services in the U.S. shales. In line with IEA projections, they expect U.S. crude oil production to grow by approximately 1.3 million barrels a day in 2019 once the constraints imposed by a lack of pipeline capacity in the fecund Permian basin ease. MLPs positioned to resolve the transportation bottleneck should be able to count on a bright near-term future. “Location, location, location” applies to pipelines as well as real estate, and reinforces a bottom-up focus when selecting MLPs.   Jennifer Lacombe, Senior Analyst jenniferl@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The U.S. economy is slowing in a completely predictable manner. With inflationary pressures largely dormant, the Fed can afford to stay on hold for the next few FOMC meetings. Growth in the U.S. and the rest of the world should stabilize by mid-year. This will enable the Fed to resume raising rates in June. A bearish stance towards U.S. Treasurys is warranted over a 12-month horizon. As long as the Fed is hiking rates in response to above-trend GDP growth rather than accelerating inflation, risk assets will fare well. Investors should overweight global equities and spread product for now, but monitor inflation trends closely for signs of when to get out. Brexit fears are overdone. Stay long the pound versus the euro. We were stopped out of our short AUD/JPY trade for a gain of 10%. Feature A Predictable Slowdown Investors are misunderstanding the nature of the current slowdown in the United States and much of the world. Completely predictable slowdowns, such as this one, rarely morph into recessions. Real U.S. GDP rose at a blistering 3.8% average annualized pace in Q2 and Q3 of 2018. There is no way that sort of growth rate could have been sustained. Financial conditions also tightened sharply in Q4, which has inevitably weighed on growth. Given the stock market rout, it is actually surprising that the economy has not weakened more than it has. The New York Fed GDP Nowcast points to growth of 2.5% in Q4 of 2018 and 2.1% in Q1 of 2019. This is still above the Fed’s long-term estimate of potential GDP growth of 1.9%. Most of the slowdown has been concentrated in the manufacturing sector, but even there, the bloodletting may be ending. The latest Philadelphia Fed survey — arguably the most important of the regional Fed manufacturing reports — showed an uptick in activity, with the new orders component hitting the highest level since last July. Despite the tightening in financial conditions, bank lending to the business sector has accelerated over the past three months (Chart 1). The Conference Board’s Leading Credit Index remains in expansionary territory (Chart 2). While business capex intention surveys have come off their highs, they still point to robust spending plans over the next few quarters (Chart 3). Chart 1Credit Is Still Flowing To U.S. Businesses Chart 2Little Sign Of A Looming Credit Crunch Chart 3Capex Plans Still Solid The labor market remains healthy, as evidenced by ongoing strong payroll growth and low initial unemployment claims. Faster wage growth is boosting consumer spending. Holiday sales rose by 5.1% from a year earlier according to the Mastercard SpendingPulse report, the fastest growth in six years. The Redbook same-store index tells a similar story (Chart 4). Chart 4Same-Store Sales Are Robust The housing market struggled for much of 2018, but the recent stabilization in mortgage rates should help matters (Chart 5). Notably, mortgage applications for purchase have surged to their highest levels since 2010 (Chart 6). Homebuilder confidence improved in January, mirroring the rally in homebuilder shares (Chart 7). We are long homebuilders versus the S&P 500, a trade that is up 5.3% since we recommended it on November 1, 2018. Chart 5aThe U.S. Housing Sector Will Stabilize (I) Chart 5BThe U.S. Housing Sector Will Stabilize (II) Chart 6A Positive Signal For U.S. Housing Chart 7U.S. Homebuilder Stocks Have Been Outperforming Recently U.S. Government Shutdown: A Near-Term Hit To Growth The government shutdown poses a near-term risk to the U.S. economy. If it lasts until the end of March, it will shave about 1.7% off Q1 GDP based on White House estimates. While this represents a potentially significant hit to the economy, the effect is likely to be completely reversed once the shutdown ends. Moreover, the drag to growth from the shutdown pales in comparison to the overall stance of fiscal policy. According to the IMF, the cyclically-adjusted budget deficit is set to reach 5.7% of GDP this year, up from 3.2% of GDP in 2015. There is also a reasonable chance that any deal to end the shutdown will involve a commitment to increase spending beyond currently budgeted levels. This would increase the overall amount of fiscal stimulus the economy is receiving. Taking The Pulse Of Global Growth The slowdown in growth has been deeper and more protracted outside the United States. Nevertheless, rays of sunshine are emerging. Our global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index, which measures the proportion of countries with rising LEIs compared to those with falling LEIs, has bottomed. The diffusion index leads the global LEI by a few months (Chart 8). Chart 8The Uptick In The LEI Diffusion Index Suggests Global Growth Could Stabilize As is increasingly the case, the fate of the Chinese economy will be critical in determining when global growth begins to reaccelerate. The latest Chinese activity data has been disappointing, with this week’s downright awful export figures being the latest example. That said, credit growth may be starting to stabilize, as evidenced by stronger-than-expected loan growth for December. With credit growth now running only slightly above nominal GDP growth, the need for the authorities to maintain their deleveraging campaign has diminished. In an encouraging sign, the Market-Based China Growth Indicator developed by our China Investment Strategy service has been moving higher (Chart 9). Chart 9Encouraging Sign For The Chinese Economy A revival in Chinese growth would aid trade-sensitive economies such as Japan and Germany. The former saw a decline in economic momentum in the second half of 2018, exacerbated by typhoons and an earthquake in Hokkaido. With the consumption tax set to increase from 8% to 10% in October, the Bank of Japan will need to maintain its yield curve control regime at least until 2020. This could weigh on the yen. With that in mind, we tightened the stop on our short AUD/JPY trade two weeks ago and subsequently exited the position with a gain of 10%. The German economy has taken it on the chin recently. Real GDP contracted in the third quarter and barely grew in the fourth quarter. The economy should rebound in 2019 as external demand improves. The drag on growth from the decline in automobile assemblies following the introduction of new emission standards should also turn into a modest tailwind as production resumes. In addition, fiscal policy is set to turn more stimulative, while robust wage growth, lower oil prices, and rising home prices should support consumption. Elsewhere in Europe, the Italian economy should recover as bond yields come down from their highs and confidence improves following the resolution of the impasse with the EU over budget targets. The modest easing in Italy’s fiscal policy of about 0.5% of GDP in 2019 should also benefit growth. It is too early to quantify the effect on the French economy from the “yellow vest” protests. France is no stranger to protests of this sort, so our guess is that the impact on the economy will be minimal. President Macron’s pledge to loosen fiscal policy in hopes of placating the protestors should also support demand. Brexit: A “No Deal” Outcome Looks Less Likely The Brexit saga could end in one of three ways: 1) A “no deal” where the U.K. leaves the EU with no alternative in place; 2) A “soft Brexit” involving an agreement to form a permanent customs union or some sort of “Norway plus” arrangement; 3) A decision to reverse the results of the original referendum and stay in the EU. In thinking about which of these three outcomes is most likely, one should keep the following in mind: Any course of action that the U.K. takes must have the support of the British parliament. A no deal outcome does not have parliament’s support. Not even close. Thus, it will not happen. This leaves options 2 and 3. This publication has argued since the day after the Brexit vote that the European establishment, following the example of the Irish and Danish referendums over various EU treaties, will keep insisting on do-overs until it gets the result it wants. If one referendum is good, two is even better – it’s twice as much democracy! The betting markets seem to be coming around to our view. As we go to press, PredictIt shows a one-in-three chance that a new referendum will be called by March 31 (Chart 10). Polling trends suggest that if another referendum were held, the remain side would probably prevail (Chart 11). Chart 11U.K.: A Change Of Heart? In some sense though, it does not matter for investors whether the original referendum is reversed or a soft-Brexit deal is reached. Either outcome would be welcomed by markets. We continue to advocate buying GBP/EUR. My colleague Dhaval Joshi, BCA’s Chief European strategist, also recommends that equity investors purchase the FTSE 250 index, which comprises from the 101st to the 350th largest companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Unlike its large-cap counterpart, the FTSE 100, the FTSE 250 index is more geared to what happens in the U.K. than in the rest of the world. Investment Conclusions Global inflation remains subdued, which gives central banks the luxury of taking a wait-and-see approach to tightening monetary policy. Growth in the U.S. and the rest of the world should stabilize by mid-year. This will enable the Fed to resume raising rates in June. Given that the market is no longer pricing in any Fed hikes, a bearish stance towards U.S. Treasurys is warranted over a 12-month horizon (Chart 12). Outside of Japan, bond yields will also rise in the major developed economies. Chart 12Treasurys Will Underperform If The Fed Hikes Rates By More Than Expected We downgraded global equities in June as our leading indicators began to point to slower growth ahead, but upgraded them back to overweight after stocks plunged following the December FOMC meeting. The rally over the past three weeks has reversed deeply oversold conditions and our tactical MacroQuant model is once again flagging some near-term risk to stocks. Nevertheless, if the global economy avoids a recession this year, as we expect, equities should fare well over a 12-month horizon. The MSCI All-Country World index is trading at a modest 13.6-times forward earnings (Chart 13). Profit estimates have been revised down meaningfully, suggesting that the bar for upward earnings surprises is now quite low. Chart 13A Lot Of Bad News Already Discounted? Risk assets can tolerate higher rates as long as tighter monetary policy is the result of stronger growth. What risk assets cannot withstand is a stagflationary environment where growth is slowing but the Fed is hiking rates in order to bring down inflation. That is not the situation today, but could be the situation next year. Bottom line: Investors should overweight global equities and spread product for now, but monitor inflation trends closely for signs of when to get out. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Global Corporates: The Fed is now clearly signaling a near-term capitulation to tightening financial conditions alongside slowing global growth and inflation. A pause in the U.S. rate hiking cycle, after credit spread valuations have cheapened up, opens up a window of opportunity for global corporate bond market outperformance versus government debt over the next 3-6 months. Country Allocation: Move to overweight (4 of 5) on both U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporates, while downgrading U.S. Treasuries to underweight (2 of 5). Upgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporates to neutral (3 of 5), while downgrading euro area governments to underweight (2 of 5). Upgrade emerging market U.S. dollar denominated debt (both sovereign and corporate) from maximum underweight to underweight (2 of 5). Feature We downgraded our overall recommended investment stance on global corporate debt to neutral on June 26 of last year.1 That decision reflected our concern at the time that less accommodative central banks, a rising U.S. dollar, weakening global growth momentum and intensifying U.S.-China trade tensions had all significantly worsened the near-term risk/reward tradeoff for owning corporate bonds. This accompanied a firm-wide call at BCA to pare back our recommended exposure to global equities for the same reasons. We now see an opportunity, driven by better value and diminished market volatility after the Fed has clearly signaled a pause on U.S. rate hikes (Chart of the Week), to go back to an overweight stance on corporate credit on a tactical basis (3-6 months). Chart of the WeekTime For A Pause In Corporate Spread Widening To be clear, we still see medium-term risks for corporate credit once global growth stabilizes and a resilient U.S. economy forces the Fed to restart the rate hikes in the latter half of 2019. A move to a restrictive stance by the Fed toward year-end, signaled by an inversion of the U.S. Treasury yield curve, will raise recession risks and be the eventual death knell for this credit cycle. In the meantime, corporate debt is likely to outperform government bonds, justifying a tactical overweight position. This mirrors the recent change in the BCA House View, returning to a tactical overweight stance on global equities. On a regional basis, we prefer taking more of our upgraded credit risk in U.S. corporates over European and emerging market (EM) equivalents. The outlook for growth remains more favorable on a relative basis to Europe or China, the latter being most critical for the outperformance of EM assets. Why The Spread Widening Will Pause: A Patient Fed Is Taking A Break Global corporate bond spreads have widened since we did our downgrade in June, across all countries and credit tiers (Chart 2). Typically, some underperformance of corporate credit should occur when global growth momentum slows, as was the case throughout 2018. Yet the most violent period of spread widening only began once the Fed began signaling that it would continue with its interest hikes and balance sheet runoff, despite softening global growth. This set off yet another clash between policy and the markets – one of BCA’s key investment themes for 2018 that still applies in 2019 – resulting in a sharp selloff in global risk assets, including corporate debt. The result was a tightening of U.S. financial conditions, first through a stronger U.S. dollar (supported by rate hike expectations) and later through lower equity prices and wider corporate spreads. This echoed the 2014/15 period when the Fed was trying to lift rates off the zero bound after ending its quantitative easing program. The Fed was only able to deliver a single rate hike in December 2015 before pausing because of severely slumping global growth (most notably in China) and a sharp tightening in financial conditions, both of which knocked the wind out of the U.S. economy. Turning to 2019, the downturn in cyclical growth indicators like manufacturing purchasing managers indices (PMI) and the global leading economic indicator (LEI) has reached levels last seen after that 2014/15 episode (Chart 3). Importantly, our global LEI diffusion index, which measures the number of countries with rising LEIs compared to falling LEIs and is itself a reliable leading indicator of the global LEI, is bottoming out at the same level that preceded the 2016 LEI revival (middle panel). This suggests that a stabilization of the global LEI could unfold in the next few months, which would also signal a potential rebound in corporate credit returns (bottom panel). Chart 3Credit Returns Already Reflect Slowing Growth Given the many similarities between today and the 2014/15 backdrop, it is sensible to look for other indicators that accurately heralded the end of that period of spread widening to help time a potential increase in recommended exposure to corporates. Over the past several weeks, our colleagues at our sister BCA service, U.S. Bond Strategy, have been following a checklist of market-based signals to determine the timing of a potential peak in U.S. credit spreads.2 These are grouped into two categories: signals of rebounding global growth and signals of Fed capitulation on rate hikes. For global growth, the indicators monitored are shown in Chart 4: Chart 4Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Global Growth the CRB raw industrials index of commodity prices (a broader measure that excludes highly volatile oil prices) the BCA Market-Based China Growth Indicator (created by our China Investment Strategy team as a proxy of investor expectations of Chinese growth3) the Global Industrial Mining equity price index For Fed capitulation, the indicators monitored are shown in Chart 5: Chart 5Checklist For Peak U.S. Spreads: Fed Capitulation our 12-month fed funds discounter, which measures the amount of expected Fed rate hikes over the next year discounted in the U.S. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve the price of gold in dollars (a higher price correlating with perceptions of easier U.S. monetary policy and vice versa) the nominal trade-weighted U.S. dollar index Among the growth-focused elements of the checklist, only the China Growth Indicator is in a clear uptrend. Non-oil commodity prices had been stabilizing at the end of 2018 but appear to be rolling over, while it is not yet clear if the downturn in Mining stocks has ended. With momentum in global PMIs and LEIs still having not yet bottomed out, it may be too early to expect a cyclical rebound in non-oil commodities and related equities. At a minimum, that will require even greater signs that China’s economy is regaining some vigor. However, as we discussed last week, Chinese policymakers’ options to stimulate growth are far more limited now than they were in 2015 and 2016 when a rebounding China boosted commodity demand and EM asset performance.4 Within the Fed-focused components of the “Peak Spreads Checklist”, the near-term bullish signal for credit is much stronger. Our fed funds discounter has rapidly priced out all rate hikes for 2019. Since November, gold is up nearly 8% and the nominal trade-weighted U.S. dollar is down 2%. The shift in recent Fed messaging from signaling a “gradual pace” of tightening to exhibiting “patience” on any future policy moves was a highly dovish signal for investors. This alone has been enough to stabilize equity and credit markets, which had been discounting that Fed tightening in 2019 would drive the U.S. into a possible recession. In the constant battle between financial conditions and the Fed, the former has won this latest round. How long will this Fed pause last? Continuing with the comparison to the 2014/15 episode, a critical difference is that underlying trends in U.S. economic growth and inflation are firmer today. This is evident in the BCA Fed Monitor, which is comprised of economic and financial data that indicate pressure on the Fed to tighten or ease monetary policy. Chart 6 shows a “cycle-on-cycle” comparison of the Fed Monitor (and its subcomponents) today versus 2014/15. The Fed Monitor is still signaling a need for the Fed to continue tightening because the Economic Growth and Inflation Components remain elevated. Yet the Monitor has declined from its recent peak thanks entirely to the plunge in the Financial Conditions Component, which has fallen even faster than it did in 2014/15. Chart 6BCA Fed Monitor: Today Vs 2014/15 The implication from our Fed Monitor is that there needs to be more evidence of slowing U.S. economic growth and reduced inflation pressures for the Fed to stay on hold for longer. If the data stay firm, but financial conditions ease because investors expect a prolonged pause from the Fed, then the Fed could quickly return to a hawkish bias later this year. This is now our base case scenario for how 2019 will play out. This is also why we are only upgrading corporate debt on a tactical basis. We do not expect U.S. growth or inflation to slow enough to prevent more Fed tightening later this year – an outcome that will weigh on credit returns as the Fed moves to a restrictive policy stance. Yet even if we are wrong and the U.S. economy decelerates more sharply, that is also a bad outcome for credit because it means weaker corporate profits and rising downgrades and defaults. For bond investors with longer-time horizons than 3-6 months, the credit rally that we are anticipating can actually provide an opportunity to reduce credit exposure for the final leg of the Fed’s monetary policy cycle and the multi-year corporate credit cycle. In other words, selling into the rally rather than chasing it. For now, we are choosing to play for the shorter-term move by upgrading our recommended global credit allocations. Yet we do not envision this turning into a long-term position. The medium-term outlook for corporates is far more challenging given the advanced age of the monetary, business and credit cycles. Bottom Line: The Fed is now clearly signaling a near-term capitulation to tightening global financial conditions alongside slowing global growth and inflation. A pause in the U.S. rate hiking cycle, after credit spread valuations have cheapened up, opens up a window of opportunity for global corporate bond market outperformance versus government debt over the next 3-6 months. The Specific Changes To Our Recommended Asset Allocation As part of our tactical upgrade of global corporate debt, we are making the following changes to our recommended portfolio allocation tables (see Page 13): Upgrade overall global credit exposure to overweight (4 out of 5) Upgrade both U.S. investment grade and high-yield corporate exposure to overweight (4 out of 5), while downgrading U.S. Treasury exposure to underweight (2 out of 5) Upgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporate exposure to neutral (3 out of 5) and downgrade euro area government bond exposure to underweight (2 out of 5) Upgrade EM U.S. dollar denominated debt from maximum underweight to underweight (2 out of 5), both for sovereign and corporate debt. The changes all represent a one-notch upgrade from our previous allocations, based on our more positive tactical view on overall global credit risk, while still maintaining our relative preference for U.S. corporates over non-U.S. equivalents. We prefer U.S. credit not only because we expect better relative economic growth momentum in the U.S., but also because our preferred valuation metrics indicate that U.S. corporate bond spreads now look relatively attractive. Our estimate of the default-adjusted spread on U.S. high-yield corporates, which is simply the current spread minus losses from defaults, has risen to 302bps, well above the long-run average of 268bps (Chart 7). That is a function of the high-yield spread now discounting a 2019 default rate of nearly 6%, well above our forecasted default rate of 2.5%.5 Chart 7Too Much Default Risk Priced Into U.S. Junk Corporate credit spreads in the U.S. also look attractive on a volatility-adjusted basis. Our estimates of Breakeven Spreads – the amount of spread widening required for corporate returns to break-even with duration-matched U.S. Treasuries on a one-year horizon – shows that credit spreads have cheapened to levels that are in the upper end of the historical range for both investment grade and high-yield debt (Charts 8 & 9). Chart 8Vol-Adjusted IG Spreads Have Cheapened   Chart 9Vol-Adjusted HY Spreads Are Cheap Credit spreads have also cheapened up in Europe and EM, and a “risk-on” rally from a Fed pause will likely benefit spread product in those regions. However, the performance of U.S. credit versus non-U.S. credit remains largely determined by relative growth trends (Charts 10 & 11). Given our more positive view on U.S. growth on a relative basis, we are maintaining a higher recommended allocation to U.S. corporates versus euro area and EM equivalents, even as we upgrade overall global corporate exposure. This is also a way to provide a partial hedge to the specific risks in the latter regions coming from: Chart 10Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over Europe   Chart 11Global Corporates: Continue Favoring U.S. Over EM a) an end of the ECB’s corporate bond buying as part of its Asset Purchase Program, which takes a major buyer out of the euro area corporate market b) a more persistent slowing of Chinese growth momentum and softer non-oil commodity prices, both of which would be negatives for EM assets On a final note, we are also changing the specific weighting in our Model Bond Portfolio on Page 12 to reflect all of the above changes. The allocations to all U.S., euro area and EM corporates are increased – with bigger allocation changes in the U.S. – funded out of reduced weightings in U.S., German and French government bonds. Note that we are not making any changes to our relative U.K. exposures this week, given the unique risk for U.K. financial markets from the Brexit uncertainty. Thus, we are maintaining an overweight stance on U.K. Gilts in the government bond portion of the model portfolio, while remaining underweight U.K. corporates on the credit side.   Robert Robis, CFA, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Time To Take Some Chips Off The Table: Downgrade Global Corporate Bond Exposure To Neutral”, dated June 26th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Checklist For Peak Credit Spreads”, dated November 27th 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem”, dated November 21st 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Big Questions To Start Off 2019”, dated January 8th 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 That forecasted default rate is taken from Moody’s, who have a similarly positive outlook on 2019 U.S. growth as BCA. Therefore, we see no reason to use a different default rate assumption in our high-yield valuation estimate. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns