Gov Sovereigns/Treasurys

Dear Client, I will be on vacation next week. In lieu of our regular report, we will be sending you a Special Report written by my colleagues Chester Ntonifor, BCA Research’s Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist, and Matt Gertken, Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Their report discusses the threat to the dollar’s reserve status over the next decade. This week, Matt published a timely report entitled “Afghanistan? Watch Iran And China,” examining the global macro significance of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I trust you will find both reports insightful.   Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Over the next 12 months, US inflation will decline fast enough to allow the Federal Reserve to maintain its accommodative monetary stance, but not as fast as investors are expecting. A number of structural forces were becoming inflationary even before the pandemic began. The pandemic will only buttress the tide. Even if the virus is eventually vanquished, the pandemic could prop up inflation by permanently reducing labor supply, hastening the retreat from globalization, and keeping fiscal policy looser than it otherwise would have been. Fixed-income investors should maintain a short duration stance. We expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to rebound to about 1.8% by early next year. Long-term bond yields in the other major economies will also rise, although not as much as in the US. In and of itself, higher inflation is not necessarily bad for equities. What makes higher inflation toxic for stocks is when it forces central banks to raise rates to punitive levels. Fortunately, such an outcome is still a few years away, justifying an overweight equity position for now. Upside Risks To Inflation In our July 23rd report, we argued that investors were asking the wrong question about inflation. Rather than asking whether higher inflation is transitory, they should be asking whether inflation will decline faster or slower than what the market is discounting. Chart 1Investors Expect Inflation To Fall Rapidly From Current Levels Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Chart 1 shows that investors expect inflation to fall rapidly from current levels and to remain subdued thereafter. The widely followed 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate currently stands at 2.12%, below the Fed’s comfort zone of 2.3%-to-2.5% (Chart 2).1 Chart 2Below-Target Inflation Expectations And A Low R* Have Restrained Bond Yields Below-Target Inflation Expectations And A Low R* Have Restrained Bond Yields Below-Target Inflation Expectations And A Low R* Have Restrained Bond Yields Downbeat long-term inflation expectations and the market’s perception that the neutral rate of interest is very low are the two main reasons why bond yields are so depressed. QE programs have also dampened yields, although not nearly as much as widely believed. Chart 3Outside Of A Few Pandemic-Related Sectors, The CPI Has Yet To Return To Trend Outside Of A Few Pandemic-Related Sectors, The CPI Has Yet To Return To Trend Outside Of A Few Pandemic-Related Sectors, The CPI Has Yet To Return To Trend In our report, we contended that US inflation would come down fast enough over the next few quarters to allow the Federal Reserve to maintain its accommodative monetary stance, but not as fast as investors are expecting. On the one hand, the evidence clearly shows that most of the recent increase in US inflation has been driven by just a few pandemic-related sectors (Chart 3). On the other hand, high levels of excess household savings, the need for firms to expand capacity and rebuild inventories, and continued policy support will boost output and prices. The Long-Term Inflationary Consequences Of The Pandemic We also argued that a variety of structural forces, including the exodus of baby boomers from the labor market, a retreat from globalization, and increasing social unrest, would drive up inflation over the long haul. A key question is how the pandemic will shape these structural forces going forward. As we discuss below, there are three main overlapping channels through which the pandemic could have a lasting impact on inflation: Labor market scarring: Even if the virus is eventually vanquished, the pandemic could still permanently reduce the labor supply. Widespread worker shortages would fuel inflation. Deglobalization: Globalization has historically been a deflationary force. The pandemic could accelerate the retreat from globalization by prompting firms to bring more production back home, while exacerbating geopolitical tensions. Fiscal policy: Big budget deficits could persist in the post-pandemic period. Debt-saddled governments may turn to inflation to erode their debt burdens. Let us assess these three channels in turn.   Channel #1: Labor Market Scarring Despite July’s blockbuster employment report, there are still nearly 4% fewer Americans employed than was the case in January 2020. Yet, US businesses are struggling to hire workers (Chart 4). Nationwide, the job openings rate stands at a record 6.5%, up from 4.5% on the eve of the pandemic (Chart 5). Chart 4US Companies Are Facing A Labor Shortage US Companies Are Facing A Labor Shortage US Companies Are Facing A Labor Shortage Chart 5There Are Plenty Of Jobs Available There Are Plenty Of Jobs Available There Are Plenty Of Jobs Available Generous unemployment benefits, less immigration, and the reluctance of many workers to expose themselves to the virus have all helped to reduce labor supply. A marked shift in the composition of spending has increased the demand for workers in some sectors while reducing demand in other sectors (Chart 6). Since labor is not perfectly fungible across sectors, this has caused overall unemployment to rise. Chart 6Which Sectors Have Gained And Which Have Lost Jobs Since The Pandemic? Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Looking out, labor supply should increase as emergency unemployment benefits expire, immigration picks up, and more people are vaccinated. The mismatch of workers across sectors should also diminish as goods and services spending rebalances. Nevertheless, there is considerable uncertainty over how quickly all this will happen. According to Indeed, an online job posting site, unemployed workers cited having a “financial cushion” as the most popular reason for not looking for a job in July (Chart 7). Given that American households are sitting on $2.4 trillion in excess savings, it may take some time for this cushion to deflate (Chart 8). Chart 7Americans Are Not Desperate To Find Work Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Chart 8A Lot Of Excess Savings A Lot Of Excess Savings A Lot Of Excess Savings Chart 9No Jab, No Job Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Wider vaccine mandates could also impact labor market participation. A host of major companies, ranging from Google to Citigroup, are requiring their employees to be inoculated before returning to the office (Chart 9). The Pentagon has laid out a plan endorsed by President Biden obliging members of the military to get the COVID-19 vaccine. Earlier this week, the Las Vegas Raiders became the first NFL team to require fans to produce proof of vaccination to gain entry to home games. On the one hand, vaccine mandates could encourage more people to get the jab, which should help curb the pandemic and boost employment in the service sector. While the numbers have improved in recent weeks, only 57% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 64 are fully vaccinated (Chart 10). On the other hand, some people might opt for unemployment over a vaccine. According to a recent YouGov poll, about half of all unvaccinated Americans believe that the government is using COVID-19 vaccines to microchip the population (Chart 11). The threat of losing one’s job is unlikely to sway many of them. Chart 10Many Workers Remain Unvaccinated Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Chart 11One In Five Americans Believes The US Government Is Using The Covid-19 Vaccine To Microchip The Population Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Pandemic-induced shifts in work-life preferences could also reduce labor supply. According to Ipsos, a polling firm, most employees would prefer to work remotely at least part of the time, with 25% indicating they do not want to return to their workplace at all (Chart 12). The same poll found that 30% of workers would consider looking for another job if their employer required them to work away from home full time (Chart 13). Chart 12Let’s Chat Around The Water Cooler On Tuesdays And Wednesdays Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Chart 13What Is The Opposite Of A “One Size Fits All” Work Environment? Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Chart 14Number Of Retired People Jumped During The Pandemic Number Of Retired People Jumped During The Pandemic Number Of Retired People Jumped During The Pandemic If remote working boosted productivity, as some have claimed, this would not be such a bad thing. However, it is far from clear that this is the case. A recent University of Chicago study of 10,000 skilled professionals from an Asian IT company revealed that work-from-home policies decreased productivity by 8%-to-19%. Early retirement has also reduced labor supply. The share of retirees in the US population rose by 1.3 percentage points between February 2020 and July 2021, with most of the increase occurring early in the pandemic (Chart 14). Based on pre-pandemic demographic trends, the retirement rate should have risen by only 0.5 percentage points over this period.  The good news, as discussed in a recent study by the Kansas City Fed, is that most of the increase in the retirement rate was driven by fewer people transitioning from retirement back into employment. The share of people transitioning from employment to retirement did not change much (Chart 15). This led the authors to conclude that “More retirees may rejoin the workforce as health risks fade, but the retirement share is unlikely to return to a normal level for some time.” Chart 15Increased Retirees: A Closer Look Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Bottom Line: Labor supply will recover as the pandemic recedes. Nevertheless, the available pool of workers will likely be lower in the post-pandemic period than it would have otherwise been. A shortage of workers will prop up wage growth, helping to fuel inflation.   Channel #2: Deglobalization Globalization was on the back foot even before the pandemic began. Having steadily increased between 1991 and 2008, the ratio of global trade-to-output was basically flat during the 2010s (Chart 16). Ironically, the pandemic has revived global trade by shifting the composition of spending away from non-tradable services towards tradable goods. This shift in spending is the key reason why shipping costs have soared in recent months (Chart 17). Chart 16Globalization Plateaued Over A Decade Ago Globalization Plateaued Over A Decade Ago Globalization Plateaued Over A Decade Ago Chart 17Shipping Costs Have Soared In Recent Months Shipping Costs Have Soared In Recent Months Shipping Costs Have Soared In Recent Months The rebound in trade will not endure. Already, we are seeing companies moving production back home to establish greater control over their supply chains. The pandemic has exacerbated geopolitical tensions between China and the US. Recriminations about how the pandemic began and what China could have done to stop it will not go away anytime soon. Trade bloomed during Pax Britannica, when Great Britain ruled the waves, and then again during Pax Americana, when the US controlled the commanding heights. As BCA’s geopolitical team has long stressed, the shift to a multi-polar world is likely to restrain globalization.2 Historically, globalization has been a deflationary force. Trade has allowed countries such as the US that consistently run current account deficits to satiate excess demand for goods with imports, thereby forestalling inflation. Trade has also raised productivity by allowing countries to specialize in those areas in which they have a comparative advantage, while providing a mechanism to diffuse technological know-how around the world. Standard trade theory predicts that less-skilled workers in developed economies will suffer a relative decline in wages in response to rising trade with developing countries. A number of studies have documented that this is precisely what happened after China entered the global trading system.3  Poor workers tend to spend more of their paychecks than either rich workers or the owners of capital. To the extent that deglobalization shifts the balance of economic power back towards blue-collar workers in advanced economies, this will raise overall aggregate demand. Against the backdrop of muted productivity growth, inflation could increase as a consequence. Bottom Line: Globalization is deflationary, while deglobalization is inflationary. The pandemic is likely to reinforce the trend towards deglobalization.    Channel #3: Fiscal Policy There was once a time when governments trembled in fear of the bond vigilantes. Those days are long gone. After briefly rising to 4% in June 2009, the US 10-year Treasury yield trended lower over the subsequent decade, even though unemployment fell and government debt rose. The pandemic sent the bond vigilantes scurrying for cover. Negative real yields allowed governments to run budget deficits of previously unimagined proportions during the pandemic. Budget deficits will decline over the next few years, but the aversion to deficit spending will not return. Not anytime soon at least. The IMF expects the cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit in advanced economies to average 2.6% of GDP between 2022 and 2026, up from 1% of GDP in the 2014-19 period (Chart 18). Even that is probably too conservative, since the IMF’s projections do not include pending legislation such as President Biden’s $550 billion infrastructure package and $3.5 trillion reconciliation budget bill. Chart 18Fiscal Policy: Tighter But Not Tight Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation If the growth rate of the economy exceeds the interest rate on government debt, then governments with high debt-to-GDP ratios could run larger budget deficits than governments with low ratios, while still achieving a stable debt-to-GDP ratio over time.4  The problem is that these same governments would face an exponential increase in debt-servicing costs if interest rates were to rise above the growth rate of the economy. This is not a risk for any major developed economy at the moment but could become an issue as spare capacity recedes. At that point, central banks could face political pressure to keep rates low, even if their economies are overheating. The result could be higher inflation. Higher inflation, in turn, would boost nominal GDP growth, putting downward pressure on debt-to-GDP ratios. Bottom Line: While budget deficits will come down over the next few years, governments in developed economies will still maintain looser fiscal policies than before the pandemic. High debt levels could incentivize policymakers to permit higher inflation. Investment Conclusions US inflation will decline over the next 12 months, but not as quickly as markets are discounting. A number of structural forces were becoming inflationary even before the pandemic began. The pandemic will only reinforce the inflationary tide. Fixed-income investors should maintain a short duration stance. We expect the US 10-year Treasury yield to rebound to about 1.8% by early next year as the Delta variant wave fades. Long-term bond yields in the other major economies will also rise, although not as much as in the US. In and of itself, higher inflation is not necessarily bad for equities. What makes higher inflation toxic for stocks is when it forces central banks to raise rates to punitive levels. Fortunately, such an outcome is still a few years away, justifying an overweight equity position for now. The second quarter earnings season was a strong one. Back on July 2nd, analysts expected S&P 500 companies to generate about $45 in EPS in Q2. In the end, they generated at least $52. Analysts expect earnings to decline in absolute terms in Q3 and remain below Q2 levels until the second quarter of next year, when they are projected to grow by a meagre 3.5% year-over-year (Table 1). Table 1US Earnings Estimates Have Upside Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Earnings estimates usually drift lower over time (Chart 19). BCA’s US equity strategists think there is scope for earnings estimates for the second half of this year to rise materially from current levels. This should support US stocks. Along the same lines, above-trend global growth and attractive valuations should buoy stock markets outside the US. Chart 19Analysts Have Been Revising Up Earnings Estimates This Year Analysts Have Been Revising Up Earnings Estimates This Year Analysts Have Been Revising Up Earnings Estimates This Year Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of about 2.3%-to-2.5%. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report “Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update),” dated July 30, 2021; and Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here,” dated November 12, 2014. 3 For example, economists Katharine Abraham and Melissa Kearney have estimated that increased competition from Chinese imports cost the US economy 2.65 million jobs between 1999 and 2016, almost double the 1.4 million jobs lost to automation. Similarly, David Autor and his colleagues found that increased trade with China has led to large job losses for blue-collar workers in the US manufacturing sector. 4 The steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio can be expressed as p/(r-g), where r is the interest rate, g is trend GDP growth, and p is the primary (i.e., non-interest) budget balance. Thus, for example, if the government wanted to achieve a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 50% and r-g is -2%, it would need to run a primary budget deficit of 0.5*0.02=1% of GDP. However, if the government targeted a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of 200%, it could run a primary budget deficit of 2*0.02=4% of GDP. See Box 1 in our February 22, 2019 report for a derivation of this debt sustainability equation. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Special Trade Recommendations Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Current MacroQuant Model Scores Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation Transitory At First: The Pandemic’s Long-Term Impact On Inflation

Highlights Global growth is peaking, which makes it important to monitor the risks for signs that it is time to reduce equity exposure. We are especially focused on five risks: 1) The emergence of vaccine-resistant Covid variants; 2) a possible “goods recession”; 3) higher real bond yields; 4) higher US corporate tax rates; and 5) a weaker Chinese economy and regulatory crackdown. For now, we recommend a modest overweight to global equities. We will likely pare back exposure early next year. Stocks And The Business Cycle Our “golden rule” for asset allocation is to remain bullish on equities unless there is a good reason to think that a recession is around the corner. This rule has strong empirical support. Chart 1 shows that equity bear markets rarely occur outside of major business cycle downturns. Chart 1Recessions And Bear Markets Tend To Overlap Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring Nevertheless, there are different shades of bullishness. Stocks generally perform best coming out of recessions; that is, when the economy is weak but improving. Stocks perform worst when the economy is falling into recession. We are currently in an intermediate phase, where global growth is weakening but still solidly above trend. Historically, stocks have posted positive but uninspiring returns during such phases (Table 1). Table 1The Economic Cycle And Financial Assets Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring Monitoring The Risks In “post peak growth” environments, it is important to monitor the risks for signs that it is time to reduce equity exposure. We are especially focused on five risks:   Risk 1: New Covid Variants Chart 2A New Covid Wave Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring The Delta strain continues to roll through the US and a number of other countries (Chart 2). While the new strain does not seem to be any more deadly than other variants, it is a lot more contagious. CDC internal estimates suggest the R0 for the Delta variant is between 5-to-8, similar to that of chickenpox, and 40% higher than the original strain.1 Countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, which were able to keep the pandemic at bay last year, have succumbed to Delta. In Australia, the 7-day average of new cases has climbed above 300, the highest since last August. China has detected the Delta variant in more than a dozen cities since July 20. Even if the country succeeds in quashing the new variant, it will come at an economic cost. Lockdowns in major Chinese cities could further clog a global supply chain that is still reeling from the dislocations caused by the pandemic. While still vulnerable to the Delta variant, the symptoms of vaccinated individuals tend to be mild and non-life threatening. The Lambda variant, which surfaced in Peru this past December, appears more vaccine-resistant than the Delta variant. Fortunately, it is not as contagious as Delta, and has struggled to propagate outside of South America. The risk is that a new variant emerges which is: 1) highly contagious; 2) vaccine resistant; and 3) as or more lethal than the original strain. Chart 3The Divergence Between Goods And Services Spending The Divergence Between Goods And Services Spending The Divergence Between Goods And Services Spending Our Assessment: The current suite of vaccines confers substantial protection. While a vaccine-resistant strain could emerge, it is likely that vaccine producers will be able to adjust their formula to keep the virus at bay. As such, we see Covid as only a modest risk to global stocks.   Risk #2: A Goods Recession Even if Covid fades from view, the dislocations caused by the pandemic will persist for a while longer. As we discussed last week, the pandemic induced a major reallocation of spending from services to goods: Overall consumer spending in the US is broadly back to its pre-pandemic trend. However, service spending remains below trend while goods spending is above trend (Chart 3). Retail sales, which are dominated by goods, are also firmly above trend (Chart 4). We do not expect spending on goods to drop off anytime soon. A variety of manufactured goods, ranging from automobiles to major appliances, remain in short supply. The need to fill backorders and replenish inventories will keep production elevated for the next four quarters. However, at some point in the second half of 2022, manufacturers and retailers could find themselves with a glut of goods on their hands. Chart 4AUS Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (I) US Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (I) US Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (I) Chart 4BUS Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (II) US Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (II) US Retail Spending Is Well Above Trend (II) Manufacturing accounts for only 11% of US GDP. However, goods producers account for about a third of S&P 500 market capitalization. Thus, while a slowdown in spending on goods is unlikely to push the US into recession, it could cause S&P 500 earnings growth to slow sharply, similar to what occurred during the 2015-16 manufacturing recession (Chart 5). Our Assessment: A goods recession represents a threat to both US and overseas stocks, particularly manufacturers and retailers. Most likely, however, that threat will not become visible to investors until next year.   Risk #3: Higher Real Bond Yields Stocks represent a claim on future corporate cash flows. Higher real interest rates reduce the present value of those claims, leading to lower stock prices. Chart 6 shows that there is a strong correlation between the US 10-year TIPS yield and the forward P/E ratio for the stock market. Chart 5The 2015-16 Manufacturing Recession Weighed On Earnings The 2015-16 Manufacturing Recession Weighed On Earnings The 2015-16 Manufacturing Recession Weighed On Earnings Chart 6Higher Real Rates Would Be A Headwind For Equity Valuations Higher Real Rates Would Be A Headwind For Equity Valuations Higher Real Rates Would Be A Headwind For Equity Valuations US real yields jumped in the wake of July’s stellar employment report. However, they still remain negative and far below pre-pandemic levels. Looking out, real yields could rise for two diametrically different reasons. On the one hand, an adverse demand shock could drive up real yields by pushing down inflationary expectations. This is precisely what happened during the early days of the pandemic.     Such a deflationary shock could arise if a vaccine-resistant variant emerges or if spending on manufactured goods declines faster than we expect. The failure of the US Congress to pass the infrastructure bill and/or a budget reconciliation bill could also exacerbate fiscal tightening next year. Under current law, fiscal policy will subtract around two percentage points from growth next year (Chart 7). Chart 7After A Strong Boost, Fiscal Thrust Is Turning Negative Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring On the other hand, real yields could rise if an overheated economy prompts the Fed to hike rates more aggressively than markets are discounting. The US 10-year yield tends to track expected policy rates three years out (Chart 8). Chart 810-Year Treasurys Track Expected Policy Rates Three Years Out 10-Year Treasurys Track Expected Policy Rates Three Years Out 10-Year Treasurys Track Expected Policy Rates Three Years Out Chart 9Both The Fed And Market Participants Have Revised Down Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Of Interest Both The Fed And Market Participants Have Revised Down Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Of Interest Both The Fed And Market Participants Have Revised Down Their Estimate Of The Neutral Rate Of Interest   An increase in the market’s estimate of the terminal rate could also push up real yields. According to the New York Fed’s survey of primary dealers and market participants, investors think that the fed funds rate will top out at around 2%. Not only is this extremely low by historic standards, but it is also lower than the Fed’s estimate of the terminal rate (Chart 9). In the past, we have made a distinction between the strong- and weak-form versions of secular stagnation. The strong-form version is one where an economy is unable to reach full employment even with zero interest rates. Japan is a good example. The weak-form version is one where the economy can achieve full employment but only in the presence of low positive interest rates (Chart 10). Chart 10Strong- Versus Weak-Form Secular Stagnation Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring In many respects, weak-form secular stagnation is better for equities than the normal state of affairs where the economy is at full employment and interest rates are near their historic average. This is because weak-form secular stagnation allows equity investors to have their cake and eat it too – to enjoy full employment and high corporate profits, all with the persistent tailwind of very low rates. Our Assessment: Our baseline view on the US envisions a goldilocks scenario of sorts: An economy that is hot enough to keep deflationary forces at bay, but not so hot that the Fed has to intervene to raise rates. While there are risks on both sides of this view, they are fairly modest. US households are sitting on nearly $2.5 trillion in excess savings, which should support consumption over the next few years. BCA’s geopolitical team, led by Matt Gertken, thinks that there is an 80% chance that Congress will pass an infrastructure bill. Assuming an infrastructure bill passes, they also see a 65% chance that the Democrats will succeed in pushing through a watered-down $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation bill. Meanwhile, as the July CPI report illustrates, inflationary forces are already starting to die down, which should keep rate expectations from rising too rapidly.   Risk #4: Higher US Corporate Tax Rates Chart 11Bettors Expect US Corporate Tax Rates To Rise, But Not By Much Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring Congress’ passage of a budget reconciliation bill would blunt some of the fiscal tightening slated for next year. However, to pay for the additional spending, Democrats will seek to levy more taxes on corporations and higher-income earners. The Biden Administration is aiming to raise the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%, bringing it halfway back to the 35% level that prevailed prior to the Trump tax cuts. Joe Manchin, a key swing voter in the Senate, has indicated a preference for 25%. PredictIt, a popular betting site, assigns 31% odds to no tax hike. Among bettors forecasting higher tax rates, the median estimate is around 25% (Chart 11). Analyst estimates do not appear to reflect the prospect of higher taxes. This is not surprising. Chart 12 shows that analysts did not adjust their earnings estimates until shortly after President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act into law on December 22, 2017. Chart 12Analysts Have Not Adjusted Their Earnings Estimates To Reflect The Likelihood Of Higher Taxes Analysts Have Not Adjusted Their Earnings Estimates To Reflect The Likelihood Of Higher Taxes Analysts Have Not Adjusted Their Earnings Estimates To Reflect The Likelihood Of Higher Taxes Chart 13Until Recently, Companies That Stand To Lose The Most From Higher Taxes Have Fared Well Until Recently, Companies That Stand To Lose The Most From Higher Taxes Have Fared Well Until Recently, Companies That Stand To Lose The Most From Higher Taxes Have Fared Well It is more difficult to know what markets are discounting. Chart 13 displays the performance of Goldman‘s “Formerly High Tax” and “Formerly Low Tax” equity baskets. The formerly high-taxed companies gained the most from Trump’s tax cuts and presumably would lose the most if the tax cuts were rolled back. While formerly high-taxed companies have underperformed the market since early May, they are still up relative to their low-taxed peers since the Georgia runoff election, which handed control of the Senate to the Democrats. Moreover, companies that are vulnerable to higher taxes on overseas profits – many of which are in the tech space – have continued to fare well. Our Assessment: BCA’s geopolitical team thinks that corporate taxes will rise more than current market expectations suggest. However, even under our baseline scenario, higher tax rates will only cut earnings-per-share for S&P 500 companies by about 5% in 2022. Given that earnings are expected to rise by 9% next year, this would still leave earnings growth in positive territory.   Risk #5: China The Chinese economy grew at an annualized rate of only 3.5% in the first half of 2021 (Chart 14). While stricter Covid restrictions will weigh on growth in Q3, activity should pick up again in the fourth quarter. Chart 14Chinese Growth Was Weak In The First Half of 2021 Chinese Growth Was Weak In The First Half of 2021 Chinese Growth Was Weak In The First Half of 2021 The degree to which China’s economy recovers later this year will depend on the overall policy stance. Both credit and money growth fell short of expectations in July. Aggregate social financing declined to CNY 1.06 trillion from CNY 3.7 trillion in June, missing expectations of a CNY 1.7 trillion increase. M2 money growth clocked in at 8.3% year-over-year, below consensus estimates of 8.7%. As of July, local governments had used only 37% of their annual bond issuance quota, compared with 61% over the same period last year and 78% in 2019. BCA Chief China strategist, Jing Sima, thinks that local governments were waiting for a clear signal from the Politburo meeting held on July 30th before issuing new debt. If so, the fiscal stance should turn more expansionary over the coming months. Nevertheless, Beijing continues to send conflicting messages – on the one hand, telling local governments that they need to support growth, while on the other hand admonishing them for wasteful spending. Chart 15Chinese Tech Stocks Have Underperformed Their Global Peers This Year Chinese Tech Stocks Have Underperformed Their Global Peers This Year Chinese Tech Stocks Have Underperformed Their Global Peers This Year Stepped-up regulation of China’s major internet companies has also unnerved investors. Chinese internet stocks have underperformed the global tech sector by more than 40% since February (Chart 15). Our Assessment: With credit growth back down to its 2018 lows, the authorities are likely to ease policy over the coming months. While the crackdown on internet companies will continue, it is unlikely to spill over to other sectors. Unlike Chinese companies in, say, the telecom or semiconductor sectors, Beijing does not see most online platforms as contributing much to the economy. What they do see are companies with the potential to undermine the authority of the Communist Party (and in the case of online education providers, reduce the birth rate by burdening parents with high educational expenses). Investment Conclusions Chart 16Equities Look More Attractive Than Bonds Equities Look More Attractive Than Bonds Equities Look More Attractive Than Bonds We will likely pare back equity exposure early next year. For now, however, we recommend that asset allocators maintain a modest overweight to global equities. Growth is slowing but will remain solidly above trend for the remainder of the year. The forward earnings yield on the MSCI All-Country World Index stands at 5.2%. While this is not particularly high in absolute terms, it is still very high in relation to bond yields (Chart 16). Stocks outside the US trade at a still-decent earnings yield of 6.4% (compared to 4.6% in the US). Granted, the earnings performance of many non-US companies leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, relative valuations largely discount this fact. Moreover, continued above-trend global growth, Chinese stimulus, and rising bond yields should benefit cyclical stocks and value names, which are overrepresented in overseas indices. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  The basic reproduction number, R0 (pronounced “R naught”), corresponds to the average number of people a carrier of the virus will infect in a population with no natural or vaccine-induced immunity.   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring Special Trade Recommendations Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring Current MacroQuant Model Scores Five Risks We Are Monitoring Five Risks We Are Monitoring

Highlights Since 2008, the 10-year T-bond yield has struggled to exceed the earnings yield on technology stocks minus a constant of 2.5 percent. Based on the current technology earnings yield of 3.8 percent, and the 10-year T-bond yield at 1.3 percent, stock markets are on the edge of rationality. But at the limit, the elastic can briefly stretch by around 0.5 percent before it eventually snaps back. Hence, the 10-year T-bond yield could make a brief trip to 1.8 percent before reversing. The labour market participation rate for African Americans dropped sharply in July to 2.3 percent below its pre-pandemic benchmark level. The weakest performing demographic group could set the employment condition for the Fed’s lift-off, making it later than the market is pricing. The next shock will drive down the T-bond yield to its ultimate low, and the stock market’s valuation to its ultimate high. Fractal analysis: NOK/GBP, Hong Kong versus the world, and Netherlands versus New Zealand. Feature Chart of the WeekSince 2008, The 10-Year T-Bond Yield Has Struggled to Exceed the Earnings Yield On Tech (Minus A Constant Of 2.5 Percent) Since 2008, The 10-Year T-Bond Yield Has Struggled to Exceed the Earnings Yield On Tech (Minus A Constant Of 2.5 Percent) Since 2008, The 10-Year T-Bond Yield Has Struggled to Exceed the Earnings Yield On Tech (Minus A Constant Of 2.5 Percent) Since 2008, a remarkable financial relationship has held true. The 10-year T-bond yield has struggled to exceed the earnings yield on technology stocks minus a constant of 2.5 percent. The 10-year T-bond yield has struggled to exceed the earnings yield on technology stocks minus a constant of 2.5 percent. T-bond yield ≤ technology forward earnings yield – 2.5% (Chart I-1). The upshot is that whenever, as now, the yields on tech and other high-flying growth stocks have become depressed – which is to say highly valued – the upper limit to the bond yield has been established not by the economy, but by the financial markets. On the occasions that the bond yield has attempted to breach its stock market-set upper limit, it has unleashed a self-correcting sequence of events. It has pulled up the tech sector earnings yield, which is to say pulled down the tech sector’s valuation and price. Then, to contain and reverse this sharp sell-off, the bond yield has quickly unwound its short-lived spike. Stock Markets Are On The Edge Of Rationality Earlier this year in The Rational Bubble Is Turning Irrational we highlighted that the T-bond yield was at its stock market-set upper limit. And in the subsequent six months, the markets have behaved exactly as predicted. First, tech stocks declined sharply through February-March. Then, bond yields declined sharply through May-July, allowing tech stocks to claw back their declines and then reach new highs. Indeed, since mid-February, the T-bond yield and tech stocks have moved as a near-perfect mirror image (Chart I-2). Chart I-2The T-Bond Yield And Tech Stocks Have Moved As A Near-Perfect Mirror Image The T-Bond Yield And Tech Stocks Have Moved As A Near-Perfect Mirror Image The T-Bond Yield And Tech Stocks Have Moved As A Near-Perfect Mirror Image In the long run, a depressed earnings yield relative to the bond yield – which is to say a high valuation – can normalise as earnings go up. But in the short term, the adjustment must come from either the equity price declining or the bond yield declining. Or some combination of the two. With the tech earnings yield now at 3.8 percent – and assuming the post-GFC 2.5 percent minimum gap still holds true – it would set the upper limit of the 10-year T-bond yield at 1.3 percent, close to where it is trading today. Still, at the limit, the elastic can briefly stretch before it eventually snaps back. Over the last thirteen years, the maximum stretch has been around 0.5 percent. This means that, based on the current earnings yield of the tech sector, the 10-year T-bond yield could make a brief trip to 1.8 percent before reversing. For equity investors, a higher T-bond yield would support the value versus growth trade. But given that it would be a brief trip, the opportunity would not be cyclical (12-month) but merely tactical (3-month), as has been the case over the past ten years. Since 2012, cyclical opportunities to overweight value versus growth have been virtually non-existent, but there have been several good tactical opportunities (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3Cyclical Opportunities To Overweight Value Versus Growth Have Been Virtually Non-Existent... Cyclical Opportunities To Overweight Value Versus Growth Have Been Virtually Non-Existent... Cyclical Opportunities To Overweight Value Versus Growth Have Been Virtually Non-Existent... Chart I-4...But There Have Been Several Good Tactical Opportunities ...But There Have Been Several Good Tactical Opportunities ...But There Have Been Several Good Tactical Opportunities We await a fractal signal that T-bonds are overbought to initiate this tactical trade. Stay tuned. The Truth About The Jobs Recovery At first glance, last week’s US employment report appeared strong. The unemployment rate continued its plunge from 14.8 percent in April 2020 to 5.4 percent in July 2021, constituting the fastest jobs recovery of all time. But the first glance doesn’t tell the true story.   Unlike in previous recessions, the number of workers put on furlough or ‘temporary layoff’ surged and then plunged as the pandemic let rip and then was brought under control. Hence, to get the true story of the jobs recovery, we must strip out the furloughed workers and focus on the unemployment rate based on those ‘not on temporary layoff’ (Chart I-5). Chart I-5To Get The True Story Of The Jobs Recovery, Focus On Those 'Not On Temporary Layoff' To Get The True Story Of The Jobs Recovery, Focus On Those 'Not On Temporary Layoff' To Get The True Story Of The Jobs Recovery, Focus On Those 'Not On Temporary Layoff' Based on this truer measure of labour market slack, the pace of the current recovery in jobs looks remarkably like the recoveries that followed previous downturns in 1974/75, the early 1980s, the early 1990s, dot com bust, and the GFC. The true story is that the US is little more than a third of the way on the journey to full employment (Chart I-6). Chart I-6The Pace Of The Current Jobs Recovery Looks Remarkably Like Previous Recoveries The Pace Of The Current Jobs Recovery Looks Remarkably Like Previous Recoveries The Pace Of The Current Jobs Recovery Looks Remarkably Like Previous Recoveries This is significant, because unlike in previous recoveries, the Federal Reserve is now explicitly targeting full employment before it lifts the policy interest rate. Furthermore, the employment recovery must be broad and inclusive of minority demographic groups, which adds further conditionality for the Fed. While the market is focussing on the aggregate employment market, it is the weakest performing demographic group that could set the condition for the Fed’s lift-off. On this note, the labour market participation rate for African Americans dropped sharply in July to 2.3 percent below its pre-pandemic benchmark level (Chart I-7). This raises an interesting point. While the market is focussing on the aggregate employment market, it is the weakest performing demographic group that could set the condition for lift-off, if the Fed stays true to its promise of inclusivity. Which would push back lift-off to later than the market is pricing. Chart I-7The Labour Market Participation Rate For African Americans Dropped Sharply In July The Labour Market Participation Rate For African Americans Dropped Sharply In July The Labour Market Participation Rate For African Americans Dropped Sharply In July Shocks Do Not Have A Cycle According to the recovery in jobs then, we are still ‘early cycle.’ Some people argue that early cycle implies that a recession is a distant prospect, that stocks only underperform in a recession, and therefore that the bull market in stocks has further to run. The investment conclusion is right, but the reasoning is wrong, on two counts. First, nobody can predict the precise timing of recessions or shocks. Second, recessions or shocks do not have a ‘cycle.’ Shocks can come in quickfire succession such as the back-to-back GFC in 2008 and the euro debt crisis which started in 2010, or the back-to-back votes for Brexit and Trump in 2016 (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Shocks Do Not Have A Cycle Shocks Do Not Have A Cycle Shocks Do Not Have A Cycle Yet, while we cannot predict the precise timing of shocks, The Shock Theory Of Bond Yields tells us that we can predict their statistical distribution very accurately. The upshot is that in any 5-year period, the probability of (at least) one shock is an extremely high 81 percent, and in any 10-year period, it is a near-certain 96 percent.  Given the tight feedback from bond yields to stocks and then back to bond yields, we can say with high conviction that the next shock will drive down the T-bond yield to its ultimate low. This will happen directly from a deflationary shock, or indirectly from an initially inflationary shock that drives up bond yields through the upper limit set by stock valuations. The resulting sharp correction in stocks will then cause bond yields to reverse to the ultimate low. The next shock will drive down the T-bond yield to its ultimate low, and the stock market’s valuation to its ultimate high. In turn, the ultimate low in the T-bond yield will mark the ultimate high in the stock market’s valuation, and the end of the structural bull market in stocks. Until then, long-term investors should own stocks. Fractal Analysis Update This week’s fractal analysis highlights three recent price moves that are at risk of reversal because of fragile fractal structures. First, the recent sell-off in NOK/GBP has become fragile on its 65-day fractal structure implying a likelihood of a countertrend move based on similar recent signals (Chart I-9). Chart I-9NOK/GBP Is Oversold NOK/GBP Is Oversold NOK/GBP Is Oversold Second, the sell-off following China’s aggressive crackdown on its technology and private education sectors has created fragility in Hong Kong’s relative performance on its composite 65-day/130-day fractal dimension. Assuming the worst of the policy crackdown is over, this would imply a countertrend reversal based on similar signals over the past decade. The recommended trade is long Hong Kong versus developed world (MSCI indexes), setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 4 percent (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Hong Kong Versus The World Is Oversold Hong Kong Versus The World Is Oversold Hong Kong Versus The World Is Oversold Finally, the massive outperformance of tech-heavy Netherlands versus healthcare and utility-heavy New Zealand has reached the limit of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that signalled major turning points in 2011, 2015, 2016, and 2018 (Chart I-11). Hence the recommended trade is short Netherlands versus New Zealand, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 13 percent. Chart I-11Netherlands Versus New Zealand Is Overbought Netherlands Versus New Zealand Is Overbought Netherlands Versus New Zealand Is Overbought   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights US Treasuries: US Treasury yields are rising once again, in response to typical drivers – less dovish Fed commentary and upside growth surprises. The spread of the Delta variant in the US represents a potential near-term roadblock to additional yield increases, but the recent slowing of new cases in the UK and Europe is a positive sign that the US can see a similar result and avoid a major economic hit. Stay below-benchmark on US duration exposure. UK: The Bank of England is starting to prepare the markets for less accommodative monetary policy, with the UK economy holding up well as its Delta variant surge is losing momentum. UK Gilt yields are vulnerable to a hawkish repricing with only 48bps of rate hikes discounted by the end of 2024. Stay below-benchmark on UK duration exposure, and downgrade Gilts to underweight in global bond portfolios. A New Turning Point For Global Bond Yields? After seeing steady declines since the peak in late March that took the yield down to an intraday 2021 low of 1.13% last week, the 10-year US Treasury experienced a rebound back to 1.30% in a span of just three days. Yields in typically “high-beta” countries like Canada and Australia also saw significant increases. There were two main triggers for the pickup in US yields. Firstly, a speech from Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida was interpreted hawkishly, as he stated that he expects the conditions necessary for the Fed to begin lifting rates would be met by the end of 2022. Secondly, a better-than-expected July employment report confirmed the strength of the US labor market already evident in booming demand indicators like job openings. A third potential cause of the trough in yields can be found outside the US in the increasingly positive news on the spread of the Delta variant coming out of the UK. We would argue that the more relevant turning point for global bond yields in 2021 was not the late March peak in the US, but the mid-May peak in non-US developed market yields. The 10-year UK Gilt yield reached its 2021 apex on May 13, just as the spread of the Delta variant was starting to push UK COVID-19 case numbers sharply higher – despite the high vaccination rate in that country (Chart of the Week). This raised the fears that the “reopening boom” could stall, not only in the UK but other major economies, at a time when global growth momentum was already starting to cool off from the overheated pace in the first half of the year. Chart of the WeekThe "Delta Rally" In Bond Markets Is Fading The 'Delta Rally' In Bond Markets Is Fading The 'Delta Rally' In Bond Markets Is Fading The Delta variant wave continues to wash over the US, although primarily in regions with lower vaccination rates. There was little sign of any impact from the variant in the July US jobs data with just over one million new jobs added (including revisions to prior months) and the unemployment rate falling one-half of a percentage point to 5.4%, the lowest level since March 2020 (Chart 2). However, we will need to see more economic data from July and August to confirm that this latest wave is not having a material impact on the broad US economy beyond the regions with lower vaccination rates. New COVID-19 cases in the UK peaked in mid-July, and are rolling over in continental Europe, with relatively low hospitalization rates – a hopeful sign that the US Delta spread could also soon begin to lose momentum. We continue to believe that steady improvements in the US labor market will be the driver of higher US bond yields over at least the next 6-12 months, as falling unemployment will embolden the Fed to begin tapering asset purchases and, eventually, begin rate hikes towards the end of 2022. The technical backdrop for Treasuries has become less of a headwind to higher yields, with the 10-year yield falling back to its 200-day moving average and speculators closing a lot of short positioning in Treasury futures (Chart 3). If the US can follow the more positive news from across the Atlantic with regards to the spread of the Delta variant, this would remove another impediment to higher US bond yields. Chart 2Steady Progress Towards The Fed's Employment Goals Steady Progress Towards The Fed's Employment Goals Steady Progress Towards The Fed's Employment Goals Bottom Line: US Treasury yields are rising once again, in response to typical drivers – less dovish Fed commentary and upside growth surprises. Chart 3Technical Backdrop Less Of A Headwind To Higher US Yields Technical Backdrop Less Of A Headwind To Higher US Yields Technical Backdrop Less Of A Headwind To Higher US Yields The surge in Delta variant cases represents a potential near-term roadblock to additional yield increases, but the recent slowing of new cases in the UK and Europe may be a positive sign that the US will avoid a major economic hit. Stay below-benchmark on US duration exposure. A Gilt-Bearish Shift In Tone From The Bank Of England Chart 4Pressures Building On The BoE To Dial Back Stimulus Pressures Building On The BoE To Dial Back Stimulus Pressures Building On The BoE To Dial Back Stimulus BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy has had the UK on “downgrade watch” over the past few months. Improving growth momentum and recovering inflation have raised the risks of a more hawkish turn by the Bank of England (BoE), as evidenced by the elevated reading from our UK Central Bank Monitor (Chart 4). At the same time, the spread of the Delta variant injected a note of caution into an otherwise positive UK economic story. We now think it is time to move from “downgrade watch” to a full downgrade of our current neutral stance on UK Gilts. The BoE left its policy settings unchanged at last week’s policy meeting, but did provide strong indications that some removal of monetary accommodation would soon be necessary. The central bank noted that the UK economy was recovering from the pandemic shock at a faster-than-expected pace. In the August Monetary Policy Report (MPR) also released last week, the BoE maintained its 2021 real GDP growth forecast at 7.25% while slightly raising its 2022 growth estimate to 6%. UK GDP is now projected to fully recover to the pre-COVID level by the end of 2021. More importantly, the projections for the unemployment rate were lowered substantially. The central bank no longer expects much of an impact on unemployment when the UK government’s job-protecting furlough scheme expires in September. The BoE now expects unemployment to peak at 5.1% in Q3/2021 (Chart 5), a big change from the 6% projection in the May MPR, with the central bank noting that job vacancies are already back to pre-pandemic levels. The unemployment rate is projected to reach 4.25% in both 2022 and 2023. Chart 5Major Changes To The BoE's Forecasts Major Changes To The BoE's Forecasts Major Changes To The BoE's Forecasts The BoE baseline forecast now calls for UK headline CPI inflation to see a temporary surge to 4% in Q4/2021 – a significant change from the 2.5% peak in inflation projected in the May MPR - before returning back to close to 2% over the next two years. Yet the minutes of last week’s policy meeting noted that the medium-term risks surrounding inflation were “two-way”, a message that sounds a bit more concerning compared to the benign 2022/23 inflation projections. The BoE is now running the risk of underestimating how long the UK inflation uptrend can persist and force increases in interest rates – perhaps beginning as soon as mid-2022 – given the multiple factors that are pushing up inflation. A modest growth hit from the Delta variant The daily number of new cases has fallen by nearly one-half since the peak on July 20th, according to the Oxford University data (Chart 6). Hospitalizations are also rolling over at a peak that would be one-quarter the size of the January peak. If these trends continue, this latest wave of COVID will not have a lasting negative impact on the economy that would dampen inflation pressures. The modest dip in the UK manufacturing and services PMIs in June and July, when cases were rising, supports this conclusion. Accelerating wage growth UK job vacancies are now higher than the pre-pandemic peak, while the BoE’s Agents’ Survey of companies reports an increasing number of firms reporting recruitment difficulties across a broader range of industries (Chart 7). The job market frictions are similar to the dynamics currently at play in the US, where labor demand is booming but firms have struggled to fill openings because government pandemic support programs have dampened labor market participation. Chart 6The Biggest Threat To The Dovish BoE Stance The Biggest Threat To The Dovish BoE Stance The Biggest Threat To The Dovish BoE Stance Chart 7Good Help Is Hard To Find In The UK Good Help Is Hard To Find In The UK Good Help Is Hard To Find In The UK The BoE noted in the August MPR that its forecasts include the impact of labor market frictions that have temporarily raised the medium-term equilibrium rate of unemployment during the pandemic, resulting in a surge in wage growth. However, this effect is expected to fade as the economy normalizes and government support programs expire. For example, the BoE estimates that the UK government’s job retention “furlough” scheme, which pays a reduced wage to workers who cannot work because of COVID economic restrictions and which expires in September, has acted to dampen measured wage growth over the past year. At the same time, compositional effects, with pandemic job losses being skewed towards lower-paying roles, have had a far greater impact in lifting wage growth. The BoE estimates that the “underlying” pace of wage growth, excluding pandemic effects, is only 3.3% compared to the reported 7.2%, but is expected to rise towards 4.5% in Q3 as the labor market recovers. Yet if the employment frictions do not fade as rapidly as the BoE expects, perhaps due to persistent skills mismatches for existing job openings, then the inflationary pressures emanating from the UK jobs market may cause UK inflation to stay elevated for longer than the BoE is projecting. Continued recovery from the initial COVID shock Chart 8Recovering From The COVID Recession Recovering From The COVID Recession Recovering From The COVID Recession The BoE now expects UK real GDP to return to its pre-pandemic level in Q4 of this year (Chart 8). Much of the recovery in activity seen so far has been in services as pandemic restrictions have been lifted. Looking forward, consumer spending will be boosted by improving growth momentum in employment and incomes, further underpinned by a high levels of household savings accumulated during the pandemic. Business investment is also expected recover, given the robust reading from the BoE Agents’ Survey of investment intentions (bottom panel). The twin engines of consumption and investment will be enough to keep the UK economy growing at an above-trend pace in 2022, even with a modest expected drag from fiscal policy, which should help maintain some of the current cyclical inflationary pressures. Rising house prices UK house prices are experiencing another sharp uptick, with the Nationwide index up 10.3% year-over-year in Q2 (Chart 9). Demand for homes has been boosted by the UK government’s holiday on stamp duty, or housing transaction taxes, which began last year as a form of pandemic economic support. Housing transactions spiked in June as demand surged ahead of the expiry of the stamp duty holiday last month, and some payback is likely in the near-term. Yet UK housing demand has also been supported by the same factors boosting house prices in most developed economies - low interest rates, high household savings available for down payments and the increased need for space for those choosing to work from home. UK house price inflation thus could remain higher for longer than the BoE expects. Chart 9Is This House Price Surge 'Transitory' Or Policy Driven? Is This House Price Surge 'Transitory' Or Policy Driven? Is This House Price Surge 'Transitory' Or Policy Driven? Supply Chain Bottlenecks The BoE noted in the August MPR that overall UK import prices have risen faster than expected, especially with the British pound higher on a year-over-year basis. UK firms have faced rising input costs because of disruption to global supply chains from the pandemic. For example, the annual growth rate of import prices for manufactured components rose by 12.1% in May, a sharp contrast to the -5.4% deflation of consumer goods prices (Chart 10). The BoE projects UK overall import price inflation to turn negative in 2022 and 2023, a big part of its slowing inflation forecast. Some decrease is inevitable as price momentum in oil and other commodities cools from overheated levels seen in 2021. However, supply chain disruptions are a global phenomenon already persisting for longer than expected in other countries and could linger into 2022 if global growth stays above trend - potentially causing UK import price inflation to once again exceed the BoE’s expectations. Summing it all up, the pressure is clearly building on the BoE to dial back the massive monetary easing put in place last year in response to the pandemic. Not only is the economy now recovering far more rapidly than the BoE had been projecting, with inflation set to peak at a higher level, but there are other indications that monetary conditions may now be too loose like accelerating house prices. There are numerous upside risks to the BoE’s benign post-2021 inflation forecasts, especially with the central bank also projecting the UK to have a positive output gap in 2022 and 2023 (Chart 11). Chart 10BoE Betting On Waning Global Supply Bottlenecks BoE Betting On Waning Global Supply Bottlenecks BoE Betting On Waning Global Supply Bottlenecks Markets are not expecting much from the BoE in terms of interest rate increases. While the UK overnight index swap (OIS) curve is now discounting an initial 25bp rate hike in August 2022, only one other 25bp increase is expected by the end of 2024 (Table 1). Chart 11Domestic Price Pressures On The Rise Domestic Price Pressures On The Rise Domestic Price Pressures On The Rise The BoE has not been a very active central bank since the 2008 financial crisis, never raising the Bank Rate above 0.75% over that time, thus the markets now seem conditioned to think that the BoE will continue to do very little in the future. Table 1Markets Expect The BoE To Hike Before The Fed The UK Leads The Way The UK Leads The Way Chart 12Markets Expect Persistent Negative UK Real Rates The UK Leads The Way The UK Leads The Way That is evident when you look at longer-dated OIS rates compared to forward inflation rates from the UK CPI swap curve. The combined message from those markets is that the BoE is expected to maintain deeply negative real interest rates for at least the next decade, a major reason why the UK has persistently negative real bond yields (Chart 12). A lower equilibrium real interest rate (i.e. “r-star”) is consistent with the declining trend in the OECD’s estimate of UK potential real GDP growth over the past 20 years (Chart 13). Yet it is a stretch to think that the neutral UK real interest rate is now negative, especially given how rapidly UK growth and inflation have snapped back from the 2020 COVID recession. UK interest rate markets are highly vulnerable to any hawkish shift by the BoE – and outcome that the current growth and inflation dynamics suggest is increasingly likely over the next 6-12 months. The BoE has already started to process of dialing back monetary accommodation by slowing the pace of asset purchases in its quantitative easing (QE) program (Chart 14). While no decision on additional tapering was made last week, the BoE did dedicate three pages of the August MPR to a detailed discussion on how the future size of the BoE’s balance sheet would likely be reduced if the BoE were to begin raising interest rates. There has also been some political pressure on the UK to dial back QE, with the Chair of the Economic Affairs Committee in the UK House of Lords saying that the BoE was “addicted” to QE last month. BoE Governor Andrew Bailey has previously stated that he viewed QE as a regular part of a central banker’s toolkit, to be used opportunistically during periods of deep economic or financial market stress. That made sense in 2020 during the height of the pandemic, but is no longer the case now. Chart 13UK R-Star Is Still Positive UK R-Star Is Still Positive UK R-Star Is Still Positive We anticipate that the BoE will end the current QE program sometime in the next six months, with an initial 25bp rate hike occurring sometime in mid-2022. Chart 14UK QE: Expect More Tapering UK QE: Expect More Tapering UK QE: Expect More Tapering This would be a faster pace of tapering, with a quicker liftoff, than the Fed, although we expect the Fed to eventually raise rates by more than the BoE in the next interest rate cycle. Investment Conclusions Given our expectation that the BoE is starting to prepare the markets for an unwind of its pandemic policy settings, we come to the following fixed income and currency investment conclusions (Chart 15): Chart 15Summarizing Our UK Fixed Income Recommendations Summarizing Our UK Fixed Income Recommendations Summarizing Our UK Fixed Income Recommendations Chart 16A More Hawkish BoE Would Benefit The Pound A More Hawkish BoE Would Benefit The Pound A More Hawkish BoE Would Benefit The Pound Duration: Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance within dedicated UK bond portfolios, with too few rate hikes discounted Country Allocation: Downgrade UK Gilts to underweight in global bond portfolios Yield Curve: On a tactical (0-6 months) basis, the UK Gilt curve may re-steepen as UK and global growth stays resilient, but a more hawkish BoE will eventually result in a flatter Gilt curve Inflation-Linked: Inflation breakevens on UK index-linked Gilts are already quite elevated and are overvalued on our fair value models, while real yields are at deeply negative levels that are conditioned on a continually dovish BoE – a combination that suggests an underweight stance on UK linkers is appropriate. Corporate Credit: Stay neutral on a tactical basis, as solid UK growth will offset the impact of a shift to a less dovish BoE. Currency: Our currency strategists are positive on the British pound - which is undervalued on their models (Chart 16) - over the medium-term, with the BoE seemingly on a path to begin tightening monetary policy sooner than the ECB and perhaps even the Fed.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index The UK Leads The Way The UK Leads The Way Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Fed: The Fed is preparing markets for a taper announcement in Q4 of this year. But we don’t see asset purchase tapering as a catalyst for higher bond yields. Rather, bond yields will move higher as the employment data continue to come in hot. Job growth will be strong enough to reach the Fed’s definition of maximum employment by the end of 2022, and the fed funds rate will rise more quickly than is implied by current market expectations. Duration: The 10-year Treasury yield will reach a range of 2% to 2.25% by the time the Fed is ready to lift rates, near the end of 2022. Strong employment data will catalyze the next significant jump in bond yields, but this may not happen until Q4 of this year. The spread of the delta COVID variant could limit the pace of hiring during the next month or two, and bond market positioning may need to turn more bullish before yields can rise. Labor Market: After July’s strong employment report, we calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 431k is required to reach the Fed’s “maximum employment” liftoff criteria by the end of 2022. Feature Chart 1A Tapering Announcement Is Coming A Tapering Announcement Is Coming A Tapering Announcement Is Coming It’s finally time to talk about tapering. Several Fed governors and regional presidents made media appearances last week, each one presenting a timeline that sets up a tapering announcement before the end of this year. Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller: I think you could be ready to do an announcement by September. That depends on what the next two jobs reports do. If they come in as strong as the last one, then I think you have made the progress you need. If they don’t, then I think you are probably going to have to push things back a couple of months.1 St Louis Fed President James Bullard: I don’t think that we need to continue with these purchases now that we’ve got new risks on the horizon and possibly inflation risks on the horizon. […] What I think we should do here is start sooner and go faster and get finished by the end of the first quarter of next year. We don’t really need the purchases anymore.2 Dallas Fed President Robert Kaplan: As long as we continue to make progress in July (jobs) numbers and in August jobs numbers, I think we’d be better off to start adjusting these purchases soon. Doing so gradually, over a time frame of plus or minus about eight months, will help give ourselves as much flexibility as possible to be patient and be flexible on the fed funds rate.3 Fed Governor Lael Brainard presented the most detailed description of what it will take for the Fed to start paring its asset purchases.4 Since December, the Fed’s criteria for tapering has been “substantial further progress” toward its employment and price stability goals. In December, nonfarm payrolls were about 10 million below pre-pandemic levels (Chart 2A). In her speech, which was given prior to the release of July’s jobs report, Brainard noted that if employment grows at the same rate in Q3 as it did in Q2, then “about two-thirds of the outstanding job losses as of December 2020” would be made up by the end of 2021. That figure rose to 71% after July’s strong jobs number (Chart 2B). Chart 2AConditions For Tapering Conditions For Tapering Conditions For Tapering Chart 2BDefining "Substantial Further Progress" Defining "Substantial Further Progress" Defining "Substantial Further Progress" In other words, as long as employment growth stays solid – in the 500k/month range – then the Fed will be well over 50% of the way toward its maximum employment goal by the end of this year. This would certainly count as “substantial further progress”. Our expectation is that Q3 jobs growth will be strong enough for the Fed to make an official taper announcement in Q4, with the actual tapering starting in January 2022.5 There is an outside chance that the Fed will rush to start tapering earlier, but only if long-dated inflation expectations rise to well above the Fed’s target range (Chart 2A, bottom panel). As for market impact, we don’t expect the tapering announcement to move markets all that much. First, we mainly care about asset purchase tapering because it could signal that the Fed intends to move more quickly toward rate hikes (Chart 1). This is the concern that prompted the 2013 taper tantrum. This time around, however, the Fed has tied liftoff to explicit employment and inflation criteria. This forward guidance significantly weakens the signaling power of any tapering announcement. Second, surveys indicate that market participants already anticipate that tapering will start in early-2022 (Tables 1A & 1B). In other words, a Q4 taper announcement shouldn’t be that much of a shock to expectations. Table 1ASurvey Of Market Participants Expected Fed Timeline Talking About Tapering Talking About Tapering Table 1BSurvey Of Primary Dealers Expected Fed Timeline Talking About Tapering Talking About Tapering Interestingly, Fed Vice-Chair Richard Clarida did manage to shock markets with his speech last week, but only because he went further than just a discussion of tapering. Specifically, Clarida articulated his expected timeline for lifting interest rates: Chart 3Median FOMC Forecasts Median FOMC Forecasts Median FOMC Forecasts While, as Chair Powell indicated last week, we are clearly a ways away from considering raising interest rates and this is certainly not something on the radar screen right now, if the outlook for inflation and outlook for unemployment I summarized earlier turn out to be the actual outcomes for inflation and unemployment realized over the forecast horizon, then I believe that these three necessary conditions for raising the target range for the federal funds rate will have been met by year-end 2022.6 What are the economic forecasts that Clarida says would meet the conditions for liftoff by the end of 2022? It turns out that they are very close to the FOMC’s median projections (Chart 3). The Fed’s forecast calls for 3% core PCE inflation in 2021, falling to 2.1% in 2022 and 2023. The Fed also sees the unemployment rate falling to 4.5% by the end of this year, 3.8% by the end of 2022 and 3.5% by the end of 2023. Clarida said that he views this forecast as consistent with overall employment returning to its pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2022. We think Clarida’s expected timeline is reasonable. The Appendix at the end of this report presents different scenarios for when the Fed’s “maximum employment” liftoff condition might be met. We estimate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of 431k will get us to maximum employment by the end of 2022, in time for early-2023 liftoff. At least so far, monthly nonfarm payroll growth is tracking well above the 431k threshold. If we compare our (and Clarida’s) forecast to market prices, we conclude that market rate expectations are too low. The overnight index swap curve is priced for Fed liftoff in January 2023 but for not even three 25 basis point rate hikes in total by the end of 2023 (Chart 4). This seems too low if the Fed’s liftoff criteria are in fact met by the end of 2022, as is our expectation. Chart 4Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Bottom Line: The Fed is preparing markets for a taper announcement in Q4 of this year. But we don’t see asset purchase tapering as a catalyst for higher bond yields. Rather, bond yields will move higher as the employment data continue to come in hot. Job growth will be strong enough to reach the Fed’s definition of maximum employment by the end of 2022, and the fed funds rate will rise more quickly than is implied by current market expectations. Timing The Move Higher In Yields Our expectation for a return to maximum employment by the end of 2022 implies that bond yields will be significantly higher by then. Specifically, we expect that both the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield and the 10-year Treasury yield will be in a range between 2% and 2.25% by the time of the first rate hike (Chart 5). The 2% to 2.25% range is consistent with survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate. But a big question remains over the timing of the next move higher in yields. Are bond yields poised to jump higher immediately? Or will they remain low for the next few months and move up only in 2022? Our sense is that the catalyst for the next significant jump in bond yields will be surprisingly strong employment data. There is widespread consensus that inflation will be close to the Fed’s target (if not higher) by the end of 2022, but recent concerns about labor supply have increased the uncertainty around employment projections. Ultimately, we think that labor supply constraints will ease and that the unemployment rate will catch up to levels implied by different labor demand indicators (Chart 6). However, this may not happen during the next month or two. Chart 5A Target For Long-Dated Yields A Target For Long-Dated Yields A Target For Long-Dated Yields Chart 6Labor Demand Is Strong Labor Demand Is Strong Labor Demand Is Strong The spread of the Delta coronavirus variant has just started to ramp up in the United States (Chart 7). The UK’s experience with the variant shows that vaccination significantly limits the number of hospitalizations and suggests that economic lockdowns can be avoided. However, it took about one month for the UK’s new case count to peak once the variant started spreading. A similar roadmap could lead to hiring delays in the US during the next month or two, at least until the new case count starts to fall and concerns abate. From a market technical perspective, we also note that bond market positioning remains significantly net short and that bond market sentiment is less bullish than is often the case at major inflection points (Chart 8). This is not the ideal technical set-up for a large immediate jump in bond yields. Chart 7Delta Is A Near-Term Risk To Hiring Delta Is A Near-Term Risk To Hiring Delta Is A Near-Term Risk To Hiring Chart 8Positioning & Sentiment Positioning & Sentiment Positioning & Sentiment Bottom Line: The 10-year Treasury yield will reach a range of 2% to 2.25% by the time the Fed is ready to lift rates, near the end of 2022. Strong employment data will catalyze the next significant jump in bond yields, but this may not happen until Q4 of this year. The spread of the delta COVID variant could limit the pace of hiring during the next month or two, and bond market positioning may need to turn more bullish before yields can rise. Appendix: How Far From “Maximum Employment” And Fed Liftoff? Chart A1Defining “Maximum Employment” Defining "Maximum Employment" Defining "Maximum Employment" The Federal Reserve has promised that the funds rate will stay pinned at zero until the labor market returns to “maximum employment”. The Fed has not provided explicit guidance on the definition of “maximum employment”, but we deduce that “maximum employment” means that the Fed wants to see the U3 unemployment rate within a range consistent with its estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, currently 3.5% to 4.5%, and that it wants to see a more or less complete recovery of the labor force participation rate back to February 2020 levels (Chart A1). Alternatively, we can infer definitions of “maximum employment” from the New York Fed’s Surveys of Primary Dealers and Market Participants. These surveys ask respondents what they think the unemployment and labor force participation rates will be at the time of Fed liftoff. Currently, the median respondent from the Survey of Market Participants expects an unemployment rate of 3.5% and a participation rate of 63%. The median respondent from the Survey of Primary Dealers expects an unemployment rate of 3.7% and a participation rate of 63%. Tables A1-A4 present the average monthly nonfarm payroll growth required to reach different combinations of unemployment rate and participation rate by specific future dates. For example, if we use the definition of “maximum employment” from the Survey of Market Participants, then we need to see average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of +431k in order to hit “maximum employment” by the end of 2022. Table A1Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 4.5% By The Given Date Talking About Tapering Talking About Tapering Table A2Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 4% By The Given Date Talking About Tapering Talking About Tapering Table A3Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required For The Unemployment To Reach 3.5% By The Given Date Talking About Tapering Talking About Tapering Table A4Average Monthly Nonfarm Payroll Growth Required To Reach “Maximum Employment” As Defined By Survey Respondents Talking About Tapering Talking About Tapering Chart A2 presents recent monthly nonfarm payroll growth along with target levels based on the Survey of Market Participants’ definition of “maximum employment”. This chart is to help us track progress toward specific liftoff dates. For example, if monthly nonfarm payroll growth continues to print at the same level as last month, then we could anticipate a Fed rate hike by June 2022. Table A2Tracking Toward Fed Liftoff Tracking Toward Fed Liftoff Tracking Toward Fed Liftoff We will continue to track these charts and tables in the coming months, and will publish updates after the release of each monthly employment report. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-02/waller-says-strong-job-reports-may-warrant-september-taper-call?sref=Ij5V3tFi 2 https://www.stlouisfed.org/from-the-president/video-appearances/2021/bullard-washington-post-inflation-tapering 3 https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/exclusive-feds-kaplan-wants-bond-buying-taper-start-soon-be-gradual-2021-08-04/ 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210730a.htm 5 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “A Central Bank Timeline For The Next Two Years”, dated June 1, 2021. 6 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/clarida20210804a.htm Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Highlights Chart 1Still Close To Fair Value Still Close To Fair Value Still Close To Fair Value Treasury yields fell significantly in July, particularly at the long end of the curve. We continue to view this move as an overreaction to mediocre economic data that will be reversed this fall when labor supply constraints ease and employment surprises to the upside. It’s important to note, however, that despite the drop in long-dated yields the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield remains within the bounds of its 1.75% to 2.5% fair value range (Chart 1). That is, shorter-maturity Treasury yields have much more upside than long-dated yields on a 6-12 month investment horizon. We expect the next big move in bonds to be a bear-flattening of the yield curve as the market prices in a Fed rate hike cycle that we see starting near the end of 2022. Investors should position for that outcome today by keeping portfolio duration low and by entering yield curve flatteners. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +172 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports continued positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. At 89 bps, the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope remains steep. This is a strong signal that monetary conditions are accommodative. But despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade valuations are extremely tight (Chart 2). A recent report looked at what different combinations of Treasury slope and corporate spreads have historically signaled about corporate bond excess returns.1 It shows that tight corporate spreads only correlate with negative excess returns once the 3-year/10-year Treasury slope is below 50 bps. Though we retain a positive view of spread product as a whole, better value can be found outside of the investment grade corporate sector. Specifically, we recommend that investors shift into high-yield corporates, municipal bonds and USD-denominated EM sovereigns and corporates. We also advise investors to favor long-maturity corporate bonds and those corporate sectors with elevated Duration-Times-Spread.2   Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +433 bps. A recent report looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.3 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.2% (Chart 3). Using a model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards, we estimate that the 12-month default rate will fall to between 2.3% and 2.8%, below what the market currently discounts. Notably, the corporate default rate is tracking at an annualized rate of roughly 1.6% through the first six months of the year, well below the estimate generated by our macro model. Another recent report looked at the incremental spread pick-up investors can earn by moving out of investment grade corporates and into junk.4 It concluded that the extra spread available in high-yield is worth grabbing and that B-rated bonds look particularly attractive in risk-adjusted terms.   MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -64 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries widened 8 bps in July. The spread is wide compared to recent history, but it remains tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The conventional 30-year MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) widened 3 bps in July (panel 3), and it is now starting to look more competitive compared to other similarly risky spread sectors. The conventional 30-year MBS OAS sits at 36 bps, below the 54 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds but above the 20 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS and the 34 bps offered by Agency CMBS. In a recent report we looked at MBS performance and valuation across the coupon stack.5 We noted that the higher convexity of high-coupon MBS makes them likely to outperform lower-coupon MBS in a rising yield environment. Higher coupon MBS also have greater OAS than lower coupons. This makes the high-coupon MBS more likely to outperform in a flat bond yield environment as well. Given our view that bond yields will be higher in 6-12 months, we recommend favoring high coupons (4%, 4.5%) over low coupons (2%, 2.5%, 3%) within an overall underweight allocation to Agency MBS. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related Index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +57 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 149 bps in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -113 bps. Foreign Agencies underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 11 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +35 bps. Local Authority bonds underperformed by 19 bps in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +372 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 2 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +28 bps. Supranationals performed in line with Treasuries in July, year-to-date excess returns held flat at +26 bps. USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign bonds continue to offer an attractive spread pick-up versus investment grade US corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Russia. A recent report looked at valuation within the investment grade USD-denominated EM corporate space.6 It found that EM corporates are attractively priced relative to US corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum. It also found that EM corporates are attractive relative to EM sovereigns within the A and Baa credit tiers. EM sovereigns have the edge in the Aa credit tier. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +271 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The economic and policy back-drop is favorable for municipal bond performance. Trailing 4-quarter net state & local government savings were already positive through the end of Q1 2021 and they received another significant boost in Q2 as funds from the American Rescue Plan were doled out (Chart 6). With state & local government balance sheets in such good shape, we are comfortable moving down in quality within municipal bonds. A move down in quality is especially compelling because of tight Aaa muni valuations relative to Treasuries (top panel). Valuation is more compelling in the lower investment grade credit tiers, especially at the long-end of the curve.7 GO munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket offer a 10% breakeven tax rate versus corporates with the same credit rating and duration. The breakeven tax rate for Revenue munis is just 2% (panel 2). Finally, high-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive relative to high-yield corporates, offering a breakeven tax rate of 25% (panel 4). But despite the attractive spread, we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates as the deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them susceptible to extension risk if bond yields rise. Treasury Curve: Buy 2/10 Barbell Versus 5-Year Bullet Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-flattened in July. Bond yields were down across the curve, but by much more at the long end. The 2-year/10-year slope flattened 15 bps to end the month at 105 bps. The 5-year/30-year slope steepened 1 bp to end the month at 120 bps. While we expect the recent decline in bond yields to reverse during the next 6-12 months, we do not think this reversal will coincide with a re-steepening of the 2/10 yield curve. We noted on the first page of this report that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield remains close to its fair value range. Last week’s report demonstrated that yield curve steepening only occurs when either the Fed is cutting rates or the 5-year/5-year forward yield rises.8 This means that the 2/10 Treasury curve is more likely to flatten than steepen during the next 6-12 months, even as bond yields move higher. Similarly, we observe that the overnight index swap (OIS) curve is priced for the fed funds rate to be 0.17% in one year’s time and 1.36% in five years (Chart 7). While the latter rate has 157 bps of upside if it converges all the way back to its 2018 high, this pales in comparison to the 269 bps of upside in the 12-month forward rate. The yield curve will flatten as the 12-month forward OIS rate converges with the 5-year forward rate (panel 3). Investors should position in yield curve flatteners on a 6-12 month horizon. Specifically, we recommend shorting the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell.   TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 112 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +578 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose by 9 bps and 8 bps, respectively, on the month. At 2.43%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the middle of the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with inflation expectations being well anchored around the Fed’s target (Chart 8). Meanwhile, at 2.26%, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is just below target (panel 3). With long-dated inflation expectations close to the Fed’s target levels, we see limited upside on a 6-12 month investment horizon. We also see the cost of short-maturity inflation protection falling during the next few months as realized inflation moderates from its extremely high level. This will lead to some modest steepening of the inflation curve (bottom panel). While the inflation curve has some room to steepen, we don’t see it returning to positive territory. An inverted inflation curve is simply more consistent with the Fed’s Average Inflation Target than a positively sloped one. This is because the Fed’s new framework calls for it to attack its inflation target from above rather than from below.  ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +37 bps. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed by 3 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +28 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 4 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +88 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed in April 2020. That excess savings has still not been spent and the most recent round of stimulus checks has only added to the stockpile, pushing the savings rate higher yet again (Chart 9). The extraordinarily large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is also extraordinarily high. Indeed, many households have been using their windfalls to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should also take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum.   Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in July, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +187 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS performed in-line with Treasuries in July, keeping year-to-date excess returns steady at +82 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 16 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +539 bps (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain attractive, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 28 basis points in July, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +87 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 5 bps on the month and it currently sits at 34 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have recovered to well below pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of July 30TH, 2021) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of July 30TH, 2021) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 26 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 26 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of July 30TH, 2021) It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners It’s Time For Bear-Flatteners Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 2 For ideas on how to increase the average spread of a US bond portfolio please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Post-FOMC Credit Environment”, dated June 29, 2021. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Collapsing Credit Risk Premium”, dated July 20, 2021. 8 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “A Bump On The Road To Recovery”, dated July 27, 2021.

Highlights The countertrend yield rally is near its end. Despite the deteriorating Chinese credit impulse, the outlook for global growth remains robust. An ample global liquidity backdrop, an inventory restocking cycle, and an upbeat capex outlook will increase aggregate demand and global capacity utilization. In this context, safe-haven bonds have sufficiently rallied. German yields will rise too, because the European yield curve will steepen. European banks will benefit from this trend. Investors should buy European momentum stocks and sell growth stocks. Investors should favor industrial equities and Sweden. Feature On April 12 of this year, we warned that a countertrend rally in bonds was increasingly likely. The decline in the Chinese credit impulse and the increasingly oversold state of Treasuries created the perfect conditions to generate disappointments in a lopsided market. As a corollary, we grew worried about our equity positioning, which calls for a large exposure to pro-cyclical stocks. Consequently, we recommended investors hedge this portfolio bias with some defensive bets. On July 20, Treasury yields fell to as low as 1.13%. Did this level mark the end of the Treasury rally? The bulk of the decline is behind us, and investors with a 12- to 18-month investment horizon should resume shortening portfolio duration. In Europe too, German yields are likely to trend higher. As a result, European financials and momentum stocks should generate significant outperformance in the coming quarters. Industrial equities are also set to shine, which will benefit the Swedish market, our favorite. Should I Stay Or Should I Go? The near-term outlook for Treasuries is currently more complex than it was in April, when forces lined up neatly to warn of an imminent pullback in yields. Technical indicators show that the oversold conditions that prevailed this spring have mostly cleared up. In April, the BCA Composite Technical Indicator for Treasuries reached its most oversold level in more than 20 years, which provided a very reliable buy signal (Chart 1). Now that the 10-year yield has reclaimed its 40-week moving average, the technical indicator is back to neutral. Normally, when bonds are in a cyclical bear market, which is BCA’s House View, the indicator rarely dips significantly into overbought territory. Meanwhile, the Marketvane Bullish Sentiment survey stands at 60%, which indicates that bonds are once again favored by many newsletters, traders, and investors. Chinese credit growth continues to send a bond-bullish signal (Chart 2). Slowing credit growth could hurt Chinese capex, which in turn has the potential to slow the demand for capital at the global level. This risk could still decrease global yields. Chart 1Bonds Are Not Oversold Anymore... Bonds Are Not Oversold Anymore... Bonds Are Not Oversold Anymore... Chart 2...But China Still Consistutes A Risk ...But China Still Consistutes A Risk ...But China Still Consistutes A Risk Chart 3A Synchronous Global Upswing A Synchronous Global Upswing A Synchronous Global Upswing The global economic recovery remains sufficiently broad-based to compensate for the risk of a Chinese slowdown. Our Global Synchronicity Indicator shows that manufacturing PMIs among the world’s major economies are all expanding (Chart 3), which usually elevates yields. This is especially important today, because the far-reaching and generalized nature of the current recovery gives more scope to the global economy to withstand a Chinese economic deceleration. Bottom Line: The variables that called for lower yields in early April are currently sending a mixed message. “Go!” The Global Business Cycle Responds Outside of China’s TSF impulse, most economic variables point toward higher yields. Chart 4Financial Liquidity Lifts The Business Cycle Financial Liquidity Lifts The Business Cycle Financial Liquidity Lifts The Business Cycle Global liquidity conditions remain consistent with higher growth and thus also with rising global interest rates. BCA’s US Financial Liquidity Index still stands near record highs and confirms that the Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) will remain at elevated levels (Chart 4). As a result, we expect the current fall in the Global LEI Diffusion Index to be short lived. Any softening in global growth, therefore, will prove to be transitory. Markets are forward looking. The recent decline in yields anticipated the deceleration in the Global LEI. Long-term rates will also increase before the LEI firms anew.  Excess money growth tells a similar story. Historically, an expansion of the global money supply in excess of the demand for credit sends a strong signal that global economic activity is well supported by reflationary policies. It forecasts above-trend industrial production growth, robust international trade and rising global export prices. Currently, excess money growth in the US, Eurozone and Japan has overtaken its post-GFC high and is consistent with higher US and German yields (Chart 5). Global capacity utilization also points toward higher yields. Our US Composite Capacity Utilization indicator is back in the neutral zone after a steep decline in 2020. Furthermore, US industrial capacity utilization is currently back above its structural trend. Most importantly, capacity utilization should be evaluated at the global level. Even when slower-growing economies such as the Euro Area and Japan are included, global capacity utilization is improving enough to be consistent with rising yields (Chart 6). Chart 5Excess Money Points To Higher Yields Excess Money Points To Higher Yields Excess Money Points To Higher Yields Chart 6Rising CAPU Lifts Yields Rising CAPU Lifts Yields Rising CAPU Lifts Yields Capacity utilization should climb higher in the coming quarters as the world experiences an inventory re-stocking cycle. The US, with its rich data, provides a good example. The sales-to-inventory ratio is at an extremely elevated level and is climbing very rapidly (Chart 7). Meanwhile, the level of inventories is still 1% below its pre-pandemic peak, while GDP overtook it previous high in the second quarter, and business sales are 11% above their 2018 high. The recent rise in inflation highlights the inability of companies to fulfil demand for their goods and services and, consequently, the need to restock. Hence, we expect companies to increase their inventory spending, which will add to demand and to capacity utilization as the adjustment process takes place. Capex will also lift capacity utilization and put upward pressure on yields. US capex intentions are rising swiftly as firms are unable to meet demand (Chart 8, top panel). Our Japanese Capex Indicator reiterates this message, while the European Commission’s Investment Surveys are also recovering (Chart 8 bottom panels). Historically, capex intentions are an excellent, leading indicator of actual investments, hence, the recent poor capex numbers will not last. Chart 7Restocking Ahead! Restocking Ahead! Restocking Ahead! Chart 8Climbing Capex Intentions Everywhere Climbing Capex Intentions Everywhere Climbing Capex Intentions Everywhere Greater global cash flow growth is also consistent with higher capex. The growth in EBITDA among global companies has bottomed, and it is currently around 14%. Incidentally, this suggests that capex among quoted firms around the world should expand in the second half of the year by a similar amount (Chart 9). Ultimately, robust cash flows finance expansion plans and also send a strong signal to corporate boards that the environment is ripe for investment spending. Already, capital goods orders are strengthening, which confirms the signal from both the capex surveys and profits. This strength portends very strong private capex numbers in the coming quarters and thus, a greater level of demand in the economy (Chart 10). Chart 9Rising Cash Flows Lead To Higher Capex Rising Cash Flows Lead To Higher Capex Rising Cash Flows Lead To Higher Capex Chart 10Strong Global Orders Strong Global Orders Strong Global Orders Public infrastructure plans will create the final boost to global capex. $550 billion of the Biden administration’s infrastructure plan is getting close to bipartisan approval, and the budget reconciliation process might still result in an even bigger package before yearend. In Europe, the EUR800 billion NGEU plan that has been approved by all the EU’s national parliaments also includes large infrastructure spending envelopes to deploy over the coming five years. This context suggests that yields are unlikely to decline much further from current levels, since the oversold conditions that prevailed in March have been purged. Chart 11 shows that specific events are needed to prompt a greater 90-trading day collapse in yields than the one just registered. In 2019 and 2020, the Fed was cutting rates. Today, it is gearing up to raise them. In 2010 and 2011, the European sovereign debt crisis was hurting global growth and creating massive deflationary risks. In 2015, China was mired in deep deflation and devalued the RMB, which exported these negative pressures around the world and lowered yields. By late 2018, the yield curve was moving toward an inversion, which signaled that monetary policy was too tight. Today, none of these conditions are present and, consequently, the odds of a greater decline in yields are low. Chart 11Yields Have Moved Enough Yields Have Moved Enough Yields Have Moved Enough Bottom Line: The broad-based nature of the global recovery will limit the decline in yields. Global liquidity conditions remain extremely accommodative, global capacity utilization is improving, and inventories and capex spending will add to demand in the coming quarters. In this context, the recent decline in yields corrected this spring’s oversold condition in the bond market sufficiently. Investment Implications Bonds Investors with an investment horizon of more than six months should reduce their portfolio duration and remove hedges protecting against higher yields. The low in Treasury yields is likely to stay around 1.1%. The exact timing of the rebound is imprecise, and yields could churn for a brief period and retest their recent lows, but the balance of risks points toward a much greater probability of higher yields in the coming six to twelve months, and a limited probability of significantly lower yields from current levels. In fact, the CRB-to-gold ratio, often shown by BCA’s US bond strategists, clearly favors higher yields (Chart 12). Higher yields are not inconsistent with BCA’s view that the current inflation spike is transitory. TIPS yields are at a record low. As global growth recovers and the Fed moves closer to removing some accommodation, real yields will increase (Chart 13, top panel). Meanwhile, 5-year/5-year forward inflation breakeven rates remain well below the 2.5%-to-3% zone that prevailed prior to 2014, when long-term inflation expectations were still well anchored (Chart 13, bottom panel). The Fed is actively aiming to push this inflation expectation measure higher. Chart 12The CRB/Gold Ratio Points To Higher Yields The CRB/Gold Ratio Points To Higher Yields The CRB/Gold Ratio Points To Higher Yields Chart 13TIPS Yields Will Rise TIPS Yields Will Rise TIPS Yields Will Rise Chart 14The European Yield Curve Will Steepen The European Yield Curve Will Steepen The European Yield Curve Will Steepen German yields have some upside too, even if the ECB will lag well behind the Fed in terms of both ending its QE program and lifting interest rates. The ECB policy rate mostly anchors the short end of the curve, and the large European excess savings warrant lower Bund yields than those of T-Note. However, the nominal and real terminal rates embedded in the German curve remain lower than at the apex of the European sovereign debt crisis and are extremely low compared to the US. As a result, the European yield curve will steepen, which is confirmed by the comparative strength of the earnings revisions of Europe’s cyclical equity sectors (Chart 14). Equities An environment in which yields rise again should favor financials, industrials, and momentum stocks at the expense of growth stocks. In Europe, banks and financials will be the prime beneficiaries of higher yields. Historically, higher German Bund yields are associated with an outperformance of banks relative to the broad market, because a steeper yield curve boosts net interest margins (Chart 15). European banks also have scope for some re-rating. There is little case to significantly upgrade the sectors’ expected long-term profitability significantly, considering that the European economy remains replete with an excessively large capital stock. Nonetheless, at a price-to-book ratio of 0.6 or 55% below that of US banks and 67% below the European broad market, European banks are also priced as risky investments. However, European NPLs have declined significantly, and the public sector support during the pandemic will limit how high NPLs can rise (Chart 16, top panel). Moreover, European banks are much better capitalized than they once were, which further decreases their riskiness (Chart 16). Additionally, the ECB has allowed banks to pay dividends again. Finally, the fiscal risk sharing created by the NGEU funds and continued bond purchases by the ECB will cap the upside for peripheral yield spreads, which will limit the odds of the emergence of the kind of doom-loop that once plagued the European banking system. UK bank stocks look particularly attractive.   Chart 15European Banks Have Upside European Banks Have Upside European Banks Have Upside Chart 16Less Risky Less Risky Less Risky The massive underperformance of European momentum stocks relative to growth stocks is also likely to reverse (Chart 17). As Chart 18 shows, momentum stocks currently trade at an exceptionally large discount to both growth stocks and the European broad market. Most importantly, momentum equities tend to outperform growth stocks in the wake of a rise in German yields (Chart 19). This sensitivity to yields is currently accentuated by the sector bias of momentum stocks. Relative to growth stocks, momentum equities greatest overweights are financials, industrials and materials (Table 1), three sectors that thrive on higher interest rates. Meanwhile, their largest relative underweights are consumer staples and healthcare, two sectors with strong defensive characteristics that benefit from lower yields.  Chart 17Bomned Out Momentum Stocks... Bomned Out Momentum Stocks... Bomned Out Momentum Stocks... Chart 18...Have Become Very Cheap ...Have Become Very Cheap ...Have Become Very Cheap Chart 19Momentum Stocks Outperform When Yields Rise Momentum Stocks Outperform When Yields Rise Momentum Stocks Outperform When Yields Rise Table 1Sector Biases: Momentum Vs Growth Stocks The Ageing Bond Rally The Ageing Bond Rally Chart 20The Capex Outlook Favors Industrials The Capex Outlook Favors Industrials The Capex Outlook Favors Industrials Finally, we recommend investors move more aggressively into industrial equities. Industrials are the best-placed sector to benefit from the rise in global capex and the excess money supply growth. As Chart 20 highlights, even if the rate of growth of global capital goods orders decelerates, industrials should outperform the European broad market as long as the rate of growth remains positive. Nonetheless, the sector’s outperformance could moderate because it has become more expensive than the broad market. However, a stronger profitability compensates for this negative. As a corollary, we continue to favor Swedish equities because of their 38% weight in industrials and 27% allocation to financials. Moreover, their superior return on equity and profit margins, as well as the EUR/SEK’s downside potential, add to Sweden’s allure. The largest risk for industrials remains the slowdown in the Chinese credit impulse. However, the upbeat picture for DM capex and inventory growth counters this negative side. We continue to recommend some hedges against this risk. When it comes to our Sweden overweight, we still advise selling Norway, a position that has worked out well. We also still like selling consumer discretionary equities / long European telecoms to protect portfolios against a greater-than-anticipated global slowdown. Bottom Line: Global safe-haven yields are unlikely to decline significantly from current levels. Instead, they will rise meaningfully in the coming quarters, even in Germany. Consequently, investors with an investment horizon greater than six months should curtail their portfolio duration once again. Higher yields will also benefit European bank equities. We also recommend investors buy European momentum stocks and sell growth stocks. Finally, European industrials are set to shine compared to the rest of the European market, which will give a fillip to Swedish stocks, our favored European market.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Currency Performance Currency Performance The Ageing Bond Rally The Ageing Bond Rally Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds The Ageing Bond Rally The Ageing Bond Rally Corporate Bonds The Ageing Bond Rally The Ageing Bond Rally Equity Performance Major Stock Indices The Ageing Bond Rally The Ageing Bond Rally Geographic Performance The Ageing Bond Rally The Ageing Bond Rally Sector Performance The Ageing Bond Rally The Ageing Bond Rally

Highlights Recent progress on the path to a post-pandemic state and the return to pre-COVID economic conditions has been mixed. The share of vaccinated individuals continues to rise globally, and the number of confirmed UK cases has recently peaked. However, vaccine penetration remains comparatively low in the US, and there has been no meaningful change in the pace of vaccination. Given the emergence of the delta variant as well as vaccine hesitancy in some countries, policymakers currently face a trilemma that is conceptually similar to the Mundell-Fleming Impossible Trinity. The pandemic version of the Impossible Trinity suggests that policymakers cannot simultaneously prevent the reintroduction of pandemic control measures while maintaining a functioning medical system and the complete freedom of individuals to choose whether or not to be vaccinated. Were they to occur, the imposition of renewed pandemic control measures or a dangerous rise in hospitalizations this fall would likely weigh on earnings expectations, at a time when income support for households negatively impacted by the pandemic will be withdrawn. The delta variant of COVID-19 is not vaccine-resistant, meaning that a delta-driven surge in hospitalizations this fall could delay – but not prevent – eventual asset purchase tapering and rate hikes from the Fed. 10-year Treasury yields are well below the fair value implied by a mid-2023 rate hike scenario, underscoring that the recent decline in long-maturity yields is overdone. The recent (slight) tick higher in China’s credit impulse is perhaps a sign that the worst of the credit slowdown has already occurred, but we do not expect a rising trend without a genuine shift toward a looser monetary policy stance. As such, a normalization in services spending in advanced economies remains the likely impulse for global growth over the coming year, at least over the coming 3-6 months. On a 12-month time horizon, we would recommend that investors position for the underperformance of financial assets that are negatively correlated with long-maturity government bond yields. However, for investors more focused on the near term, we would note the potential for further underperformance of cyclical sectors, value stocks, international equities, and most global ex-US currencies versus the US dollar – depending heavily on the evolution of the medical situation in the US and the subsequent response from policymakers. Feature Since we published our last report, progress made on the path to a post-pandemic state and the return to pre-COVID economic conditions have been mixed. Encouragingly, Chart I-1 highlights that the share of people who have received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine continues to rise outside of Africa, which continues to be impacted by India’s ban on vaccine exports. By the end of September, at least a quarter of the world’s population will have been fully vaccinated against COVID-19, and many more will have received at least one dose. Pfizer’s plan to request emergency authorization for its vaccine for children aged 5-11 by October also stands to raise total vaccination rates in advanced economies even further by the end of the year. In addition, Chart I-2 presents further evidence that the relationship between new cases of COVID-19 and hospitalization has truly been altered. The chart shows that the number of patients in UK hospitals is much lower than what would be implied by the number of new cases, which itself now appears to have peaked at a lower level than that of January. Given that the strain on the medical system is the dominant constraint facing policymakers, a modest rise in hospitalizations implies a durable end to pandemic restrictions and a return to economic normality. Chart I-1Global Vaccination Progress Continues Global Vaccination Progress Continues Global Vaccination Progress Continues Chart I-2Vaccines Have Truly Altered The Relationship Between Cases And Hospitalizations Vaccines Have Truly Altered The Relationship Between Cases And Hospitalizations Vaccines Have Truly Altered The Relationship Between Cases And Hospitalizations   However, the risk from the delta variant appears to be higher in the US than in the UK, due to a lower level of vaccine penetration. Only 56% of the US population has received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, compared with 67% in Israel, 69% in the UK, and 71% in Canada. And thus far, there has been no meaningful change in the pace of vaccination in the US in response to the threat from the delta variant, despite recent exhortations from politicians and media personalities from both sides of the political spectrum. The Impossible Trinity: Pandemic Edition Last year, most investors would have said that the existence of a safe and effective vaccine would likely be enough to durably end the pandemic. But given the development of more dangerous variants of the disease, and the existence of vaccine hesitancy in many countries, policymakers now face a trilemma that is conceptually similar to the concept of the “Impossible Trinity” as described by Mundell and Fleming. The upper portion of Chart I-3 illustrates the standard view of the Impossible Trinity, which posits that policymakers must choose one side of the triangle, while foregoing the opposite economic attribute. For example, most modern economies have chosen “B,” gaining the free flow of capital and independent monetary policy by giving up a fixed exchange rate regime (and allowing currency volatility). By contrast, Hong Kong has chosen side “A,” meaning that its monetary policy is driven by the Federal Reserve in exchange for a pegged currency and an open capital account. The lower portion of Chart I-3 presents the pandemic version of the trilemma, which sees policymakers having to choose two of these three outcomes: No economically-damaging pandemic control restrictions placed on society A functioning medical system The complete freedom of individuals to choose whether or not to be vaccinated Chart I-3Variants And Vaccine Hesitancy Have Created A Difficult Choice For Policymakers August 2021 August 2021 In reality, the pandemic version of the Impossible Trinity is likely to be resolved in a fashion similar to how China views the original trilemma,1 which is to distribute a 200% “adoption rate” among the three competing choices. In essence, this means that policymakers will likely partially adopt all three measures with a degree of intensity that will change over time in response to the prevailing circumstances. Chart I-4No Sign Yet Of A Pickup In US Vaccination Rates No Sign Yet Of A Pickup In US Vaccination Rates No Sign Yet Of A Pickup In US Vaccination Rates But Chart I-4 is a clear example of the differences in approach adopted by the US in response to vaccine hesitancy compared to other. So far, attempts to convince vaccine-hesitant Americans to get their shot have relied mostly on “carrot” approaches in an attempt to preserve individual freedom of choice, i.e. side “B” in Chart I-3. As noted above, these measures, so far, have failed, as there has been no noticeable uptick in the pace of vaccine doses administered in the US over the past month. By contrast, France, like several other countries, has begun to use “stick” approaches that push it more toward side “A” of the trilemma. In mid-July, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that French citizens who want to visit cafes, bars or shopping centers must show proof of vaccination or a negative test result. The policy also mandated that French health care and nursing home workers must be vaccinated. The result was a sharp, and thus far sustained, uptick in the pace of doses administered. For equity investors, the risk is that the politically contentious nature of vaccine mandates in the US will cause policymakers to acquiesce to renewed pandemic control measures this fall if the delta variant continues to spread widely over the coming few months (as seems likely). Alternatively, policymakers may allow a dangerous increase in hospitalizations, but this would merely postpone the imposition of control measures – and they would be more severe once reintroduced. Thus, there is a legitimate risk that the spread of the delta variant in the US does weigh on earnings expectations, especially for consumer-oriented services companies, at a time when income support for households negatively impacted by the pandemic will be withdrawn. Bond Yields, Delta, And Slowing Growth Momentum Chart I-5Growth Momentum Has Slowed... Growth Momentum Has Slowed... Growth Momentum Has Slowed... Of course, many investors would point to the significant decline in US 10-year bond yields since mid-March as having already acted in response to waning growth momentum. For example, the peak in US bond yields coincided with the March peak in the ISM manufacturing PMI, as well as a meaningful shift lower in the US economic surprise index (Chart I-5). Without a soaring inflation surprise index, the overall economic surprise index for the US would likely already be negative. The takeaway for some investors has been that a decline in yields has been normal given that the economy has passed its point of maximum strength. But there are two aspects of this narrative that do not accord with the data. First, Chart I-6 highlights that growth is peaking from an extremely strong pace, making it difficult to justify the magnitude of the decline in long-term yields over the past few months. And second, Chart I-7 highlights that the decline in the US 10-year yield closely corresponds to delta variant developments in the US. The chart shows that the 10-year yield broke below 1.5% shortly after the effective US COVID-19 reproduction rate (“R0”) began to rise, and the significant decline in yields over the past month began once R0 rose above 1. Chart I-7 does suggest that yields have reacted in response to the growth outlook, but in a different way than the “maximum strength” narrative suggests. Chart I-6…But Growth Itself Remains Quite Strong August 2021 August 2021 Chart I-7The Yield Decline Over The Past Month Seems Related To Delta The Yield Decline Over The Past Month Seems Related To Delta The Yield Decline Over The Past Month Seems Related To Delta Chart I-810-Year Yields Are Too Low, Even If Variants Delay The Fed 10-Year Yields Are Too Low, Even If Variants Delay The Fed 10-Year Yields Are Too Low, Even If Variants Delay The Fed While we can identify the apparent trigger for the decline in bond yields since mid-March, we do not agree that the decline is fundamentally justified. The delta variant of COVID-19 is not vaccine-resistant, meaning that a delta-driven surge in hospitalizations this fall could delay – but not prevent – eventual asset purchase tapering and rate hikes from the Fed. For example, Chart I-8 highlights that the 10-year yield is now 60 basis points below its fair value level in a scenario in which the Fed only begins to raise interest rates in mid-2023, underscoring that the recent decline in yields is overdone. And, although it is also true that market-based measures of inflation compensation have eased from their May highs, we have noted in previous reports that the Fed’s reaction function is almost exclusively driven by progress in the labor market back toward “maximum employment” levels – not inflation. Chart I-9 highlights that US real output per worker has grown at a much faster pace since the onset of the pandemic than what occurred on average over the past four economic recoveries, reflecting the success that US fiscal policy has had in supporting aggregate demand as well as constraints on labor supply in services industries. These factors will wane in intensity over the coming year, suggesting that real output per worker is unlikely to rise meaningfully further over that time horizon. Based on consensus market expectations for growth as well as the Fed’s most recent forecasts, a flat trend in real output per worker over the coming year would imply that the employment gap will be closed by Q2 of next year. This would be consistent with the recent trend in high frequency mobility data, such as US air traveler throughput and public transportation use in New York City (Chart I-10), the epicenter of the negative impact on urban core services employment stemming from the pandemic “work from home” effect. Chart I-9Real Output Per Worker Unlikely To Rise Much Further Over The Coming Year Real Output Per Worker Unlikely To Rise Much Further Over The Coming Year Real Output Per Worker Unlikely To Rise Much Further Over The Coming Year Chart I-10High-Frequency Data Points To A Closed Jobs Gap By Mid-2022 High-Frequency Data Points To A Closed Jobs Gap By Mid-2022 High-Frequency Data Points To A Closed Jobs Gap By Mid-2022   A closed employment gap by the middle of next year would imply that the Fed will begin to raise rates sometime in 2H 2022. Even if this were delayed by several months due to delta, Chart I-8 illustrated that 10-year Treasury yields are still too low. No Help From China If the spread of the delta variant over the coming few months does temporarily weigh on developed market economic activity via renewed pandemic control measures, investors should note that the lack of a countervailing growth impulse from China may act as an aggravating factor. Chart I-11 highlights that China’s PMI remains persistently below its 12-month trend, as it has tended to do following a decline in China’s credit impulse. And while some investors were hoping that the PBOC’s recent cut to the reserve requirement ratio represented a pivot in Chinese monetary policy towards sustained easing, Chart I-12 highlights that the 3-month repo rate remains well off its low from last year – and is only modestly lower than it was on average during most of the 2018/2019 period. Chart I-11China Is Slowing, And Policy Has Not Yet Reversed Course August 2021 August 2021 Chart I-12The Recent RRR Cut Was Not The Start Of A Dovish PBOC Shift The Recent RRR Cut Was Not The Start Of A Dovish PBOC Shift The Recent RRR Cut Was Not The Start Of A Dovish PBOC Shift   The recent (slight) tick higher in China’s credit impulse is perhaps a sign that the worst of the credit slowdown has already occurred, but we do not expect a rising trend without a genuine shift toward a looser monetary policy stance. As such, a normalization in services spending in advanced economies remains the likely impulse for global growth over the coming year, at least over the coming three to six months. Investment Conclusions Chart I-13Assets That Benefit From Lower Yields May Remain Well-Bid In The Near Term Assets That Benefit From Lower Yields May Remain Well-Bid In The Near Term Assets That Benefit From Lower Yields May Remain Well-Bid In The Near Term The unprecedented nature of the pandemic, as well as the unclear impact the delta variant will have given prevailing rates of vaccination in advanced economies, has clouded the near-term economic outlook. It is unlikely that the delta variant of SARS-COV-2 will have a long-lasting impact on economic activity in advanced economies, but it does have the potential to cause the temporary reintroduction of some pandemic restrictions and, thus, modestly delay the transition to a post-pandemic state. While long-term government bond yields are set to rise on a 12-month time horizon, financial assets that are negatively correlated with long-term bond yields could remain well-bid over the next few months. Chart I-13 highlights that cyclical equity sectors have underperformed defensive equity sectors over the past month, and banks have underperformed the overall index. The correlation between long-maturity real Treasury yields and the relative performance of value and growth stocks has also held up, with growth stocks outperforming since the end of March. Global ex-US equities have also underperformed US stocks, and the dollar has modestly risen. On a 12-month time horizon, we would recommend that investors position for a reversal of all these recent moves. However, for investors more focused on the near term, we would note the potential for further underperformance of cyclical sectors, value stocks, international equities, and most global ex-US currencies versus the US dollar – depending heavily on the evolution of the medical situation in the US and the subsequent response from policymakers. This underscores that cyclical investment strategy will be even more data dependent than usual throughout the second half of the calendar year. The pace of nonfarm payrolls growth in the US remains the single most important data release driving US monetary policy, and investors should especially focus on whether jobs growth this fall is consistent with the Fed’s maximum employment objective, as the impact of the delta variant becomes clearer, as constraints to labor supply are removed, and as employees progressively return to work. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst July 29, 2021 Next Report: August 26, 2021 II. The Social Media Magnification Effect: Austerity, Populism, And Slower Growth Investors should view social media as a technological innovation with negative productivity growth. Social media has contributed to policy mistakes – such as fiscal austerity and protectionism – that have acted as shocks to aggregate demand over the past 15 years. The cyclical component of productivity was long lasting in nature during the last economic expansion. Forces that negatively impact economic growth but do not change the factors of production necessarily reduce measured productivity, and repeated policy mistakes strongly contributed to the slow growth profile of the last economic cycle. Political polarization in a rapidly changing world is the root cause of these policy shocks, but social media likely facilitated and magnified them. The risks of additional mistakes from populism remain present, even before considering other risks to society from social media: a reduction in mental health among young social media users, and the role that social media has played in spreading misinformation. A potential revival in protectionist sentiment is a risk to a constructive cyclical view that we will be closely monitoring over the coming 12-24 months. Investors with concentrated positions in social media stocks should be aware of the potential idiosyncratic risks facing these companies from the public’s impression of the impact of social media on society – especially if social media companies come to be widely associated with political gridlock, the polarization of society, and failed economic policies (as already appears to be the case). Investors should view social media as a technological innovation with negative productivity growth. Social media has contributed to policy mistakes – such as fiscal austerity and protectionism – that have acted as shocks to aggregate demand over the past 15 years. Political polarization in a rapidly changing world is the root cause of these policy shocks, but social media likely facilitated and magnified them. While the risk of premature fiscal consolidation appears low today compared to the 2010-14 period, the pandemic and its aftermath could force the Biden administration or Congressional Democrats toward protectionist or otherwise populist actions over the coming year in the lead up to the 2022 mid-term elections. The midterms, for their part, are expected to bring gridlock back into US politics, which could remove fiscal options should the economy backslide. Frequent shocks during the last economic expansion reinforced the narrative of secular stagnation. In the coming years, any additional policy shocks following a return to economic normality will again be seen by both investors and the Fed as strong justification for low interest rates – despite the case for cyclically and structurally higher bond yields. In addition, investors with concentrated positions in social media companies should take seriously the long-term idiosyncratic risks facing these stocks. These risks stem from the public’s impression of the impact of social media on society, particularly if social media comes to be widely associated with political gridlock, the polarization of society, and failed economic policies. A Brief History Of Social Media The earliest social networking websites date back to the late 1990s, but the most influential social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, originated in the mid-2000s. Prior to the advent of modern-day smartphones, user access to platforms such as Facebook and Twitter was limited to the websites of these platforms (desktop access). Following the release of the first iPhone in June 2007, however, mobile social media applications became available, allowing users much more convenient access to these platforms. Charts II-1 and II-2 highlight the impact that smartphones have had on the spread of social media, especially since the release of the iPhone 3G in 2008. In 2006, Facebook had roughly 12 million monthly active users; by 2009, this number had climbed to 360 million, growing to over 600 million the year after. Twitter, by contrast, grew somewhat later, reaching 100 million monthly active users in Q3 2011. Chart II-1Facebook: Monthly Active Users August 2021 August 2021 Chart II-2Twitter: Monthly Active Users Worldwide August 2021 August 2021   Social media usage is more common among those who are younger, but Chart II-3 highlights that usage has risen over time for all age groups. As of Q1 2021, 81% of Americans aged 30-49 reported using at least one social media website, compared to 73% of those aged 50-64 and 45% of those aged 65 and over. Chart II-4 highlights that the usage of Twitter skews in particular toward the young, and that, by contrast, Facebook and YouTube are the social media platforms of choice among older Americans. Chart II-3A Sizeable Majority Of US Adults Regularly Use Social Media A Sizeable Majority Of US Adults Regularly Use Social Media A Sizeable Majority Of US Adults Regularly Use Social Media Chart II-4Older Americans Use Facebook Far More Than Twitter August 2021 August 2021 Chart II-5Social Media Has Changed The Way People Consume News August 2021 August 2021 As a final point documenting the development and significance of social media, Chart II-5 highlights that more Americans now report consuming news often (roughly once per day) from a smartphone, computer, or tablet other than from television. Radio and print have been completely eclipsed as sources of frequent news. The major news publications themselves are often promoted through social media, but the rise of the Internet has weighed heavily on the journalism industry. Social media has, for better and for worse, enabled the rapid proliferation of alternative news, citizen journalism, rumor, conspiracy theories, and foreign disinformation. The Link Between Social Media And Post-GFC Austerity Following the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC), there have been at least five deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to the US and global economies that have contributed to the disconnection between growth and interest rates: A prolonged period of US household deleveraging from 2008-2014 The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis Fiscal austerity in the US, UK, and Euro Area from 2010 – 2012/2014 The US dollar / oil price shock of 2014 The rise of populist economic policies, such as the UK decision to leave the European Union, and the US-initiated trade war of 2018-2019. Among these shocks to growth, social media has had a clear impact on two of them. In the case of austerity in the aftermath of the Great Recession, a sharp rise in fiscal conservatism in 2009 and 2010, emblematized by the rise of the US Tea Party, profoundly affected the 2010 US midterm elections. It is not surprising that there was a fiscally conservative backlash following the crisis: the US budget deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio soared after the economy collapsed and the government enacted fiscal stimulus to bail out the banking system. And midterm elections in the US often lead to significant gains for the opposition party However, Tea Party supporters rapidly took up a new means of communicating to mobilize politically, and there is evidence that this contributed to their electoral success. Chart II-6 illustrates that the number of tweets with the Tea Party hashtag rose significantly in 2010 in the lead-up to the election, which saw the Republican Party take control of the House of Representatives as well as the victory of several Tea Party-endorsed politicians. Table II-1 highlights that Tea Party candidates, who rode the wave of fiscal conservatism, significantly outperformed Democrats and non-Tea Party Republicans in the use of Twitter during the 2010 campaign, underscoring that social media use was a factor aiding outreach to voters. Chart II-6Tea Party Supporters Rapidly Adopted Social Media To Mobilize Politically Tea Party Supporters Rapidly Adopted Social Media To Mobilize Politically Tea Party Supporters Rapidly Adopted Social Media To Mobilize Politically Table II-1Tea Party Candidates Significantly Outperformed In Their Use Of Social Media August 2021 August 2021   And while it is more difficult to analyze the use and impact of Facebook by Tea Party candidates and supporters owing to inherent differences in the structure of the Facebook platform, interviews with core organizers of both the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements have noted that activists in these ideologically opposed groups viewed Facebook as the most important social networking service for their political activities.2 Under normal circumstances, we agree that fiscal policy should be symmetric, with reduced fiscal support during economic expansions following fiscal easing during recessions. But in the context of multi-year household deleveraging, the fiscal drag that occurred in following the 2010 midterm elections was clearly a policy mistake. This mistake occurred partially under full Democratic control of government and especially under a gridlocked Congress after 2010. Chart II-7 highlights that the contribution to growth from government spending turned sharpy negative in 2010 and continued to subtract from growth for some time thereafter. In addition, panel of Chart II-7 highlights that the US economic policy uncertainty index rose in 2010 after falling during the first year of the recovery, reaching a new high in 2011 during the Tea Party-inspired debt ceiling crisis. Chart II-7The Fiscal Drag That Followed The 2010 Midterm Elections Was A Clear Policy Mistake The Fiscal Drag That Followed The 2010 Midterm Elections Was A Clear Policy Mistake The Fiscal Drag That Followed The 2010 Midterm Elections Was A Clear Policy Mistake Chart II-8Policy Mistakes Significantly Contributed To Last Cycle's Subpar Growth Profile Policy Mistakes Significantly Contributed To Last Cycle's Subpar Growth Profile Policy Mistakes Significantly Contributed To Last Cycle's Subpar Growth Profile In addition to the negative impact of government spending on economic growth, this extreme uncertainty very likely damaged confidence in the economic recovery, contributing to the subpar pace of growth in the first half of the last economic expansion. Chart II-8 highlights the weak evolution in real per capita GDP from 2009-2019 compared with previous economic cycles, which was caused by a prolonged household balance sheet recovery process that was made worse by policy mistakes. To be sure, the UK and the EU did not have a Tea Party, and yet political elites imposed fiscal austerity. It is also the case that President Obama was the first president to embrace social media as a political and public relations tool. So it cannot be said that either social media or the Republican Party are uniquely to blame for the policy mistakes of that era. But US fiscal policy would have been considerably looser in the 2010s if not for the Tea Party backlash, which was partly enabled by social media. Too tight of fiscal policy in turn fed populism and produced additional policy mistakes down the road. From Fiscal Drag To Populism While social media is clearly not the root cause of the recent rise of populist policies, it has had a hand in bringing them about – in both a direct and indirect manner. The indirect link between social media use and the rise in populist policies has mainly occurred through the highly successful use of social media by international terrorist organizations (chiefly ISIL) and its impact on sentiment toward immigration in several developed market economies. Chart II-9Terrorism And Immigration Likely Contributed To Brexit Terrorism And Immigration Likely Contributed To Brexit Terrorism And Immigration Likely Contributed To Brexit Chart II-9 highlights that public concerns about immigration and race in the UK began to rise sharply in 2012, in lockstep with both the rise in UK immigrants from EU accession countries and a series of events: the Syrian refugee crisis, the establishment and reign of the Islamic State, and three major terrorist attacks in European countries for which ISIL claimed responsibility. Given that the main argument for “Brexit” was for the UK to regain control over its immigration policies, these events almost certainly increased UK public support for withdrawing from the EU. In other words, it is not clear that Brexit would have occurred (at least at that moment in time) without these events given the narrow margin of victory for the “leave” campaign. The absence of social media would not have prevented the rise of ISIL, as that occurred in response to the US’s precipitous withdrawal from Iraq. The inevitable rise of ISIL would still have generated a backlash against immigration. Moreover, fiscal austerity in the UK and EU also fed other grievances that supported the Brexit movement. But social media accelerated and amplified the entire process.  Chart II-10Brexit Weakened UK Economic Performance Prior To The Pandemic Brexit Weakened UK Economic Performance Prior To The Pandemic Brexit Weakened UK Economic Performance Prior To The Pandemic Chart II-10 presents fairly strong evidence that Brexit weakened UK economic performance relative to the Euro Area prior to the pandemic, with the exception of the 2018-2019 period. In this period Euro Area manufacturing underperformed during the Trump administration’s trade war as a result of its comparatively higher exposure to automobile production and its stronger ties to China. Panel 2 highlights that GBP-EUR fell sharply in advance of the referendum, and remains comparatively weak today. Turning to the US, Donald Trump’s election as US President in 2016 was aided by both the direct and indirect effects of social media. In terms of indirect effects, Trump benefited from similar concerns over immigration and terrorism that caused the UK to leave the EU: Chart II-11 highlights that terrorism and foreign policy were second and third on the list of concerns of registered voters in mid-2016, and Chart II-12 highlights that voters regarded Trump as the better candidate to defend the US against future terrorist attacks. Chart II-11Terrorism Ranked Highly As An Issue In The 2016 US Election August 2021 August 2021 Chart II-12Voters Regarded Trump As Better Equipped To Defend Against Terrorism August 2021 August 2021 Trump’s election; and the enactment of populist policies under his administration, were directly aided by Trump’s active use of social media (mainly Twitter) to boost his candidacy. Chart II-13 highlights that there were an average of 15-20 tweets per day from Trump’s Twitter account from 2013-2015, and 80% of those tweets occurred before he announced his candidacy for president in June 2015. This strongly underscores that Trump mainly used Twitter to lay the groundwork for his candidacy as an unconventional political outsider rather than as a campaign tool itself, which distinguishes his use of social media from that of other politicians. In other words, new technology disrupted the “good old boys’ club” of traditional media and elite politics. Some policies of the Trump administration were positive for financial markets, and it is fair to say that Trump fired up animal spirits to some extent: Chart II-14 highlights that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act caused a significant rise in stock market earnings per share. But the Trump tax cuts were a conventional policy pushed mostly by the Congressional leadership of the Republican Party, and they did not meaningfully boost economic growth. Chart II-15 highlights that, while the US ISM manufacturing index rose sharply in the first year of Trump’s administration, an uptrend was already underway prior to the election as a result of a significant improvement in Chinese credit growth and a recovery in oil prices after the devastating collapse that took place in 2014-2015. Chart II-13Trump Used Twitter To Lay The Groundwork For His Candidacy Trump Used Twitter To Lay The Groundwork For His Candidacy Trump Used Twitter To Lay The Groundwork For His Candidacy Chart II-14The Trump Tax Cuts A Huge Rise In Corporate Earnings The Trump Tax Cuts A Huge Rise In Corporate Earnings The Trump Tax Cuts A Huge Rise In Corporate Earnings   Chart II-15But The Tax Cuts Did Not Do Much To Boost Growth But The Tax Cuts Did Not Do Much To Boost Growth But The Tax Cuts Did Not Do Much To Boost Growth Similarly, Chart II-15 highlights that the Trump trade war does not bear the full responsibility of the significant slowdown in growth in 2019, as China’s credit impulse decelerated significantly between the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and the onset of the trade war because Chinese policymakers turned to address domestic concerns. Chart II-16The Trade War Caused An Explosion In Global Trade Uncertainty The Trade War Caused An Explosion In Global Trade Uncertainty The Trade War Caused An Explosion In Global Trade Uncertainty But Chart II-16 highlights that the aggressive imposition of tariffs, especially between the US and China, caused an explosion in trade uncertainty even when measured on an equally-weighted basis (i.e., when overweighting trade uncertainty, in countries other than the US and China), which undoubtedly weighed on the global economy and contributed to a very significant slowdown in US jobs growth in 2019 (panel 2). Moreover, Chinese policymakers responded to the trade onslaught by deleveraging, which weighed on the global economy; and consolidating their grip on power at home. In essence, Trump was a political outsider who utilized social media to bypass the traditional media and make his case to the American people. Other factors contributed to his surprising victory, not the least of which was the austerity-induced, slow-growth recovery in key swing states. While US policy was already shifting to be more confrontational toward China, the Trump administration was more belligerent in its use of tariffs than previous administrations. The trade war thus qualifies as another policy shock that was facilitated by the existence of social media. Viewing Social Media As A Negative Productivity-Innovation A rise in fiscal conservatism leading to misguided austerity, the UK’s decision to leave the European Union, and the Trump administration’s trade war have represented significant non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies over the past 12 years. These shocks strongly contributed to the subpar growth profile of the last economic expansion, as demonstrated above. Chart II-17Policy Mistakes, Partially Enabled By Social Media, Reduced Productivity During The Last Expansion Policy Mistakes, Partially Enabled By Social Media, Reduced Productivity During The Last Expansion Policy Mistakes, Partially Enabled By Social Media, Reduced Productivity During The Last Expansion Given the above, it is reasonable for investors to view social media as a technological innovation with negative productivity growth, given that it has facilitated policy mistakes during the last economic expansion. Chart II-17 underscores this point, by highlighting that multi-factor productivity growth has been extremely weak in the post-GFC environment. While productivity is usually driven by supply-side factors over the longer term, it has a cyclical component to it – and in the case of the last economic expansion, the cyclical component was long lasting in nature. Any forces negatively impacting economic growth that do not change the factors of production necessarily reduce measured productivity; it is for this reason that measured productivity declines during recessions; and policy mistakes negatively impact productivity growth. The Risk Of Aggressive Austerity Seems Low Today… Chart II-18State & Local Government Finances Are In Much Better Shape Today State & Local Government Finances Are In Much Better Shape Today State & Local Government Finances Are In Much Better Shape Today Fiscal austerity in the early phase of the last economic cycle was the first social media-linked shock that we identified, but the risk of aggressive austerity appears low today. Much of the fiscal drag that occurred in the aftermath of the global financial crisis happened because of insufficient financial support to state and local governments – and the subsequent refusal by Congress to authorize more aid. But Chart II-18 highlights that state and local government finances have already meaningfully recovered, on the back of bipartisan stimulus in 2020, while the American Rescue Plan provides significant additional funding. While it is true that US fiscal policy is set to detract from growth over the coming 6-12 months, this will merely reflect the unwinding of fiscal aid that had aimed to support household income temporarily lost, as a result of a drastic reduction in services spending. As we noted in last month’s report,3 goods spending will likely slow as fiscal thrust turns to fiscal drag, but services spending will improve meaningfully – aided not just by a post-pandemic normalization in economic activity, but also by the deployment of some of the sizable excess savings that US households have accumulated over the past year. Fiscal drag will also occur outside of the US next year. For example, the IMF is forecasting a two percentage point increase in the Euro Area’s cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance, which would represent the largest annual increase over the past two decades. But here too the reduction in government spending will reflect the end of pandemic-related income support, and is likely to occur alongside a positive private-sector services impulse. During the worst of the Euro Area sovereign debt crisis, the impact of austerity was especially acute because it was persistent, and it occurred while the output gap was still large in several Euro Area economies. Chart II-19 highlights that Euro Area fiscal consolidation from 2010-2013 was negatively correlated with economic activity during that period, and Chart II-20 highlights that, with the potential exception of Spain, this austerity does not appear to have led to subsequently stronger rates of growth. Chart II-19Euro Area Austerity Lowered Growth During The Consolidation Phase… August 2021 August 2021 Chart II-20…And Did Not Seem To Subsequently Raise Growth August 2021 August 2021   This experiment in austerity led the IMF to conclude that fiscal multipliers are indeed large during periods of substantial economic slack, constrained monetary policy, and synchronized fiscal adjustment across numerous economies.4 Similarly, attitudes about austerity have shifted among policymakers globally in the wake of the populist backlash. Given this, despite the significant increase in government debt levels that has occurred as a result of the pandemic, we strongly doubt that advanced economies will attempt to engage in additional austerity prematurely, i.e., before unemployment rates have returned close-to steady-state levels. …But The Risk Of Protectionism And Other Populist Measures Looms Large The role that social media has played at magnifying populist policies should be concerning for investors, especially given that there has been a rising trend towards populism over the past 20 years. In a recent paper, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch have compiled a cross-country database on populism dating back to 1900, defining populist leaders as those who employ a political strategy focusing on the conflict between “the people” and “the elites.” Chart II-21 highlights that the number of populist governments worldwide has risen significantly since the 1980s and 1990s, and Chart II-22 highlights that the economic performance of countries with populist leaders is clearly negative. Chart II-21Populism Has Been On The Rise For The Past 30 Years August 2021 August 2021 The authors found that countries’ real GDP growth underperformed by approximately one percentage point per year after a populist leader comes to power, relative to both the country’s own long-term growth rate and relative to the prevailing level of global growth. To control for the potential causal link between economic growth and the rise of populist leaders, Chart II-23 highlights the results of a synthetic control method employed by the authors that generates a similar conclusion to the unconditional averages shown in Chart II-22: populist economic policies are significantly negative for real economic growth. Chart II-22Populist Leaders Are Clearly Growth Killers Even After… August 2021 August 2021 Chart II-23… Controlling For The Odds That Weak Growth Leads To Populism August 2021 August 2021 Chart II-24Inequality: The Most Important Structural Cause Of Populism And Polarization Inequality: The Most Important Structural Cause Of Populism And Polarization Inequality: The Most Important Structural Cause Of Populism And Polarization This is especially concerning given that wealth and income inequality, perhaps the single most important structural cause of rising populism and political polarization, is nearly as elevated as it was in the 1920s and 1930s (Chart II-24). This trend, at least in the US, has been exacerbated by a decline in public trust of mainstream media among independents and Republicans that began in the early 2000s and helped to fuel the public’s adoption of alternative news and social media. The decline in trust clearly accelerated as a result of erroneous reporting on what turned out to be nonexistent weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and other controversies of the Bush administration. Chart II-21 showed that the rise in populism has also yet to abate, suggesting that social media has the potential to continue to amplify policy mistakes for the foreseeable future. It is not yet clear what economic mistakes will occur under the Biden administration, but investors should not rule out the possibility of policies that are harmful for growth. The likely passage of a bipartisan infrastructure bill or a partisan reconciliation bill in the second half of this year will most likely be the final word on fiscal policy until at least 2025,5 underscoring that active fiscal austerity is not likely a major risk to investors. Spending levels will probably freeze after 2022: Republicans will not be able to slash spending, and Democrats will not be able to hike spending or taxes, if Republicans win at least one chamber of Congress in the midterms (as is likely). Biden has preserved the most significant of Trump’s protectionist policies by maintaining US import tariffs against China, and the lesson from the Tea Party’s surge following the global financial crisis is that major political shifts, magnified by social media, can manifest themselves as policy with the potential to impact economic activity within a two-year window. Attitudes toward China have shifted negatively around the world because of deindustrialization and now the pandemic.6 White collar workers in DM countries have clearly fared better during lockdowns than those of lower-income households. This has created extremely fertile ground for a revival in populist sentiment, which could force the Biden administration or Congressional Democrats toward protectionist or otherwise populist actions over the coming year, in the lead up to the 2022 mid-term elections. Investment Conclusions In this report, we have documented the historical link between social media, populism, and policy mistakes during the last economic expansion. It is clear that neither social media nor even populism is solely responsible for all mistakes – the UK’s and EU’s ill-judged foray into austerity was driven by elites. Furthermore, we have not addressed in this report the impact of populism on actions of emerging markets, such as China and Russia, whose own behavior has dealt disinflationary blows to the global economy. Nevertheless, populism is a potent force that clearly has the power to harness new technology and deliver shocks to the global economy and financial markets. The risks of additional mistakes from populism are still present, and that is even before considering other risks to society from social media: a reduction in mental health among young social media users, and the role that social media has played in spreading misinformation – contributing to the vaccine hesitancy in some DM countries that we discussed in Section 1 of our report. Two investment conclusions emerge from our analysis. First, we noted in our April report that there is a chance that investor expectations for the natural rate of interest (“R-star”) will rise once the economy normalizes post-pandemic, but that this will likely not occur as long as investors continue to believe in the narrative of secular stagnation. Despite the fact that the past decade’s shocks occurred against the backdrop of persistent household deleveraging (which has ended in the US), these shocks reinforced that narrative, and any additional policy shocks following a return to economic normality will again be seen by both investors and the Fed as strong justification for low interest rates. Thus, while the rapid closure of output gaps in advanced economies over the coming year argues for both cyclically and structurally higher bond yields, a revival in protectionist sentiment is a risk to this view that we will be closely monitoring over the coming 12-24 months. Chart II-25The Underperformance Of Social Media Would Not Excessively Weigh On The Broad Market The Underperformance Of Social Media Would Not Excessively Weigh On The Broad Market The Underperformance Of Social Media Would Not Excessively Weigh On The Broad Market Second, for tech investors, the bipartisan shift in public sentiment to become more critical of social media companies is gradually becoming a real risk, potentially affecting user growth. Based solely on Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, and Snapchat, social media companies do not account for a very significant share of the overall equity market (Chart II-25), suggesting that the impact of a negative shift in sentiment toward social media companies would not be an overly significant event for equity investors in general. Chart II-25 highlights that the share of social media companies as a percent of the broad tech sector rises if Google is included; YouTube accounts for less than 15% of Google’s total advertising revenue, however, suggesting modest additional exposure beyond the solid line in Chart II-25. Still, investors with concentrated positions in social media stocks should be aware of the potential idiosyncratic risks facing social media companies as a result of the public’s impression of the impact of social media on society. If social media companies come to be widely associated with political gridlock, the polarization of society, and failed economic policies (as already appears to be the case), then the fundamental performance of these stocks is likely to be quite poor regardless of whether or not tech companies ultimately enjoy a relatively friendly regulatory environment under the Biden administration. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has aggressively retreated from its high last year, reflecting a meaningful recovery in government bond yields since last August. The indicator still remains above the boom/bust line, however, highlighting that monetary policy remains supportive for risky asset prices. Forward equity earnings are pricing in a substantial further rise in earnings per share, but for now there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions remain very strong, and positive earnings surprises have risen to their highest levels on record. Within a global equity portfolio, global ex-US equities have underperformed alongside cyclical sectors, banks, and value stocks more generally. On a 12-month time horizon, we would recommend that investors position for the underperformance of financial assets that are negatively correlated with long-maturity government bond yields. But investors more focused on the near term, we would note the potential for further underperformance of cyclical sectors, value stocks, international equities, and most global ex-US currencies versus the US dollar – depending heavily on the evolution of the medical situation in the US and the subsequent response from policymakers. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has fallen sharply since mid-March. This decline was initially caused by waning growth momentum, but has since morphed into concern about the impact of the delta variant of SARS-COV-2 and the implications for US monetary policy. 10-year Treasury yields are well below the fair value implied by a mid-2023 rate hike scenario, underscoring that the recent decline in long-maturity yields is overdone. The extreme rise in some commodity prices over the past several months has eased. Lumber prices have normalized, whereas industrial metals have moved mostly sideways since late-April and agricultural prices remain 13% below their early-May high. We had previously argued that a breather in commodity prices was likely at some point over the coming several months, and we would expect further declines in some commodity prices as supply chains normalize, labor supply recovers, and Chinese demand for metals slows. US and global LEIs remain very elevated, but are starting to roll over. Our global LEI diffusion index has declined very significantly, but this likely reflects the outsized impact of a few emerging market countries (whose vaccination progress is still lagging). Still-strong leading and coincident indicators underscore that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly at some point over the coming year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4US Stock Market Breadth US Stock Market Breadth US Stock Market Breadth Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report “Moderate Releveraging And Currency Stability: An Impossible Dream?” dated September 5, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Grassroots Organizing in the Digital Age: Considering Values and Technology in Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street by Agarwal, Barthel, Rost, Borning, Bennett, and Johnson, Information, Communication & Society, 2014. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst “July 2021,” dated June 24, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 4 “Are We Underestimating Short-Term Fiscal Multipliers?” IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2012 5 Please see US Political Strategy Outlook "Third Quarter Outlook 2021: Game Time," dated June 30, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 6 “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries,” PEW Research Center, October 2020.

Highlights Portfolio Duration: The decline in US bond yields is overdone. We anticipate that strong US employment data will catalyze a jump in bond yields this fall and that the 10-year US Treasury yield will reach a range of 2% - 2.25% by the time that the Fed is ready to lift rates, likely by the end of 2022. Maintain below-benchmark duration in bond portfolios. US Yield Curve: Investors should position for a rebound in bond yields but not a reversal of recent US Treasury curve flattening. In fact, we advocate owning 2/10 flatteners on the US Treasury curve as we see ample room for further curve flattening as Fed rate hikes approach in late-2022. ECB: The ECB’s new forward interest rate guidance has moved it that much closer to the Fed’s ultra-accommodative stance. This reinforces the defensive nature of the European bond market. Investors should overweight European bonds within global fixed income portfolios with a particular emphasis on peripheral European bond markets like Italy and Spain. Feature Chart 1Can The Bond Rally Continue? Can The Bond Rally Continue? Can The Bond Rally Continue? The bond rally continues to rip. The selloff that started last August when Jay Powell officially announced the Federal Reserve’s adoption of an Average Inflation Target ended on March 31st 2021. Since then, the 10-year US Treasury yield has retraced from 1.74% to 1.29% and the Bloomberg Barclays US Treasury index has clawed back 285 bps of excess return versus cash, partially offsetting the 465 bps that were lost between August 2020 and March 2021 (Chart 1). The US Bond Strategy Weekly Report from two weeks ago and last week’s Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report both discuss the reasons for recent bond market strength.1 We won’t re-hash those arguments this week except to reiterate our conclusion that the decline in US bond yields is overdone. We anticipate that strong US employment data will catalyze a jump in bond yields this fall and that the 10-year US Treasury yield will reach a range of 2% - 2.25% by the time that the Fed is ready to lift rates, likely by the end of 2022. The first section of this week’s report looks at whether correlations between different asset classes have held up during the recent bond rally, with a focus on whether those relationships give us any information about the near-term direction for bond yields. The second section considers the outlook for the slope of the US Treasury curve and the third section discusses the recently released results of the European Central Bank’s strategy review. Cross-Market Correlations During The Bond Rally The bond rally has been just as intense as the prior sell-off. The US Treasury index has outperformed a position in cash by an annualized 9% since March 31st, matching the annualized losses of 9% seen between August 2020 and March 2021 (Chart 2). An important question to answer is whether this bond market performance is consistent with other asset classes. If it is, then it may suggest that the economy is experiencing a deflationary episode and that bond yields have further downside. If it isn’t, then it is more likely that the drop in bond yields will be temporary. Chart 2Bonds Versus Credit And Equities Bonds Versus Credit And Equities Bonds Versus Credit And Equities Bonds Versus Equities And Corporate Credit Chart 3Equity Sector Performance Consistent With Yields Equity Sector Performance Consistent With Yields Equity Sector Performance Consistent With Yields Looking first at corporate bonds, we find that – consistent with stronger Treasury performance – excess US corporate bond returns have slowed since March 31st. Baa-rated corporates have been outperforming at an annualized rate of 3% since March 31st compared to an annualized rate of 12% between August 2020 and March 2021 (Chart 2, panel 2). Equities, on the other hand, have maintained their strong performance. The S&P 500 returned an annualized 30% between August 2020 and March 2021 and has returned an even greater 42% (annualized) since the end of March (Chart 2, panel 3). Extremely tight spreads are the most likely explanation for lower corporate bond excess returns. Meanwhile, the fact that equities continue to perform well is an indication that the drop in bond yields may be overdone. Interestingly, while overall equity returns haven’t dropped in line with bond yields, the relative performance of equity sectors has been totally consistent with the movement in yields (Chart 3). Cyclical equity sectors (Industrials, Energy and Materials) have underperformed defensive equity sectors (Healthcare, Telecoms, Consumer Staples and Utilities) and Banks have underperformed the overall index. The correlation between long-maturity real Treasury yields and the relative performance of value and growth stocks has also held up, with growth stocks outperforming since the end of March (Chart 3, bottom panel). Bonds Versus Commodities Chart 4Commodities And Bonds Have Diverged Commodities And Bonds Have Diverged Commodities And Bonds Have Diverged We see the biggest divergence in relative performance between bond yields and commodities. Historically, the ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials commodity price index and Gold is tightly correlated with the 10-year US Treasury yield. However, the CRB/Gold ratio has increased since the end of March while bond yields have fallen (Chart 4). In our view, this is the strongest piece of evidence suggesting that bond yields have overshot to the downside. Bonds Versus Currencies Chart 5Bonds Versus Currencies Bonds Versus Currencies Bonds Versus Currencies Finally, we observe that the US dollar has strengthened as bond yields have dropped. This is not that unusual. There are other periods when significant declines in US bond yields have coincided with dollar strength, 2019 and 2014/15 immediately come to mind (Chart 5). The common theme of those prior episodes is that the global economy was experiencing a deflationary shock. Commodity prices also fell during those periods and Emerging Market (EM) currencies depreciated versus the dollar. However, so far this year, EM currencies have held firm versus the dollar (Chart 5, bottom panel) and commodity prices continue to rise. On balance, financial markets don’t appear to be pricing-in a deflationary economic shock. In summary, since US Treasury yields peaked on March 31st, we have observed a sector rotation within US equities, but overall stock market performance has been strong. Corporate bonds continue to outperform Treasuries, though gains are limited by tight valuations. Commodity prices have held up and while the US dollar has firmed, dollar strength has not bled into EM currency weakness. All in all, we don’t view financial market performance as consistent with a deflationary economic episode. This suggests that bond yields are an outlier within the financial landscape and that the recent drop in yields won’t persist. A Quick Word On Sentiment And Positioning Chart 6A Rebound In Yields May Require A Shift In Sentiment A Rebound In Yields May Require A Shift In Sentiment A Rebound In Yields May Require A Shift In Sentiment One possible reason why bond performance has been inconsistent with some other markets is that there had simply been too much consensus around the “bond-bearish trade”. It’s certainly true that portfolio managers have been running large net-short positions and that the MarketVane survey of bond bullish sentiment is much less bullish than it was last year (Chart 6). We suspect that we may need to see bond market positioning and sentiment get more bullish before yields move meaningfully higher. Chart 6 shows that major troughs in the 30-year US Treasury yield often occur when portfolio manager positioning is “net long” bonds and when bond bullish sentiment is significantly higher than current levels. For this reason, we don’t anticipate an immediate rebound in bond yields. Rather, we suspect that yields will remain near current levels for the next month or two before strong employment data in the fall sets off the next phase of bearish bond action.   Position For A Rebound In Bond Yields, But Don’t Expect Much Curve Steepening Chart 7The 5-Year/5-Year Yield Remains Close To Target The 5-Year/5-Year Yield Remains Close To Target The 5-Year/5-Year Yield Remains Close To Target We see bond yields re-gaining their March 2021 highs, and then some, on a 6-12 month investment horizon. However, we don’t think this rebound in yields will coincide with a significant re-steepening of the US Treasury curve. For context, the 2/10 US Treasury slope peaked at 159 bps near the end of March. It is currently 51 bps lower, at 108 bps. We can categorize periods of yield curve steepening as falling into two categories. Bull-steepening: The curve steepens as yields fall. This tends to occur when the Fed is cutting interest rates. Bear-steepening: The curve steepens as yields rise. We can identify these periods as being when the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield rises from low levels toward its fair value range. Since 2012, we can identify a fair value range for the 5-year/5-year forward US Treasury yield using survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate. At present, the fair value range from the New York Fed’s Survey of Primary Dealers is from 2.06% to 2.50%, with a median of 2.31%. The fair value range from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants is from 1.75% to 2.50%, with a median of 2.00%. The 5-year/5-year forward US Treasury yield is currently 1.93% (Chart 7). We identify seven significant periods of 2/10 Treasury curve steepening since 2009 (Table 1). Six of those episodes were bear-steepening episodes that coincided with an increase in the 5-year/5-year yield, the other was a bull-steepening episode that coincided with Fed rate cuts in 2019/20. If we assume that our fair value ranges provide a reasonable target for how high the 5-year/5-year forward US Treasury yield can rise during the next bear-steepening move, it means that – at most – we could see an increase of 57 bps in the 5-year/5-year yield as it moves all the way up to the 2.50% top-end of our target ranges. A linear regression of changes in the 2/10 slope versus changes in the 5-year/5-year forward yield during the six bear-steepening episodes we identified suggests that a 57 bps increase in the 5-year/5-year yield would lead to 12 bps of 2/10 curve steepening (Chart 8). In fact, we can see in both Table 1 and Chart 8 that it would take about 100 bps of upside in the 5-year/5-year yield to bring the 2/10 slope back to its March highs. This is extremely unlikely. Table 1Periods Of US Treasury Curve Steepening In The Zero-Lower-Bound Era A Bump On The Road To Recovery A Bump On The Road To Recovery Chart 8Bear-Steepening Episodes Since 2009 A Bump On The Road To Recovery A Bump On The Road To Recovery   In fact, if the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield only rises back to the middle of its fair value range – somewhere between 2% and 2.31% - then our regression suggests that the yield curve slope will probably stay close to its current level. The bottom line is that while investors should position for a rebound in bond yields by keeping portfolio duration low, they should avoid US Treasury curve steepeners. In fact, we advocate owning 2/10 flatteners on the US Treasury curve as we see ample room for further curve flattening as Fed rate hikes approach in late-2022. The ECB’s New Guidance Solidifies The Defensive Nature Of European Bonds Last week, the European Central Bank (ECB) revised its forward rate guidance in light of its recently concluded Strategy Review.2 The ECB’s new rate guidance is as follows: In support of its symmetric two per cent inflation target and in line with its monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at their present or lower levels until it sees inflation reaching two per cent well ahead of the end of its projection horizon and durably for the rest of the projection horizon, and it judges that realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term. This may also imply a transitory period in which inflation is moderately above target.3   This may sound familiar, and it should. Though not explicitly an Average Inflation Target, the ECB has moved a long way toward the Federal Reserve’s new dovish reaction function. Specifically, both the ECB and Federal Reserve now acknowledge that a temporary period of above-2% inflation will be tolerated, if not explicitly sought. Also, both central banks have linked the timing of the first rate increase to some form of outcome-based forward guidance. The Federal Reserve has explicitly said that it will not lift rates until inflation is above 2% and the economy has reached “maximum employment”. The ECB now claims that interest rates won’t rise until inflation is seen reaching 2% “well ahead of its projection horizon”, a criterion that Christine Lagarde described as having an element of outcome-based guidance.4 The ECB’s new forward guidance may not be as explicitly dovish as the Fed’s. The ECB has no “maximum employment” target and its inflation trigger for lifting rates still relies on the Governing Council’s forecasts. But for investors, the big signal is that the ECB has recognized that the risk of tightening policy prematurely is greater than the risk of remaining on hold for too long. This gives us even more confidence that there will be no ECB tightening on the horizon, and we should continue to view European bond markets as being highly defensive. This is hardly news. European bond markets performed relatively well during the bearish bond episode that lasted from August 2020 to March 2021, they have then gained less than cyclical bond markets (like US and Canada) since March (Table 2). The ECB’s new reaction function ensures that this relationship will remain place for many years to come. Table 27-10 Year Government Bond Returns (In USD, %) A Bump On The Road To Recovery A Bump On The Road To Recovery The new reaction function is also a boon for peripheral European bond markets (like Italy and Spain) where yields trade at a spread above German bunds. The ECB’s commitment to staying dovish will only reinforce the downward pressure on peripheral European bond spreads versus Germany (Chart 9). Chart 9Grab The Extra Spread In Spanish And Italian Bonds Grab The Extra Spread In Spanish And Italian Bonds Grab The Extra Spread In Spanish And Italian Bonds The bottom line is that investors should continue to overweight European bonds within global fixed income portfolios, with a particular emphasis on peripheral European bond markets like Italy and Spain. The defensive nature of European bonds will protect investors from losses during the next move higher in global yields. Italian and Spanish bond markets may not perform quite as well during the next bond bear market as they did between August 2020 and March 2021, as spreads have already compressed a lot. But ultra-accommodative ECB policy will limit the amount of spread widening that can occur, making any additional spread worth grabbing.  Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Overreaction”, dated July 13, 2021 and Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Message From Falling US Bond Yields”, dated July 21, 2021. 2 The results of the Strategy Review itself are discussed in Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Reflationary Backdrop Is Still In Place”, dated July 14, 2021. 3 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ecb.mp210722~48dc3b436b.en.html 4 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2021/html/ecb.is210722~13e7f5e795.en.html Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations A Bump On The Road To Recovery A Bump On The Road To Recovery Treasury Index Returns A Bump On The Road To Recovery A Bump On The Road To Recovery Spread Product Returns A Bump On The Road To Recovery A Bump On The Road To Recovery

Highlights The decline in US Treasury yields has once again reduced the appeal of US paper, relative to foreign developed and emerging market bonds. Historically, lower US bond yields relative to other markets has been dollar bearish. The caveat is that if declining yields are due to a flight to safety, the dollar initially benefits due to US bond inflows. The academic research on which yields matter for currencies is mixed. Historically, short rates have mattered more. But with short-term interest rates anchored at zero, there is evidence investors are moving out the curve. Our bias is that looking across the yield curve will provide a more accurate picture of the countries that will benefit from bond inflows. More importantly, it is the sum of portfolio flows that drive a currency. This means equity flows will be important as well. Feature Global bond yields have rolled over, driven by the long end of the curve. The US 10-year yield has fallen from a high of 1.74% at the end of March to 1.29% today. While other bond yields have rolled over, the move has been more pronounced in the US. For example, the spread between the US 10-year Treasury and the 10-year German bund has narrowed from 200bps to 175bps. Given the correlation between relative interest rates – especially in real terms – and the dollar, a rare divergence has opened up in favor of short dollar positions (Chart I-1). A fall in yields can be driven by prospects of either slowing growth, lower inflation expectations, or a combination of the two. In the case of the US and to a certain extent the eurozone, the culprit behind lower yields has been a drop in both the real and the nominal component. This suggests that the markets are worried about central banks becoming too hawkish at the exact moment global growth is set to slow. Across maturities, the US yield curve has thus flattened (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Real Yields And Currencies Have Diverged Real Yields And Currencies Have Diverged Real Yields And Currencies Have Diverged Chart I-2Flattening Yield Curves Flattening Yield Curves Flattening Yield Curves A few questions arise from the setup above. How do you trade the dollar in the current environment? What is the future path for yields, especially relative yields? Should investors focus on a specific maturity as a signal for future currency moves? Finally, are yields the key driver of currencies in the current environment or should investors focus on other factors as well? Explaining Recent Dollar Strength Chart I-3Rising Demand For Hedges Rising Demand For Hedges Rising Demand For Hedges If the decline in rates globally has been led by the US, then why has the dollar remained strong? The first reason is rising safe-haven demand, especially as global growth peaks. Usually, as a counter-cyclical currency, the dollar benefits in a risk-off environment. The latest Treasury International Capital (TIC) data show that foreign inflows into US bonds have been part of the reason for the decline in Treasury yields since March. A reset in equity markets has also been a driver. The DXY index has been very closely correlated with the put-call ratio in the US, and increased demand for hedges, including long dollar positions, have benefited the greenback (Chart I-3). This has been consistent with the outperformance of the more defensive US equity market. The third reason has been a slowdown in relative economic momentum between the G10 and the US. Chart I-4 shows that the Citigroup economic surprise index for the euro area relative to the US remains strong but has rolled over. The story is similar using relative PMIs between the US and the rest of the G10. Relative economic performance has usually tended to dictate currency movements in the near term. Chart I-4Relative Economic Momentum Is Slowing Relative Economic Momentum Is Slowing Relative Economic Momentum Is Slowing Finally, as we highlighted a fortnight ago, the dollar was oversold and due for a tactical bounce. Leveraged funds have been covering their short positions in recent weeks, while speculators are now long the dollar (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Speculators Are Now Long The Dollar Speculators Are Now Long The Dollar Speculators Are Now Long The Dollar Going forward, most of these trends should reverse. While the Delta variant of COVID-19 is raging across countries, hospitalizations are low, and thus the case for renewed lockdowns is weak. Meanwhile, non-US growth should regain the upper hand, especially in countries like Japan where vaccinations are ramping up quite fast. Global yields should also rise, as output gaps close and inflation remains well anchored.             The Dollar And Interest Rates: Real Versus Nominal? As Chart 1 highlights, it is important to think about relative rates when looking for the next move in the dollar. The historical evidence is that there is little correlation between the dollar and the absolute level or direction of bond yields. Over the last few decades, global bond yields have collapsed while the dollar has undergone rolling bull and bear markets. Currencies react more to the path of relative real rates than nominal rates. By definition, a currency is the mechanism by which prices are equalized across borders. Rising inflation lowers the purchasing power of a currency, which in turn forces the currency to adjust lower in a globally competitive pricing system. Across the G10, there has been a longstanding relationship between real interest rate differentials and the path of the currency (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Negative Real Rates In The US Across The Curve Negative Real Rates In The US Across The Curve Negative Real Rates In The US Across The Curve Chart I-7The US Sports A Very Negative ##br##Real Yield Which Rates Matter For Currencies? Which Rates Matter For Currencies? Importantly, US real rates, especially at the short end of the curve, are very depressed. In fact, compared to other G10 countries, the US sports one of the worst 2-year real yields (Chart I-7). Based on the historical precedent illustrated in Chart I-6, a significant increase in US real rates is required to allow the dollar to rise on a structural basis. What About Hedged Yields? It is true that hedged yields in the US are positive for foreign investors. For example, hedged 10-year US yields for German bond investors provide 97 bps of pickup. For a Japanese investor, the yield pickup in the US is 96 bps, and for a British investor, it is 73 bps (Chart I-8A, Chart I-8B, Chart I-8C). Chart I-8BUS Hedged Yields For Japanese Investors US Hedged Yields For Japanese Investors US Hedged Yields For Japanese Investors Chart I-8AUS Hedged Yields For Euro Investors US Hedged Yields For Euro Investors US Hedged Yields For Euro Investors Chart I-8CUS Hedged Yields For British Investors US Hedged Yields For British Investors US Hedged Yields For British Investors   However, there is little correlation between the hedged yields and currency performance, and for good reason: Under covered interest rate parity, a hedged yield will be an arbitrage opportunity, which should be duly uncovered by efficient markets. This arbitrage window for hedged yields disappears if you extend the maturity of your hedging, as economic theory suggests. For example, hedging a 10-year bond with a 3-month currency forward can lead to massive losses as you roll over these contracts. This is because the cost of hedging in the short term tends to have wild fluctuations. For example, hedging in euros for a German investor buying Treasurys was over 300bps at the end of 2018. This wiped out the positive spread between the two bonds.  Many investors do not hedge currency exposure. In fact, the “least regrets” approach of hedging 50% of currency exposure has been quite popular.1 Therefore, focusing on the real yield, rather than the hedged or nominal yield (Chart I-9), has been a far more robust solution in gauging the direction of currencies. By definition, a hedged yield means buying a currency at spot and selling it forward. This should be currency neutral, and especially, arbitrage away the yield differential. Chart I-9Hedged Yields And Currencies: No Correlation Hedged Yields And Currencies: No Correlation Hedged Yields And Currencies: No Correlation Which Bond Yields Matter? The academic evidence suggests that short-term interest rates matter more for currencies, especially when policy is close to the zero bound. According to a BIS paper,2  not only has the FX impact of monetary policy grown significantly in the last few years, but short maturity bonds have had the strongest impact. Moreover, at a lower level of interest rates, the foreign-exchange impact is greater as the adjustment burden falls onto the exchange rate. Looking purely through the lens of the US dollar, our view is more nuanced. Foreign inflows into US long-term Treasurys have been improving tremendously, while flows into T-bills are relapsing (Chart I-10). This suggests longer-term rates have been a bigger driver of inflows into the US, and, more recently, the dollar rally. It is similar to what occurred at beginning of the dollar bull market last decade. Admittedly, the picture shifted over time, with shorter term flows becoming increasingly important as the Fed began to hike interest rates. Taking a step back, bond investors tend to span the duration spectrum, with pension funds investing in bonds many years out. As 1-year and 2-year yield differentials are not meaningfully different across countries (Chart I-11), this curtails the appeal of short-term paper. If inflation differentials are considered, it reduces the appeal of US paper even further. Chart I-10Long-Term Versus Short-Term Flows Long-Term Versus Short-Term Flows Long-Term Versus Short-Term Flows Chart I-11Narrow Gap In Short Term Yields Narrow Gap In Short Term Yields Narrow Gap In Short Term Yields Let’s not forget quantitative easing. If a central bank explicitly targets a bond yield near zero, like in Japan or Australia, that makes it difficult for that same yield tenor to generate positive inflows or send a reliable signal about the economy. This suggests a better method is looking at a spectrum of indicators, including yields at various maturities. Charts I-12 plots the yield differentials across maturities and countries. It shows that currencies have been correlated across the relative yield maturity spectrum. As such, we recommend investors monitor both short- and long-term yields in evaluating currency decisions. Chart I-12AYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12BYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12CYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12DYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12EYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12FYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12GYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12HYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Chart I-12IYield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities Yield Differentials Across Different Maturities    Other Asset Classes There are multiple drivers of exchange rates. Bond yields are just one of them. Equity and other flows also matter. It is the sum of portfolio flows that drive a currency. In fact, inflows into US equities and agency bonds have been the bigger drivers of the US dollar this year (Chart I-13). Outside the US, the correlation between interest rates and the currency can be very weak. The Canadian dollar is much more correlated with terms of trade than with real interest rate differentials. Rising oil prices attract inflows into Canadian corporate bonds and equities, which are positive for the currency. The key point is that flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns. As such, monitoring flows other than government bond purchases is important. We expect that yields will be higher on a cyclical horizon. This will be beneficial for cyclical stocks, especially banks. This will also be beneficial for flows into non-US bourses, that have a higher weighting of cyclical stocks..  In short, the US equity market has become very tech heavy. Rising interest rates will hurt higher duration sectors such as technology and health care. At the margin, this hurts the relative performance of US equities (Chart I-14). Given that equity inflows have been a key driver of the US dollar, this will also hurt at the margin Chart I-13Agency Bonds And Equity Purchases Have Driven US Inflows Agency Bonds And Equity Purchases Have Driven US Inflows Agency Bonds And Equity Purchases Have Driven US Inflows Chart I-14US Valuations Benefit From ##br##Lower Rates US Valuations Benefit From Lower Rates US Valuations Benefit From Lower Rates   Concluding Thoughts US real interest rates have deteriorated relative to the rest of the world. As such, it will require a significant rise in US real rates to seriously question a dollar bearish view. Meanwhile, a modest rise in global rates will also be bearish for US stocks compared to non-US bourses. US rates are usually high beta, and so could rise more in an improving growth environment. But relative rates are correlated to relative growth. As such, if non-US growth picks up relative to the US, like the IMF expects, this will provide a modest fillip to non-US yields (Chart I-15). US real rates are also very negative, so the bar to create a genuine dollar rally is very high. Finally, the market still expects the Federal Reserve to lead the hiking cycle. This means that there is still potential for an upside surprise in interest rates outside the US, compared to within (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Relative Bond Yields And Relative Economic Momentum Relative Bond Yields And Relative Economic Momentum Relative Bond Yields And Relative Economic Momentum Chart I-16The Market Is Still Relatively Hawkish On The Fed The Market Is Still Relatively Hawkish On The Fed The Market Is Still Relatively Hawkish On The Fed   Housekeeping Our long Scandinavian basket was triggered at our buy point of a -2% pullback from July 9th levels. As such, we are now short EUR/NOK, USD/NOK, EUR/SEK, and USD/SEK. We were also stopped out of our long silver/short gold position for a small loss. We will be looking to reopen this trade in the coming weeks.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Michenaud, S., and  Solnik, B., , “Applying regret theory to investment choices: Currency hedging decisions,” Journal of International Money and Finance 27, 2008, 677-694. 2 Ferrari, Massimo, Kearns, Jonathan and Schrimpf, Andreas, “Monetary policy’s rising FX impact in the era of ultra-low rates,” Bank of International Settlements, April 2017. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Data out of the US this week was mixed: June retail sales came in better than expected. The control group rose 1.1% month on month, versus a -1.4% decline in May. For July, the University of Michigan survey showed inflation expectations continue to edge higher, but the sentiment of current conditions and expectations was well below consensus. Inflows into US assets reversed in May, with net outflows of $30.2bn. Existing home sales rose by 1.4% month on month in June to 5.9 million units. The US dollar DXY index rose modestly this week. Technically, the dollar is now approaching overbought territory. Our intermediate-term indicator has broken above 60, speculators are now long the dollar and sentiment on the greenback has turned up at a time when real rates remain negative in the US. This suggests much optimism is in the price. Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Data out of the eurozone this week was robust: The trade balance came it at €9.4bn for May. Final June CPI was in line with expectations – 1.9% for headline and 0.9% for core. The ECB kept rates unchanged in their July 22 meeting, but added to their framework of forward guidance. The euro fell by 40bps this week. Following Christine Lagarde’s Bloomberg interview last week, the ECB made some policy changes. First, they will allow for an inflation overshoot should this be consistent with longer-term inflation at 2%. They will also likely extend the PEPP beyond the March deadline, so no tapering before then. Finally, interest rates are expected to remain negative as far as the eye can see. This is nudging the euro towards becoming a low-beta currency. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward - April 2, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 There was some positive news out of Japan this week: Exports rose 48.6% year on year in June. Imports also expanded at a 32.7% year-on-year pace, signaling rising domestic demand momentum. National CPI for June was in line with expectations. The core measure was at 0.2%. Supermarket sales continued to improve in June. The yen was down 0.3% against the dollar this week. The yen is the most shorted developed-market currency, and our intermediate-term indicator is at bombed-out levels. This is occurring at a time when domestic data is on the mend. This is bullish from a contrarian perspective. Report Links: The Case For Japan - June 11, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 There was some mixed data out of the UK this week: Rightmove house prices rose 5.7% year on year in July. The CBI survey was softer than expected in July. Total orders fell from 19 to 17, while the component of selling prices and business optimism fell 4 and 5 points respectively. The pound fell by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. Momentum on the pound continues to suggest near-term downside. Our intermediate term indicator is still blasting downward, and speculators are cutting their long positions from very aggressive levels. This suggests continued near-term downside in cable. Report Links: Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low? - March 10, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Thoughts On The British Pound - December 18, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Australia this week: NAB business confidence for Q2 fell from 19 to 17. The RBA minutes confirmed that the central bank will stay dovish in the near term. The AUD fell by 0.7% this week against the USD, the worst performing G10 currency. COVID-19 will continue to dictate near-term developments in Australia, with the latest lockdowns having slowed economic activity. Speculators have started shorting the AUD on this basis (in addition to the risk of a decline in metal prices). In the end, if the COVID-19 crisis proves transient, it will create a coiled spring response for the AUD. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The was scant data out of New Zealand this week: Credit card spending rose 6.3% year on year in June. The performance services index rose from 56.1 to 58.6 in June. The NZD was down 23bps versus the US dollar this week. Last week’s rally in the NZD, following the signal that the RBNZ will end QE this week, is fizzling. From a technical standpoint, speculators are neutral the NZD, but our intermediate-term indicator has not yet bottomed out. We are long CHF/NZD, as a reset in global asset prices could increase currency volatility and benefit the pair. Report Links: How High Can The Kiwi Rise? - April 30, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada this week has been robust: June housing starts came in at 282.1K versus expectations of 270K. Foreigners continued to accumulate Canadian securities in June, to the tune of C$20bn. House prices remain on fire. The Teranet/National Bank index rose 16% year on year in June. The Bloomberg Nanos Confidence index held steady at 66.3. The CAD rose by 0.2% this week, performing better than other G10 currencies. The longer-term outlook for the loonie is clearly positive as the BoC will hike interest rates ahead of the Federal Reserve. Near term, USD/CAD could retest the 1.28 level as our intermediate-term indicator continues to work off overbought conditions. Ultimately, we will be selling this pair between 1.28 and 1.30. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 The Outlook For The Canadian Dollar - October 9, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: Exports fell 3% month on month in June. However, watches continued to sell well, with exports rising 71% year on year. Total sight deposits were unchanged at CHF 712 bn for the week of July 16. The Swiss franc was down 0.2% this week. A rebound in global bond yields is a threat to franc long positions. However, we believe the period of volatility in both economic data and equity markets is not over. As such, the franc will benefit from safe-haven inflows. We are long the CHF/NZD cross on this basis. Report Links: An Update On The Swiss Franc - April 9, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Data out of Norway is improving: Industrial confidence came in at 11.3 for Q2, from 8.6 the previous quarter. The NOK was down by 0.5% this week against the dollar. This triggered our limit-buy on Scandinavian currencies at the -2% trigger level we had originally been targeting. As such, we are now short EUR/NOK and USD/NOK. With real yields in Norway much higher than in the US or Europe, portfolio flows should benefit the NOK. Report Links: The Norwegian Method - June 4, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been somewhat mixed: There is a slight upward revision to the Bloomberg economic forecasts. GDP growth is now expected to be 4% year on year in 2021, from a previous estimate of 3.5%. However, CPI was revised down 10bps to 1.7% this year, and 1.4% next year, considering the disappointing CPI print last week. The SEK was down 20bps this week. The SEK remains one of our most potent plays on a global growth recovery. Historically, the SEK has correlated very well with global growth variables and relative economic growth between Sweden and the rest of the world. This week, our limit-buy on Scandinavian currencies was triggered. As such, we are now short EUR/SEK and USD/SEK. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Sweden Beyond The Pandemic: Poised To Re-leverage - March 19, 2020 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades