Inflation/Deflation

Executive Summary Global inflation will peak sometime in the next few months, a process that has likely already begun in the US. This will give policymakers some breathing room to turn less hawkish, a more credible stance given softening global growth momentum and increased financial market volatility. Our Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing suggests that overall government bond returns should turn positive over the next year, but with widening divergences across countries for our base case scenarios. Projected government bond return expectations over the next 12 months look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK – where far too many rate hikes are priced in – compared to the US, where the Fed is more likely to follow through on most, but not all, discounted rate increases. Japan has the lowest expected returns, and the defensive properties of “low-beta” JGBs will be less necessary with global yield momentum set to peak in the latter half of 2022. Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Bottom Line: The return expectations over the next year stemming from our Global Golden Rule suggest the following country allocation recommendations in global government bond portfolios: maintain overweights in Australia, Germany and the UK, stay underweight the US and neutral Canada, but downgrade Japan to underweight. Feature Chart 1A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market Global bond markets may finally be showing signs of settling down after a painful period of rising yields and high volatility. Government bond yields across the developed economies have fallen substantially over the past week as equity and credit markets have sold off, in a typical risk-off response to increased concerns over global growth momentum. For example, benchmark 10-year government yields have fallen by -32bps both the US and UK, -25bps in Germany and -22bps in Canada since the cyclical intraday high was reached on May 9. These moves are modest in the context of the cyclical bond bear market, with the Bloomberg Global Treasury index still down -12.1% year-to-date and -14.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 1). That painful selloff has been driven by expectations of intense monetary tightening in response to surging global inflation. However, last week’s release of US Consumer Price Index data for April confirmed that US goods inflation has peaked, a trend that we expect to follow suit in other countries (Chart 2). That will leave inflation momentum, and eventual interest rate hikes, to be driven more by domestic services inflation that will prove to be less correlated across countries over the next 6-12 months (Chart 3). Chart 2Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . . ​​​​​​ Chart 3. . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation . . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation . . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation ​​​​​​ With that in mind, we revisit our framework for linking government bond returns to monetary policy outcomes versus expectations, the Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing. A Brief Overview Of The Global Golden Rule In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.” This was an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate that were not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.1 The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields and Treasury returns. Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyRevisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We discovered that relationship also held in other developed market countries. This gave us a framework to help project expected global bond returns simply based on a view for future central bank interest rate moves versus market expectations.2 Specific details on the calculation of the Global Golden Rule can be found in those original 2018 papers. In the following pages, we present the latest results of the Global Golden Rule for the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, the euro area and Japan. The set-up for the chart shown for each country is the same. We show the 12-month policy rate “surprise”, defined as the actual change in the central bank policy rate over the preceding 12-months versus the expected 12-month change in the policy rate from a year earlier extracted from OIS curves (a.k.a. our 12-month discounters). We then compare the 12-month policy rate surprise to the annual excess return over cash (treasury bills) of the Bloomberg government bond index for each country. We also show the 12-month policy rate surprise versus the 12-month change in the government bond index yield. The very strong historical correlation between those latter two series is the backbone of the Global Golden Rule framework. After that, we present tables showing expected yield changes and excess returns for various maturity points, as well as the overall government bond index, derived from the Global Golden Rule regressions. The expected change in yield is derived from regressions on the policy rate surprises, with different estimations done for each maturity point. In the tables, we show the results for different scenarios for changes in policy rates. For example, the row in the return tables labeled “+25bps” would show the expected yield changes and excess returns if the central bank for that particular country lifts the policy interest rate by +25bps over the next 12 months. Showing these scenarios allows us to pick the one that most closely correlates to our own expectation for central bank actions, translating that into government bond return expectations. Global Golden Rule: US Chart 4Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises' US Treasuries have delivered a painful loss of -7.8% versus cash over 12 months. Bearish outcomes of such magnitude were last seen during 1994 and 1999 when the Fed was aggressively lifting the funds rate. The Fed delivered a smaller hawkish surprise over the past year than those 1990s episodes, with a trailing 12-month policy rate surprise of -72bps. Thus, the Golden Rule underestimated losses realized by US Treasuries, as US bond yields moved to price in far more Fed tightening than what was expected one year ago. The US OIS curve now discounts +229bps of rate hikes over the next 12 months, taking the fed funds rate to 3.3% (Chart 4). That is a more aggressive profile than was laid out in the March 2022 Fed “dots”, where the median FOMC member projection called for the funds rate to climb to 2.8% in 2023. That means there is less scope for Fed rate hikes to surprise versus market expectations that are already very hawkish, at a time when US growth and inflation momentum is rolling over. Our base case calls for the Fed to deliver +200bps of rate increases over the next year, +50bps at the next two policy meetings followed by +25bps at the subsequent four meetings. That outcome produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall US Treasury index yield falling -13bps, generating a total return of +3.73% (Tables 1 & 2). Table 1US: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 2US: Expected Changes In Treasury Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Canada Chart 5Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC Canadian government bonds have sold off hard over the past 12 months, delivering an excess return over cash of -7.5% (Chart 5). That loss reflects the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) hawkish turn, but is a less severe outcome compared to other developed economy government bond markets that saw a major repricing of rate hike expectations like the US and Australia. Losses in the Canadian government bond market were consistent with the +34bps of hawkish surprises delivered by the BoC, which tightened by +75bps on a 12-month basis versus the +41bps expected by markets in May 2021. Rate expectations are highly aggressive on a forward basis. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts 210bps of interest rate increases over the next 12 months. However, high household debt in Canada, fueled by a relentlessly expanding housing bubble, will limit the ability of the BoC to match the Fed’s rate hikes over the next 6-12 months. Higher debt levels also imply a lower nominal neutral rate of interest, as the BoC has less room to hike before debt servicing costs become overly burdensome for overleveraged Canadian consumers. Our base case is that the BoC will deliver +150bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of a decline in the overall Canadian government bond index yield of -17bps, delivering a projected total return of 4.52% (Tables 3 & 4). Table 3Canada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 4Canada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Australia Chart 6Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia Australian government bonds have delivered a negative excess return over cash of -9.6% over the past year (Chart 6). This is the biggest sell-off among all the countries covered in our Global Golden Rule framework. The magnitude of those realized losses far exceeded what would have been predicted by the Golden Rule a year ago, with the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivering only a modest hawkish surprise. An unexpectedly high Australian headline inflation print of 5.1% in Q1 of this year led the RBA to deliver a surprise +25bps rate hike in April. This created a mild hawkish policy rate surprise of -17bps over the past 12 months, as only +8bps of tightening had been discounted in the Australian OIS curve in May 2021. The Australian OIS curve is now discounting 292bps of rate hikes over the next year, taking the cash rate to just over 3% - a level last seen in 2013 when the neutral rate in Australia was much higher by the RBA’s own reckoning. The RBA appears confident in the Australian economy, forecasting the unemployment rate to reach a 50-year low around 3.5% in 2023. However, we believe the RBA will be more measured in its pace of rate increases over the next year than markets expect, as global traded goods inflation cools and Australian wages are still not overheating. According to the Golden Rule projections, our base case of +150bps of tightening will produce a decline in Australian government bond index yield of -92bps, delivering a projected total return of 9.29% (Tables 5 & 6). Table 5Australia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 6Australia: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: UK Chart 7The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect UK government bonds have gotten hit hard over the past year, delivering a negative excess return over cash of -7.9% - one of the worst performances seen over the past quarter century (Chart 7). The size of that loss was in line with the Global Golden Rule forecasts, given the magnitude of the rate shock seen in the UK. The Bank of England (BoE) hiked rates by 90bps over the past 12 months, which was a hawkish surprise of -79bps compared to what was discounted one year earlier. The UK OIS curve is now priced for another +139bps of rate hikes over the next year. This would take the BoE’s Bank Rate to 2.4%, a level that would push the UK unemployment rate up by two percentage points and lower UK inflation to below 2% within the next 2-3 years, according to the BoE’s own forecasting models. As we discussed in our report last week, where we upgraded our stance on UK Gilts to overweight, the neutral level of UK policy rates is between 1.5-2%, at best, with UK potential growth barely above 1%. Thus, markets are already pricing in a very restrictive monetary policy stance from the BoE that is unlikely to be fully delivered before UK growth and inflation decline sharply. Our base case calls for the BoE to deliver only another +75bps of hikes over the next year, which will produce a fall in the UK government bond index yield of -21bps and a total return of 4.12% (Tables 7 & 8). Table 7UK: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 8UK: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Germany Chart 8German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise German government bonds suffered major losses over the past year, underperforming cash by -8.5% over the past year. We saw no policy surprise from the European Central Bank (ECB) over that time relative to market expectations (Chart 8). The dramatic sell-off instead reflected surging expectations of future tightening as the euro area faces an energy-driven inflation spike. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Germany (and the overall euro area) remains stuck near zero. However, markets now expect a very aggressive move by the ECB, discounting a full +156bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This would push the ECB’s main refinancing rate to levels last seen in the disastrous tightening cycle during the 2011 European debt crisis. As argued by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, the euro area is heading into a growth slowdown and energy inflation looks set to peak. Even if the hawks are able to sway the ECB Governing Council to begin hiking rates this summer, the slowing trajectory of growth and inflation make it highly unlikely that the ECB will deliver the full amount of tightening currently discounted. Our base case is that the ECB will deliver only +50bps of tightening over the next 12 months, enough to push the deposit rate out of negative territory to 0%. As shown in Tables 9 & 10, this is consistent with the Germany government bond index yield falling -55bps, delivering an index return of 5.07% over a 12-month horizon. Table 9Germany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 10Germany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Global Golden Rule: Japan Chart 9The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have delivered an excess return versus cash of -1.8% over the past twelve months (Chart 9). The policy rate surprise was flat as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept the policy rate unchanged at -0.1%. Admittedly, the Golden Rule framework is poorly suited to project Japanese bond returns. The BoJ has been unable to lift policy rates for many years, while instituting yield curve control on 10-year JGBs since 2016 to anchor yields near zero. With no variability on policy rates or bond yields, a methodology that links bond returns to unexpected policy interest rate changes will have poor predictive power. However, rates traders are making some attempt to challenge the BoJ’s ultra-dovish posture. The Japan OIS curve now discounts +9bps of tightening, approximately enough to push the policy rate to zero, over the next 12 months. With the yen weakening rapidly and the cost of imported energy elevated, consumer price inflation in Tokyo (excluding fresh food) hit the BoJ’s 2% target in April. However, as evidenced in the minutes of the March BoJ meeting, policymakers see a sustainable inflation overshoot as unlikely. Our base case is the “Flat” scenarios shown in Tables 11 & 12, with the BoJ keeping policy rates unchanged for the next twelve months and delivering a slight dovish surprise. That generates a Golden Rule forecast of a -6bps fall in the Japanese government bond index yield, with a total return projection of 0.87%. Table 11Japan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Table 12Japan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Investment Implications Of The Global Golden Rule Projections For all the countries discussed above, our base case calls for the respective central banks to deliver less tightening than markets are discounting over the next year. This suggests that government bonds should be expected to deliver positive returns versus cash, even as we expect multiple rate increases from all central banks except the BoJ. While this could argue for an above-benchmark duration stance at the overall global level, we prefer to translate the Global Golden Rule results via country allocations – as we have greater conviction on relative central bank moves in the current high inflation environment – while keeping overall global duration exposure at neutral. The return outcomes for our base case scenarios for the six countries in our Global Golden Rule framework are presented in Table 13. We show the expected returns both in local currency and hedged into US dollars, the latter allowing a comparison in common currency terms. In our base case scenarios, we expect Australian and German government bonds to deliver the strongest performance over the next year, followed by the UK, Canada, the US and Japan. Table 13Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Chart 10Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight Our UK upgrade to overweight last week was a change to our strategic call on Gilts. Based on the results from our Global Golden Rule update, increased exposure to UK Gilts should be “funded” in a global bond portfolio by reducing exposure to Japan, with JGBs expected to deliver the weakest returns. Cutting JGB exposure also fits with the signal from our Global Duration Indicator, which is heralding a peak in global bond yield momentum in the latter half of 2022 (Chart 10). JGBs are typically a good “defensive” overweight country allocation in an environment of rising global bond yields. Persistently low Japanese inflation prevents the BoJ from credibly signaling rate hikes when other central banks like the Fed are lifting rates in response to stronger growth or overshooting inflation as is currently the case. The relative performance of Japan versus the Bloomberg Global Treasury benchmark index (in USD-hedged terms) is highly correlated to the year-over-year momentum of the overall level of global bond yields. With our Duration Indicator signaling a peak in yield momentum, we expect JGBs, which continue to exhibit a very low “beta” to changes in global bond yields, to underperform. Thus, this week we are downgrading our strategic allocation to Japan from overweight (4 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5). We view this as an offsetting recommendation to our UK upgrade from last week, while leaving our other country allocations unchanged. The result is that our country recommendations now line up with the expected returns from our Global Golden Rule, as can be seen in Table 13. That includes leaving the recommended US Treasury exposure at underweight, as we expect the Fed to deliver the smallest dovish surprise out of the central banks discussed in this report. We are adding both of the view changes made over the past two weeks, upgrading the UK and downgrading Japan, to our model bond portfolio as seen on pages 20-21. Bottom Line: Our Global Golden Rule suggests that developed market government bonds are expected to deliver positive returns over the next year as softening inflation momentum leads central banks to not fully deliver discounted rate hikes. Return expectations look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK, especially compared to the US and Japan.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Deborah Acri Research Associate deborah.acri@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcarearch.com. 2     Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks Tactical Overlay Trades

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary The Dollar Likes Volatility The Dollar Likes Volatility The Dollar Likes Volatility Uncertainty about Fed policy has supercharged volatility in bond markets, and correspondingly, USD demand (Feature chart). A well-telegraphed path of interest rates will deflate the volatility “bubble” in Treasury markets and erode the USD safety premium. The dollar has also already priced in a very aggressive path for US interest rates. The onus is on the Fed to deliver on these expectations. Our theme of playing central bank convergence – by fading excessive hawkishness or dovishness by any one central bank – continues to play out. Our latest candidate: short EUR/JPY. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, and ensuing volatility in oil markets, is providing some trading opportunities. One of those is that “good” oil will continue to trade at a premium to “bad” oil. Go long a basket of CAD and NOK versus the RUB. TRADES* INITIATION DATE INCEPTION LEVEL TARGET RATE STOP LOSS PERCENT RETURNS SPOT CARRY** TOTAL Short DXY 2022-05-12 104.8 95 107       Short EUR/JPY 2022-05-12 133.278 120 137       Bottom Line: We recommended shorting the DXY index on April 8th at 102, with a tight stop at 104. That stop-loss was triggered this week. We are reinitiating this trade this week at 104.8, in line with our cyclical view that the dollar faces downside on a 12–18 month horizon.       Multiple factors tend to drive the dollar: Real interest rate differentials, growth divergences, portfolio flows into both public and private capital markets, or even safe-haven demand. Across both developed and emerging market currency pairs, the dollar has been strong (Chart 1), but what has been the key driver of these inflows? For most of this year, interest rate differentials have played a key role in pushing the dollar higher. That said, they have not been the complete story. Chart 2 shows that the dollar has very much overshot market expectations of Fed interest rate policy, relative to other central banks. That premium has been around 8%-10% in the DXY index. In real terms, the overshoot has been even higher. Chart 1The Dollar Has Been King Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar Chart 2The Fed And The Dollar The Fed And The Dollar The Fed And The Dollar Chart 3The Dollar Likes Volatility The Dollar Likes Volatility The Dollar Likes Volatility A key source of this safe-haven premium has been rising volatility, specifically in the bond market. For most of the last two years, the dollar has tracked the MOVE index, a volatility measure of US Treasurys (Chart 3). Uncertainty about the path of US interest rates, and the corresponding rise in dollar hedging costs, have ushered in a wave of “naked” foreign buyers – owning USTs without a corresponding dollar hedge. Foreign purchases of US Treasurys are surging. Speculators have also expressed bearish bets on the euro, yen, and even sterling via the dollar. There is a case to be made that some of these bullish dollar bets will be unwound in the next few months, even if marginally. For example, the market expects rates to be 248 bps and 313 bps higher in the US by year end, respectively, compared to the euro area and Japan (Chart 4). This might be exaggerated. The real GDP growth and inflation differential between the eurozone and the US is 0.1% and 0.8%, respectively, for 2022. The difference in the neutral rate could be as low as 1.25%. This suggests that a simplified Taylor-rule framework will prescribe a policy rate differential of only 1.7% (1.25 + 0.5(0.8+0.1)). In a global growth slowdown, US inflation will come in much lower, which will allow the Fed to ratchet back interest rate expectations. Should growth accelerate, however, then growth differentials between open economies and the US will widen, narrowing the policy divergence we have been experiencing. The safe-haven premium in the dollar has also been visible in the equity market. One striking feature of the correction has been the inability for US equities to outperform, as they usually do, during a market riot point. The carnage in technology stocks has been absolute, and the tech-heavy US equity market continues to struggle against its global peers. As such, there has been a break in the historically strong relationship between the dollar and the outperformance of the US equity market (Chart 5). Chart 4Pricing In The Euro And Yen In Line With Rates Pricing In The Euro And Yen In Line With Rates Pricing In The Euro And Yen In Line With Rates Chart 5The Dollar Has Overshot The Relative Performance Of US Equities The Dollar Has Overshot The Relative Performance Of US Equities The Dollar Has Overshot The Relative Performance Of US Equities As US equity markets were surging throughout 2021, investors started accumulating dollars as a hedge against equity market capitulation, which explained the tight correlation between the put/call ratio and the USD (Chart 6). As the carry on the dollar has risen, and puts have become more expensive, our suspicion is that the greenback has become a preferred hedge. Chart 6Dollar Hedges Against A Drawdown In The S&P Dollar Hedges Against A Drawdown In The S&P Dollar Hedges Against A Drawdown In The S&P As we have highlighted in past reports, the dollar continues to face a tug of war. Higher interest rates undermine the US equity market leadership, while lower rates will reverse the record high speculative positioning in the dollar. Given recent market action, the path of US bond yields will be critical for the dollar outlook. Cresting inflation could pressure bond yields lower. As a strategy, we recommended shorting the DXY index on April 8th at 102, with a tight stop 104. That stop-loss was triggered this week. We are reinitiating this trade at 104.8, in line with our cyclical view that the dollar faces downside on a 12–18-month horizon. As usual, this week’s Month In Review report goes over our take on the latest G10 data releases and the implications for currency strategy both in the near term and longer term.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com   US Dollar: Inflation Will Be Key Chart 7How Sustainable Is The Breakout? How Sustainable Is The Breakout How Sustainable Is The Breakout The dollar DXY index is up 9% year-to-date, hitting multi-year highs (panel 1). The Fed increased interest rates by 50bps this month. In our view, the Fed will continue to calibrate monetary policy based on data, and the key releases continue to surprise to the upside. Headline CPI came in at 8.3% in April, while the core measure was at 6.2%. Both were higher than expected. Importantly, the month-on-month rate for core was 0.6%, much higher than a run rate of 0.2% that will be consistent with the Fed’s target of inflation (panel 2). It is important to note that used car prices have had an important contribution to US CPI. Airfares had an abnormally large contribution to US CPI for the month of April. As these prices crest, along with other supply-driven costs, inflation could meaningfully roll over in the coming months (panel 3). The job’s report was robust, but there was disappointment in the participation rate that fell from 62.4% to 62.2%. This suggests there might be more labor slack in the US than a 3.6% unemployment rate suggests. Wages continue to inflect higher. The Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker currently sits at 6% (panel 4). These developments continue to underpin market expectations for aggressive interest rate increases. The market now expects the Fed to raise rates to 2.5% by December 2022. Speculators are also very long the dollar. Three factors could unhinge market expectations. First, inflation could come crashing back down to earth which will unwind some of the rate hikes priced in the very near term. That would hurt the dollar. Second, growth could pick up outside the US, especially in economies with lots of pent-up demand like Japan. Third, financial conditions could ease, which will help revive animal spirits. In conclusion, our 3-month view on the dollar remains neutral, but our 12-18-month assessment is to sell the dollar. We are reinitiating our short DXY position today with a stop-loss at 106.  Euro: A Recession Is Priced Chart 8Go Short EUR/JPY Go Short EUR/JPY Go Short EUR/JPY The euro has broken below 1.05 and the whisper circulating in markets is that parity is within striking distance. EUR/USD is down 8.7% year-to-date. We have avoided trading the euro against the dollar and have mostly focused on the crosses – long EUR/GBP, and this week, we are selling EUR/JPY. The euro is in a perfect tug of war: Rising inflation is threatening the credibility of the ECB while there is the risk of slowing growth tipping the euro area into a recession. In our view, the euro has already priced in the latter, much more than potentially higher rates in the eurozone. The ZEW sentiment index, a gauge of European growth prospects, is at COVID-19 lows, along with EUR/USD (panel 1). My colleague, Mathieu Savary, constructed a stagflation index for Europe which perfectly encapsulates the ECB’s quandary. A growing cohort of ECB members are supporting a July rate hike. On the surface, the ECB has the lowest rate in the G10 (outside of Switzerland). With HICP inflation at 7.5% (panel 2), emergency monetary settings are no longer required. A “least regrets” approach suggests gently nudging rates higher to address inflationary pressures. House prices in Germany and Italy are rising at their fastest pace in over a decade, much more than wage inflation (panel 3). The key for the ECB will be to telegraph that policy remains extremely accommodative. It is hard to envision that hiking rates from -0.5% to -0.25% will trigger a European recession, but the ECB will need to balance that outcome with the possibility that inflation crests and real rates rise in Europe. In our trading books, we are long EUR/GBP as a play on policy convergence between the ECB and the BoE. This week, we are playing the same theme via shorting EUR/JPY. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY should fall. In an economic boom, the cross has already priced in a stronger euro, relative to the yen (panel 4). We are neutral on the euro over a 3-month horizon but are buyers over 12-18 months.  Japanese Yen: A Mean-Reversion Play Chart 9A Capitulation In The Yen? A Capitulation In The Yen? A Capitulation In The Yen? The Japanese yen is down 10.5% year-to-date, one of the worst performing G10 currency this year. In retrospect, a chart formation since 1990 suggests that we witnessed a classic liquidation phase that could only be arrested by an exhaustion in selling pressure, or a shift in fundamentals (panel 1). The two key drivers of yen weakness are the rise in US yields (panel 2) and the higher cost of energy imports. As today’s price move suggests, any reversal in these key variables will lead to a selloff in USD/JPY – falling bond yields and/or lower energy prices. We have been timidly long the yen, via a short CHF position. Today we are introducing a short EUR/JPY trade as well. What has been remarkable in the last month is the improvement in Japanese economic fundamentals, as the country slowly emergences from the latest COVID-19 wave: Both the outlook and current situation components of the Eco Watchers Survey improved in April. This is a survey of small and medium-sized businesses, very sensitive to domestic conditions. PMIs in Japan are improving on both the manufacturing and service fronts. The Tokyo CPI surprised to the upside, with the headline figure at 2.5%. Historically, the earlier release of the Tokyo CPI has been a reliable gauge for nationwide inflation. Importantly, the release was much below BoJ forecasts. Inflation in Japan could surprise to the upside (panel 3). Employment numbers remain robust. The unemployment rate fell to 2.6% in March, and the jobs-to-applicants ratio rose to 1.22. The Bank of Japan has stayed dovish, reinforcing yield curve control in its April 27 meeting, with strong forward guidance. That said, the BoJ will have no choice but to pivot if inflationary pressures prove stronger than they anticipate, and/or the output gap in Japan closes much faster as demand recovers. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyWhat To Do About The Yen? We were stopped out of our short USD/JPY position at 128. In retrospect, USD/JPY rallied above 131 and is finally falling back down to earth. We are already in the money on our short CHF/JPY position, from our last in-depth report on the yen. This week, we recommend shorting EUR/JPY.  British Pound: A Volte-Face By The BoE Chart 10The Pound Is Being Traded As High Beta The Pound Is Being Traded As High Beta The Pound Is Being Traded As High Beta The pound is down 9.8% year-to-date. While the Bank of England raised rates to 1% this month, they also expect the economy to temporarily dip into recession this year. This week’s disappointing GDP release confirmed the BoE’s fears. In short, pricing in the SONIA curve for BoE rate hikes remains aggressive. The Bank of England has been one of the more proactive central banks, yet the currency has been performing akin to an inflation crisis in emerging markets (panel 1). Inflation continues to soar in the UK with headline CPI now at 6.2% (panel 2). According to the BoE’s projections, inflation will rise to around 10% this year before peaking, well above previous forecasts of 8%. Together with tighter fiscal policy, the combination will be a hit to consumer sentiment. While the BOE must contain inflationary pressures (in accordance with their mandate), the risks of a policy mistake have risen, akin to the eurozone. Labor market conditions appear tight on the surface (panel 3), but our prognosis is that the UK needs less labor regulation, especially towards areas in the economy where labor shortages are acute and are pressuring wages higher. That is unlikely to change in the near term. As such, the current stance of tight monetary and fiscal policy will stomp out any budding economic green shoots. We are currently short sterling, via a long EUR position. In our view, the EUR/GBP cross still heavily underprices the risks to the UK economy in the near term. Given that the pound is very sensitive to global financial conditions (panel 1), it could rebound if recession fears ease, but our suspicion is that it will still underperform the euro.  Canadian Dollar: The BoC Will Stay Hawkish Chart 11The CAD Will Stay Resilient The CAD Will Stay Resilient The CAD Will Stay Resilient The CAD is down 3% year-to-date. The key driver of the CAD remains the outlook for monetary policy and the path of energy prices (panel 1). In the near term, oil prices will stay volatile, but the CAD has not priced in the fact that the BoC is matching the Fed during this interest rate cycle, and/or the rise in energy prices. Together with the NOK, we are going long the CAD versus the RUB today. As we expected, the Bank of Canada raised interest rates by 50bps to 1% at the April 13 meeting. Since then, all the measures the BoC looks at to calibrate monetary policy are continuing to suggest more tightening in monetary policy. Both headline and core inflation came in strong, with headline inflation at 6.7% in March. The common, trim, and median inflation prints were at 2.8%, 4.7%, and 3.8%, respectively, well above the BoC’s target. This continues to suggest inflationary pressures in Canada are broad- based (panel 2). The employment report in April disappointed market consensus, but employment in Canada is back above pre-pandemic levels, and the unemployment rate fell to 5.2%, close to estimates of NAIRU. This suggests the BoC’s path for monetary policy will not be altered (panel 3). House price inflation seems to be moderating across many cities, which argues that monetary policy is having the intended effect, but price increases remain well above nominal income growth (panel 4). Speculators are slightly long the CAD, a risky stance over the next three months. That said, we are buyers of CAD over a 12-to-18-month horizon.  New Zealand Dollar: Positive Catalysts, But Fairly Valued Chart 12Real NZ Rates Need To Stabilize Real NZ Rates Need To Stabilize Real NZ Rates Need To Stabilize The NZD is down 8.7% year-to-date. The RBNZ remains the most hawkish central bank in the G10. They further raised interest rates to 1.5% on April 13. Given a strict mandate on inflation, together with house price considerations, long bond yields have accepted that the RBNZ will be steadfast in tightening policy and hit 3.8% this month. This will help stabilize real yields are rising (panel 1). Underlying data suggests that the “least regrets” approach by the RBNZ makes sense – in a nutshell, tighten policy as fast as economically possible, to get ahead of the inflation curve. CPI continues to accelerate, hitting 6.9% year-on-year in Q1, from 5.9% the previous quarter (panel 2). House price inflation is rolling over from very elevated levels (panel 3). This suggests that monetary policy is having the intended effect of dampening demand.  A weak NZD could sustain imported inflation, but a hawkish central bank cushions this risk.   The RBNZ is forecasting a 2.8% overnight rate for June 2023. The OIS curve suggests that market expectations are much higher. This fits with our view that the market had been overpricing higher interest rates in New Zealand, especially relative to other countries. We already took profits on our long AUD/NZD trade and continue to expect the NZD to underperform at the crosses, even if it rises versus the dollar.  Australian Dollar: Our Top Pick Against The Dollar Chart 13The AUD Has A Terms Of Trade Tailwind The AUD Has A Terms Of Trade Tailwind The AUD Has A Terms Of Trade Tailwind The Australian dollar is down 5.5% year-to-date. The Reserve Bank of Australia raised interest rates by 15bps on its May 3rd meeting, in line with the hawkish tone telegraphed at the prior meeting. The two critical measures that the RBA is focusing on, inflation and wages, have been improving. That said, we had expected the RBA to wait for fresh wage data, out next week, before calibrating monetary policy. The key point is that emergency monetary settings are no longer required in Australia. Home prices remain robust, the unemployment rate has fallen to a cycle low of 4% in and inflationary pressures remain persistent.  Headline CPI was at 5.1% year-on-year in Q1. The trimmed-mean and weighted- median CPI print came in at 3.7% and 3.2%, respectively, above the upper bound of the RBA’s 2%-3% target range. The external environment is one area of concern for the AUD. The trade balance continues to soar, but China’s zero COVID-19 policy is a risk to Australian exports. On the flip side, many speculators are now short the Aussie, which is bullish from a contrarian perspective. We are long the AUD as of 72 cents, expecting this trade to be volatile in the near term, but to pay off over a longer horizon.  Swiss Franc: The Yen Is A Better Hedge Chart 14Swiss Inflation Will Fall Swiss Inflation Will Fall Swiss Inflation Will Fall Year-to-date, CHF is down 9% against USD and flat against the EUR.  The Swiss economy continues to perform well and remains relatively insulated from the inflation dynamics taking place in the rest of the G10. In April, headline CPI inched higher to 2.5% and core CPI to 1.5% year-over-year (panel 2), while the unemployment rate was down to 2.3%. The KOF indicator was also above expectations at 101.7. At 62.5, the manufacturing PMI is still well in the expansionary zone. In other data, retail sales were up 0.8% month-on-month in March and the trade surplus was down to CHF 1.8bn, likely due to the elevated exchange rate versus the euro. Since then, the franc has given up all its gains against the euro. Several SNB board members have recently spoken about the beneficial role of a strong franc in helping to control inflation (panel 4). That said, it is unclear whether the SNB, known for rampant currency interventions, will be as welcoming to a highly valued franc should inflation roll over. Switzerland’s trade surplus as a share of GDP has been persistently increasing since the early 2000s. An expensive currency would not be positive for economic growth. In fact, SNB sight deposits, have been on the rise recently. Last week, these deposits posted the largest one-week increase in two years. In a world where inflation starts to roll over, the SNB will be more dovish. In this environment, EUR/CHF can see more upside.  Norwegian Krone: Bullish On A 12-to-18 Month Horizon Chart 15NOK Has Upside Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar The NOK is down 10.7% against the USD this year. This is a remarkable development amidst higher real rates in Norway (panel 1). The Norges Bank is one of the most predictable central banks. It is set to deliver quarterly 25bps hikes through the end of 2023 to a total of 2.5%. In April, headline CPI rose 5.4% and the measure excluding energy was up 2.6% (panel 2). Although slightly above the latest projections, these figures are unlikely to make the bank deviate from its projected rate path. Economic activity is recovering steadily since the removal of pandemic-related restrictions in February. Household consumption and retail sales grew 4.3% and 3.3% month-over-month, respectively, in March. The manufacturing PMI broke above the 60 level in April, while industrial production was up 2.2% on the month in March. Registered unemployment fell under 2% in April, below pre-pandemic levels. This is helping boost wages (panel 3). Norway’s trade balance continued to break all-time highs with a NOK 138bn surplus in March. Elevated energy prices and the transition away from Russian energy should be a significant tailwind for the Norwegian economy. Oil companies planned to increase investment even before the invasion, and recent developments will likely induce more capex. NOK has significantly underperformed in the last month largely due to broad risk-off sentiment. Once markets stabilize, the krone should strengthen over the next 12–18 months. Given the relatively “safer” nature of Norwegian oil, we are initiating a long NOK/RUB trade today, along with a long CAD leg.  Swedish Krona: Into A Capitulation Phase Chart 16SEK Has Upside SEK Has Upside SEK Has Upside The SEK is down 10.8% versus the dollar this year. In a major policy U-turn, the Riksbank raised rates by 25bps during its last meeting, after inflation came in above expectations at 6.1% on the year in March. The Bank also announced a faster pace of balance-sheet reduction, as well as expecting two-to-three more hikes before the end of the year. Just like the euro area, Sweden is within firing range of tensions between Russia and Ukraine (panel 1). Swedish GDP contracted 0.4% from the previous quarter. Global uncertainty and rising prices are weighing on consumer confidence, reflected in subdued retail sales and household consumption in March. The manufacturing PMI remains robust at 55 but is falling quite rapidly, as are real rates (panel 2). As a small open economy, Sweden needs external demand to recover. On a positive note, orders remain very strong and an easing of lockdowns in China should contribute to growth in manufacturing and goods exports later this year. It is also encouraging that Sweden’s trade surplus rose to 4.7bn SEK in March.  The krona remains vulnerable to both a growth contraction in Europe as well as geopolitical risk, especially as Finland might join NATO, sparring retaliation from Russia. That said, the negative news is likely already priced in. SEK should benefit from growth normalization and a pick-up in the Chinese credit impulse in the second half of the year. As a way to benefit from this dynamic, we are short CHF/SEK, but short USD/SEK positions will be warranted later this year.  Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Artem Sakhbiev Research Associate artem.sakhbiev@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Southeast Asia is suffering from fading macro and geopolitical tailwinds but there are still investment opportunities on a relative basis. The peace dividend, globalization dividend, and demographic dividend are all eroding and will continue to erode, though there are relative winners and losers. The Philippines and Thailand are most secure; the Philippines and Indonesia are least dependent on trade; and the Philippines and Vietnam have the highest potential GDP growth. Geopolitical risk premiums have risen for Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and will rise for the Middle East. This leaves ASEAN states as relatively attractive emerging markets. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG PHILIPPINES / EM EQUITIES 2022-05-12   LONG ASEAN / ACW EQUITIES 2022-05-12   Bottom Line: ASEAN’s geopolitical outlook is less ugly than many other emerging markets. Cyclically, go long ASEAN versus global equities and long Philippine equities versus EM. Feature Chart 1Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States The Philippines elected its second “strongman” leader in a row on May 9, provoking the usual round of editorials about the death of liberalism. Investors know well by now that such political narratives do as much to occlude economic reality as to clarify it. Still, there is a fundamental need to understand the changing global political order since it will ultimately impact the investment landscape. If the global order stabilizes – e.g. US-Russia and US-China relations normalize – then trade and investment may recover from recent shocks. A new era of “Re-Globalization” could ensue. Asia Pacific would be a prime beneficiary as it is full of trading economies (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategySecond Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours By contrast, if Great Power Rivalry escalates further, then trade and investment will suffer, the current paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will continue, and East Asia’s frozen conflicts from 1945-52 will thaw and heat up. Asian states will have to shift focus from trade to security and their economies will suffer relative to previous expectations. How will Southeast Asia fare in this context? Will it fall victim to great power conflict, like Eastern Europe? Or will it keep a balance between the great powers and extract maximum benefits? Three Dividends Three dividends have underpinned Southeast Asia’s growth and prosperity in recent decades: 1.  Peace Dividend – A relative lack of war and inter-state conflict. 2.  Globalization Dividend – Advantageous maritime geography and access to major economies. 3.  Demographic Dividend – Young demographics and strong potential GDP growth. All three of these dividends are eroding, so the macro and geopolitical investment case for ASEAN has weakened relative to twenty years ago. Nevertheless in a world where Russia, China, and the Gulf Arab markets face a higher and persistent geopolitical risk premium, ASEAN still offers attractive investment opportunities, particularly if the most geopolitically insecure countries are avoided. Peace Dividend Favors The Philippines And Thailand Since the end of the US and Chinese wars with Vietnam, military conflicts in Southeast Asia have been low intensity. Lack of inter-state conflict encouraged economic prosperity and security complacency. The five major Southeast Asian nations saw military spending decline since the 1990s and only Vietnam spends more than 2% of GDP (Chart 2). Chart 2Peace Brought Prosperity Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Unfortunately that is about to change. China has large import dependencies, an insufficient tradition of sea power, and feels hemmed in by its geography and the US alliance system. Beijing’s solution is to build and modernize its navy and prepare for potential conflict with the US, particularly over Taiwan. The result is rising tension across East Asia, including in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The ASEAN states fear China will walk over them, China fears they will league with the US against China, and the US tries to get them to do exactly that. Hence ASEAN’s defense spending has not kept up with its geopolitical importance and will have to rise going forward. Consider the following: Vietnam risks conflict with China. Vietnam has the most capable and experienced naval force within ASEAN due to its sporadic conflicts with China. Its equipment is supplied mainly by Russia, pitting it squarely against China’s Soviet or Soviet-inspired equipment. But Russia-China ties are tightening, especially after Russia’s divorce with Europe. While Vietnam will not reject Russia, it is increasingly partnering with the United States. The pandemic added to the Vietnamese public’s distrust of China, which is ancient but has ramped up in recent years due to clashes in the South China Sea. While Vietnam officially maintains that it will never host the US military, it is tacitly bonding with the US as a hedge against China. Yet Vietnam does not have a mutual defense treaty with the US, so it is vulnerable to Chinese military aggression over time. Indonesia distances itself from China. Rising security tensions are also forcing Indonesia to change its strategy toward China. Indonesia lacks experience in naval warfare and is not a claimant in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is reluctant to take sides due to its traditionally non-aligned diplomatic status, its military culture of prioritizing internal stability (which is hard to maintain across thousands of islands), and China’s investment in its economy. However, China is encroaching on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and Indonesia has signaled its displeasure through diplomatic snubs and high-profile infrastructure contracts. Indonesia is trying to bulk up its naval and air capabilities, including via arms purchases from the West. Malaysia distances itself from China. Malaysia and the Philippines have the weakest naval forces and both face pressure from China’s navy and coast guard due to maritime-territorial disputes. But while the Philippines gets help from the US and its allies and partners, Malaysia has no such allies. Traditionally it was non-aligned. Instead it utilizes economic statecraft, as it has often done against more powerful countries. It recently paused Chinese economic projects in the country to conduct reviews and chose Ericsson over Huawei to build the 5G network. Ongoing maritime and energy disputes will motivate defense spending. The Philippines preserves alliance with United States. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte tried but failed to strengthen ties with China and Russia. Beijing continued to swarm the Philippines’ economic zone with ships and threaten its control of neighboring rocks and reefs. Ultimately Duterte renewed his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in July 2021. The newly elected President “Bong Bong” Marcos is even less likely to try to pivot away from the US. Instead the Philippines will work with the US to try to deter China. Thailand preserves alliance with United States. Thailand is the most insulated from the South China Sea disputes and often acts as mediator between China and other ASEAN states. However, Thailand is also a formal US defense ally and assisted with logistics during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. While US military aid was suspended after the 2014 military coup, non-military aid from the US continued. The State Department certified Thailand’s return to democracy in 2019, relations were normalized, and the annual Cobra Gold exercise resumed in 2020. The US’s hasty normalization shows Thailand’s importance to its regional strategy. On their own, the ASEAN states cannot counter China – they are simply outgunned (Chart 3). Hence their grand strategy of balancing Chinese trade relations with American security relations. Chart 3Outgunned By China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Chart 4Opinion Shifts Against China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines In recent decades, with the US divided and distracted, they sought to entice China through commercial deals, in hopes that it would reduce its encroachments on the high seas. This strategy failed, as China’s expansion of economic and military influence in the region is driven by China’s own imperatives. Beijing’s lack of transparency about Covid-19 also sowed distrust. As a result, public opinion became more critical of China and defensive of national sovereignty (Chart 4). Southeast Asia will continue trading with China but changing public opinion, the US-China clash, and tensions in the South China Sea will inject greater geopolitical risk into this once peaceful and prosperous region. Military weakness will also lead the ASEAN states to welcome the US, EU, Japan, and Australia into the region as economic and security hedges against China. This trend risks inflaming regional tensions in the short run – and China may not be deterred over the long run, since its encroachments in the region are driven by its own needs and insecurities. Decades of under-investment in defense will result in ASEAN rearmament, which will weigh on fiscal balances and potentially economic competitiveness. Investors should not take the past three decades of peace for granted. Bottom Line: Vietnam (like Taiwan) is in a geopolitical predicament where it could provoke China’s wrath and yet lacks an American security guarantee. The Philippines and Thailand benefit from American security guarantees. Indonesia and Malaysia benefit from distance from China. All of these states will attempt to balance US and China relations – but in the future that means devoting more resources to national security, which will weigh on fiscal budgets and take away funds from human capital development. Waning Globalization Dividend Favors Indonesia And The Philippines All the ASEAN states rely heavily on both the US and China for export markets. This reliance grew as trade recovered in the wake of the global pandemic (Chart 5). Now global trade is slowing down cyclically, while US-China power struggle will weigh on the structural globalization process, penalizing the most trade-dependent ASEAN states relative to their less trade-dependent neighbors. So far US-China economic divorce is redistributing US-China trade in a way that is positive for Southeast Asia. China is rerouting exports through Vietnam, for example, while the US is shifting supply chains to other Asian states (Chart 6). The US will accelerate down this path because it cannot afford substantively to reengage with China’s economy for fear of strengthening the Russo-Chinese bloc. Chart 5Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance ​​​​​ Chart 6ASEAN’s Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China’s ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's Hence the US will become more reliant on Southeast Asian exporters. Whatever the US stops buying from China will have to be sourced from other countries, so countries that export a similar basket of goods will benefit from the switch. Comparing the types of goods that China and ASEAN export to the US, Thailand is the closest substitute for China, whereas Malaysia is the farthest (Chart 7). That is not to say that Malaysia will suffer from US-China divorce. It is already ahead of China in exporting high-tech goods to the US, which is the very reason its export profile is so different. In 2020, 58% of Malaysia’s exports to the US are high-tech versus 35% for China’s. At the same time, Southeast Asian exports to China may not grow as fast as expected – cyclically China’s economy may accelerate on the back of current stimulus efforts, but structurally China is pursuing self-sufficiency and import substitution via a range of industrial policies (“Made in China 2025,” “dual circulation,” etc). These policies aim to make Chinese industrials competitive with European, US, Japanese, and Korean industrials. But they will also make China more competitive with medium-tech and fledging high-tech exports from Southeast Asia. Thus while China will keep importing low value products and commodities, such as unrefined ores, from Southeast Asia, imports of high-tech products will be limited due to China’s preference for indigenous producers. US export controls will also interfere with ASEAN’s ability to export high-tech goods to China. (In order to retain their US trade, in the face of Chinese import substitution, ASEAN states will have to comply with US export controls at least partially.) Even the low-to-medium tech goods that China currently imports from Southeast Asia may not grow as fast in the coming years as they have in the past. The ten provinces in China with the lowest GDP per capita exported a total of $129 billion to the world in 2020, whereas China’s imports from the top five ASEAN states amounted to $154 billion USD in 2020 (Chart 8). If Beijing insists on creating a domestic market for its poor provinces’ exports, then Southeast Asian exports to China will suffer. China might do this not only for strategic sufficiency but also to avoid US and western sanctions, which could be imposed for labor, environmental, human rights, or strategic reasons. Chart 7The US Sees Thailand And Vietnam As Substitutes For China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 8China Threatens ASEAN With Import Substitution Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 9Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China China, unlike the US during the 1990s and 2000s, cannot afford to open up its doors and become a ravenous consumer and importer of all Asia’s goods. This would be a way to buy influence in the region, as the US has done in Latin America. But China still has significant domestic development left to do. This development must be done for the sake of jobs and income – otherwise the Communist Party will face sociopolitical upheaval. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand are the most vulnerable to China’s dual circulation strategy because of their sizeable exports to China, which stand at 12%, 15% and 7.6% of GDP respectively (Chart 9). Even though the Southeast Asian states have formed into a common market, and have joined major new trade blocs such as the CPTPP and RCEP, they will not see unfettered liberalization within these agreements – and they will not be drawn exclusively into China’s orbit. Instead they will face a China that wishes to expand export market share while substituting away from imports. The US and India, which are not part of these new trade blocs, will still increase their trade with ASEAN, as they will seek to substitute ASEAN for China, and ASEAN will be forced to substitute them for China. Thus globalization will weaken into regionalization and will not provide as positive of a force for Southeast Asia as it did over the 1980s-2000s. Going forward, the new paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will weigh on trade-dependent countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand relative to their neighbors. Within this cohort, Malaysia and the Philippines will benefit from selling high-tech goods to the US, while Thailand and Vietnam will benefit from selling low- and mid-tech goods. China will remain a huge and critical market for ASEAN states but its autarkic policies will drive them to pursue other markets. Those with large and growing domestic markets, like Indonesia and the Philippines, will weather hypo-globalization better than their neighbors. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand are all extremely dependent on foreign trade and hence vulnerable if international trade linkages weaken. Bottom Line: Global trade is likely to slow on a cyclical basis. Structurally, Hypo-Globalization is the new paradigm and will remove a tailwind that super-charged Southeast Asian development over the past several decades. Indonesia and the Philippines stand to suffer least and benefit most. Potential Growth Dividend Favors The Philippines And Vietnam Countries that can generate endogenous growth will perform the best under hypo-globalization. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have the largest populations within ASEAN. But we must also take into account population growth, which contributes directly to potential GDP growth. A domestic market grows through population growth and/or income growth. For example, China benefitted from its growing population but now must switch to income generation as its population growth is stagnating. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have the highest population growth, while Thailand has the lowest. Thai population growth is even weak compared to China. The total fertility rate reinforces this trend – it is highest in Philippines but lowest in Thailand (Chart 10). A population that is too young or too old needs significant support that diverts resources away from the most productive age group. Philippines and Indonesia have the lowest median age, while Thailand has the highest. The youth of Indonesia and Philippines will come of age in the next decade, augmenting labor force and potential GDP growth. By contrast, Vietnam and especially Thailand, like China, will be weighed down by a shrinking labor force in the coming decade (Chart 11). Chart 10Fertility Rates Robust In ASEAN Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 11Falling Support Ratio Weighs On Thailand, Vietnam Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Hence Indonesia and Philippines will prosper while Thailand, and to some extent Vietnam, lack the ability to diversify away from trade through domestic market growth. Malaysia sits in the middle: it is trade dependent and has the smallest population, but it has a young and growing population, and its labor force is still growing. Yet falling population growth is not a disaster if productivity and income growth are high. Productivity trends often contrast with population trends: Indonesia had the weakest productivity growth despite having a large, young, and growing population, while Vietnam had the strongest growth, despite a population slowdown. In fact Vietnam has the strongest productivity growth in Southeast Asia, at a 5-year, pre-pandemic average of 6.3%, followed by the Philippines (Chart 12A). By comparison China’s productivity growth averaged between 3%-6.6%, depending on the data source. Chart 12AProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 12BProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 13Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Productivity growth adds to labor force growth to form potential GDP. In 2019, Philippines had the highest potential GDP growth at 6.9%, followed by the Vietnam at 6.8%, Indonesia at 5.6%, Malaysia at 3.9% and Thailand at 2.3%. In comparison China’s potential GDP growth was 3.6%-5.9%, again depending on data. Thailand is undoubtedly the weakest from both a population and productivity standpoint, while the Philippines has strength in both (Chart 12B). Countries invest in their economies to increase productivity. In 2019, Vietnam recorded the highest growth in grossed fixed capital formation at around 10.6%, followed by Indonesia at 6.9%, Philippines at 6.3%, and Thailand at 2.2%. Gross fixed capital formation has rebounded from the contractions countries suffered during the pandemic lockdowns in 2020 (Chart 13). Bottom Line: The Philippines has strong potential GDP growth, but Indonesia is not far behind as it invests in its economy. Vietnam has the highest investment and productivity growth, but its demographic dividend is waning. Malaysia is slightly better than Thailand because it has a growing population, but it has stopped investing and it is as trade dependent as Thailand. Thailand is weak on all accounts: it is trade dependent, has a shrinking population, and has a low potential GDP growth. Investment Takeaways Bringing it all together, ASEAN is witnessing the erosion of key dividends (peace, globalization, and demographics). Yet it offers attractive investment opportunities on a relative basis, given the permanent step up in geopolitical risk premiums for other major emerging markets like Russia, eastern Europe, China, and (soon) the Gulf Arab states (Charts 14A & 14B). Indeed the long under-performance of ASEAN stocks as a bloc, relative to global stocks, has recently reversed. As investors recognize China’s historic confluence of internal and external risks, they increasingly turn to ASEAN despite its flaws. Chart 14AASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China The US and China will use rewards and punishments to try to win over ASEAN states as strategic and economic partners. Those that have a US security guarantee, or are most distant from potential conflict, will see a lower geopolitical risk premium. Chart 14BASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ​​​​​​ Chart 15Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines The Philippines is the most attractive Southeast Asian market based on our criteria: it has an American security guarantee, domestic-oriented growth, and high productivity. Populism in the Philippines has come with productivity improvements and yet has not overthrown the US alliance. Philippine equities can outperform their emerging market peers (Chart 15). Indonesia is the second most attractive – it does not have direct territorial disputes with China, maintains defense ties with the West, is not excessively trade reliant, and keeps up decent productivity growth. It is vulnerable to nationalism and populism but its democracy is effective overall and the regime has maintained general political stability after near-dissolution in 1998. Thailand is geopolitically secure but lacking in potential growth. Vietnam has high potential growth but is geopolitically insecure over the long run. Investors should only pursue tactical investments in these markets. We maintain our long-term favorable view of Malaysia, although it is trade dependent and productivity has weakened. In future reports we will examine ASEAN markets in greater depth and with closer consideration of their domestic political risks.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary   The surge in food prices following Russia's invasion of Ukraine will drive EM headline inflation higher, given more of individuals' incomes in these economies are spent on food. Economies in the MENA will remain at risk for higher food prices, given their reliance on wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia, which together comprise ~ 30% of global wheat exports.  Wheat is the most widely traded grain in the world; its production is second only to that of corn.  Higher shipping and input costs – especially for fertilizers – will exacerbate the upside price pressure on grains, particularly wheat. Tenuous social contracts raise the risk of social unrest in MENA reminiscent of the Arab Spring unrest of 2011, which was fueled by food scarcity, economic stagnation and popular anger at autocratic governments. A strong USD will continue to raise the local-currency cost of grains and food, which also will fuel EM inflation. The War Increased Food Prices… High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation Bottom Line: Wheat prices will remain volatile with a bias to the upside for as long as the Russia-Ukraine war persists.  The uncertain evolution of this war means EM states will be more exposed to grain-price volatility and higher inflation.  This could prove to be destabilizing to MENA states in particular.  Separately, we update our recommendations below.  Feature High food prices will drive EM headline inflation, owing to the fact a higher proportion of individuals’ incomes in these economies are spent on food. These pressures are particularly acute for wheat following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyCopper Demand Will Ignore Recession Wheat is the most widely traded grain in the world, according to the World Population Review (WPR).1 In terms of global production, it is second only to corn, totaling 760mm tons in 2020. In order, the top three wheat producers in the world are China, India, and Russia, which account for 41% of global output. The US is the fourth-largest producer. The WPR notes that if the EU were to be counted as a single country, its wheat production would be second only to China (Chart 1). Within emerging markets, the Middle East and North African (MENA) nations will be worst hit by rising wheat prices.2 This is because the bulk of their wheat imports are sourced from Russia and Ukraine, and shipped from Black Sea ports, which are literally caught in the crosshairs of the Russia-Ukraine war. Many of these states do not have sufficient grain reserves to tide themselves over this crisis, and will be forced to import food at elevated prices. A strong USD, which this past week hit a 19-year high, will add to the price of USD-denominated commodity imports, particularly wheat. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will continue to exacerbate EM food scarcity and drive input costs – e.g., fertilizers – and shipping rates higher. This will keep food and wheat prices volatile with a strong bias to the upside (Chart 2). Chart 1Wheat Production Faces Concentration Risk High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation Chart 2The War Increased Food Prices… High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation In addition to the inflation risk from high food and energy prices, the tenuous social contracts in many states again raises the risk of social unrest in MENA, as occurred in the 2011 Arab Spring protests against food scarcity, economic stagnation and autocratic government.3 War Disruptions Will Continue Russia’s invasion of Ukraine jeopardized wheat supply from two countries which together constitute nearly 30% of total global wheat exports. The invasion will continue to keep wheat prices volatile and biased to the upside (Chart 3). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) forecasts Ukraine’s 2021/22 wheat output will drop below its 5-year average, since at least 20% of total arable land cannot be used due to the war. While nearly 60% lower than this time last year, Ukrainian wheat exports in March were not completely shut down. However, they were re-routed around the direct routes from the Black Sea.4 In March, Ukraine managed to export 309k tons of wheat. Chart 3...Particularly Wheat ...Particularly Wheat ...Particularly Wheat Ukraine will need to rely on these convoluted routes until port services are either restored or unblocked. Exports through more circuitous routes will delay distribution and increase transport costs. This, of course, also adds to the delivered cost of wheat that is being rerouted and slows the overall distribution of grains globally. Additionally, Ukrainian exports via other countries will be disrupted by those countries’ own trade slowdowns, since global bottlenecks affects all trade. Thus far, Russia has been able to maintain wheat exports. Russia continued to supply wheat to global markets in March and April. The USDA estimates that during the 2021/22 crop year, which ends in June, Russian wheat exports will total 33mm tons, which is just 2mm tons lower than the USDA's pre-crisis estimate.5 Because of high carryover stocks and record production, Russia's exports in the 2022/23 crop year are expected to be more than 40mm tons. Sourcing Alternative Wheat Supplies With a sizable portion of global wheat supply at risk – primarily from Ukraine – other exporting countries will need to increase output to fill this gap (Chart 4). This production, however, is not guaranteed, as it depends primarily on weather and fertilizer prices. New trade routes will also need to be created. This will tax existing export infrastructures as shipping dynamics are reconfigured. Particularly important will be how far the new-found sources of supply have to travel to deliver grain, shipping availability, and, of course, the incremental costs incurred to move supplies. As of 2021, the EU – the Black Sea states’ principle competitor in the wheat-export market – and 48% of total wheat exports to Middle East and African countries (Chart 5). The EU's ability to increase exports for the remainder of the 2021/22 crop year will depend on its production, since demand for exports will be guaranteed given the crisis in the Black Sea. Chart 4Other Exporters Will Need To Ramp Up High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation Chart 5MENA Is EU’s Primary Wheat Export Market High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation The European Commission expects the EU to export a record 40mm tons of wheat for the 2022/23 market year, 6mm tons higher than its expected 2021/22 exports. Based on past trade patterns, these excesses will go to the Middle East, Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Strong USD Favors LatAm Exports US wheat exports will not be competitive this year or next, given the strong USD and relatively high prices (Chart 6). Additionally, this year’s winter-wheat crop will be affected by current drought conditions in the key Hard Red Winter wheat growing regions of Western Kansas, Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas. Canada faces a similar issue to its North American neighbor. Compared to other major wheat exporting states, it exports wheat at the second highest price, after the US. Furthermore, in 2021/22 Canadian wheat output is expected to be the lowest in 14 years following a warm and dry summer. The USDA expects strong Argentinian and Brazilian wheat exports in 2021/22. Compared to exports from the EU, US, Australia and Canada, wheat from these two sources is cheaper and hence will attract price sensitive bids from the Middle East and Africa. Chart 6US Wheat Remains Non-Competitive US Wheat Remains Non-Competitive US Wheat Remains Non-Competitive A strong USD will incentivize the LatAm giants’ wheat exports since their input costs are in local-currency terms and their revenues are in USD. While some countries have taken advantage of high wheat and food prices to increase exports, others have imposed restrictions or outright bans on exports, which will continue to drive prices higher. Kazakhstan, which constitutes nearly 5% of global wheat exports, now has a quota on such exports, which will affect Central Asian import markets. India was expected to constitute an uncharacteristically large share of wheat exports this year and next. However, the country is experiencing its hottest March in 122 years, which most likely will reduce its harvest this year and incentivize it to keep wheat stocks at home. The world’s second largest wheat producing and consuming nation expects a 6% drop in production this year.6 Fertilizer Costs Will Remain High … Countries’ abilities to increase production will depend on fertilizer availability and costs. The USDA cited high fertilizer prices as one of the causes for lower expected Australian wheat output in 2022/23. Prices of natural gas – the primary feedstock for fertilizers – took off like a rocket following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. High natgas prices feed directly into fertilizer costs (Chart 7). The EU's proposal to ban Russian oil imports could see Russia embargo natgas supply in retaliation, which would further spike natgas and fertilizer costs. This will have knock-on effects on all ags markets. Fertilizer export bans announced by Russia and China are another factor driving fertilizer prices higher (Chart 8). High fertilizer costs most likely will dissuade farmers from using fertilizers in volumes associated with more normal market conditions, and likely will cause them to wait on planting and treating acreage, which will lower crop quality or delay planting. Both scenarios will lead to higher crop prices (Chart 9). Chart 7High Natgas Prices Feeds Right Into Fertilizers High Natgas Prices Feeds Right Into Fertilizers High Natgas Prices Feeds Right Into Fertilizers Chart 8Russia, China Are Big Fertilizer Exporters High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation Chart 9Nitrogen Fertilizer Prices Continue To Rise Nitrogen Fertilizer Prices Continue To Rise Nitrogen Fertilizer Prices Continue To Rise …As Do Shipping Costs Redrawing trade routes – i.e., finding new supplies and new shippers to compensate for the loss of Ukrainian wheat exports – will be expensive. For example, US grain shipping costs soared to an 8-year high after countries, led by China, dramatically increased soybean imports from the US due to a drought in Brazil.7 In 2021, high shipping costs led directly to higher food prices (Chart 10).8 Shipping, like any other commodity, is a function of supply and demand for different types of vessels capable of carrying grain from one part of the world to another. On the supply-side, port closures in China and the Black Sea are increasing port congestion, and making ships available for moving grains scarce. The Ukraine war has stranded ships in the Black Sea and forced merchants to re-route their shipments. This increases sailing times, which has the effect of contributing to supply scarcity in shipping markets. Fewer available ships, coupled with high fuel prices are keeping freight rates elevated. A low orderbook of expected new-vessel additions to the global shipping fleet in 2022 and 2023, along with guidance for ships to reduce speeds to increase fuel efficiency, will exacerbate current ship supply scarcity.9 On the demand side, the major international economic organizations have reduced 2022 GDP estimates due to lower economic activity. Lower economic activity will translate into lower ship demand and hence reduce prices (Chart 11). Chart 10Shipping Prices Remain Elevated Shipping Prices Remain Elevated Shipping Prices Remain Elevated Chart 11Shipping Demand Driven By Economic Activity Shipping Demand Driven By Economic Activity Shipping Demand Driven By Economic Activity   Shipping prices will drop meaningfully once port congestion clears. This will depend on the duration of COVID-19 in China and the evolution of the Russia-Ukraine war. A recession – the probability of which will increase if the EU bans Russian oil imports and Russia retaliates with its own natgas ban – acts as a downside risk to shipping costs. Investment Implications The gap in Black Sea wheat exports produced by the Russia-Ukraine war will require a ramp-up in other countries’ supply. Higher production is contingent on weather conditions and input costs. Changing weather patterns, due to climate change, will increase food insecurity, and make it more difficult to predict how ag markets – particularly grain trading – will handle this shock and other shocks down the road. We remain neutral agricultural commodities but will follow wheat and food market developments closely.   Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodity Round-Up Energy: Bullish Going into the Northern Hemisphere's summer driving season, US retail gasoline prices are trading at record levels -- $4.328/gal ($181.78/bbl) as of 9 May 2022, according to the US Energy Information Administration (Chart 12). Regular gasoline (RBOB specification traded on the NYMEX) for delivery in the NY Harbor settled at $144.27/bbl ($3.4349/gal) on Tuesday, giving refiners a rough wholesale margin (versus Brent crude oil) of $41.81/bbl. Retail diesel fuel prices also have been extremely well bid, posting record highs as well of $5.623/gal ($236.17/bbl) on 9 May 2022 (Chart 13). On the NYMEX, the ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel contract for July delivery settled at $3.6793/gal ($154.53/bbl). Jet fuel prices also are extremely well bid, as demand increases against a backdrop of lower refinery output pushed NY Harbor prices to $7.61/gal ($319.62/bbl) on 4 April 2022. NY Harbor jet-fuel prices have been much stronger than US Gulf prices and European prices seen in the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) markets, which were averaging ~ $3.60/gal, according to the EIA. This is accounted for by robust demand – evident since mid-2021, when it recovered pandemic-induced losses – and lower-than-normal output of jet by refiners. Assuming the US does not go into a profound recession, refined-product markets likely will remain tight during the summer-driving season and into the rest of this year, in our estimation. As is the case with the Exploration & Production companies, refiners also have been parsimonious with their capex, which translates into lower capacity to meet demand. Base Metals: Bullish Per the latest US CFTC data, we believe hedge funds and speculators investing in copper are dismissing bullish micro fundamentals and are focusing on bearish macroeconomic factors, such as the probability of an economic slow down increases. This would explain why funds’ short positions have exceeded long positions for the first time since end-May 2020. We have written about medium-to-long-term bullish micro fundamentals at length in previous reports.10 On micro fundamentals, the Chilean constitutional assembly passed articles expanding environmental protection from mining over the weekend. These will be added to the draft constitution to be voted on in September. The article expanding state control in Chilean mining activity did not pass and will be renegotiated before being sent back to the constitutional assembly for a second vote. Uncertain governance will affect mining investment in the state, as BHP recently highlighted. Chart 12 High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation Chart 13 High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation High Food Prices Drive EM Inflation           Footnotes 1     Please see Wheat Production by Country 2022, published by worldpopulationreview.com. 2     Awika (2011) notes, "… cereal grains are the single most important source of calories to a majority of the world population. Developing countries depend more on cereal grains for their nutritional needs than the developed world. Close to 60% of calories in developing countries are derived directly from cereals, with values exceeding 80% in the poorest countries." Please see Joseph M. Awika (2011), "Major Cereal Grains Production and Use around the World," published by the American Chemical Society. The three most important grains in this regard are rice, corn and wheat. 3    Please see Egypt's Arab Spring: The bleak reality 10 years after the uprising, published by dw.com on January 25, 2021. 4    Please see First Ukrainian corn cargo leaves Romanian Black Sea port, published by Reuters on April 29, 2022. 5    All USDA estimates mentioned in this report are taken from the USDA’s Grain and Feed Annual for each country. 6    Please refer to After five record crops, heat wave threatens India’s wheat output, export plans, published by Reuters on May 2, 2022. 7     Please refer to U.S. Grain Shipping Costs Soar With War and Drought Swinging Demand, published by Bloomberg on March 18, 2022. 8    For a more detailed discussion, please refer to Risk of Persistent Food-Price Inflation, which we published on November 11, 2021. 9    For estimates of orderbook vessels in 2022/23 please see Shipping market outlook 2022 Container vs Dry bulk, published by IHS Markit on November 30, 2021; slower speeds could reduce effective shipping capacity by 3-5%, according to S&P Global (see Shipping efficiency targets could prompt slower speeds and reduced capacity: market sources). 10   For the latest on this, please see Copper Demand Will Ignore Recession, which we published on April 14, 2022.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations   Recommendations: We are re-establishing our positions in XME, PICK and XOP, which were stopped out APRIL 22, 2022 with gains of 42.42%, 9.77% and 20.91%, respectively, at tonight's close. We also will be adding the VanEck Oil Refiners ETF (CRAK) to our recommendations, given our bullish view of the global refining sector. Strategic Recommendations   Trades Closed in 2022 Image  

Executive Summary India’s annual consumer price inflation will rise a notch from current levels but is unlikely to surpass 8% in a sustained manner. Demand-driven price pressures are absent in the Indian economy. So are wage pressures. That leaves commodity prices as the sole source of inflation. Global industrial commodity prices dictate India’s producer price inflation, but not consumer price inflation. The latter is determined by domestic factors. Higher import costs on fertilizer and edible oils will push up India’s food inflation a bit, but food inflation is mainly affected by the ‘Minimum Support Price’ that the government pays to farmers for food procurement. The central bank is making a policy mistake by raising interest rates to suppress commodity price-driven inflation when domestic demand is quite weak. The Indian profit outlook has deteriorated meaningfully due to falling margins. Higher interest rates will add to the headwinds. This bourse is also very expensive relative to its EM peers. India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply Bottom Line: Absolute return investors should avoid this bourse. Asset allocators should stay underweight India in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Bond investors should stay neutral India in EM and Emerging Asian domestic bond portfolios. Feature In much of the developed world, inflation has risen to 40-year highs. Inflation has surged in many developing countries as well. India has been one major exception in the latter group − where both headline and core consumer inflation have remained rangebound so far (Chart 1). The question is, if and for how long will India be able to buck the tide of higher global inflation? On a related note, what would be the likely effects of higher inflation on Indian markets? We believe headline and core CPI in India will rise from the current levels of around 6.5%; but will not go past 8% on a sustainable basis. This is much below the double digit levels the country often witnessed in the 1990s and 2000s. The main reason behind our optimism is that demand-driven price pressures are absent in the current cycle. The sole source of inflation is higher global commodity prices, which could be peaking on a rate of change basis. The commodity-led nature of inflation in India also makes monetary policy a less effective tool to control it in this cycle. In fact, considerable monetary tightening will be a policy error as it could nip the already weak domestic demand in the bud. We turned bearish on Indian stocks in March this year, and believe they have more downside in absolute terms. Their recent relative outperformance will also fizzle out sooner rather than later, as this was partially due to investors forsaking the Chinese market. This caused a sharp fall in the latter boosting other bourses’ relative performances (Chart 2). Chart 1India Has So far Been An Exception To The Global Trend Of Surging Inflation India Has So far Been An Exception To The Global Trend Of Surging Inflation India Has So far Been An Exception To The Global Trend Of Surging Inflation Chart 2Indian Stocks Will Weaken More And Underperform EM Indian Stocks Will Weaken More And Underperform EM Indian Stocks Will Weaken More And Underperform EM   Investors would therefore do well to stay underweight Indian stocks in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios for now. Local currency bond investors should stay neutral India in the respective EM and Emerging Asian bond portfolios. Why Has Inflation Stayed Downbeat? Just like in other economies, labor productivity trends set the tone of India’s structural inflation backdrop. Up until the early 2000s, India’s average productivity gains used to be rather low: of the order of 3% annually. Thereafter, a surge in capital spending on infrastructure and other productive capacity propelled India’s average annual productivity growth rate to twice as high. This has helped improve India’s structural inflation backdrop considerably. That said, over a cyclical horizon, it is the ebbs and flows of broad money supply (M3) that determines India’s consumer inflation trajectory (Chart 3). Chart 3India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply India: Consumer Price Inflation Is A Function Of Broad Money Supply Chart 4Money Supply Will Stay Tame As Its Sources Are Rather Muted Money Supply Will Stay Tame As Its Sources Are Rather Muted Money Supply Will Stay Tame As Its Sources Are Rather Muted Broad money supply in India has decelerated over the past year and a half. This is in sharp contrast to most developed economies and many emerging economies in Latin America and EMEA; and it is the main reason why inflation prints have diverged between those countries and India. In the foreseeable future, there is little indication that India’s broad money supply will accelerate by any meaningful measure. This is because the major sources of money creation – bank credit origination and the central bank and commercial banks’ purchases of non-bank securities − have all remained rather muted in the recent past. Bank credit has grown only at a 7% nominal annualized rate over the past three years. In real terms (deflated by headline CPI), they have barely risen. Commercial banks’ purchases of government bonds are growing at only 5%. The central bank’s monetization of government debt, the other source of money creation, has also decelerated since early 2020 (Chart 4). The decelerating broad money supply means the odds of a demand-driven surge in consumer price inflation is also quite low. What About Commodity-Led Inflation? Elevated commodity prices have pushed up India’s consumer price inflation by a notch. Yet, given that much of the rally in global industrial commodities is probably already behind us, it’s effect on future inflation in India will likely be limited: Global industrial commodity prices drive India’s producer price inflation1 (PPI). But the correlation with India’s consumer price inflation is only tenuous (Chart 5). Moreover, given that India’s PPI tracks global commodity prices with a few months lag, this is also set to decelerate in the coming months.  Consistently, the pass-through effect from high global crude prices to local gasoline and diesel prices in India has also rolled over on a rate of change basis (Chart 6, top panel). Chart 5Global Commodity Prices Dictate India's Producer Prices, But Not Consumer Prices Global Commodity Prices Dictate India's Producer Prices, But Not Consumer Prices Global Commodity Prices Dictate India's Producer Prices, But Not Consumer Prices Chart 6Domestic Fuel Price Inflation Is Much Lower Than Crude Price Would Suggest Domestic Fuel Price Inflation Is Much Lower Than Crude Price Would Suggest Domestic Fuel Price Inflation Is Much Lower Than Crude Price Would Suggest   Notably, Indian authorities did not reduce local gasoline and diesel prices back in 2020-21 when global crude prices had slumped. Hence, the incremental rise in local fuel prices in the past several months has not been as steep as they might have been (Chart 6, bottom panel). As a result, energy-related inflation prints in India are not as high as crude oil prices would suggest. In fact, CPI for Fuel & Light and Transport & Communication2 have both decelerated from 12%+ YoY rate to 8% and are slowing further. That means the pass-through from higher fuel prices to the rest of the economy going forward will also be receding. Fertilizer (mostly potash) and edible oil3 are the two other major commodities that India imports. The import bill of these two items has almost doubled in dollar as well as in rupee terms in the past year due to surging prices globally. Together, they now account for 5% of India’s total imports. Higher import costs of these items will lead to slightly higher food prices in future. That said, India’s food inflation moves more with the “Minimum Support Price” (MSP). This is the price that the government pays to farmers for procuring various food grains every year (Chart 7, top panel). Since the government is by far the single largest purchaser, the price it pays sets the floor in the market. In recent years, authorities did not hike procurement prices by much. Unless authorities announce a much higher MSP for the current year, both food and headline CPI will likely stay under control. Finally, India is largely self-reliant when it comes to food. The buffer stock of the country’s food grains, currently at 74 million tons, far exceeds the estimated requirements (Chart 8). Short of any logistics debacle therefore, it’s hard to imagine that food prices could soar sustainably. Chart 7The Government's Support Prices Have A strong Bearing On Food Inflation And Rural Wages The Government's Support Prices Have A strong Bearing On Food Inflation And Rural Wages The Government's Support Prices Have A strong Bearing On Food Inflation And Rural Wages Chart 8India's Buffer Stock Of Food Grains Is Quite Robust India's Buffer Stock Of Food Grains Is Quite Robust India's Buffer Stock Of Food Grains Is Quite Robust   All that said, food inflation is the main risk on India’s inflation horizon. The reason for that is rising food prices often unmoor household inflation expectations, and eventually lead to higher realized inflation. Chart 9 shows that higher food prices in India do leak into non-food prices, albeit to a limited extent. As such, marginally higher food prices owing to higher import costs of fertilizer and edible oils will see India’s core inflation also rise a bit.   Chart 9Higher Food Inflation Leaks Into Core Inflation, But Only So Much Higher Food Inflation Leaks Into Core Inflation, But Only So Much Higher Food Inflation Leaks Into Core Inflation, But Only So Much How High Can Core CPI Rise? As discussed, India’s core inflation will likely remain mostly under control. A crucial reason for that is wage pressures are absent in India. This is in stark contrast to the US, where high wage pressures are threatening to morph into a wage-inflation spiral. In rural India, both farm and non-farm nominal wages have been growing at an average sub-5% rate since 2016, which is below CPI inflation. One reason rural wages have stayed low is that authorities have not raised the MSP much in recent years. A lower MSP not only reins in food prices, but it also keeps a tab on wages (Chart 7, bottom panel). As such, unless the government decides to raise the MSP meaningfully this year, it will be difficult for rural wages to rise materially. On the urban side, the RBI survey on expectations for industrial salary and remunerations also depicts a similarly subdued outlook (Chart 10). Going forward, as tens of millions of young people continue to join the workforce every year, the broader wage picture in India is unlikely to change much. Subdued wage pressures will help keep a tab on the general inflationary pressures in the economy. On its own, India’s core CPI (i.e., CPI ex-food and ex-fuel) is largely a function of domestic money and credit trends. Global crude oil prices also matter to some extent. However, as discussed above, few of these variables are accelerating sharply. That means odds are low that core CPI will rise much more from the current levels. Indeed, our in-house model for core CPI, based on the variables just mentioned, points to a rather benign outlook (Chart 11). Chart 10Wage Pressures Are Absent, Entailing Core Inflation Will Stay Under Control Wage Pressures Are Absent, Entailing Core Inflation Will Stay Under Control Wage Pressures Are Absent, Entailing Core Inflation Will Stay Under Control Chart 11India's Inflation Outlook Is Sanguine India's Inflation Outlook Is Sanguine India's Inflation Outlook Is Sanguine   Does Inflation Hurt Indian Stocks? The primary drivers of Indian stocks are economic growth and corporate profits. Stock prices do not usually get hurt as long as CPI stays in low and mid-single digits. However, once CPI breaches the 8% mark sustainably, stocks typically sell off (Chart 12). Chart 12Indian Stocks Face Major Headwinds When CPI Breaches The 8% Mark Indian Stocks Face Major Headwinds When CPI Breaches The 8% Mark Indian Stocks Face Major Headwinds When CPI Breaches The 8% Mark Chart 13Indian Stocks Have A Positive Correlation With PPI, As Both Benefit From Global Growth Indian Stocks Have A Positive Correlation With PPI, As Both Benefit From Global Growth Indian Stocks Have A Positive Correlation With PPI, As Both Benefit From Global Growth The reason is that when inflation is sustainably high, meaningful monetary tightening ensues. Higher interest rates make it costlier to borrow for either consumption or investment purposes, and therefore depresses demand in the economy. That leads to a squeeze in profit margins, which in turn weighs on equity multiples and thus equity prices.  Interestingly, unlike CPI, which has no stable correlation with Indian stock prices, PPI has a robust positive correlation with stocks. The link is via corporate earnings. Indian PPI tracks the ebbs and flows in global commodity prices, and therefore global growth. Strong global growth boosts all corporate earnings, including that of India. Accelerating PPI is therefore a harbinger of higher Indian earnings and stock prices. Going forward, however, a decelerating PPI is pointing to lower stock prices in India (Chart 13). Is RBI Making A Policy Mistake? India’s central bank seems to be committing a policy mistake by raising interest rates to suppress commodity price-driven inflation when domestic demand is already very weak. This is negative for the economy and share prices. Chart 14Household Consumption Is Quite Weak; Domestic Production Is Far Below Trend Household Consumption Is Quite Weak; Domestic Production Is Far Below Trend Household Consumption Is Quite Weak; Domestic Production Is Far Below Trend The Reserve Bank of India surprised the market last week by raising policy rates by 40 basis points to 4.4%. They also raised commercial banks’ cash reserve ratio by 50 basis points to 4.5% in order to tighten banking sector liquidity. Monetary tightening, as a policy tool, works by stifling domestic demand. It makes borrowing for the purpose of investments and consumption more costly. It is, however, rather ineffective in resolving inflation caused by higher food and fuel prices – as is the case in India presently. Notably, high commodity inflation itself forces consumers to spend a lower amount on other core items – leading to weaker demand for the latter. Further monetary tightening would exacerbate that weakness. As explained before, Indian consumer prices are driven mostly by domestic factors, such as money supply and productivity (Chart 3, above), rather than global commodity prices. This distinction is important given that the central bank’s mandate is to manage CPI, not PPI. As such, monetary policy should ideally be based on mostly domestic dynamics. India’s domestic demand is extremely soft compared to the US where inflation has skyrocketed. Given the massive negative output gap that opened up in the Indian economy during the pandemic-related lockdowns, it will take a while before this economy sees genuine, sustained overheating. In view of this softness, any meaningful hike in interest rates (say another 100 basis points) could have a material negative impact on the recovery, and by extension, on stock prices:  Household consumption is quite weak − as is evident in local car and 2-wheeler sales (Chart 14, top panel). One reason for that is the subdued wage growth mentioned above. Pandemic-era fiscal stimulus, at less than 2% of GDP, has not been nearly enough to compensate for lost household income during the lockdowns. Consistent with lackluster household demand, manufacturing and other industrial productions are also languishing at far below the pre-pandemic trend (Chart 14, bottom panel). Robust capex is what spearheaded India’s post-pandemic recovery. But, now with decelerating corporate profits, capital investments have begun to slow. Higher costs of borrowing will further discourage capex plans. If so, lower investments will do more than shave off GDP growth in the coming quarters. If continued, this could be a major risk for India’s sustainable growth story, and its ill-effects may linger. Chart 15Higher Interest Rates Are A Headwind For Stock Prices Higher Interest Rates Are A Headwind For Stock Prices Higher Interest Rates Are A Headwind For Stock Prices All in all, given the nature of inflation in India in the current cycle, it will be a mistake to raise policy rates by any meaningful measure. Both consumption and investments will be hurt. Stock prices, which clearly benefit from lower interest rates, will be facing higher rates, and will therefore sell off (Chart 15). As such, it will be difficult for the RBI to continue to tighten monetary policy without causing a significant bear market in Indian stocks.   Investment Conclusions Equities: The Indian profit outlook has deteriorated meaningfully as a result of falling margins and an impending growth slowdown. This bourse is also very expensive relative to its EM peers. Higher interest rates will add to the headwinds. Absolute return investors should avoid this market. Asset allocators should stay underweight in EM and Emerging Asian equity portfolios. Currency And Bonds: The Indian rupee could depreciate marginally along with a likely sell-off in Indian stocks. Given that higher interest rates will likely be detrimental to a growth recovery, it will discourage capital inflows, and will therefore be negative for the rupee. As the rupee could be weaker, and bond yields could rise marginally with tighter banking sector liquidity, investors should stay neutral on India in EM and Emerging Asian bond portfolios. Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Also called ‘wholesale prices.’ 2     CPI for Fuel & Light has a 6.8% weight in the CPI basket. Transportation & Communication has 8.6% weight. 3    Edible oil has a weight of 3.6% in India’s CPI basket.​​​​​​​

Executive Summary The Fed, Bank of England (BoE) and Reserve Bank of Australia all hiked rates last week. The BoE, however, signaled a note of caution on future UK growth, given soaring energy prices and plunging consumer and business confidence.  Interest rate markets are pricing in a peak in UK policy rates over the next year near 2.5%, above realistic estimates of neutral that are more in the 1.5-2% range. UK productivity and potential growth remain too weak to support a higher neutral rate than that. With the BoE forecasting near recessionary conditions over the next couple of years if those market-implied rate hikes come to fruition, the time is right to increase exposure to UK government bonds in global fixed income portfolios. UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High Bottom Line: Markets are overestimating how much additional tightening the Bank of England can deliver. We are upgrading our recommended strategic stance on UK Gilts from underweight (2 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). Not All Central Bankers Can Credibly Restore Credibility Chart 1Developed Market Bond Yields Back To 2018 Highs Developed Market Bond Yields Back To 2018 Highs Developed Market Bond Yields Back To 2018 Highs Three more central bank meetings, three more rate hikes. Last week brought a 50bp hike from the Fed, a 25bp hike – the first of this tightening cycle – by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and a 25bp rate increase from the Bank of England (BoE). The Fed and RBA moves did little to stabilize the government bond bear markets in the US and Australia, but the BoE was able to provide a temporary reprieve for the Gilt selloff by playing up potential UK recession (stagflation?) risks. Bond yields worldwide remains laser focused on high global inflation and the associated monetary policy response that will be needed to stabilize inflation expectations (Chart 1). That includes both interest rate hikes and reducing the size of bloated central bank balance sheets. The threat of such “double tightening” is weighing on global growth expectations and risk asset valuations. The MSCI World equity index is down -6.4% (in USD terms) so far in the Q2/2022 and down -14.5% since the mid-November/2021 peak. Although in a more mitigated way, credit markets are also being impacted, with the Bloomberg Global High-Yield index down -2.6% so far in Q2 on an excess return basis versus government bonds. Rate hike expectations have started to catch up to elevated inflation expectations, at least according to inflation linked bonds. The yield on 10-year US TIPS now sits at +0.29%, a huge swing from the -1% level seen just one month ago (Chart 2). The 10-year real yield is even higher in Canada (+0.81%) where the Bank of Canada just delivered its own 50bp rate hike in April. On the other hand, 10-year real yields remain deeply below 0% in Europe and the UK, where central bankers have been providing less explicit guidance on future rate hikes and asset purchase reductions compared to the Fed or Bank of Canada. Interest rate markets remain reluctant to price in significantly positive real policy interest rates at the peak of the current tightening cycle. Our proxy for the real terminal rate expectation, the 5-year/5-year overnight index swap rate (OIS) minus the 5-year/5-year CPI swap rate, is only +0.18% in the US. It is still deeply negative in Europe (-1.53%) and the UK (-0.97%). Our estimates of the term premium component of 10-year government bond yields in those three markets is rising alongside interest rate expectations yet remains deeply negative in Europe and the UK (Chart 3). Chart 2Real Rate Divergences In The Face Of A Global Inflation Shock Real Rate Divergences In The Face Of A Global Inflation Shock Real Rate Divergences In The Face Of A Global Inflation Shock ​​​​​​ Chart 3Markets Still Pricing In Structurally Low Rates Markets Still Pricing In Structurally Low Rates Markets Still Pricing In Structurally Low Rates ​​​​​​ Of those three major bond markets, we see the UK term premium as being the least likely to see additional upward repricing, with the BoE less likely than the Fed or ECB to push for an aggressively smaller balance sheet given domestic economic risks. UK Rate Expectations Are Too Hawkish Chart 4Our BoE Monitor Justifies Recent Tightening Moves Our BoE Monitor Justifies Recent Tightening Moves Our BoE Monitor Justifies Recent Tightening Moves The Bank of England raised rates by 25bps last week, pushing Bank Rate to a 13-year high of 1.0%. The decision was a 6-3 majority, with three Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members calling for a 50bp hike – matching recent moves by other G-10 central banks like the Fed and Bank of Canada – given tight UK capacity constraints (i.e. low unemployment) and high realized inflation. The MPC noted that additional rate increases would likely be necessary to tame very high UK inflation, a message confirmed by the elevated level of our UK Central Bank Monitor (Chart 4). However, the new economic forecasts presented by the BoE painted a gloomy picture on UK growth, raising the risks of a recession even as UK inflation is expected to continue climbing to a 10% peak in late 2022 on the back of high energy prices.1 Strictly looking at current inflation, the case for the BoE to continue hiking rates is obvious. Yet the BoE may now be placing more weight on the downside risks to growth from the energy shock, at a time when fiscal tightening is no longer providing stimulus. In the press conference following last week’s MPC meeting, BoE Governor Andrew Bailey noted the difficult situation policymakers are facing given the huge surge in energy prices that is fueling inflation while also weighing on household and business real incomes. So what is “neutral” anyway? Related Report  Global Fixed Income StrategyThe UK Leads The Way The BoE is one of the least transparent major central banks when it comes to providing guidance on what it thinks the neutral policy rate is. Market participants are left to arrive at their own conclusions and those can vary substantially, as is currently the case. The UK OIS curve is discounting a peak in rates of 2.72% in 2023 and discounting rate cuts after that starting in 2024. Yet the respondents to the BoE’s new Market Participants Survey are calling for a much lower trajectory with rates peaking at 1.75% before falling to 1.5% in 2024 (Chart 5). Those rate levels are in the lower half of the range of longer-run neutral rate estimates from the same Market Participants Survey, between 1.5% and 2.0% (the shaded box in the chart). Chart 5UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High UK Rate Expectations Are Too High Chart 6Recessionary BoE Forecasts, Except For GDP Recessionary BoE Forecasts, Except For GDP Recessionary BoE Forecasts, Except For GDP Combining the messages from the OIS curve and the Survey, markets are pricing in a path for the BoE Bank Rate that will become restrictive by mid-2023, with another 172bps of rate hikes. The BoE uses market pricing for future interest rates in its economic forecasts. The Bank’s models suggest that a move to raise rates to 2.5% in response to high UK inflation, as markets are discounting, would result in a severe UK downturn that would both push up unemployment from the current 3.7% to 5.4% by Q2/2025 (Chart 6). Headline inflation would plunge to 1.3% over the same period as the UK output gap widens to -2.25% of GDP from the current “excess demand” level of +0.5%. Oddly enough, the BoE is only forecasting a flat profile for real GDP growth over that entire three-year forecasting period, although there will clearly be some negative GDP prints during that period to generate such a massively disinflationary outcome. A mixed picture on UK growth Currently, the UK economy is flashing some warning signs on growth momentum. The UK manufacturing PMI was 55.8 in April, still well above the 50 level indicating growth but 9.8 pts below the cyclical peak in 2021 (Chart 7). The services PMI is in better shape at 58.9, but it did dip lower in the latest reading. The GfK consumer confidence index has fallen sharply in response to contacting real household income growth, reaching the second-lowest reading in the history of the series dating back to 1974 in April. This is a warning sign for consumer spending – retail sales fell in April for the first time in fifteen months (middle panel). Business confidence is also impacted by the high costs of both energy and labor that is squeezing profit margins. UK real investment spending is nearly contracting on a year-over-year basis, despite the robust readings on investment intentions from the BoEs’ Agents Survey of UK businesses (bottom panel).UK firms are facing higher wage costs at a time of very tight labor market and robust labor demand. The BoE estimates that UK private sector wage growth, after adjusting for compositional effects related to the pandemic, will accelerate to 5.1% by the end of Q2/2022 (Chart 8). Chart 7UK Growth Facing Inflationary Headwinds UK Growth Facing Inflationary Headwinds UK Growth Facing Inflationary Headwinds ​​​​​​ Chart 8UK Labor Market Remains Healthy UK Labor Market Remains Healthy UK Labor Market Remains Healthy ​​​​​​ Chart 9Will House Prices Signal The Peak In UK Inflation? Will House Prices Signal The Peak In UK Inflation? Will House Prices Signal The Peak In UK Inflation? A robust labor market and quickening wage growth is forcing the BoE to maintain a relatively hawkish bias at a time of high energy inflation, even with the growth outlook darkening in the central bank’s own forecasts. Booming house prices are also making the central bank’s job more challenging. The annual growth rate of the Nationwide UK house price index reached 12.4%, a 17-year high, in March. However, rising mortgage rates and declining household real incomes will likely begin to eat into housing demand and, eventually, help slow the rapid pace of house price growth (Chart 9, bottom panel). Summing it all up, the overall UK inflation picture, including wages and housing costs in addition to energy prices and durable goods prices, will force the BoE to deliver a few more rate hikes before year-end before reaching a peak level that is lower than current market pricing. The neutral UK interest rate is likely very low Chart 10Structurally Weak UK Growth = A Low Neutral Rate Structurally Weak UK Growth = A Low Neutral Rate Structurally Weak UK Growth = A Low Neutral Rate The UK economy has suffered from structurally low potential economic growth dating back to the Brexit referendum in 2016. UK businesses stopped investing in the face of the uncertainty over the UK’s relationship with Europe. There has basically been no growth in UK fixed investment over the past five years. In response, UK productivity has only grown an annualized 0.9% over that same period (Chart 10) and the OECD’s estimate of UK potential GDP growth has been cut from 2% to 1.1%. With such low potential growth, the neutral BoE policy interest rate is likely even lower than the 1.5-2% range of estimates from the BoE’s Market Participant Survey. Tighter fiscal policy also lowers the neutral UK interest rate, with the UK Office of Budget Responsibility forecasting a narrowing of the UK budget deficit of -13.6 percentage points between the 2021 peak and 2027 (bottom panel). A flat UK Gilt curve is also a sign that the neutral interest rate is quite low. The 2-year/10-year Gilt curve now sits at a mere -49bps with Bank Rate only at 1% (Chart 11). While this is modestly steeper from the near-inversion of the curve seen at the start of 2022, a very flat curve at a nominal policy rate of only 1% suggests that the neutral rate is not far from the current level. Sluggish UK equity market performance and widening UK corporate credit spreads also argue that Bank Rate may already be turning restrictive, although a lower trade-weighted pound is helping to mitigate the overall tightening of UK financial conditions. Chart 11UK Financial Conditions Are Not Restrictive (Yet) UK Financial Conditions Are Not Restrictive (Yet) UK Financial Conditions Are Not Restrictive (Yet) ​​​​​​ Chart 12Pressure On The BoE Will Not Peak Until Inflation Does Pressure On The BoE Will Not Peak Until Inflation Does Pressure On The BoE Will Not Peak Until Inflation Does ​​​​​​ In the end, the pressure on the BoE to tighten will not ease until UK inflation peaks. The BoE is suffering a severe credibility crisis, with its own public opinion survey showing the deepest level of public dissatisfaction with the bank since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 12). Inflation expectations are at similar levels that prevailed during that period, although the unique nature of the current inflation upturn, fueled by global supply-chain squeezes and war-related boosts to commodity prices, will likely prevent a repeat of the relatively fast reversal of inflation expectations seen after the Global Financial Crisis. Investment Implications – Get Ready For Gilt Outperformance Chart 13Upgrade UK Gilts To Overweight Upgrade UK Gilts To Overweight Upgrade UK Gilts To Overweight With the BoE already pushing Bank Rate towards a plausible neutral range, we do not expect many more rate hikes in the UK. Our base case is that the BoE hikes 2-3 more times by year-end, pushing Bank Rate to 1.5-1.75%, before pausing. This would represent a lower peak in policy rates than currently priced in the UK OIS curve. That is a relatively dovish outcome that typically leads to positive performance for a government bond market according to our “Global Golden Rule” framework, which we will revisit in next week’s Strategy Report. For now, however, we see a strong case to turn more positive on UK Gilts, with the BoE likely to deliver fewer rate hikes than discounted (Chart 13). The BoE is also far less likely to begin reducing its balance sheet by selling its Gilt holdings back to the market. BoE Governor Bailey strongly hinted last week that such aggressive quantitative tightening (QT) was not a given, even after the Bank research staff presents its proposals to the MPC in August. A delay in QT would also be a factor boosting UK Gilt performance versus other developed economy bond markets where more aggressive reductions in central bank balance sheets are more likely, like the US and potentially even the euro area. This week, we are upgrading our recommended strategic UK weighting from underweight to overweight. In next week’s report, we will consider the proper allocation for the UK within our model bond portfolio, after reviewing potential bond return forecasts stemming from our Global Golden Rule. Bottom Line: Markets are overestimating how much additional tightening the Bank of England can deliver. We are upgrading our recommended strategic stance on UK Gilts from underweight (2 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The mechanical way that the UK government’s energy price regulator, Ofgem, sets price caps on retail gas and electricity costs - based on changes in wholesale energy costs implied by futures curves – means that UK household energy prices will rise by 40% in October, according to BoE estimates. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts It’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts Tactical Overlay Trades

Listen to a short summary of this report.       Executive Summary Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off We tactically downgraded global equities in late February but see the current level of stock prices as offering enough upside to warrant an overweight. Global equities are now trading at 15.6-times forward earnings, and only 12.6-times outside the US. More importantly, the forces that pushed down stock prices are starting to abate: The war in Ukraine no longer seems likely to devolve into a broader conflict; the number of new Covid cases in China has fallen by half; and global inflation has peaked. The next 18 months of falling inflation and receding recession fears could see stocks recover much of their losses. The “Last Hurrah” for equities is coming. We continue to think that over a 5-year horizon, bond yields will rise from current levels, value stocks will outperform growth stocks, and crypto prices will fall. However, countertrend rallies are likely. To express this view, we recommend taking partial profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade recommendation (up 9.3% from an initial entry yield of 1.45% on June 30, 2021). We are also halving our long global value/growth position (up 20.1% since inception on December 10, 2020) and our short Bitcoin position (up 98% based on our exponential shorting technique). Bottom Line: Global equities are heading towards a “last Hurrah” starting in the second half of this year. Tactically upgrade stocks to overweight.   Feature Dear Client, We published a Special Alert early this afternoon tactically upgrading global equities to overweight. As promised, the enclosed report elaborates on our view change. Best regards, Peter Berezin Restore Tactical Overweight On Global Equities Chart 1Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off We tactically downgraded global equities from overweight to neutral on February 28th. The war in Ukraine, the Covid outbreak in China, and most importantly, the rise in bond yields have kept us on the sidelines ever since. At this point, however, the outlook for stocks has brightened, and thus we are restoring our tactical (3-month) overweight to stocks so that it is consistent with our bullish 12-month cyclical view. First, valuations have discounted much of the bad news. After the recent sell-off, global equities are trading at 15.6-times forward earnings (Chart 1). Outside the US, they trade at only 12.6-times forward earnings. Second, the forces that pushed down stock prices are starting to abate. The war in Ukraine is approaching a stalemate, with Russian troops unable to take much of the country, let alone seriously threaten regional neighbours. A European embargo on Russian oil is likely but will be watered down significantly before it is implemented. European officials have shied away from banning Russian natural gas, an action that would have much more severe economic implications. While still very high in absolute terms, December-2022 European natural gas futures are down 36% from their peak on March 7 (Chart 2). The 7-day average of new Covid cases in China has fallen by more than half since late April (Chart 3). Considering that a significant fraction of China’s elderly population is unvaccinated, the authorities will continue to play whack-a-mole with the virus for the next few months (Chart 4). Fortunately, Chinese domestic production of Pfizer’s Paxlovid anti-Covid drug is starting to ramp up, which should allow for some easing in lockdown measures later this year. Chart 2European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil European Natural Gas Futures Have Come Off The Boil Chart 3Covid Cases Are Falling In China… It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight The 20th Chinese National Party Congress is slated for this fall. In the lead-up to the Congress, it is likely that the government will move to diffuse social tensions over its handling of the pandemic by showering the economy with stimulus funds. Of note, the credit impulse has already turned higher, which bodes well for both Chinese growth and growth abroad (Chart 5). Chart 4… But Low Vaccination Rates Among The Elderly Remain A Risk It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Chart 5A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World A Rebound In China's Credit Impulse Bodes Well For China And The Rest Of The World   Inflation Is Peaking On the inflation front, the data flow has gone from unambiguously bad to neutral (and perhaps even slightly positive). In the US, core goods inflation fell by 0.4% month-over-month in April, the first outright decline in core goods prices since February 2021. The Manheim Used Vehicle Value Index has crested and is now 6.4% below its January peak (Chart 6). Global shipping rates have moved up a bit recently on the back of Chinese port shutdowns but remain well below their highs earlier this year (Chart 7). Chart 6Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Used Car Prices Appear To Have Peaked Chart 7Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs Global Shipping Rates Are Well Off Their Highs It Is The Composition Of Spending That Is Distorted Despite the often-heard claim that US consumer spending is well above trend, the reality is that spending is more or less in line with its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 8). It is the composition of spending that is out of line: Goods spending is well above trend while services spending is well below. One might think that only the overall level of spending should matter for inflation, and that the composition of spending is irrelevant. However, this ignores the reality that services prices are generally stickier than goods prices. Companies that sold fitness equipment during the pandemic had no qualms about raising prices. In contrast, gyms barely cut prices, figuring that lower membership fees would do little to drive new business through the door (Chart 9). Chart 8Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed Chart 9Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices This asymmetry matters, and it suggests that goods inflation should continue to fall over the coming months as the composition of spending shifts back to services. A Lull In Wage Growth Wages are the most important determinant of services inflation. While it is too early to be certain, the latest data suggest that wage growth has peaked. The 3-month annualized growth rate in average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers slowed from 7.2% in the second half of 2021 to 3.8% in April (Chart 10). Assuming productivity growth of around 1.5%, this is consistent with inflation of only slightly more than 2%. Nominal wage growth is a function of both labor market slack and expected inflation. Slack should increase modestly during the rest of the year as labor participation recovers. Chart 11 shows that the labor force participation rate is still about 0.9 percentage points below where one would expect it to be, even adjusting for an aging population and increased early retirements. Chart 10Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Wage Growth Seems To Be Topping Out Chart 11Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover Employment has been particularly depressed among lower-wage workers (Chart 12). This should change as more low-wage workers exhaust their savings and are forced to seek employment. According to the Fed, the lowest-paid 20% of workers are the only group to have seen their bank deposits dwindle since mid-2021 (Chart 13). Chart 12More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work More Low-Wage Employees Will Return To Work Chart 13The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling The Savings Of Low-Wage Workers Are Dwindling Inflation expectations should come down as goods inflation recedes and oil prices come off their highs (Chart 14). Bob Ryan, BCA’s Chief Commodity Strategist, sees the price of Brent averaging $86/bbl in the second half of this year, down 16% from current levels.  Central Banks Will Dial Back The Hawkishness With inflation set to fall over the remainder of the year, and financial markets showing increasing signs of stress, the Fed and other central banks will adopt a softer tone. It is worth noting that the median terminal dot for the Fed funds rate actually declined from 2.5% to 2.4% in the March Summary of Economic Projections (Chart 15). Given that markets expect US interest rates to rise to 3.25% in 2023, the Fed may not want investors to further rachet up rate expectations. Chart 14US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop US Inflation Expectations Should Recede If Oil Prices Drop Chart 15Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral Rate Expectations Have Moved Well Above The Fed's Estimate of Neutral   The Bank of England has already veered in a more dovish direction. Its latest forecast, released on May 5, showed real GDP contracting slightly in 2023. Based on market interest rate expectations, the BoE sees headline inflation falling to 1.5% by end-2024, below its target of 2%. Even assuming that interest rates remain at 1%, the BoE believes that inflation will only be slightly above 2% at the end of 2024, implying little need for incremental policy tightening. Not surprisingly, the pound has sold off. We have been tactically short GBP/USD but are using this opportunity to turn tactically neutral. Given favorable valuations, we like the pound over the long run. Chart 16Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending In The Euro Area Is Well Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend The euro area provides a good example of the dangers of focusing too much on short-term inflation dynamics. Supply-side disruptions stemming from the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have weighed on European growth this year. Yet, those very same factors have also pushed up inflation. Harmonized inflation across the euro area reached 7.5% in April, the highest since the launch of the common currency. The ECB is eager to put some distance between policy rates and the zero bound. However, there is little need for significant tightening. Unlike in the US, spending in the euro area is well below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 16). If anything, more inflation would be welcome since that would give the ECB scope to bring real rates further into negative territory if economic conditions warrant it. To its credit, the Bank of Japan has stuck with its yield curve control system, even as bond yields have risen elsewhere in the world. Japan’s currency has weakened but given that inflation expectations are too low, and virtually all of its debt is denominated in yen, that is hardly a bad thing. Too Late? Has the surge in bond yields already done enough damage to the global economy to make a recession inevitable? We do not think so. As noted above, much of the recent harm has been caused by various dislocations, namely the war in Ukraine and the ongoing effects of the pandemic. As these dislocations dissipate, inflation will fall and global growth will recover. Despite the hoopla over how the US economy contracted in the first quarter, real private final sales to domestic purchasers (a measure of GDP growth that strips out the effects of changes in government spending, inventories, and net exports) rose by 3.7% at an annualized rate. As Table 1 shows, this measure of economic activity has the highest predictive power for GDP growth one-quarter ahead. Table 1A Good Sign: Real Final Sales To Private Domestic Purchasers Rose By 3.7% In Q1 It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Meanwhile, and completely overlooked at this point, S&P 500 earnings have come in 7.3% above expectations so far in Q1, with nearly 80% of S&P 500 companies surprising on the upside. Earnings are up 10.4% year-over-year in Q1. Sales are up 13.6%. Looking out to Q4 of 2022, S&P companies are expected to earn $60.93 in EPS, up 4.3% from what analysts expected at the start of the year. It is also worth noting that homebuilder stocks have basically been flat over the past 30 days, even as the S&P 500 has dropped by nearly 10% over this period. Housing is the most interest rate-sensitive sector of the economy. With the homeowner vacancy rate at record low levels, even today’s mortgage rates may not be enough to push the economy into recession (Chart 17). Economic vulnerabilities are greater outside the US. Nevertheless, there is enough pent-up demand on both the consumer and capital spending side to sustain growth. The Last Hurrah How long will the “Goldilocks” period of falling inflation and supply-side driven growth last? Our guess is about 18 months, starting this summer and lasting until the end of 2023. Unfortunately, as is often the case, the benign environment that will emerge in the second half of this year will sow the seeds of its own demise. Real wages are currently falling across the major economies (Chart 18). That has dampened consumer confidence and spending. However, as inflation comes down, real wage growth will turn positive. This will stoke demand, leading to a reacceleration in inflation, most likely in late 2023 or early 2024. Chart 17Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Tight Supply Makes Housing More Resilient Chart 18Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries Real Wages Are Falling In Most Countries   In the end, central banks will discover that the neutral rate of interest is higher than they thought. That is good news for stocks in the short-to-medium run because it means that forthcoming rate hikes will not induce a recession. Down the road, however, a higher neutral rate means that investors will eventually need to value stocks using a higher discount rate. It also means that the disinflation we envision over the next 18 months will not last. All this puts us in the rather lonely “transitory transitory” camp: We think much of today’s high inflation will prove to be transitory, but the transitory nature of that inflation will itself be transitory. Be that as it may, the next 18 months of falling inflation and receding recession fears could see stocks recover much of their losses. For most investors, that is too long a period to sit on the sidelines. The “Last Hurrah” for equities is coming. Taking Partial Profits On Our Short Treasury, Long Value/Growth, And Short Bitcoin Trades We continue to think that over a 5-year horizon, bond yields will rise from current levels, value stocks will outperform growth stocks, and crypto prices will fall. However, with the “Last Hurrah” approaching, countertrend rallies are likely. To express this view, we recommend taking half profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade recommendation (up 9.3% from an initial entry yield of 1.45% on June 30, 2021). We are also halving our long global value/growth position (up 20.1% since inception on December 10, 2020), and our short Bitcoin position (up 98% based on our exponential shorting technique). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight It’s Time To Buy: Tactically Upgrading Global Equities To Overweight

Executive Summary The Fed offered more explicit near-term forward rate guidance at its meeting last week. This guidance will reduce yield volatility at the front-end of the curve during the next few months. We expect the Fed to deliver two more 50 basis point rate hikes (in June and July) before settling into a pattern of hiking by 25 bps at each meeting. Our anticipated Fed hike path is shallower than what is priced in the market, but it also lasts longer. Investors should position for this outcome by buying the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract. Economic and financial market indicators suggest that the 10-year Treasury yield will fall back during the next six months, alongside falling inflation. Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Bottom Line: Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for now, though we expect to get an opportunity to reduce portfolio duration later this year once inflation and bond yields are lower. Feature Last week was a chaotic one for the US bond market. Treasury yields rose and the Fed delivered its first 50 basis point rate increase since 2000. Yet, there is a broad consensus that the Fed’s message was dovish relative to expectations. In this week’s report we try to make sense of these confusing market signals. We do this by focusing on two important occurrences: (1) The Fed’s “dovish” 50 basis point rate hike and (2) The 10-year Treasury yield breaking above 3% for the first time since 2018. The Fed Takes Back Control Chart 1An Uncertain Rates Market An Uncertain Rates Market An Uncertain Rates Market Fed Chair Jay Powell had a clear agenda for last week’s FOMC press conference. Simply, he wanted to provide more concrete forward rate guidance to a market that had become increasingly volatile (Chart 1). The problem is that while the Fed had been explicit about its intention to lift rates, it hadn’t provided any firm guidance about its anticipated pace of tightening. This led to wild speculation in rates markets. Will the Fed lift rates at every meeting or every other meeting? Will it move in traditional 25 basis point increments or perhaps 50 basis point increments? Maybe even 75 basis point increments? This sort of speculation is unacceptable to Chair Powell who said in his opening remarks that the Fed “will strive to avoid adding uncertainty to what is already an extraordinarily challenging and uncertain time.”1 New Explicit Forward Guidance From Chair Powell’s post-meeting press conference, we can discern the following about the Fed’s near-term rate hike intentions. The Fed will not lift rates by 75 basis points at any single meeting. Two more 50 basis point rate hikes are likely at the June and July FOMC meetings. After July, the Fed will likely continue to lift rates at each FOMC meeting. Inflation’s trend will dictate whether these rate increases are delivered in 50 bps or 25 bps increments. The Fed will continue to lift rates at every meeting until it is confident that it has “done enough to get us on a path to restore price stability.” It’s also worth noting that, in addition to delivering a 50 basis point rate hike and providing firmer forward rate guidance, the Fed announced that it will begin shrinking its balance sheet on June 1. The Fed will follow the plan that was presented in the minutes from the March FOMC meeting and that we discussed in a recent report.2 Turning to markets, we see that the overnight index swap curve (OIS) is priced for an additional 201 bps of rate increases between now and the end of 2022 (Chart 2). This is consistent with three more 50 basis point rate hikes and two more 25 basis point rate hikes at this year’s five remaining FOMC meetings. If delivered, those hikes would bring the fed funds rate up to a range of 2.75% to 3.00%. Chart 2Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Rate Expectations Looking out until the end of 2023, we see the OIS curve priced for 262 bps of rate increases. That is, the market is priced for roughly 200 bps of tightening between now and the end of 2022, but only another 62 bps of rate increases in 2023. In fact, Chart 2 shows that the OIS curve has the funds rate peaking at 3.49% near the middle of 2023 and then edging slowly back down. Related Report  US Investment StrategyWage-Price Spiral? Not So Fast Based on our view that inflation will decline between now and the end of the year, we see the Fed delivering only 175 bps of additional tightening this year (50 bps rate hikes in June and July, followed by three more 25 bps hikes). This is slightly lower than what is priced in the curve. However, given the strong state of private sector balance sheets, we can also easily envision 25 basis point rate increases continuing at every meeting in 2023. That scenario would push the fed funds rate above 4% by the end of 2023, significantly higher than what is priced in the market. We recommend that investors position for this “slower, but longer” tightening cycle by buying the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract (see “Yield Curve Trades” table on page 12). Charts 3A-3D focus more specifically on what’s priced in for the next few FOMC meetings. The charts show where the fed funds rate is expected to land after each meeting, as implied by the fed funds futures curve. Additionally, we use an ‘x’ to denote where we expect the fed funds rate to be at the end of each meeting. You can see that we expect the fed funds rate to be about 25 bps lower than the market by the end of September. Our expectation of a slower near-term hike pace stems from our view that inflation has already peaked.3 With that in mind, it’s notable that monthly core PCE inflation printed below levels consistent with the Fed’s 2022 forecasts in both February and March (Chart 4). In addition, last week’s employment report showed a significant deceleration in average hourly earnings (Chart 5). Average hourly earnings are an imperfect wage measure because they don’t adjust for the changing industry composition of the workforce. However, an adjusted measure that gives each industry group equal weighting is also starting to slow (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 3AMay 2022 FOMC Meeting May 2022 FOMC Meeting May 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3BJune 2022 FOMC Meeting June 2022 FOMC Meeting June 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3CJuly 2022 FOMC Meeting July 2022 FOMC Meeting July 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 3DSeptember 2022 FOMC Meeting September 2022 FOMC Meeting September 2022 FOMC Meeting Chart 4Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Tracking Below The Fed's Forecast Chart 5Peak Wage Growth Peak Wage Growth Peak Wage Growth Bottom Line: The Fed’s more explicit rate guidance will reduce yield volatility at the front-end of the curve. Two more 50 basis point rate hikes are likely in June and July, but we expect falling inflation will prompt the Fed to switch to 25 basis point hikes after that. We also expect the tightening cycle to last longer than what is currently priced in the curve. Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark and should position for our expected “slower, but longer” tightening cycle by owning the December 2022 SOFR futures contract versus the December 2024 contract. A Quick Note On The Neutral Rate And Financial Conditions Chart 6Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Financial Conditions Chart 2 shows that the market expects the Fed to lift the funds rate until it is slightly above the range of the Fed’s long-run neutral rate estimates (2% - 3%). At that point, restrictive monetary policy will presumably weigh on economic growth enough for the Fed to back away from tightening. While forecasters need some estimate of the neutral rate to predict where bond yields will land at the end of the cycle, it’s important to understand that Fed policymakers are not guided by these same concerns. In fact, Chair Powell said the following last week when asked whether the Fed intended to lift rates above estimates of neutral: … there’s not a bright line drawn on the road that tells us when we get [to neutral]. So we’re going to be looking at financial conditions, right. Our policy affects financial conditions and financial conditions affect the economy. So we’re going to be looking at the effect of our policy moves on financial conditions. Are they tightening appropriately? And then we’re going to be looking at the effects on the economy. And we’re going to be making a judgment about whether we’ve done enough to get us on a path to restore price stability. In other words, actual Fed policy will not be guided by neutral rate estimates. Instead, the Fed will continue lifting rates at a regular pace until it sees enough evidence of tightening financial conditions and slowing inflation. For this reason, it will be critical to monitor broad indexes of financial conditions as the Fed tightens policy. At present, the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index remains deep in “accommodative” territory, but it is rising quickly (Chart 6). Based on history, we might expect the pace of tightening to slow once the index breaks into “restrictive” territory. Conversely, if financial conditions don’t tighten very much, then it will encourage the Fed to hike more aggressively.  The Return Of 3% Treasury Yields Chart 7Back Above 3% Back Above 3% Back Above 3% The 10-year Treasury yield broke above 3% after the FOMC meeting on Wednesday and it has so far held firm above that key psychological level. The last time the 10-year yield reached these heights was near the end of the last tightening cycle in 2018 (Chart 7). One big difference between today and 2018 being that today’s 3% 10-year yield consists of a much higher inflation component and a much lower real yield (Chart 7, bottom panel). At 2.88%, the cost of inflation compensation embedded in the 10-year yield is too high, and it will fall as inflation rolls over and the Fed tightens. There is a question, however, about whether this drop in 10-year inflation expectations will translate into a lower nominal bond yield or simply be offset by a rising 10-year real yield. The answer will depend on how quickly inflation comes down off its highs. Chart 85y5y Is Above Neutral 5y5y Is Above Neutral 5y5y Is Above Neutral If inflation falls quickly during the next few months, then the market will start to price-in a less aggressive Fed. This will hold down the 10-year real yield. However, if inflation remains sticky near its current level, then the market will judge that the Fed still has a lot of work to do. This will pressure 10-year real yields higher even if long-dated inflation expectations recede. It’s often simpler to ignore the breakdown between real yields and inflation expectations and focus purely on the nominal bond yield itself. This exercise strongly suggests that long-maturity nominal bond yields will fall back somewhat during the next six months. First, we observe that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has risen to 3.19%, above the upper-end of survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate (Chart 8). Long-maturity forward yields have rarely moved much above the range of neutral rate estimates during the past decade. Second, high-frequency indicators that historically correlate with bond yields have not justified the recent move higher in the 10-year yield. The ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials commodity price index and gold and the relative performance of cyclical versus defensive equity sectors have both stalled out, even as yields have shot up (Chart 9). Finally, the change in bond yields correlates strongly with the level of economic data surprises. Positive data surprises tend to coincide with a rising Treasury yield, and vice-versa. Economic data surprises have been positive during the past few months, justifying the move higher in yields (Chart 10). However, that trend is poised to reverse in the coming months. Economic momentum is bound to slow now that the Fed is tightening and the labor market is close to full employment. Further, the Economic Surprise Index exhibits a strong mean-reverting pattern. Extremely high values tend to be followed by lower values, and vice-versa. A simple auto-regressive model of the Surprise Index suggests that it is on track to turn negative within the next month. Chart 9Bonds Go Their Own Way Bonds Go Their Own Way Bonds Go Their Own Way Chart 10Economic Data Surprises Economic Data Surprises Economic Data Surprises Bottom Line: Our indicators suggest that the 10-year Treasury yield will fall back somewhat during the next six months. That said, on a longer-run horizon we continue to expect that interest rates will rise further than the market anticipates. Investors should maintain neutral portfolio duration for now, but stand ready to re-initiate below-benchmark positions later this year once inflation and bond yields are lower. A Quick Note On The Yield Curve And Credit Spreads Yield Curve Positioning Not only have bond yields increased since the Fed meeting last Wednesday, but the Treasury curve has also steepened significantly. The turnaround in the yield curve has been startling. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope was inverted one month ago, but it is now back up to 40 bps (Chart 11). But despite the big moves in the 2/10 slope, the yield curve remains quite flat beyond the 5-year maturity point. In fact, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread – the 5-year yield minus the yield on a duration-matched 2/10 barbell – remains far too high compared to the 2/10 slope (Chart 11, bottom 2 panels). Therefore, our recommended yield curve positioning remains unchanged. Investors should buy the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. Credit Spreads A steeper yield curve has positive implications for corporate bond spreads. All else equal, a steeper yield curve suggests that we are further away from the end of the economic recovery, meaning that corporate bonds have a longer window for outperformance. That said, at 40 bps, the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope is still relatively flat, and while corporate bond spreads have widened during the past few months, the high-yield index option-adjusted spread is still close to its 2019 level and the 12-month breakeven spread for the investment grade index is still below its median since 1995 (Chart 12). Chart 11Favor The 5-Year Favor The 5-Year Favor The 5-Year Chart 12Corporate Bond Valuation Corporate Bond Valuation Corporate Bond Valuation We remain cautious on corporate credit for the time being. Specifically, we recommend an underweight allocation (2 out of 5) to investment grade corporates and a neutral allocation (3 out of 5) to high-yield. However, if the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope were to steepen to above 50 bps and/or if corporate bond spreads were to widen further, then we may see an opportunity this year to tactically increase exposure. Stay tuned. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1    https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20220504.p… 2    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Peak Inflation,” dated April 19, 2022. 3    Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Peak Inflation,” dated April 19, 2022.   Recommended Portfolio Specification On A Dovish Hike And A 3% Bond Yield On A Dovish Hike And A 3% Bond Yield Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns

Executive SummaryIn this report, we look at recent macroeconomic developments through the lens of the business cycle, inflation, and Treasury yield regimes to select winning sectors and styles.The US economy is currently in the slowdown stage of the business cycle, with all of its hallmark attributes, such as slowing growth, elevated inflation, and rising rates.We find that, despite being a real asset, equity performance deteriorates when inflation is on the rise. However, once inflation goes past its apex, the equity rebound is swift.During periods when both inflation and rates are rising, the Energy and Materials sectors tend to outperform, while the Financials and Consumer Discretionary sectors lag.The market is currently in a “high inflation and rising rates” regime but is about to transition to the “inflation is high but falling” regime, and today’s winners may turn into tomorrow’s losers. The new winners are likely to be the Financials, Consumer Discretionary, and Technology sectors.Bottom Line: As inflationary regimes shift, investors can tilt the odds of positive returns in their favor by taking a granular approach to sector selection.  We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime So far, 2022 has not been a welcoming year for investors.  All at once, slowing growth, surging inflation, impending monetary tightening, soaring energy prices, lockdowns in China, and a war in the heart of Europe have been thrown at them.With so much happening, it is difficult to separate signal from noise in the cross-currents of economic data. To make sense of the markets, we will look at recent developments through the lens of macroeconomic regimes, focusing on the stages of the business cycle, level and change in inflation, and the direction of Treasury yields.The Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown StageThe business cycle is a cornerstone of any investment decision as it underpins the fundamentals, and preordains the types of assets likely to outperform based on their level of risk and sensitivity to economic growth. The stage of the business cycle is a succinct way to summarize a wide range of economic data, such as capacity utilization, growth, policy, credit conditions, and valuation (Table 1). Table 1Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  While we are barraged with somewhat contradictory economic data, it is still fair to say that we are currently in the middle of the slowdown stage of the business cycle. Our proprietary business cycle indicator, constructed from a mix of soft and hard data across multiple economic dimensions, is trending down, consistent with that position (Chart 1). Furthermore:Growth is slowing, albeit off high levels, and the most recent disappointing ISM PMI is just another case in point. More concerning is that the new orders-to-inventories ratio has plunged (Chart 2);Unemployment is at a 2-year low of 3.6%, and there are currently two job openings per job seeker;Capacity utilization is high;Inflation is elevated;The Fed has commenced a monetary tightening cycle. Chart 1Economic Growth Is Slowing Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage Business Cycle Is In A Slowdown Stage   Chart 2ISM PMI Disappointed ISM PMI Disappointed ISM PMI Disappointed  As such, during slowdown stage of a business cycle, returns tend to be lower than during recovery and expansion, while volatility is elevated (Chart 3).Chart 3During A Slowdown, Equity Returns Are Paltry, While Volatility Is Elevated Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  If equities are set to deliver pedestrian returns, we need to be more discerning in our sector and style selection. In an environment of slowing growth, growth stocks, large caps, and defensives tend to outperform (Chart 4).  However, we have all observed that Growth has not fared that well due to rapidly rising interest rates and soaring inflation. In order to better understand the implication of the macroeconomic backdrop for equities, we need to drill further down into the inflation and interest-rate regimes.Chart 4During A Slowdown, Quality, Growth, And Defensives Outperform Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Inflation And Rates RegimesHigh Inflation: Then And NowThe recent spike in inflation came as a shock to most money managers – the last time inflation hit this level was in the 1980s, which predated their investment careers.In the wake of major oil shocks, oil prices quadrupled in 1973-74 and doubled in 1979-80. The combination of high inflation with weak economic growth, fueled by repeated supply shocks, gave rise to the phenomenon of “stagflation”, i.e., soaring inflation accompanied by stagnating economic growth and high unemployment.The high inflation we are living through now was brought about by the pandemic, which ushered in unprecedented fiscal and monetary easing, soaring demand for consumer goods, and a disrupted global supply chain. More recently, inflation has been further exacerbated by the indirect effects of the war in Ukraine, such as skyrocketing energy, food, and materials prices. Despite the challenges of the current period, economic growth is still robust, and unemployment is at historically low levels. Energy and materials prices have soared, but not to the same extent as in the 1970s. And while economic growth is slowing, and stagflation is a risk, it is hardly inevitable.To ensure a more precise study of the sector and style analysis, we will separate the 1970-1984 period and look at it as a template for the performance of equities during a stagflation regime. We will use the 1984 to 2022 period to analyze sector performance during more ordinary inflation regimes.Equities Hate ItEquities are a real asset and, theoretically, should not be affected by inflation – sales and earnings growth are reported in nominal terms, and underlying economic growth is, by far, more important than inflation.Of course, reality is often different from theory, and businesses hate inflation: Not only do they have difficulty budgeting and planning ahead, but they are also often not able to convert sales growth into earnings growth, i.e., their costs may grow faster than their revenues. According to the most recent NFIB survey, 31% of small businesses consider inflation their biggest problem compared to 1-2% in 2019.In addition, high inflation is a harbinger of a hawkish Fed and rising interest rates. Hence, on balance, high inflation is bad news for equities (Chart 5). As inflation climbs, equity returns decline, as multiples contract in anticipation of lower earnings and higher discount rates (Chart 6). Chart 5Equities Underperform In A High-Inflation Environment Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 6High Inflation Leads To Multiple Contraction Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Investing In Periods Of High-Inflation And Rising RatesHigh inflation is often accompanied by rising rates both because of strong economic growth and imminent monetary tightening which aims to arrest growth to combat inflation. As a result, high inflation comes hand in hand with elevated risk aversion and the repricing of more economically sensitive areas of the market.Indeed, when inflation is high (>3.5%) and rates are rising, median three-month equity returns are outright negative, and positive three-months returns occur less than 50% of the time (Chart 7). To beat the market, we need to tilt the return distribution in our favor.Chart 7We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime We Are In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime  When inflation is elevated (above 3.5%) and Treasury yields are climbing, the most appropriate portfolio stance is a tilt toward all-weather defensive sectors like Consumer Staples and Health Care, which hold their own in an environment of slowing growth, as well as sectors that command significant pricing power (Chart 8). The following is a brief summary of the winners and losers. Chart 8Sector Performance In High Inflation / Rising Rates Regime Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  High Inflation/Rising Rate WinnersEnergy: High oil prices are often one of the culprits behind runaway inflation, with the exception of the mid-1980s episode when Saudi Arabia drowned the world in oil, causing a collapse in oil prices, while inflation was on the rise. The energy sector has significant pricing power as it is upstream of the supply chain and can pass on costs to customers (Chart 9). This sector also benefits from high operating leverage. Outperformance usually peaks when inflation turns.Health Care: Health Care stocks tend to outperform when overall consumer prices advance. The non-cyclical nature of health care services reflects their resilience against economic volatility, irrespective of the direction of pricing pressures (Chart 10).  Over the past few years, health care companies have struggled, mostly because of the pressure exerted on pharma by hospitals, insurers, and the government. However, recently, the sector’s pricing power has turned because of pent-up demand for medical procedures. Chart 9The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power The Energy Sector Wields Significant Pricing Power   Chart 10Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand Pricing Power Of The Health Care Sector Has Picked Up Thanks To Pent-up Demand  Consumer Staples: Historically, Consumer Staples have outperformed during periods of high inflation (Chart 11). Just like Health Care, this is a non-cyclical sector, because the demand for necessities is inelastic. While this sector is experiencing challenges because of the rising prices of raw materials, it is able to pass on its costs to customers, who have to allocate an increasing share of their budget to necessities. It has also helped multinationals in the S&P 500 index, as they invest in brand building, which now aids them to differentiate their offerings even when consumers are under duress.Utilities: Utilities is another quintessential defensive sector, with a stable revenue stream, significant pricing power, and profitability controlled by the regulators.    Of course, one might argue that this is a highly leveraged sector which may be hurt by rising borrowing costs.  However, it fares well, as regulators have a target return-on-investment for utilities companies, thus allowing them to raise prices to offset rising costs.  Furthermore, with high inflation, long-term debt is smaller in real terms.  Chart 11Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building Consumer Staples Companies Have Invested In Brand-building  High Inflation/Rising Rates LosersConsumer Discretionary companies underperform in an environment of high and rising inflation as inflation reduces consumers’ purchasing power and forces them to shift spending away from discretionary goods and services, and toward necessities. The high negative correlation of the sector with the Consumer Drag Indicator is a case in point (Chart 12). Further, rising interest rates often follow high inflation, and weigh on demand for durable goods that require financing.Financials: High inflation is a headwind for the sector because monetary tightening which follows on the heels of high inflation tends to flatten the yield curve, affecting banks’ Net Income Margins (NIM), or the spread between loans and deposits. Inflation also hurts S&P Financials due to the mismatch between bank assets and liabilities. A typical bank has longer maturity for its assets (loans) than for its liabilities (deposits). Consequently, as inflation rises, this reduces the future net inflow because creditors demand higher interest rates, while the returns earned by the bank on its current loan book are mostly fixed by existing contracts. Chart 12Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending Raging Inflation Cuts Into Consumers' Discretionary Spending  Inflation Will Turn Soon (Hopefully), And So Will Sector PerformanceInflation is likely to fade somewhat over the coming quarters, as supply chains normalize, and consumer demand wanes because of saturation and elevated prices. Arithmetic will also help, i.e., the base effect will kick in. Also, aggressive monetary policy is likely to slow economic growth and demand for labor further. With all of that, inflation will trend down but will reach the elusive 2% only years from now.However, when it comes to inflation, it is both the level of inflation and the direction of change that matter. While, overall, high inflation is bad for equities, it is necessary to differentiate between “inflation high and rising” and “inflation high and falling” regimes (Chart 13). As such, it is likely that we are about to shift into the “inflation is above 3.5% but falling” regime, where the median three-month return is 3.0% and returns are positive 69% of the time. We do anticipate a rebound in equities once the tighter monetary regime is priced in, and inflation shows signs of abating.Chart 13When Inflation Turns, Equities Will Rebound Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  With the Fed assuming an active role, we believe that going forward, equity returns will be more of a function of the monetary tightening cycle than of inflation. However, falling inflation readings may slow the pace of monetary tightening, or even put the Fed on hold.According to our analysis of sector performance in the “inflation is above 3.5% and is falling” regime, Energy and Materials will be the first sectors to reverse recent gains. The Consumer Discretionary sector is likely to rebound as pressure on consumer purses eases. Financials will also be among sectors that outperform in this regime, since fading inflation will help with asset/liability management. Consumer Staples and Health Care are likely to keep their outperformance going as inflation will continue to be an issue.Last, while empirical analysis does not show that the Technology sector outperforms when inflation is falling, we believe this will be the case based on the simple assumption that falling inflation will imply a lower discount rate (Chart 14). In this regime, we also anticipate a rotation from Value to Growth, and from Large to Small (Chart 15). Chart 14New Inflation Regime Will Usher In New Winners Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 15Changes In Inflation Regimes Brought About Market Rotations Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Stagflation: Magnifying Glass On The 1970sStagflation, along with a recession, is now on investors’ minds – concern about the Fed making a policy mistake. After all, the Fed is already behind the curve, and it is hard to put the inflation genie back into the bottle. What would happen then?In this case, just as in the 1970s, we will see continued growth slowdown accompanied by raging inflation (Chart 16). Back then, equities pulled back every time inflation was on the rise (Chart 17), with Energy, Materials, and Health Care outperforming.The market rebounded at the first signs of inflation abating, reversing sector performance, and turning losers into winners, i.e., Consumer Discretionary and Real Estate started outperforming (Chart 18).Chart 16In The 1970s’ Stagflation Crushed Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 17Energy And Materials Were Biggest Winners In the "Inflation High And Rising" Regime... Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities   Chart 18...But They Gave Back Their Gains In "Inflation High But Falling" Regime Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities Macroeconomic Regimes And Their Implications For US Equities  Bottom LineWe are in a slowdown stage of the business cycle, and Quality, Defensives, and Growth are expected to outperform. However, high inflation has mixed up all the cards and sent Growth into a tailspin. High inflation is unfavorable, not only for Growth but also for equities in general, even though they are a real asset. However, investors can shift the odds of positive returns in their favor by taking a granular approach to sector selection suitable for different inflation regimes.The market is currently in a “high inflation and rising rates” regime, with Energy and Materials outperforming. However, we are about to transition into the “inflation is high but falling” regime, and today’s winners may turn into losers. Defensives is the only group which holds up across all high inflation regimes, thanks to its earnings resilience even in the face of slowing growth.  Irene TunkelChief Strategist, US Equity Strategyirene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com 

Executive Summary Europe's Largest Import Bill: Oil Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise The EU crossed the Rubicon this week, proposing to eliminate Russian oil imports within six months. The speed of putting the sanctions into effect, and Russia’s retaliation, will be critical to whether the world endures continued inflationary pressures or whether a global recession ensues. Russia indicated it will launch its own round of sanctions in the near future, which could profoundly affect not only global oil and gas markets, but once again induce input price shocks to electricity markets – which will hit firms and households again with higher prices – and agricultural markets. Turmoil in commodity markets has opened a policy debate over whether the world will be forced to migrate to a new monetary order based on access to commodities and control of commodity flows, which would replace the fiat-money architecture that succeeded the post-WWII Bretton Woods system. This debate draws together numerous trends – the centrality of commodities to price levels and inflation; central-bank policy; failed regulation at commodity exchanges; and commodity scarcity due to weak capex. Bottom Line: Commodity markets are changing rapidly as fundamentals adapt to supply tightness and an extremely erratic demand recovery.  However, this does not mark the beginning of a new Bretton Woods era.  Markets adapt quickly to changing fundamentals and that will continue. Feature With its proposal this week to ban the import of Russian oil, the EU crossed the Rubicon and now will prepare for an escalation of its economic war with Russia. Oil imports are, by far, the EU's largest energy import expense, and Russia is its largest supplier (Chart 1). Russian natural gas exports to Europe account for 74% of its total natgas exports, although natgas comprises a much smaller share of Russia’s revenue than oil (Chart 2). In a pecuniary sense, oil is far more important, but in an economic sense gas is more meaningful for Europe. Chart 1Europe's Largest Import Bill: Oil Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Chart 2Russia's Largest Market: Europe Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Russia produced 10.1mm b/d of crude and condensates in 2021. Of the 4.7mm b/d of this that Russia exported, OECD Europe was its largest customer, at 50% of total, according to the US EIA. If Russia's production is curtailed by roughly 1mm b/d this year and next year due to sanctions, we estimate Brent prices could reach $120/bbl. Losing 1.8mm this year and another 700k b/d next year could push Brent prices above $140/bbl (Chart 3). On the natgas side, one-third of the ~ 25 Tcf of Russian production last year was exported via pipeline or as LNG, based on 2021 data from the EIA. This amounted to almost 9 Tcf. Most of this – 74% – was exported via pipeline to the OECD Europe. These are dedicated volumes flowing through Russia's network into Europe. Until the Power of Siberia pipeline is expanded – likely over the next 2-3 years — this gas will not be available for export. Chart 3Losing Russian Oil Exports Will Push Prices Sharply Higher Losing Russian Oil Exports Will Push Prices Sharply Higher Losing Russian Oil Exports Will Push Prices Sharply Higher Oil and gas exports last year accounted for close to 40% of the Russian government's budget. Crude and product revenue last year came in at just under $180 billion, while pipeline and LNG shipments of natgas accounted for close to $62 billion of the Russian government's revenues. Clearly, the stakes are extremely high for Russia if Europe embargoes oil imports. Escalation Of Economic War Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak last month threatened to shut off Russian exports of natural gas if the EU cut off oil imports. Whether – or how quickly – that threat is acted upon will be critical for Europe. Speculation around the EU's proposal to embargo oil imports of all kinds from Russia centers on the ban becoming effective by the end of this week, with a six-month phase-down of imports.1 It is still possible that the sanctions will be vetoed and revised. But with Germany changing its position and now willing to embargo oil, it is only a matter of time before the majority of the EU cuts off Russian oil imports. In response, Russia will launch its own round of embargoes, which could profoundly affect not only global oil and gas markets, but once again induce input-price shocks to electricity markets – which will hit household budgets and base-metals smelters and refiners – and agricultural markets, given the large share of natgas in fertilizers (Chart 4). It is not difficult to imagine base-metals refining operations closing again in Europe, along with crop-planting delays rising.2 On the back of this collateral damage from the cut-off of Russian oil and gas exports, we would expect inflation and inflation expectations to take another leg up. This comes against a backdrop in which central banks led by the US Fed already have initiated a rate-hiking program to address inflation that is running far hotter than previously forecast. Chart 4Tight Natgas Markets Drive Fertilizer/Grain Prices Higher Power, Fertilizer, Base Metals Could Be Shocked By Russian Cut-Offs Tight Natgas Markets Drive Fertilizer/Grain Prices Higher Power, Fertilizer, Base Metals Could Be Shocked By Russian Cut-Offs Tight Natgas Markets Drive Fertilizer/Grain Prices Higher Power, Fertilizer, Base Metals Could Be Shocked By Russian Cut-Offs Policymakers Reassess Commodities This turmoil in commodity markets has ignited a policy debate over whether the world will be forced to migrate to a new monetary order. The new order, so the argument goes, would be based on access to commodities and control of commodity flows and would replace the fiat-money architecture that succeeded the post-WWII Bretton Woods system. This debate draws together numerous trends – the centrality of commodities to price levels and inflation; central-bank policy; failed regulation at commodity exchanges; non-USD invoicing and funding; and commodity scarcity – particularly in industrial commodities like oil, natgas and metals due to weak capex over almost a decade. The debates around these different crises are being framed around the heightened geopolitical awareness of the critical role of commodities in the language of financial markets. This is a novel innovation; however, it essentially is an argument by analogy and can obfuscate underlying causes and effects. Bretton Woods III In The Offing? Following WW II, the US and other advanced economies launched the Bretton Woods system, under which the US would operate and maintain a commodity-money regime – i.e., the gold standard – that maintained convertability of USD to gold upon demand. This post-World War II Bretton Woods (BW) system – call it BWI – remained in place until the early 1970s and made the USD the preeminent currency in the world during that period. Literally, the system, operated by the Fed, made the USD "as good as gold." That didn't last, as US domestic exigencies – the Vietnam War and the War on Poverty – forced the US to abandon gold-convertibility and adopt a fiat-money system to finance these multiple wars. Nevertheless the dollar retained its centrality to global markets. Call this fiat system BWII. As of 2022, the dollar remains the world’s dominant reserve currency, accounting for ~ 60% of the $12.25 trillion of foreign exchange reserves, according to IMF data (Chart 5).3 As a vehicle currency, it accounts for close to 90% of daily FX trading – amounting to ~ $6 trillion/day of turnover. The dollar also is the preeminent funding and invoice currency. Trade invoicing denominated in USD accounts for 93% of imports and 97% of exports worldwide. Chart 5USD Remains Dominant Reserve Currency Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise According to the WTO, global trade in 2019 (just before the COVID-19 pandemic) was just shy of $19 trillion (Chart 6). This global dominance of the USD means the dollar’s funding-currency role “mediates the transmission of U.S. monetary policy to global financing conditions.”4 This has been the case for the 23 years since the creation of the euro, including the periods before and after the 2008 global financial crisis. Chart 6USD Dominates World Trade Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise Die Cast By EU: Inflation, Recession Risks Rise The dollar’s importance to the global economy has only grown since the BWI era.5 Obstfeld notes US gross external assets and liabilities relative to GDP “grow sharply (but roughly commensurately) up until the global financial crisis, reaching ratios to GDP in the neighborhood of 150 percent. Since then, assets have levelled off but liabilities have continued to grow.” The dollar faces a range of challenges, as we discuss below, but any discussion must begin with its resilience as the top currency – a resilience that spans the creation of the euro, the rise of China, vast US budget and trade deficits, multiple rounds of quantitative easing, and political instability in Washington. A Return To Commodity-Based Money? The full power of the Fed's role at the center of the global monetary system – as a reserve currency and as the preeminent medium for funding and invoicing trade – was revealed following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The US froze Russian foreign reserves, denied it access to the international SWIFT payments system, and imposed sanctions on Russian firms and individuals, and anyone trading with them. Following the US actions, Russia's economy was partially frozen out of global trade, banking and finance. Western partners abandoned their Russian investments, taking their capital and technology out of the country. Outside of the sanctions, individual firms such as refiners, shippers and trading companies “self-sanctioned” their dealings with Russia, and refused to handle inbound or outbound Russian commodities. Given the US capability revealed, and the threat posed to other countries should the US sanction them in a likely manner, new risks to the dollar system will emerge. The primacy of the USD, and the Fed's role in maintaining its central banking position to the world, are by no means assured. Indeed, other states – namely China – will try to insulate themselves from similar sanctions. India is apparently willing to trade with Russia in rubles. Saudi Arabia is exploring being paid in RMB for oil exports to China and a wide range of states could increase their acceptance of RMB at least to cover their growing trade with China. China has been pushing hard to have its RMB recognized and used as a global reserve currency, and a trade-invoicing and trade-funding currency. For this to happen, China also would have to allow its currency to become a vehicle currency – i.e., the anchor leg in FX trading. Zoltan Pozsar, a Credit Suisse analyst, recently penned an article exploring the new terrain exposed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the US and EU responses.6 For Pozsar, "Commodity reserves will be an essential part of Bretton Woods III, and historically wars are won by those who have more food and energy supplies – food to fuel horses and soldiers back in the day, and food to fuel soldiers and fuel to fuel tanks and planes today." Pozsar avers that his formulation of Bretton Woods III will reverse the disinflation created by globalization, and "serve up an inflationary impulse (de-globalization, autarky, just-in-case hoarding of commodities and duplication of supply chains, and more military spending to be able to protect whatever seaborne trade is left)." These conclusions are similar to conclusions we have reached over the course of the past few years, as it became increasingly apparent that the US was losing geopolitical clout relative to rising powers, mainly China, and that the international system was becoming multipolar and unstable. The Ukraine war confirmed the new environment of Great Power Rivalry. Nation-states will indeed amass and hoard commodities as they will need to gird for battle as this rivalry heats up. Preparation for war and war itself are historically inflationary (Chart 7). Chart 7War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary However, countries still have to pay for commodities in a currency that exporters are willing to receive. Yet the biggest global oil and food exporters depend on the US for their security, except Russia. Even in base metals the US wields extraordinary influence over the non-aligned exporters. These states could reduce their dollar invoicing to cover their share of trade with countries outside the West, but their national security alliances and partnerships imply a hard-to-change view on which economies and currencies will be most stable over the long run. The dollar is again preeminent. China unquestionably wants to diversify away from the dollar. But China’s trade partners will have a limit on how much yuan cash they are willing to hold. If they want to recycle this cash into China’s economy, China must open its capital account. But this would reduce the Communist Party’s control of the domestic economy due to the Impossible Trinity (the yuan would have to float freely). So until China makes this change, the world is stuck in today’s monetary system. By contrast, if China totally closes its system due to domestic or foreign political threats, then the world faces a recession and investors will not be rushing to sell the dollar. For now China is trying to have it both ways: maintaining large foreign exchange reserves while gradually diversifying away from the dollar (Chart 8). China selling off its Treasury holdings and dollar reserves, which began in the aftermath of the Great Recession, is the biggest monetary shift since 1999, when the euro emerged and China’s purchases of Treasuries began to surge due to trade surpluses on the back of its joining the WTO. But there is little basis for China or anyone else to abandon fiat currencies and return to the gold standard. Fiat currencies enable states to control the money supply and hence to try to control their economies and societies. The Chinese are the least likely to abandon fiat currency given their laser focus on employment, manufacturing, and social stability. China is a commodity importer, so that if it seeks to amass commodities as strategic reserves in the midst of a commodity boom, it will pay top price. This means the yuan would need to be kept strong. But in fact China is allowing the yuan to depreciate, as it would face higher unemployment and instability if domestic demand were further suppressed by a rising yuan. China is already undergoing a painful transition away from export orientation – and Beijing has already acknowledged that de-industrialization should slow down because it poses a sociopolitical threat (Chart 9). A monetary revolution that strengthens the yuan at the expense of the dollar would force an immediate conclusion to China’s transition away from export-manufacturing. That would be politically destabilizing. Chart 8China Diversifies from USD - But Closed Capital Account Prevents Global RMB China Diversifies from USD - But Closed Capital Account Prevents Global RMB China Diversifies from USD - But Closed Capital Account Prevents Global RMB Chart 9Stronger RMB Would De-Industrialize China At Great Political Risk Stronger RMB Would De-Industrialize China At Great Political Risk Stronger RMB Would De-Industrialize China At Great Political Risk If China or other countries attempt to create a commodity base for their currencies, but simultaneously try to prevent a fixed exchange rate that constrains their money supply, then there will be little difference from a fiat currency regime. Today’s major reserve currency issuers already possess reserves of physical wealth (e.g. commodities) beneath their flexible monetary policy regimes – this dynamic would not inherently change. Of course, Europe, Japan, and the United Kingdom are the leading providers of reserve currencies outside the US and yet they are relatively lacking in commodity reserves. If global investors begin chasing currencies primarily on the basis of commodity reserves, the USD will not suffer the most, as the United States is a resource-rich country. China’s policy and strategy may become clearer after the twentieth party congress this fall, but most likely the current contradictions will persist. China will want to prolong the period of economic engagmeent with the West for as long as possible even as it prepares for a time when engagement is utterly broken. While China knows that the US will pursue strategic containment, and US-China engagement is over, it also knows that European leaders have a different set of interests. They have enough difficulty dealing with Russia and are not eager to expand their sanctions to China. Yet switching from dollar to euro reserves offers China little protection against sanctions in any major confrontation in the coming years. A radical decision by China to buy high and sell low (realize big losses on Treasuries and buy high-priced commodities) would show that Beijing is expecting Russian-style confrontation with the West immediately, which would scare foreign investors away from China. Net foreign direct investment in China has surged since the downfall of the Trump presidency (Chart 10). But that process would reverse as companies saw China going down Russia’s path and disengaging from the global monetary system. In that context, western governments would also penalize their own companies for investing in a geopolitical rival that was apparently preparing for conflict (while buttressing Russia). In short, private capital will flee countries that abandon the global financial system because that would be an economically inefficient decision taken for reasons of state security, and hence it would imply higher odds of conflict. Wealthy nations see China’s and other emerging markets’ foreign exchange reserves as “collateral” against asset seizures and geopolitical risks: if China reduces the collateral, private capital will feel less secure flowing into China.7 Chart 10If China Abandonds USD To Prepare For Sanctions, FDI Will Reverse If China Abandonds USD To Prepare For Sanctions, FDI Will Reverse If China Abandonds USD To Prepare For Sanctions, FDI Will Reverse Ultimately China will try to wean itself off the dollar – but it will keep doing so gradually to avoid a catastrophic social and economic change at home and abroad. This is continuation of post-2008 status quo. An accelerated shift away from USD will be interpreted by global actors as preparation for war (just like Russia’s shift). This will drive investors to swap Chinese assets for American or other assets. History suggests that USD devaluations followed US wars and budget expansions. Investors should wait until the next US military adventure, in Iran or elsewhere, before expecting massive dollar depreciation. If the US pursues an offshore balancing strategy, as it appears to be doing today, then other countries will become less stable and the dollar will remain appealing as a safe haven. Bottom Line: Russia’s and China’s diversification away from the dollar over the past decade has not caused global flight from the dollar. International trust in the economy and government of Russia and China is not very high. The euro, the viable alternative to the dollar, is less attractive in the face of the Ukraine war and broader geopolitical instability. The path toward monetary revolution is for China to open up its capital account, make its currency convertible, and sell USD assets while appreciating the yuan. Yet China’s leaders have not embarked on this course for fear of domestic instability. In lieu of that, the current monetary regime continues.     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see Brussels proposes EU import ban on all Russian oil published by ft.com on May 4, 2022 for summary of the EU's export-ban proposals. 2     Please see our report from March 31, 2022 entitled Germany Closer To Rationing Natgas for further discussion. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    See Obstfeld, Maurice (2020), Global Dimensions of U.S. Monetary Policy, International Journal of Central Banking, 16:1, pp. 73-132. 4    Obstfeld (2020, p. 113). 5    Obstfeld (2020, p. 77-78). 6    Please see Pozsar, Zoltan (2022), "Money, Commodities, and Bretton Woods III," published by Credit Suisse Economics. 7     For the “collateral” interpretation of US dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, see Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter M. Garber, “US Sanctions Reinforce The Dollar’s Dominance,” NBER Working Paper Series 29943, April 2022, nber.org.