Inflation/Deflation

Highlights Chart 1Back To Fair Value February was a terrible month for the bond market. In fact, the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index returned -1.8%, its worst month since November 2016. The 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield rose 37 bps. At 2.19%, it is now fairly valued for the first time since 2019, at least according to survey estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rates (Chart 1). We outlined a checklist for increasing portfolio duration in our Webcast two weeks ago. So far, only two of the five items on our list have been checked. In particular, dollar sentiment and cyclical economic indicators continue to point toward higher yields, even though the market is now priced for a rate hike cycle that is slightly more hawkish than the Fed’s median forecast from December. We anxiously await this month’s revisions to the Fed’s interest rate forecasts. If the Fed’s forecasts remain unchanged from December, then we may get an opportunity to add some duration back into our recommended portfolio. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 65 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +68 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. Though Treasury yields have risen in recent weeks, this does not yet pose a risk for credit spreads. The 5-year/ 5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate remains below 2%. We won’t be concerned about restrictive monetary policy pushing credit spreads wider until it reaches a range of 2.3% to 2.5%. Despite the positive macro backdrop, investment grade corporate valuations are extremely tight. The investment grade corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread is down to its 2nd percentile (Chart 2). This means that the breakeven spread has only been tighter 2% of the time since 1995. The same measure shows that Baa-rated bonds have only been more expensive 3% of the time (panel 3). We don’t anticipate material underperformance versus Treasuries, but we see better value outside of the investment grade corporate space.1 Specifically, we advise investors to favor tax-exempt municipal bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. We also prefer USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereign bonds over investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration. Finally, the supportive macro environment means we are comfortable adding credit risk to a portfolio. With that in mind, we encourage investors to pick up the additional spread offered by high-yield corporates. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 115 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +178 bps. Ba-rated credits outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 111 bps on the month, besting B-rated bonds which outperformed by only 104 bps. The Caa-rated credit tier delivered 138 bps of outperformance versus duration-matched Treasuries. We view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We noted in our 2021 Key Views Special Report that the additional spread earned from moving down in quality below Ba is merely in line with historical averages.2 Assuming a 25% recovery rate on defaulted debt and a minimum required risk premium of 150 bps, we calculate that the junk index is priced for a default rate of 2.3% for the next 12 months (panel 3). This represents a steep drop from the 8.3% default rate observed during the most recent 12-month period. However, only 2 defaults occurred in January, down from a peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, have also fallen dramatically (bottom panel). Overall, we see room for spread compression across all junk credit tiers in 2021 but believe that Ba-rated bonds offer the best opportunity in risk-adjusted terms. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 26 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -2 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries widened 6 bps in February, but it remains low relative to the recent pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 1 bp on the month to 24 bps. This is considerably below the 57 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds and the 42 bps offered by Agency CMBS. It is only slightly above the 22 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. The plummeting primary mortgage spread was a key reason for the elevated refi activity seen during the past year. However, the spread has now recovered back to more typical levels (bottom panel). The implication is that further increases in Treasury yields will likely be matched by higher mortgage rates. This means that mortgage refinancings are likely close to a peak. A drop in refi activity would be a positive development for MBS returns, but we aren’t yet ready to turn bullish on the sector. First, relative OAS valuation favors Aa-rated corporates and Agency CMBS over MBS. Second, the gap between the nominal MBS spread and the MBA Refinance Index remains wide (panel 2) meaning that we could still see spreads adjust higher. Last year’s spike in the mortgage delinquency rate is alarming (panel 4), but it will have little impact on MBS returns. The increase was driven by household take-up of forbearance granted by the federal government. Our US Investment Strategy service has shown that a considerable majority of households will remain current on their loans once the forbearance period ends, causing the delinquency rate to fall back down.3  Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +21 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt underperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 95 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -116 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 31 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +25 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 63 bps in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +203 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 1 bp, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +16 bps. Supranationals underperformed by 2 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +5 bps. We recently took a detailed look at valuation for USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereigns.4 We found that, on an equivalent-duration basis, EM Sovereigns offer a spread advantage versus US corporates for all credit tiers except Ba. We recommend that investors take advantage of this spread pick-up by favoring investment grade EM Sovereigns over investment grade US corporates. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Russia and Colombia. We prefer US corporates over EM Sovereigns in the high-yield space. Ba-rated high-yield US corporates offer a spread advantage over EM Sovereigns and the extra spread available in B-rated and lower EMs comes from distressed credits in Turkey and Argentina. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +102 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads have tightened dramatically during the past few months and Aaa-rated Munis now look expensive compared to Treasuries, with the exception of the short-end of the curve (Chart 6). That said, if we match the duration and credit rating between the Bloomberg Barclays Municipal bond indexes and the US Credit index, we find that both General Obligation (GO) and Revenue Munis appear attractive compared to US investment grade Credit. Both GO and Revenue Munis offer a before-tax spread pick-up relative to US Credit for maturities above 12 years (bottom panel), the same goes for Revenue bonds in the 8-12 year maturity bucket (panel 3). Revenue bonds in the 6-8 year maturity bucket offer an after-tax yield pick-up versus Credit for investors with an effective tax rate above 0.3%. GO bonds in the 8-12 year and 6-8 year maturity buckets offer breakeven effective tax rates of 1% and 10%, respectively. All in all, municipal bond value has deteriorated markedly in recent months and we downgraded our recommended allocation from “maximum overweight” to “overweight” in January. However, investors should still prefer municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with the same credit rating and duration. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields moved up dramatically in February, with the curve steepening out to the 7-year maturity point and flattening thereafter. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 30 bps on the month to reach 130 bps. The 5/30 slope, meanwhile, held steady at 142 bps. Slopes across the entire yield curve traded directionally with yields for the bulk of February. That is, until last Thursday when a surge in bond yields occurred alongside flattening beyond the 5-year maturity point. As a result, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread spiked (Chart 7), moving into positive territory for the first time in a while (panel 4). This curve behavior raises an interesting question. Was last week’s sharp underperformance in the belly a one-off move driven by convexity selling and other technical factors, as many have suggested?5 Or, are we now close enough to a potential Fed liftoff date that we should expect some segments of the yield curve to flatten on days when yields rise? We will be watching the correlations between different yield curve segments and the overall level of yields closely during the next few weeks, but as of today, we think it’s premature to declare that the 5/10 slope has transitioned into a regime where it flattens on days when yields move higher. That being the case, we expect further increases in bond yields to coincide with a falling 2/5/10 butterfly spread, and we retain our recommended position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 39 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +183 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 2 bps on the month to hit 2.17%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 15 bps in February to reach 1.91%. February’s TIPS outperformance was concentrated at the front-end of the curve, as investors started to price-in the possibility of higher inflation during the next year or two that eventually subsides. It’s interesting to note that, despite last month’s surge in bond yields, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell, moving further away from the Fed’s 2.3% to 2.5% target range in the process (Chart 8). The Fed will continue to strive for an accommodative policy stance at least until this target is met. Last month’s price action caused our recommended positions in inflation curve flatteners and real yield curve steepeners to perform very well, but we think further gains are possible in the coming months. The 2/10 CPI swap slope has only just dipped into negative territory (panel 4). With the Fed officially targeting a temporary overshoot of its 2% inflation target, this slope should remain inverted for some time yet. With the Fed also continuing to exert more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, short-maturity real yields will continue to come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +20 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 2 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +13 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 9 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +58 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed last April. This excess savings has still not been spent, and now another round of checks is pushing the savings rate higher again (Chart 9). The large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is very high, with many households using their windfall to pay down debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and take advantage of strong collateral performance by moving down in credit quality. The Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of 2020 does not alter our recommendation. Spreads are already well below the borrowing cost that was offered by TALF, and these tight spread levels are justified by strong household balance sheets. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +87 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 5 bps in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +37 bps. Meanwhile, non-Aaa CMBS outperformed by 75 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +262 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus won’t be negatively impacted. Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +39 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 3 bps on the month to reach 42 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have completely recovered back to their pre-COVID lows, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. This is especially true when you consider the Fed’s continued pledge to purchase as much Agency CMBS as “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of February 26TH, 2021) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of February 26TH, 2021) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 39 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 39 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of February 26th, 2021) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For a look at alternatives to investment grade corporates please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Big Bank Beige Book, January 2021”, dated January 25, 2021, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-25/convexity-hedging-haunts-markets-already-reeling-from-bond-rout?sref=Ij5V3tFi Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation

Highlights Portfolio Strategy The selloff in the long end of the Treasury bond market and related yield curve steepening, rising loan growth and a turnaround in bank net interest margins, all signal that a durable re-rating phase is in the offing in the beaten down financials sector. Soaring real and nominal yields on the back of a US economic reopening, sinking policy uncertainty, and the specter of a countertrend USD rally, all undermine global gold mining stocks. Downgrade to underweight. We deem there is an exploitable opportunity within the reopening theme and we reiterate our recent pair trade recommendation: long USES “Laggards” basket/short USES “Overshooters” basket (excluding the GICS1 sectors). Recent Changes Downgrade the global gold mining index to underweight, today. This move also pushes the S&P materials sector to a neutral allocation. Last week our rolling 2.5% stop was triggered and we booked gains of 17% in the deep cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent that is now on even keel. On February 10, we closed the S&P consumer staples and the S&P homebuilding high-conviction underweights for 8% and -11% returns, respectively, since the December 7 inception. On February 11, we rolled over the synthetic long SPY options structure from March expiry (long $390/$410 call spread/short $340 put) to June expiry (long $400/$420 call spread/short $340 put) netting gains of $5.41/contract or 676% since the January 12 inception. Feature While stocks swiftly gyrated last week and the selloff in Treasury bonds dominated the news flow, the corporate bond market remained as placid as ever. This eerie calmness is slightly unnerving as junk spreads, all the way out to the CCC poor-quality spectrum, have been steadily sinking. But, resurging commodities likely confirm that there is no real reason to panic as global growth remains on an upward trajectory courtesy of pent-up demand that will get unleashed in the back half of the year as the global economy reopens (Chart 1). We recently reinitiated the long “Back-To-Work” basket as the expense of our “COVID-19 Winners” basket and this trade is already up another 21.3% since the second inception on Feb 3, 2021. With regard to monetary policy that remains a key pillar of equity euphoria, the Fed has vociferously signaled that they will not be backing down from QE and their ZIRP policy. The FOMC is not even thinking about thinking about tapering asset purchases, despite a looming inflation spike in the coming months due to base effects and bottlenecks that they vehemently deem transitory. Chart 1Eerie Calm? Importantly, Charts 2 & 3 show that both the ISM’s manufacturing prices paid index and a sideways move in retail gasoline prices predict a surge in headline CPI in the April/May time frame as we first showed in a recent Special Report. Chart 2The Bond Market Is Already… Chart 3…Testing The Fed Tack on a plethora of anecdotes regarding shortages and price hikes in a slew of industries and an inflationary spurt is already here. In more detail, an inflationary impulse is not only evident in chip and car shortages and in container freight shipping rates, but also in dry bulk transport rates. Drilling beneath the surface of the Baltic Dry Index, and looking beyond Capesize carriers, reveals that Panamax and Handysize vessel freight rates are on a tear, probing 11-year highs and more than quadrupling since the March lows (Chart 4). These smaller ships are more nimble and rarely take voyage empty as recent container ships have been when returning to China to reload. Thus, the sizable increase in Handysize and Panamax shipping rates suggests that commodity demand is robust, especially industrial commodities. Returning to US shores, the most recent retail sales report also caused a jump in the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow and the NY Fed’s Nowcast forecasts for Q1 near double digit real GDP growth. For calendar 2021, according to daily data from Bloomberg, economists expect US real GDP growth north of 4.9% (Chart 5). More blow out quarters are in the offing courtesy of the inoculation of the population, the reopening of the economy and persistent government largesse. Chart 4Look Beneath The Surface… Chart 5…And The Economic Recovery Is Gaining Steam… Crudely put, while consumers will not buy 10 coffees or eat 10 meals at a restaurant all at once when the economy fully reopens, they may choose to fly business on their next vacation and indulge on a more lavish hotel. Add on that the hospitality industry specifically has aggressively shut down capacity and an inflationary impulse is likely as consumer purse strings will loosen very quickly. Thus, trust in the Fed’s ultra-dovishness represents the biggest equity market risk in the coming months as the FOMC allows the economy to run hot and there are high odds that the bond market will continue to test the Fed’s resolve. Our sense is that the Fed will initially ignore the spike in inflation, at least until the summer, thus refraining from removing the proverbial “punch bowl”. However, if the market detects any signs of a “less dovish” Fed, especially if high inflation prints persist for whatever reason, risk premia will get repriced a lot higher (Chart 6). Chart 6…But A Lot Of Good News Is Baked In Staying on the topic of interest rates, we have a long-held rule of thumb that stocks cannot stomach more than 100-125bps tightening via a selloff in the 10-year US Treasury bond in a less than a year time frame basis. In other words, were the 10-year US Treasury yield to surpass and stay over 1.55% by March, 2.05% by June, and 1.75% by August, then the equity market will likely suffer a pullback, especially given the absence of a valuation cushion. In fact, last Thursday the 10-year US Treasury yield cleared the 1.6% hurdle and stocks sold off violently. In more detail, we examined data from 2009 onward, therefore only covering the QE era, which would increase the applicability of our analysis. Importantly, the 2009-2011 iterations provide the closest parallels as to what will likely take root this cycle as those instances occurred in a post recessionary environment, which is similar to today. The 2009-2011 period also best aligns with the main reason for having this rule of thumb in the first place: to gauge the risk of interest rates undermining the market by weighing on forward multiples and/or via an economic slowdown because of tightening in monetary conditions. Our analysis shows that while the exact timing and size of the stock market drawdown varies from episode to episode, it is generally consistent with a roughly 10% pullback in the S&P 500 albeit with a 1-2 month lag following the trigger in our rule1 (Chart 7). Chart 7Monitoring Our 100-125bps Rule Of Thumb Keep in mind that such a pullback is consistent with historical precedents when the Fed is actively engaged in QE, with the most recent example being last September’s/October’s 10% drawdown. Our sense is that the ongoing bond market selloff will serve as a catalyst for a continuation/acceleration of the reopening/rotation/reflation trade out of highly valued tech stocks and into more compellingly valued deep and early cyclicals. Such a transition typically proves tumultuous. This week, we update our sanguine view on an early-cyclical sector, and act on the downgrade alert to a deep cyclical sector via downgrading a safe haven commodity index to a below benchmark allocation. Financials Are On Fire Within the GICS1 universe, the most levered sector to interest rates is the S&P financials sector. Given that the bond selloff has staying power, we reiterate our overweight stance on this early-cyclical sector that we fist boosted to an above benchmark allocation on November 16, 2020. Following up from the 100-125bps bond market tightening rule of thumb, adding another layer of complexity via bringing in the yield curve (YC) is instructive. This analysis corroborates our rule of thumb and suggests that not only do 10-year US Treasury yields have more room to rise, but also so does the S&P financials sector, especially given that it is hovering at an extremely depressed level relative to the S&P 500 (Chart 8). Chart 8V-Shaped Recovery? Historically the yield curve peaks at a range of 150 to 250 bps. In the past 7 cycles, this range was in place with only one exception: the first leg of the double dip recession in the early 80s. This represents a stellar track record of where the YC peters out based on empirical evidence. Even in the post GFC world, the YC steepened north of 250bp (thrice) and during the early stages of that recovery. The implication is that if history at least rhymes, then the yield curve can steepen a lot more. Were it to revisit the 250bps level, the YC could nearly double from current levels (Chart 9A). Practically, given that the Fed will pin the 2-year US Treasury yield near zero with a near-term max value of roughly 50bps, this equates to a tentative early-cycle peak 10-year Treasury yield range of 2% to 3%.   Chart 9AYield Curve Can Steepen A Lot More Putting this in perspective, at current levels, the 10-year US Treasury yield is roughly where it stood right after Brexit in mid-2016, which was last cycle’s trough, and still deeply in overvalued territory according to BCA bond valuation model (Chart 9B). Importantly, back then, as now, yields have been late comers to the equity rally. As a reminder, during the manufacturing recession the SPX troughed on Feb 15, 2016 – the day the Royal Dutch Shell / BG Group merger closed – while interest rates bottomed in the first week of July 2016. One key driver of the positive impact of rising interest rates on relative financials share prices will be the end to the banking sector’s hemorrhaging net interest margins (Chart 10). Chart 9BBonds Remain Extremely Overvalued Chart 10NIM Turnaround Looms   Financial services companies represent the nervous system of every economy and a vibrant economy is synonymous with firming loan growth (bottom panel, Chart 11). Beyond the recovery in the broad non-financial corporate sector, the overheating residential housing market in particular is another vital area that is propping up the financials sector (top panel, Chart 11).  All of this suggests that relative profitability will pick up steam this year, a message that our macro-driven relative EPS models also corroborate (second panel, Chart 12). This stands in marked contrast to sell-side analysts’ profit expectations and represents an exploitable trading opportunity: the earnings hurdle is so low for financials that even a modest beat of suppressed EPS growth expectations will go a long way in breathing fresh life into this neglected early-cyclical sector (third & bottom panels, Chart 12). Tack on pent up financials sector buyback demand and a 40bps dividend yield carry versus the SPX and the profit outlook brightens further for this interest rate-sensitive sector. Chart 11Financials Rising Alongside The Economy Finally, relative valuations are bombed out on any metric used (middle, fourth & bottom panels, Chart 13). Granted, relative technicals are not as alluring as last November, however our Technical Indicator is still below overbought levels that have marked prior relative performance peaks (second panel, Chart 13). Chart 12Green Light On Earnings Chart 13Financials Are Cheap No Matter How You Cut It Adding it all up, the selloff in the long end of the Treasury bond market and the associated yield curve steepening, rising loan growth and a turnaround in bank net interest margins signal that a durable re-rating phase looms for the beaten down financials sector. Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the S&P financials sector. Are Gold Miners Losing Their Luster? Last December when we penned the 2021 high-conviction calls Strategy Report, we put global gold miners in the “also rans” section as we did not have the courage to go underweight despite our view of an economic reopening and selloff in the bond market. It is never too late. Today, we use the downgrade alert we issued on the S&P materials sector to trim the sector to neutral via downgrading the global gold mining index to a below benchmark allocation. As a reminder, in mid-January we had put the materials sector on our downgrade watch list as a way to express the move of the cyclicals/defensives portfolio bent back down to even keel. The stock-to-bond (S/B) ratio has broken out to at least a three decade high because stocks are near all-time highs and bonds are selling off violently. This represents an explosive cocktail for gold stocks and is warning that there is ample downside for relative share prices (S/B ratio shown inverted, Chart 14). Chart 14Sell Gold Miners… This is largely due to the definitive reopening of the US economy in the coming quarters (bottom panel, Chart 15). It is also evident in 5-year/5-year forward real yields that have been soaring year-to-date signaling that investors should shy away from gold miners (real yields shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 15). Even nominal yields underscore that the path of least resistance for global gold mining equities points lower, especially given that the recent bond market selloff is driven by the real (i.e. growth) not inflation component. As a reminder, gold bullion and gold miners yield next to nothing thus when real rates rise, the opportunity cost to hold gold and gold miners skyrockets and investors abandon gold miners for higher yielding assets (top panel, Chart 16). The recent fall in the share of global negative yielding bonds by over $4tn also weighs on the prospects of gold miners (bottom panel, Chart 16). Importantly, while we are not calling for the Fed to raise rates any time soon, the 12-month forward fed funds rate discounter (as backed out of the OIS curve) has jumped back to the zero line, opening a wide gap with relative share prices. This is unsustainable and our sense is that this gulf will narrow via a drop in the latter in the coming months (fed funds rate discounter shown inverted and advanced, middle panel, Chart 16). Chart 15…When The Economy Is Roaring Another source of worry for gold stocks is the USD. Historically, a rising greenback pushes gold bullion and gold equities lower and vice versa. If the US economy will rebound at a faster clip than the euro area as the Fed is explicitly taking inflation risk and is allowing the economy to run hot, then at some point the US dollar may start to flex its muscles. Granted, this will likely be a countertrend rally in the context of a USD bear market that commenced last spring, especially given the still lopsided US dollar positioning (Chart 17). Chart 16Rising Rates Are bearish Bullion Chart 17Mighty USA = Countertrend Rally In The USD In addition, US and global policy uncertainties are melting as the US/Sino trade war has been in hibernation, the US elections are behind us and a “Blue Wave” sweep is certain to deliver mega fiscal easing packages, thus exerting downward pressure on the safe haven status of gold bullion and gold mining equities (Chart 18). Finally, the global equity risk premium is in freefall as not only the Fed, but also the ECB, the BoJ, and a plethora of other CB including EM ones are doing QE effectively engineering a “risk on” asset price inflation phase (Chart 18). Nevertheless, our bearish gold mining equity thesis has to contend with oversold conditions and bombed out relative valuations. We will be closely monitoring these two risks and stand ready to act and cut losses in case value oriented buyers come out of left field (Chart 19). Chart 18Mind The Catch Down Phase Chart 19Two Risks To Monitor Netting it all out, soaring real and nominal yields on the back of a US economic reopening, sinking policy uncertainty, and the specter of a countertrend USD rally, all undermine global gold mining stocks. Bottom Line: Downgrade the global gold mining index to underweight today. This move also pushes the S&P materials sector back to the neutral zone. A Few Words On The “Back-To-Work” Trade Last year we created two baskets of stocks to capture the economic reopening theme by constructing a long/short pair trade. This year, we crystallized 21.5% in gains from that pair trade and subsequently reopened it and it is already up another 21.3% since the second inception on February 3, 2021. Two weeks ago, we took a fresh look at the economic reopening theme and pitted “Back-To-Work” laggards against leaders. First, we filtered for well-behaved cyclical industries among all the sectors and sub-sectors we cover. We define a well-behaved cyclical industry as one that trailed the SPX from February 19, 2020 to March 23, 2020; and then outpaced the broad market from March 23, 2020 to today (all computations are in relative to SPX terms). Such filtering excluded all of the defensive & cyclical industries that outperformed the market during the recession, and it also excluded those industries that were too damaged by the pandemic and could not recover above the March 23 trough level (for example, airlines) always in relative terms. Chart 20 is a stylized depiction of our analysis. In total 27 industries survived the filtering. We then computed what is the minimum percentage increase required in order for each group to recover to its February 19 level, and then calculated the difference between that required increase and the one that actually materialized. A positive value signifies that the sector climbed above its February 19 level, whereas a negative value means that the sector still has not recovered. Chart 20Stylized Depiction Of “Back-To-Work” Sectors To Buy And To Avoid… Chart 21 displays the results. Our rationale is as follows: should the economic recovery and normalization themes continue unabated as we expect, then the risk/reward trade-off of owning the “laggards” is greater than the “overshooters”: the former have ample upside potential left, whereas the latter are already discounting a lot of good news. Chart 22 plots the ratio of the two baskets against the ISM manufacturing prices paid sub-component and the 10-year US Treasury yield and supports our rationale that the “laggards” have a long runway ahead versus the “overshooters”. Chart 21…Buy The Laggards / Sell The Overshooters Chart 22Inflation Impulse Beneficiaries Bottom Line: We deem there is an exploitable opportunity within the reopening theme and we reiterate our recent pair trade recommendation: long USES “Laggards” basket/short USES “Overshooters” basket (excluding the GICS1 sectors). As a proxy for this trade we include tickers for the largest stock in each sub-sector (excluding GICS1). Laggards: V, BLK, HCA, MCD, HON, AXP, JPM, COP, PSX, MAR, SLB. Overshooters: EMR, BLL, LIN, NUE, UNP, HD, DHI, CAT, MS, J, TSLA, AMAT. We are aware of some minor conflicts between the “Overshooters” and the “Back-To-Work” basket and also versus our current recommendations table, but we still recommend investors stick with this pair trade.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     A quick note on the taper tantrum and the 2016 iterations. During those periods the S&P 500 actually fell at the same time as yields rose (not after the rule was triggered), so technically we should not have counted that as a valid iteration on our chart.     Current Recommendations Current Trades Strategic (10-Year) Trade Recommendations Size And Style Views February 24, 2021 Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives January 12, 2021  Stay neutral small over large caps June 11, 2018 Long the BCA Millennial basket  The ticker symbols are: (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, ABNB, V). January 22, 2018 Favor value over growth

Highlights The positive correlation between share prices and US bond yields – that has been in place since 1997 – is likely to turn negative. Looking ahead, stock prices will fall when US bond yields rise and will rally when Treasury yields drop. The basis is that the key macro risk to equities is shifting from low inflation/deflation to higher inflation. Global growth stocks will underperform value stocks. US equities will lag international markets. Investment strategies and frameworks that have worked over the past 24 years might require modifications. Feature From 1966 until 1997, US equity prices were negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 1, top panel). Since 1997, US share prices have been positively correlated with US government bond yields. We believe we are now in the process of a major paradigm shift in the stock-bond correlation, reverting to the pre-1997 relationship. Chart 1US Stock-Bond Correlation: Paradigm Shifts In 1966 And 1997 The basis for the 1997 reversal in the stock-bond correlation was a regime shift in the global macro backdrop. Before 1997, the main risk to business cycles and share prices was inflation. From 1997 until very recently, the main risk to equity markets was deflation or very low inflation. The watershed event that triggered this global macro shift from inflation to deflation was the Asian currency devaluation of 1997. The latter followed the Chinese currency devaluations of early 1994 and the Mexican peso’s crash of early 1995 (Chart 2). All these currency devaluations allowed local producers – operating in these large manufacturing hubs – to cut their export prices in US dollar terms. The price reductions unleashed deflationary forces that spread all over the world, including the US. US import prices from emerging Asia ex-China began plummeting in 1997 (Chart 3). Chart 2EM Currency Devaluations Set Off A Deflation Shock In Second Half Of 1990s Chart 3Deflating Asian Export Prices Reinforced Disinflation Trends In US Due to this deflationary shock from EM currency devaluations and other forces (productivity gains, globalization and outsourcing, among others), the US core inflation rate dropped to 2% in 1997 (Chart 3). This marked a regime shift in global equity markets where concerns about deflation, rather than inflation, became the prime focus of investors. Consequently, share prices rallied when bond yields rose, i.e., stock investors cheered stronger growth because the latter meant diminished deflation risks and only a modest inflation pickup.   The positive relationship also prevailed in the period prior to the mid-1960s when inflation was below 2% (Chart 1). Looking ahead, the main risk to share prices, at least in the US, will be higher inflation. As investors gain confidence that US core inflation will exceed 2%, US share prices will once again exhibit a negative correlation with Treasury yields, as they did prior to 1997. Inflation Redux Odds are that US core inflation will rise well above 2%, and could potentially overshoot, over the coming 12-36 months. Chart 4US Core Inflation Lags Business Cycle By About 12 Months Cyclical factors driving core inflation higher in the US are as follows: 1. Core inflation lags the business cycle by about 12 months (Chart 4). A continuous economic recovery points to higher core inflation starting this spring. 2. A combination of surging money supply and a potential revival in the velocity of money heralds higher nominal GDP growth and inflation. It is critical to realize that in contrast to the last decade when the Fed was also undertaking QE programs, US money supply is now skyrocketing, as shown in Chart 5. In the Special Report from October 22, BCA’s Emerging Markets team discussed in depth why US money growth is currently substantially stronger than it was in the post-GFC period. Chart 5An Unprecedented US Broad Money Boom With household income and deposits (money supply) booming due to fiscal transfers funded by the Fed (genuine public debt monetization), the only missing ingredient for inflation to transpire is a pickup in the velocity of money. Lets’ recall: Nominal GDP = Price Level x Output Volume = Velocity of Money x Money Supply Solving the above equation for inflation, we arrive at: Price Level = (Velocity of Money x Money Supply) / (Output Volume) Going forward, the velocity of US money will likely recover, for it is closely associated with consumer and businesses’ willingness to spend. At that point, a rising velocity of money and greater money supply will work together to exert upward pressure on nominal GDP and inflation (Chart 6). Chart 6As Velocity Of Money Rises, Inflation Will Accelerate Chart 7US Goods Prices Are Rising 3. Demand-supply distortions and shortages will lead to higher prices. The pandemic has distorted supply chains while the overwhelming demand for manufacturing goods has, accordingly, produced shortages. US household spending on goods is booming and US core goods prices as well as import prices from emerging Asia, China and Mexico are rising (Chart 7). Lockdowns will likely permanently curtail capacity in some service sectors. Meanwhile, the reopening of the economy will likely release pent-up demand for services. As a result, demand for some services will overwhelm supply and companies will take advantage of this new reality by charging considerably higher prices. Consumers will not mind paying higher prices to enjoy services that were not available to them for 18 months or so. This will lead to higher inflation expectations, which might become engrained. Critically, this could happen even if the unemployment rate is high or the output gap is large. 4. Pandemic-related fiscal stimulus in the US has amounted to 21% of GDP. We reckon this exceeds the lingering output gap that opened up in response to the economic crash last year. In short, US authorities are over-stimulating. On top of cyclical forces, there are several structural forces pointing to higher inflation: Higher concentration in US industries and the consequent reduction in competition create fertile grounds for inflation. Over the past two decades, the competitive structure of many US industries has changed: it has become oligopolistic. Due to cheap financing and weak enforcement of anti-trust regulations, large companies have acquired smaller competitors. Chart 8 shows the number of anti-trust enforcement cases has been in a secular decline and is currently very low. In the recent past, there were slightly more than 100 cases per annum while the 1970s averaged more than 400 cases per annum when the economy was much smaller and industry concentration was much lower than now. In many industries, several dominant players now have a substantial market share. Such a high concentration across many industries raises odds of collusion and price increases where conditions permit. Chart 9 demonstrates a measure of market concentration across all US industries. A higher number indicates higher industry concentration. Presently, we have the highest concentration in 50 years, which creates fertile ground for companies to raise their prices. Notably, the sharp drop in this measure of market concentration in the early 1980s was one of reasons behind the secular disinflation trend that followed. Chart 8In Past 20 Years Antitrust Regulations Have Not Been Reinforced In US Chart 9US Industry Concentration Is At A Record High Chart 10US Demographic Points Towards Higher Wage Inflation   Retirement of baby boomers entails more consumption and less production and is inflationary, ceteris paribus. The US support ratio1 (shown inverted on the chart) portends that the US is transitioning from an environment of low to higher wage growth (Chart 10). This ratio is calculated as the number of workers relative to consumers. This means more consumers exist versus workers available to produce goods and services and, hence, entails higher wages. Higher employee compensation, unless supported by rapid productivity gains, will beget higher inflation.   Government policies targeting faster growth in employee compensation are conducive to higher inflation. One of the Biden administration’s key priorities is to boost wages and reduce income inequality. Unless productivity growth accelerates considerably in the coming years, odds are that labor’s share in national income will rise and companies’ profit margins will be jeopardized. Businesses will attempt to raise prices to restore their profit margins. Provided that income and spending are robust, companies might succeed in raising their prices. In the US, a (moderate) wage-inflation spiral is probable in the coming years.   De-globalization – the ongoing shift away from the lowest price producer – entails higher costs of production and, ultimately, higher prices. US import prices are already rising (Chart 7 above). If the US dollar continues to depreciate, exporters to the US will have no other choice but to raise US dollar prices to protect their profit margins. Bottom Line: The US core inflation rate will rise well above 2% in the coming years. Inflationary pressures will become evident later this year when the economy opens up. The main risk to this view is that technology and automation will boost productivity and allow companies to cut or maintain prices despite rising wages. An Invincible Fed? Many investors are relying on the Fed and other central banks to get things right. Yet, policymakers are not always infallible. We offer several reasons why putting one’s faith squarely in the Fed at present might not be the most appropriate investment strategy.   It is not unusual for central banks and other government agencies to fight previous wars. As long as the same war lingers, the Fed’s vision and strategy will remain adequate and its policies and actions will secure financial and economic stability, to the benefit of both bond and equity markets. Chart 11US Financial Markets Aggregate Volatility However, if we are experiencing a macro paradigm shift from low to higher inflation, the Fed’s strategy and actions will likely prove inadequate, begetting higher financial market volatility, i.e., instability (Chart 11). In brief, if our inflation redux thesis is correct, the Fed will fall behind the inflation curve. In such a scenario, the bond market will continue selling off and rising yields will depress equity valuations.   The Fed is excessively and singularly relying on the output gap models and the Phillips curve to forecast inflation. Yet, inflation is a complex and intricate phenomenon, and it is shaped by numerous cyclical and structural forces beyond the output gap and unemployment. Importantly, the output gap and the Phillip’s curve are theoretical models that do not have great success in real-time forecasting. If these models turn out to be wrong, policy decisions will be suboptimal. Financial markets, which up until now have put their faith in the Fed, will riot. Chart 12Inflation Could Rise And Stay High Amid High Unemployment Interestingly, a popular economic index in the 1970s was the Misery Index, which is calculated as the sum of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate (Chart 12, top panel). The Misery Index was extremely elevated in the 1970s because both unemployment and inflation were high (Chart 12, bottom panel). The point is that inflation can be high alongside elevated unemployment. In its recent report, BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy service argued: “Some of the mistakes that policymakers made during the 60s and 70s were far from obvious at the time. Athanasios Orphanides, who formerly served as a member of the ECB’s Governing Council, has documented that central banks in the US and other major economies systematically overestimated the amount of slack in their economies. They also overestimated trend growth, with the result that they came to see the combination of sluggish growth and seemingly high unemployment as evidence of inadequate demand.”   Inflation is a very inert and persistent phenomenon, and it is not easy to reverse its trajectory. The Fed is now explicitly targeting higher inflation with full confidence that it can easily deal with high inflation when it transpires. We would bet that the Fed will get higher inflation this time, but that high inflation will turn out to be an unpleasant outcome for US policymakers. The basis is that US equity and credit markets are not priced for higher interest rates. By directly and indirectly super-charging equity and bond prices, the Fed has crafted excesses that are vulnerable to higher interest rates (Chart 13). Chart 13US Markets Are Priced To Perfection On the whole, the Fed is set to fall behind the inflation curve as policymakers will be late to acknowledge higher inflation and alter their policy accordingly. This will be bad news for both equity and corporate bond markets that are priced for perfection. The 1960s Roadmap For Financial Markets? There are many similarities between the US macro picture now and as it was in the late 1960s. In the late 1960s: US inflation was subdued, and interest rates were very low in the preceding two-three decades, i.e., inflation expectations were well anchored heading into the second half of the 1960s. America’s fiscal policy was extremely easy, and the budget deficit was swelling. US domestic demand was robust, and the current account deficit was widening. Chart 14FAANGM Now And Nifty-Fifty Mania In The 1960s Finally, US equities were in a long bull market and a dozen large-cap stocks (the Nifty-Fifty) was leading the rally. Notably, the decade-long profile of FAANGM2 stock prices in real terms (adjusted for inflation) resembles that of Walt Disney – one of the leaders of the Nifty-Fifty pack – in the 1960s (Chart 14). The following dynamics of financial markets in the 1960s and 1970s are noteworthy and could serve as a roadmap for the present: In the mid-1960s, US share prices initially ignored rising bond yields. However, obstinately rising Treasury yields eventually led to a major equity sell-off (bond yields are shown inverted on this panel) (Chart 15, top panel). Yet, bond yields continued ascending despite plunging share prices. Chart 151962-1974: Stock Prices, Bond Yields, Business Cycle And Inflation The culprit was US core inflation surging well above 2% in 1966. This marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between equity prices and US Treasury yields. Share prices bottomed in late 1966 only after bond yields began declining. Notably, the S&P 500 fell by 22% in 1966, even though economic growth remained robust (Chart 15, middle panel). Critically, US bond yields in the period from 1966 until the early 1980s were more correlated with the core inflation rate than with the business cycle (Chart 15, middle and bottom panels). In short, sticky and persistent inflation not economic growth was the main worry for both US bond and stock markets from the mid-1960s until the early-1980s.  Presently, the US recovery will continue, and economic growth will be rather robust. However, core inflation will climb well above 2% and US Treasury yields will increase further. At some point, this will upset the equity market. Chart 16US And EM EPS Growth Expectations Are Already Very Elevated A pertinent question for stocks from a valuation standpoint is whether profit growth expectations can continue to increase enough to offset the rise in the discount factor. US equities are already pricing in a lot of earning growth: analysts’ expectations for the S&P 500’s EPS growth are 24% for 2021 and another 15% for 2022. Worth noting is that long-term EPS growth expectations have skyrocketed for both US and EM equities (Chart 16). In short, the main problem with US equities is that their valuations are expensive at a time when inflation and interest rates are set to rise. Investment Strategy The equity rally is entering a risky period. Major shakeouts are likely. Share prices will advance when US bond yields drop, and they will dip when Treasury yields ascend. As and when US share prices drop due to concerns about higher inflation, the Fed will attempt to calm investors arguing that inflation is transitory, and it knows how to deal with it. Stocks and bonds will likely rally on reassurances of this kind. However, financial markets will resume selling off if evidence from the real economy corroborates the thesis of higher inflation. The Fed will again soothe the investment community. Although equity and bond prices might firm up anew, such a rebound might not last long as investors will begin to question the appropriateness of the Fed’s policy. Chart 17No Contrarian Buy Signal For US Treasurys The sell-off in US Treasurys is unlikely to be over for now as traders’ sentiment on government bonds is far from a bearish extreme (Chart 17). Ultimately, to cap inflation, the Fed will have to hike interest rates more than the fixed-income market is currently pricing. This will not go down well with stock or bond markets. Higher US bond yields entail that global growth stocks will underperform global value stocks. The former is much more expensive and, hence, is more vulnerable to a rising discount rate. Global equity portfolios should underweight the US, adopt a neutral stance on EM and overweight Europe and Japan. The market-cap weight of growth stocks is the highest in the US followed by EM. European and Japanese bourses are less vulnerable to rising bond yields. The Fed falling behind the inflation curve is fundamentally bearish for the US dollar. That is why the primary trend for the dollar remains down. However, the greenback is very oversold and a rebound is likely, especially if US yields continue to rise, triggering a period of risk-off in global financial markets.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1This measure was originally shown by BCA’s Global Investment Strategy team and is calculated as the ratio of the number of workers to the number of consumers. The number of workers incorporates age-specific variation in labor force participation, unemployment, hours worked, and productivity while the number of consumers incorporates age-specific variation in needs or wants based on age-specific consumption data. 2An equally-weighted index of Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google (Alphabet) and Microsoft stock prices.    

Highlights The positive correlation between share prices and US bond yields – that has been in place since 1997 – is likely to turn negative. Looking ahead, stock prices will fall when US bond yields rise and will rally when Treasury yields drop. The basis is that the key macro risk to equities is shifting from low inflation/deflation to higher inflation. Global growth stocks will underperform value stocks. US equities will lag international markets. Investment strategies and frameworks that have worked over the past 24 years might require modifications. Feature From 1966 until 1997, US equity prices were negatively correlated with US Treasury yields (Chart 1, top panel). Since 1997, US share prices have been positively correlated with US government bond yields. We believe we are now in the process of a major paradigm shift in the stock-bond correlation, reverting to the pre-1997 relationship. Chart 1US Stock-Bond Correlation: Paradigm Shifts In 1966 And 1997 The basis for the 1997 reversal in the stock-bond correlation was a regime shift in the global macro backdrop. Before 1997, the main risk to business cycles and share prices was inflation. From 1997 until very recently, the main risk to equity markets was deflation or very low inflation. The watershed event that triggered this global macro shift from inflation to deflation was the Asian currency devaluation of 1997. The latter followed the Chinese currency devaluations of early 1994 and the Mexican peso’s crash of early 1995 (Chart 2). All these currency devaluations allowed local producers – operating in these large manufacturing hubs – to cut their export prices in US dollar terms. The price reductions unleashed deflationary forces that spread all over the world, including the US. US import prices from emerging Asia ex-China began plummeting in 1997 (Chart 3). Chart 2EM Currency Devaluations Set Off A Deflation Shock In Second Half Of 1990s Chart 3Deflating Asian Export Prices Reinforced Disinflation Trends In US Due to this deflationary shock from EM currency devaluations and other forces (productivity gains, globalization and outsourcing, among others), the US core inflation rate dropped to 2% in 1997 (Chart 3). This marked a regime shift in global equity markets where concerns about deflation, rather than inflation, became the prime focus of investors. Consequently, share prices rallied when bond yields rose, i.e., stock investors cheered stronger growth because the latter meant diminished deflation risks and only a modest inflation pickup.   The positive relationship also prevailed in the period prior to the mid-1960s when inflation was below 2% (Chart 1). Looking ahead, the main risk to share prices, at least in the US, will be higher inflation. As investors gain confidence that US core inflation will exceed 2%, US share prices will once again exhibit a negative correlation with Treasury yields, as they did prior to 1997. Inflation Redux Odds are that US core inflation will rise well above 2%, and could potentially overshoot, over the coming 12-36 months. Chart 4US Core Inflation Lags Business Cycle By About 12 Months Cyclical factors driving core inflation higher in the US are as follows: 1. Core inflation lags the business cycle by about 12 months (Chart 4). A continuous economic recovery points to higher core inflation starting this spring. 2. A combination of surging money supply and a potential revival in the velocity of money heralds higher nominal GDP growth and inflation. It is critical to realize that in contrast to the last decade when the Fed was also undertaking QE programs, US money supply is now skyrocketing, as shown in Chart 5. In the Special Report from October 22, BCA’s Emerging Markets team discussed in depth why US money growth is currently substantially stronger than it was in the post-GFC period. Chart 5An Unprecedented US Broad Money Boom With household income and deposits (money supply) booming due to fiscal transfers funded by the Fed (genuine public debt monetization), the only missing ingredient for inflation to transpire is a pickup in the velocity of money. Lets’ recall: Nominal GDP = Price Level x Output Volume = Velocity of Money x Money Supply Solving the above equation for inflation, we arrive at: Price Level = (Velocity of Money x Money Supply) / (Output Volume) Going forward, the velocity of US money will likely recover, for it is closely associated with consumer and businesses’ willingness to spend. At that point, a rising velocity of money and greater money supply will work together to exert upward pressure on nominal GDP and inflation (Chart 6). Chart 6As Velocity Of Money Rises, Inflation Will Accelerate Chart 7US Goods Prices Are Rising 3. Demand-supply distortions and shortages will lead to higher prices. The pandemic has distorted supply chains while the overwhelming demand for manufacturing goods has, accordingly, produced shortages. US household spending on goods is booming and US core goods prices as well as import prices from emerging Asia, China and Mexico are rising (Chart 7). Lockdowns will likely permanently curtail capacity in some service sectors. Meanwhile, the reopening of the economy will likely release pent-up demand for services. As a result, demand for some services will overwhelm supply and companies will take advantage of this new reality by charging considerably higher prices. Consumers will not mind paying higher prices to enjoy services that were not available to them for 18 months or so. This will lead to higher inflation expectations, which might become engrained. Critically, this could happen even if the unemployment rate is high or the output gap is large. 4. Pandemic-related fiscal stimulus in the US has amounted to 21% of GDP. We reckon this exceeds the lingering output gap that opened up in response to the economic crash last year. In short, US authorities are over-stimulating. On top of cyclical forces, there are several structural forces pointing to higher inflation: Higher concentration in US industries and the consequent reduction in competition create fertile grounds for inflation. Over the past two decades, the competitive structure of many US industries has changed: it has become oligopolistic. Due to cheap financing and weak enforcement of anti-trust regulations, large companies have acquired smaller competitors. Chart 8 shows the number of anti-trust enforcement cases has been in a secular decline and is currently very low. In the recent past, there were slightly more than 100 cases per annum while the 1970s averaged more than 400 cases per annum when the economy was much smaller and industry concentration was much lower than now. In many industries, several dominant players now have a substantial market share. Such a high concentration across many industries raises odds of collusion and price increases where conditions permit. Chart 9 demonstrates a measure of market concentration across all US industries. A higher number indicates higher industry concentration. Presently, we have the highest concentration in 50 years, which creates fertile ground for companies to raise their prices. Notably, the sharp drop in this measure of market concentration in the early 1980s was one of reasons behind the secular disinflation trend that followed. Chart 8In Past 20 Years Antitrust Regulations Have Not Been Reinforced In US Chart 9US Industry Concentration Is At A Record High Chart 10US Demographic Points Towards Higher Wage Inflation   Retirement of baby boomers entails more consumption and less production and is inflationary, ceteris paribus. The US support ratio1 (shown inverted on the chart) portends that the US is transitioning from an environment of low to higher wage growth (Chart 10). This ratio is calculated as the number of workers relative to consumers. This means more consumers exist versus workers available to produce goods and services and, hence, entails higher wages. Higher employee compensation, unless supported by rapid productivity gains, will beget higher inflation.   Government policies targeting faster growth in employee compensation are conducive to higher inflation. One of the Biden administration’s key priorities is to boost wages and reduce income inequality. Unless productivity growth accelerates considerably in the coming years, odds are that labor’s share in national income will rise and companies’ profit margins will be jeopardized. Businesses will attempt to raise prices to restore their profit margins. Provided that income and spending are robust, companies might succeed in raising their prices. In the US, a (moderate) wage-inflation spiral is probable in the coming years.   De-globalization – the ongoing shift away from the lowest price producer – entails higher costs of production and, ultimately, higher prices. US import prices are already rising (Chart 7 above). If the US dollar continues to depreciate, exporters to the US will have no other choice but to raise US dollar prices to protect their profit margins. Bottom Line: The US core inflation rate will rise well above 2% in the coming years. Inflationary pressures will become evident later this year when the economy opens up. The main risk to this view is that technology and automation will boost productivity and allow companies to cut or maintain prices despite rising wages. An Invincible Fed? Many investors are relying on the Fed and other central banks to get things right. Yet, policymakers are not always infallible. We offer several reasons why putting one’s faith squarely in the Fed at present might not be the most appropriate investment strategy.   It is not unusual for central banks and other government agencies to fight previous wars. As long as the same war lingers, the Fed’s vision and strategy will remain adequate and its policies and actions will secure financial and economic stability, to the benefit of both bond and equity markets. Chart 11US Financial Markets Aggregate Volatility However, if we are experiencing a macro paradigm shift from low to higher inflation, the Fed’s strategy and actions will likely prove inadequate, begetting higher financial market volatility, i.e., instability (Chart 11). In brief, if our inflation redux thesis is correct, the Fed will fall behind the inflation curve. In such a scenario, the bond market will continue selling off and rising yields will depress equity valuations.   The Fed is excessively and singularly relying on the output gap models and the Phillips curve to forecast inflation. Yet, inflation is a complex and intricate phenomenon, and it is shaped by numerous cyclical and structural forces beyond the output gap and unemployment. Importantly, the output gap and the Phillip’s curve are theoretical models that do not have great success in real-time forecasting. If these models turn out to be wrong, policy decisions will be suboptimal. Financial markets, which up until now have put their faith in the Fed, will riot. Chart 12Inflation Could Rise And Stay High Amid High Unemployment Interestingly, a popular economic index in the 1970s was the Misery Index, which is calculated as the sum of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate (Chart 12, top panel). The Misery Index was extremely elevated in the 1970s because both unemployment and inflation were high (Chart 12, bottom panel). The point is that inflation can be high alongside elevated unemployment. In its recent report, BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy service argued: “Some of the mistakes that policymakers made during the 60s and 70s were far from obvious at the time. Athanasios Orphanides, who formerly served as a member of the ECB’s Governing Council, has documented that central banks in the US and other major economies systematically overestimated the amount of slack in their economies. They also overestimated trend growth, with the result that they came to see the combination of sluggish growth and seemingly high unemployment as evidence of inadequate demand.”   Inflation is a very inert and persistent phenomenon, and it is not easy to reverse its trajectory. The Fed is now explicitly targeting higher inflation with full confidence that it can easily deal with high inflation when it transpires. We would bet that the Fed will get higher inflation this time, but that high inflation will turn out to be an unpleasant outcome for US policymakers. The basis is that US equity and credit markets are not priced for higher interest rates. By directly and indirectly super-charging equity and bond prices, the Fed has crafted excesses that are vulnerable to higher interest rates (Chart 13). Chart 13US Markets Are Priced To Perfection On the whole, the Fed is set to fall behind the inflation curve as policymakers will be late to acknowledge higher inflation and alter their policy accordingly. This will be bad news for both equity and corporate bond markets that are priced for perfection. The 1960s Roadmap For Financial Markets? There are many similarities between the US macro picture now and as it was in the late 1960s. In the late 1960s: US inflation was subdued, and interest rates were very low in the preceding two-three decades, i.e., inflation expectations were well anchored heading into the second half of the 1960s. America’s fiscal policy was extremely easy, and the budget deficit was swelling. US domestic demand was robust, and the current account deficit was widening. Chart 14FAANGM Now And Nifty-Fifty Mania In The 1960s Finally, US equities were in a long bull market and a dozen large-cap stocks (the Nifty-Fifty) was leading the rally. Notably, the decade-long profile of FAANGM2 stock prices in real terms (adjusted for inflation) resembles that of Walt Disney – one of the leaders of the Nifty-Fifty pack – in the 1960s (Chart 14). The following dynamics of financial markets in the 1960s and 1970s are noteworthy and could serve as a roadmap for the present: In the mid-1960s, US share prices initially ignored rising bond yields. However, obstinately rising Treasury yields eventually led to a major equity sell-off (bond yields are shown inverted on this panel) (Chart 15, top panel). Yet, bond yields continued ascending despite plunging share prices. Chart 151962-1974: Stock Prices, Bond Yields, Business Cycle And Inflation The culprit was US core inflation surging well above 2% in 1966. This marked a paradigm shift in the relationship between equity prices and US Treasury yields. Share prices bottomed in late 1966 only after bond yields began declining. Notably, the S&P 500 fell by 22% in 1966, even though economic growth remained robust (Chart 15, middle panel). Critically, US bond yields in the period from 1966 until the early 1980s were more correlated with the core inflation rate than with the business cycle (Chart 15, middle and bottom panels). In short, sticky and persistent inflation not economic growth was the main worry for both US bond and stock markets from the mid-1960s until the early-1980s.  Presently, the US recovery will continue, and economic growth will be rather robust. However, core inflation will climb well above 2% and US Treasury yields will increase further. At some point, this will upset the equity market. Chart 16US And EM EPS Growth Expectations Are Already Very Elevated A pertinent question for stocks from a valuation standpoint is whether profit growth expectations can continue to increase enough to offset the rise in the discount factor. US equities are already pricing in a lot of earning growth: analysts’ expectations for the S&P 500’s EPS growth are 24% for 2021 and another 15% for 2022. Worth noting is that long-term EPS growth expectations have skyrocketed for both US and EM equities (Chart 16). In short, the main problem with US equities is that their valuations are expensive at a time when inflation and interest rates are set to rise. Investment Strategy The equity rally is entering a risky period. Major shakeouts are likely. Share prices will advance when US bond yields drop, and they will dip when Treasury yields ascend. As and when US share prices drop due to concerns about higher inflation, the Fed will attempt to calm investors arguing that inflation is transitory, and it knows how to deal with it. Stocks and bonds will likely rally on reassurances of this kind. However, financial markets will resume selling off if evidence from the real economy corroborates the thesis of higher inflation. The Fed will again soothe the investment community. Although equity and bond prices might firm up anew, such a rebound might not last long as investors will begin to question the appropriateness of the Fed’s policy. Chart 17No Contrarian Buy Signal For US Treasurys The sell-off in US Treasurys is unlikely to be over for now as traders’ sentiment on government bonds is far from a bearish extreme (Chart 17). Ultimately, to cap inflation, the Fed will have to hike interest rates more than the fixed-income market is currently pricing. This will not go down well with stock or bond markets. Higher US bond yields entail that global growth stocks will underperform global value stocks. The former is much more expensive and, hence, is more vulnerable to a rising discount rate. Global equity portfolios should underweight the US, adopt a neutral stance on EM and overweight Europe and Japan. The market-cap weight of growth stocks is the highest in the US followed by EM. European and Japanese bourses are less vulnerable to rising bond yields. The Fed falling behind the inflation curve is fundamentally bearish for the US dollar. That is why the primary trend for the dollar remains down. However, the greenback is very oversold and a rebound is likely, especially if US yields continue to rise, triggering a period of risk-off in global financial markets.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1This measure was originally shown by BCA’s Global Investment Strategy team and is calculated as the ratio of the number of workers to the number of consumers. The number of workers incorporates age-specific variation in labor force participation, unemployment, hours worked, and productivity while the number of consumers incorporates age-specific variation in needs or wants based on age-specific consumption data. 2An equally-weighted index of Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google (Alphabet) and Microsoft stock prices.    

Highlights US Treasuries: The uptrend in US Treasury yields has more room to run. However, the primary driver is starting to shift from increased inflation expectations to higher real yields amid greater confidence on the cyclical US economic outlook. Fed Outlook: It is still too soon to expect the Fed to begin signaling a move to turn less accommodative. However, rising realized US inflation amid dwindling spare economic capacity will make the Fed more nervous about its ultra-dovish policy stance in the second half of 2021. This will trigger a repricing of the future path of US interest rates embedded in the Treasury curve, but a Taper Tantrum repeat will be avoided. US Duration: Maintain below-benchmark US duration exposure, with the 10-year Treasury yield likely to soon test the 1.5% level. Feature Chart 1A Cyclical Rise In Global Bond Yields The selloff in global government bond markets that began in the final few months of 2020 has gained momentum over the past few weeks. The benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield now sits at 1.37%, up 45bps so far in 2021, while the 30-year Treasury yield is at a six-year high of 2.22%. Yields are on the move in other countries, as well, with longer-maturity yields moving higher in the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand – even Germany, where the 30yr is now back in positive yield territory at 0.20%, a 34bp increase over the past month alone. The main reason for this move higher in yields can be summed up in one word: “optimism”. Economic growth expectations are improving according to investor surveys like the global ZEW, which is a reliable leading indicator of global bond yields (Chart 1). Falling global COVID-19 case numbers with rising vaccination rates, combined with very large US fiscal stimulus measures proposed by the Biden administration, have given investors hope that a return to some form of pre-pandemic economic normalcy can be achieved later this year. That means faster global growth and a risk of higher inflation, both of which must be reflected in higher bond yields. With the 10-year US Treasury yield now already in the middle of our 2021 year-end target range of 1.25-1.5%, and the macro backdrop remaining bond-bearish, we think it is timely to discuss the possibility that our yield target is too conservative Good Cyclical News Is Bad News For Treasuries The more recent move higher in US Treasury yields is notable because it has not been all about higher inflation breakevens, as has been the case since yields bottomed in mid-2020; real yields are finally starting to inch higher. The 30-year TIPS yield now sits in positive territory at +0.09%, ending a period of negative real yields dating back to the pandemic-induced market shock of last spring (Chart 2). Real yields across the rest of the TIPS curve are also starting to stir, even at the 2-year point, yet remain negative. Thus, the price action has supported one of US Bond Strategy’s Key Views for 2021 that the real yield curve will steepen.1 This uptick in US real yields has occurred alongside a string of positive developments on the US economy, suggesting that improved growth prospects – and what that means for future US inflation and Fed policy - are the key driver. Improving US domestic demand US economic data is not only showing resilience but gaining positive momentum. The preliminary US Markit composite PMI (combining both manufacturing and services industries) for February rose to the highest level in six years (Chart 3). Retail sales in January rose by an eye-popping 5.3% versus the month prior, due in no small part to the impact of government stimulus checks issued in the December pandemic relief package. The Conference Board measure of consumer confidence also picked up in January. The improving trend in US data so far in 2021 is pointing to some potentially big GDP numbers – the New York Fed’s “Nowcast” is calling for Q1 real GDP growth of 8.3%. Chart 2US Real Yields Starting Are Stirring Chart 3US Growing Faster Than Lockdown-Stricken Europe Vaccine rollout success After a sloppy start to the COVID-19 vaccination program in the US, the numbers are starting to improve with 19% of the US population having received at least one dose (Chart 4). Numbers of new cases and hospitalizations due to the virus have been collapsing as well, a sign that new lockdowns can be avoided, particularly in the larger US coastal cities. The vaccination numbers are even higher in the UK, where Prime Minister Boris Johnson this week revealed an ambitious plan to fully reopen the UK economy by June. While the pace of inoculation has been far slower within the euro area and other developed countries like Canada, developments in the US and UK are a hopeful sign that the vaccines can help free the world economy from the shackles of COVID-19. Chart 4The US & UK Leading The Way On The Vaccine Rollout Even more fiscal stimulus Our US political strategists expect the Biden Administration’s $1.9 trillion pandemic relief package (the “American Rescue Plan”) to be passed by the US Senate in mid-March via a simple majority through a reconciliation bill.2 A second bill is likely to be passed this autumn or next spring with a much larger number, potentially up to $8 trillion worth of spending on infrastructure, health care, child care and green projects over the next ten years (Chart 5). These are big numbers for a $21 trillion US economy that will increasingly need less stimulus as lockdowns ease. Chart 5Biden’s Agenda AFTER The American Rescue Plan Chart 6Welcome Back, Inflation? Chart 7Price Pressures From US Manufacturing Bottlenecks The combined impact of fiscal stimulus, accommodative monetary policy, easy financial conditions and fewer pandemic related economic restrictions has the potential to boost US economic growth quite sharply this year. If US GDP growth follows the Bloomberg consensus forecasts, the US output gap will be fully closed by Q1/2022 (Chart 6).That would be a much faster elimination of the spare capacity created by the 2020 recession compared to the post-2009 experience, raising the risk of upside inflation surprises later this year and in 2022. Signs of growing inflation pressures will make many FOMC members increasingly uncomfortable, even under the Fed’s new Average Inflation Targeting strategy where inflation overshoots will be more tolerated. Already, there are signs of sharply increased price pressures in the US economy stemming from factory bottlenecks (Chart 7). US manufacturers have had to deal with pandemic-induced disruptions to supply chains, in addition to the unexpectedly fast recovery of US consumer demand from last year’s recession that left companies short of inventory.3 The ISM Manufacturing Prices Paid index hit a 10-year high in January, fueled by surging commodity prices, which is already showing up in some inflation data. The US Producer Price Index for finished goods jumped 1.3% in January – the largest monthly surge since 2009 – boosting the annual inflation rate to 1.7% from 0.8% the prior month. Chart 8A Boost To US Inflation Coming Soon From Base Effects Chart 9Additional Upside US Inflation Risks Chart 10US Shelter Inflation Set To Bottom Out A pickup in US annual inflation rates over the next few months was already essentially a done deal because of base effect comparisons versus the collapse in inflation during the 2020 COVID-19 recession (Chart 8). Additional inflation pressures stemming from factory bottlenecks could provide an additional lift to realized inflation rates. When looking at the main components of the US inflation data, there is scope for a broad-based pickup that goes beyond simple base effect moves. Core Goods CPI inflation is now rising at a 1.7% year-over-year rate, the highest since 2012, with more to come based on the acceleration of growth in US non-oil import prices (Chart 9). Core Services CPI inflation has plunged during the pandemic and is now growing at a 0.5% annual rate. As the US economy reopens from pandemic restrictions, services inflation should begin to recover and add to the rising trend of goods inflation. This will especially be true if the Shelter component of US inflation also begins to recover in response to a tightening demand/supply balance for US housing (Chart 10). Bottom Line: US Treasury yields are rising in response to positive upward momentum in US economic growth, the likelihood of some pickup in inflation over the next 6-12 months and, most importantly, shifting expectations that the Fed will turn less dovish later this year. Evaluating The Fed’s Next Moves Fed officials have continued to signal that they are not yet ready to consider any change to monetary policy settings or forward guidance on future rate moves. In his semi-annual testimony before US Congress this week, Fed Chair Jerome Powell reiterated that the pace of the Fed’s asset purchases would only begin to slow once “substantial progress” has been made towards the Fed’s inflation and unemployment objectives. Powell also stuck to his previous messaging that the Fed would “continue to clearly communicate our assessment of progress toward our goals well in advance of any change in the pace of purchases”.4 According to the New York Fed’s Primary Dealer and Market Participant surveys for January, however, the Fed is not expected to stay silent on the topic of tapering for much longer. According to the surveys, the Fed is expected to begin tapering its purchases of Treasuries and Agency MBS in the first quarter of 2022 (Chart 11). A full tapering to zero (net of rollovers of maturing debt) is expected by the first quarter of 2023. Clearly, bond traders and asset managers believe that US growth and inflation dynamics will both improve over the course of this year such that the Fed will have little choice but to begin the signaling of tapering sometime before the end of 2021. Chart 11Fed Surveys Expect A Full QE Tapering In 2022 The Fed has been a bit more transparent on the conditions that must be in place before rate hikes would begin. Labor market conditions must be consistent with full employment, while headline PCE inflation must reach at least 2% and be “on track” to moderately exceed that target for some time. On that front, markets believe these conditions will all be met by early 2023, based on pricing in the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve. The first 25bp rate hike is now priced to occur in February 2023 (Chart 12). This is a big shift from the start of the year, when Fed “liftoff” was expected to occur in October 2023. Thus, in a span of just six weeks, interest rate markets have pulled forward the timing of the first Fed rate hike by eight months. Liftoff would occur almost immediately after the Fed was done fully tapering asset purchases, based on the timetable laid out in the New York Fed surveys, although Fed officials have noted that rate hikes could begin before tapering is complete. Chart 12Pulling Forward The Timing Of Future Fed Rate Hikes In our view, the timetable laid out in the New York Fed surveys and in the US OIS curve is not only plausible but probable. If the US economy does indeed print the 4-5% real GDP consensus growth forecasts during the second half of this year, with realized inflation approaching 2% as outlined above, then it will be very difficult for the Fed to justify the need to maintain the current pace of asset purchases. The Fed will want to avoid another 2013 Taper Tantrum by signaling less QE well in advance, to avoid triggering a spike in Treasury yields that could upset equity and credit markets or cause an unwelcome appreciation of the US dollar. However, the New York Fed surveys indicate that the bond market is well prepared for a 2022 taper, so the Fed only has to meet those expectations to prevent an unruly move in the Treasury market. That means the Fed will likely signal tapering toward the end of this year. Chart 13Markets Expect A Negative Real Fed Funds Rate The Fed can maintain caution on signaling the timing of the first rate hike once tapering begins, based on how rapidly the US unemployment rate falls towards the Fed’s estimate of full employment. The median projection from the FOMC’s latest Summary of Economic Projections is for the US unemployment rate to fall to 4.2% in 2022 and 3.7% in 2023, compared to the median longer-run estimate of 4.1%. Thus, if the Fed sticks to current guidance on the employment conditions that must be in place before rate hikes can begin, then liftoff would occur sometime in late 2022 or early 2023 – not far off current market pricing – as long as US inflation is at or above the Fed’s 2% target at the same time. Once the Fed begins rate hikes, the pace of the hikes relative to inflation will determine how high real bond yields can rise. The 10-year TIPS yield has become highly correlated over the past few years to the level of the real fed funds rate (Chart 13). The current forward pricing in US OIS and CPI swap curves indicates that the markets are priced for a negative real fed funds rate until at least 2030. That is highly dovish pricing that will be revised higher once the Fed begins tapering and the market begins to debate the timing and pace of the Fed’s next rate hike cycle. Thus, it is highly unlikely that real Treasury yields will stay as low as implied by the forward curves over the next few years. Bottom Line: It is still too soon to expect the Fed to begin signaling a move to turn less accommodative. However, rising realized US inflation amid dwindling spare economic capacity will make the Fed more nervous about its ultra-dovish policy stance in the second half of 2021. This will trigger a repricing of the future path of US interest rates embedded in the Treasury curve, but a Taper Tantrum repeat will be avoided. How High Can Treasury Yields Go In The Current Move? Our preferred financial market-based cyclical bond indicators are still trending in a direction pointing to higher Treasury yields (Chart 14). The ratio of the industrial commodity prices (copper, most notably) to the price of gold, the relative equity market performance of US cyclicals (excluding technology) to defensives, and the total return of a basket of emerging market currencies are all consistent with a 10-year US Treasury yield above 1.5%. With regards to other valuation measures, the 5-year/5-year Treasury forward rate is already at or close to the top of the range of the longer-run fed funds rate projection from the New York Fed surveys (Chart 15). We have used that range to provide guidance as to how high Treasury yields can go during the current bond bear market. On this basis, longer maturity yields do not have much more upside unless survey respondents start to revise up their fed fund rate expectations, something that could easily happen if inflation surprises to the upside in the back-half of the year. Chart 14Cyclical Indicators Support Rising UST Yields Chart 15A Rapid Move Higher In UST Forward Rates Chart 16This UST Selloff Not Yet Stretched Finally, the rising uptrend in longer-maturity Treasury yields is not overly stretched from a technical perspective (Chart 16). The 10-year yield is currently 55bps above its 200-day moving average, but yields got as high as 80-90bps above the moving average during the previous cyclical troughs in 2013 and 2016. The survey of fixed income client duration positioning from JP Morgan shows that bond investors are running duration exposure below benchmarks, but not yet at the bearish extremes seen in 2011, 2014 and 2017. A similar message can be seen in the Market Vane Treasury Sentiment indicator, which has been falling but remains well above recent cyclical lows. Summing it all up, it appears that the 1.5% ceiling of our 2021 10-year Treasury yield target range may prove to be too low. A move 20-30bps above that is quite possible, although those levels would only be sustainable if the Fed alters the forward guidance to pull forward the timing of rate hikes. We view that as a risk for 2022, not 2021. Bottom Line: Maintain below-benchmark US duration exposure, with the 10-year Treasury yield likely to soon test the 1.5% level.     Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "2011 Key Views: US Fixed Income", dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research US Political Strategy Weekly Report, "Don’t Forget Biden’s Health Care Policy", dated February 17, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com. 3https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumer-demand-snaps-back-factories-cant-keep-up-11614019305?page=1 4https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/powell20210223a.htm Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights US inflation is set to increase sharply over the coming months as base effects kick in. Higher fuel prices, fiscal stimulus, and the partial relaxation of lockdown measures should also boost inflation. The Fed is unlikely to react hawkishly to higher inflation, arguing that it is largely transitory in nature. While the Fed’s relaxed attitude towards inflation risks may be justified in the near term, there is a high probability that inflation will get out of hand later this decade. Contrary to conventional wisdom, many of the factors that led to high inflation in the 1970s could reassert themselves. Investors should overweight stocks for now, but be prepared to reduce equity exposure in about two years. US Inflation Has Bottomed US inflation surprised on the downside in January. The core CPI was flat on the month, compared with the consensus estimate for an increase of 0.2%. We expect US inflation to move higher over the coming months. The weakness in January’s inflation print was concentrated in sectors of the economy that have been hard hit by the pandemic. Airline fares dropped 3.2%, hotel rates fell 1.9%, and entertainment admission prices declined 5.5%. Prices in these sectors should rise on a year-over-year basis as base effects kick in (Chart 1). The relaxation of lockdown measures should also help to partially restore demand in these areas. WTI crude prices have risen 70% since the end of October. Rising energy prices should push up headline inflation, with some bleed-through to core prices. Chart 2 shows that there is a strong correlation between gasoline prices and headline inflation. If gasoline prices evolve in line with what is predicted by the futures market, headline inflation could temporarily rise to 4% this spring. Chart 1Base Effects Will Push Inflation Higher Chart 2Strong Link Between Gasoline Prices And Headline Inflation   In addition, the lagged effects from a weaker dollar should translate into higher goods prices in the US (Chart 3). A stronger labor market and a slower pace of rent forgiveness should also boost housing inflation (Chart 4).  Chart 3A Weaker Dollar Will Be A Tailwind For Inflation Chart 4Stronger Labor Market Will Boost Housing Inflation Fiscal stimulus should further supercharge demand, adding to inflationary pressures. Ironically, Republican unwillingness to offer modest, politically palatable cuts to President Biden’s proposed aid bill has opened the door to the Democrats ramming through the entire $1.9 trillion package via the reconciliation process. As we discussed last week, the amount of stimulus in the pipeline easily dwarfs the size of the output gap.   From Reflation To Inflation? Deflation is bad for stocks, just as is high and accelerating inflation. Somewhere between deflation and inflation, however, lies reflation. Reflation is good for stocks. Chart 5Inflation Expectations Have Recovered But Are Still Below Levels That Would Cause Concern For The Fed We are currently in a reflationary Goldilocks zone, where inflation expectations have risen but not by enough to force the Fed’s hand. There is a high probability we will stay in this Goldilocks zone for the remainder of the year. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate is still below the level that the Fed regards as consistent with its long-term inflation objective, and even farther below the level that would cause the Fed to panic (Chart 5). Jay Powell told The Economic Club of New York last week that the Fed is unlikely to “even think about withdrawing policy support” anytime soon. The Fed minutes released on Wednesday echoed this view. That ‘70s Show? The path to higher interest rates is lined with lower interest rates. A period of ultra-easy monetary policy can sow the seeds for economic overheating, rising inflation, and ultimately, much higher interest rates. Since this is precisely what happened during the 1970s, it is prudent to ask whether something like that could happen again. Investors certainly do not believe a replay of the 70s is in the cards, at least if long-term CPI swaps are any guide (Chart 6). Yet, we think that a 1970s-style inflationary episode is a greater risk than most investors realize. As we discuss below, much of what investors believe about how inflation emerged during that period is either based on myths, or at best, half-truths. Let’s examine each of these misconceptions in turn. Myth #1: High inflation in the 1970s was primarily driven by supply disruptions, with oil shocks being the most prominent. Fact: Oil shocks exacerbated the inflation problem in the 1970s, but it was an overheated economy that permitted inflation to rise in the first place. Inflation took off in 1966, seven years before the first oil shock. By 1969, core CPI inflation was running at close to 6% (Chart 7). Chart 6Investors Do Not Expect Inflation To Vault Higher Chart 7Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s   Similar to today, fiscal policy was exceptionally accommodative in the mid-1960s. The escalation of the Vietnam War produced a surge in military expenditures. Social spending rose dramatically with the introduction of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” programs. Medicare and Medicaid took effect in July 1966. Amy Finkelstein has estimated that Medicare, the larger of the two health care programs, led to a 37% increase in real hospital expenditures between 1965 and 1970. Johnson’s “guns and butter” policies caused government spending to surge in the second half of the decade. The budget deficit, which was broadly balanced during the first half of the 60s, swelled to 4% of GDP (Chart 8). As fiscal policy was loosened, the economy began to overheat. The unemployment rate fell to 3.8% in 1966, two percentage points below what economists later concluded had been its full-employment level. Chart 8US "Guns And Butter" Policies In The 1960s Caused Government Spending To Swell Myth #2: The Phillips curve is much flatter today. Chart 9The Increase In Inflation In 1966 Was Broad-Based Fact: The Phillips curve was also flat during the 1960s. Core inflation was remarkably stable during the first half of the 60s, averaging about 1.5%, even as the unemployment rate steadily declined. Then, starting in 1966, core inflation more than doubled within the span of ten months. As Chart 9 illustrates, the sudden spike in inflation in 1966 was fairly broad-based. A “kink” in the Phillips curve had been reached. That the relationship between inflation and unemployment turned out to be non-linear is not surprising. As long as there is some slack in the labor market, employers are likely to resist raising wages. Thus, a decline in unemployment from a high level to a merely moderate level is unlikely to lead to meaningful wage inflation. It takes a truly overheated labor market – one that forces firms to engage in a tit-for-tat battle to entice workers – for the relationship between unemployment and inflation to reassert itself. In the near term, there is little risk that the US economy will reach a kink in the Phillips curve. Jason Furman estimates that the unemployment rate stood at 8.3% in January if one adjusts for the drop in labor force participation and methodological problems with how the BLS defines temporarily furloughed workers. This is well above the level that could trigger a price-wage spiral. Chart 10Is The Phillips Curve Really Dead? Yet, it would be naïve to think that such a spiral could not materialize in a few years. As Chart 10 shows, over the past 40 years, every time the US labor market was on the cusp of overheating, something would invariably come along to push up unemployment. Last year, it was the pandemic. In 2008, it was the Global Financial Crisis. In 2000, it was the dotcom bust. In the early 1990s, it was the collapse in commercial real estate prices following the Savings and Loan Crisis. Admittedly, only the pandemic qualifies as a truly exogenous shock. The preceding three recessions were fomented by growing economic imbalances, which were ultimately laid bare by a Fed hiking cycle. One can debate the degree to which the US economy is suffering from non-pandemic related imbalances today, but one thing is certain: The Fed is not keen on raising rates anytime soon. Thus, whatever imbalances exist today may not be exposed before the economy has had the chance to overheat. Myth #3: Inflation expectations are better anchored these days. Chart 11Long-Term Bond Yields Lagged Inflation During The 1960s Fact: Inflation expectations certainly became unmoored in the 1970s. However, there is not much evidence that expectations were adrift prior to the sudden increase in inflation in 1966. At the time, the US had not experienced a major episode of inflation since the Civil War. While long-term bond yields did rise in the second half of the 60s, they generally lagged inflation, suggesting that investors were caught off-guard (Chart 11). It should also be noted that the US and other major economies operated under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates during the 1960s. Each US dollar was convertible into gold at the official rate of $35 per ounce. The existence of this quasi-gold standard helped anchor inflation expectations. The system began to fall apart in the late 1960s as inflation rose. When President Nixon suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold in August 1971, the US CPI had already increased by nearly 30% from its 1965 level. While the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s undoubtedly caused inflation expectations to become further unhinged, the breakdown of the system would not have occurred if inflation had not risen in the first place. Myth #4: Widespread wage indexation and powerful trade unions fueled an acceleration in the 1960s. Fact: Just as was the case with the unmooring of inflation expectations, wage indexation was more a response to rising inflation than a cause of it. Chart 12 shows that the share of workers covered by cost of living adjustments only jumped after inflation had accelerated. Chart 12Higher Inflation Led To More Inflation-Indexed Wage Contracts, Not The Other Way Around As far as unions are concerned, the US unionization rate peaked by the end of the 1950s and was already on a downward path when inflation began to rise. Revealingly, Canada experienced a similar decline in inflation as the US in the early 1980s even though unionization rates remained elevated (Chart 13). This suggests that union power was not a dominant driver of inflation. Chart 13Inflation Fell In Canada, Despite A High Unionization Rate   Myth #5: Today’s globalized economy will limit inflationary pressures. Fact: The empirical evidence generally suggests that the impact of globalization on US inflation has been smaller than widely supposed.1 This is not surprising. The US is a fairly closed economy. Imports account for only 15% of GDP. As a result, a fairly large change in relative prices is necessary to prompt Americans to shift a meaningful fraction of their expenditures towards foreign-made goods. Such a shift in spending would require a real appreciation of the US dollar. A real appreciation could occur either if US inflation exceeds inflation abroad or if the nominal value of the dollar strengthens against other currencies. (Admittedly, the standard terminology can be a bit confusing; just think of a real US dollar appreciation as anything that makes the US economy less competitive). Here’s the thing though: The US dollar is unlikely to strengthen unless the Federal Reserve starts to sound more hawkish. If the Fed remains in the dovish camp, real rates could fall as inflation edges higher. This will put downward pressure on the dollar, leading to a smaller trade deficit and even more aggregate demand.  Myth #6: Demographics are much more deflationary now than they were in the past. Fact: Demographic trends arguably did help push down inflation over the past few decades. However, population aging is likely to boost inflation going forward. Chart 14 shows that the ratio of workers-to-consumers in the US and around the world – the so-called “support ratio” – rose steadily in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s as more women entered the labor force and the number of dependent children per household declined. An increase in the ratio of workers-to-consumers is equivalent to an increase in the ratio of production-to-consumption. A rising support ratio is thus deflationary. More recently, however, the support ratio has begun to decline as baby boomers retire but continue to spend. Consumption actually increases in old age once health care spending is included in the tally (Chart 15). As production falls in relation to consumption, inflation could rise. Chart 14Support Ratios Are Declining Globally After Rising Steadily For Three Decades Chart 15Consumption Increases In Old Age Once Health Care Spending Is Factored In   Myth #7: Today’s fast pace of technological innovation will keep inflation down. Chart 16Total Factor Productivity Growth Is Lower Than It Was During The Great Inflation Fact: Total factor productivity growth – a broad measure of innovation – is not just low by historic standards today; it is lower than during the period of the Great Inflation spanning from 1966 to 1982 (Chart 16). Some have argued that productivity growth is mismeasured. We have examined this argument in the past and found it wanting. In any case, economic theory does not necessarily say that technological innovation should be deflationary. Economic theory states that faster innovation should lead to higher real incomes. It does not say whether the increase in real income should come via rising nominal income or falling inflation. Indeed, to the extent that faster innovation leads to higher potential GDP growth, it could fuel inflation. This is because stronger trend growth will tend to raise the neutral rate of interest, implying that monetary policy will become more stimulative for any given policy rate. Myth #8: Policymakers have learned from their mistakes. It is easy to dismiss this claim, but it is worth considering it seriously. Some of the mistakes that policymakers made during the 60s and 70s were far from obvious at the time. Athanasios Orphanides, who formerly served as a member of the ECB’s Governing Council, has documented that central banks in the US and other major economies systematically overestimated the amount of slack in their economies (Chart 17). They also overestimated trend growth, with the result that they came to see the combination of sluggish growth and seemingly high unemployment as evidence of inadequate demand. Chart 17Central Banks Overestimated The Degree Of Slack In Their Economies During The Great Inflation Is it possible that economic analysis has improved so much over the past 40 years that such mistakes would not be repeated today? Perhaps, but it is worth noting that not only did most economists fail to predict the productivity boom in the late 1990s, most were not even aware that it had happened until after it had ended. Knowing what is happening to the economy in real time is hard enough. Predicting what will happen to such things as trend growth and the natural rate of unemployment is even more difficult. Myth #9: The Fed is a lot more independent now. Fact: We will only know for sure when this independence is tested. History clearly shows that inflation tends to be higher in countries which lack independent central banks (Chart 18). The Fed’s independence was compromised in the 1970s. In his exhaustive study of the Nixon tapes, Burton Abrams documented how Richard Nixon sought, and Fed Chairman Arthur Burns obligingly delivered, an expansionary monetary policy in the lead-up to the 1972 election. Chart 18Inflation Is Higher In Countries Lacking Independent Central Banks Starting with the appointment of Paul Volcker, the Fed sought to regain its independence. Most recently, Jay Powell publicly resisted Donald Trump’s efforts to prod the Fed to ease monetary policy. Yet, the Fed’s independence may turn out to be illusory. The Fed wasted little time in slashing rates and relaunching its QE program once the pandemic began. But will it be as quick to tighten monetary policy if inflation starts getting out of hand? Jay Powell’s four-year term as chair runs through February 2022. He will need to stay in Joe Biden’s good graces if he hopes to be reappointed to a second term. The fact that government debt levels are so high further complicates matters. Higher interest rates would force the government to shift funds from social programs towards bond holders. Will the Fed raise rates even if it faces strong political opposition? Time will tell. Investment Conclusions Chart 19Social Unrest Can Fuel Inflation While no two periods are exactly the same, there are a number of striking similarities between the late 1960s and the present day. As is the case today, fiscal policy was highly expansionary back then. The same goes for monetary policy: Just like today, the Fed kept interest rates well below the growth rate of the economy. In the 1960s, the Federal Reserve was still focused on avoiding a repeat of the Great Depression and the deflationary wave that accompanied it. Today, the Fed is equally focused on reflating the economy. The 1960s was a decade of rising political and social unrest. Crime rates went through the roof, a trend that was eerily matched by rising inflation rates (Chart 19). Early estimates suggest that the US homicide rate jumped by 37% in 2020 – easily the largest one-year increase on record. As was the case in the 1960s, most of the news media has ignored this disturbing development. What should investors do? Our tactical MacroQuant model is flagging some near-term risks for stocks. Nevertheless, as long as the economy is growing solidly and the Fed remains on the sidelines, it is too early for investors with a 12-month horizon to bail on equities. Instead, equity investors should favor sectors that could benefit from higher inflation. Commodity producers are a natural choice. Banks could also gain from an uptick in inflation. Chart 20 shows the remarkably strong correlation between the performance of US banks relative to the S&P 500 and the 10-year Treasury yield. Higher bond yields would boost bank net interest margins, leading to higher profits. Banks are also very cheap and have started to see their earnings estimates rise faster not only relative to the broader market but even relative to tech stocks (Chart 21). Chart 20Bank Shares Are A Buy (I) Fixed-income investors should keep duration risk low. They should also favor inflation-protected securities over nominal bonds. Chart 21Bank Shares Are A Buy (II) Looking further out, the secular bull market in stocks will end when inflation rises to a high enough level that even the Fed cannot ignore. That day will arrive, but probably not for another two years.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Globalization is often cited as a potential reason behind low inflation in advanced economies, including the US. However, a number of empirical studies have found that globalization did not play a major role. In general, domestic economic conditions are seen as the main factor in the inflation process. Please see Jane Ihrig, Steven B. Kamin, Deborah Lindner, and Jaime Marquez, “Some Simple Tests of the Globalization and Inflation Hypothesis,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (International Finance Discussion Papers No. 891) (April 2007); Laurence M. Ball, “Has Globalization Changed Inflation?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series 12687 (November 2006), and associated blog post “Has Globalization Changed Inflation?” National Bureau of Economic Research,  (June 2007); Janet. L. Yellen, 'Panel discussion of William R. White “Globalisation and the Determinants of Domestic Inflation”,' Presentation to the Banque de France International Symposium on Globalisation, Inflation and Monetary Policy (March 2008); Fabio Milani, “Global Slack And Domestic Inflation Rates: A Structural Investigation For G-7 Countries,” Journal of Macroeconomics, (32:4) (2010); and and Lei Lv, Zhixin Liu, and Yingying Xu, “Technological progress, globalization and low-inflation: Evidence from the United States,” PLoS ONE, (14:4), (April 2019).   Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (today at 10:00 AM EST, 3:00 PM GMT, 4:00 PM CET, 11:00 PM HKT). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist  

Highlights The amount of fiscal stimulus in the pipeline is more than enough to close the US output gap. Inflation is likely to surprise on the upside this year. The Fed will brush off any evidence of economic overheating during the coming months, stressing the “transitory” nature of the problem. Still, long-term bond yields, over which the Fed has less control, will rise. As long as bond yields move higher in conjunction with improving growth expectations, stocks will remain in an uptrend. The bull market in equities will only end when the Fed starts to sound more hawkish. That is not in the cards for the next 12 months at least. Stimulus Smackdown During the past month, a debate has erupted over how much additional fiscal stimulus the US economy needs. The side arguing that the sea of red ink has gotten too deep includes an unlikely cast of characters like Larry Summers, who has famously contended that sustained large budget deficits are necessary to stave off secular stagnation. It also includes Olivier Blanchard, who previously served as the IMF’s chief economist and pushed the multilateral lender to abandon its historic adherence to fiscal austerity. Chart 1Generous Government Transfers Boosted Household Savings Rather than citing debt sustainability concerns, these newfound stimulus skeptics worry that large-scale fiscal easing at the present juncture risks overheating the economy. They point out that President Biden’s proposed $1.9 trillion package, coming on the heels of the $900 billion stimulus bill Congress passed in late December, would inject another 13% of GDP into the economy, on the back of the lagged boost from the first stimulus package. We estimate that US households had accumulated $1.5 trillion in excess savings (7% of GDP) as of the end of 2020, thanks to the fiscal transfers they received under the CARES Act (Chart 1). US real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2020 was 2.5% below its level in the fourth quarter of 2019. Assuming trend growth of 2%, this implies that the output gap – the difference between what the economy is capable of producing and what it actually is producing – has widened by about 4.5% of GDP since the onset of the pandemic.   The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) believes the US economy was operating 1% above potential in Q4 of 2019, suggesting that the output gap is around 3.5% of GDP. As it has in the past, the CBO is probably understating the amount of slack in the economy. Our guess is that the US was close to full employment in the months leading up to the pandemic, which implies that the output gap is currently somewhere between 4% and 5% of GDP. While fairly large in absolute terms, it is still smaller than the amount of stimulus currently in the pipeline. Gentle Jay Not So Worried About Overheating Stimulus advocates argue that households will continue to use stimulus checks to fortify their balance sheets, rather than rush out to spend the windfall. They also note that unemployment payments will come down if the labor market recovers more quickly than projected. And even if the economy does temporarily overheat, “so what” they say. The Fed has been trying to engineer an inflation overshoot for years. Now is its chance. Jay Powell seems to sympathize with this thesis. Speaking at a virtual conference organized by The Economic Club of New York this week, Powell repeated his call for fiscal easing and told attendees that the Fed is unlikely to “even think about withdrawing policy support” anytime soon. His words echo remarks made at the press conference following January’s FOMC meeting, where he said “I’m much more worried about falling short of a complete recovery and losing people’s careers,” before adding: “Frankly, we welcome slightly higher inflation.” Most other FOMC members have struck a similar tone. Earlier this year, Fed Governor Lael Brainard noted that “The damage from COVID-19 is concentrated among already challenged groups. Federal Reserve staff analysis indicates that unemployment is likely above 20 percent for workers in the bottom wage quartile, while it has fallen below 5 percent for the top wage quartile.” How Big Is The Fiscal Multiplier From Stimulus Checks? Chart 2Service Inflation Fell During The Pandemic, While Goods Inflation Rose One of the reasons that households saved much of last year’s stimulus checks was because there was not much to spend them on. Officially measured service inflation was well contained last year, but many services were simply not available for purchase. In contrast, goods prices, which usually fall over time, rose (Chart 2). As the economy opens up, total spending will recover. Rising household spending will have a multiplier effect. The simplest version of the Keynesian multiplier for fiscal transfer payments is equal to MPC/(1-MPC), where MPC is the marginal propensity to consume. Assuming that households initially spend 50 cents of every dollar they receive, the multiplier would be 0.5/(1-0.5)=1. In other words, every dollar of direct stimulus payments will eventually generate one additional dollar of aggregate demand. One could argue that this multiplier estimate overstates the impact on demand because it ignores the fact that households will regard stimulus checks as one-time payments rather than a continuous flow of income. One could also point out that taxes and imports will cut into the multiplier effect on domestic spending. There is truth to all these arguments, but they are not as compelling as they seem. According to a recent US Census study, only 37% of Americans reported no difficulty in paying for usual household expenses during the pandemic. A mere 16% of workers with incomes below $35,000 reported no difficulty, compared with more than two-thirds of workers with incomes above $100,000 (Chart 3). In the euphemistic parlance of economics, most US households are “liquidity constrained,” meaning that they are likely to spend a large chunk of any income they receive, even if it is a one-off grant.1 Chart 3The Pandemic Has Put A Spotlight On The Liquidity Constraints Of US Households As for taxes, while the income from subsequent spending will be taxed, the stimulus checks that households receive will remain untaxed. Granted, some of the demand generated by stimulus checks will leak abroad in the form of higher imports. However, keep in mind that the US is a fairly closed economy – imports account for only 15% of GDP. Moreover, the full impact on imports depends on what happens to the value of the dollar. If the Fed keeps rates unchanged but inflation rises, the accompanying decline in short-term real rates could weaken the dollar, curbing imports and boosting exports in the process. This could lead to a higher multiplier rather than a lower one. Lastly, higher consumption is likely to boost corporate capex, as companies scramble to raise capacity in anticipation of strong demand (Chart 4). Economists call this the “accelerator effect.” Investment spending is 2.5-times as volatile as consumption. Hence, even modest increases in consumption can trigger large increases in investment. Chart 4Stronger Consumption Tends To Boost Capex Unemployment Benefits: Adding To Aggregate Demand But Subtracting From Supply? As Chart 5 shows, stimulus payments to households account for 17% of the December stimulus bill and 26% of Biden’s proposed package for a combined total of around $650 billion (3% of GDP, or around two-thirds of the current output gap). The balance consists of expanded unemployment benefits, health and education funding, support for small businesses, and aid to state and local governments. Chart 5Stimulus Package Breakdowns Unemployment benefits are likely to be spent fairly quickly since, in most cases, they replace lost income that had previously been used to finance consumption. More generous unemployment benefits could temporarily reduce aggregate supply. Higher federal unemployment benefits would more than offset the lost income of close to half of jobless workers, potentially creating a disincentive to seek employment. Inflation Expectations Will Continue To Rise Aggregate demand is likely to outstrip the economy’s supply-side potential over the coming months. Hence, inflation will probably surprise on the upside this year, although not by enough to force the Fed to abandon its easy money stance. Inflation expectations have recovered since the depths of the pandemic. However, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate is still below the level that BCA’s bond strategists believe the Fed regards as consistent with its long-term inflation objective, and even farther below the level that would cause the Fed to panic (Chart 6). This suggests that the Fed will brush off any evidence of overheating during the coming months, stressing the “transitory” nature of the problem. Still, rising inflation expectations will push up long-dated bond yields. At present, the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield stands at 1.89%. This is below the median estimate of the long-run equilibrium fed funds rate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Primary Dealers (Chart 7). With policy rates on hold, higher long-term bond yields will translate into steeper yield curves. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to rise to 1.5% by the end of the year from the current level of 1.16%, with risks to yields tilted to the upside. Chart 6Inflation Expectations Have Recovered But Are Still Below Levels That Would Cause Concern For The Fed Chart 7Forward Treasury Yields Are Below Primary Dealers' Projections   Can Stocks Stand The Heat? To what extent will higher bond yields hurt stocks? To get a sense of the answer, it is useful to consider a dividend discount model. The simplest model, the Gordon Growth Model, says that the price of a stock, P, should equal the dividend that it pays, D, divided by the difference between the long-term discount rate, r, and the expected dividend growth rate, g:   We can write the discount rate as the combination of the long-term risk-free rate and the equity risk premium such that r = rf + ERP and then solve for the dividend yield:     Note that the value of the stock market becomes increasingly sensitive to changes in the risk-free rate when the dividend yield is low to begin with. For example, if the dividend yield is 2%, a 10-basis-point rise in the long-term risk-free rate will push down stock prices by 5%. In contrast, if the dividend yield is 1%, a 10-basis-point rise in the long-term risk-free rate will push down stock prices by 10%. Today, dividend and earnings yields for most global equity sectors are quite low, although not as low as they were in 2000 (Chart 8). Watch The Correlation Between  r  And  g The fact that dividend and earnings yields are below their long-term average does make stocks vulnerable to a rise in bond yields. This is especially the case for relatively expensive equity sectors such as tech and consumer discretionary. Nevertheless, there is an important mitigating factor at work: Increases in the risk-free rate have generally been accompanied by stronger growth expectations. Chart 9 shows that S&P 500 forward earnings estimates have moved in lockstep with the 10-year Treasury yield, a proxy for the long-term risk-free rate. Chart 8Global Dividend And Earnings Yields Are Quite Low, Although Not As Low As In 2000 Chart 9Earnings Estimates Move In Lockstep With Bond Yields   This suggests that the main danger to equity investors is not higher bond yields per se, but a rise in bond yields in excess of upward revisions to growth expectations, or worse, against a backdrop of faltering growth. Such a predicament could eventually manifest itself. However, it is only likely to happen when the Fed turns hawkish. This is not in the cards for the next 12 months at least.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  The difficulty that many households have had in making ends meet predates the pandemic. For example, in May 2019, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau found that about 40% of US consumers claimed that they had difficulty paying bills and expenses. Among those with annual household incomes of $20,000 or less, difficulties were experienced by 6 out of 10 people. Moreover, about half of consumers reported that they would be able to cover expenses for no more than two months if they lost their main source of income by relying on all available sources of funds, including borrowing, savings, selling assets, or even seeking help from family and friends. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores

Dear client, On behalf of the China Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a very happy, healthy, and prosperous Chinese New Year of the Ox (Bull)! Gong Xi Fa Chai, Jing Sima, China Strategist   Highlights A projected 8% increase in China’s real GDP for 2021 will not be an acceleration from the V-shaped economic recovery from the second half of last year. Excluding an exceptionally strong year-over-year economic expansion in Q1, the average growth in the rest of this year will be slower than in 2H20, which implies China’s economic growth momentum has already passed its peak. On a quarter-over-quarter basis, an expected 18% annual growth in Q1 would mean that China’s economic growth momentum has moderated from Q4 last year. Chinese policymakers are not in a hurry to press the stimulus accelerator again, with good reason. Commodity and risk-asset prices will be the most vulnerable to a weakened demand growth.   Feature China’s real GDP is expected to grow by more than 8% this year, which would be a significant improvement over last year’s 2.3%.1 However, it is misleading to compare this year’s growth with that of 2020 as a whole. The first three months of this year will undergo an exceptionally high year-on-year growth (YoY) rate due to the deep contraction experienced in Q1 last year. An 8% annual growth for 2021 would imply that the rate of economic expansion in the rest of this year will be slower than the sharp recovery in 2H20.  From a policy perspective, an 8% real GDP growth in 2021 implies an average rate of 5% over the 2020-2021 period, within the long-term growth range targeted in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan - this removes policymakers’ incentives to further stimulate the economy. The annual National People's Congress (NPC) in early March should provide clues about the government's growth priorities and policy directions. If policymakers set 2021’s real GDP growth target at around 8%, our interpretation is that Chinese leaders are not looking to accelerate growth beyond where it ended in 2020. Major equity indexes are already richly valued. A moderating growth momentum from China will weigh on commodity and risk asset prices, both in China and globally.  We reiterate our view that downside risks are high in the near term; the market could take the easing demand growth from China as a reason for a long overdue correction. A Perspective On Growth In 2021 Investors should put this year’s GDP growth projections into perspective given last year’s distortions in China’s economic conditions and data. On a YoY basis, data in the first quarter this year will be artificially boosted due to the deep contraction in Q1 last year. The market consensus is that Q1 2021 will register an 18% YoY rate of real GDP expansion. If we assume the economy can expand by 8% this year over 2020, then the YoY GDP growth rates in the rest of this year will average less than 6%. This would be below the 6.5% YoY rate in the fourth quarter of 2020 – meaning that on a YoY basis, China’s growth momentum has peaked (Chart 1). Importantly, sequential growth, such as month-over-month (MoM) and quarter-over-quarter (QoQ), drives the financial markets. On a QoQ basis, Q1 business activities are typically weaker due to the Chinese New Year. However, when we compare the rate of QoQ slowdown in Q1 this year with previous years, an 18% YoY increase would mean China’s output in the first three months of 2021 would be one of the worst in the past 20 years (Chart 2).  Chart 1Q1 GDP Growth Will Be Artificially Boosted, On A YoY Basis Chart 2…But Will Be On The Weaker Side, On A QoQ Basis The moderating growth momentum in Q1 this year was already reflected in high-frequency data in January. Most major components in last week’s PMI surveys in both the manufacturing and service sectors had larger setbacks than in January of previous years. Prices in major commodities as well as the Baltic Dry Index softened (Chart 3). Cyclical sector stocks in China’s onshore market, which is highly sensitive to domestic economic policies, have halted their outperformance relative to defensive stocks (Chart 4).  Chart 3Chinese Economic Growth May Be Showing Signs Of Moderation Chart 4Outperformance In Onshore Cyclical Stocks Is Rolling Over Furthermore, it is useful to look past the growth outliers in the previous four quarters to gain insight into the status of China’s business cycle. On a two-year smoothed term, an 8% annual output growth in 2021 would represent a continuation of China’s downward economic growth trend (Chart 5). Chart 5This Years Rebound In Headline GDP Growth Does Not Alter Chinas Structural Downtrend Bottom Line:  It is misleading to consider an 8% YoY real GDP growth rate in 2021 as an acceleration in China’s economic recovery. On a quarterly basis, Q1 will undergo a moderation in growth momentum. The economy in the rest of the year will remain on a downward growth trend. No Rush To Stimulate Anew If Q1 growth turns out to be weaker than the market anticipates, then will Beijing continue to dial back stimulus? Or, will it become concerned about the underlying fragility in the economy and provide more support? So far, all signs point to a continuation of a stimulus pullback. Chart 6Tighter Monetary Conditions are Starting To Bite the Economy The resurgence of domestic COVID-19 cases contributed significantly to January’s shaky demand. However, tighter monetary conditions in 2H20 are likely another reason for the growth moderation (Chart 6). Here are some factors that may have prompted Chinese authorities to stay on track to scale back stimulus: Policymakers appear to consider the massive fiscal stimulus last year overdone. In contrast with the previous two years, local governments are not issuing special-purpose bonds (SPBs) before the NPC sets its quota in early March. China’s broader fiscal budgetary deficit widened to 11% of GDP in 2020 from 6% in 2019. Local governments issued nearly 70% more SPBs in 2020 than in the previous year (Chart 7). SPBs are mostly used for investing in infrastructure projects and last year’s fiscal support along with substantial credit expansion helped to speed up infrastructure investment. However, towards the end of last year local governments reportedly experienced a shortage in profitable investment projects and thus, parked more than 400 billion yuan of proceeds from last year’s SPB issuance at the central bank (Chart 8). This will likely convince the central government to reduce the SPB quota by a large margin this year. Chart 7Fiscal Stimulus Last Year May Be Overdone Chart 8Local Governments Reportedly Ran Out Of Profitable Infrastructure Projects To Invest Last Year In addition, government revenues in 2020 were surprisingly strong and spending was well below budgeted annual expenditures, resulting in 2.5 trillion yuan in idle funds (Chart 9). Based on China’s fiscal budget laws, any unspent funds from the previous year will be carried over to the next year. In other words, the 2.5 trillion yuan will contribute to fiscal deficit reduction this year and are not extra savings that can be distributed.  In addition, asset price bubbles are a perennial concern. Land sales and housing demand for top-tier cities roared back last year due to cheap loans and a relaxed policy environment (Chart 10). In our opinion, Chinese leaders allowed the real estate market to temporarily heat up last year to avoid a deep economic recession. As the economy recovered to its pre-pandemic level by late 2020, policymakers have sharply reduced their tolerance for the booming housing market and substantially tightened restrictions in the real estate sector. Chart 9Unspent Fiscal Stimulus Checks Do Not Lead To Higher Government Spending Next Year Chart 10Housing Market Heats Up Again The domestic labor market has been surprisingly resilient, removing the leadership’s political constraints and incentives to further stimulate the economy.  Labor market conditions and household income are improving. The gap between household disposable income and spending growth has narrowed, the unemployment rate is back to its pre-pandemic level and consumer confidence has rebounded (Chart 11). More importantly, China’s labor market in urban areas is tightening again, with migrant workers receiving higher pay than prior to the pandemic (Chart 12).  Chart 11Labor Market Is On The Mend Chart 12China’s Urban Labor Market Is Tightening Again Bottom Line: Growth rates will moderate, but policymakers will wait for more evidence of a pronounced slowdown in economic conditions before they ease policies. Concerns about financial risks and excesses in the property market entail authorities to allow stimulus of 2020 to relapse. It will take a much deeper slowdown in the business cycle before easing is re-introduced. Investment Implications Our baseline view indicates that credit growth will decelerate by two to three percentage points in 2021 from 2020, and the local government SPB quota will drop by 10%. The projected pullbacks on stimulus are small and more measured than the last policy tightening cycle in 2017/18. Nevertheless, a smaller stimulus and tighter policy environment will consequently lead to moderating growth momentum in China’s domestic economy and demand, particularly in the second half of this year.   Chart 13How Far Can Chinas Inventory Restocking Cycle Go Without More Policy Tailwinds Commodity prices may be at high risk of easing demand. The strong rebound in China’s commodity imports in 2H20 was not only due to a recovery in domestic consumption, but also inventory restocking from an extremely low level. Chart 13 shows that the change in China’s industrial inventories relative to exports has risen substantially from a two-year contraction. Going forward, the pace of inventory accumulation will slow following a weaker policy tailwind and growth momentum, which will weigh on the demand for and prices of key industrial raw materials. Corporate profits should continue to recover, albeit at a slower rate than in 2H20. At the same time, risks are tilted to the downside, and policy initiatives should be closely monitored going forward. As such, we maintain a cautious view on Chinese stocks.    Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnote: 1     IMF World Economic Outlook and World Bank Global Outlook, January 2021   Footnotes Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations