Monetary

Highlights The Japanese economy is booming. This is allowing the BoJ to move away from its QQE (Quantitive and Qualitative Easing) program. However, the YCC (Yield Curve Control) program will stay in place for the foreseeable future as inflation remains a direct function of financial conditions. Because yen positioning and valuations are so skewed, this could result in a yen rally, especially against the Euro. Short EUR/JPY. Like the Fed, the BoC will hike rates three times this year. However, the market already discounts more hikes in Canada than the U.S. We remain neutral USD/CAD. However, CAD will experience downside against the NOK. Short CAD/NOK. Feature Chart I-1JPY Vs. Bonds: The Divorce Something fascinating happened to USD/JPY in recent months: it began to decouple from U.S. bond yields (Chart I-1). To a large degree, this break in relationship reflected the dollar's own weakness, as the dollar index fell by 10% in 2017. But as weak as the dollar may have been last year, it has actually been flat since September 7. Another culprit behind the yen's decoupling from bond yields has been that as the European Central Bank announced the end of its own asset purchases program, the Bank of Japan has been seen as the next in line to diminish its purchases. On January 8th, the BoJ began moving in that direction, as it started to curtail its buying of long-dated JGBs. Since that day, not only have global bonds sold off, but the yen has regained vigor as well. We believe the yen bear market is not over, but a playable rally against the euro is likely to emerge. The Sun Is Rising The BoJ is justified in wanting to remove some policy stimulus. The Japanese economy is firing on all cylinders, and the improvement seems broad-based. Consumer confidence, buoyed by rising asset prices and an unemployment rate at 23-year lows, is hitting record highs (Chart I-2). This will continue to support real household spending, which is now growing at a nearly 2% pace after contracting steadily from 2015 to early 2017. Another support for household spending comes from the wage front. Contractual wages are already growing at their fastest pace since 2006, and wages excluding overtime pay are expanding at rates not seen since 1998 (Chart I-3). Moreover, the openings-to-applicant ratio is at its highest level since 1974. This increases the likelihood that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's arm-wrestling with corporate Japan to increase wages will bear fruit, and that the upcoming spring wage negotiation will generate accelerating gains. Chart I-2Japanese Households Feel Ebullient Chart I-3Wage Growth Has Picked Up Business confidence is also surging. The Japanese manufacturing PMI number is elevated by Japanese standards, currently at 54, and small business confidence points toward an acceleration in industrial production (Chart I-4). Financial markets validate this picture as well. The surge in the Nikkei has grabbed the imagination of investors, but even more impressive has been the strength in small-cap equities, which have outperformed their large-cap counterparts by 17% since 2015 (Chart I-5). This development has coincided with a pick-up in credit growth, and is also normally associated with a robust growth outlook. The GDP model developed by our sister publication, The Bank Credit Analyst, encapsulates these various phenomena, and forecasts that Japanese real GDP growth could hit an annual rate of 3% in the first half of 2018 (Chart I-6). Thus, it would seem that the Japanese economy will continue to gain momentum. Chart I-4Japanese Companies Are Also##br## Feeling The Good Vibes Chart I-5Small Caps Point To##br## A Bright Outlook Chart I-6Japanese Growth ##br##Has Momentum But what underpins these improvements? First, the fiscal thrust in Japan has changed. Fiscal policy was a drag in Japan from 2012 to 2016, creating an average brake on economic activity of 0.6% of GDP per year. However, in 2017, fiscal policy eased to add 0.2% to GDP. Second, Japan has greatly benefited from the rebound in EM growth. According to the IMF, a 1% growth shock in EM affects Japanese growth by 50 basis points - nearly five times more than the effect of the same shock on the U.S. economy. This is because 43% of Japanese exports are shipped to EM economies. Third, the impact of EM activity on Japan is amplified by the countercyclical nature of the JPY. As global and EM growth expands more vigorous, the yen weakens, which eases Japanese financial conditions. This phenomenon was in full display last year, as financial conditions eased by a full standard deviation over the past 16 months. These developments are what have laid the ground for better growth and the change in the BoJ's tone. Bottom Line: Japan is doing very well. Consumers and businesses are upbeat, spending is on the rise and GDP is forecasted to accelerate even further. Easing fiscal belt-tightening, stronger EM economies, and the softening financial conditions are the factors behind these improvements. The BoJ is taking notice. How Far Can The BoJ Go? The BoJ had been itching to move policy for a few months now. In November 2017, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda was making noise about the concept of the "reversal rate." The reversal rate is the interest rate below which additional interest rate cuts become contractionary for economic activity. This is because below this level, lower rates hurt bank interest margins to such a degree that commercial banks start curtailing their lending to the private sector. The reason why the BoJ was getting more vocal about the reversal rate was because this rate is inversely related to the amount of securities held on commercial banks' balance sheets. If commercial banks hold plenty of government bonds, as interest rates fall to very low levels, the value of these securities increases, offsetting the negative impact of lower interest rate margins. The problem in Japan is that as the BoJ mopped up more JGBs than was issued by the government, and therefore the bond holdings of banks were dwindling at an alarming rate (Chart I-7). This meant that the reversal rate was rising, implying that the BoJ had less control over policy. When inflation surprised to the upside in December, financial markets reacted violently. While Japanese nominal yields did not budge much, Japanese inflation expectations surged, which prompted a collapse in Japanese real rates (Chart I-8). This produced a de facto easing in Japanese monetary conditions, creating the perfect cover for the BoJ to adjust its asset purchases: any negative impact from tweaking bond purchases would be mitigated and the BoJ, according to its view, would not lose control of financial conditions because of a falling reversal rate. Despite this shift in policy action and rhetoric, we do not yet foresee the end of the Yield Curve Control program. Inflation excluding food and energy only stands at a paltry 0.3%, still well below the BoJ's 2% target or even 1% - a level that is likely to result in a more real removal of easing. Additionally, the BoJ is in somewhat of a bind. It is true that the economy is doing much better, but this does not really help explain inflation dynamics. Japanese capacity utilization only explains 3% of the movements in Japanese core inflation; global utilization, only 10%; and inflation leads credit creation in Japan. Instead, the best factor to explain Japanese inflation has been financial conditions (FCIs). In no other country do FCIs explain inflation dynamics as much as they do in Japan. The recent movements in Japanese inflation are fully consistent with how Japanese FCIs have evolved since 2010. Based on this relationship, CPI excluding food and energy should likely peak at 0.7% in June 2018 (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Japanese Reversal Rate##br## Is Falling Because Of QQE Chart I-8Sudden Pick Up In##br## Inflation Expectations Chart I-9Inflation Is Picking Up Because##br## Financial Conditions Eased However, if the BoJ removes accommodation too fast, the yen would rally and financial conditions would tighten sharply. In all likelihood, inflation would weaken substantially, nullifying the very reason to tighten policy in the first place. These very dynamics point to a continuation of YCC for at least the next 12 to 18 months. Bottom Line: Japan will soon fully do away with its QQE program. However, this is not indicative of a removal of yield curve controls. This is not only because Japanese inflation is extremely far off from the BoJ's target, but also because Japan's inflation rate is hyper-sensitive to financial conditions. Therefore, any tightening in financial conditions created by a stronger yen - the likely market response of tighter policy - will cause inflation to collapse, nullifying the very need for tighter policy. Investment Implications USD/JPY is expensive, trading 16% above the fair value implied by purchasing power parity. Additionally, the yen is supported by a generous current account surplus of 4% of GDP. Moreover, global investors have been underweighting duration. This phenomenon tends to be negative for the yen. When investors are as underweight duration as they are currently, the yen becomes more likely to rally (Chart I-10). It is true that in 2014, investors were as negative on bonds as they are today, but USD/JPY sold off. This was because back then, the BoJ announced an increase to its asset purchase program. Today, the BoJ is moving toward ditching its QQE program, which is likely to prompt a short-covering rally. Now, the key question for investors is what currency should be sold against the yen. We posit the euro is an interesting alternative to the USD. EUR/JPY is exceptionally expensive at present. On a long-term basis, EUR/JPY is trading well outside its normal range on a purchasing-power-parity basis (Chart I-11). Moreover, while USD/JPY is mildly expensive according to metrics that incorporate rate differentials and risk appetite, EUR/USD is very dear based on a similar comparison. The implication is that EUR/JPY is trading at an exceptionally demanding level in terms of short-term valuations (Chart I-12). Hence, tactically, the timing is becoming increasingly ripe to short this cross Chart I-10Duration Positioning Points To Upside Risk For The Yen Chart I-11EUR/JPY Is Expensive Chart I-12Tactical Risk For EUR/JPY . Further arguing in favor of shorting EUR/JPY instead of USD/JPY are relative financial conditions. Euro area financial conditions have tightened much more than U.S. financial conditions relative to Japan's (Chart I-13). As a consequence, even when adjusting for sector biases, European stocks are currently underperforming Japanese equities by a greater margin than the underperformance of U.S. equities. This highlights that Japan's relative economic outlook burns brighter when compared to the euro area than when compared to the U.S. This also means that the yen has more room to rally against the euro than the USD. Finally, relative positioning between the euro and the yen is also exceptionally skewed. As Chart I-14 illustrates, when speculators are simultaneously long the euro and short the yen, EUR/JPY tends to experience subsequent corrections. Chart I-13Euro Area FCIs Tightened ##br##More Than U.S. Ones Chart I-14Skewed Positioning##br## In EUR The aforementioned factors point to a potentially large yen rally, but the durability of this rally is likely to be limited. The BoJ will only be dropping a QQE program that it had already only half-implemented in recent months, as bond purchases were well below its JPY80 trillion-yen objective. The BoJ is still committed to its YCC program for the foreseeable future. Only a rejection of this program will create a durable support for the yen. In the meanwhile, as any yen rally will tighten financial conditions and hurt inflation, any yen rally is to be rented rather than owned, as terminal policy rates in Japan still have little scope to rise. Bottom Line: Ditching QQE is likely to result in a yen rally. Such a rally is likely to be most pronounced against the euro as valuations, positioning, and financial conditions are especially exacerbated when compared to the European currency. To be clear, the yen rally is likely to be a countertrend move, as a strong yen will exert serious deflationary pressures on Japan, which means the BoJ's YCC program will remain firmly in place. We are shorting EUR/JPY at 133.79. CAD: Stuck Between The BoC And NAFTA Chart I-15Canada Will Experience Rising Wages Canada:##br## Inflationary Conditions Emerging The Bank of Canada (BoC) is meeting next week and the odds are rising that it will lift policy rates this month. The Canadian economy is very strong too, led by the domestic sector. Real consumer spending is growing at its fastest pace in nearly 10 years, the unemployment rate is at 40-year lows, and capex is recovering after having been decimated by the collapse in oil prices from 2014 to 2016. Thanks to this backdrop, the Canadian economy is hitting its own capacity constraints. The BoC estimates that the Canadian output gap has closed. Moreover, the recent Business Outlook Survey confirms this message: A record proportion of Canadian firms are having difficulty meeting demand because of capacity constraints, and the growing number and intensity of labor shortages points to a tight labor market (Chart I-15). Tight capacity and higher wages will support the already-visible rebound in core inflation, which has already reached 1.8%. As a result, we expect the BoC to tighten rates as much as the Federal Reserve this year. However, the impact of this development on the CAD might be limited. Investors are already pricing in more hikes in Canada than in the U.S. over the next 12 months - 82 basis points versus 60 basis points, respectively. Moreover, speculators are once again very long the loonie, implying an elevated hurdle for strong economic data to actually lift CAD further. Moreover, NAFTA remains a major risk for Canada. As Marko Papic, our Chief Geopolitical Strategist, wrote in a November Special Report, President Trump does have uninhibited power when it comes to abrogating NAFTA (Table I-I).1 If NAFTA were to collapse, Canada would most likely ultimately revert to the still-preferential Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Thus, the impact on Canada-U.S. trade would likely be temporary. However, the brunt of the pain should be felt in Canadian capex spending. The high degree of uncertainty associated with unwinding NAFTA would cause companies to abandon expansion plans in Canada, and prompt them to expand their North American capacity directly in the U.S., thereby bypassing the regulatory risk created in the supply chain. This would dampen the future growth profile of Canada. Table I-1Trump Faces Few Constraints On Trade Oil is unlikely to fill the void for CAD. At near US$70/bbl, Brent has hit our Commodity and Energy strategists' target. OPEC 2.0 will be unwilling to accommodate much higher prices, as this would incentivize shale producers to expand capacity, recreating the supply glut dynamics that existed prior to the 2014 crash. Additionally, the West Canada Select benchmark, the oil price most relevant for Canada, remains at a substantial discount to WTI and Brent. This is because there is not enough pipeline capacity to ship oil outside of Alberta. Canada is drowning in its own oil. This situation is not about to change. Chart I-16CAD/NOK Is Stretched Based on this combination, we are neutral USD/CAD on a 12-month basis, even if a move back to 1.29 is likely over the coming weeks. However, while Canadian oil is trading at a discount, the CAD has performed better than the NOK, the other petrocurrency in the G10 space. This suggests that shorting CAD/NOK may be a cleaner way to play the risks inherent to the Canadian dollar. First, the Canadian dollar is very expensive relative to the Norwegian krone right now, trading 11% above its purchasing-power-parity rate (Chart I-16). Even when adjusting for other factors like productivity and commodity prices, CAD is trading at its largest premium to the NOK since 1994. This represents a risk for CAD/NOK as the loonie is exposed to trade policy risks, while the nokkie is not. Second, the balance-of-payments picture remains highly favorable for the NOK. Norway runs a current account surplus of 5.5% while Canada runs a deficit of 2.8%. Additionally, Norway sports a Net International Investment position (NIIPs) of 210% of GDP, the largest in the G10. Strong NIIPs are associated with rising real effective exchange rates. Third, while the Canadian economy's momentum is well known by investors - this is the reason why they are so long the CAD and expecting so many hikes from the BoC - the positives in Norway are being ignored. Norway's leading economic indicator is still rising, and Norwegian industrial production and real GDP growth are accelerating. Fourth, the Norges Bank is responding to weakness in the NOK. At its December meeting, it adjusted its tone, as the NOK is easing monetary conditions too much in the eyes of the Norwegian central bank. This suggests the 25-basis-point hike currently expected out of Norway could be too low. It also highlights that the exceptional 60-basis-point gap between Canada and Norway in terms of expected 12-month rate hikes is also likely to normalize. Finally, CAD/NOK is trading toward the top of both its long-term and near-term historical trading ranges. While positioning on the CAD is now quite extended on the long side, speculators are short the NOK, according to Norges Bank data. Thus, with NAFTA in question, a fully priced BoC outlook, and the unlikelihood that the WCS-Brent discount narrows, risks are skewed toward a lower CAD/NOK going forward. Bottom Line: The Canadian economy is booming. This means the BoC will keep pace with the Fed and increase rates at least thrice this year. However, markets are already discounting more hikes in Canada than they are in the U.S. Moreover, oil prices have limited upside from here, and the WCS benchmark will continue to trade at a deep discount to Brent. Thus, while USD/CAD has limited upside, it has limited downside as well. However, CAD/NOK faces plenty of downside risks from current levels. We are shorting this cross this week, with an entry point at 6.398. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism" dated November 10, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: Nonfarm payrolls surprised to the downside, coming in at 148 thousand. Moreover, labor force participation rate surprised to the downside, coming in at 62.7%. ISM non-manufacturing PMI also underperformed expectations, coming in at 55.9. However, consumer credit change outperformed expectations, coming in at 27.95 billion dollars. The dollar began the week on a strong, which ultimately dissipated, on relatively hawkish ECB minutes and policy tweaks in Japan. Overall, we expect the market to continue to price the fed dot plot, putting upward pressure on the dollar. Report Links: A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the Euro area has been positive: Core inflation outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.1%. Moreover, the economic sentiment indicator also outperformed expectations, coming in at 116. Retail sale yearly growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at 2.8%. Finally, the unemployment rate declined from 8.8% to 8.7% In spite of the positive data the euro has fallen this weekThe Euro begun the week on the weak side but surged in the wake of the ECB's hawkish minutes. This has happened due to the surge in rate expectations in the U.S., as the market has continued to price in the fed. Overall, we expect to see downside in EUR/JPY as the BoJ has more room to back off its ultra-dovish policy than the ECB. Report Links: A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Labor Cash earnings yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.9%. They also increased relative to October. However consumer confidence surprised to the downside, coming in at 44.7 and declining from the previous month. The yen has been surging this week, with USD/JPY falling by 1.7%. This was caused because the BoJ signaled that they would reduce their buying of long dated bonds. The market interpret this as a signal that the BoJ will start exiting from its ultra-dovish monetary policy. These developments should continue to provide upside to the JPY, particularly against the Euro. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - December 8, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Industrial Production yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. Moreover, manufacturing production yearly growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at 3.5%. However, Halifax House Prices yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.7% as the month-on-month growth contracted by 0.6%. The pound has been flat, this week against the dollar, while it has lost about 1% against the euro. Overall, the BoE is limited in the capacity to raise rates meaningfully. Moreover, inflation should start to ease following the rate hike and the rise in the pound. This will put downward pressure on the pound. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: Building permits yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 17.2%. However, the trade balance in November surprised to the downside, coming in at -628 million. It also decreased from -302 million one month earlier. AUD/USD has been flat this week, however AUD/NZD has fallen by roughly 1%. While it is true that global growth continues to be strong, key indicators like Korean and Taiwanese export growth have rolled over. Moreover money supply growth in China continues to decrease. All of this points to a temporary slowdown in Chinese industrial activity, which would lead to weakness in AUD/USD. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi has rallied by nearly 5% since the start of the year, as global growth continues to stay robust. Overall, we expect that the NZD will continue to outperform the AUD this year, as New Zealand is less sensitive to a tightening in financial conditions than Australia. However on a longer time horizon, the upside for the Kiwi is limited, as the new populist government has not only vowed to decrease immigration into the country, but also for the RBNZ to have a dual mandate. Both of these policies will depress the neutral rate in New Zealand, and consequently put downward pressure on the kiwi. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mostly positive: The unemployment rate surprised positively, as it declined to 5.7% from 5.9% Moreover, net change in employment also outperformed expectations, coming in at 78.6 thousand. Housing starts yearly growth also outperformed expectations, coming in at 217 thousand. However, the Ivey Purchasing Manager Index underperformed, coming in at 60.4. USD/CAD jumped on Tuesday following reports that Trump will exit the NAFTA accord. Overall we believe that the Canadian dollar will have limited upside from here on out, as the market is now pricing in more hikes in Canada than in the U.S. This weakness could be taken advantage of by shorting CAD/NOK, as this cross is much overvalued according to multiple metrics. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Market Update - October 27, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been positive: Headline inflation came in line with expectations, at 0.8%, meanwhile month on month inflation surprised to the upside, coming in at 0%. The unemployment rate also came in line with expectations, at a very low level, coming in at 3%. Finally, retail sales yearly growth surprised to the upside substantially, coming in at -0.2%, compared to 2.6% last month. EUR/CHF has stayed relatively flat since last week. Overall, we expect limited upside in the franc. As the SNB will stay active in the foreign exchange market. In order for the SNB to change its policy, inflation in Switzerland will have to stay at a high level for a considerable amount of time. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Headline inflation outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.6%. Moreover core inflation also surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.4% However, manufacturing output growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.3% USD/NOK is down by roughly 0.7%, as oil prices continue to approach the 70 dollar mark. Nevertheless, we believe that the upside for USD/NOK is limited from here, as the market will start pricing in more rate hikes from the Fed. That being said, investors willing to bet on more oil strength could short EUR/NOK. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 After falling precipitously at the end of 2017, USD/SEK has been relatively flat this year. Overall, while Stefan Ingves continues to be very dovish, he conceded in the latest minutes that a change in monetary policy is getting closer. Meanwhile, Deputy Governor Jansson stated that while he supports to continue with asset purchases, to keep the repo rate unchanged would be "difficult to digest". Investors willing to bet on a slowdown in the Euro area caused by tightening financial conditions could short EUR/SEK. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights U.S. Treasuries: U.S. Treasury yields are too low relative to the strength of global economic growth and the rising trend in U.S. inflation expectations. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure in the U.S., stay underweight Treasuries versus global bond benchmarks, and continue to favor TIPS over nominals. Canada: The Canadian economic data is moving from strength to strength, and now price and wage inflation data is moving higher. The Bank of Canada will hike rates next week with additional increases likely in 2018. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds and stay long inflation protection (both through linkers and CPI swaps). 2017 Model Portfolio Performance Wrap-Up: We closed the books on the first full calendar year of our model bond portfolio with a total return of 3.75%. This was a small -13bps of underperformance versus our custom benchmark, coming entirely from underweight positions on longer-dated developed market government bonds that offset the asset allocation gains from overweights to corporate debt. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Bond Yields Are Too Low 2018 has started much as 2017 ended, with growth-sensitive assets rallying alongside robust economic data. Most major global equity markets are already up 2-3% after the first week of the year, with the U.S. NASDAQ, Japanese Nikkei and Italian MIB indices advancing over 4%. Global credit markets are also off to a strong start, with spreads for U.S. High-Yield corporate debt and EM hard currency corporate debt tighter by -17bps and -8bps, respectively. Even commodity markets have joined the party, with the benchmark Brent oil price hitting the highest level in nearly three years. The pro-growth, pro-risk backdrop is keeping upward pressure on global government bond yields. This is occurring primarily through the inflation expectations component of yields, which are rising in all developed economies (even Japan). Real yields, which are not rising despite the strength of the broad-based global growth upturn (Chart of the Week), have been drifting lower, providing some offset to rising inflation expectations. The primary trend for global yields remains upward, however - especially if growth remains solid and inflation expectations continue to push higher, giving central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve the confidence to continue hiking interest rates. We continue to favor below-benchmark duration exposure, and overweight corporate bond allocations versus government debt, for global fixed income investors over the next 6-9 months. U.S. Treasuries: Still More Reasons To Sell Than Buy U.S. Treasury market participants have a lot to things to be nervous about at the moment. Likely future Fed rate hikes, the weakening U.S. dollar, rising oil prices, ongoing U.S. labor market strength, persistently booming economic growth, the never-ending equity bull market, the potential impact of the Trump fiscal stimulus, the Fed starting its balance sheet runoff - all factors that should force bond investors to expect yields to rise. Yet longer-dated Treasury yields continue to trade too low relative to the bond-bearish fundamentals. The current benchmark 10-year Treasury yield at 2.48% remains well below the fair value from our 2-factor regression model, which is now up to 2.94% (Chart 2). That valuation gap of 46bps is close to the widest levels seen in July 2016 and September 2017, which were both episodes that proved to be excellent entry points for bearish Treasury positions. The two inputs into our Treasury yield model are the global manufacturing PMI and bullish sentiment towards the U.S. dollar (USD). The PMI is included as an indicator of global growth and currently sits at 54.5 - the highest level in nearly seven years - led by strong readings in almost every major economy (Chart 3). This has been the primary driver of the fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield since global growth bottomed out and began to accelerate in mid-2016. Chart 210-Year Treasuries Are##BR##Overvalued On Our Model Chart 3Global Growth##BR##Is Booming Sentiment towards the USD is the second input to our Treasury model. It is included as a weakening greenback represents an easing of monetary conditions that could trigger a need for more Fed rate hikes that can push the Treasury curve higher from the short-end (and vice versa for a rallying USD). At the same time, a depreciating USD can drive U.S. inflation higher through higher costs of imported goods & services, which can raise bond yields through higher inflation expectations or greater Fed tightening expectations (again, the opposite holds true for a strengthening USD). Right now, both the strong PMI and weak sentiment towards the dollar are boosting the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield. The fall in value of the greenback is particularly unusual, as it is flying in the face of widening interest rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world (Chart 4, top panel). This is clearly a function of the fact that global growth is rapidly improving - especially in Europe - but very few central banks have yet to respond to that growth with interest rate hikes that match what the Fed has been delivering. So while actual interest rate differentials remain USD-supportive, expectations of some eventual tighter monetary policy outside the U.S. that could narrow those interest rate gaps are triggering speculative inflows into non-USD currencies. With the trade-weighted USD now 5% below levels of a year ago, this should lead to higher headline inflation in the U.S. in the next few months (middle panel). Combined with the continued strength in global oil prices, that means that the two biggest factors that weighed on realized U.S. inflation- the USD rally and oil price collapse of 2014/15 - are now both acting to boost inflation expectations (bottom panel). Throw in the growing body of evidence that a tight U.S. labor market that is putting gentle upward pressure on wage growth, and U.S. inflation expectations - which still remain 40-50bps below levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target - should continue to move higher in the next six months. Rising longer-term inflation expectations would typically result in bear-steepening pressures on the Treasury yield curve. That is not happening at the moment, however, with the 2-year/10-year Treasury curve still at a relatively flat 53bps at the time this report went to press. The flatness of the Treasury curve has worried investors, and even some Fed officials, given the well-known leading relationship between the yield curve and U.S. economic growth. It is too early to draw any conclusions between the shape of the curve and future U.S. economic growth, however, for several reasons: As mentioned above, inflation expectations are still well below levels consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target on the PCE deflator (which translates to 2.5% on the CPI index used to price TIPS and CPI swaps). Both the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) are still buying bonds through their asset purchase programs, although at a slower pace than previous years. This continues to depress local bond yields in Europe and Japan with spillover effects into the U.S. Treasury market - even as the Fed begins the slow runoff of Treasuries from its massive balance sheet. Data on mutual fund and ETF flows shows that there has been significant and sustained buying of bond funds by U.S. retail investors over the past couple of months. There has also been net selling of equity funds, however, suggesting that U.S. retail investors are rebalancing as the equity markets surge higher. Investor positioning in the U.S. Treasury market is very short at the moment, with the J.P. Morgan survey of "active" bond manager duration exposure at an all-time low and the net positioning on Treasury futures now slightly favoring shorts (Chart 5). It makes little sense to interpret a flattening Treasury curve as a signal that the bond market believes that the Fed was making a policy mistake if professional bond investors were running massive duration underweight positions that would benefit if bond yields rise. Chart 4Upside Pressure On U.S. Inflation##BR##From Oil & The USD Chart 5Big Duration Underweight##BR##Among U.S. Bond Managers All these factors muddy the economic signal provided by the Treasury curve at the moment. Nonetheless, we remain of the view that the Fed would not continue on its rate hiking path without U.S. inflation expectations moving sustainably back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target. In other words, the Treasury curve must bearishly steepen first through rising inflation expectations before bearishly flattening later through actual Fed rate hikes. The latter will dampen future U.S. growth expectations and eventually result in a cyclical peak in longer-dated Treasury yields, but from levels closer to 3% on the 10-year after inflation expectations "fully" normalize. Bottom Line: U.S. Treasury yields are too low relative to the strength of global economic growth and the rising trend in inflation expectations. Maintain below-benchmark duration exposure in the U.S., stay underweight Treasuries versus global bond benchmarks, and continue to favor TIPS over nominals. The Bank Of Canada Keeps On Playing Catch-Up The Canadian economic story continues to be the best within the developed world. The year-over-year growth rate for real GDP accelerated to over 3% late last year, primarily on the back of robust consumer spending (Chart 6). Even the lagging parts of the economy, like business investment and government spending, began to perk up last year. The momentum remained powerful at the end of 2017, with the unemployment rate in December hitting a 40-year low. The economic boom forced the Bank of Canada (BoC) to begin lifting interest rates last year, with two 25bp hikes occurring in July and September that unwound the easing from 2015. The rapid pace of growth has absorbed spare capacity much faster than the BoC originally projected. More hikes will be required if the current pace of growth is maintained, particularly with the BoC estimating that the neutral policy rate is around 3% and the current Overnight Rate is only at 1%. The Canadian consumer has been enjoying a powerful shopping spree. Real consumer spending growth is at 4% on a year-over-year basis - the highest level since early 2008 (Chart 7). This is led by a powerful surge in spending on consumer durables, where annual growth has surged to 10% (middle panel). Consumer confidence is booming and Canadian workers are enjoying the fastest pace of income growth since 2014 (bottom panel). Chart 6Robust Canadian Growth,##BR##Led By The Consumer Chart 7Canadian Consumers Are##BR##Confidently Spending Surprisingly, the powerful surge in consumer spending has occurred alongside some cooling of the overheated Canadian housing market. The growth rates of existing home sales and prices have both decelerated massively from the pace of the boom years in 2012-16 (Chart 8). The performance of house prices in the three biggest Canadian cities is now a mixed bag, with Vancouver prices reaccelerating, prices in Toronto decelerating and prices in Montreal growing only modestly (middle panel). Regulatory actions to limit the speculative buying of Canadian real estate by foreigners has helped dampen the surge in house prices in some markets. Although the bigger macro-prudential measures designed to tighten mortgage finance rules and reduce the amount of leverage in Canadian housing transactions has likely had a bigger effect. Canadian banks must now conduct stress tests to check if borrowers are able to pay off their mortgages if Canadian interest rates continue to rise. This represents a reduction in the marginal supply of riskier mortgage lending that will help restrain house price inflation in Canada's major cities. In addition, the supply of Canadian homes is growing with new home-building activity, both for single and multiple units, having picked up and overall residential investment growth now up nearly 5% on a year-over-year basis (bottom panel). With signs that the Canadian housing market has stopped rapidly inflating, the BoC can focus its interest rate policy on domestic growth and inflation considerations without worrying about pricking the housing bubble. On that front, the latest edition of the BoC's Business Outlook Survey, released yesterday, provided plenty of reasons to tighten monetary policy further. The overall survey indicator surged back to the peak seen last summer just before the BoC delivered its first rate hike (Chart 9). Capital spending intentions also rebounded back to the 2017 peaks, which bodes well for future gains in investment spending (second panel). Chart 8Canadian Housing Looking##BR##A Bit Less Frothy Chart 9BoC Business Outlook Survey Signaling##BR##Tightening Capacity Constraints The most interesting parts of the Business Outlook Survey were the capacity utilization measures. A greater share of companies were reporting labor shortages (third panel), with the highest percentage of firms reported difficulties in meeting unexpected increases in demand since 2007 (bottom panel). This suggests that the recent surge in employment, wage growth and price inflation are all sustainable. Headline and core CPI inflation are up to 2.1% and 1.8%, respectively, as of November. This is around the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target range (Chart 10). The Bank of Canada forecasts that CPI inflation will continue to rise and remain near 2% target in 2018, but all the risks are to the upside. The unemployment rate is now down to 5.7%, the lowest level since 1976 and well below the OECD's estimate of the NAIRU level at 6.5%. Average hourly earnings growth has surged in response, rising to just under 3% on a year-over-year basis since the trough in early 2017. The Phillips Curve appears to be alive and well in Canada. Canadian interest rate markets have already responded aggressively to the stronger growth and inflation data. Our interest rate discounters now show that the money markets are now expecting 61bps of BoC rate hikes over the next six months and 91bps over the next twelve months (Chart 11). With a 25bp hike at next week's BoC meeting now priced with almost full certainty, the current market pricing suggests at least one more hike will happen by June and nearly three more hikes by year-end. That would be even more hikes than we expect from the Fed in 2018, which is important for the Canadian dollar (CAD). The CAD has appreciated 16% since it bottomed out in early 2016, occurring alongside the rise in global oil prices over the same period (second panel). The price of Canada's Western Select grade of crude oil has lagged the move in other oil benchmarks massively over the past several months, due to a lack of pipeline capacity getting oil out of Alberta that has created a supply glut. This may limit the degree to which additional gains in global energy prices benefit the Canadian dollar from a terms-of-trade perspective. This will not prevent the BoC from delivering additional rate hikes, however - especially if that merely matches the 75bps of Fed rate hikes that the FOMC is projecting, and which we expect, over the rest of the year. In terms of investment strategy, the combination of robust Canadian economic growth and rising inflation pressures leads us to continue recommending an underweight stance on Canadian government bonds, as we have maintained since July 11, 2017. This week, we are introducing two new tactical trades that should benefit as Canadian inflation moves higher and the BoC tightens more aggressively in response (Chart 12): Chart 10The Canadian Phillips Curve Is Not Dead Chart 11The Market Now Expects A Lot From The BoC Chart 12Two New Tactical Trades In Canada Short the June 2018 Canada Bankers' Acceptance futures contact vs. the December 2018 contract (middle panel). The market is now discounting the likely maximum amount of tightening that the BoC can deliver by year-end, while there are only little more than two hikes priced by June. Assuming that the BoC hikes next week, that means that there is only one more hike expected by June. With three more BoC meetings scheduled between next week and June, that provides plenty of opportunities for hawkish surprises from the BoC before then. In other words, this trade is a way to play for the BoC being forced to front-load more rate hikes into the first half of 2018 versus the latter half. Long 10yr inflation expectations through linkers versus nominal government bonds, or using CPI swaps (bottom panel). Given the pickup in domestic inflation pressures currently underway, plus the rise in global inflation coming from the surge in commodity prices, there is room for Canadian market-based inflation expectations to rise from the current level of 1.7%. Bottom Line: The Canadian economic data is moving from strength to strength, and now price and wage inflation data is moving higher. The Bank of Canada will likely hike rates next week with additional increases likely in 2018. Remain underweight Canadian government bonds. 2017 GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Performance: A Brief Review The turn of the year marked the end of the first full calendar year for the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio. This now allows us to report the performance of the portfolio on the same basis as our clients. In the future, we will publish quarterly reviews of the portfolio returns after the end of each quarter in a calendar year (in April, July, October and January). The GFIS model portfolio returned 3.45% in 2017. This underperformed our custom performance benchmark (a blend of the Barclays Global Aggregate Index with global high-yield corporate debt) by -13bps (Chart 13). That underperformance can be entirely attributed to our government bond duration allocations, which lagged the benchmark by -46bps. Our recommended credit positions were a positive contributor, generating 33bps of outperformance primarily through overweights to U.S. Investment Grade and High-Yield corporate bonds. The detailed breakdown of the 2017 returns is presented in Table 1. In terms of the government bond portion of the portfolio, the underperformance can be isolated completely to the longest maturity bucket (10+ years). The combined performance of that bucket for all countries lagged that of the benchmark by -52bps. Given our expectation that global yield curves would bear-steepen in the latter half of 2017, it is no surprise that the bulk of our underperformance came by having too little exposure at the long-end. Also, having too much exposure in Japanese government bonds offering no yield also represented a major drag on the income component of the model portfolio's returns (Chart 14). Chart 13GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##2017 Return Breakdown Table 1GFIS Model Bond Portfolio##BR##2017 Return Breakdown In terms of our credit allocations, favoring U.S. corporate exposure vs. non-U.S. corporates was the right call, generally speaking (Chart 15). However, we did not have enough portfolio weight in that trade to offset the drag on the overall yield from the Japan government bond overweight. Chart 14GFIS Model Portfolio Government Bond Performance Attribution By Country Chart 15GFIS Model Portfolio Spread Product Performance Attribution Looking ahead, the new model bond portfolio allocation for 2018 that we discussed in our final report of 2017 should offer a better chance of outperforming the benchmark.1 Specifically, we dialed down the Japan overweight, increased the U.S. Investment Grade corporate bond overweight, and reduced the curve steepening exposure in Euro Area governments. This not only boosted the overall yield of the portfolio, but also moderated the overall portfolio duration underweight. This portfolio will do well in the first half of 2018 if our base case of an inflation-driven rise in global government bond yields, led primarily by the U.S. where corporate debt is also expected to outperform Treasuries, comes to fruition. Bottom Line: We closed the books on the first full calendar year of our model bond portfolio with a total return of 3.75%. This was a small -13bps underperformance of versus our custom benchmark, coming entirely from underweight positions on longer-dated developed market government bonds that offset the asset allocation gains from overweights to corporate debt. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Our Model Bond Allocation In 2018: A Tale Of Two Halves", dated December 19th 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Upbeat economic reports for December set the stage for a solid 2018. The FOMC minutes acknowledged the flatter curve and only a minority of members discounted the signal from the curve. A majority thought that a tighter labor market would lead to higher inflation. The Citi Economic Surprise Index is peaking, but risk assets should hold up as the Index rolls over. Feature The first week of 2018 brought more good news for risk assets. U.S. stocks beat bonds, oil prices rose, and credit spreads narrowed amid a solid set of economic data. Several high-profile U.S. companies announced share buybacks, and/or one-time bonuses or wage increases linked to the tax cut plan passed by Congress at the end of 2017. Moreover, there were hints of further economic stimulus as lawmakers from both sides of the aisle discussed relaxing the sequester rules that would lift federal spending this year. Markets shrugged off a fresh round of saber rattling between the U.S. and North Korea. Gold prices nudged higher and the U.S. dollar fell despite the upbeat economic news. December's reports on manufacturing and service sector ISM, vehicle sales and the labor market, along with November's numbers on construction spending, trade and factory orders, all lifted estimates for Q4 GDP and boosted the prospects for corporate earnings in Q4 2017 and beyond. Chart 1 shows that the elevated ISM figures provide a favorable backdrop for earnings and sales in 2018. Moreover, Chart 2 indicates that IP, a proxy for S&P 500 sales, is poised to advance in 2018 and provide a lift to corporate profits. We will preview the S&P 500's Q4 2017 earnings reports in next week's U.S. Investment Strategy. Chart 1Favorable Macro Backdrop For Earnings And Sales Chart 2ISM Components Suggest IP Poised To Accelerate The Atlanta Fed GDP Now estimate stood at 2.7% on January 5, while the New York Fed's Nowcast for Q4 GDP was a healthy 4% (Chart 3). Both soundings are well above the FOMC's assessment of the economy's long-term potential growth rate (1.8%) and puts GDP growth in 2017 above the Fed's forecast. The implication is that the output gap pushed deeper into positive territory as 2017 ended, setting the stage for higher inflation in 2018. The December 2017 jobs report, released last Friday, January 5, does not change BCA's outlook for the U.S. economy or the Fed. The U.S. economy added a lower than expected 148,000 new jobs in December, which left the unemployment rate unchanged at 4.1%. Despite the softer than anticipated data, the 3-month average of payrolls growth is still a very healthy 204,000. The monthly increase in wages quickened to 0.3% m/m in December, up from 0.1% m/m last month. However, annual wage inflation remains modest at just 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3U.S. Economic Growth Well##BR##Ahead Of Potential In Q4 Chart 4Labor Market Still Tightening Despite##BR##Soft December Report The indications for Q4 GDP growth are solid. Aggregate hours worked rose 2.5% at an annualized rate in Q4 2017. Assuming modest growth in productivity, the payrolls data are consistent with over 3% GDP growth in Q4. There is nothing in the December payroll data to suggest that the underlying trajectory in the U.S. economy has changed. The economy continues to grow above trend. Wage gains are modest at the moment, but should accelerate as the labor market keeps tightening with above-trend GDP growth. This upbeat economic outlook is also supported the December 2017 non-manufacturing ISM survey, also released last Friday. While the overall index fell from 57.4 to 55.9, it is still consistent with solid GDP growth. Moreover, the employment index rose from 55.3 to 56.3, which signals firm job gains, and the prices paid index held steady at a fairly elevated level of 60.8. Bottom Line: It's been solid start to 2018 and it's steady as she goes for the U.S. economy and the Fed. FOMC Minutes: A Rubric BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy service expects that the 2/10 yield curve will languish between 0 and 50 bps in 2018. The curve will steepen from 51 bps at the end of 2017 through mid-year 2018, and then flatten into year-end (Chart 5). Which asset classes would benefit if our curve call is accurate? BCA's "The Bucket List"1 explains our view of the curve in 2018 and details the past performance of various U.S. assets in differing yield curve environments. Chart 5A Flat Yield Curve Is OK For Most Risk Assets BCA expects that the yield curve will first steepen in 2018, then become flatter, ultimately spending most of the year between 0 and 50 bps. A flat curve is the ideal environment for the S&P 500 and the stock-to-bond ratio. However, small cap stocks struggle when the curve is flat; BCA's view is that small caps will outperform large caps in 2018. A flat yield curve raises the risk of a sell-off in high yield, but provides a favorable grounding for oil, which is in line with BCA's fundamental view. BCA expects EPS growth will be positive this year; earnings growth is higher 75% of the time when the curve is flat. The yield curve's slope was a focus of debate at the FOMC's December 12-13, 2017 meeting. Participants cited several reasons for the flat curve2: recent increases in the target range for the federal funds rate; reductions in investors' estimates of the longer-run, neutral real interest rate; lower longer-term inflation expectations; lower term premiums Fed economists recently updated their quantitative assessments of the FOMC's minutes. The note provides a guide (Table 1 in the Fed paper3 and Tables 1 and 2 below) to the number of quantitative descriptors in the minutes (one, a couple, a few, etc.). We use this rubric to assess the committee's latest views on the yield curve and inflation. Table 1FOMC Assessment Of The Yield Curve Table 2FOMC Assessment Of Inflation In short, the FOMC acknowledged the flatter curve and only a minority of members discounted the signal from the curve. Moreover, a majority thought that a tighter labor market would lead to higher inflation. Only one participant held the view that secular trends were muting inflation. Bottom Line: BCA expects the Fed to deliver 3 to 4 rate hikes in 2018, which is still not fully priced in by the market. Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration in fixed income portfolios. Asset allocators should remain overweight stocks versus bonds. Growth is strong and the yield curve is not inverted yet. Therefore, it is still early to de-risk portfolios. Is Economic Surprise Peaking? The Citigroup (Citi) Economic Surprise Index is elevated relative to its recent history, but it may have further to run. Economic prospects were cheery following the 2016 presidential election and the economic data exceeded those lofty projections, aided by a warmer than usual winter. However, the temperate conditions borrowed activity from the spring, which was cooler and wetter than normal, and the combination of lofty expectations and seasonal distortions sent the Citi Economic Surprise Index spiraling lower through mid-year 2017. Since its bottom in June 2017 at -78.6%, the index climbed for 135 days before its peak in late December 2017 (Chart 6, panel 1). On average since 2010, the Citi Index moved from trough-to-peak in 96 days, which means the recent run-up was much longer than usual. However, that phenomenon may have been due to the raised economic expectations and variable weather patterns at the start of 2017. Chart 6Economic Surprise Index Has Surged, But Expectations Remain Muted At 80.7%, the Index has been above zero for 68 days (Chart 6, panel 1). It typically takes 46 days for it to climb from zero to its zenith. Table 3 shows the performance of financial markets and other assets after the Index moves from zero to the peak. The most recent episode (October through December 2017) matched historical averages across most asset classes, although the underperformance of small caps versus large ran counter to the past as the Surprise Index climbed from zero. Table 3Risk Assets Perform Well As Surprise Index Climbs Since 2010, the Index has stayed above 40 for an average of 51 days (Chart 6, panel 1). The Index has been over 40 since November 16, 2017, or 35 days. This suggests that it can remain elevated for another month or so before it again moves lower. However, the Index is mean reverting and investors wonder what will happen to risk assets after economic surprise rolls over. Table 4 and Chart 7 shows the performance of key financial markets and commodities when the Citi Index returned to zero from 40-plus. There have been six such intervals since 2010. On average, gold and oil perform well as the surprise index dips to zero. Stocks and credit outperform Treasuries during these episodes, and small caps beat large caps. Rising economic surprise (Table 3) is a more favorable environment for stocks, credit and oil than when the surprise index is rolling over. However, the performance of gold and small caps is better after the Citi Surprise Index peaks (Table 4). Table 4Risk Assets Hold Up When Citi Surprise Index Rolls Over Chart 7U.S. Assets As Economic Surprise Rolls Over Nonetheless, muted economic expectations will limit the downside in the Index in the coming months. Panel 3 of Chart 6 shows that the outlook for both hard and soft economic data remained muted through the end of November 2017, especially when compared with the significant improvement in economic prospects in late 2016 and early 2017. Bottom Line: Risk assets outperformed as the Citi Economic Surprise Index climbed in the second half of 2017. The Index can stay near recent peaks for several more months thanks to subdued economic forecasts, but it will roll over eventually. However, the elevated level of the Index suggests that there are near-term risks for equities and credit because a lot of good economic news is already priced in. Still, we recommend that investors ride out the volatility given our view that stocks will outperform bonds in the next 6-12 months. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Bucket List", published December 18, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20171213.htm 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-fomc-meeting-minutes-an-update-of-counting-words-20170803.htm

Highlights A "decision tree" for the allocation to Chinese stocks highlights several key questions for investors over the coming year. The equity allocation decision hinges on the condition of the global economy, the stance of monetary policy, the pace of structural reforms, and the character of the ongoing economic slowdown. Despite several identifiable risks, our "decision tree" suggests that investors should be overweight Chinese vs global stocks. Feature Unlike in past years, BCA's China Investment Strategy service published its 2018 themes report in December, as an addendum to BCA's special year end Outlook report.1 Our final report for 2017 echoed our key themes by recapping some of the most important developments in China last year, as well as their longer-term implications.2 These reports outline our framework for evaluating China's economy in 2018, and will serve as an important reference point over the coming months relating to the pace of China's economic slowdown, policymakers' actions and priorities, and investor attitudes toward Chinese assets. In today's brief report, we begin the New Year by walking through the Chinese equity "decision tree" that flows from the framework that we detailed in our themes piece noted above (Chart 1). The chart presents a set of questions that should be answered over the coming 6-12 months in order to decide on the ideal allocation to Chinese equities within a global portfolio. We elaborate on the decision tree below. Chart 1The Chinese Equity "Decision Tree" Is The Global Economy Slowing Significantly?: Developments in China need to be considered within a global context. We have noted in previous reports that a synchronized global economic slowdown was a key factor behind China's economic slowdown in 2015.3 If global growth were to slow significantly this year, it would bode poorly for the relative performance of Chinese stocks. Next week's report will discuss the evolution of the alpha and beta characteristics of China's investable stock market; while our research is still ongoing, the evidence suggests that Chinese equities in US$ terms have become a high-beta market that would likely suffer in relative terms if the global equity market stumbles. Chart 1 highlights that the appropriate allocation to Chinese equities vs global stocks is underweight if the answer to this first question is yes, with the upgrade/downgrade bias determined simply by whether there has been an appropriate response from Chinese and global policymakers. Is Significant Further Monetary Policy Tightening Likely?: Overly tight monetary policy was the second ingredient that contributed to the 2015 slowdown. Monetary conditions tightened somewhat in the first half of 2017 (Chart 2), but the overall stance is not restrictive. Taken alone, hawkish rhetoric from the PBOC would imply that significant further tightening is imminent. However our sense is that the bark of monetary authorities will be worse than their bite over the coming months, especially since growth momentum and house price appreciation has already peaked. Is The Pace Of Renewed Structural Reforms Likely To Be Aggressive?: October's Party Congress heralded stepped-up reform efforts in 2018 and beyond, which we have highlighted is a risk to a constructive stance towards Chinese stocks. While the "status quo" scenario of no significant reforms is highly unlikely, the intensity of reforms pursued over the coming year will have to be closely monitored by policymakers to avoid a repeat of the 2015 experience. Even if policymakers feel that their threshold for pain will be higher in 2018 than has previously been the case, they are very likely to avoid a significant slowdown as it would raise the risk of returning to the exact set policies that they are trying to turn away from. In other words, an intense pace of reform would risk turning a "two steps forward, one back" situation into a full-blown retreat from structural reform momentum. For now, our China Reform Monitor continues to suggest that reform intensity will be consistent with a rising equity market (Chart 3). Chart 2Chinese Monetary Conditions ##br##Have Tightened Chart 3Investors Don't Believe That Reforms##br## Will Upset The Apple Cart Is The Existing Slowdown In China's Growth Momentum Metastasizing? Our view of China's significant growth slowdown in 2015 suggests that the end of the recent economic "mini-cycle" is likely to be benign and controlled, absent a policy mistake or a major global shock. However, it is possible that the lagged effect of a deceleration in export growth and tighter monetary policy, both of which have already occurred, could cause a broader or deeper slowdown in economic growth beyond what we have already observed. In order to gauge this risk, we tested a wide range of commonly-watched macro data series for signs that they reliably lead economic activity in China,4 using the Li Keqiang index as our proxy for the business cycle. We concluded that measures of money & credit are among the most important predictors, and presented a composite leading indicator of the Li Keqiang index based on six series that passed our test criteria (Chart 4). For now, our indicator suggests that the Chinese economy will continue to slow over the coming months, but that the pace and magnitude of the decline will be benign and controlled. The first question in our decision tree is the easiest to answer: The highly synchronized nature of global economic growth suggests that a significant slowdown is not imminent, even if the pace of growth becomes narrower or slows modestly (Chart 5). While our decision tree highlights that answering "yes" to any of the last three questions means that investors should have a negative bias towards Chinese investable stocks (and should downgrade them in response to a technical breakdown), these questions are still addressing risks rather than probable events. This supports our current recommendation of being overweight Chinese investable equities with a positive bias. Chart 4The Chinese Economy##br## Will Gradually Slow Chart 5No Sign Of A Significant ##br##Global Economic Slowdown As a final point, some investors and market participants have noted that investable Chinese stocks experienced a non-trivial selloff at the end of 2017, with some questioning whether it is a harbinger of a more pronounced economic slowdown. Our answer is no, for two reasons. First, there is some evidence to suggest that the selloff was technical in nature, as the sectors that had experienced the largest gains prior to the selloff also experienced the largest declines (Chart 6). Second, the timing of the relative selloff in Chinese stocks coincided exactly with a relative selloff in the global tech sector (Chart 7), which is strongly indicative of a common, global, factor. But given the underlying strength in the global economy, we regard this event as idiosyncratic and do not view it as a threat to the relative performance of Chinese vs global stocks over the coming year. Chart 6The Late-Year Selloff Was Partially ##br##Driven By Technical Conditions Chart 7Global Tech Also Drove The Selloff##br## In Chinese Relative Performance Bottom Line: While there are several identifiable risks that need to be monitored in 2018, for now our "decision tree" for the relative allocation to Chinese equities suggests that investors should be overweight within a global equity portfolio. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, and Weekly Report, "Three Themes For China In The Coming Year", dated December 7, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Legacies Of 2017", dated December 21, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, and "China's Economy - 2015 vs Today (Part 1): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Before re-capping the performance of our recommendations last year - up 77%, led by oil calls, which posted an average gain of 111% - we take a look at what the re-emergence of financial and monetary factors will mean for commodities this year. Fundamentals - supply, demand, inventories - drove the evolution of industrial commodity prices over the past two years, and will remain supportive for oil and, to a lesser degree, base metals in 1H18. Thereafter, in 2H18, we believe financial and monetary variables will begin to re-assert their importance in the evolution of commodity prices. Forecasting commodity prices becomes more difficult, as a result, as it is not clear the Fed or other systematically important central banks, understand what is driving their principal policy variables - particularly inflation - or how they are evolving. Despite these central-bank uncertainties, we remain long broad commodity exposure via the S&P GSCI (up 6.4% since it was recommended in Dec/17), long call spreads in Brent and WTI across 2018 deliveries (up 78%); and long gold (up 6.7%). 2018 Weightings Energy: Overweight. WTI and Brent crude oil forward curves will become more backwardated as the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline and continued strength in demand draws inventories lower. This will boost S&P GSCI returns.1 Base Metals: Neutral. Base metals will continue to be supported through 1Q18 by China's environmental reforms, which are reducing supply in the face of continued strength in global demand. Strong demand ex-China will offset weaker Chinese growth, supporting metals prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. While we expect four rate hikes by the Fed this year, we are wary of policy errors at systemically important central banks, which makes forecasting monetary policy highly uncertain. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Still-high supplies outside the corn market; policy uncertainty re NAFTA; and uncertainty over Fed policy likely keep grain prices weak. A stronger USD would weaken demand for U.S.-sourced grains and softs. Feature Chart of the WeekFundamentals Continue To##BR##Support Commodities That was quick! Oil prices are closely hewing to fundamentals as the year opens. We revised our Brent forecast to $67/bbl in early December (up from a $65/bbl forecast in mid-October 2017), based on our fundamental assessment of the market - supply, demand and inventories - and, voilà, contracts for Mar/18 delivery got there by the end of 2017. Our $63/bbl forecast for WTI is still ~ $2.50/bbl from being realized, but we continue to expect this gap to close. At the moment, fundamentals for industrial commodities - oil and, to a slightly lesser extent, base metals - will support firmer prices in 1H18 (Chart of the Week). For oil, this will be an extension of the fundamental realignment initiated by OPEC 2.0 at the end of 2016. The producer coalition agreed to remove ~ 1.1mm b/d from the market, which, along with another 300k to 400k barrels of natural declines, tightened the supply side considerably. On the demand side, the synchronized global economic upturn that powered consumption up by 1.65mm b/d last year, by our estimation, will push demand higher by 1.67mm b/d this year. Supply-side adjustments in base metals, particularly copper, where strikes and natural disasters combined to tighten markets, will be augmented by the ongoing environmental reforms in China (Chart 2). These supply-side effects in industrial commodities occurred against a backdrop of stronger-than-expected economic growth worldwide last year - the first such upturn since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 (Chart 3). Chart 2Fundamentals Supported Metals Chart 3Global Upturn Powers Commodity Demand We expect this to continue. Part of the recovery in aggregate demand worldwide can be attributed to the massive monetary stimulus by systematically important central banks - led by the Fed, the ECB and BoJ. Lower energy prices last year, which acted like a tax cut, put more discretionary income in consumers' hands and also boosted aggregate demand.2 Monetary Policy Will Re-Assert Itself Chart 4The USD Will Re-Emerge As A##BR##Driver Of Commodity Prices The influence of monetary policy - chiefly how the Fed's actions affect the USD - has been de minimis over the past two years relative to fundamentals, which have driven price formation in industrial commodities (Chart 4). While the Fed raised its policy rate 3 times last year, monetary conditions remained relatively loose in the U.S., which was supportive of commodity prices. Looser monetary conditions kept the USD better offered than other major currencies in 4Q17, which allowed gold prices to recover late in the year. A weaker USD also supported grain markets, which also have staged a somewhat subdued recovery following a mid-2017 sell-off. For at least 1H18, we see commodities generally continuing to be supported by strong fundamentals and relatively accommodative monetary policy globally, even with the Fed lifting its policy rate as many as four times this year, per our House view. Inflation Pressures Could Start Building By 2H18, inflationary pressures could start to build: In the U.S., tax cuts coupled with fiscal stimulus from the federal government in the form of disaster relief and higher discretionary spending - could add ~ 0.5% to GDP growth this year, based on calculations by BCA's Global Investment Strategy team (Chart 5).3 This should, all else equal, increase demand for labor and push the U.S. unemployment rate lower, lifting wages, inflation and inflation expectations in turn (Chart 6). At least that's how it's supposed to work. Our colleagues in BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy note, the "dichotomy between stronger growth and a tight labor market on the one hand and low inflation on the other gets to the heart of the first big challenge that incoming Fed Chairman Jay Powell will face next year. Specifically, how much faith should the Fed have in its framework for forecasting inflation? Chart 5U.S. Inflation Is Ticking Higher Chart 6Still Waiting On The Phillips Curve "... Janet Yellen's Phillips Curve model of core inflation does not explain this year's decline.1 It also shows that inflation is close to 0.5% below fair value, almost the largest deviation since 1995."4 We're inclined to agree with former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke on this. In 2016, he noted that, given the years-long stretch of errors in forecasting key economic variables - output, unemployment and the Fed funds rate - "Fed-watchers should probably focus on incoming data and count a bit less on Fed policymakers for guidance."5 This is a mixed blessing (or curse) for commodity markets: Increased economic activity raises demand for commodities, so at least in 1H18, and most likely for the second half as well, commodity demand will remain well supported globally. If we do get higher inflation, the Fed likely would feel it could lean into its rate-normalization with greater vigor, and start guiding to more frequent or bigger rate hikes. If we don't see higher inflation - if, as Chicago Fed President Charles Evans fears, inflation expectations have been marked down in a meaningful way - and the Fed cannot justify further rate hikes, we could see the real side of the global economy take another leg higher, lifting commodity demand in the process.6 This is the big issue for the coming year. We cannot say at this point how it plays out, which is why we recommend commodity investors remain in tactical mode, as we did a year ago. Recapping 2017's Recommendations Our trade recommendations were up an average of 77% last year, led by a 111% gain in our oil calls. This was a touch better than the 95% average gain we posted on our oil recommendations in 2016 (Table 1). Table 1Average Quarterly Returns 2017 Without a doubt, most of our recommendations were in the oil markets, as the accompanying tables show, and we maintained an exposure of one sort or another in oil throughout the year (Table 2). Table 2Trades Closed In 2017 The big drivers of our view in oil markets were fundamentals: On the supply side, we maintained the view OPEC 2.0 would not waver in its commitment to draining global storage levels, particularly in the OECD commercial inventories via supply reductions. On the demand side, by mid-2017, it became apparent to us the big data providers - the U.S. EIA and the IEA in Paris - and most of the sell-side analysts were underestimating demand. Information flows during 1H17 were often contradictory, which injected enormous volatility in crude-oil spread markets - particularly the calendar spreads trading markets employ to take a view on the shape of the forward curve (e.g., long a near-term futures contract like Dec/17 Brent, vs. short a deferred delivery contract like Dec/18). This intense volatility drove us toward the relative safety of call-option spreads in 2H17, where the risk of loss is limited to the net premium paid for the call spread. As we did last year, we constructed an information ratio (IR) to determine whether the additional volatility produced by our recommendations was adequately compensated for by the returns (simple percent changes of the opening level for a recommendation vs. the closing level). Our IR uses the S&P GSCI as a benchmark, given it has a relatively high weight in energy-related exposures. Our ratio looks at the average excess return of the active portfolio against this benchmark. This average excess return is divided by its standard deviation (also referred to as the tracking error volatility) in order to generate a risk-adjusted metric to measure returns on our recommendations relative to the risk we took to generate them. BCA's IR thus is calculated as: The higher the IR, the better the risk-adjusted relative performance of the portfolio. Three elements can explain a high IR: High returns in the portfolio; low returns in the benchmark, or low tracking error volatility. Hence, this measure provides a numeric value to analyze the risk-reward trade-off; it tells us whether or not the risk assumed in our trades was compensated for by larger returns. Viewing our energy recommendations as a portfolio over the course of 2017, our average return was 111%, while the GSCI return was 5.8%. The tracking error volatility was 112%.7 Using these inputs, the IR of our recommendations was 0.94. While not as stellar as our 2016 IR of 1.47, this risk-adjusted return is still stout, and indicates the consistent positive excess returns of our portfolio relative to passive GSCI exposure compensated for the high volatility of those returns. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we've given the OPEC + non-OPEC producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. 2 For a summary of our 2018 outlooks, please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Oil Fundamentals Remain Bullish Heading Into 2018," published on December 21, 2017, and "Opposing Forces: Stay Neutral Metals In 2018" in the same issue. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve," published December 22, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Ill Placed Trust?," published December 19, 2017. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "The Fed's shifting perspective on the economy and its implications for monetary policy," by Ben S. Bernanke, published by the Brookings Institution on its website August 8, 2016. 6 Please see "All Talk, Few Answers From FOMC for Yellen's Long Inflation Miss," published by bloomberg.com on January 3, 2018. 7 Note: In order to find the standard deviation of the portfolio's excess returns (tracking error volatility), we averaged the daily percentage change in each trade's underlying assets. Any given trade only weighed in the daily average return if it was open during that day of the year. We are not accounting for the type of trades (spreads, pairs or single trades), we only track the underlying asset returns. From these daily average returns we subtracted the daily return of the preferred benchmark to obtain the daily excess return. Using this, we computed an historical standard deviation (based on 20-day periods) for every day during which a trade was open in our portfolio (we had 224 days with at least one energy trade opened). Lastly, we annualized this standard deviation to obtain our tracking-error volatility. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017

Highlights Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. It could be more, depending on the impact on animal spirits in the business sector and any fresh infrastructure spending. The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Real GDP growth is accelerating in the major advanced economies, driven in part by a surge in capital spending. Nonetheless, record low volatility and a flat yield curve in the U.S. highlight our major theme for 2018; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. We expect inflation to finally begin moving higher in the U.S. and some of the other advanced economies. This will challenge the consensus view that "inflation is dead forever", and that central banks will respond quickly to any turbulence in financial markets with an easier policy stance. The S&P 500 would suffer only a 3-5% correction if the VIX were to simply mean-revert. But the pain would likely be more intense if there is a complete unwinding of 'low-vol' trading strategies. We will be watching inflation expectations and our S&P Scorecard for signs to de-risk. Government yield curves should bear steepen, before flattening again later in 2018. Stay below benchmark in duration for now and favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia versus the U.S. and Canada (currency hedged). Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. The intensity of forthcoming Chinese reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic 'pain threshold'. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex. Bitcoin is not a systemic threat to global financial markets. Feature Chart I-1Policy Collision Course? Global bourses celebrated solid earnings growth and the passage of U.S. tax cuts heading into year-end. Ominously, though, a flatter U.S. yield curve and extraordinarily low measures of volatility hover like dark clouds over the equity bull market (Chart I-1). The flatter curve could be a sign that the Fed is at risk of tightening too far, which seems incompatible with depressed asset market volatility. This combination underscores the major theme of the BCA Outlook 2018 that was sent to clients in November; policy is on a collision course with risk assets because output gaps are closing and monetary policy is moving away from "pedal to the metal" stimulus. Analysts are debating how much of the decline in volatility is due to technical factors and how much can be pinned on the macro backdrop. For us, they are two sides of the same coin. Betting that volatility will remain depressed has reportedly become a yield play, via technical trading strategies and ETFs. Trading models encourage more risk taking as volatility declines, such that lower volatility enters a self-reinforcing feedback loop. The danger is that this virtuous circle turns vicious. On the macro front, many investors appear to believe that the structure of the advanced economies has changed in a fundamental and permanent way. Deflationary forces, such as Uber, Amazon and robotics are so strong that inflation cannot rise even if labor becomes very scarce. If true, this implies that central banks will proceed slowly in tightening, and that the peak in rates is not far away. Moreover, below-target inflation allows central banks to respond to any economic weakness or unwanted tightening in financial conditions by adopting a more accommodative policy stance. In other words, investors appear to believe in the "Fed Put". Implied volatility is a mean-reverting series. It can remain at depressed levels for extended periods, especially when global growth is robust and synchronized. Nonetheless, we believe that the "outdated Phillips curve" and the "Fed Put" consensus views will be challenged later in 2018, leading to an unwinding of low-vol yield plays. For now, though, it is too early to scale back on risk assets. Global Growth Shifts Up A Gear... The good news on global growth continue to roll in. Easy financial conditions and the end of fiscal austerity provide a supportive growth backdrop. A measure of fiscal thrust for the G20 advanced economies shifted from a headwind to a slight tailwind in 2016 (Chart I-2). Our short-term models for real GDP growth in the major countries continue to rise, in line with extremely elevated purchasing managers' survey data (Chart I-3). The major exception is the U.K., where our GDP growth model is rolling over as the Brexit negotiations take a toll. Chart I-2Fiscal Austerity Is Over Chart I-3GDP Growth Models Are Upbeat Much of the acceleration in our GDP models is driven by the capital spending components. Animal spirits appear to be taking off and it is a theme across most of the advanced economies. G3 capital goods orders pulled back a bit in late 2017, but this is more likely due to noise in the data than to a peak in the capex cycle (Chart I-4). Industrial production, the PMI diffusion index and advanced-economy capital goods imports confirm strong underlying momentum in investment spending. Chart I-4Capital Spending Helping To Drive Growth In the U.S., tax cuts will give business outlays and overall U.S. GDP growth a modest lift in 2018. The House and Senate hammered out a compromise on tax cuts that is similar to the original Senate version. The new legislation will cut individual taxes by about $680 billion over ten years, trim small business taxes by just under $400 billion, and reduce corporate taxes by roughly the same amount (including the offsetting tax on currently untaxed foreign profits). The direct effect of the tax cuts will likely boost U.S. real GDP growth in 2018 by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points. However, much depends on the ability that the tax changes and immediate capital expensing to further lift animal spirits in the business sector and bring forward investment spending. Any infrastructure program would also augment the fiscal stimulus. The total impact is difficult to estimate given the lack of details, but it is clearly growth-positive. ...But The U.S. Yield Curve Flattens... Bond investors are unimpressed so far with the upbeat global economic data. It appears that long-term yields are almost impervious as long as inflation is stuck at low levels. In the U.S., a rising 2-year yield and a range-trading 10-year yield have resulted in a substantial flattening of the 2/10 yield slope (although some of the flattening has unwound as we go to press). Investors view a flattening yield curve with trepidation because it smells of a Fed policy mistake. It appears that the bond market is discounting that the Fed can only deliver another few rate hikes before the economy starts to struggle, at which point inflation will still be below target according to market expectations. We would not be as dismissive of an inverted yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. There are indeed reasons for the curve to be structurally flatter today than in the past, suggesting that it will invert more easily. Nonetheless, the fact that the yield curve has called all of the last seven recessions is impressive (with one false positive). The good news is that, in the seven episodes in which the curve correctly called a recession, the signal was confirmed by warning signs from our Global Leading Economic Indicator and our monetary conditions index. At the moment, these confirming indicators are not even flashing yellow.1 Our fixed-income strategists believe that the curve is more likely to steepen than invert over the next six months. If inflation edges higher as we expect, then long-term yields will finally break out to the upside and the curve will steepen until the Fed's tightening cycle is further advanced. If we are wrong and inflation remains stuck near current levels or declines, then the FOMC will have to revise the 'dot plot' lower and the curve will bull-steepen. In other words, we do not think the FOMC will make a policy mistake by sticking to the dot plot if inflation remains quiescent. Rising inflation is a larger risk for stocks and bonds than a policy mistake. A clear uptrend in inflation would shake investors' confidence in the "Fed Put" and thereby trigger an unwinding of the low-vol investment strategies. A sharp selloff at the long end of the curve in the major markets would send a chill through the investment world because it would suggest that the Phillips curve is not dead, and that central banks might have fallen behind the curve. ...As Inflation Languishes For now there is little evidence of building inflation pressure in either the CPI or the Fed's preferred measure, the core PCE price index. The latter edged up a little in October to 1.4% year-over-year, but the November core CPI rate slipped slightly to 1.7%. For perspective, core CPI inflation of 2.4-2.5% is consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the core PCE index. The Fed has made no progress in returning inflation to target since the FOMC started the tightening cycle. A risk to our view is that the expected inflation upturn takes longer to materialize. The annual core CPI inflation rate fell from 2.3 in January 2017 to 1.7 in November, a total decline of 0.55 percentage points. The drop was mostly accounted for by negative contributions from rent of shelter (-0.31), medical care services (-0.13) and wireless telephone services (-0.1). These categories are not closely related to the amount of slack in the economy, and thus might continue to depress the headline inflation rate in the coming months even as the labor market tightens further. Recent regulatory changes, for example, suggest that there is more downside potential in health care services inflation. We have highlighted in past research that it is not unusual for inflation to respond to a tight labor market with an extended lag, especially at the end of extremely long expansion phases. Chart I-5 updates the four indicators that heralded inflection points in inflation at the end of the 1980s and 1990s. All four leading inflation indicators are on the rise, as is the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Indicator (not shown). Importantly, economic slack is disappearing at the global level. The OECD as a group will be operating above potential in 2018 for the first time since the Great Recession (Chart I-6). Finally, oil prices have further upside potential. Higher energy prices will add to headline inflation and boost inflation expectations in the U.S. and the other major economies. Chart I-5U.S. Inflation: Indicators Point Up Chart I-6Vanishing Economic Slack The bottom line is that we are sticking with the view that U.S. inflation will grind higher in the coming months, allowing the FOMC to deliver the three rate hikes implied by the 'dot plot' for 2018. In December, the FOMC revised up its economic growth forecast to 2.5% in 2018, up from 2.1%. The projections for 2019 and 2020 were also revised higher. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for the next three years. The FOMC expects that the jobless rate will dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. With the estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%, this means that the labor market is expected to shift even further into 'excess demand' territory. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. It is unreasonable to expect the unemployment rate to stabilize in 2019 and tick up in 2020 if the economy is growing above-trend. This forecast highlights the risk that the FOMC will suddenly feel 'behind the curve' if inflation re-bounds more quickly than expected, at a time when the labor market is so deep in 'excess demand' territory. The consensus among investors would also be caught off guard in this scenario, resulting in a rise in bond volatility from rock-bottom levels. How Vulnerable Are Stocks? How large a correction in risk assets should we expect? One way to gauge this risk is to estimate the historical 'beta' of risk asset prices to mean-reversions in the VIX. The VIX is currently a long way below its median. Major spikes to well above the median are associated with recessions and/or financial crises. However, as a starting point, we are interested in the downside potential for risk asset prices if the VIX simply moves back to the median. Table I-1 presents data corresponding to periods since 1990 when the VIX mean-reverted from a low level over a short period of time. We chose periods in which the VIX surged at least to its median level (17.2) from a starting point that was below 13. The choice of 13 as the lower threshold is arbitrary, but this level filters out insignificant noise in the data and still provides a reasonable number of episodes to analyze.2 Table I-1Episodes Of VIX 'Mean Reversion' The episodes are presented in ascending order with respect to the starting point for the 12-month forward P/E ratio. This was done to see whether the valuation starting point matters for the size of the equity correction. The "VIX Beta" column shows the ratio of the percent decline in the S&P 500 to the change in the VIX. The average beta over the 15 episodes suggests that stocks fall by almost a half of a percent for every one percent increase in the VIX. Today, the VIX would have to rise by about 7½% to reach the median value, implying that the S&P 500 would correct by roughly 3½%. Investment- and speculative-grade corporate bonds would underperform Treasurys by 22 and 46 basis points, respectively, in this scenario. Interestingly, the equity market reaction to a given jump in the VIX does not appear to intensify when stocks are expensive heading into the shock. The implication is that a shock that simply returns the VIX to "normal" would not be devastating for risk assets. The shock would have to be worse. Chart I-7Market Reaction To 1994 Fed Shock The episodes of VIX "mean reversion" shown in Table I-1 are a mixture of those caused by financial crises and by monetary tightening (and sometimes both). The U.S. 1994 bond market blood bath is a good example of a pure monetary policy shock. It was partly responsible for the "tequila crisis", but that did not occur until late that year. Chart I-7 highlights that the U.S. equity market reacted more violently to Fed rate hikes in 1994 than the average VIX beta would suggest. The VIX jumped by about 14% early in the year, coinciding with a 9% correction in the S&P 500. Investors had misread the Fed's intension in late 1993, expecting little in the way of rate hikes over the subsequent year. A dramatic re-rating of the Fed outlook caused a violent bond selloff that unnerved equity investors. We are not expecting a replay of the 1994 bond market turmoil because the Fed is far more transparent today. Nonetheless, the equity correction could be quite painful to the extent that the VIX overshoots the median as the large volume of low-volatility trades are unwound. A 10% equity correction in the U.S. this year would not be a surprise given the late stage of the bull market and current market positioning. Yield Curves To Bear Steepen Upward pressure on inflation, bond yields and volatility will not only come from the U.S. We expect inflation to edge higher in the Eurozone, Canada, and even Japan, given tight labor markets and diminished levels of global spare capacity. The European economy has been a star performer this year and this should continue through 2018. Even the periphery countries are participating. The key driving factors include the end of the fiscal squeeze in the periphery and the recapitalization of troubled banks. The latter has opened the door to bank lending, the weakness of which has been a major growth headwind in this expansion. Taken at face value, recent survey data are consistent with about 3% GDP growth (Chart I-3). We would dis-count that a bit, but even continued 2.0-2.5% GDP growth in the euro area would compare well to the 1% potential growth rate. This means that the output gap is shrinking and the labor market will continue tightening. Despite impressive economic momentum, the ECB is sticking to the policy path it laid out in October. Starting in January, asset purchases will continue at a reduced rate of €30bn per month until September 2018 or beyond. Meanwhile, interest rates will remain steady "for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of the net asset purchases." If asset purchases come to an end next September, then the first rate hike may not come until 2019 Q1 at the earliest. Thus, rate hikes are a long way off, but the deceleration of growth in the Eurozone monetary base will likely place upward pressure on the long end of the bund curve (shown inverted in Chart I-8). Chart I-8ECB Tapering Will Be Bond-Bearish Canada is another economy with ultra-low interest rates and rapidly diminishing labor market slack. The Bank of Canada will be forced to follow the Fed in hiking rates in the coming quarters. In Japan, strong PMI and capital goods orders are hopeful signs that domestic capital spending is picking up, consistent with our upbeat real GDP model (Chart I-3). Recent data on industrial production and retail sales were weak, but this was likely due to heavy storm activity; we expect those readings to bounce back. Nonetheless, it is still not clear that the Japanese economy has moved away from a complete dependency on the global growth engine. We would like to see stronger wage gains to signal that the economy is finally transitioning to a more self-reinforcing stage. It is hopeful that various measures of core inflation are slightly positive, but this is tentative at best. That said, the BoJ may be forced to alter its current "yield curve control" strategy by modestly lifting the target on longer-term JGB yields later in 2018, in response to pressures from robust growth and rising global bond yields. Thus, the pressure for higher bond yields should rotate away from the U.S. in the latter half of 2018 towards Europe, Canada and possibly Japan. This could eventually see the U.S. dollar head lower, but we still foresee a window in the first half of 2018 in which the dollar will appreciate on the back of widening interest rate differentials. We are less bullish than we were in mid-2017, expecting only about a 5% dollar appreciation. China: Long-Term Gain Or Short-Term Pain? The Chinese cyclical outlook remains a key risk to our upbeat view on risk assets. Significant structural reforms are on the way, now that President Xi has amassed significant political support for his reform agenda. These include deleveraging in the financial sector, a more intense anti-corruption campaign focused on the shadow-banking sector, and an ongoing restructuring in the industrial sector. The reforms will likely be positive for long-term growth, but only to the extent that they are accompanied by economic reforms. This month's Special Report, beginning on page 19, highlights that 2018 will be pivotal for China's long-term investment outlook. In the short term, reforms could be a net negative for growth depending on how deftly the authorities handle the monetary and fiscal policy dials. We witnessed this tension between growth and reform in the early years of President Xi's term, when the drive to curtail excessive credit growth and overcapacity caused an abrupt slowdown in 2015. Managing the tradeoff means that China's economy will evolve in a series of growth mini cycles. China is in the down-phase of a mini cycle at the moment, as highlighted by the Li Keqiang Index (LKI; Chart I-9). The LKI is a good proxy for the business cycle. BCA's China Strategy service recently combined the data with the best leading properties for the LKI into a single indicator.3 This indicator suggests that the LKI will end up retracing about 50% of its late 2015 to early 2017 rise before the current slowdown is complete. The good news is that broad money growth, which is a part of the LKI leading indicator, has re-accelerated in recent months. This suggests that the current economic slowdown phase will not be protracted, consistent with our 'soft landing' view. The intensity of forthcoming reforms will have to be monitored carefully for signs they have reached an economic pain threshold. We will be watching our LKI leading indicator and a basket of relevant equity sectors for warning signs. We do not view China as a risk to DM risk assets, but even a soft landing scenario could be painful for base metals and the EM complex (Chart I-10). Chart I-9China: Where Is The Bottom? Chart I-10Metals At Risk Of China Soft Landing Equity Country Allocation For now we continue to recommend overweight positions in stocks versus bonds and cash within balanced portfolios. We also still prefer Japanese stocks to the U.S., reflecting our expectation for rising bond yields in the latter and an earnings outlook that favors the former. Chart I-11 updates our earnings-per-share growth forecast for the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone. We expect U.S. EPS growth to decelerate more quickly in 2018 than in Japan, since the U.S. is further ahead in the earning cycle and is more exposed to wage and margin pressure. European earnings growth will also be solid in 2018, but this year's euro appreciation will be a headwind for Q4 2017 and Q1 2018 earnings. European and Japanese stocks are also a little on the cheap side versus the U.S., although not by enough to justify overweight positions on valuation grounds alone. We have extended our valuation work to a broader range of countries, shown in Chart I-12. All are expressed relative to the U.S. market. These metric exclude the Financials sector, and adjust for both differing sector weights and structural shifts in relative valuation. Mexico is the only one that is more than one standard deviation cheap relative to the U.S. Nonetheless, our EM team is reluctant to recommend this market given uncertainty regarding the NAFTA negotiations. Russia is not as cheap, but is in the early stages of recovery. Our EM team is overweight. Chart I-11Top-Down EPS Projection Chart I-12Valuation Ranking Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. A Note On Bitcoin Finally, we have received a lot of client questions regarding bitcoin. The incredible surge in the price of the cryptocurrency dwarfs previous asset price bubbles by a wide margin (Chart I-13). As is usually the case with bubble, supporters argue that "this time is different." We doubt it. Chart I-13Bitcoin Bubble Dwarfs All The Rest BCA's Technology Sector Strategy weighed into this debate in a recent Special Report.4 In theory, blockchain technology, including cyber currencies, can be used as a highly secure, low cost, means of transfer value from one person to the next without an intermediary. However, the report highlights that bitcoin is highly subject to fraud and manipulation because it is unregulated. Liquidity and accurate market quotes are questionable on the "fly by night" exchanges. Its use as a medium of exchange is very limited, and governments are bound to regulate it because cryptocurrencies are a tool for money laundering, tax evasion and other criminal activities. Another fact to keep in mind is that, although the supply of new bitcoins is restricted, the creation of other cryptocurrencies is unlimited. Would the bursting of the bitcoin bubble represent a risk to the economy? The market cap of all cryptocurrencies is estimated to be roughly US$400 billion (US$250 billion for bitcoin alone). This is tiny compared to global GDP or the market cap of the main asset classes such as stocks and bonds. The amount of leverage associated with bitcoin is unknown, but it is hard to see that it would be large enough to generate a significant wealth effect on spending and/or a marked impact on overall credit conditions. The links to other financial markets appear limited. Investment Conclusions Our recommended asset allocation is "steady as she goes" as we move into 2018. The policy and corporate earnings backdrop will remain supportive of risk assets at least for the first half of the year. In the U.S., the recently passed tax reform package will boost after-tax corporate cash flows by roughly 3-5%. Cyclical stocks should outperform defensives in the near term. Nonetheless, we expect 2018 to be a transition year. Stretched valuations and extremely low volatility imply that risk assets are vulnerable to the consensus macro view that central banks will not be able to reach their inflation targets even in the long term. The consensus could be in for a rude awakening. We expect equity markets to begin discounting the next U.S. recession sometime in early 2019, but markets will be vulnerable in 2018 to a bond bear phase and escalating uncertainty regarding the economic outlook. If risk assets have indeed entered the late innings, then we must watch closely for signs to de-risk. One item to watch is the 10-year U.S. CPI swap rate; a shift above 2.3% would be consistent with the Fed's 2% target for the PCE measure of inflation. This would be a signal that the FOMC will have to step-up the pace of rate hikes and aggressively slow economic growth. We will also use our S&P Scorecard Indicator to help time the exit from our overweight equity position (Chart I-14). The Scorecard is based on seven indicators that have a good track record of heralding equity bear markets.5 These include measures of monetary conditions, financial conditions, value, momentum, and economic activity. The more of these indicators in "bullish" territory, the higher the score. Currently, four of the indicators are flashing a bullish signal (financial conditions, U.S. unemployment claims, ISM new orders minus inventories, and momentum). We demonstrated in previous research that a Scorecard reading of three or above was historically associated with positive equity total returns in the subsequent months. A drop below three this year would signal the time to de-risk. Our thoughts on the risks facing equities carry over to the corporate bonds space. Our Global Fixed Income Strategy service notes that uncertainty about future growth has the potential to increase interest rate volatility that can also push corporate credit spreads wider (Chart I-15).6 Elevated leverage in the corporate sector adds to the risk of a re-rating of implied volatility. For now, however, investors should continue to favor corporate bonds relative to governments for the (albeit modest) yield pickup. Chart I-14Watch Our Scorecard To Time The Exit Chart I-15Higher Uncertainty & ##br##Vol To Hit Corporate Bonds Overall bond portfolio duration should be kept short of benchmark. We may recommend taking profits and switching to benchmark duration after global yields have increased and are beginning to negatively affect risk assets. While yields are rising, investors should favor bonds in Japan, Italy, the U.K. and Australia within fixed-income portfolios (on a currency-hedged basis). Underweight the U.S. and Canada. German and French bonds should be close to benchmark. Yield curves should steepen, before flattening later in the year. Interest rate differentials in the first half of the year should modestly benefit the U.S. dollar versus the other major currencies. Finally, investors should remain exposed to oil and related assets, and bet on rising inflation expectations in the major bond markets. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 28, 2017 Next Report: January 25, 2018 1 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy service, "A Guide to Spotting And Weathering Bear Markets," August 16, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 2 Note that we are not saying that a rise in the VIX "causes" stocks to correct. Rather, we are assuming that a shock occurs that causes stocks to correct and the VIX to rise simultaneously. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle," November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" December 12, 2017, available at tech.bcaresearch.com 5 Market Timing: Holy Grail Or Fool's Gold? The Bank Credit Analyst, May 26, 2016. 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy service, "Our Model Bond Portfolio Allocation In 2018: A Tail Of Two Halves," December 19, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com II. A Long View Of China 2018 is a pivotal year for China, as it will set the trajectory for President Xi Jinping's second term ... and he may not step down in 2022. Poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent threats to China's political stability. The new wave of the anti-corruption campaign is part of Xi's attempt to improve governance and mitigate political risks. Yet without institutional checks and balances, Xi's governance agenda will fail. Without pro-market reforms, investors will face a China that is both more authoritarian and less productive. Hearts rectified, persons were cultivated; persons cultivated, families were regulated; families regulated, states were rightly governed; states rightly governed, the whole world was made tranquil and happy. - Confucius, The Great Learning Comparisons of modern Chinese politics with Confucian notions of political order have become cliché. Nevertheless, there is a distinctly Confucian element to Chinese President Xi Jinping's strategy. Xi's sweeping anti-corruption campaign, which will enter "phase two" in 2018, is essentially an attempt to rectify the hearts and regulate the families of Communist Party officials and civil servants. The same could be said for his use of censorship and strict ideological controls to ensure that the general public remains in line with the regime. Yet Xi is also using positive measures - like pollution curbs, social welfare, and other reforms - to win over hearts and minds. His purpose is ultimately the preservation of the Chinese state - namely, the prevention of a Soviet-style collapse. Only if the regime is stable at home can Xi hope to enhance the state's international security and erode American hegemony in East Asia. This would, from Beijing's vantage, make the whole world more tranquil and happy. Thus, for investors seeking a better understanding of China in the long run, it is necessary to look at what is happening to its governance as well as to its macroeconomic fundamentals and foreign relations.1 China's greatest vulnerability over the long run is its political system. Because Xi Jinping's willingness to relinquish power is now uncertain, his governance and reform agenda in his second term will have an outsized impact on China's long-run investment outlook. The Danger From Within From 1978-2008, the Communist Party's legitimacy rested on its ability to deliver rising incomes. Since the Great Recession, however, China has entered a "New Normal" of declining potential GDP growth as the society ages and productivity growth converges toward the emerging market average (Chart II-1). In this context, Chinese policymakers are deathly afraid of getting caught in the "middle income trap," a loose concept used to explain why some middle-income economies get bogged down in slower growth rates that prevent them from reaching high-income status (Chart II-2).2 Chart II-1The New Normal Chart II-2Will China Get Caught In The Middle-Income Trap? Such a negative economic outcome would likely prompt a wave of popular discontent, which, in turn, could eventually jeopardize Communist Party rule. The quid pro quo between the Chinese government and its population is that the former delivers rising incomes in exchange for the latter's compliance with authoritarian rule. The party is not blind to the fate of other authoritarian states whose growth trajectory stalled. The threat of popular unrest in China may seem remote today. The Communist Party is rallying around its leader, Xi Jinping; the economy rebounded from the turmoil of 2015 and its cyclical slowdown in recent months is so far benign; consumer sentiment is extremely buoyant; and the global economic backdrop is bright (Chart II-3). Yet these positive political and economic developments are cyclical, whereas the underlying political risks are structural and persistent. China has made massive gains in lifting its population out of poverty, but it is still home to 559 million people, around 40% of the population, living on less than $6 per day, the living standard of Uzbekistan. It will be harder to continue improving these workers' quality of life as trend growth slows and the prospects for export-oriented manufacturing dry up. This is why the Xi administration has recently renewed its attention to poverty alleviation. The government is on target in lifting rural incomes, but behind target in lifting urban incomes, and urban-dwellers are now the majority of the nation (Chart II-4). The plight of China's 200-250 million urban migrants, in particular, poses the risk of social discontent. Chart II-3China's Slowdown So Far Benign Chart II-4Urban Income Targets At Risk Moreover, while China knows how to alleviate poverty, it has less experiencing coping with the greatest threat to the regime: the rapid growth of the middle class, with its high expectations, demands for meritocracy and social mobility, and potential for unrest if those expectations are spoiled (Chart II-5). Democracy is not necessarily a condition for reaching high-income status, but all of Asia's high-income countries are democracies. A higher level of wealth encourages household autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Today, China has reached the $8,000 GDP per capita range that often accompanies the overthrow of authoritarian regimes.3 The Chinese are above the level of income at which the Taiwanese replaced their military dictatorship in 1987; China's poorest provinces are now above South Korea's level in that same year, when it too cast off the yoke of authoritarianism (Chart II-6). Chart II-5The Communist Party's Greatest Challenge Chart II-6China's Development Beyond Point At Which Taiwan And Korea Overthrew Dictatorship This is not an argument for democracy in China. We are agnostic about whether China will become democratic in our lifetime. We are making a far more humble point: that political risk will mount as wealth is accumulated by the country's growing middle class. Several emerging markets - including Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil - have witnessed substantial political tumult after their middle class reached half of the population and stalled (Chart II-7). China is approaching this point and will eventually face similar challenges. Chart II-7Middle Class Growth Troubles Other EMs The comparison reveals that an inflection point exists for a society where the country's political establishment faces difficulties in negotiating the growing demands of a wealthier population. As political scientists have shown empirically, the very norms of society evolve as wealth erodes the pull of Malthusian and traditional cultural variables.4 Political transformation can follow this process, often quite unexpectedly and radically.5 Clearly the Chinese public shows no sign of large-scale, revolutionary sentiment at the moment. And political opposition does not necessarily result in regime change. Nevertheless, it is empirically false that the Chinese people are naturally opposed to democracy or representative government. After all, Sun Yat Sen founded a Republic of China in 1912, well before many western democratic transformations! And more to the point, the best survey evidence shows that the Chinese are culturally most similar to their East Asian neighbors (as well as, surprisingly, the Baltic and eastern European states): this is not a neighborhood that inherently eschews democracy. Remarkably, recent surveys suggest that China's millennial generation, while not wildly enthusiastic about democracy, is nevertheless more enthusiastic than its peers in the western world's liberal democracies (Chart II-8)! Chart II-8Chinese People Not Less Fond Of Democracy Than Others China is also home to one of the most reliable predictors of political change: inequality. China's economic boom is coincident with the rise of extreme inequalities in income, wealth, region, and social status. True, judging by average household wealth, everyone appears to be a winner; but the average is misleading because it is pulled upward by very high net worth individuals - and China has created 528 billionaires in the past decade alone. A better measure is the mean-to-median wealth ratio, as it demonstrates the gap that opens up between the average and the typical household. As Chart II-9 demonstrates, China is witnessing a sharp increase in inequality relative to its neighbors and peers. More standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, also show very high readings in China. And this trend has combined with social immobility: China has a very high degree of generational earnings elasticity, which is a measure of the responsiveness of one's income to one's parent's income. If elasticity is high, then social outcomes are largely predetermined by family and social mobility is low. On this measure, China is an extreme outlier - comparable to the U.S. and the U.K., which, while very different economies, have suffered recent political shocks as a result of this very predicament (Chart II-10). Chart II-9Inequality: A Severe Problem In China Chart II-10China An Outlier In Inequality And Social Immobility "China does not have voters" unlike the U.S. and U.K., is the instant reply. Yet that statement entails that China has no pressure valve for releasing pent-up frustrations. Any political shock may be more, not less, destabilizing. In the U.S. and the U.K., voters could release their frustrations by electing an anti-establishment president or abrogating a trade relationship with Europe. In China, the only option may be to demand an "exit" from the political system altogether. Note that there is already substantial evidence of social unrest in China over the past decade. From 2003 to 2007, China faced a worrisome increase in "mass incidents," at which point the National Bureau of Statistics stopped keeping track. The longer data on "public incidents" suggests that the level of unrest remains elevated, despite improvements under the Xi administration (Chart II-11). Broader measures tell a similar story of a country facing severe tensions under the surface. For instance, China's public security spending outstrips its national defense spending (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Chinese Social Unrest Is Real Chart II-12China Spends More On ##br##Domestic Security Than Defense In essence, Chinese political risk is understated. This conclusion may seem counterintuitive, given Xi's remarkable consolidation of power. But is ultimately structural factors, not individual leaders, that will carry the day. The Communist Party is in a good position now, but its leaders are all-too-aware of the volcanic frustrations that could be unleashed should they fail to deliver the "China Dream." This is why so much depends upon Xi's policy agenda in the second half of his term. To that question we will now turn. Bottom Line: The Communist Party is at a cyclical high point of above-trend economic growth and political consolidation under a strongman leader. However, political risk is understated: poverty, inequality, and middle-class angst are structural and persistent and the long-term potential growth rate is slowing. If we assume that China is not unique in its historical trajectory, then we can conclude that it is approaching one of the most politically volatile periods in its development. Chart II-13Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign The Governance And Reform Agenda Since coming to office in 2012-13, President Xi has spearheaded an extraordinary anti-corruption campaign and purge of the Communist Party (Chart II-13). The campaign has understandably drawn comparisons to Chairman Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Yet these are not entirely fair, as Xi has tried to improve governance as well as eradicate his enemies. As Xi prepares for his "re-election" in March 2018, he has declared that he will expand the anti-corruption campaign further in his second term in office: details are scant, but the gist is that the campaign will branch out from the ruling party to the entire state bureaucracy, on a permanent basis, in the form of a new National Supervision Commission.6 There are three ways in which this agenda could prove positive for China's long-term outlook. First, the regime clearly hopes to convince the public that it is addressing the most burning social grievances. Corruption persistently ranks at the top of the list, insofar as public opinion can be known (Chart II-14). Public opinion is hard to measure, but it is clear that consumer sentiment is soaring in the wake of the October party congress (see Chart II-3 above). It is also worth noting that the Chinese public's optimism perked up in Xi's first year in office, when the policy agenda on offer was substantially the same and the economy had just experienced a sharp drop in growth rates (Chart II-15). Reassuring the public over corruption will improve trust in the regime. Second, the anti-corruption campaign feeds into Xi's broader economic reform agenda. Productivity growth is harder to generate as a country's industrialization process matures. With the bulk of the big increases in labor, capital, and land supply now complete in China, the need to improve total factor productivity becomes more pressing (Chart II-16). Unlike the early stages of growth, this requires reaching the hard-to-get economic conditions, such as property rights, human capital, financial deepening, entrepreneurship, innovation, education, technology, and social welfare. Chart II-14Chinese Public Grievances Chart II-15Anti-Corruption Is Popular Chart II-16Productivity Requires Institutional Change On this count, the Xi administration's anti-corruption campaign has been a net positive. The most widely accepted corruption indicators suggest that it has made a notable improvement to the country's governance. Yet the country remains far below its competitors in the absolute rankings, notably its most similar neighbor Taiwan (Chart II-17 A&B). The institutionalization of the campaign could thus further improve the institutional framework and business environment. Chart II-17AAnti-Corruption Campaign Is A Plus... Chart II-17B...But There's A Long Way To Go Third, the anti-corruption campaign can serve as a central government tool in enforcing other economic reforms. Pro-productivity reforms are harder to execute in the context of slowing growth because political resistance increases among established actors fighting to preserve their existing advantages. If the ruling party is to break through these vested interests, it needs a powerful set of tools. Recently, the central government in Beijing has been able to implement policy more effectively on the local level by paving the way through corruption probes that remove personnel and sharpen compliance. Case in point: the use of anti-corruption officials this year gave teeth to environmental inspection teams tasked with trimming overcapacity in the industrial sector (Chart II-18). And there are already clear signs that this method will be replicated as financial regulators tackle the shadow banking sector.7 Chart II-18Reforms Cut Steel Capacity, ##br##Reduced Need For Scrap These last examples - financial and environmental regulatory tightening - are policy priorities in 2018. The coercive aspect of the corruption probes should ensure that they are more effective than they would otherwise be. And reining in asset bubbles and reducing pollution are clear long-term positives for the regime. Ideally, then, Xi's anti-corruption campaign will deliver three substantial improvements to China's long-term outlook: greater public trust in the government, higher total factor productivity, and reduced systemic risks. The administration hopes that it can mitigate its governance deficit while improving economic sustainability. In this way it can buy both public support and precious time to continue adjusting to the new normal. The danger is that these policies will combine to increase downside risks to growth in the short term.8 Bottom Line: Xi's anti-corruption campaign is being expanded and institutionalized to cover the entire Chinese administrative state. This is a consequential campaign that will take up a large part of Xi's second term. It is the administration's major attempt to mitigate the socio-political challenges that await China as it rises up the income ladder. Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely? The problem, however, is that Xi may merely use the anti-corruption campaign to accrue more power into his hands. As is clear from the above, Xi's governance agenda is far from impartial and professional. The anti-corruption campaign is being used not only to punish corrupt officials but also to achieve various other goals. Xi has even publicly linked the campaign to the downfall of his political rivals.9 In essence, the campaign highlights the core contradiction of the Xi administration: can Xi genuinely improve China's governance by means of the centralization and personalization of power? Chart II-19China's Governance Still Falls Far Behind Over the long haul, the fundamental problem is the absence of checks and balances, i.e. accountability, from Xi's agenda. For instance, the National Supervision Commission will be granted immense powers to investigate and punish malefactors within the state - but who will inspect the inspectors? Xi's other governance reforms suffer the same problem. His attempt to create "rule of law" is lacking the critical ingredients of judicial independence and oversight. The courts are not likely to be able to bring cases against the party, central government, or powerful state-owned firms, and they will not be able to repeal government decisions. Thus, as many commentators have noted, Xi's notion of rule of law is more accurately described as "rule by law": the reformed legal system will in all probability remain an instrument in the hands of the Communist Party. Likewise, Xi's attempt to grant the People's Bank of China greater powers of oversight in order to combat systemic financial risk suffers from the fact that the central bank is not independent, and will remain subordinate to the State Council, and hence to the Politburo Standing Committee. This is not even to mention the lamentable fact that Xi's campaign for better governance has so far coincided with extensive repression of civil society, which does not mesh well with the desire to improve human capital and innovation.10 Thus it is of immense importance whether Xi sets up relatively durable anti-corruption, legal, and financial institutions that will maintain their legitimate functions beyond his term and political purposes. Otherwise, his actions will simply illustrate why China's governance indicators lag so far behind its peers in absolute terms. Corruption perceptions may improve further, but there will be virtually no progress in areas like "voice and accountability," "political stability and absence of violence," "rule of law," and "regulatory quality," each of which touches on the Communist Party's weak spots in various ways (Chart II-19). Analysis of the Communist Party's shifting leadership characteristics reinforces a pessimistic view of the long run if Xi misses his current opportunity.11 The party's top leadership increasingly consists of career politicians from the poor, heavily populated interior provinces - i.e. the home base of the party. Their educational backgrounds are less scientific, i.e. more susceptible to party ideology. (Indeed, Xi Jinping's top young protégé, Chen Miner, is a propaganda chief.) And their work experience largely consists of ruling China's provinces, where they earned their spurs by crushing rebellions and redistributing funds to placate various interest groups (Chart II-20). While one should be careful in drawing conclusions from such general statistics, the contrast with the leadership that oversaw China's boldest reforms in the 1990s is plain. Chart II-20China's Leaders Becoming More 'Communist' Over Time Bottom Line: Xi's reform agenda is contradictory in its attempt to create better governance through centralizing and personalizing power. Unless he creates checks and balances in his reform of China's institutions, he is likely to fall short of long-lasting improvements. The character profiles of China's political elite do not suggest that the party will become more likely to pursue pro-market reforms in Xi's wake. Xi Jinping's Choice Xi is the pivotal player because of his rare consolidation of power, and 2018 is the pivotal year. It is pivotal because it will establish the policy trajectory of Xi's second term - which may or may not extend into additional terms after 2022. So far, the world has gained a few key takeaways from Xi's policy blueprint, which he delivered at the nineteenth National Party Congress on October 18: Xi has consolidated power: He and his faction reign supreme both within the Communist Party and the broader Chinese state; Xi's policy agenda is broadly continuous: Xi's speech built on his administration's stated aims in the first five years as well as the inherited long-term aims of previous administrations; China is coming out of its shell: In the international realm, Xi sees China "moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind"; The 2022 succession is in doubt: Xi refrained from promoting a successor to the Politburo Standing Committee, the unwritten norm since 1992. Markets have not reacted overly negatively to these developments (Chart II-21), as the latter do not pose an immediate threat to the global rally in risk assets. The reasons are several: Chart II-21Market Not Too Worried About ##br##Party Congress Outcomes Maoism is overrated: While the Communist Party constitution now treats Xi Jinping as the sole peer of the disastrous ruler Mao Zedong, the market does not buy the Maoist rhetoric. Instead, it sees policy continuity, yet with more effective central leadership, which is a plus. Reforms are making gradual progress: Xi is treading carefully, but is still publicly committed to a reform agenda of rebalancing China's economic model toward consumption and services, improving governance and productivity, and maintaining trade openness. Whatever the shortcomings of the first five years, this agenda is at least reformist in intention. China's tactic of "seeking progress while maintaining stability" is certainly more reassuring than "progress at any cost" or "no progress at all"! Trump and Xi are getting along so far: Xi's promises to move China toward center stage threaten to increase geopolitical tensions with the United States in the long run, yet markets are not overly alarmed. China is imposing sanctions on North Korea to help resolve the nuclear missile standoff, negotiating a "Code of Conduct" in the South China Sea, and promoting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which will marginally add to global development and growth. Trump is hurling threatening words rather than concrete tariffs. 2022 is a long way away: Markets are unconcerned with Xi's decision not to put a clear successor on the Politburo Standing Committee, even though it implies that Xi will not step down at the end of his term in five years. Investors are implicitly approving Xi's strongman behavior while blissfully ignoring the implication that the peaceful transition of power in China could become less secure. Are investors right to be so sanguine? Cyclically, BCA's China Investment Strategy is overweight Chinese investible equities relative to EM and global stocks. Geopolitical Strategy also recommends that clients follow this view and overweight China relative to EM. Beyond this 6-12 month period, it depends on how Xi uses his political capital. If Xi is serious about governance and economic reform, then long-term investors should tolerate the other political risks, and the volatility of reforms, and overweight China within their EM portfolio. After all, China's two greatest pro-market reformers, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, were also heavy-handed authoritarians who crushed domestic dissent, clashed with the United States from time to time, and hesitated to relinquish control to their successors. However, if Xi is not serious, then investors with a long time horizon should downgrade China/EM assets - as not only China but the world will have a serious problem on its hands. For Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin always reaffirmed China's pro-market orientation and desire to integrate into the global economic order. If Xi turns his back on this orientation, while imprisoning his rivals for corruption, concentrating power exclusively in his own person, and contesting U.S. leadership in the Asia Pacific, then the long-run outlook for China and the region should darken rather quickly. Domestic institutions will decay and trade and foreign investment will suffer. How and when will investors know the difference? As mentioned, we think 2018 is critical. Xi is flush with political capital and has a positive global economic backdrop. If he does not frontload serious efforts this year then it will become harder to gain traction as time goes by.12 If he demurs, the Chinese political system will not afford another opportunity like this for years to come. The country will approach the 2020s with additional layers of bureaucracy loyal to Xi, but no significant macro adjustments to its governance or productivity. It is not clear how long China's growth rate is sustainable without pro-productivity reforms. It is also not clear that the world will wait five years before responding to a China that, without a new reform push, will appear unabashedly mercantilist, neo-communist, and revisionist. Bottom Line: The long-run investment outlook for China hinges on Xi Jinping's willingness to use his immense personal authority and concentration of power for the purposes of good governance and market-oriented economic reform. Without concrete progress, investors will have to decide whether they want to invest in a China that is becoming less economically vibrant as well as more authoritarian. We think this would be a bad bet. Matt Gertken Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist Geopolitical Strategy 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Chinese policymakers are expressly concerned about the middle-income trap. Please see the World Bank and China's Development Research Center of the State Council, "China 2030: Building A Modern, Harmonious, And Creative Society," 2013, available at www.worldbank.org. Liu He, who is perhaps Xi Jinping's top economic adviser, had a hand in drafting this report and is now a member of the Politburo and shortlisted to take charge of the newly established Financial Stability and Development Commission at the People's Bank of China. 3 Please see Indermit S. Gill and Homi Kharas, "The Middle-Income Trap Turns Ten," World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 7403 (August, 2015), available at www.worldbank.org 4 Please see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: the Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 5 For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, as well as the downfall of communist regimes writ large, were completely unanticipated. 6 Specifically, Xi is creating a National Supervision Commission that will group a range of existing anti-graft watchdogs under its roof at the local, provincial, and central levels of administration, while coordinating with the Communist Party's top anti-graft watchdog. More details are likely to be revealed at the March legislative session, but what matters is that the initiative is a significant attempt to institutionalize the anti-corruption campaign. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 China has recently drafted top anti-graft officials, such as Zhou Liang, from the powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Commission and placed them in the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which is in charge of overseeing banks. Authorities have already imposed fines in nearly 3,000 cases in 2017 affecting various kinds of banks, including state-owned banks. On the broader use of anti-corruption teams for economic policy, please see Barry Naughton, "The General Secretary's Extended Reach: Xi Jinping Combines Economics And Politics," China Leadership Monitor 54 (Fall 2017), available at www.hoover.org. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Gao Shan et al, "China's President Xi Jinping Hits Out at 'Political Conspiracies' in Keynote Speech," Radio Free Asia, January 3, 2017, available at www.rfa.org 10 Xi has cranked up the state's propaganda organs, censorship of the media, public surveillance, and broader ideological and security controls (including an aggressive push for "cyber-sovereignty") to warn the public that there is no alternative to Communist Party rule. This tendency has raised alarms among civil rights defenders, lawyers, NGOs, and the western world to the effect that China's governance is actually regressing despite nominal improvement in standard indicators. This is the opposite of Confucius's bottom-up notion of order. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Xi faces politically sensitive deadlines in the 2020-22 period: the economic targets in the thirteenth Five Year Plan; the hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021; and Xi's possible retirement at the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. At that point he will need to focus on demonstrating the Communist Party's all-around excellence and make careful preparations either to step down or cling to power. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equity indexes remained on a tear heading into year-end on the back of robust earnings growth in the major countries and U.S. tax cuts. There are some dark clouds hanging over this rally, as discussed in the Overview section. The technicals are stretched, but none of our fundamental indicators are warning of a market top. Implied equity volatility is very low, which can be interpreted in a contrary fashion. Investor sentiment is frothy and our Speculation Indicator is very elevated. Moreover, our equity valuation indicator has finally reached one standard deviation, which is our threshold of overvaluation. Valuation does not tell us anything about timing, but it does highlight the downside risks. Our monetary indicator also deteriorated a little more in December, although not by enough on its own to justify downgrading risk assets. On a positive note, earnings surprises and the net revisions ratio are not sending any warning signs for profit growth (although net revisions have edged lower recently). Moreover, our new Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) continued on its bullish equity signal in November for the fifth consecutive month. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators are also bullish on stocks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. The small dip in the Japanese WTP in December is a little worrying, but we need to see more weakness to confirm that flows no longer favor Japanese equities. In contrast, Europe's WTP rose sharply in December, suggesting that investors are allocating more to their European equity holdings. We are overweight both Europe and (especially) Japan relative to the U.S. (currency hedged). U.S. Treasury valuation is still very close to neutral, even following December's backup in yields. There is plenty of upside potential for yields before they hit "inexpensive" territory. Similarly, our technical bond indicator suggests that technical factors will not be headwind to a further bond selloff in 2018. Little has change for the dollar. The technicals are neutral. Value is expensive based on PPP, but less so by other valuation metrics. We see modest upside for the greenback in 2018. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And ##br##Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart II-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart II-10U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart II-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart II-1210-Year Treasury Yield ComponentsChart II-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart II-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart II-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart II-16U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart II-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart II-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart II-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart II-20Euro Technicals Chart II-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart II-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart II-23Broad Commodity Indicators Chart II-24Commodity Prices Chart II-25Commodity Prices Chart II-26Commodity Sentiment Chart II-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart II-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart II-29U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart II-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart II-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart II-32U.S. Labor Market Chart II-33U.S. Consumption Chart II-34U.S. Housing Chart II-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart II-36U.S. Financial Conditions Chart II-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart II-38Global Economic Snapshot: China

Dear Client, This is our last report of 2017. We will be back on January 4, 2018, with our customary recap of recommendations made this year. We wish you and your loved ones the very best this lovely season has to offer. Sincerely, Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity Strategist Commodity & Energy Strategy Highlights With GDP growth accelerating in ~ 75% of countries monitored by the IMF, we expect commodity demand - particularly for crude oil and refined products - to remain strong in 2018. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will maintain its production discipline, which will force commercial oil inventories lower in 2018. As a result, we expect oil markets to continue to tighten in 2018, keeping upside risk to prices from unplanned production outages acute. This was clearly demonstrated in separate incidents in the U.S. and North Sea in the past two months, which removed more than 400k b/d from markets since November. Geopolitical risk will remain elevated, particularly in Venezuela, where operations at the state oil company were paralyzed after senior military officers assumed leadership positions there. Beyond 2018, we believe OPEC 2.0 will endure as a coalition. It will manage production and provide forward guidance consistent with a strategy to keep WTI and Brent forward curves backwardated. This will provide a supportive backdrop for the Saudi Aramco IPO, expected toward the end of next year, and will limit the volume of hedging U.S. shale-oil producers are able to effect. In turn, this will limit the number of rigs U.S. E&Ps can profitably deploy. Energy: Overweight. Our Brent and WTI call spreads in 2018 - long $55/bbl calls vs. short $60/bbl calls - are up an average 53.8%. We will retain these exposures into 2018. Base Metals: Neutral. We expect base metals to be supported through 1Q18, after which reform measures in China could crimp supply and demand, as we discuss below. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain long gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk, even though inflation remains quiescent (see below). Ags/Softs: Underweight. Fed policy will be critical to ag markets in 2018. We expect as many as four rate hikes next year, as the Fed continues with rates normalization (see below). Feature Our updated balances model indicates global oil markets will continue to tighten in 2018, as demand growth accelerates and OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - maintains production discipline (Chart of the Week). Earlier this week, IMF noted improving employment conditions globally, which will continue to support aggregate demand and the synchronized global expansion in manufacturing and trade (Chart 2 and Chart 3).1 This acceleration of GDP growth rates globally will continue to support income growth and commodity demand generally. Oil-exporters have not participated in the global economic expansion to the extent of other economies, according to the Fund, which can be seen in the trade data (Chart 3). However, imports by Middle East and African countries are moving higher, and look set to post year-on-year (yoy) growth in the near future. Chart of the WeekOil Balances Will Continue to Tighten In 2018 Chart 2Global Upturn Boosts Manufacturing, ##br##Commodity Demand... The combination of continued production discipline from OPEC 2.0 and expanding incomes boosting demand will force crude and product inventories lower, particularly those in the OECD, which are the primary target of the producer coalition (Chart 4). Chart 3...And Global Trade Chart 4OECD Inventories Will Fall Below 5-year ##br##Average In BCA's Supply-Demand Assessment Unplanned Outages Mounting; Risk Remains Acute Unlike many forecasters, we continue to expect inventories to draw in 1Q18. This expectation is the direct result of our supply-demand modelling, and also is supported by our expectation that the risk of unplanned outages is increasing. This already has been demonstrated in the U.S. and U.K. North Sea, where more than 400k b/d of pipeline flows in November and December were lost. Of far greater moment, however, is the potential for unplanned outages in Venezuela. We believe the state-owned oil company there is one systemic malfunction away from shutting down exports entirely - e.g., a breakdown in pumping stations - as happened in 2002. Reuters reports the government of Nicolas Maduro appears to be consolidating power via an "anti-corruption" campaign, and is installing senior military officials with little or no industry experience in leadership roles inside PDVSA.2 Reuters notes, "The ongoing purge, in which prosecutors have arrested at least 67 executives including two recently ousted oil ministers, now threatens to further harm operations for the OPEC country, which is already producing at 30-year-lows and struggling to run PDVSA units including Citgo Petroleum, its U.S. refiner." The news service goes on to report, "Executives that remain, meanwhile, are so rattled by the arrests that they are loathe to act, scared they will later be accused of wrongdoing." We have Venezuela output at just under 1.90mm b/d, and expect it to decline to a little more than 1.70mm b/d by the end of 2018. Brent Expected To Average $67/bbl In 2018 We continue to forecast average Brent prices of $67/bbl and WTI at $63/bbl next year, given our assessment of global supply-demand balances, which drive our fundamental price forecasts: We expect global crude and liquids supply to average 100.23mm b/d in 2018, vs 100.01mm b/d expected by the U.S. EIA, while we have global demand coming in at 100.29mm b/d on average next year, vs the 99.97mm b/d expected by EIA (Chart 5 and Chart 6). Chart 5BCA's Expected Crude Oil Supply Vs. EIA's Chart 6BCA's Expected Demand Exceeds EIA's In 2018 Our expectations translate into a 2.55mm b/d increase in supply next year, vs a 1.67mm b/d increase in demand yoy (Table 1). Running the EIA's supply-demand assessments through our fundamental pricing models produces average Brent and WTI prices of $49/bbl and $47/bbl, respectively. EIA is expecting a 2.04mm b/d increase in supply next year, vs a 1.63mm b/d increase in demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) In line with our House view, we are expecting some USD strengthening on the back of as many as four interest-rate hikes by the Federal Reserve in the U.S. (Chart 7). As we've noted in the past, we expect these effects to be felt more in 2H18. Along with higher U.S. shale-oil production driven by higher prices - we expect shale output to go up 0.97mm b/d next year to 6.64mm b/d - a stronger USD will keep Brent and WTI prices below $70/bbl next year. Oil Beyond 2018: OPEC 2.0 Endures OPEC 2.0 will remain an enduring feature of the oil market going forward, in our view. Allowing the coalition to fade away, and returning the global oil market to a production free-for-all once again serves neither KSA's nor Russia's interests. Following the IPO of Saudi Aramco toward the end of 2018, KSA will, we believe, want to maintain stability in the market, by demonstrating to capital markets that OPEC 2.0 can manage crude-oil supplies in a way that is not disruptive to its new-found investors. It is important to remember the Aramco IPO is only the beginning of the process of transforming KSA from a crude resource exporter into a vertically integrated global refining and marketing colossus. To eclipse Exxon as the world's largest refiner, Aramco would benefit from continued access to capital markets throughout the following decades, as well reliable cash flows to lower its cost of capital, service debt, and maintain whatever dividends it envisions. This cannot occur if oil markets are continually at risk of collapsing because production cannot be managed in a business-like manner. While Russia has not embarked on the same sort of transformation of its resource industry as KSA, it still has a very strong interest in maintaining stability in the crude oil markets, given its dependence on hydrocarbon exports. The Russian rouble moves in near-lock-step with Brent prices - since 2010, Brent prices explain ~80% of the movement in the rouble (Chart 8). It is obvious a collapse in global crude oil prices would, once again, have devastating effects on Russia's economy, as it did in 2009 and 2014. Such a collapse would trigger inflation domestically, as the cost of imports skyrockets, and threaten civil unrest as incomes and GDP are hobbled and foreign reserves evaporate. Chart 7Stronger USD Limits Oil-Price Appreciation In 2018 Chart 8Russia Cannot Afford An Oil Price Collapse Both KSA and Russia have a deep interest in maintaining oil's pre-eminent position as a transportation fuel for as long as possible. For this reason, neither wants to encourage prices that are too high - $100/bbl+ prices greatly encouraged the development of shale technology in the U.S. - nor too low, given the dire consequences such an outcome would have for both their economies. The common goals of KSA and Russia cannot be achieved by allowing OPEC 2.0 to dissolve, leaving member states to produce at will in the sort of production free-for-all that characterized the OPEC market-share war of 2014 - 15. To the extent possible, OPEC 2.0 must continue to manage member states' production in a manner that does not permit inventories to once again fill to the point where the only way to moderate over-production is to push prices through cash costs, so that enough output is shut in to clear the market. The most obvious way for these goals to be accomplished is by keeping markets relatively tight. This can be done by keeping commercial oil inventories worldwide low enough to keep Brent and WTI forward curves backwardated - particularly in highly visible OECD and U.S. storage facilities. A backwardated forward curve means the average price over a typical 2- or 3-year hedge horizon is lower than the spot price received by OPEC 2.0 producers. The deeper the backwardation, the lower the average price a U.S. shale producer can lock in by hedging. This limits the number of rigs that can be deployed by shale producers. This will require continual communication with markets to assure them sufficient spare capacity and easily developed production can be brought to market to alleviate any temporary shortage. In the meantime, OPEC 2.0 members with flexible storage will need to communicate these barrels will be readily available to the market. This management and forward-guidance should be easier for OPEC 2.0 to execute on, following its recent success in keeping some 1.0mm b/d of production off the market - largely in KSA and Russia - and member states' existing spare capacity and storage. We continue to expect the daily working dialogue of the OPEC 2.0 member states - most especially KSA and Russia - to deepen as time goes by, and for tactics and strategy to evolve as each gains comfort operating with the other. Whether OPEC 2.0 can pull this off remains to be seen. However, given the success of the coalition over the past two years, we are inclined to believe they will continue to develop a durable modus operandi supporting this outcome. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst HugoB@bcaresearch.com Opposing Forces: Stay Neutral Metals In 2018 Chart 9Strong Global Demand Will Neutralize ##br##Impact of China Slowdown While we expect more upside to metal prices in the first half of 2018, slowing growth in China and a stronger USD will prevent a repeat of this year's stellar performance. While a deceleration in China is - ceteris paribus - most definitely a headwind to metal prices, we believe the impact may pan out differently this time around. The silver lining comes from the Communist Party's commitment to environmental reforms, which, in many cases, will manifest themselves in the form of less supply of the refined product, or demand for the ores. Either way, this alone is a positive for metals. China's Environmental Reforms Will Dominate in 1Q18 China's commitment to cleaning its air is currently shaping up in the form of winter cuts in major steel- and aluminum-producing provinces. While policies are hard to predict, we will keep monitoring the development and implementation of reforms from within China to assess how they will impact the markets. Outcomes from the Annual National People's Congress in March will give us a clearer indication of what to expect in terms of policy. For now, we see these reforms putting a floor under metal prices, at least in the beginning of 2018. Robust Global Demand Offsets Stronger USD & Slower Chinese Growth Xi's reforms will turn into a headwind for metal prices as they begin to impact the real economy in 2H18. Signs of weakness have already emerged in measures of industrial activity such as the Li Keqiang and Chinese PMI (Chart 9). In addition, the real estate sector has been showing some weakness since the beginning of the year. Annual growth rates in real estate investment and floor-space started are decelerating - a worrisome sign. Nonetheless, domestic demand remains robust, and policymakers in Beijing are approaching economic reforms gradually and with caution. Consequently we do not expect a major policy mistake to derail the Chinese economy. While Chinese growth will likely slow from above trend levels, a hard landing is most probably not in the cards. Another bearish risk comes from a stronger USD. We see the Fed as more committed to interest-rate normalization than markets expect, and consequently would not be surprised to see up to four rate hikes next year. Inverting the yield curve is a policy mistake incoming Chair Jerome Powell will try to avoid; however, we expect inflation to bottom in the first half of next year, giving the Fed room to accelerate its path of rate hikes. This will result in a stronger USD, which is bearish for commodities priced in U.S. dollars. In any case, these bearish factors will likely be offset by strong global growth, supported by a robust U.S. economy. Bottom Line: Xi's reforms will dominate metal markets in 2018 as bullish supply side environmental reforms duel against bearish demand-side economic reforms. Robust global growth will neutralize the impact of downside pressures. Stay neutral, but beware of modest USD strength. Low Inflation Retards Gold's Advance Once again, reality confounded theory: Inflation failed to emerge this year, even as systematically important central banks remained massively accommodative, and some 70% of the economies tracked by the OECD reported jobless rates below the commonly used estimate of the natural rate of unemployment (Chart 10). Chart 10Massive Monetary Accommodation Failed ##br##To Spur Inflation In The U.S. These fundamentals should be inflationary and supportive of gold. To date, they haven't been. We Expect Inflation To Revive The global economy has endured decades of low inflation going back at least to the 1990s. This has been driven by numerous factors. First, the expansion of the global value chain (GVC) over the past three decades has synchronized inflation rates worldwide, as our research and that of the BIS has found. As a result, U.S. wages and goods' inflation are now more dependent on global spare capacity. With the global output gap now almost closed, this disinflationary force will dissipate.3 Second, most measures of labor-market slack are now pointing toward tighter conditions, which, we expect, will strengthen the Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment next year. Inflation is a lagging indicator: Wage inflation lags the unemployment rate, and CPI inflation lags wage inflation. Investors should expect inflation to show up in 2018.4 Lastly, one-off technical factors, which depressed inflation last year - e.g. drop in cellphone data charges and prescription drug prices - also will fade. Once these big one-offs are no longer in annual percent-change calculations, inflation rates will rise. The Fed's Choppy Waters Against this backdrop, the Fed is embarking on a rates-normalization policy, which we believe will result in U.S. central bank's policy rate being increased up to four times next year. The risk of a policy error is high. Should the Fed proceed with its rate hikes while inflation remains quiescent, real interest rates will increase. This would depress gold prices, and, at the limit, threaten the current economic expansion by tightening monetary conditions well beyond current levels, potentially lifting unemployment levels. If, on the other hand, the Fed deliberately keeps rate hikes below the rate of growth in prices - i.e., it stays "behind the curve" - it risks being forced to implement steeper rate hikes later in 2018 or in 2019 to get stronger inflation under control. This could tighten monetary conditions suddenly, and threaten the expansion, pushing the U.S. economy into recession. There's a lot riding on how the Fed navigates these difficult conditions. Geopolitical Risks Will Support Gold On the geopolitical side, the risks we've identified in our October 12, 2017 publication - i.e. (1) U.S.-North Korea tensions, (2) trade protectionism of the Trump administration, and (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East-- will add a geopolitical risk premium to gold prices, supporting the metal's role as a safe haven.5 Bottom Line: We remain neutral precious metals, but still recommend investors allocate to gold as a strategic portfolio hedge against inflation and geopolitical risk. U.S. Policies Will Weigh On Ags In 2018 U.S. monetary and trade policy will dominate ags next year. Our modelling reveals that U.S. financial factors - real rates and the USD - are significant in explaining ag price behavior (Chart 11).6 Given that we expect the Fed to hike interest rates more aggressively than what the market is currently pricing in, we see grains as vulnerable to the downside. In addition, the risk that NAFTA is abrogated by the U.S. would weigh on ag markets, as Canada and Mexico are among the U.S.'s top three ag export destinations. Chart 11Bearish U.S. Monetary And Trade Policies ##br##Amid Healthy Inventories Will Weigh On Ags We expect ag markets will remain well supplied next year, and inventories will moderate the impact of supply-side shocks - most notably in the form of a La Nina event. The probability of a La Nina currently stands above 80%, and is expected to last until mid-to-late spring. U.S. Monetary Policy Is Relevant With U.S. inflation rates still subdued, there has been much talk about how soon the Fed will be able embark on its tightening cycle. A weaker-than-expected USD has been favorable for ag markets this year, and thus kept U.S. ag exports competitive. However, if and when the economy reaches the kink in the Philipps Curve, and inflation begins its ascent, the Fed will be able to proceed with its rate-hiking cycle. With the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge at a cycle high, we expect this scenario to unfold in the first half of 2018. This would give incoming Fed Chairman Jerome Powell ample room to hike rates which would - ceteris paribus - bear down on ag prices. FX Developments In Other Major Exporters Will Also Be Bearish The effects of higher U.S. interest rates are translated to ag markets via the exchange-rate channel. Commodities are priced in USD, thus a stronger USD vis-à-vis the currency of a major ag exporter will, all else equal, increase the profitability of farmers competing against U.S. exporters in international markets. Among the ag-relevant currencies, we highlight the Brazilian Real, EUR, Russian Rouble, and Australian Dollar as most likely to depreciate vis-à-vis the USD in 2018. Termination Of NAFTA Is A Risk For American Farmers U.S. farmers are keeping a close eye on NAFTA renegotiations, and rightly so. Canada and Mexico are the U.S.'s second and third largest agricultural export markets - accounting for 15% and 13% of U.S. agricultural exports in 2016, respectively. In fact, corn, rice, and wheat exports to Mexico accounted for 26%, 15%, and 11% share of U.S. exports of those commodities, respectively. However, as BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy service points out, the long-run impact depends on the underlying reason for the termination of the trade agreement. If Trump is merely a "pluto-populist" - as they expect - NAFTA will simply be replaced by bilateral trade agreements, with no lasting economic disturbance. The risk is that Trump is a genuine populist. If this turns out to be the case, tariffs and a rejection of the WTO would make U.S. exports less competitive, and would become a bearish force in ag markets.7 The risk of a collapse in the NAFTA trade deal would be devastating for U.S. farmers. In fact, in a bid to reduce reliance on the U.S., Mexican Economic Minister Ildefonso Guajardo recently announced that they are working on a Mexico-European Union trade deal.8 In addition, Mexico signed the world's largest free trade agreement with Japan, and is currently exploring the opportunity to join Mercosur. Bottom Line: Weather-induced volatility is possible in the near term, as a La Nina event threatens to reduce yields. Nevertheless, U.S. financial conditions and trade policy will dominate ag markets in 2018. With markets underestimating the Fed's resolve regarding interest rate hikes, we see some upside to the USD. This will keep a lid on ag prices next year. 1 Please see "The year in Review: Global Economy in 5 Charts," published on the IMF Blog December 18, 2017. https://blogs.imf.org/2017/12/17/the-year-in-review-global-economy-in-5-charts/ 2 Please see "Paralysis at PDVSA: Venezuela's oil purge cripples company," published by reuters.com December 15, 2017. 3 The IMF estimates the median output gap for 20 advanced economies reached -0.1% in 2017 and will rise to +0.3% in 2018. Please see BIS https://www.bis.org/publ/work602.htm. The Bank for International Settlements in Basel describes the GVC as "cross-border trade in intermediate goods and services." 4 The U.S. unemployment has been under its estimated NAIRU for 9 consecutive months now. 5 Please see Commodity and Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Balance Of Risks Favors Holding Gold," dated October 12, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Our modelling indicates that U.S. financial factors are important determinants of agriculture commodity price developments. More specifically, a 1% move in the USD TWI and a 1pp change in 5 year real rates are associated with a 1.4%, and an 18% change in the CCI Grains & Oilseed Index, in the opposite direction. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report titled "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see "Mexico sees possible EU trade deal as NAFTA talks drag on," dated December 13, 2017, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q17 Trades Closed in Summary of Trades Closed in

This will be the last U.S. Bond Strategy report of the year. The next publication will be on January 9 with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for January 2018. Until then we extend our best wishes for a wonderful holiday and a Happy New Year. Highlights Duration: Rising core inflation will cause the nominal 10-year Treasury yield to increase, driven mostly by the inflation component. We target a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation is back close to the Fed's target, likely sometime in the middle of 2018. Yield Curve: The yield curve will steepen modestly during the next six months as inflation recovers and the Fed lifts rates only gradually. This mild steepening will transition to flattening once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have recovered to pre-crisis levels. Credit Cycle: Our indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but for now we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will be monitoring to gauge the end of the cycle. Feature Chart 1Fed Sees Stronger Growth In 2018 As was widely anticipated, the Fed delivered the fifth rate hike of the cycle last week, bringing the target range for the fed funds rate up to 1.25% to 1.5%. What's more, neither the Summary of Economic Projections nor Janet Yellen's final post-meeting press conference gave much indication that the Fed is worried enough about inflation to deviate from its current pace of tightening. To wit, the Fed did not alter its median projections for inflation or the near-term pace of rate hikes. As in September, the Fed still expects core PCE inflation to rise from its current 1.45% to 1.9% by the end of 2018. It also still expects to lift rates three more times next year. However, the Fed did respond to recent strong growth and employment data by revising its projection for GDP growth higher and its projection for the unemployment rate lower (Chart 1). It also revised the post-meeting statement to indicate that it now believes the economy has reached full employment. In other words, the Fed believes there is no longer any slack in the labor market. This dichotomy between stronger growth and a tight labor market on the one hand and low inflation on the other gets to the heart of the first big challenge that incoming Fed Chairman Jay Powell will face next year. Specifically, how much faith should the Fed have in its framework for forecasting inflation? Chart 2 shows that Janet Yellen's Phillips Curve model of core inflation does not explain this year's decline.1 It also shows that inflation is close to 0.5% below fair value, almost the largest deviation since 1995 (Chart 2, panel 2). It is this deviation that prompted Chair Yellen to say the following at last week's press conference: [W]e've had an undershoot of inflation for a number of years. We absolutely recognize that. I think until this year [the] undershoot was understandable. In other words, until this year the Fed's model did a good job of explaining low inflation. But now that a large residual has opened up between inflation and the Fed's model, it is reasonable for both the market and the Fed to question whether the underlying relationship between inflation and economic growth has changed. The market has already rendered its verdict in the affirmative. The compensation for inflation priced into the 10-year Treasury yield is only 1.88%. Historically, a level between 2.4% and 2.5% suggests the market has faith in the Fed's 2% inflation target. Further, the yield curve has been flattening dramatically. The 2/10 Treasury slope is down to 51 bps, and the fed funds/10-year slope is down to 94 bps. In other words, the bond market is discounting that the Fed can only deliver another 3-4 rate hikes before the economy starts to struggle, at which point inflation will still be below target. The recent revisions to the Fed's own economic projections also suggest that the perceived relationship between economic growth and inflation has weakened. The Fed revised its projection for GDP growth higher and its projection for the unemployment rate lower, but left its projections for inflation and the fed funds rate unchanged. This can only mean that the Fed views the relationship between economic growth and inflation as having weakened since September. So how much longer can the Powell Fed tighten policy without inflation actually trending higher? This is the single biggest question for bond markets and we detailed the three possible answers in last week's report.2 The most likely scenario is that the Fed's Phillips Curve model starts to work again next year. Core inflation trends higher and this eases the flattening pressure on the yield curve allowing the Fed to continue tightening. In support of this outcome, pipeline inflation measures have hooked up in recent weeks, suggesting that core inflation is about to bottom (Chart 3). Chart 2The Fed's Inflation Model Chart 3Pipeline Inflation Measures However, in the scenario where inflation does not move higher, the next most likely outcome is that risk assets sell off in the next couple months. This would lead to a tightening of financial conditions and would cause the Fed to react by adopting a more dovish policy stance. We showed in last week's report that risk off episodes in junk spreads become more frequent once the 2/10 Treasury slope breaks below 50 bps. It is also possible that the Fed proactively adopts a more dovish policy stance without having its hand forced by tighter financial conditions, but this now seems like the least likely outcome. Implications For Treasury Yields In the most likely scenario where core inflation trends higher during the next six months, Treasury yields will rise driven mostly by the inflation component (Chart 4). A return to the range of 2.4% to 2.5% on the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate would put between 52 bps and 62 bps of upward pressure on the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. This means that even if the real 10-year yield remains flat we should see the nominal 10-year yield in a range between 2.87% and 2.97% by the time that core inflation gets back to the Fed's target. But even a flat real 10-year yield seems like a fairly conservative assumption. We can think of the real 10-year yield as being driven by three main factors: (i) the fed funds rate itself, (ii) expectations for future changes in the fed funds rate and (iii) a term premium. In Chart 5 we show that a simple model based on these three factors does a good job explaining the fluctuations in the real 10-year Treasury yield.3 Chart 4Market Not Priced For Rising Inflation Chart 5A Simple Model Of The Real 10-Year Treasury Yield The model works better prior to the Great Recession because we deliberately chose pre-crisis coefficients for our three independent variables. Chart 6 shows the coefficients for the three variables estimated over rolling 5-year intervals, and the dashed horizontal lines show the coefficients we chose for our model. It is clear from Chart 6 that the zero-lower bound caused the estimated coefficient on the fed funds rate to decrease and the estimated coefficient on the 12-month discounter to increase. We expect both will converge slowly back toward pre-crisis levels now that the fed funds rate is well off the zero bound. Chart 6Controlling For The Zero Lower Bound The key conclusion from this modeling exercise is that, even with fairly conservative assumptions, it is difficult to craft a reasonable scenario where the real 10-year Treasury yield declines during the next 12 months. The forecast in Chart 5 assumes that the Fed lifts rates three times next year - consistent with its median projections - but also that rate hike expectations fall so that by the end of 2018 the market only expects one further rate hike during the next 12 months. Finally, we assume that implied interest rate volatility stays flat at historically low levels. Even in that relatively benign scenario our model suggests that the real 10-year Treasury yield would drift higher during the next 12 months. This leads us to project a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation moves back close to the Fed's 2% target. Implications For The Yield Curve The slope of the yield curve during the next 6-12 months will depend both on how quickly core inflation rises and how quickly the Fed tightens policy. Table 1 shows different scenarios for the fed funds rate, the 2-year/fed funds slope - which can be thought of as the expected number of rate hikes during the next two years - and the 10-year Treasury yield. For example, if core inflation rises back close to the Fed's target by next June and the Fed has only delivered one or two more rate hikes during that time period, then it is very likely that the yield curve will have steepened, at least modestly. If the Fed gets three or four hikes off before inflation gets back to target, then it is much more likely that the yield curve will have flattened. We think a modest curve steepening is the most likely outcome for the next six months. This is premised on the view that core inflation will start to trend higher in the coming months, and will approach the Fed's target by the middle of next year. During that timeframe the Fed will only deliver one or two rate hikes, consistent with its median projection for three hikes in 2018. Once core inflation is back closer to target and the compensation for inflation priced into long-dated Treasury yields is back to its pre-crisis 2.4% to 2.5% range, then aggressive curve flattening becomes much more likely. Table 1Scenarios For The Number Of Fed Rate Hikes By The Time That Inflation Returns To Target Bottom Line: The Fed is playing a dangerous game by continuing to signal a gradual pace of rate hikes in the face of inflation data that have not kept pace with its projections. Ultimately we think the Fed's models will be proven correct during the next six months and core inflation will resume its gradual cyclical uptrend. Rising core inflation will cause the nominal 10-year Treasury yield to increase, driven mostly by the inflation component. We target a range of 2.80% to 3.25% for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield by the time that core inflation is back close to the Fed's target, likely sometime in the middle of 2018. The yield curve will steepen modestly during the next six months as inflation recovers and the Fed lifts rates only gradually. This mild steepening will transition to flattening once long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates have recovered to pre-crisis levels. Credit Cycle Update: Favorable For Now, But Will Turn In 2018 The U.S. Financial Accounts (formerly Flow of Funds) were released this month. This gives us the opportunity to update our Corporate Health Monitor (CHM), as well as our other indicators of non-financial corporate sector leverage. Recall that historically three conditions must be met before the credit cycle turns and a sustained period of corporate spread widening kicks in. They are: Corporate balance sheet health must be deteriorating Monetary policy must be restrictive Bank lending standards must be tightening Chart 7 provides a snapshot of the current state of affairs for these three criteria. Chart 7Credit Cycle Indicators Chart 8Corporate Health Monitor Corporate Balance Sheet Health The CHM is our number one indicator of non-financial corporate sector balance sheet health (Chart 7, panel 2). It has been signaling "deteriorating health" since 2015, but ticked down in the third quarter and has been moving slowly back toward "improving health" territory since the beginning of the year. It is worth mentioning that in order to get a leading signal from our CHM we use de-trended versions of the Monitor's underlying components. The six financial ratios that we combine to calculate the CHM are shown in their not de-trended forms in Chart 8. We also show a not de-trended version of the overall Monitor in the second panel of Chart 7. Notice that while the traditional (de-trended) CHM has been signaling "deteriorating corporate health" since 2015, the not de-trended version remains in "improving health" territory. Box: Corporate Health Monitor Components The BCA Corporate Health Monitor is a normalized composite of six financial ratios, calculated for the non-financial corporate sector as a whole. These six ratios are defined as follows: Profit Margins: After-tax cash flow as a percent of corporate sales Return on Capital: After-tax earnings plus interest expense, as a percent of capital stock Debt Coverage: After-tax cash flow less capital expenditures, as a percent of all interest bearing debt Interest Coverage: EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization) divided by the sum of interest expense and dividends Leverage: Total debt as a percent of market value of equity Liquidity: Working Capital, excluding inventories, as a percent of market value of assets The unusual length of the current recovery has caused the not de-trended and de-trended versions of the CHM to diverge by much more than in prior cycles. While this almost certainly means that the negative signal from our traditional (de-trended) Monitor came too early this cycle, we should also expect the negative signal from the not de-trended version of our model to arrive too late. So while the truth lies somewhere in between the de-trended and not de-trended versions, we are fairly confident in saying that the condition of "deteriorating corporate health" has already been met for this cycle. Restrictive Monetary Policy Panels 3 and 4 of Chart 7 show two different indicators for the stance of monetary policy. The first is the real effective fed funds rate relative to the Laubach-Williams (2003) estimate of its equilibrium level. According to this measure, monetary policy moved into restrictive territory following last week's rate hike. However, a much simpler indicator for the stance of monetary policy is the slope of the yield curve. While the slope of the yield curve is not flashing red just yet, it has been rapidly flattening and is approaching levels that signaled a restrictive stance of monetary policy in prior cycles. In last week's report we showed that monthly excess returns to high-yield bonds have averaged only 12 bps when the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve is between 0 bps and 50 bps, and that monthly excess returns have been negative 48% of the time in those periods.4 Tightening Bank Lending Standards The Federal Reserve's most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey showed that banks continue to modestly ease standards on commercial & industrial (C&I) loans (Chart 7, bottom panel). We traditionally view this third condition as more of a confirming indicator of the turn in the credit cycle. That is, tighter bank lending standards are typically preceded by deteriorating corporate health and restrictive monetary policy. An Additional Measure Of Corporate Sector Leverage In addition to the components of our CHM, we also track a measure of gross leverage for the non-financial corporate sector, calculated as total debt divided by EBITD (Chart 9). Historically, the trend in corporate bond spreads has followed the trend in gross leverage, or at the very least, deviations in direction between spreads and leverage have tended not to last very long. Chart 9Rising Gross Leverage Is A Risk For Spreads Our measure of gross leverage ticked higher in Q3, EBITD grew at an annualized rate of 4.1% but this was not enough to offset the 5.4% annualized increase in corporate debt. Overall, gross leverage has been roughly flat this year even though corporate spreads have tightened. Going forward, our leading indicators are still consistent with mid-single digit profit growth. If that view pans out then the pace of debt accumulation will need to fall in order for leverage to decline. We will be watching this measure of leverage closely during the next couple of quarters, if leverage continues to increase then we will be quicker to call the end of the credit cycle. Bottom Line: Our indicators suggest that we are moving into the late stages of the credit cycle, but for now we retain an overweight cyclical stance on corporate bonds. A shift to a more restrictive monetary policy, tightening C&I bank lending standards and/or a continued uptrend in gross corporate leverage are the main catalysts we will be monitoring to gauge the end of the cycle. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 The Phillips Curve model of inflation shown in Chart 2 is re-created from Janet Yellen's September 2015 speech: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 We use our 12-month fed funds discounter to measure rate hike expectations and the MOVE implied volatility index as a proxy for the term premium. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?", dated December 12, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights BCA expects the 2/10 curve to steepen in 1H in 2018, then flatten in 2H. U.S. equities, the stock-to-bond ratio and oil thrive when the curve is flat. Small caps struggle. Record household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Feature Wrangling over the GOP's tax plan and the Federal Open Market Committee's final meeting of 2017 provided the backdrop for financial markets last week. The dollar was the big loser, as investors doubted the ability of the Republican leadership in Congress to find the votes needed to pass the bill. BCA's view remains that Congress will pass a tax cut package by the end of Q1 2018. Even though inflation missed the Fed's forecast in 2017 (Chart 1), the FOMC left its inflation and interest projections unchanged for the next two years given its outlook for stronger growth and lower unemployment. Inflation will reach the 2% target by the end of 2019. As a consequence, the Fed expects to lift interest rates three more times in 2018 and another two times in 2019 (Chart 2). Chart 1Persistent Inflation Shortfall Chart 2The FOMC's Latest Forecasts The economy is now expected to grow 2.5% in 2018, up from the Fed's previous forecast of 2.1%. Growth is seen remaining above the 1.8% trend rate for three years. The Fed nudged its forecasts for the unemployment rate down by 0.2% for the next three years, based on the higher growth projections. The jobless rate is now expected to dip to 3.9% in 2018 and 2019, before ticking up to 4.0% in 2020. If anything, these forecasts look too conservative. Importantly, the Fed left its estimate for long-run unemployment unchanged at 4.6%. Therefore, the labor market is expected to tighten further beyond full employment. Consequently, wage gains should accelerate and allow inflation to return to the Fed's 2% target in 2019. We don't have any major disagreements with the Fed's interest rate forecasts for 2018, but inflation must turn higher. The Fed has raised rates five times over the last two years, but CPI inflation has made no progress toward the 2% objective. However, the New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge continues to move steadily higher (Chart 1, panel 1). Nevertheless, the real Fed funds moved closer to its neutral level and the yield curve has continued to flatten (panel 3). Bottom Line: BCA expects the yield curve to steepen in the first half of 2018, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. However, a flat curve is not the death knoll for risk assets. The yield curve will not invert until inflation has recovered to the Fed's target. This means that a period of modest curve steepening is likely, driven either by rising inflation or a more dovish Fed. Powell Versus The Market BCA's view is that the current paths of inflation and the yield curve are unsustainable. If the Fed continues to hike rates, but inflation fails to rise, then the yield curve will invert in the coming months. The inversion would signal that bond investors anticipate a recession and the Fed has not achieved its inflation target. Such an obvious policy error will not be permitted to occur, which leaves three possible outcomes for Fed policy and the Treasury curve during the next six months.1 1) The Fed Is Right In this scenario, inflation would rebound in the coming months, pushing up the compensation for inflation protection embedded in long-dated bond yields. This would cause an increase in long-maturity nominal yields and probably impart a steepening bias to the yield curve, depending on how quickly the Fed lifts rates. BCA's Outlook for 2018 makes a case why inflation will likely bottom in the coming months. Therefore, we view the "Fed is Right" scenario as the most probable outcome.2 2) The Fed Is Proactive In another scenario, the Fed recognizes there is a risk of tightening the yield curve into inversion - and the economy into recession - if inflation stays low. Therefore, the Fed may proactively adopt a more dovish policy stance to prevent the yield curve from inverting. The yield curve would also steepen, but this time it would be a bull-steepener where short-maturity yields fall more than long-maturity yields. This outcome would be the least likely of our three scenarios. The Fed will cling to its forecast that inflation will climb, given that economic growth is accelerating. If inflation fails to respond, then risky assets will eventually sell-off. 3) The Fed Is Reactive The Fed has a strong track record of reacting to tighter financial conditions and risk-off periods in equities and credit markets. If the yield curve continues to flatten, then we will soon see credit spreads widen and equities sell-off. At that stage, the Fed would almost certainly respond by signaling a slower pace of rate hikes. This would steepen the curve and ease pressures on risky assets. We view this development as more likely than the one where the Fed is proactive. Trouble With The Curve BCA's U.S. Bond Strategy team expects that the 2/10 yield curve will languish between 0 and 50 bps in 2018. The curve will steepen from 53 bps in mid-December 2017 through mid-year 2018, and then flatten into year-end. Which asset classes would benefit if BCA's curve call is accurate? Charts 3 through 7 show how several key financial markets have performed in previous yield curve environments. Chart 3A shows that the S&P 500 performs best when the curve is flat (between 0 and 50 bps), with average annualized returns of 22% and median annualized returns of 21%. Moreover, S&P 500 returns are negative less than 5% of the time when the curve is flat, but are negative 25% of the time when the curve is very steep (+100 to +150 bps) (Chart 3B). In general, Chart 3A demonstrates that returns diminish as the curve climbs. Chart 3AS&P 500 Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 3BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P 500 Returns (1988- Present) A flat slope of the 2/10 curve is also the sweet spot for the stock-to-bond ratio (Chart 4A). Treasuries outperform stocks only in 5% of months when the 2/10 Treasury curve is flat (Chart 4B). As with stocks, the performance of the stock-to-bond ratio deteriorates as the curve steepens. The stock-to-bond ratio declines more than a third of the time when the curve is very steep. A 2/10 slope of +100 to +150 bps is the worst backdrop for the stock-to-bond ratio. Stocks underperform bonds 40% of the time in this situation. Chart 4AStock-To-Bond Total Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988 - Present) Chart 4BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##Stock-To-Bond Total Return (1988 - Present) However, a flat curve is a poor setting for small-cap excess performance (Chart 5A). Small caps underperform large caps nearly 80% of the time when the curve is flat (Chart 5B). The average underperformance is 600 bps. Moreover, a flat curve is the most unhealthy climate for small-cap excess returns, even poorer than when the curve inverts. A precipitous curve is the best environment for small caps, with small caps outperforming large by 400 bps on average. Small caps beat large caps 60% of the time when the curve is between 100 and 150 bps. Chart 5AS&P Small/Large TOTAL Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 5BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##S&P Small/Large Total Return (1988- Present) Our U.S. Bond Strategy colleagues note that the flatter the curve, the higher the risk of a sell-off in high-yields relative to Treasuries.3 Junk bonds underperform Treasuries 48% of the time when the curve is flat, which we expect in 2018 (not shown). The implication for investors is that the first half of 2018 will be the best period for junk bond returns. Investment-grade corporates have a similar return profile relative to the curve. Oil performs best when the 2/10 curve is inverted (Chart 6A). However, WTI oil returns an annualized 10-15% when the curve is between 0 and 100 bps. Plus, oil is higher 75% of the time when the curve is between 50 and 100 bps, which is the environment we expect in the first half of next year (Chart 6B). Chart 6AWTI Crude Oil Price Return & Yield Curve##BR##(1988- Present) Chart 6BPercent Of Months With Negative##BR##WTI Crude Oil Price Return (1988- Present) Forward earnings per share perform well with a flat curve, but earnings growth is optimal when the curve is inverted. The steeper the curve, the bigger the headwind for EPS. Since 1988, earnings growth has been positive when the curve inverts and is positive 95% of the time when the curve is flat. Chart 7 provides the historical context for a flat yield curve (0 to 50 bps) in terms of the performance of stocks, Treasury bonds, the stock-to-bond ratio, small caps and oil. The Appendix (see page 13) also includes three other charts that provide a perspective on asset class performance when the curve is moderately steep (50 to 100 bps), steep (100 to 150bps) and above 150 bps. Chart 7Stocks, Treasuries, Small Caps And Oil When The Curve Is Flat Bottom Line: BCA expects that the yield curve will first steepen in 2018, then become flatter, ultimately spending most of the year between 0 and 50 bps. A flat curve is the ideal environment for the S&P 500 and the stock-to-bond ratio. However, small cap stocks struggle when the curve is flat; BCA's view is that small caps will outperform large caps in 2018. A flat yield curve raises the risk of a sell-off in high yield, but provides a favorable grounding for oil, which is in line with BCA's fundamental view. BCA expects EPS growth will be positive next year; earnings growth is higher 75% of the time when the curve is flat. Household Net Worth Loses Influence Chart 8The Consumer Is In Good Shape U.S. consumer health has improved markedly since early this year, driving BCA's Consumer Health Indicator into positive territory (Chart 8). These elevated readings should bolster household consumption well into 2018. The improvement supports BCA's view of a stronger U.S. economy alongside a global synchronized recovery, at least over the next 12 months. Real consumer spending is underpinned by advances in real disposable income stemming from increasingly healthy labor market. Moreover, household net worth has continued to soar to an all-time high in 2017Q3 as equity markets remain frothy and house prices stable. However, net worth's direct influence on overall household consumption is not as significant as before the Great Recession. During the housing bubble in the early 2000s, U.S. households leveraged their spending through extensive mortgage refinancing and mortgage equity withdrawal. Real estate was the principal holding on most households' balance sheets. However, as the Great Recession unfolded, household net worth suffered with a collapse in both house prices and equity markets. By 2009, U.S. households were tapped out and grossly over-indebted. Deleveraging is now over, U.S. households have re-fortified their balance sheets and consumer spending is back in line with income growth. In the long term, inflation-adjusted disposable income is more highly correlated with inflation-adjusted consumer spending growth than real household net worth (Chart 9). Positive momentum should continue to support further real consumer spending over the next few quarters, given that unemployment is at a 17-year low and consumer confidence is at a 17-year high, and also given elevated consumers' expectations of real income gains over the next year or two. Chart 9Consumer Spending More Correlated With Income Than Net Worth Household net worth matters more for household saving than for consumption. Chart 10 shows the inverse relationship between net worth and the saving rate. Empirical research has demonstrated the risk that the structural decline (since the mid-1990s) in personal savings has on consumer spending and the overall economy. An often cited conclusion drawn by the investment community is that a lower savings rate raises the risk of consumer retrenchment.4 Chart 10Low Savings Rate, Record High Household Net Worth And Rising Income Expectations Even though the personal savings rate can be considered a contrarian measure for consumer spending, like many measures from the BEA national accounts (NIPA), it is subject to regular revisions. Over the long-term, according to the BEA, the level of the savings rate is often revised upwards but the trend over the last 45 years remains unchanged. There was a downtrend path to revisions in the mid-2000s housing bubble, but there has been a subtle uptrend since 2008 (Chart 11). Even so, in the long run, BCA views the low personal savings rate as a potential headwind for consumer spending as it cannot sustainably remain at its recovery low of 3.2%. However, rising income expectations and a sturdy labor market are offsets to depressed savings and will ensure that the economic expansion remains sustainable and, therefore, less vulnerable to volatile saving patterns. Does record high net worth alter the risks to the FOMC's goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth? In a recent research paper, the Federal Reserve of St-Louis looked at the most exuberant peaks in the ratio of household net worth to income in 1999 and 2006, which occurred before collapses in asset prices and recessions. Although caution is prescribed as household net worth keeps making new highs, the report noted that the composition of households' balance sheet is less alarming today than prior peaks, as equities and real estate relative to household income or total assets are more reasonable. Debt levels are also much more tame today than in 2006. With more immune balance sheets, households may be less vulnerable to unexpected shocks in the future (Chart 12).5 BCA's view is that financial vulnerabilities from the household sector are well contained. Outside of subprime auto loans, household borrowing is increasing modestly at an annual pace of 3.6%, in stark contrast with a 12.9% rate in the early-to-mid 2000s. Broad measures of household solvency, such as the household debt-to-income ratio, is within the range of the past few years and back to pre-recession levels. Furthermore, liquidity buffers (liquid assets to liabilities) are almost as high as the levels that preceded the equity market boom/bust in 1999-2000 (Chart 13). Chart 11Savings Rate Level Often Revised Upwards Chart 12Household Sector Balance Sheet Composition Chart 13Household Sector Buffers Are Solid BCA expects the Fed to remain vigilant about financial stability.6 Policymakers will take comfort that household liquidity and solvency ratios have improved dramatically in the past nine years, aided by the cumulative gains in housing and financial assets. Bottom Line: The outlook for the U.S. consumer is bright as incomes continue to improve amid tight labor market conditions. However, record household net worth is more relevant today for savings than for consumption. The Fed should remain committed to gradual rate hikes, but the central bank's quandary will be to determine the optimal pace to foster maximum employment and price stability. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Jizel Georges, Senior Analyst jizelg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's "2018 Outlook Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course ," published December 2017. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?," published on December 12, 2017. Available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 4 "Should The Decline In The Personal Savings Rate Be A Cause For Concern?", Alan C. Garner, The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2006Q2; and "The Decline in the U.S. Personal Savings Rate: Is It Real and Is It A Puzzle?", Massimo Guidolin and Elizabeth A. La Jeunesse, The Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, November/December 2007. 5 "Household Wealth Is At A Post-WW II High: Should We Celebrate or Worry?", William R. Emmons and Lowell R. Ricketts, Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis, In the Balance, Perspectives on Household Balance Sheets, May 2017. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Powell's In Power," published on November 6, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart 14U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 50 And 100 Bps Chart 15U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Between 100 And 150 Bps Chart 16U.S. Financial Markets When The 2/10 Curve Is Steeper Than 150 Bps