Monetary Policy
Executive Summary
Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker?
Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker?
Economic growth is now a casualty, and not a driver, of monetary policy choices. Inflation is dictating where central banks are taking interest rates. Our baseline view remains that core US inflation will cool by enough on its own without the need for the Fed to deliver a policy-induced recession. However, the odds of the latter have increased after the upside surprise in the May US CPI report. The ECB has been dragged into the same morass as other major central banks – tightening policy because of soaring inflation, despite broad-based signs of sluggish economic growth. We still see the pricing of cumulative rate hikes in the euro area as being too aggressive, even after last week’s clear announcement from the ECB that a string of future rate hikes was coming. With the ECB also announcing an end to its QE program, but offering no details on a replacement, markets have been given the green light to push Italian yields/spreads higher (and the euro lower) until there is an ECB response to market fragmentation in European sovereign debt. Bottom Line: The Fed is still more likely than the ECB to follow through on rate hikes discounted in US and European interest rate curves - position for renewed widening of the Treasury-Bund spread. Italian bond yields will remain under upward pressure until the contours of an ECB plan to stabilize Peripheral Spreads alongside rate hikes are revealed – tactically position for a wider BTP-Bund spread. Central Bankers Cannot Worry About Growth … Or Your Investment Portfolio The US consumer price index (CPI) report for May was yet another bond-bearish shock in a year full of them. With US headline US inflation hitting an 41-year high of 8.6%, the Treasury market adjusted bond yields upward to reflect both higher inflation expectations and even more aggressive Fed tightening. Coming only a day after the June European Central Bank (ECB) meeting that provided guidance that a series of rate hikes would begin in July, that could include a 50bp hike at the September meeting, financial markets worldwide moved to price in the risk that policy-induced recessions were the only way to bring down soaring global inflation. The result: global bond yields soared to new highs for the year, while risk assets of all shapes and sizes were hammered. We have our doubts that today’s class of policymakers – especially the Fed - has the stomach to repeat the actions of former Fed Chair Paul Volcker, who famously pushed US interest rates above the double-digit inflation rates of the late 1970s to engineer a deep recession to crush inflation. The starting point of the current tightening cycle is even further behind the curve than during the Volcker era, in terms of “realized” real interest rates, with the 10-year US Treasury yield now over five percentage points below headline US CPI inflation (Chart 1). Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyAssessing The Risks To Our Main Views Central bankers are now faced with the no-win scenario of pushing nominal policy rates higher to chase soaring inflation in a bid to maintain inflation fighting credibility, regardless of the spillover effects on financial market stability or economic growth expectations. More worryingly, the rate hikes needed to establish that credibility are not only becoming more frequent but larger. 50bps has become the “standard” size for developed market rate hikes. The Fed may have upped the ante with the 75bp hike at yesterday's FOMC meeting. Such is the reality of a funds rate still only at 1.75% but with US inflation pushing toward 9%. The timing of the latest hawkish shifts from the Fed, ECB and others is surprising, looking purely from a growth perspective. The OECD leading economic indicators for the US, euro area and China are slowing, alongside depressed consumer confidence and deteriorating business sentiment (Chart 2). Similar readings are evident in comparable measures in other major economies, both in developed and emerging economies. This would normally be the type of backdrop that would entice central banks to consider easing monetary policy - IF inflation was subdued, which is clearly not the case today. Chart 1Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker?
Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker?
Does Powell Need To Channel His Inner Volcker?
In fact, high inflation is the reason why economic sentiment has worsened. Chart 2Worrying Signs For Global Growth
Worrying Signs For Global Growth
Worrying Signs For Global Growth
Consumers see income growth that is lagging inflation, especially for everyday items like gasoline and food. Businesses are seeing input costs rising, especially for labor in an environment of tight job markets. Inflation has become broad-based, across goods, services and wages. This is true for countries that are more advanced in their monetary tightening cycles - the US, Canada and the UK - where inflation rates are remarkably similar (Chart 3). But it is also now true in countries with lower (but still accelerating) inflation rates and where central banks have been slower to tighten monetary conditions, like the euro area and Australia (Chart 4). Chart 3Inflation Turning More 'Domestic' (Services / Wages) Here
Inflation Turning More 'Domestic' (Services / Wages) Here
Inflation Turning More 'Domestic' (Services / Wages) Here
Chart 4Still No Major Services/Wage Inflation Overshoots Here
Still No Major Services/Wage Inflation Overshoots Here
Still No Major Services/Wage Inflation Overshoots Here
For the Fed, assessing the underlying momentum of US inflation, and setting monetary policy accordingly, has become a bit trickier. While headline inflation continues to accelerate in response to rising energy and food prices, core inflation ticked lower in both April and May and now sits at 6.1%, down from 6.5% in March. Longer-term survey-based measures of inflation expectations have been moving steadily higher, with the University of Michigan 5-10 year consumer inflation expectations survey now up to a 14-year high of 3.3% (Chart 5). Yet longer-term market-based inflation expectations have been more stable, with the 10-year TIPS breakeven now at 2.66%, down from the late April peak of 3.02%. There are also some mixed signals visible within the US inflation data. Core goods CPI inflation clocked in at 8.5% in May, down from the recent peak of 12.4% in February 2022, while core services CPI inflation accelerated to a 14-year high of 5.2% in May (Chart 6). A similar divergence can be seen when looking at the Atlanta Fed’s measures of “sticky” and “flexible” price inflation. Core flexible CPI inflation – measuring prices that adjust more rapidly – has fallen from a peak of 19% to 12.3% in May. At the same time, core sticky CPI inflation for prices that are slower to adjust sped up to an 31-year high of 5% in May. Chart 5Some Mixed Inflation Messages For The Fed
Some Mixed Inflation Messages For The Fed
Some Mixed Inflation Messages For The Fed
Chart 6US Inflation Will Eventually Be Lower, But 'Stickier'
US Inflation Will Eventually Be Lower, But 'Stickier'
US Inflation Will Eventually Be Lower, But 'Stickier'
Chart 7Stick With UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades
Stick With UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades
Stick With UST-Bund Spread Widening Trades
In terms of the Fed’s next policy moves, the acceleration of core services (and sticky) inflation means underlying inflation momentum remains strong enough to make it difficult for the Fed to tighten by less than markets are discounting over the next year. Yet the deceleration of core goods (and flexible) inflation, if it continues, can lead to an eventual peak in overall US inflation. This would ease pressure on the Fed to tighten policy more aggressively than markets are expecting to slam the brakes on US economic growth. For nervous markets worried about Fed-induced recession risks, the clear peak in US inflation that we had been expecting has likely been pushed out further into the latter half of 2022. Thus, a significant fall in US Treasury yields that would provide relief to stressed risk assets is unlikely in the near term. Our preferred way to play that upward pressure on US Treasury yields is through an underweight stance on US Treasuries in global bond portfolios, rather than a below-benchmark duration stance. That is particularly true versus German Bunds - the 10-year UST-Bund yield spread is now well below the fair value level from our fundamental valuation model (Chart 7). Bottom Line: It is not clear that the Fed needs to “pull a Volcker” and generate a policy-induced recession to cool off US inflation. However, the Fed is far more likely to hike rates in line with market expectations than the ECB over the next 6-12 months. Stay underweight US Treasuries versus core Europe in global bond portfolios. The ECB Takes The Patient Off Life Support The ECB is finally coming to grips with surging European inflation. At last week’s policy meeting, the ECB Governing Council voted to end new bond buying via the Asset Purchase Program, while also signaling that a 25bp rate hike was on the way in July, with more hikes to follow – perhaps as much as 50bps in September if inflation remains elevated. Chart 8Markets Pricing In A Highly Aggressive ECB
Markets Pricing In A Highly Aggressive ECB
Markets Pricing In A Highly Aggressive ECB
The central bank provided a new set of quarterly economic projections that, unsurprisingly, included significant upward revisions to the inflation forecasts. The 2022 headline HICP inflation forecast was bumped from 5.1% to 6.8%, the 2023 forecast from 2.1% to 3.5% and the 2024 forecast was nudged higher from 1.9% to 2.1%. The projections for core HICP inflation were also increased to 3.3% for 2022, 2.8% for 2023 and 2.3% for 2024. The central bank now expects euro area inflation to stay above its 2% inflation target throughout its forecast period – even with a 20% decline in oil prices, and 36% fall in natural gas prices, built into the projection between 2022 and 2024. A move towards tighter monetary policy has been heralded by our ECB Monitor, which remains elevated largely due to its inflation component (Chart 8). By contrast, the growth component of the Monitor has rolled over and is now at levels consistent with unchanged monetary policy. Yet in the current environment of very elevated inflation, concerns about the economy are taking a back seat to maintaining the ECB’s inflation-fighting credibility. In the relatively young history of the ECB, dating back to the inception of the euro in 1998, there have only been three true hiking cycles that involved multiple interest rate increases: 2000, 2006-08 and 2011. In each case, both growth and inflation were accelerating in a broad-based way across the majority of euro area countries. Today, inflation is surging, with the headline HICP inflation rate hitting 8.1% in May, while core inflation (ex energy and food) is a more subdued but still high 4.4%. Economic growth is decelerating, however, with leading economic indicators now slowing in a majority of euro area countries (Chart 9). Chart 9Coming Up: An Unusual ECB Tightening Cycle That Ignores Growth
Coming Up: An Unusual ECB Tightening Cycle That Ignores Growth
Coming Up: An Unusual ECB Tightening Cycle That Ignores Growth
The ECB’s updated economic growth forecasts were downgraded for this year and next, with real GDP growth now expected to reach 2.8% in 2022 and 2.1% in both 2023 and 2024. Cutting growth forecasts for the current year was inevitable given the uncertainties stemming from the Ukraine war and soaring European energy prices. However, the projected growth rates do seem optimistic in the face of deeply depressed readings on economic sentiment from reliable measures like the ZEW index or the European Commission consumer confidence index, both of which have fallen sharply to levels last seen during the 2020 pandemic shock (Chart 10). Demand for European exports is also sluggish, particularly exports to China which are now flat in year-over-year terms. A similar pattern can be seen in the ECB’s inflation forecasts, which seem too optimistic in projecting lower wage growth and core inflation through 2024, even with the euro area unemployment rate forecasted to stay below 7% - under the OECD’s full employment estimate of 7.7% over the same period (Chart 11). Chart 10Overly Optimistic ECB Growth Forecasts
Overly Optimistic ECB Growth Forecasts
Overly Optimistic ECB Growth Forecasts
Chart 11Overly Optimistic ECB Inflation Forecasts?
Overly Optimistic ECB Inflation Forecasts?
Overly Optimistic ECB Inflation Forecasts?
The ECB is facing the same communications problem as other central banks at the moment. There is a fear of forecasting a major growth slowdown that would scare financial markets, even though that is a necessary condition to help bring down elevated inflation. At the same time, projections of a big decline in inflation that would limit the need for economy-crushing monetary tightening are not credible in the current environment of historically elevated headline inflation with very low unemployment rates. Interest rate markets understand the bind that the ECB finds itself in, and have moved to price in a very rapid jump in policy rates over the next 1-2 years. The 1-month OIS rate, 2-years forward is now at 2.5%, a high level compared to estimates of the neutral ECB policy rate, which lies between 1-1.5%. Core European bond yields have moved up alongside those rising rate expectations, with the 10-year German bund yield now at 1.64%, a far cry from the -0.18% yield at the start of 2022. Additional German yield increases will prove to be more difficult in the months ahead. There has already been a major upward adjustment in the inflation expectations component of yields, with the 10-year euro CPI swap rate now up to 2.6% compared to 2% at the start of this year (Chart 12). Importantly, those inflation expectations have stabilized of late, even in the face of high oil prices. Meanwhile, real bond yields, while still negative, have also moved up substantially and are now back to levels that prevailed before the ECB introduced negative policy rates in 2014 (bottom panel). With so much bond-bearish news now priced into core European bond yields, additional yield increases from here would require a more fundamental driver – an upward repricing of terminal interest rate expectations. On that note, the German yield curve is signaling that the terminal rate in the euro area is not much above 1.75%, as that is where bond yield forwards have converged to for both long and short maturity bonds (Chart 13). Chart 12How Much Higher Can Bund Yields Realistically Go?
How Much Higher Can Bund Yields Realistically Go?
How Much Higher Can Bund Yields Realistically Go?
Chart 13Markets Signaling A 1.75% Terminal Rate
Markets Signaling A 1.75% Terminal Rate
Markets Signaling A 1.75% Terminal Rate
Given our view that the neutral rate in Europe is, at best, no more than 1.5%, ECB rate hikes much beyond that level would likely invert a Bund curve that is priced for only a 1.75% terminal rate. An inverted Bund curve would also raise the odds that Europe enters a policy-induced recession – turning a bond bearish outcome into a bond bullish one. Even with the relatively aggressive policy expectations priced into European bond yields, it is still too soon to raise European duration exposure with inflation still accelerating. We prefer maintaining a neutral duration stance until there is a clear peak in realized European inflation – an outcome that would also favor a shift into Bund curve steepeners as the markets price out rate hikes and, potentially, begin to discount future rate cuts. Does The ECB Even Have A Plan For Italian Debt? The ECB seems to have a clear near-term plan on the timing, and even the potential size, of rate hikes. There is far less clarity on how it will deal with stabilizing sovereign bond yields post-APP in the countries that benefitted from ECB asset purchases, most notably Italy. By offering no details on a replacement to APP buying of riskier European debt at last week’s policy meeting, markets were given the green light to test the ECB’s resolve by pushing Italian bond yields higher (and the euro lower). Volatility in both markets will continue until there is a credible ECB response to so-called “market fragmentation” in European sovereign debt (i.e. higher yields and wider spreads versus Bunds in the Periphery). With the benchmark 10-year Italian BTP yield pushing above 4%, the ECB tried to calm markets yesterday by announcing an emergency meeting of the Governing Council to discuss “anti-fragmentation” policy options. The announcement triggered a relief rally in BTP prices, likely fueled by short covering. But the ECB statement was again light on concrete details, only noting that: a) reinvestments from maturing bonds from the now-completed Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) could be used “flexibly” to support stressed parts of the European bond market b) the timeline for ECB researchers to prepare proposals for a “new anti-fragmentation instrument” would be accelerated. We expect the ECB to eventually produce a credible bond buying plan to support Peripheral European bond markets – but only after an “iterative” trial-and-error process where trial balloon proposals are floated and skeptical financial markets respond. Chart 14Stay Cautious On Italian Government Bonds
Stay Cautious On Italian Government Bonds
Stay Cautious On Italian Government Bonds
There is almost certainly some serious horse trading going on within the ECB Governing Council, with inflation hawks demanding more rate hikes in exchange for their support of new plans to deal with market fragmentation. Details such as the size of any new program, the conditions under which it would be activated, and country purchase limits (if any) will need to be ironed out. Internal ECB debates will prolong that trial-and-error process with financial markets, keeping yield/spread/FX volatility elevated in the short-term. On a strategic (6-18 month) time horizon, we see a neutral allocation to Italy in global bond portfolios as appropriate, given the tradeoff between increasingly attractive yields and the uncertain timing of effective ECB market stabilization proposals. On a more tactical horizon (0-6 months), we expect Italian yields and spreads versus Germany to remain under upward pressure until a viable anti-fragmentation program is announced (Chart 14). To play for that move, we are introducing a new position in our Tactical Overlay Trade portfolio, selling 10-year Italy futures and buying 10-year German Bund futures. The details of the new trade, including the specific futures contracts and weightings for the two legs of the trade to make it duration-neutral, can be found in the Tactical Trade table on page 18. As we monitor and discuss this trade in future reports, we will refer to the well-followed 10-year Italy-Germany spread (currently 225bps) to determine targets and stop levels of this bond futures spread trade. We are setting a stop-out on this trade if the 10-year Italy-Germany spread has a one-day close below 200bps, while targeting a potential widening to 275-300bps (the 2018 peak in that spread). Bottom Line: The ECB’s lack of conviction on designing a plan to support Peripheral bond markets during the upcoming period of interest rate hikes will keep upward pressure on Peripheral yields/spreads over the next few months. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark
Volcker's Ghost
Volcker's Ghost
The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations*
Volcker's Ghost
Volcker's Ghost
Tactical Overlay Trades
Executive Summary Bonds sold off dramatically in response to Friday’s surprisingly high CPI number. Markets are now pricing in a much more rapid increase in the fed funds rate, with some probability of a 75 bps move this week. We think a 75 bps rate hike at any one FOMC meeting is possible, but unlikely. Rather, we see the Fed continuing to hike by 50 bps per meeting until inflation shows signs of rolling over. The guts of the CPI report were less concerning than the headline figure, and it is still more likely than not that core CPI will trend down during the next 6-12 months. Contribution To Month-Over-Month Core CPI
No Relief From High Inflation
No Relief From High Inflation
Bottom Line: Investors should maintain benchmark portfolio duration as it is unlikely that the Fed will deliver a more aggressive pace of tightening than what is already in the price. Investors should also underweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries as a play on a hawkish Fed and moderating consumer prices. The May CPI Print Ensures An Ultra-Hawkish Fed The “peak inflation” narrative took a blow last week when core CPI came in well above expectations for May. While the annual rate ticked down due to base effects, monthly core CPI saw its largest increase since last June (Chart 1). The bond market reacted to the news with an abrupt bear-flattening of the Treasury curve. The 2-year Treasury yield rose above 3% for this first time this cycle and the 10-year yield hit 3.27% on Monday morning (Chart 2). The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope flattened sharply, and it now sits at just 5 bps (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 1Strong Inflation In May
Strong Inflation In May
Strong Inflation In May
Chart 2A Big Bear-Flattening
A Big Bear-Flattening
A Big Bear-Flattening
With core inflation not showing any signs of slowing, the Fed will maintain its ultra-hawkish tone when it meets this week. While there’s an outside chance that the Fed will try to shock markets with a 75 basis point rate hike, we think it’s more likely that it will deliver the 50 basis point rate increase that Jay Powell teased at the last meeting while signaling that further 50 basis point rate increases are likely at both the July and September FOMC meetings. While inflation is not falling as quickly as either we or the Fed had previously anticipated, a look through the guts of the CPI report still leads to the conclusion that core inflation is more likely to fall than rise in the second half of this year. The main reason for this conclusion is that we aren’t seeing much evidence that inflation is transitioning from the goods sectors that were most heavily impacted by the pandemic to non-impacted service sectors. Rather, the main issue is that core goods inflation remains stubbornly high. Chart 3 shows the breakdown of core CPI into its three main components: (i) goods, (ii) shelter, and (iii) services excluding shelter. We can see that after only one month of decline in March, core goods prices accelerated to +0.69% in May, the largest monthly increase since January. The bulk of the May increase in goods inflation came from new and used cars (Chart 4), a sector where we should see price declines in the second half of this year now that motor vehicle production is ramping back up. Chart 3Contribution To Month-Over-Month Core CPI
No Relief From High Inflation
No Relief From High Inflation
Chart 4Contribution To Month-Over-Month Core Goods CPI
No Relief From High Inflation
No Relief From High Inflation
Turning to services, we observe a deceleration in May relative to April (Chart 3), and also notice that airfares continue to account for an outsized chunk of services inflation (Chart 5). Excluding airfares, core services inflation was just 0.36% in May. Chart 5Contribution To Month-Over-Month Core Services CPI (Excluding Shelter)
No Relief From High Inflation
No Relief From High Inflation
Finally, we see that shelter CPI increased by 0.61% in May, up from 0.51% in April. Shelter is the most cyclical component of CPI and as such it tends to closely track the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate has been flat at 3.6% for three consecutive months and it is more likely to rise than fall going forward. Therefore, we don’t anticipate further acceleration in shelter inflation during the next 6-12 months. Monetary Policy & Investment Implications At the last FOMC meeting, Chair Powell went out of his way to guide market expectations toward 50 basis point rate hikes at both the June and July FOMC meetings. After which, Powell hinted that the Fed would re-assess the economic outlook and would likely continue to lift rates at each meeting in increments of either 50 bps or 25 bps, depending on the outlook for inflation. Powell clearly wanted to set a firm marker down for the pace of rate hikes so that Fed policy doesn’t “add uncertainty to what is already an extraordinarily uncertain time.”1 For this reason, we don’t expect the Fed to lift rates by more than 50 basis points at any single meeting. However, May’s elevated CPI number will likely cause Powell to tease an additional 50 basis point rate hike for September. After September, if inflation finally does soften, the Fed will likely downshift to a pace of 25 bps per meeting. Taking a look at market expectations, we see that fed funds futures are fully priced for a 50 bps rate hike this week and are even discounting a small chance of a 75 bps hike (Chart 6A). Meanwhile, the market is almost fully priced for 125 bps of tightening by the end of the July FOMC meeting, i.e., one 50 bps hike and one 75 bps hike (Chart 6B). Looking out to the September FOMC meeting, we see the market priced for 180 bps of cumulative tightening (Chart 6C). This is consistent with a little more than two 50 basis point rate increases and one 75 basis point rate increase at the next three FOMC meetings. Chart 6AJune FOMC Expectations
June FOMC Expectations
June FOMC Expectations
Chart 6BJuly FOMC Expectations
July FOMC Expectations
July FOMC Expectations
Chart 6CSeptember FOMC Expectations
September FOMC Expectations
September FOMC Expectations
Looking even further out, we find the market priced for the fed funds rate to hit 3.28% by the end of the year and to peak at 3.88% in June 2023 (Chart 7).2 Chart 7Rate Expectations
Rate Expectations
Rate Expectations
Our own expectation is that the Fed will deliver three or four more 50 basis point rate increases this year, followed by a string of 25 basis point hikes. This will bring the fed funds rate up to a range of 2.75% to 3.25% by the end of 2022, slightly below what is currently priced in the yield curve. As for portfolio duration, we recommend keeping it close to benchmark for the time being. Many indicators – such as economic data surprises, the CRB Raw Industrials/Gold ratio and the relative performance of cyclical versus defensive equities – suggest that bond yields are too high.3 That said, with inflation surprising to the upside and the Fed in a hawkish frame of mind, it is not wise to bet too aggressively on bonds. We also reiterate our view that investors should underweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. It’s notable that long-maturity TIPS yields moved higher and that the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate was close to unchanged on Friday, despite the surprisingly high CPI number. This tells us that the market is not pricing-in a scenario where the Fed is losing control of long-dated inflation expectations. Rather, the market is discounting a scenario where the Fed does what is necessary to bring inflation back down. Softish Or Volckerish? Chart 8The Everything Selloff
The Everything Selloff
The Everything Selloff
Of course, the big question for financial markets is whether the Fed will be forced to cause a recession to bring inflation down, or whether it will achieve what Jay Powell called a “softish” landing.4 The Fed’s hoped for “softish landing” scenario is one where inflation recedes naturally as we gain further distance from the pandemic. This outcome would limit the speed at which the Fed is forced to lift rates and push back the expected start date of the next recession. Unfortunately, trends in financial markets suggest that investors are putting less faith in the softish landing scenario. Our BCA Counterpoint Strategy recently observed that stocks, bonds, industrial metals and gold have recently all sold off in concert (Chart 8).5 It is rare for all four of these assets to sell off at the same time, but they did in 1981 when Paul Volcker was in the midst of dramatically lifting rates to conquer inflation. If we truly are on the cusp of the Fed tightening the economy into recession, then it makes sense for all four of those assets to perform poorly. Bond yields rise because the Fed is hiking much more quickly than was previously anticipated. Stocks and industrial metals sell off because of an increase in recession fears. Finally, gold sells off because of rising expectations that the Fed will do what it takes to bring inflation back down. And it’s not just financial markets that are warning that the Fed will be forced to repeat Chairman Volcker’s aggressive tightening. Two influential macroeconomists, Larry Summers and Olivier Blanchard, recently put out papers suggesting that the Fed needs another Volcker moment.6 Summers’ paper (with two co-authors) notes that changes in how the Bureau of Labor Statistics calculates shelter inflation make historical comparisons using CPI problematic. The authors estimate what core CPI would look like prior to 1983 if the current methodology had been employed and find that year-over-year core CPI peaked at 9.9% in 1980 well below the originally published figure of 13.6% and much closer to today’s 6% (Chart 9). The implication is that inflation is already almost as out of control now as it was in the early-1980s, and it will take a similar amount of monetary policy tightening to conquer it. In his paper, Olivier Blanchard makes a similar point by noting that the gap between the real fed funds rate and 12-month core CPI is as wide today as it was in 1975. The implication is that the Fed must play a similar amount of catch-up to bring inflation back down. Chart 9Properly Measured, Core CPI Was Much Lower In 1980
Properly Measured, Core CPI Was Much Lower In 1980
Properly Measured, Core CPI Was Much Lower In 1980
We think comparisons to the early-1980s are mistaken for three reasons. First, the Fed targets PCE inflation not CPI and PCE inflation does not suffer from the methodological inconsistencies that Summers et al identified. If we look at core PCE inflation, of which data only go to April, we see that 12-month core PCE inflation is currently 4.9% compared to a peak of 9.8% in 1980 (Chart 10). In other words, there is still a fair amount of distance between today’s PCE inflation and what was seen in the early 1980s. Chart 10The Fed Targets PCE Inflation
The Fed Targets PCE Inflation
The Fed Targets PCE Inflation
Second, inflation was more broadly distributed in the 1970s/80s than it is today. At different points in the 1970s and early-1980s all three of the major components of core inflation – goods, shelter and services excluding shelter – were above 10% in year-over-year terms (Chart 11). Today, only core goods inflation has moved above 10% and year-over-year shelter and services ex. shelter inflation sit at 5.4% and 4.8%, respectively. Chart 11Inflation Is Less Broad-Based Than In The 1970s/80s
Inflation Is Less Broad-Based Than In The 1970s/80s
Inflation Is Less Broad-Based Than In The 1970s/80s
Finally, wages had been accelerating rapidly for a full decade before inflation peaked in 1980 and this led to the emergence of a wage/price spiral (Chart 12). Firms increased prices to compensate for rising labor costs and then employees demanded further wage gains to compensate for rising consumer prices. Today, the evidence of a wage/price spiral is far less convincing. Wage growth has just recently moved above 5%, and we have seen recent indications that it is already starting to moderate.7 Typically, it takes a prolonged period of rapid wage growth for long-dated inflation expectations to rise and for a wage/price spiral to take hold. At present, we have seen only a modest move up in long-dated inflation expectations (Chart 13) and, as noted above, market-based measures of long-dated inflation expectations barely budged in response to last Friday’s inflation report. Chart 12No Wage/Price Spiral Yet
No Wage/Price Spiral Yet
No Wage/Price Spiral Yet
Chart 13Inflation Expectations
Inflation Expectations
Inflation Expectations
The bottom line is that inflation is still more likely to fall than rise during the next 6-12 months, and this will prevent the Fed from tightening more quickly than what is already priced in the yield curve. That said, while inflation is likely to dip, it will remain above the Fed’s 2% target and a recession will eventually be required to restore price stability. That recession, however, may not occur until late-2023 and it will likely be preceded by far less aggressive monetary tightening than what Paul Volcker delivered in the early-1980s. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For more details on the Fed’s forward guidance please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “On A Dovish Hike And A 3% Bond Yield”, dated May 10, 2022. 2 These numbers are as of last Friday’s close. 3 For details on these indicators please see US Bond Strategy Webcast, “Will The Fed Get Its Soft Landing?”, dated May 17, 2022. 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20220504.pdf 5 Please see BCA Counterpoint Weekly Report, “Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession”, dated May 19, 2022. 6 Please see Bolhius, Cramer, Summers, “Comparing Past and Present Inflation”, June 2022. https://www.nber.org/papers/w30116. And also Blanchard, “Why I worry about inflation, interest rates, and unemployment”, March 2022. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/why-i-worry-about-inflation-interest-rates-and-unemployment. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, “The Case For A Soft Landing”, dated June 7, 2022. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns
Executive Summary Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields
Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields
Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields
Bond yields in the developed world have ticked higher recently, due to a renewed increase in oil prices and the spillover effect from more hawkish policy expectations out of Europe. The competing forces of slowing global growth momentum and geopolitical uncertainty on one side, and high inflation with tightening monetary policies on the other, will keep global government bond yields rangebound over the next several months. UK investment grade corporate bonds now offer an intriguing combination of higher yields, attractive spread valuations and strong financial health. By maturity, shorter-maturity corporates offer the best value. At the industry level, spreads look most attractive for Financials. A hawkish Bank of England, both through rate hikes and upcoming outright sales of corporate debt the central bank has purchased via quantitative easing, remains a major headwind to UK corporate bond returns. Sectors most at risk to central bank sales are Water, Consumer Cyclicals and Consumer Non-Cyclicals. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on overall duration exposure in global bond portfolios. Maintain a neutral stance on UK corporates, favoring shorter-maturity bonds and Financial names, but look to upgrade once UK inflation peaks and the Bank of England pauses on tightening. Trendless, Friendless Bond Markets Chart 1Recovering From The Ukraine War Shock...
Recovering From The Ukraine War Shock...
Recovering From The Ukraine War Shock...
Although it may not feel like it given the ferocity of some daily price swings, many important financial markets have not moved all that much, cumulatively, since the first major shock of 2022 – the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24. For example, the S&P 500 is only down around -2% from the pre-invasion level, while the VIX index of equity option volatility is at 24, seven points below the closing level on February 23 (Chart 1). The Bloomberg US investment grade corporate bond index spread is only 12bps above its pre-invasion level, down 20bps from the peak seen in mid-May. More recently, even US bond yields have shown signs of stabilization. The 10-year US Treasury yield has traded in a 2.70-3.15% range since the start of April, while the MOVE index of US Treasury option volatility has fallen by one-quarter since its most recent peak in early May. Not all markets, however, have seen this kind of relative stability. Global oil prices are trading close to post-invasion highs, as are government bond yields in Germany and the UK. High-yield credit spreads in the US and Europe are both still around 50bps above where they were pre-invasion. The DXY US dollar index is 6% above the pre-invasion level, led by the USD/JPY currency pair that has appreciated to levels last seen in 2002. Given the mix of slowing global growth momentum and ongoing geopolitical uncertainty, but with persistent high inflation and tightening global monetary policy, it is unsurprising that financial markets are having a difficult time formulating a consistent message. This is especially true for global government bond yields. Chart 2Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields
Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields
Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields
Even as market-based inflation expectations have eased a bit in recent weeks, bond yields across the developed world have been unable to decline because markets continue to discount more rate hikes (Chart 2). Yet with such a significant amount of monetary tightening now priced in across all countries, global bond yields are more likely to stay rangebound over the next 3-6 months than begin a new trend. Chart 3DM Bond Yields Discounting Tight Monetary Policy
DM Bond Yields Discounting Tight Monetary Policy
DM Bond Yields Discounting Tight Monetary Policy
10-year government bond yields and 2-year-ahead interest rate expectations in overnight index swap (OIS) curves are trading in lockstep in the US, Europe, UK, Canada and Australia (Chart 3). This correlation indicates that longer-term bond yields have become a pure play on future policy rate expectations, rather than a reflection of rising inflation expectations as was the case in 2021. However, both yields and rate expectations are now trading close to, or even well above, plausible estimates of neutral nominal policy rates in all regions - including estimates provided by central bankers themselves. For example, in Australia, where the RBA just delivered a 50bp rate hike this week, markets are pricing in a peak Cash Rate between 3.5-4%, even with RBA Governor Philip Lowe stating that the neutral rate is likely in the 2-3% range – a view that we agree with. The situation is even more extreme in the euro area, with the euro area OIS curve now pricing in a peak policy rate between 1.5-2%, with most of that increase coming over the next 12 months. While we expect the ECB to fully exit the negative (deposit) rate era by September, rate hikes beyond that are far less likely given slowing euro area growth momentum and still-moderate euro area inflation beyond the spillover effects from energy costs. Only in the US are markets potentially underestimating the potential peak in the fed funds rate for this tightening cycle. Estimates of the longer-run (neutral) funds rate from the latest set of FOMC projections back in March ranged from 2.0-3.0%. Thus, the current level of 10-year bond yields, and 2-year-ahead rates discounted in the US OIS curve, are only at the top end of that range. It is possible that the Fed will have to raise rates to restrictive levels (i.e. above 3%) given the size of the current US inflation overshoot. More importantly, the US neutral rate is likely higher than the Fed thinks it is, possibly as high as 4% according to BCA Research’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin. We continue to see the US as the one major government bond market where there is a risk that markets are underestimating the neutral policy rate. For that reason, we remain underweight US Treasuries in the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy model bond portfolio. Don’t Dismiss The QT Effect One other factor that has likely kept global bond yields elevated, even as global growth has softened, has been the shift away from central bank asset purchases towards quantitative tightening (QT). As policymakers have moved to slow, or even stop, the buying of government bonds, the term premium component of longer-term bond yields has risen. The moves have been quite large. Using our own in-house estimates, the term premium on 10-year government bond yields have jumped by about 100bps on average in the US, UK, Canada, Australia and Europe since the lows seen during the 2020 COVID global recession (Chart 4). The jump in term premiums is occurring at the same time as markets have moved to price in more rate hikes and a higher path for real interest rates (bottom panel). Chart 4Yields Repricing As QE Moves To QT
Yields Repricing As QE Moves To QT
Yields Repricing As QE Moves To QT
Chart 5Stay Neutral Global Duration Exposure
Stay Neutral Global Duration Exposure
Stay Neutral Global Duration Exposure
That combined effect of the upward repricing of term premiums – especially as more price-sensitive private investors replace the demand for bonds from price-insensitive central banks - but with less upward movement in already elevated interest rate expectations will keep longer-term bond yields in trading ranges during the “Global QT Phase” over at least the next six months and likely longer. That message is reinforced by our Global Duration Indicator, which is heralding a peak in global bond yield momentum over the latter half of 2022 (Chart 5). Bottom Line: Stay neutral on overall duration exposure in global bond portfolios, with yields in the major developed markets likely to stay rangebound over the next few months. Assessing The Value In UK Investment Grade Corporates Chart 6A Big Jump In UK Investment Grade Corporate Yields
A Big Jump In UK Investment Grade Corporate Yields
A Big Jump In UK Investment Grade Corporate Yields
Global credit markets have had a rough time in 2022, and UK corporate debt is no exception. The Bloomberg UK Corporate index of investment grade corporate debt has delivered a year-to-date total return of -11%, as the index yield-to-maturity rose 174bps to 4% - the highest level since 2014 (Chart 6). Relative to UK Gilts, the results have also been grim as corporate credit spreads have widened, with the Bloomberg UK corporate index realizing an excess return of -3% since the start of the year. We have maintained a neutral stance on UK corporate bond exposure in our global model bond portfolio during the selloff. This was the result of a relative value opinion, as we have concentrated our more defensive view on global investment grade corporate debt with an underweight to US corporates. However, after the significant repricing of UK investment grade credit, it is now a good time to reassess our opinion on the asset class. Spread Valuation From a pure spread valuation perspective, UK investment grade now looks more attractive. Our preferred valuation metric – 12-month breakeven spreads - shows that the UK investment grade corporate index spread, on a duration-adjusted basis, is now in the 75th percentile of its history over the past 25 years (Chart 7). Chart 7UK Corporate Spreads Now Offer Some Value
UK Corporate Spreads Now Offer Some Value
UK Corporate Spreads Now Offer Some Value
We find 12-month breakevens to a useful spread valuation measure, as they show how much spreads would need to widen to make the expected one-year-ahead return on a credit product equal to that of a duration-matched position in government bonds. In other words, breakevens measure the spread “cushion” against excess return losses from spread widening. What makes the current attractive reading on UK investment grade spread valuation so interesting is that the absolute level of spreads is still relatively low. The Bloomberg UK investment grade corporate index spread is currently 170bps, but during previous episodes where the 12-month breakeven as near the top quartile ranking – as is currently the case – the index spread ranged from 200-350bps. The reason for that relates to the index duration which, at 7.3 years, is down 1.5 years from the 2020 peak and at the lowest level since 2011. Some of that lower duration is related to the convexity effect from higher corporate bond yields. But there has also been a reduction in the average maturity of the UK investment grade corporate bond universe, with the index average maturity now at 10.4 years, down a full year lower over the past 12 months and the lowest average maturity since 1999. UK companies appear to have shortened up the maturity profile of their bond issuance, which helped reduce the riskiness (duration) of corporate bond returns to rising yields. Thus, the message from the 12-month breakevens is correct – UK investment grade corporate bond yields are attractive from a historical perspective, on a duration-adjusted basis. Chart 8UK Credit Curves Are Relatively Flat
UK Credit Curves Are Relatively Flat
UK Credit Curves Are Relatively Flat
When looking within the UK investment grade universe, the messages on valuation are a bit more mixed. The UK credit curve is not particularly steep, when looking at the spread differences by credit rating within the benchmark index universe (Chart 8). There is a similar message when looking at 12-month breakevens broken down by credit rating, where there is little difference between the percentile rankings (Chart 9). However, the 12-month breakeven percentile rankings broken down by maturity buckets show that shorter-maturity bonds have noticeably higher percentile rankings than longer-maturity UK corporates (top panel). From a cross-country perspective, UK corporate breakeven percentile rankings are much higher than equivalent rankings for US corporates, but are lower than those of the euro area. Chart 9Shorter-Maturity UK Spreads Are More Attractive
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Corporate Financial Health Our top-down UK Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) - which uses data on non-financial corporate sector revenues, expenses and balance sheets taken from GDP accounts – has shown a very strong improvement in UK corporate financial health over the past few years (Chart 10). The biggest improvements are in the categories related to debt service, with interest coverage at the highest level since 2002 and debt coverage is at the highest level since 1999. Chart 10UK Corporates Can Withstand Higher Borrowing Rates
UK Corporates Can Withstand Higher Borrowing Rates
UK Corporates Can Withstand Higher Borrowing Rates
Chart 11Stay Neutral UK Corporates Until The BoE Is Done
Stay Neutral UK Corporates Until The BoE Is Done
Stay Neutral UK Corporates Until The BoE Is Done
The message from our top-down UK CHM is similar to the conclusions from an October 2021 BoE report that analyzed the UK corporate sector from a financial stability perspective. In that report, the BoE used a bottom-up sample of 500 UK companies and concluded that corporate borrowing rates could rise as much as 400bps before the share of companies with a “distressed” interest coverage ratio below 2.5 would rise to the past historical peak. Within our top-down UK CHM, relatively wide corporate profit margins are also contributing to the strong reading on UK corporate health. Like the interest/debt coverage ratios, those margins provide some cushion to profits in the current environment of high inflation and elevated input costs for businesses. The all-in message from our UK CHM is that financial health is a fundamental tailwind for UK corporate bond performance. Monetary Policy Attractive spread valuations and strong financial health metrics would normally justify an overweight stance on any corporate bond market. However, the monetary policy cycle is also an important factor that drives corporate bond performance. Currently, with the BoE not only hiking rates but also moving to QT on asset purchases, monetary policy is a severe headwind to UK corporate bond returns. Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyIt’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts The annual growth rate of the BoE’s balance sheet has proven to be a reliable leading indicator of UK corporate bond annual excess returns. With the growth in the balance sheet set to turn negative in the latter half of 2022 (Chart 11), it will prove difficult for UK credit spreads to narrow in a way that will boost excess returns. The BoE’s aggressive (by its standards) rate hiking cycle, in response to UK inflation that is nearing 10% alongside a very tight labor market, remains a threat to UK economic growth that is already losing some momentum. As we discussed in a recent Special Report, the UK neutral interest rate is likely no more than 1.5-2%. If the BoE were to follow current market pricing and push Bank Rate toward 2.5%, this would be a restrictive policy stance that would likely result in a sharp growth slowdown if not a full-blown recession. Importantly, our UK Central Bank Monitor is showing signs of peaking (bottom panel), due to signs of slower economic growth and tightening financial conditions. A peak in UK inflation would help reduce the Monitor even further, and would likely correspond to a pause on BoE rate hikes – a necessary condition before we would upgrade our recommended stance on UK investment grade corporates to overweight. Some Final Thoughts On Industry Sector Valuation Our UK investment grade corporate sector valuation model is a cross-sectional analysis of individual industry/sector corporate credit spreads, after controlling for differences in duration, convexity and credit rating. The model is currently signaling that there are few compelling valuation stories with positive “risk-adjusted” spreads (Chart 12). Only Financials look cheap, while Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals and Capital Goods are all trading at expensive risk-adjusted spreads. Chart 12Not Many Compelling Values Within UK Corporates By Industry
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
An additional risk to UK corporate bond performance relates to the BoE’s decision to unwind its corporate bond portfolio. The BoE has announced that there will be outright sales from the corporate holdings accumulated over the past couple of years, with a goal of having the stock of debt fully unwound by the end of 2023. This is important for much of the UK investment grade corporate bond universe, where the BoE holds between 8-10%, on average, of outstanding debt (Chart 13).1 Chart 13The BoE Has Become An Important Corporate Bondholder
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
When we compare our risk-adjusted spreads versus the BoE ownership share by sector, we conclude that Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals and Other Utilities offer the most unattractive combination of expensive spreads and high BoE concentration (Chart 14). We recommended underweight allocations to those sectors within an overall neutral allocation to UK corporates. Chart 14BoE Asset Sales Are A Major Risk For Some UK Corporate Sectors
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Bottom Line: Maintain a neutral stance on UK corporates, given the mix of attractive valuations but tighter monetary policy. Favoring shorter-maturity bonds and Financial names, but look to upgrade once UK inflation peaks and the Bank of England pauses on tightening. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In Chart 13, we use the market capitalization of each sector from the Bloomberg UK corporate bond index in the numerator of all ratios shown, as a proxy for outstanding debt. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Mixed Messages & Range-Bound Bond Yields
Listen to a short summary of this report. Executive Summary US Financial Conditions Have Tightened Significantly This Year
US Financial Conditions Have Tightened Significantly This Year
US Financial Conditions Have Tightened Significantly This Year
US financial conditions have tightened by enough that the Fed no longer needs to talk up interest rate expectations. If inflation decelerates faster than anticipated over the coming months, as we expect will be the case, the Fed’s messaging will soften further. Bond yields in the US and abroad are likely to fall over the next 6-to-12 months, even if they do rise over a longer-term horizon. Stay overweight stocks, favoring non-US equities over their US peers. We are closing our short 10-year Gilts trade, initiated at a yield of 0.85%, for a gain of 7.5%. We are also opening a new trade going long Canadian short-term interest rate futures versus their US counterparts. Investors expect Canadian rates to exceed US rates in 2024, which seems unlikely to us given that the Canadian housing market is much more sensitive to higher rates than the US market. Bottom Line: After having tightened significantly over the past seven months, financial conditions should loosen modestly during the remainder of the year. This should benefit risk assets. Fed Focused on Financial Conditions Chart 1Tighter Financial Conditions Will Hurt Growth
Tighter Financial Conditions Will Hurt Growth
Tighter Financial Conditions Will Hurt Growth
Like many central banks, the Fed sees financial conditions as a key driver of the real economy. While there are many financial conditions indices (FCIs), most include bond yields, credit spreads, equity prices, and the exchange rate as inputs. Higher bond yields, wider credit spreads, lower equity prices, and a strong currency all lead to tighter financial conditions and a weaker economy, and vice versa. Goldman’s US FCI is especially popular among market participants. It is calibrated so that 100 bps in tightening corresponds, all things equal, to a 100 basis-point decline in US real GDP growth over the subsequent four quarters. The Goldman FCI has tightened by 212 bps since the start of the year and by 225 points from its loosest level in November 2021. If the historic relationship between the FCI and the economy holds, the tightening in financial conditions would be enough to push US growth to a below-trend pace by the second quarter of 2023. In fact, the tightening in the Goldman FCI over the past 12 months already suggests that the manufacturing ISM will fall below 50 (Chart 1). Along the same lines, the Chicago Fed’s Adjusted National FCI, which measures financial conditions relative to current economic conditions, has moved slightly into restrictive territory. Aside from a brief period at the outset of the pandemic, the index has been consistently in expansionary territory since early 2013 (Chart 2). Chart 2The Chicago Fed Financial Conditions Index Has Moved Into Slightly Restrictive Territory
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Other data are consistent with the message from the FCIs. Most notably, growth estimates for the US and for other major economies have come down over the past few months (Chart 3). Economic surprise indices have also fallen, especially in the US. Chart 3AGrowth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (I)
Growth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (I)
Growth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (I)
Chart 3BGrowth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (II)
Growth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (II)
Growth Forecasts Have Softened As Economic Data Have Surprised To The Downside (II)
Mission Accomplished? Chart 4The Fed Expects To Lift Rates Above Its Estimate Of Neutral
The Fed Expects To Lift Rates Above Its Estimate Of Neutral
The Fed Expects To Lift Rates Above Its Estimate Of Neutral
Given the recent tightening in financial conditions and weaker growth expectations, the Fed is likely to soften its tone. Already this week, Atlanta Fed President Raphael Bostic suggested that the Fed could pause raising rates in September in order to assess the impact of the Fed’s tightening campaign. The Fed minutes also conveyed a sense of flexibility and data-dependence about the timing and magnitude of future hikes once rates reach 2%. It’s worth stressing that the Fed expects rates to rise in 2023 to about 40 bps above its estimate of the terminal rate (Chart 4). Jawboning rate expectations higher would potentially undermine the Fed’s goal of achieving a soft landing for the economy. Inflation Will Dictate How Much Easing Lies Ahead There is a big difference between not wanting financial conditions to tighten further and wanting them to loosen. The Fed would only want to see an easing in financial conditions if inflation were to fall faster than expected. Chart 5 shows how the year-over-year change in the core PCE deflator would evolve over the remainder of the year depending on different assumptions about the month-over-month change in the deflator. The Fed would be able to reach its expectation of year-over-year core PCE inflation of 4.1% for end-2022 if the month-over-month change averages 0.33%. Monthly core PCE inflation averaged 0.3% in February and March and is expected to clock in at around the same level for April once the data is released tomorrow. Chart 5AUS Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (I)
US Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (I)
US Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (I)
Chart 5BUS Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (II)
US Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (II)
US Inflation Will Fall By More Than The Fed Expects If The Monthly Change In Core PCE Is Less Than 0.3% (II)
Regardless of tomorrow’s data print, as we discussed last week, we expect the monthly inflation rate to average less than 0.3 in the back half of the year. If that happens, inflation will surprise to the downside relative to the Fed’s expectations. Consistent with the observation above, market-based inflation expectations have already declined. The 5-year TIPS inflation breakeven has fallen from 3.64% in March to 2.98% at present. The widely watched 5-year/5-year forward breakeven rate is back down to 2.29%, at the bottom of the Fed’s comfort zone of 2.3%-to-2.5% (Chart 6).1 The Citi US Inflation Surprise Index has also rolled over (Chart 7). Chart 6Market-Based Inflation Expectations Have Come Down Of Late
Market-Based Inflation Expectations Have Come Down Of Late
Market-Based Inflation Expectations Have Come Down Of Late
Chart 7The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over
The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over
The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over
Financial Conditions Abroad Financial conditions indices in the other major developed economies have tightened somewhat less than in the US because equities represent a smaller share of household net worth abroad and also because most currencies have weakened against the US dollar (Chart 8). Nevertheless, with growth momentum having already deteriorated sharply, central banks are signaling a more balanced approach towards policy normalization. Chart 8Financial Conditions Have Tightened More In The US Than Elsewhere This Year
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
ECB: Wait and See? In a blog post published on Monday, Christine Lagarde observed that inflation expectations have risen from pre-pandemic levels, implying that real policy rates are currently lower than they were two years ago. In her mind, this warrants ending net purchases under the Asset Purchase Programme early in the third quarter. It also warrants raising the deposit rate by 25 bps at both the July and September meetings, bringing it back to zero from -0.5% at present. Beyond then, Lagarde was circumspect about what should be done, stressing the need for “gradualism, optionality and flexibility.” She noted that “The euro area is clearly not facing a typical situation of excess aggregate demand or economic overheating … Both consumption and investment remain below their pre-crisis levels, and even further below their pre-crisis trends.” She then added: “The outlook is now being clouded by the negative supply shocks hitting the economy … households’ expectations of their future financial situation dropped to their second-lowest level on record in March and remained close to that level in April.” The market expects the ECB to raise rates by 170 bps over the next 12 months, bringing the deposit rate to 1.2% by mid-2023 (Chart 9). BCA’s Global Fixed Income team, led by Rob Robis, foresees only 50 bps of tightening over the next 12 months. Chart 9Markets Expect Rates To Rise The Most In The Anglo-Saxon World
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
The UK, Canada, and Australia: Frothy Housing Markets Will Limit Rate Hikes The Bank of England (BoE) hiked rates by 90 bps over the past 12 months. The UK OIS curve is priced for another 140 bps of rate hikes over the next year. According to the BoE’s forecasting models, this would raise the unemployment rate by two percentage points while lowering inflation to below 2% within the next two-to-three years. In our opinion, that is more tightening than the BoE would like to see. BCA’s strategists expect the BoE to deliver only another 75 bps of hikes over the next year. Chart 10Buildup In Leverage And Frothy Housing Markets Pose A Challenge To Monetary Policy In Some Developed Market Countries
Buildup In Leverage And Frothy Housing Markets Pose A Challenge To Monetary Policy In Some Developed Market Countries
Buildup In Leverage And Frothy Housing Markets Pose A Challenge To Monetary Policy In Some Developed Market Countries
The Canadian economy has been quite strong, with the unemployment rate falling to 5.2% in April, the lowest since 1974. The Canadian OIS curve is discounting 195 bps of interest rate hikes over the next 12 months, substantially more than the 150 bps of tightening our fixed income team foresees. By mid-2024, investors expect Canadian policy rates to be about 25 bps above US rates. This seems unreasonable to us, and as of this week, we are expressing this view by going long the June 2024 3-month Canadian Bankers’ Acceptance (BAX) futures contract (BAM4) versus the corresponding 3-month US SOFR futures contract (SFRM4). A more liquid option is to simply go long the 10-year Canadian government bond versus the 10-year US Treasury note. At present, Canadian 10-year government bonds are yielding 5 bps more than their US counterparts. Unlike in the US, where household debt has fallen over the past 14 years, debt in Canada has risen, fueled by a massive housing boom (Chart 10). High indebtedness and the prevalence of variable rate/short-term fixed-rate mortgages will limit the ability of the BoC to raise rates. The Australian OIS curve is currently discounting 262 bps of rate hikes over the next year which, if realized, would take the cash rate to 3.3% – a level last seen in 2013 when the neutral rate in Australia was much higher by the RBA’s own reckoning. BCA’s fixed income strategists expect only 150 bps of tightening over the next 12 months. Japan: Yield Curve Control Will Continue Chart 11Japan: Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Far Lower Than In The Rest Of The World
Japan: Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Far Lower Than In The Rest Of The World
Japan: Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Far Lower Than In The Rest Of The World
The Bank of Japan expects inflation excluding fresh food prices to remain at about 2% in the second half of 2022, but then to slow to 1.1% in the fiscal year starting April 2023. The Japan OIS curve is discounting almost no tightening over the next 12 months. Long-term inflation expectations are far lower in Japan than in any other major economy, which makes ultra-low rates a necessity for the foreseeable future (Chart 11). China: Outright Easing Chart 12Covid Restrictions Have Eased Only Modestly In China
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
China faces a trifecta of problems: A weakening housing market; slowing external demand for manufactured goods; and the ongoing threat of Covid-related lockdowns. Despite a steep drop in the number of new Covid cases over the past month, China’s lockdown index has only eased modestly, as the authorities continue to fret about the next outbreak (Chart 12). The leadership in Beijing has responded with policy easing. The PBoC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate by 15 bps last week, the largest such cut since 2019. This followed a cut in the floor rate for first-home mortgages that was announced on May 15. BCA’s China strategists believe these measures will arrest the deep contraction in the property market but will not spark a full-blown recovery due to the ongoing commitment of the government to the “three red lines” policy.2 In normal times, a Chinese real estate slump would be a cause of grave concern for global investors. These are not normal times, however. Public enemy number one these days is inflation. A weaker Chinese property market would curb commodity demand, thus helping to cool inflation. That would be a welcome development for global investors. Investment Conclusions Global financial conditions have tightened to the point that betting on ever-higher rates, at least for the next 12 months, no longer makes sense. If global inflation decelerates faster than anticipated during the remainder of the year, as we expect will be the case, central banks will dial back the hawkish rhetoric. We took partial profits on our short 10-year Treasury trade earlier this month (initiated at a yield of 1.45%). As of this week, consistent with the earlier decision of BCA’s fixed income strategists to upgrade UK Gilts, we are closing our short 10-year Gilt position (initiated at a yield of 0.85%) for a gain of 7.5%. The coming Goldilocks environment of falling inflation and supply-side led growth will buttress equities. We expect global stocks to rise 15%-to-20% over the next 12 months, with non-US markets outperforming the US. Looking further out, the fate of Goldilocks will rest on where the neutral rate of interest resides. If the neutral rate in the US turns out to be substantially lower than 2.5%, then any growth recovery will falter as the lagged effects of restrictive monetary policy work their way through the economy. Conversely, if the neutral rate turns out to be substantially higher than 2.5%, then inflation will reaccelerate as the economy overheats. Given the choice, we would wager on the latter outcome. Thus, while we expect global bond yields to decline over a 12-month horizon, we foresee them rising over a 2-to-5-year time frame. Similarly, while stocks will strengthen over the next 12 months, they are likely to encounter another bout of turbulence starting late next year or in 2024 as central banks initiate a second round of rate hikes. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn Twitter Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index. The TIPS breakeven is based on the CPI index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of 2.3%-to-2.5%. 2 The People’s Bank of China and the housing ministry issued a deleveraging framework for property developers in August 2020, consisting of a 70% ceiling on liabilities-to-assets, a net debt-to-equity ratio capped at 100%, and a limit on short-term borrowing that cannot exceed cash reserves. Developers breaching these “red lines” run the risk of being cut off from access to new loans from banks, while those who respect them can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Are Financial Conditions Tight Enough?
Executive Summary Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
The neutral interest rate in Australia is lower than in past cycles, for several reasons: low potential growth, weak productivity, high household debt and inflated housing valuations. Interest rate markets are discounting a very aggressive monetary tightening cycle in Australia, with the RBA Cash Rate expected to reach 2.6% by end-2022 and 3.1% by end-2023. Australian inflation will peak in H2/2022, and the RBA will not need to raise rates beyond the midpoint of the RBA's estimated neutral range of 2-3%. The Australian dollar has not responded to rising interest rate expectations or high commodity prices, largely due to weak Chinese growth. The Aussie is cheap and has upside if China delivers more economic stimulus. The newly-elected Labor-led government will not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Expect modest fiscal stimulus, with increased spending, but also minor tax hikes for multinational corporations and high-income earners. Bottom Line: For global bond investors, an overweight allocation to Australian government bonds is warranted with the RBA likely to disappoint aggressive market rate hike expectations. For currency investors, the undervalued Australian dollar is an attractive play on an eventual rebound of Chinese growth. Feature The month of May has been eventful for investors in Australia. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivered its first interest rate hike since 2010 on May 3, a move that markets had expected but which was much earlier than the RBA’s prior forward guidance. The May 21 federal election returned the Labor party to power for the first time since 2013. These events introduce new risks for the Australian economy and financial markets, altering a policy backdrop that had been highly stimulative - and, more importantly, highly predictable - during the pandemic but must now change in response to the new reality of high inflation. In this Special Report, jointly published by BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy, Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy, we discuss the investment implications of the start of the monetary tightening cycle and the new government in Australia. Our main conclusions: markets are somehow pricing in both too many RBA rate hikes and not enough currency upside for the Australian dollar, while expectations for major fiscal policy changes should be tempered. Will The RBA Kill The Economic Recovery? Australian government bonds have been one of the worst performers in the developed world so far in 2022 (Chart 1), delivering a total return of -9.1% in AUD terms, and -9% in USD-hedged terms, according to Bloomberg. The benchmark 10-year yield now sits at 3.20%, up +142bps since the start of the year but off the 8-year intraday high of 3.6% reached in early May. Australia has historically been a “high-beta” bond market that sees yields rise more when global bond yields are rising. That is a legacy of the days when the RBA had to push policy rates to levels that exceeded other major central banks like the Fed during global tightening cycles. But by the RBA’s own admission, the neutral policy interest rate is now lower than in previous years, perhaps no more than 0% in real terms according to RBA Governor Philip Lowe. Our RBA Monitor, which consists of economic and financial variables that typically correlate to pressure on the RBA to tighten or ease policy, has been signaling since mid-2021 that higher interest rates were increasingly likely (Chart 2). However, markets have moved to price in a very rapid and aggressive tightening, with a whopping 268bps of rate hikes discounted over the next year in the Australian overnight index swap (OIS) curve. Chart 1Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers
Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers
Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers
Chart 2Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening
Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening
Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening
The growth component of the RBA Monitor will likely soon ease up with the OECD leading economic indicator for Australia in a clear downtrend (bottom panel). However, the inflation component of the RBA Monitor will stay elevated for longer given current high inflation - headline CPI inflation in Australia hit a 20-year high of 5.1% in Q1/2022 - and the tight Australian labor market. Even with those robust inflation pressures, markets are pricing in a peak level of interest rates that appears far more restrictive than the RBA is willing, and likely able, to deliver. We see three primary reasons for this. Weak Potential Growth Implies A Lower Neutral Rate The OIS curve is priced for the RBA Cash Rate staying between 3-4% over the next decade (Chart 3). The real policy rate (adjusted by CPI swap forwards as the proxy for inflation expectations), is expected to average around 1% over that same period. Those are the highest “terminal rate” estimates among the G10 economies. At the press conference following the May 3 rate hike, RBA Governor Lowe noted that “it’s not unreasonable to expect that the normalization of interest rates over the period ahead could see interest rates rise to 2.5%”. Lowe said that was the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% inflation target, thus the expected normalization of policy rates would take the inflation-adjusted real rate to 0%. That is a far cry from the more aggressive increase in real rates discounted in the Australian OIS and CPI swap curves. Lowe also noted that a real rate above 0% “over time […] would require stronger productivity growth in Australia.” On that front, the data is not suggesting that the RBA will need to reconsider its views on the neutral real interest rate anytime soon. The 5-year annualized growth rate of labor productivity is an anemic -0.8%, down from the mid-2010s peak of around 1.5% and far below the late-1990s peak of around 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Chart 4A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate
A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate
A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate
Chart 5The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking
The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking
The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking
Assuming a pre-pandemic growth rate of the working age population of between 1-1.5%, and productivity around 0.5%, Australia’s potential GDP growth rate is, at best, around 2% (middle panel) and is likely even lower than that. The working-age population growth rate fell to 0% during the pandemic due to migration restrictions that have yet to be lifted. However, population growth had already been slowing pre-COVID due to falling birth rates and reduced worker visa caps in 2018-19. High Household Debt Raises Interest Rate Sensitivity Of Consumer Demand Sluggish trend growth is not the only reason why Australia’s neutral interest rate is lower than markets are discounting. Given elevated housing valuations and aggressive lending practices, highly indebted Australian households are now more sensitive to rate increases than in years past. Australian mortgage lenders began aggressively issuing shorter-term (typically 3-year) fixed rate mortgages in 2020 after the collapse in bond yields due to the initial COVID shock, to entice borrowers to lock in low interest rates. This raised the share of new fixed rate mortgages from a historic average around 15% of all new mortgages to nearly 50%. Since the RBA ended its yield curve control policy last November, which targeted 3-year bond yields, 3-year fixed mortgage rates have surged from 2.93% to 4.34%. That already has had an impact on housing demand - home price growth has peaked in the major cities according to CoreLogic, while building approvals are contracting on a year-over-year basis (Chart 5). As the surge of fixed rate mortgage loans begin to mature in 2023, Australian homeowners will see a major spike in refinancing costs, both for fixed rate and variable rate lending. This trend should weaken home demand, and house price inflation, even further. Inflation Will Soon Peak The RBA expects softer house price inflation to help slow overall Australian inflation rates. The central bank is projecting headline CPI inflation to fall from the latest 5.1% to 4.3% by June 2023 and 2.9% by June 2024 (Chart 6). That would still be a level near the top of the RBA target band, but the downtrend could be even faster than that. As in many other countries, the latest surge in Australian inflation has been led by a rapid increase in goods prices related to severe demand/supply mismatches at a time of global supply chain bottlenecks. Australian goods inflation hit an 31-year high of 6.6% in Q1/2022, essentially matching the housing component of the CPI index (Chart 7). Yet with US goods inflation having already peaked, as have global shipping costs, it is likely that Australia goods inflation will soon follow suit. This will lower headline Australian inflation to levels more consistent with services inflation, which reached 3% in Q1/2022. Chart 6The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation
The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation
The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation
That floor in more domestically-driven services inflation will also be influenced by the pace of wage growth in Australia. The latest reading on the best wage indicator Down Under, the Wage Price Index, showed that year-over-year wage growth only reached 2.4% in Q1/2022. Chart 7Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak
Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak
Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak
This is a surprisingly low outcome given the tightness of the Australian labor market with the unemployment rate at an all-time low of 3.9% (Chart 8). Depressed labor supply is not a factor keeping the unemployment rate low, as the labor force participation rate and hours worked are both above pre-pandemic levels. Prior to the rate hike at the May 3 policy meeting, the RBA had been highlighting soft wage growth as a reason to delay the start of the monetary tightening cycle. After the May meeting, RBA Governor Lowe noted that according to the RBA’s “liaison” surveys of Australian businesses, nearly 40% of respondents said they were giving wage increases above 3%. The RBA believes that wage growth in the 3-4% range is consistent with Australian inflation remaining within the RBA’s 2-3% target band, a condition that was deemed necessary before rate hikes could begin. The message from the RBA liaison surveys was enough to trigger the start of the tightening cycle. While the Australia OIS curve is priced for an aggressive series of rate hikes, and shorter-term interest rate expectations are elevated, there is less inflationary concern priced into medium-term inflation expectations. The 5-year/5-year forward Australia CPI swap is at 2.2%, down -15bps since the start of 2022 and barely within the RBA target band. Some of that is a global factor – the 5-year/5-year forward US TIPS breakeven has declined by -44bps over just the past month. However, the Australia 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap peaked at the start of the year, just as Australian interest rate expectations began to ratchet higher (the 2-year Australia government bond yield was 0.35% at the start of 2022 and now sits at 2.61%). An increasing amount of discounted rate hikes, occurring alongside falling inflation expectations, is a sign that markets are incrementally pricing in a restrictive monetary policy. We agree with RBA Governor Lowe’s assessment that the neutral nominal Cash Rate is, at best, 2.5%. Thus, the current discounted peak in the Cash Rate of 3.2% would be restrictive. Very strong consumer spending growth at a time when inflation was already high could be a sign that a restrictive monetary stance is now necessary. However, the outlook for Australian consumption is not without risks. Consumer confidence has plunged alongside declining purchasing power, as wage growth has lagged the inflation upturn (Chart 9). While the expectation is that inflation will peak and wage growth will pick up over the latter half of 2022, it is still uncertain if the relative moves will be large enough to give a meaningful lift to real wage growth and consumer spending power. Chart 8Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment
Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment
Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment
Chart 9Headwinds For The Australian Consumer
Headwinds For The Australian Consumer
Headwinds For The Australian Consumer
The RBA believes that consumer spending will be supported by the high level of savings, with the household saving rate currently at 13.6%. Yet the high level of household debt means that debt service burdens will rise as interest rates move higher, which may limit the degree to which Australian consumers run down savings to fuel greater consumer spending. Another reason why a more restrictive monetary policy could be needed is if there was a substantial loosening of fiscal policy that was fueling faster growth, especially at a time when inflation was already overshooting. This makes an analysis of the latest election results highly relevant to the path of Australian interest rates. Bottom Line: Markets are pricing in a shift to a restrictive level of interest rates in Australia, an outcome that is not necessary with inflation set to peak at a time of high household leverage. Labor Party Takes Power With Limited Political Capital Australia’s federal election on May 21 brought a Labor Party government into power, headed by new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. National policy is unlikely to change substantially. Australia has low political risk but high geopolitical risk – meaning that domestic politics are manageable for investors but China’s conflict with the West and other geopolitical events are revolutionizing Australia’s place in the world. The previous Liberal-National Coalition government had been in power since 2013, had never found a stable leader, and had been buffeted by a series of external shocks: a commodity bust, China trade conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and inflation. Hence it is no surprise that Labor came back to power – it almost did so in 2019. However, Labor’s popularity is questionable. The new government does not have a robust political mandate: Labor will fall short of a single-party majority (or will have a very thin majority at best): As we go to press, Labor won 74 seats out of 151 in the House of Representatives. A party needs 76 seats for a majority. Labor will likely rely on three Green Party seats and some of the 10 independents to pass legislation. These minor parties will have considerable influence. Labor’s popular vote share is underwhelming: Labor won 32.8% of the popular vote, down from 33.3% in 2019, and beneath the 36% of the vote won by the outgoing Liberal-National Coalition (Table 1). The Green Party rose to 12% of the vote. While this only translates to three seats in parliament, the Greens will hold the balance of power. Table 1Australian Federal Election Results, 2022
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
Labor does not control the Senate: A bill requires a majority vote in both the House and Senate for passage. A majority requires 38 seats, but Labor and the Greens are currently slated to fall short at 36 seats. Hence, as in the House, the Labor Party will rely on “cross-bench” votes from minor parties to get a majority for bills. Labor won through pragmatism and moderation: Having suffered a surprise defeat in 2019, the Labor Party adopted a more moderate and pragmatic tone in the current election. Prime Minister Albanese campaigned on a motto of “safe change,” declared that he was “not woke,” and adopted a relatively hawkish tilt on trade and foreign policy (China relations) and immigration (“boat people”). Labor has limited room for maneuver in international relations: China’s economy is slowing down and stimulus does not work as well as it used to. China’s political system is reverting to autocracy and the Xi Jinping administration is attempting to carve a sphere of influence in the region, increasing long-term security threats to Australia in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. China has declared a “no limits” strategic partnership with a belligerent Russia, leaving the US no option but to pursue containment strategy against both powers. Prime Minister Albanese has already met with President Biden and the Quadrilateral Dialogue to emphasize Australia’s need to counter China’s newly assertive foreign policy. While Albanese may attempt to reduce trade tensions with China, any such moves will be heavily constrained. Inflation, not climate change, brought Labor to power: The media is hailing the election as a historic shift on the question of climate change and climate policy. But popular opinion has not changed much on this topic in recent years and the election results only partially support the thesis. A better explanation is that the pandemic and its inflationary aftermath galvanized opposition to the ruling Liberal-National Coalition. Hence both fiscal policy and climate policy – the most important areas of change – will be constrained by inflation. Chart 10Australia Cannot Cut Defense Amid China Challenge
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
There are two key policy takeaways from the above assessment: First, on fiscal policy, the new Labor-led government will face limitations due to inflation and the macroeconomic cycle. It will likely respond to inflation – the crisis that got it elected – even though China’s slowdown will produce negative surprises for global and Australian growth. The government will not be able to cut defense spending given the geopolitical setting (Chart 10). That means it will also not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Tax hikes are coming for multinational corporations and high-income earners. In terms of the size of the fiscal impact, the Labor Party promised spending increases worth AUD$18.9 billion (1.0% of GDP), to be offset by tax hikes amounting to AUD$11.5 billion in new revenue (0.6% of GDP). The result would be an AUD$7.5 billion increase in the budget deficit (0.4% of GDP) – a net fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). Currently the IMF projects a 1.84% fiscal drag in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit for 2023, so Labor’s plans would reduce that drag by 0.4%. However, the fiscal plans will change once the new Treasurer James Chalmers produces a new budget proposal in October. Comparison with a like-minded economy is therefore useful to put the policy change into perspective. Canada’s politics shifted from center-right to center-left in 2015 and the left-leaning government at that time put forward an agenda similar to Australia’s Labor Party today. Ultimately the budget balance declined from 0.17% to -0.45% of GDP from peak to trough (Chart 12). This 0.62% of GDP stimulus provides a point of comparison. Yet inflation was not a constraint on government spending at that time. The new Australian government may not exceed that size of stimulus in an inflationary context. But it could easily surpass it if the global economy falls back into recession. Chart 11Australian Labor’s Proposed Fiscal Stimulus
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
Chart 12Canada Offers Clue To Size Of Australian Stimulus
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
Second, on climate policy, the new ruling coalition probably will pass major climate legislation, given the importance of Greens and left-leaning independents. But Labor will have to constrain the smaller parties’ climate ambitions to preserve popular support in areas where fossil fuel industries remain strong. Australia consumes substantially more carbon per capita than other developed economies and will continue to rely on fossil fuel exports for growth. In other words, climate policy will bring incremental rather than radical change. Bottom Line: If a global recession is avoided, then the new government’s counter-cyclical fiscal policies may work. If not, they will produce a double whammy for the Australian economy: new corporate and resource taxes on top of a slowdown in exports. The AUD As A Shock Absorber Despite a higher repricing of the interest rate curve in Australia, and elevated commodity prices, the Australian dollar (AUD) has been very soft. Part of the story is broad-based US dollar strength that has sapped any potential rebound in the AUD. More specifically, a survey of the key drivers of the AUD unveils the main source of currency weakness, by process of elimination: The divergence in monetary policy between the RBA and the Fed? No. Clearly, that has not been a driver this time around as the RBA is expected to lift rates to 3.2% over the next 12 months, in line with market pricing for rate hikes from the Federal Reserve. The commodity cycle? No. Commodity prices are softening, after being in a supply-driven bull market. As a premier resource producer, the Australian economy is intricately intertwined with the outlook for coal, iron ore, copper and even liquefied natural gas prices. As Chart 13 highlights, the AUD has massively deviated from the level implied by rising terms of trade for Australia. This is a departure from a historical correlation that has been in place since the end of the Bretton Woods system. Resource booms tend to be either demand or supply driven, or a combination of both. This time around supply restrictions have played a major role. The message from the AUD is that it responds much better to improving demand conditions. Global and relative growth dynamics? YES: The overarching driver of a weak AUD as hinted above has been slowing Chinese demand. The Zero COVID-19 policy in China has led to a drastic reduction in import volumes. This is hurting Australia’s external balance at the margin, as Chinese import volumes contract (Chart 14). Chart 13The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade
The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade
The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade
Chart 14The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China
The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China
The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China
There are two key takeaways from the above analysis. First, the hawkish path for interest rates priced for the RBA is not yet reflected in a weak AUD. This implies that currency and bond markets are on a collision course. Either the RBA ratifies market pricing and triggers a coiled spring rebound in the AUD, or hawkish expectations will be tempered as inflationary pressures moderate. Second, the AUD will be very sensitive to any improvement in Chinese demand, the overarching driver of currency weakness. We expect the Chinese authorities to ramp up credit stimulus, to offset weakening demand from the Zero COVID-19 policy. The AUD has historically been very sensitive to changes in Chinese money and credit variables (Chart 15). From a fundamental perspective, a lot of pessimism is embedded in the Aussie dollar. Australian GDP has already recovered above pre-pandemic levels and could be on a path to achieve escape velocity if China recovers. Chinese fiscal and monetary policy should be eased going forward. Chinese bond yields have already dropped, reflecting an easing in domestic financial conditions. Meanwhile, Australia’s commodity exposure is well suited for a green energy shift. Besides being relatively competitive in supplying the types of raw materials that China needs and wants, (higher-grade ore, which is more expensive, but pollutes less, and is in high demand in China), Australia is a big exporter of liquefied natural gas, whose prices have been soaring in recent months and is critical in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and green energy shift (Chart 16). This will provide a multi-year tailwind for Australian export volumes and terms of trade. Chart 15The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming
The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming
The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming
Chart 16Australia Is Resource Superstar
Australia Is Resource Superstar
Australia Is Resource Superstar
Bottom Line: BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy went long AUD at 72 cents. In the near term, this position could prove quite volatile as markets try to discern a clear path for global growth. But given cheap valuations and beaten down sentiment, it should prove profitable in the longer term. Investment Conclusions For Fixed Income Investors Chart 17Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations
Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations
Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations
Our careful analysis of Australian growth, inflation, the RBA’s likely next moves leads us to the following investment conclusions for Australian bonds (Chart 17): Maintain neutral duration exposure within dedicated Australian bond portfolios (for now): On a forward basis, the entire Australian yield curve is converging to that discounted 3.5% peak in the Cash Rate (top panel). Eventually, Australian bond yields will fall once inflation clearly peaks in H2/2022 and markets realize that the RBA will not be hiking as fast as expected, justifying an above-benchmark duration tilt. Until then, Australian bond yields will be rangebound, especially with the RBA no longer buying bonds via quantitative easing, leaving more bond issuance to be absorbed by private investors. Underweight Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal-paying government bonds: Inflation will soon peak, and the discounted RBA stance is too hawkish – a recipe for lower inflation breakevens. Overweight Australian government bonds within global bond portfolios: Australia has returned to its “high-yield-beta” status, which means that an overweight stance is warranted when global bond yields are stable or falling. BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Global Duration Indicator, a growth-focused leading indicator of the momentum of global bond yields, is signalling a more stable backdrop for global yields over the rest of 2022. The Duration Indicator is also a fine leading indicator of the relative return performance of Australian government bonds (middle panel) and is supportive of an overweight stance on Australian debt. Go Long December 2022 Australia Bank Bill futures: This is a tactical trade (i.e. investment horizon of no more than six months), based on the extreme pricing of rate hikes by year-end. The market price of the December 2022 futures contract is currently 97.11, or an implied interest rate of 2.89% compared to the current RBA Cash Rate of 0.35%. That contract is priced for far too many rate hikes than will be delivered over the remaining seven RBA meetings of 2022. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist ChesterN@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com
Executive Summary Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
The neutral interest rate in Australia is lower than in past cycles, for several reasons: low potential growth, weak productivity, high household debt and inflated housing valuations. Interest rate markets are discounting a very aggressive monetary tightening cycle in Australia, with the RBA Cash Rate expected to reach 2.6% by end-2022 and 3.1% by end-2023. Australian inflation will peak in H2/2022, and the RBA will not need to raise rates beyond the midpoint of the RBA's estimated neutral range of 2-3%. The Australian dollar has not responded to rising interest rate expectations or high commodity prices, largely due to weak Chinese growth. The Aussie is cheap and has upside if China delivers more economic stimulus. The newly-elected Labor-led government will not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Expect modest fiscal stimulus, with increased spending, but also minor tax hikes for multinational corporations and high-income earners. Bottom Line: For global bond investors, an overweight allocation to Australian government bonds is warranted with the RBA likely to disappoint aggressive market rate hike expectations. For currency investors, the undervalued Australian dollar is an attractive play on an eventual rebound of Chinese growth. Feature The month of May has been eventful for investors in Australia. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivered its first interest rate hike since 2010 on May 3, a move that markets had expected but which was much earlier than the RBA’s prior forward guidance. The May 21 federal election returned the Labor party to power for the first time since 2013. These events introduce new risks for the Australian economy and financial markets, altering a policy backdrop that had been highly stimulative - and, more importantly, highly predictable - during the pandemic but must now change in response to the new reality of high inflation. In this Special Report, jointly published by BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy, Foreign Exchange Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy, we discuss the investment implications of the start of the monetary tightening cycle and the new government in Australia. Our main conclusions: markets are somehow pricing in both too many RBA rate hikes and not enough currency upside for the Australian dollar, while expectations for major fiscal policy changes should be tempered. Will The RBA Kill The Economic Recovery? Australian government bonds have been one of the worst performers in the developed world so far in 2022 (Chart 1), delivering a total return of -9.1% in AUD terms, and -9% in USD-hedged terms, according to Bloomberg. The benchmark 10-year yield now sits at 3.20%, up +142bps since the start of the year but off the 8-year intraday high of 3.6% reached in early May. Australia has historically been a “high-beta” bond market that sees yields rise more when global bond yields are rising. That is a legacy of the days when the RBA had to push policy rates to levels that exceeded other major central banks like the Fed during global tightening cycles. But by the RBA’s own admission, the neutral policy interest rate is now lower than in previous years, perhaps no more than 0% in real terms according to RBA Governor Philip Lowe. Our RBA Monitor, which consists of economic and financial variables that typically correlate to pressure on the RBA to tighten or ease policy, has been signaling since mid-2021 that higher interest rates were increasingly likely (Chart 2). However, markets have moved to price in a very rapid and aggressive tightening, with a whopping 268bps of rate hikes discounted over the next year in the Australian overnight index swap (OIS) curve. Chart 1Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers
Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers
Australian Bond Yields Have Surged Vs Global Peers
Chart 2Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening
Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening
Markets Expect Very Aggressive RBA Tightening
The growth component of the RBA Monitor will likely soon ease up with the OECD leading economic indicator for Australia in a clear downtrend (bottom panel). However, the inflation component of the RBA Monitor will stay elevated for longer given current high inflation - headline CPI inflation in Australia hit a 20-year high of 5.1% in Q1/2022 - and the tight Australian labor market. Even with those robust inflation pressures, markets are pricing in a peak level of interest rates that appears far more restrictive than the RBA is willing, and likely able, to deliver. We see three primary reasons for this. Weak Potential Growth Implies A Lower Neutral Rate The OIS curve is priced for the RBA Cash Rate staying between 3-4% over the next decade (Chart 3). The real policy rate (adjusted by CPI swap forwards as the proxy for inflation expectations), is expected to average around 1% over that same period. Those are the highest “terminal rate” estimates among the G10 economies. At the press conference following the May 3 rate hike, RBA Governor Lowe noted that “it’s not unreasonable to expect that the normalization of interest rates over the period ahead could see interest rates rise to 2.5%”. Lowe said that was the midpoint of the RBA’s 2-3% inflation target, thus the expected normalization of policy rates would take the inflation-adjusted real rate to 0%. That is a far cry from the more aggressive increase in real rates discounted in the Australian OIS and CPI swap curves. Lowe also noted that a real rate above 0% “over time […] would require stronger productivity growth in Australia.” On that front, the data is not suggesting that the RBA will need to reconsider its views on the neutral real interest rate anytime soon. The 5-year annualized growth rate of labor productivity is an anemic -0.8%, down from the mid-2010s peak of around 1.5% and far below the late-1990s peak of around 2.5% (Chart 4). Chart 3Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Markets Priced For A Restrictive Level Of Australian Rates
Chart 4A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate
A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate
A Powerful Structural Reason For A Lower Australian Neutral Rate
Chart 5The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking
The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking
The Australian Housing Cycle Is Peaking
Assuming a pre-pandemic growth rate of the working age population of between 1-1.5%, and productivity around 0.5%, Australia’s potential GDP growth rate is, at best, around 2% (middle panel) and is likely even lower than that. The working-age population growth rate fell to 0% during the pandemic due to migration restrictions that have yet to be lifted. However, population growth had already been slowing pre-COVID due to falling birth rates and reduced worker visa caps in 2018-19. High Household Debt Raises Interest Rate Sensitivity Of Consumer Demand Sluggish trend growth is not the only reason why Australia’s neutral interest rate is lower than markets are discounting. Given elevated housing valuations and aggressive lending practices, highly indebted Australian households are now more sensitive to rate increases than in years past. Australian mortgage lenders began aggressively issuing shorter-term (typically 3-year) fixed rate mortgages in 2020 after the collapse in bond yields due to the initial COVID shock, to entice borrowers to lock in low interest rates. This raised the share of new fixed rate mortgages from a historic average around 15% of all new mortgages to nearly 50%. Since the RBA ended its yield curve control policy last November, which targeted 3-year bond yields, 3-year fixed mortgage rates have surged from 2.93% to 4.34%. That already has had an impact on housing demand - home price growth has peaked in the major cities according to CoreLogic, while building approvals are contracting on a year-over-year basis (Chart 5). As the surge of fixed rate mortgage loans begin to mature in 2023, Australian homeowners will see a major spike in refinancing costs, both for fixed rate and variable rate lending. This trend should weaken home demand, and house price inflation, even further. Inflation Will Soon Peak The RBA expects softer house price inflation to help slow overall Australian inflation rates. The central bank is projecting headline CPI inflation to fall from the latest 5.1% to 4.3% by June 2023 and 2.9% by June 2024 (Chart 6). That would still be a level near the top of the RBA target band, but the downtrend could be even faster than that. As in many other countries, the latest surge in Australian inflation has been led by a rapid increase in goods prices related to severe demand/supply mismatches at a time of global supply chain bottlenecks. Australian goods inflation hit an 31-year high of 6.6% in Q1/2022, essentially matching the housing component of the CPI index (Chart 7). Yet with US goods inflation having already peaked, as have global shipping costs, it is likely that Australia goods inflation will soon follow suit. This will lower headline Australian inflation to levels more consistent with services inflation, which reached 3% in Q1/2022. Chart 6The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation
The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation
The RBA Sees Persistent Above-Target Inflation
That floor in more domestically-driven services inflation will also be influenced by the pace of wage growth in Australia. The latest reading on the best wage indicator Down Under, the Wage Price Index, showed that year-over-year wage growth only reached 2.4% in Q1/2022. Chart 7Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak
Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak
Australia Goods Inflation Should Soon Peak
This is a surprisingly low outcome given the tightness of the Australian labor market with the unemployment rate at an all-time low of 3.9% (Chart 8). Depressed labor supply is not a factor keeping the unemployment rate low, as the labor force participation rate and hours worked are both above pre-pandemic levels. Prior to the rate hike at the May 3 policy meeting, the RBA had been highlighting soft wage growth as a reason to delay the start of the monetary tightening cycle. After the May meeting, RBA Governor Lowe noted that according to the RBA’s “liaison” surveys of Australian businesses, nearly 40% of respondents said they were giving wage increases above 3%. The RBA believes that wage growth in the 3-4% range is consistent with Australian inflation remaining within the RBA’s 2-3% target band, a condition that was deemed necessary before rate hikes could begin. The message from the RBA liaison surveys was enough to trigger the start of the tightening cycle. While the Australia OIS curve is priced for an aggressive series of rate hikes, and shorter-term interest rate expectations are elevated, there is less inflationary concern priced into medium-term inflation expectations. The 5-year/5-year forward Australia CPI swap is at 2.2%, down -15bps since the start of 2022 and barely within the RBA target band. Some of that is a global factor – the 5-year/5-year forward US TIPS breakeven has declined by -44bps over just the past month. However, the Australia 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap peaked at the start of the year, just as Australian interest rate expectations began to ratchet higher (the 2-year Australia government bond yield was 0.35% at the start of 2022 and now sits at 2.61%). An increasing amount of discounted rate hikes, occurring alongside falling inflation expectations, is a sign that markets are incrementally pricing in a restrictive monetary policy. We agree with RBA Governor Lowe’s assessment that the neutral nominal Cash Rate is, at best, 2.5%. Thus, the current discounted peak in the Cash Rate of 3.2% would be restrictive. Very strong consumer spending growth at a time when inflation was already high could be a sign that a restrictive monetary stance is now necessary. However, the outlook for Australian consumption is not without risks. Consumer confidence has plunged alongside declining purchasing power, as wage growth has lagged the inflation upturn (Chart 9). While the expectation is that inflation will peak and wage growth will pick up over the latter half of 2022, it is still uncertain if the relative moves will be large enough to give a meaningful lift to real wage growth and consumer spending power. Chart 8Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment
Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment
Medium-Term Inflation Expectations Falling, Despite Low Unemployment
Chart 9Headwinds For The Australian Consumer
Headwinds For The Australian Consumer
Headwinds For The Australian Consumer
The RBA believes that consumer spending will be supported by the high level of savings, with the household saving rate currently at 13.6%. Yet the high level of household debt means that debt service burdens will rise as interest rates move higher, which may limit the degree to which Australian consumers run down savings to fuel greater consumer spending. Another reason why a more restrictive monetary policy could be needed is if there was a substantial loosening of fiscal policy that was fueling faster growth, especially at a time when inflation was already overshooting. This makes an analysis of the latest election results highly relevant to the path of Australian interest rates. Bottom Line: Markets are pricing in a shift to a restrictive level of interest rates in Australia, an outcome that is not necessary with inflation set to peak at a time of high household leverage. Labor Party Takes Power With Limited Political Capital Australia’s federal election on May 21 brought a Labor Party government into power, headed by new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. National policy is unlikely to change substantially. Australia has low political risk but high geopolitical risk – meaning that domestic politics are manageable for investors but China’s conflict with the West and other geopolitical events are revolutionizing Australia’s place in the world. The previous Liberal-National Coalition government had been in power since 2013, had never found a stable leader, and had been buffeted by a series of external shocks: a commodity bust, China trade conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and inflation. Hence it is no surprise that Labor came back to power – it almost did so in 2019. However, Labor’s popularity is questionable. The new government does not have a robust political mandate: Labor will fall short of a single-party majority (or will have a very thin majority at best): As we go to press, Labor won 74 seats out of 151 in the House of Representatives. A party needs 76 seats for a majority. Labor will likely rely on three Green Party seats and some of the 10 independents to pass legislation. These minor parties will have considerable influence. Labor’s popular vote share is underwhelming: Labor won 32.8% of the popular vote, down from 33.3% in 2019, and beneath the 36% of the vote won by the outgoing Liberal-National Coalition (Table 1). The Green Party rose to 12% of the vote. While this only translates to three seats in parliament, the Greens will hold the balance of power. Table 1Australian Federal Election Results, 2022
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
Labor does not control the Senate: A bill requires a majority vote in both the House and Senate for passage. A majority requires 38 seats, but Labor and the Greens are currently slated to fall short at 36 seats. Hence, as in the House, the Labor Party will rely on “cross-bench” votes from minor parties to get a majority for bills. Labor won through pragmatism and moderation: Having suffered a surprise defeat in 2019, the Labor Party adopted a more moderate and pragmatic tone in the current election. Prime Minister Albanese campaigned on a motto of “safe change,” declared that he was “not woke,” and adopted a relatively hawkish tilt on trade and foreign policy (China relations) and immigration (“boat people”). Labor has limited room for maneuver in international relations: China’s economy is slowing down and stimulus does not work as well as it used to. China’s political system is reverting to autocracy and the Xi Jinping administration is attempting to carve a sphere of influence in the region, increasing long-term security threats to Australia in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. China has declared a “no limits” strategic partnership with a belligerent Russia, leaving the US no option but to pursue containment strategy against both powers. Prime Minister Albanese has already met with President Biden and the Quadrilateral Dialogue to emphasize Australia’s need to counter China’s newly assertive foreign policy. While Albanese may attempt to reduce trade tensions with China, any such moves will be heavily constrained. Inflation, not climate change, brought Labor to power: The media is hailing the election as a historic shift on the question of climate change and climate policy. But popular opinion has not changed much on this topic in recent years and the election results only partially support the thesis. A better explanation is that the pandemic and its inflationary aftermath galvanized opposition to the ruling Liberal-National Coalition. Hence both fiscal policy and climate policy – the most important areas of change – will be constrained by inflation. Chart 10Australia Cannot Cut Defense Amid China Challenge
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
There are two key policy takeaways from the above assessment: First, on fiscal policy, the new Labor-led government will face limitations due to inflation and the macroeconomic cycle. It will likely respond to inflation – the crisis that got it elected – even though China’s slowdown will produce negative surprises for global and Australian growth. The government will not be able to cut defense spending given the geopolitical setting (Chart 10). That means it will also not be able to pursue its ambitious social and environmental agenda without finding more revenue to offset the inflationary impact of larger budget deficits. Tax hikes are coming for multinational corporations and high-income earners. In terms of the size of the fiscal impact, the Labor Party promised spending increases worth AUD$18.9 billion (1.0% of GDP), to be offset by tax hikes amounting to AUD$11.5 billion in new revenue (0.6% of GDP). The result would be an AUD$7.5 billion increase in the budget deficit (0.4% of GDP) – a net fiscal stimulus (Chart 11). Currently the IMF projects a 1.84% fiscal drag in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit for 2023, so Labor’s plans would reduce that drag by 0.4%. However, the fiscal plans will change once the new Treasurer James Chalmers produces a new budget proposal in October. Comparison with a like-minded economy is therefore useful to put the policy change into perspective. Canada’s politics shifted from center-right to center-left in 2015 and the left-leaning government at that time put forward an agenda similar to Australia’s Labor Party today. Ultimately the budget balance declined from 0.17% to -0.45% of GDP from peak to trough (Chart 12). This 0.62% of GDP stimulus provides a point of comparison. Yet inflation was not a constraint on government spending at that time. The new Australian government may not exceed that size of stimulus in an inflationary context. But it could easily surpass it if the global economy falls back into recession. Chart 11Australian Labor’s Proposed Fiscal Stimulus
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
Chart 12Canada Offers Clue To Size Of Australian Stimulus
The New Normal In Australia
The New Normal In Australia
Second, on climate policy, the new ruling coalition probably will pass major climate legislation, given the importance of Greens and left-leaning independents. But Labor will have to constrain the smaller parties’ climate ambitions to preserve popular support in areas where fossil fuel industries remain strong. Australia consumes substantially more carbon per capita than other developed economies and will continue to rely on fossil fuel exports for growth. In other words, climate policy will bring incremental rather than radical change. Bottom Line: If a global recession is avoided, then the new government’s counter-cyclical fiscal policies may work. If not, they will produce a double whammy for the Australian economy: new corporate and resource taxes on top of a slowdown in exports. The AUD As A Shock Absorber Despite a higher repricing of the interest rate curve in Australia, and elevated commodity prices, the Australian dollar (AUD) has been very soft. Part of the story is broad-based US dollar strength that has sapped any potential rebound in the AUD. More specifically, a survey of the key drivers of the AUD unveils the main source of currency weakness, by process of elimination: The divergence in monetary policy between the RBA and the Fed? No. Clearly, that has not been a driver this time around as the RBA is expected to lift rates to 3.2% over the next 12 months, in line with market pricing for rate hikes from the Federal Reserve. The commodity cycle? No. Commodity prices are softening, after being in a supply-driven bull market. As a premier resource producer, the Australian economy is intricately intertwined with the outlook for coal, iron ore, copper and even liquefied natural gas prices. As Chart 13 highlights, the AUD has massively deviated from the level implied by rising terms of trade for Australia. This is a departure from a historical correlation that has been in place since the end of the Bretton Woods system. Resource booms tend to be either demand or supply driven, or a combination of both. This time around supply restrictions have played a major role. The message from the AUD is that it responds much better to improving demand conditions. Global and relative growth dynamics? YES: The overarching driver of a weak AUD as hinted above has been slowing Chinese demand. The Zero COVID-19 policy in China has led to a drastic reduction in import volumes. This is hurting Australia’s external balance at the margin, as Chinese import volumes contract (Chart 14). Chart 13The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade
The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade
The AUD Has Lagged Terms Of Trade
Chart 14The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China
The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China
The AUD Is Very Sensitive To China
There are two key takeaways from the above analysis. First, the hawkish path for interest rates priced for the RBA is not yet reflected in a weak AUD. This implies that currency and bond markets are on a collision course. Either the RBA ratifies market pricing and triggers a coiled spring rebound in the AUD, or hawkish expectations will be tempered as inflationary pressures moderate. Second, the AUD will be very sensitive to any improvement in Chinese demand, the overarching driver of currency weakness. We expect the Chinese authorities to ramp up credit stimulus, to offset weakening demand from the Zero COVID-19 policy. The AUD has historically been very sensitive to changes in Chinese money and credit variables (Chart 15). From a fundamental perspective, a lot of pessimism is embedded in the Aussie dollar. Australian GDP has already recovered above pre-pandemic levels and could be on a path to achieve escape velocity if China recovers. Chinese fiscal and monetary policy should be eased going forward. Chinese bond yields have already dropped, reflecting an easing in domestic financial conditions. Meanwhile, Australia’s commodity exposure is well suited for a green energy shift. Besides being relatively competitive in supplying the types of raw materials that China needs and wants, (higher-grade ore, which is more expensive, but pollutes less, and is in high demand in China), Australia is a big exporter of liquefied natural gas, whose prices have been soaring in recent months and is critical in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and green energy shift (Chart 16). This will provide a multi-year tailwind for Australian export volumes and terms of trade. Chart 15The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming
The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming
The Chinese Economy Could Be Bottoming
Chart 16Australia Is Resource Superstar
Australia Is Resource Superstar
Australia Is Resource Superstar
Bottom Line: BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy went long AUD at 72 cents. In the near term, this position could prove quite volatile as markets try to discern a clear path for global growth. But given cheap valuations and beaten down sentiment, it should prove profitable in the longer term. Investment Conclusions For Fixed Income Investors Chart 17Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations
Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations
Australian Government Bond Investment Recommendations
Our careful analysis of Australian growth, inflation, the RBA’s likely next moves leads us to the following investment conclusions for Australian bonds (Chart 17): Maintain neutral duration exposure within dedicated Australian bond portfolios (for now): On a forward basis, the entire Australian yield curve is converging to that discounted 3.5% peak in the Cash Rate (top panel). Eventually, Australian bond yields will fall once inflation clearly peaks in H2/2022 and markets realize that the RBA will not be hiking as fast as expected, justifying an above-benchmark duration tilt. Until then, Australian bond yields will be rangebound, especially with the RBA no longer buying bonds via quantitative easing, leaving more bond issuance to be absorbed by private investors. Underweight Australian inflation-linked bonds versus nominal-paying government bonds: Inflation will soon peak, and the discounted RBA stance is too hawkish – a recipe for lower inflation breakevens. Overweight Australian government bonds within global bond portfolios: Australia has returned to its “high-yield-beta” status, which means that an overweight stance is warranted when global bond yields are stable or falling. BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy’s Global Duration Indicator, a growth-focused leading indicator of the momentum of global bond yields, is signalling a more stable backdrop for global yields over the rest of 2022. The Duration Indicator is also a fine leading indicator of the relative return performance of Australian government bonds (middle panel) and is supportive of an overweight stance on Australian debt. Go Long December 2022 Australia Bank Bill futures: This is a tactical trade (i.e. investment horizon of no more than six months), based on the extreme pricing of rate hikes by year-end. The market price of the December 2022 futures contract is currently 97.11, or an implied interest rate of 2.89% compared to the current RBA Cash Rate of 0.35%. That contract is priced for far too many rate hikes than will be delivered over the remaining seven RBA meetings of 2022. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist ChesterN@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com
Listen to a short summary of this report. Executive Summary The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
Global equities are nearing a bottom and will rally over the coming months as inflation declines and growth reaccelerates. While equity valuations are not at bombed-out levels, they have cheapened significantly. Global stocks trade at 15.3-times forward earnings. We are upgrading tech stocks from underweight to neutral. The NASDAQ Composite now trades at a forward P/E of 22.6, down from 32.9 at its peak last year. The 10-year Treasury yield should decline to 2.5% by the end of the year, which will help tech stocks at the margin. The US dollar has peaked. A weakening dollar will provide a tailwind to stocks, especially overseas bourses. US high-yield spreads are pricing in a default rate of 6.2% over the next 12 months, well above the trailing default rate of 1.2%. Favor high-yield credit over government bonds within a fixed-income portfolio. Bottom Line: The recent sell-off in stocks provides a good opportunity to increase equity allocations. We expect global stocks to rise 15%-to-20% over the next 12 months. Back to Bullish We wrote a report on April 22nd arguing that global equities were heading towards a “last hurrah” in the second half of the year as a Goldilocks environment of falling inflation and supply-side led growth emerges. Last week, we operationalized this view by tactically upgrading stocks to overweight after having downgraded them in late February. This highly out-of-consensus view change, coming at a time when surveys by the American Association of Individual Investors and other outfits show extreme levels of bearishness, has garnered a lot of attention. In this week’s report, we answer some of the most common questions from the perspective of a skeptical reader. Q: Inflation is at multi-decade highs, global growth is faltering, and central banks are about to hike rates faster than we have seen in years. Isn’t it too early to turn bullish? A: We need to focus on how the world will look like in six months, not how it looks like now. Inflation has likely peaked and many of the forces that have slowed growth, such as China’s Covid lockdown and the war in Ukraine, could abate. Q: What is the evidence that inflation has peaked? And may I remind you, even if inflation does decline later this year, this is something that most investors and central banks are already banking on. Inflation would need to fall by more than expected for your bullish scenario to play out. A: That’s true, but there is good reason to think that this is precisely what will happen. Overall spending in the US is close to its pre-pandemic trend. However, spending on goods remains above trend while spending on services is below trend (Chart 1). Services prices tend to be stickier than goods prices. Thus, the shift in spending patterns caused goods inflation to rise markedly with little offsetting decline in services inflation. To cite one of many examples, fitness equipment prices rose dramatically, but gym membership fees barely fell (Chart 2). Chart 1Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed
Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed
Total US Consumer Spending Is Almost Exactly At Its Pre-Pandemic Trend, But The Composition Of Spending Remains Skewed
Chart 2Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices
Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices
Asymmetries Matter: Firms Manufacturing Sports Equipment Jacked Up Prices, But Gyms Barely Cut Prices
As goods demand normalizes, goods inflation will come down. Meanwhile, the supply of goods should increase as the pandemic winds down, and hopefully, a detente is reached in Ukraine. There are already indications that some supply-chain bottlenecks have eased (Chart 3). Q: Even if supply shocks abate, which seems like a BIG IF to me, wouldn’t the shift in spending towards services supercharge what has been only a modest acceleration in services inflation so far? A: Wages are the most important driver of services inflation. Although the evidence is still tentative, it does appear as though wage inflation is peaking. The 3-month annualized growth rate in average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers slowed from 7.2% in the second half of 2021 to 3.8% in April (Chart 4). Assuming productivity growth of 1.5%, this is consistent with unit labor cost inflation of only slightly more than 2%, which is broadly consistent with the Fed’s CPI inflation target.1
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Chart 4Wage Pressures May Be Starting To Ease
Wage Pressures May Be Starting To Ease
Wage Pressures May Be Starting To Ease
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Moreover, a smaller proportion of firms expect to raise wages over the next six months than was the case late last year according to a variety of regional Fed surveys (Chart 5). The same message is echoed by the NFIB small business survey (Chart 6). Consistent with all this, the US Citi Inflation Surprise Index has rolled over (Chart 7). Chart 6... Small Business Owners Included
... Small Business Owners Included
... Small Business Owners Included
Chart 7The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over
The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over
The US Inflation Surprise Index Has Rolled Over
Q: What about the “too cold” risk to your Goldilocks scenario? The risks of recession seem to be rising. A: The market is certainly worried about this outcome, and that has been the main reason stocks have fallen of late. However, we do not think this fear is justified, certainly not in the US (Chart 8). US households are sitting on $2.3 trillion excess savings, equal to about 14% of annual consumption. The ratio of household debt-to-disposable income is down 36 percentage points from its highs in early 2008, giving households the wherewithal to spend more. Core capital goods orders, a good leading indicator for capex, have surged. The homeowner vacancy rate is at a record low, suggesting that homebuilding will be fairly resilient in the face of higher mortgage rates. Q: It seems like the Fed has a nearly impossible task on its hands: Increase labor market slack by enough to cool the economy but not so much as to trigger a recession. You yourself have pointed out that the Fed has never achieved this in its history. A: It is correct that the unemployment rate has never risen by more than one-third of a percentage point in the US without a recession occurring (Chart 9). That said, there are three reasons to think that a soft landing can be achieved this time.
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Chart 9When Unemployment Starts Rising, It Usually Keeps Rising
When Unemployment Starts Rising, It Usually Keeps Rising
When Unemployment Starts Rising, It Usually Keeps Rising
First, increasing labor market slack is easier if one can raise labor supply rather than reducing labor demand. Right now, the participation rate is nearly a percentage point below where it was in 2019, even if one adjusts for increased early retirement during the pandemic (Chart 10). Wages have risen relatively more at the bottom end of the income distribution. This should draw more low-wage workers into the labor force. Furthermore, according to the Federal Reserve, accumulated bank savings for the lowest-paid 20% of workers have been shrinking since last summer, which should incentivize job seeking (Chart 11). Chart 10Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover
Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover
Labor Participation Has Further Scope To Recover
Chart 11Depleted Savings Will Force More Lower-Wage Workers Into The Labor Market
Depleted Savings Will Force More Lower-Wage Workers Into The Labor Market
Depleted Savings Will Force More Lower-Wage Workers Into The Labor Market
Second, long-term inflation expectations remain well contained, which makes a soft landing more likely. Median expected inflation 5-to-10 years out in the University of Michigan survey stood at 3% in May, roughly where it was between 2005 and 2013 (Chart 12). Median expected earnings growth in the New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations was only slightly higher in April than it was prior to the pandemic (Chart 13). Chart 12Consumer Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain Relatively Low
Consumer Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain Relatively Low
Consumer Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain Relatively Low
Chart 13US Consumers Do Not Expect Wages To Grow At A Much Higher Rate Than In The Pre-Pandemic Period
US Consumers Do Not Expect Wages To Grow At A Much Higher Rate Than In The Pre-Pandemic Period
US Consumers Do Not Expect Wages To Grow At A Much Higher Rate Than In The Pre-Pandemic Period
A third reason for thinking that a soft landing may be easier to achieve this time around is that the US private-sector financial balance – the difference between what the private sector earns and spends – is still in surplus (Chart 14). This stands in contrast to the lead-up to both the 2001 and 2008-09 recessions, when the private sector was living beyond its means. Q: You have spoken a lot about the US, but the situation seems dire elsewhere. Europe may already be in recession as we speak! A: The near-term outlook for Europe is indeed challenging. The euro area economy grew by only 0.8% annualized in the first quarter. Mathieu Savary, BCA’s Chief European Strategist, expects an outright decline in output in Q2. To no one’s surprise, the war in Ukraine is weighing on European growth. The Bundesbank estimates that a full embargo of Russian oil and gas would reduce German real GDP by an additional 5% on top of the damage already inflicted by the war (Chart 15). Chart 14The US Private-Sector Financial Balance Remains In Surplus
The US Private-Sector Financial Balance Remains In Surplus
The US Private-Sector Financial Balance Remains In Surplus
Chart 15Germany’s Economy Will Sink Without Russian Energy
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
While such a full embargo is possible, it is not our base case. In a remarkable about-face, Putin now says he has “no problems” with Finland and Sweden joining NATO, provided that they do not place military infrastructure in their countries. He had previous threatened a military response at the mere suggestion of NATO membership. In any case, there are few signs that Putin’s increasingly insular and dictatorial regime would respond to an oil embargo or other economic incentives. The wealthy oligarchs who were supposed to rein him in are cowering in fear. It is also not clear if Europe would gain any political leverage over Russia by adopting policies that push its own economy into a recession. It is worth noting that the price of the December 2022 European natural gas futures contract is down 39% from its peak at the start of the war (Chart 16). It is also noteworthy that European EPS estimates have been trending higher this year even as GDP growth estimates have been cut (Chart 17). This suggests that the analyst earnings projections were too conservative going into the year. Chart 16European Natural Gas Futures Are High But Below Their Peak
European Natural Gas Futures Are High But Below Their Peak
European Natural Gas Futures Are High But Below Their Peak
Chart 17European And US EPS Estimates Have Been Trending Higher This Year
European And US EPS Estimates Have Been Trending Higher This Year
European And US EPS Estimates Have Been Trending Higher This Year
Chart 18Chinese Property Sector: Signs Of Contraction
Chinese Property Sector: Signs Of Contraction
Chinese Property Sector: Signs Of Contraction
Q: What about China? The lockdowns are crippling growth and the property market is in shambles. A: There is truth to both those claims. The government has all but said that it will not abandon its zero-Covid policy anytime soon, even going as far as to withdraw from hosting the 2023 AFC Asian Cup. While the number of new cases has declined sharply in Shanghai, future outbreaks are probable. On the bright side, China is likely to ramp up domestic production of Pfizer’s Paxlovid drug. Increased availability of the drug will reduce the burden of the disease once social distancing restrictions are relaxed. As far as the property market is concerned, sales, starts, completions, as well as home prices are all contracting (Chart 18). BCA’s China Investment Strategy expects accelerated policy easing to put the housing sector on a recovery path in the second half of this year. Nevertheless, they expect the “three red lines” policy to remain in place, suggesting that the rebound in housing activity will be more muted than in past recoveries.2 Ironically, the slowdown in the Chinese housing market may not be such a bad thing for the rest of the world. Remember, the main problem these days is inflation. To the extent that a sluggish Chinese housing market curbs the demand for commodities, this could provide some relief on the inflation front. Q: So bad news is good news. Interesting take. Let’s turn to markets. You mentioned earlier that equity sentiment was very bearish. Fair enough, but I would note the very same American Association of Individual Investors survey that you cited also shows that investors’ allocation to stocks is near record highs (Chart 19). Shouldn’t we look at what investors are doing rather than what they’re saying? A: The discrepancy may not be as large as it seems. As Chart 20 illustrates, investors may not like stocks, but they like bonds even less. Chart 19Individual Investors Still Hold A Lot Of Stock
Individual Investors Still Hold A Lot Of Stock
Individual Investors Still Hold A Lot Of Stock
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Chart 20B... But They Like Bonds Even Less
... But They Like Bonds Even Less
... But They Like Bonds Even Less
Chart 21Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off
Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off
Global Equities Are More Attractively Valued After The Recent Sell-Off
Global equities currently trade at 15.3-times forward earnings; a mere 12.5-times outside the US. The global forward earnings yield is 6.7 percentage points higher than the global real bond yield. In 2000, the spread between the earnings yield and the real bond yield was close to zero (Chart 21). It should also be mentioned that institutional data already show a sharp shift out of equities. The latest Bank of America survey revealed that fund managers cut equity allocations to a net 13% underweight in May from a 6% overweight in April and a net 55% overweight in January. Strikingly, fund managers were even more underweight bonds than stocks. Cash registered the biggest overweight in two decades. Q: Your bullish equity bias notwithstanding, you were negative on tech stocks last year, arguing that the NASDAQ would turn into the NASDOG. Given that the NASDAQ Composite is down 29% from its highs, is it time to increase exposure to some beaten down tech names? A: Both the cyclical and structural headwinds facing tech stocks that we discussed in These Three High-Flying Equity Sectors Could Come Crashing Back Down To Earth and The Disruptor Delusion remain in place. Nevertheless, with the NASDAQ Composite now trading at 22.6-times forward earnings, down from 32.9 at its peak last year, an underweight in tech is no longer appropriate (Chart 22). A neutral stance is now preferable. Chart 22Tech Stock Valuations Have Returned To Earth
Tech Stock Valuations Have Returned To Earth
Tech Stock Valuations Have Returned To Earth
Q: I guess if bond yields come down a bit more, that would help tech stocks? A: Yes. Tech stocks tend to be growth-oriented. Falling bond yields raise the present value of expected cash flows more for growth companies than for other firms. While we do expect global bond yields to eventually rise above current levels, yields are likely to decline modestly over the next 12 months as inflation temporarily falls. We expect the US 10-year yield to end the year at around 2.5%. Q: A decline in US bond yields would undermine the high-flying dollar, would it not? A: It depends on how bond yields abroad evolve. US Treasuries tend to be relatively high beta, implying that US yields usually fall more when global yields are declining (Chart 23). Thus, it would not surprise us if interest rate differentials moved against the dollar later this year. Chart 23US Treasuries Have A Higher Beta Than Most Other Government Bond Markets
US Treasuries Have A Higher Beta Than Most Other Government Bond Markets
US Treasuries Have A Higher Beta Than Most Other Government Bond Markets
It is also important to remember that the US dollar is a countercyclical currency (Chart 24). If global growth picks up as pandemic dislocations fade and the Ukraine war winds down, the dollar is likely to weaken. Chart 24The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency
The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency
The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency
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A wider trade deficit could also imperil the greenback. The US trade deficit has increased from US$45 billion in December 2019 to US$110 billion. Equity inflows have helped finance the trade deficit, but net flows have turned negative of late (Chart 25). Finally, the dollar is quite expensive – 27% overvalued based on Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates. Q: Let’s sum up. Please review your asset allocation recommendations both for the next 12 months and beyond. A: To summarize, global inflation has peaked. Growth should pick up later this year as supply-chain bottlenecks abate. The combination of falling inflation and supply-side led growth will provide a springboard for equities. We expect global stocks to rise 15%-to-20% over the next 12 months. Historically, non-US stocks have outperformed their US peers when the dollar has been weakening (Chart 26). EM stocks, in particular, have done well in a weak dollar environment Chart 26Non-US Stocks Will Benefit From A Weaker US Dollar
Non-US Stocks Will Benefit From A Weaker US Dollar
Non-US Stocks Will Benefit From A Weaker US Dollar
Chart 27The Market Is Too Pessimistic On Default Risk
The Market Is Too Pessimistic On Default Risk
The Market Is Too Pessimistic On Default Risk
Within fixed-income portfolios, we recommend a modest long duration stance over the next 12 months. We favor high-yield credit over safer government bonds. US high-yield spreads imply a default rate of 6.2% over the next 12 months compared to a trailing 12-month default rate of only 1.2% (Chart 27). Chart 28Falling Inflation Will Buoy Consumer Sentiment
Falling Inflation Will Buoy Consumer Sentiment
Falling Inflation Will Buoy Consumer Sentiment
Our guess is that this Goldilocks environment will end towards the end of next year. As inflation comes down, real wage growth will turn positive. Consumer confidence, which is now quite depressed, will improve (Chart 28). Stronger demand will cause inflation to reaccelerate in 2024, setting the stage for another round of central bank rate hikes. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn Twitter Footnotes 1 The Federal Reserve targets an average inflation rate of 2% for the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index. Due to compositional differences between the two indices, CPI inflation has historically averaged 30-to-50 basis points higher than PCE inflation. This is why the Fed effectively targets a CPI inflation rate of 2.3%-to-2.5%. 2 The People’s Bank of China and the housing ministry issued a deleveraging framework for property developers in August 2020, consisting of a 70% ceiling on liabilities-to-assets, a net debt-to-equity ratio capped at 100%, and a limit on short-term borrowing that cannot exceed cash reserves. Developers breaching these “red lines” run the risk of being cut off from access to new loans from banks, while those who respect them can only increase their interest-bearing borrowing by 15% at most. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
Goldilocks: A Skeptical Q&A
Executive Summary The Fed will continue to hike rates at a time when global trade is contracting. Earlier this week, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell reiterated that the Fed will not hesitate to hike rates until core consumer price inflation gets closer to 2%. Given that US core consumer price inflation is currently at around 5-6%, a mere rollover in core inflation from current levels will not be enough for the Fed to tone down its hawkishness. Besides, according to Powell, US financial conditions are not yet at a level that is consistent with inflation coming down substantially. China will stick to its dynamic zero-COVID policy this year. The economy will continue to underwhelm as the magnitude and nature of stimulus measures announced thus far are not adequate to produce a recovery. Industrial metal prices and global material stocks are at risk of gapping down. Play these markets on the short side. Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices
Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices
Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices
Bottom Line: It is still dangerous to bottom fish in global equities and risk assets in general. The US dollar has more upside. Continue underweighting EM stocks and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. Feature The risks to global and EM risk assets are still skewed to the downside. Although investor sentiment on global equities has soured of late, we do not think global or EM equities have made a bottom, and the US dollar has not yet reached an apex. Consequently, absolute-return investors should stay defensive, and global equity portfolios should continue to underweight EM stocks. The Fed and Equities Are Still On A Collision Course Earlier this week, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell reiterated the Fed’s commitment to hiking interest rates until core consumer price inflation gets closer to 2%. Notably, in his speech at a WSJ event on May 17, Powell noted: “This is not a time for tremendously nuanced readings of inflation”… “We need to see inflation coming down in a convincing way. Until we do, we’ll keep going.” Given that US core consumer price inflation is currently at around 5-6%, a mere rollover in core inflation from current levels will not be enough for the Fed to tone down its hawkishness. Chart 1US Core Inflation Will Roll Over But Stay Above 3.5-4% For Now
US Core Inflation Will Roll Over But Stay Above 3.5-4% For Now
US Core Inflation Will Roll Over But Stay Above 3.5-4% For Now
Chart 1 shows the average of core median CPI, core trimmed-mean CPI and core sticky CPI, which are better indicators of genuine inflationary pressures because they are less affected by outliers. Even though core CPI inflation ticked down in April, other core measures such as core median CPI, core trimmed-mean CPI and core sticky CPI continued to rise. These core inflation measures are not likely to ease back to 2% unless economic growth falls below its potential. In his same speech, Chairman Powell also asserted: “We will go until we feel like we are at a place where we can say, ‘Yes, financial conditions are at an appropriate place. We see inflation coming down.’ We will go to that point, and there will not be any hesitation about that.” This means that US financial conditions have not yet tightened enough for the Fed to back down on its hawkishness. Finally, we have been arguing that a wage-price spiral has developed in the US as the labor market has become very tight (Chart 2, top panel). Wages and unit labor costs have been surging. Unit labor costs are the most important driver of US core CPI (Chart 2, bottom panel). Therefore, it will be impossible for the Fed to bring down core inflation toward 2% without a retrenchment in the labor market, i.e., layoffs. Rising unemployment will in turn weigh on household income growth and consumption. Chart 2The US Labor Market Is Very Tight And Wage Growth Is Accelerating
The US Labor Market Is Very Tight And Wage Growth Is Accelerating
The US Labor Market Is Very Tight And Wage Growth Is Accelerating
The cost of borrowing for companies is rising globally, and these periods often coincide with equity selloffs. Notably, surging US high-yield ex-energy corporate bond yields herald lower US share prices ahead (Chart 3, top panel). Similarly, rising EM corporate bond yields foreshadow a further decline in EM ex-TMT share prices (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 3Rising Corporate Bond Yields Are Bearish For Stocks
Rising Corporate Bond Yields Are Bearish For Stocks
Rising Corporate Bond Yields Are Bearish For Stocks
On the whole, the Fed and many other central banks will be hiking interest rates at a time when global trade volumes are contracting in H2 2022. As discussed in our report A Whiff Of Stagflation? US and EU imports of consumer goods are set to shrink following the pandemic boom. Chart 4Global Export/Manufacturing Are Heading Into Contraction
Global Export/Manufacturing Are Heading Into Contraction
Global Export/Manufacturing Are Heading Into Contraction
Meantime, rolling lockdowns and extremely weak income growth are depressing domestic demand in China. High food and energy prices as well as rising interest rates are weighing on EM ex-China consumption. The sharp underperformance of global cyclicals equities versus global defensive sectors corroborates our expectation that global manufacturing activity will contract (Chart 4). The trade-weighted US dollar typically benefits from both Fed hikes and a global trade slump. As long as the Fed is hawkish and global exports are contracting, the greenback will continue to appreciate. For now, the US dollar remains in a strong position for further appreciation, especially versus EM currencies (Chart 5). Consistently, the selloff in broad EM risk assets is not yet over. Chart 5EM Currencies: More Downside
EM Currencies: More Downside
EM Currencies: More Downside
A major reversal in the trade-weighted dollar will be a signal that the global macro backdrop is improving and that global share prices and EM risk assets are bottoming. Bottom Line: Although equities have become oversold and investor sentiment is depressed, any rebound will prove to be short lived. The Fed will continue to hike rates at a time when global trade is about to shrink. The global/EM equity selloff has further to run. China: Ordinary Stimulus Despite Extraordinary Conditions Only one thing is currently certain in China: authorities are committed to the dynamic zero-COVID policy. However, most experts outside China believe that it will be very difficult to wholly limit the spread of the easily transmissible Omicron variants, even with such stringent mainland containment policies. As a result, rolling lockdowns are the most likely scenario for China’s regions and cities in 2022. These lockdowns will depress household income, confidence and consumption. Private business investment and hiring will also tank. Have authorities provided enough stimulus to support a recovery in H2 2022? We do not think so. Chinese stimulus has so far been ordinary in nature and in magnitude. Policy easing will likely prove to be insufficient to lift the economy out of the current extraordinary slump. First, Chinese exports are set to shrink in H2 as US and EU consumption of consumer goods revert to their pre-pandemic trend. Demand from EM will remain weak. Second, rising unemployment and under-employment is hindering household income. Generous cash transfers are needed to offset this hit to income. Not only did aggregate retail sales collapse in April, but online sales of goods and service also plunged (Chart 6). It is hard to imagine that private businesses will be investing when consumer spending and exports are weak. Our proxies for the marginal propensity to spend for households and enterprises continue to fall (Chart 7). Chart 6China: Even Online Retail Sales Are Shrinking
China: Even Online Retail Sales Are Shrinking
China: Even Online Retail Sales Are Shrinking
Chart 7China: Household And Enterprise Propensity To Spend Have Been Declining
China: Household And Enterprise Propensity To Spend Have Been Declining
China: Household And Enterprise Propensity To Spend Have Been Declining
Critically, China’s credit impulse, excluding government bond issuance, remains in negative territory (Chart 8). Third, China’s property market is frail. Despite modest policy easing for the real estate market, sentiment among home buyers and developers remains downbeat. Given that the housing sector faces structural headwinds, odds are that buyers and developers might not react to the modest property market easing that authorities have so far provided. It is worth noting that Chinese property stocks seem to have had a structural breakdown, and offshore corporate bonds of real estate developers remain in a bear market (Chart 9). These market patterns corroborate that China's housing market has experienced a structural breakdown. Chart 8Chinese Stimulus Has So Far Been Tame
Chinese Stimulus Has So Far Been Tame
Chinese Stimulus Has So Far Been Tame
Chart 9Chinese Property Market Has Experienced A Structural Breakdown
Chinese Property Market Has Experienced A Structural Breakdown
Chinese Property Market Has Experienced A Structural Breakdown
Finally, even though infrastructure spending is being ramped up, it will prove to be insufficient for the economy to recover from a deep slump. Local governments are facing a major financing shortfall. Land sales – which make up about 40% of local government revenues – have dried up. This will hinder local governments’ ability to finance infrastructure projects. As to Chinese equities, internet/platform stocks have become oversold. However, their long-term outlook remains dismal. As we have been arguing since late 2020, the fundamental case for their de-rating remains intact. This week’s meeting between government officials and technology companies has not produced any positive news. Although the tone from authorities was more balanced, they did not offer any relief from already imposed regulations. Chart 10Implications Of China's Common Prosperity Policies
Implications Of China's Common Prosperity Policies
Implications Of China's Common Prosperity Policies
Looking forward, implementing common prosperity policies will be the primary objective of the Communist Party in the coming years. These policies will assure that labor’s share of income will rise further at the expense of corporate profits. Chart 10 demonstrates that the share of labor in national income has been rising since 2011. Conversely, the share operating profits peaked in 2011 and has dropped to a 30-year low. These dynamics will persist as income will continue to be redistributed from shareholders to labor in the majority of industries/companies in China. This is an unfriendly outlook for shareholders, especially foreign ones. Bottom Line: Chinese policy stimulus has so far been insufficient. The economy is in a deep slump, and share prices remain at risk of further decline. Short Industrial Metals And Material Stocks Chart 11Chinese Imports Of Metals Was Shrinking In 2021
Chinese Imports Of Metals Was Shrinking In 2021
Chinese Imports Of Metals Was Shrinking In 2021
Industrial metals’ resilience last year in the face of shrinking Chinese import volumes was unusual (Chart 11). This resilience was probably due to robust DM demand for goods, supply bottlenecks and investors buying commodities as an inflation hedge. As we elaborated in the April 28 report, risks to industrial metals are skewed to the downside. This is despite the fact that agriculture prices will likely rise further, and energy prices will remain volatile due to the geopolitical situation. We continue to recommend investors underweight/short materials stocks and industrial metals for the following reasons: It is ill-advised to play the US inflation story by being long industrial metals and materials stocks. As shown in Chart 2 above, US unit labor costs are driving core inflation, not industrial metals. China accounts for 50-55% of global industrial metal consumption, and since early 2021 the key risk in China has been decelerating demand/deflation not inflation. In fact, commodities have become a crowded hedge against inflation and a global growth slowdown poses a substantial risk to industrial metals. Chart 12 demonstrates that Chinese materials stocks have plunged. We read this as a warning sign for global materials because China is by far the largest consumer of raw materials (excluding energy). Chart 12Chinese Material Stocks Are Signaling Trouble For Global Materials
Chinese Material Stocks Are Signaling Trouble For Global Materials
Chinese Material Stocks Are Signaling Trouble For Global Materials
When share prices of customers are falling, equity prices of suppliers will likely follow. Chart 13 shows that over the past 200 years raw material prices in real US dollar terms (deflated by US headline CPI) have oscillated around a well-defined downtrend. The pandemic surge in commodity prices has pushed raw material prices to two standard deviations above this long-term trend. Chart 13Raw Material Prices (In Real Terms) Are At The Upper End Of A 200-Year Downtrend
Raw Material Prices (In Real Terms) Are At The Upper End Of A 200-Year Downtrend
Raw Material Prices (In Real Terms) Are At The Upper End Of A 200-Year Downtrend
Historically, commodity rallies (and even their secular bull markets) ended when prices reached this threshold. Hence, odds are that industrial commodities might hit a soft spot. Energy prices remain a wild card due to geopolitics. It is critical to note that the raw materials price index shown in Chart 13 does not include energy, gold and semi-precious metals. Finally, shrinking global trade volumes are also negative for raw materials. The average of AUD, NZD and CAD points to lower industrial metal prices (Chart 14). Chart 14Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices
Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices
Commodity Currencies Are Signaling Lower Commodity Prices
Chart 15Bearish Technical Patterns: BHP Share Price And Copper
Bearish Technical Patterns: BHP Share Price And Copper
Bearish Technical Patterns: BHP Share Price And Copper
The share price of BHP, the world’s largest mining company, has put in a major top and is now gapping down (Chart 15, top panel). Copper prices have broken below their 200-day moving average that served as a support in the past 12 months (Chart 15, bottom panel). These market profiles point to more downside. We continue to recommend that investors play this theme in the following ways: Short copper or short copper / long gold; Short global materials / long global industrials; Short ZAR / long USD. Also, we downgraded Brazil early this week partly due to expectations of lower iron ore prices and souring investor attitude toward commodity plays in general. Investment Conclusions Global and EM equities have entered a capitulation phase. It is still dangerous to bottom fish in global equities and risk assets in general. Continue underweighting EM stocks and credit within global equity and credit portfolios, respectively. The US dollar has more upside. Continue shorting the following EM currencies versus the USD: ZAR, PLN, HUF, COP, PEN, PHP and IDR. As we discussed in a recent report, we are approaching a major buying opportunity in EM local currency bonds. However, the US dollar needs to peak for that to transpire. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)
Executive Summary Global inflation will peak sometime in the next few months, a process that has likely already begun in the US. This will give policymakers some breathing room to turn less hawkish, a more credible stance given softening global growth momentum and increased financial market volatility. Our Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing suggests that overall government bond returns should turn positive over the next year, but with widening divergences across countries for our base case scenarios. Projected government bond return expectations over the next 12 months look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK – where far too many rate hikes are priced in – compared to the US, where the Fed is more likely to follow through on most, but not all, discounted rate increases. Japan has the lowest expected returns, and the defensive properties of “low-beta” JGBs will be less necessary with global yield momentum set to peak in the latter half of 2022. Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Bottom Line: The return expectations over the next year stemming from our Global Golden Rule suggest the following country allocation recommendations in global government bond portfolios: maintain overweights in Australia, Germany and the UK, stay underweight the US and neutral Canada, but downgrade Japan to underweight. Feature Chart 1A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market
A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market
A Pause In The Global Bond Bear Market
Global bond markets may finally be showing signs of settling down after a painful period of rising yields and high volatility. Government bond yields across the developed economies have fallen substantially over the past week as equity and credit markets have sold off, in a typical risk-off response to increased concerns over global growth momentum. For example, benchmark 10-year government yields have fallen by -32bps both the US and UK, -25bps in Germany and -22bps in Canada since the cyclical intraday high was reached on May 9. These moves are modest in the context of the cyclical bond bear market, with the Bloomberg Global Treasury index still down -12.1% year-to-date and -14.4% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 1). That painful selloff has been driven by expectations of intense monetary tightening in response to surging global inflation. However, last week’s release of US Consumer Price Index data for April confirmed that US goods inflation has peaked, a trend that we expect to follow suit in other countries (Chart 2). That will leave inflation momentum, and eventual interest rate hikes, to be driven more by domestic services inflation that will prove to be less correlated across countries over the next 6-12 months (Chart 3). Chart 2Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . .
Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . .
Inflation & Rate Hike Expectations Have Become Correlated. . .
Chart 3. . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation
. . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation
. . .Making Our Global Golden Rule All About Inflation
With that in mind, we revisit our framework for linking government bond returns to monetary policy outcomes versus expectations, the Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing. A Brief Overview Of The Global Golden Rule In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.” This was an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate that were not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.1 The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields and Treasury returns. Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyRevisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We discovered that relationship also held in other developed market countries. This gave us a framework to help project expected global bond returns simply based on a view for future central bank interest rate moves versus market expectations.2 Specific details on the calculation of the Global Golden Rule can be found in those original 2018 papers. In the following pages, we present the latest results of the Global Golden Rule for the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, the euro area and Japan. The set-up for the chart shown for each country is the same. We show the 12-month policy rate “surprise”, defined as the actual change in the central bank policy rate over the preceding 12-months versus the expected 12-month change in the policy rate from a year earlier extracted from OIS curves (a.k.a. our 12-month discounters). We then compare the 12-month policy rate surprise to the annual excess return over cash (treasury bills) of the Bloomberg government bond index for each country. We also show the 12-month policy rate surprise versus the 12-month change in the government bond index yield. The very strong historical correlation between those latter two series is the backbone of the Global Golden Rule framework. After that, we present tables showing expected yield changes and excess returns for various maturity points, as well as the overall government bond index, derived from the Global Golden Rule regressions. The expected change in yield is derived from regressions on the policy rate surprises, with different estimations done for each maturity point. In the tables, we show the results for different scenarios for changes in policy rates. For example, the row in the return tables labeled “+25bps” would show the expected yield changes and excess returns if the central bank for that particular country lifts the policy interest rate by +25bps over the next 12 months. Showing these scenarios allows us to pick the one that most closely correlates to our own expectation for central bank actions, translating that into government bond return expectations. Global Golden Rule: US Chart 4Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises'
Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises'
Risk/Reward Favors Less UST-Bearish Fed'Surprises'
US Treasuries have delivered a painful loss of -7.8% versus cash over 12 months. Bearish outcomes of such magnitude were last seen during 1994 and 1999 when the Fed was aggressively lifting the funds rate. The Fed delivered a smaller hawkish surprise over the past year than those 1990s episodes, with a trailing 12-month policy rate surprise of -72bps. Thus, the Golden Rule underestimated losses realized by US Treasuries, as US bond yields moved to price in far more Fed tightening than what was expected one year ago. The US OIS curve now discounts +229bps of rate hikes over the next 12 months, taking the fed funds rate to 3.3% (Chart 4). That is a more aggressive profile than was laid out in the March 2022 Fed “dots”, where the median FOMC member projection called for the funds rate to climb to 2.8% in 2023. That means there is less scope for Fed rate hikes to surprise versus market expectations that are already very hawkish, at a time when US growth and inflation momentum is rolling over. Our base case calls for the Fed to deliver +200bps of rate increases over the next year, +50bps at the next two policy meetings followed by +25bps at the subsequent four meetings. That outcome produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall US Treasury index yield falling -13bps, generating a total return of +3.73% (Tables 1 & 2). Table 1US: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Table 2US: Expected Changes In Treasury Yields Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Global Golden Rule: Canada Chart 5Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC
Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC
Canadian Bonds Selloff After A Hawkish BoC
Canadian government bonds have sold off hard over the past 12 months, delivering an excess return over cash of -7.5% (Chart 5). That loss reflects the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) hawkish turn, but is a less severe outcome compared to other developed economy government bond markets that saw a major repricing of rate hike expectations like the US and Australia. Losses in the Canadian government bond market were consistent with the +34bps of hawkish surprises delivered by the BoC, which tightened by +75bps on a 12-month basis versus the +41bps expected by markets in May 2021. Rate expectations are highly aggressive on a forward basis. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts 210bps of interest rate increases over the next 12 months. However, high household debt in Canada, fueled by a relentlessly expanding housing bubble, will limit the ability of the BoC to match the Fed’s rate hikes over the next 6-12 months. Higher debt levels also imply a lower nominal neutral rate of interest, as the BoC has less room to hike before debt servicing costs become overly burdensome for overleveraged Canadian consumers. Our base case is that the BoC will deliver +150bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of a decline in the overall Canadian government bond index yield of -17bps, delivering a projected total return of 4.52% (Tables 3 & 4). Table 3Canada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Table 4Canada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Global Golden Rule: Australia Chart 6Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia
Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia
Aggressive Rate Hike Expectations On A Forward Basis For Australia
Australian government bonds have delivered a negative excess return over cash of -9.6% over the past year (Chart 6). This is the biggest sell-off among all the countries covered in our Global Golden Rule framework. The magnitude of those realized losses far exceeded what would have been predicted by the Golden Rule a year ago, with the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) delivering only a modest hawkish surprise. An unexpectedly high Australian headline inflation print of 5.1% in Q1 of this year led the RBA to deliver a surprise +25bps rate hike in April. This created a mild hawkish policy rate surprise of -17bps over the past 12 months, as only +8bps of tightening had been discounted in the Australian OIS curve in May 2021. The Australian OIS curve is now discounting 292bps of rate hikes over the next year, taking the cash rate to just over 3% - a level last seen in 2013 when the neutral rate in Australia was much higher by the RBA’s own reckoning. The RBA appears confident in the Australian economy, forecasting the unemployment rate to reach a 50-year low around 3.5% in 2023. However, we believe the RBA will be more measured in its pace of rate increases over the next year than markets expect, as global traded goods inflation cools and Australian wages are still not overheating. According to the Golden Rule projections, our base case of +150bps of tightening will produce a decline in Australian government bond index yield of -92bps, delivering a projected total return of 9.29% (Tables 5 & 6). Table 5Australia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Table 6Australia: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Global Golden Rule: UK Chart 7The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect
The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect
The BoE Will Hike Less Than Markets Expect
UK government bonds have gotten hit hard over the past year, delivering a negative excess return over cash of -7.9% - one of the worst performances seen over the past quarter century (Chart 7). The size of that loss was in line with the Global Golden Rule forecasts, given the magnitude of the rate shock seen in the UK. The Bank of England (BoE) hiked rates by 90bps over the past 12 months, which was a hawkish surprise of -79bps compared to what was discounted one year earlier. The UK OIS curve is now priced for another +139bps of rate hikes over the next year. This would take the BoE’s Bank Rate to 2.4%, a level that would push the UK unemployment rate up by two percentage points and lower UK inflation to below 2% within the next 2-3 years, according to the BoE’s own forecasting models. As we discussed in our report last week, where we upgraded our stance on UK Gilts to overweight, the neutral level of UK policy rates is between 1.5-2%, at best, with UK potential growth barely above 1%. Thus, markets are already pricing in a very restrictive monetary policy stance from the BoE that is unlikely to be fully delivered before UK growth and inflation decline sharply. Our base case calls for the BoE to deliver only another +75bps of hikes over the next year, which will produce a fall in the UK government bond index yield of -21bps and a total return of 4.12% (Tables 7 & 8). Table 7UK: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Table 8UK: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Global Golden Rule: Germany Chart 8German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise
German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise
German Bunds Stand To Gain From An ECB Dovish Surprise
German government bonds suffered major losses over the past year, underperforming cash by -8.5% over the past year. We saw no policy surprise from the European Central Bank (ECB) over that time relative to market expectations (Chart 8). The dramatic sell-off instead reflected surging expectations of future tightening as the euro area faces an energy-driven inflation spike. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Germany (and the overall euro area) remains stuck near zero. However, markets now expect a very aggressive move by the ECB, discounting a full +156bps of tightening over the next 12 months. This would push the ECB’s main refinancing rate to levels last seen in the disastrous tightening cycle during the 2011 European debt crisis. As argued by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, the euro area is heading into a growth slowdown and energy inflation looks set to peak. Even if the hawks are able to sway the ECB Governing Council to begin hiking rates this summer, the slowing trajectory of growth and inflation make it highly unlikely that the ECB will deliver the full amount of tightening currently discounted. Our base case is that the ECB will deliver only +50bps of tightening over the next 12 months, enough to push the deposit rate out of negative territory to 0%. As shown in Tables 9 & 10, this is consistent with the Germany government bond index yield falling -55bps, delivering an index return of 5.07% over a 12-month horizon. Table 9Germany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Table 10Germany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Global Golden Rule: Japan Chart 9The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited
The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited
The Upside On A BoJ Dovish Surprise Is Limited
Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have delivered an excess return versus cash of -1.8% over the past twelve months (Chart 9). The policy rate surprise was flat as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept the policy rate unchanged at -0.1%. Admittedly, the Golden Rule framework is poorly suited to project Japanese bond returns. The BoJ has been unable to lift policy rates for many years, while instituting yield curve control on 10-year JGBs since 2016 to anchor yields near zero. With no variability on policy rates or bond yields, a methodology that links bond returns to unexpected policy interest rate changes will have poor predictive power. However, rates traders are making some attempt to challenge the BoJ’s ultra-dovish posture. The Japan OIS curve now discounts +9bps of tightening, approximately enough to push the policy rate to zero, over the next 12 months. With the yen weakening rapidly and the cost of imported energy elevated, consumer price inflation in Tokyo (excluding fresh food) hit the BoJ’s 2% target in April. However, as evidenced in the minutes of the March BoJ meeting, policymakers see a sustainable inflation overshoot as unlikely. Our base case is the “Flat” scenarios shown in Tables 11 & 12, with the BoJ keeping policy rates unchanged for the next twelve months and delivering a slight dovish surprise. That generates a Golden Rule forecast of a -6bps fall in the Japanese government bond index yield, with a total return projection of 0.87%. Table 11Japan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Table 12Japan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Investment Implications Of The Global Golden Rule Projections For all the countries discussed above, our base case calls for the respective central banks to deliver less tightening than markets are discounting over the next year. This suggests that government bonds should be expected to deliver positive returns versus cash, even as we expect multiple rate increases from all central banks except the BoJ. While this could argue for an above-benchmark duration stance at the overall global level, we prefer to translate the Global Golden Rule results via country allocations – as we have greater conviction on relative central bank moves in the current high inflation environment – while keeping overall global duration exposure at neutral. The return outcomes for our base case scenarios for the six countries in our Global Golden Rule framework are presented in Table 13. We show the expected returns both in local currency and hedged into US dollars, the latter allowing a comparison in common currency terms. In our base case scenarios, we expect Australian and German government bonds to deliver the strongest performance over the next year, followed by the UK, Canada, the US and Japan. Table 13Our Global Golden Rule Base Case Scenarios For The Next 12 Months
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Chart 10Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight
Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight
Downgrade 'Defensive' Low-Yield-Beta JGBs To Underweight
Our UK upgrade to overweight last week was a change to our strategic call on Gilts. Based on the results from our Global Golden Rule update, increased exposure to UK Gilts should be “funded” in a global bond portfolio by reducing exposure to Japan, with JGBs expected to deliver the weakest returns. Cutting JGB exposure also fits with the signal from our Global Duration Indicator, which is heralding a peak in global bond yield momentum in the latter half of 2022 (Chart 10). JGBs are typically a good “defensive” overweight country allocation in an environment of rising global bond yields. Persistently low Japanese inflation prevents the BoJ from credibly signaling rate hikes when other central banks like the Fed are lifting rates in response to stronger growth or overshooting inflation as is currently the case. The relative performance of Japan versus the Bloomberg Global Treasury benchmark index (in USD-hedged terms) is highly correlated to the year-over-year momentum of the overall level of global bond yields. With our Duration Indicator signaling a peak in yield momentum, we expect JGBs, which continue to exhibit a very low “beta” to changes in global bond yields, to underperform. Thus, this week we are downgrading our strategic allocation to Japan from overweight (4 out of 5) to underweight (2 out of 5). We view this as an offsetting recommendation to our UK upgrade from last week, while leaving our other country allocations unchanged. The result is that our country recommendations now line up with the expected returns from our Global Golden Rule, as can be seen in Table 13. That includes leaving the recommended US Treasury exposure at underweight, as we expect the Fed to deliver the smallest dovish surprise out of the central banks discussed in this report. We are adding both of the view changes made over the past two weeks, upgrading the UK and downgrading Japan, to our model bond portfolio as seen on pages 20-21. Bottom Line: Our Global Golden Rule suggests that developed market government bonds are expected to deliver positive returns over the next year as softening inflation momentum leads central banks to not fully deliver discounted rate hikes. Return expectations look most attractive in Australia, Germany and the UK, especially compared to the US and Japan. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Deborah Acri Research Associate deborah.acri@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcarearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Updating Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing As Inflation Momentum Peaks
Tactical Overlay Trades
Listen to a short summary of this report. Executive Summary The Dollar Likes Volatility
The Dollar Likes Volatility
The Dollar Likes Volatility
Uncertainty about Fed policy has supercharged volatility in bond markets, and correspondingly, USD demand (Feature chart). A well-telegraphed path of interest rates will deflate the volatility “bubble” in Treasury markets and erode the USD safety premium. The dollar has also already priced in a very aggressive path for US interest rates. The onus is on the Fed to deliver on these expectations. Our theme of playing central bank convergence – by fading excessive hawkishness or dovishness by any one central bank – continues to play out. Our latest candidate: short EUR/JPY. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, and ensuing volatility in oil markets, is providing some trading opportunities. One of those is that “good” oil will continue to trade at a premium to “bad” oil. Go long a basket of CAD and NOK versus the RUB. TRADES* INITIATION DATE INCEPTION LEVEL TARGET RATE STOP LOSS PERCENT RETURNS SPOT CARRY** TOTAL Short DXY 2022-05-12 104.8 95 107 Short EUR/JPY 2022-05-12 133.278 120 137 Bottom Line: We recommended shorting the DXY index on April 8th at 102, with a tight stop at 104. That stop-loss was triggered this week. We are reinitiating this trade this week at 104.8, in line with our cyclical view that the dollar faces downside on a 12–18 month horizon. Multiple factors tend to drive the dollar: Real interest rate differentials, growth divergences, portfolio flows into both public and private capital markets, or even safe-haven demand. Across both developed and emerging market currency pairs, the dollar has been strong (Chart 1), but what has been the key driver of these inflows? For most of this year, interest rate differentials have played a key role in pushing the dollar higher. That said, they have not been the complete story. Chart 2 shows that the dollar has very much overshot market expectations of Fed interest rate policy, relative to other central banks. That premium has been around 8%-10% in the DXY index. In real terms, the overshoot has been even higher. Chart 1The Dollar Has Been King
Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar
Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar
Chart 2The Fed And The Dollar
The Fed And The Dollar
The Fed And The Dollar
Chart 3The Dollar Likes Volatility
The Dollar Likes Volatility
The Dollar Likes Volatility
A key source of this safe-haven premium has been rising volatility, specifically in the bond market. For most of the last two years, the dollar has tracked the MOVE index, a volatility measure of US Treasurys (Chart 3). Uncertainty about the path of US interest rates, and the corresponding rise in dollar hedging costs, have ushered in a wave of “naked” foreign buyers – owning USTs without a corresponding dollar hedge. Foreign purchases of US Treasurys are surging. Speculators have also expressed bearish bets on the euro, yen, and even sterling via the dollar. There is a case to be made that some of these bullish dollar bets will be unwound in the next few months, even if marginally. For example, the market expects rates to be 248 bps and 313 bps higher in the US by year end, respectively, compared to the euro area and Japan (Chart 4). This might be exaggerated. The real GDP growth and inflation differential between the eurozone and the US is 0.1% and 0.8%, respectively, for 2022. The difference in the neutral rate could be as low as 1.25%. This suggests that a simplified Taylor-rule framework will prescribe a policy rate differential of only 1.7% (1.25 + 0.5(0.8+0.1)). In a global growth slowdown, US inflation will come in much lower, which will allow the Fed to ratchet back interest rate expectations. Should growth accelerate, however, then growth differentials between open economies and the US will widen, narrowing the policy divergence we have been experiencing. The safe-haven premium in the dollar has also been visible in the equity market. One striking feature of the correction has been the inability for US equities to outperform, as they usually do, during a market riot point. The carnage in technology stocks has been absolute, and the tech-heavy US equity market continues to struggle against its global peers. As such, there has been a break in the historically strong relationship between the dollar and the outperformance of the US equity market (Chart 5). Chart 4Pricing In The Euro And Yen In Line With Rates
Pricing In The Euro And Yen In Line With Rates
Pricing In The Euro And Yen In Line With Rates
Chart 5The Dollar Has Overshot The Relative Performance Of US Equities
The Dollar Has Overshot The Relative Performance Of US Equities
The Dollar Has Overshot The Relative Performance Of US Equities
As US equity markets were surging throughout 2021, investors started accumulating dollars as a hedge against equity market capitulation, which explained the tight correlation between the put/call ratio and the USD (Chart 6). As the carry on the dollar has risen, and puts have become more expensive, our suspicion is that the greenback has become a preferred hedge. Chart 6Dollar Hedges Against A Drawdown In The S&P
Dollar Hedges Against A Drawdown In The S&P
Dollar Hedges Against A Drawdown In The S&P
As we have highlighted in past reports, the dollar continues to face a tug of war. Higher interest rates undermine the US equity market leadership, while lower rates will reverse the record high speculative positioning in the dollar. Given recent market action, the path of US bond yields will be critical for the dollar outlook. Cresting inflation could pressure bond yields lower. As a strategy, we recommended shorting the DXY index on April 8th at 102, with a tight stop 104. That stop-loss was triggered this week. We are reinitiating this trade at 104.8, in line with our cyclical view that the dollar faces downside on a 12–18-month horizon. As usual, this week’s Month In Review report goes over our take on the latest G10 data releases and the implications for currency strategy both in the near term and longer term. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com US Dollar: Inflation Will Be Key Chart 7How Sustainable Is The Breakout?
How Sustainable Is The Breakout
How Sustainable Is The Breakout
The dollar DXY index is up 9% year-to-date, hitting multi-year highs (panel 1). The Fed increased interest rates by 50bps this month. In our view, the Fed will continue to calibrate monetary policy based on data, and the key releases continue to surprise to the upside. Headline CPI came in at 8.3% in April, while the core measure was at 6.2%. Both were higher than expected. Importantly, the month-on-month rate for core was 0.6%, much higher than a run rate of 0.2% that will be consistent with the Fed’s target of inflation (panel 2). It is important to note that used car prices have had an important contribution to US CPI. Airfares had an abnormally large contribution to US CPI for the month of April. As these prices crest, along with other supply-driven costs, inflation could meaningfully roll over in the coming months (panel 3). The job’s report was robust, but there was disappointment in the participation rate that fell from 62.4% to 62.2%. This suggests there might be more labor slack in the US than a 3.6% unemployment rate suggests. Wages continue to inflect higher. The Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker currently sits at 6% (panel 4). These developments continue to underpin market expectations for aggressive interest rate increases. The market now expects the Fed to raise rates to 2.5% by December 2022. Speculators are also very long the dollar. Three factors could unhinge market expectations. First, inflation could come crashing back down to earth which will unwind some of the rate hikes priced in the very near term. That would hurt the dollar. Second, growth could pick up outside the US, especially in economies with lots of pent-up demand like Japan. Third, financial conditions could ease, which will help revive animal spirits. In conclusion, our 3-month view on the dollar remains neutral, but our 12-18-month assessment is to sell the dollar. We are reinitiating our short DXY position today with a stop-loss at 106. Euro: A Recession Is Priced Chart 8Go Short EUR/JPY
Go Short EUR/JPY
Go Short EUR/JPY
The euro has broken below 1.05 and the whisper circulating in markets is that parity is within striking distance. EUR/USD is down 8.7% year-to-date. We have avoided trading the euro against the dollar and have mostly focused on the crosses – long EUR/GBP, and this week, we are selling EUR/JPY. The euro is in a perfect tug of war: Rising inflation is threatening the credibility of the ECB while there is the risk of slowing growth tipping the euro area into a recession. In our view, the euro has already priced in the latter, much more than potentially higher rates in the eurozone. The ZEW sentiment index, a gauge of European growth prospects, is at COVID-19 lows, along with EUR/USD (panel 1). My colleague, Mathieu Savary, constructed a stagflation index for Europe which perfectly encapsulates the ECB’s quandary. A growing cohort of ECB members are supporting a July rate hike. On the surface, the ECB has the lowest rate in the G10 (outside of Switzerland). With HICP inflation at 7.5% (panel 2), emergency monetary settings are no longer required. A “least regrets” approach suggests gently nudging rates higher to address inflationary pressures. House prices in Germany and Italy are rising at their fastest pace in over a decade, much more than wage inflation (panel 3). The key for the ECB will be to telegraph that policy remains extremely accommodative. It is hard to envision that hiking rates from -0.5% to -0.25% will trigger a European recession, but the ECB will need to balance that outcome with the possibility that inflation crests and real rates rise in Europe. In our trading books, we are long EUR/GBP as a play on policy convergence between the ECB and the BoE. This week, we are playing the same theme via shorting EUR/JPY. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY should fall. In an economic boom, the cross has already priced in a stronger euro, relative to the yen (panel 4). We are neutral on the euro over a 3-month horizon but are buyers over 12-18 months. Japanese Yen: A Mean-Reversion Play Chart 9A Capitulation In The Yen?
A Capitulation In The Yen?
A Capitulation In The Yen?
The Japanese yen is down 10.5% year-to-date, one of the worst performing G10 currency this year. In retrospect, a chart formation since 1990 suggests that we witnessed a classic liquidation phase that could only be arrested by an exhaustion in selling pressure, or a shift in fundamentals (panel 1). The two key drivers of yen weakness are the rise in US yields (panel 2) and the higher cost of energy imports. As today’s price move suggests, any reversal in these key variables will lead to a selloff in USD/JPY – falling bond yields and/or lower energy prices. We have been timidly long the yen, via a short CHF position. Today we are introducing a short EUR/JPY trade as well. What has been remarkable in the last month is the improvement in Japanese economic fundamentals, as the country slowly emergences from the latest COVID-19 wave: Both the outlook and current situation components of the Eco Watchers Survey improved in April. This is a survey of small and medium-sized businesses, very sensitive to domestic conditions. PMIs in Japan are improving on both the manufacturing and service fronts. The Tokyo CPI surprised to the upside, with the headline figure at 2.5%. Historically, the earlier release of the Tokyo CPI has been a reliable gauge for nationwide inflation. Importantly, the release was much below BoJ forecasts. Inflation in Japan could surprise to the upside (panel 3). Employment numbers remain robust. The unemployment rate fell to 2.6% in March, and the jobs-to-applicants ratio rose to 1.22. The Bank of Japan has stayed dovish, reinforcing yield curve control in its April 27 meeting, with strong forward guidance. That said, the BoJ will have no choice but to pivot if inflationary pressures prove stronger than they anticipate, and/or the output gap in Japan closes much faster as demand recovers. Related Report Foreign Exchange StrategyWhat To Do About The Yen? We were stopped out of our short USD/JPY position at 128. In retrospect, USD/JPY rallied above 131 and is finally falling back down to earth. We are already in the money on our short CHF/JPY position, from our last in-depth report on the yen. This week, we recommend shorting EUR/JPY. British Pound: A Volte-Face By The BoE Chart 10The Pound Is Being Traded As High Beta
The Pound Is Being Traded As High Beta
The Pound Is Being Traded As High Beta
The pound is down 9.8% year-to-date. While the Bank of England raised rates to 1% this month, they also expect the economy to temporarily dip into recession this year. This week’s disappointing GDP release confirmed the BoE’s fears. In short, pricing in the SONIA curve for BoE rate hikes remains aggressive. The Bank of England has been one of the more proactive central banks, yet the currency has been performing akin to an inflation crisis in emerging markets (panel 1). Inflation continues to soar in the UK with headline CPI now at 6.2% (panel 2). According to the BoE’s projections, inflation will rise to around 10% this year before peaking, well above previous forecasts of 8%. Together with tighter fiscal policy, the combination will be a hit to consumer sentiment. While the BOE must contain inflationary pressures (in accordance with their mandate), the risks of a policy mistake have risen, akin to the eurozone. Labor market conditions appear tight on the surface (panel 3), but our prognosis is that the UK needs less labor regulation, especially towards areas in the economy where labor shortages are acute and are pressuring wages higher. That is unlikely to change in the near term. As such, the current stance of tight monetary and fiscal policy will stomp out any budding economic green shoots. We are currently short sterling, via a long EUR position. In our view, the EUR/GBP cross still heavily underprices the risks to the UK economy in the near term. Given that the pound is very sensitive to global financial conditions (panel 1), it could rebound if recession fears ease, but our suspicion is that it will still underperform the euro. Canadian Dollar: The BoC Will Stay Hawkish Chart 11The CAD Will Stay Resilient
The CAD Will Stay Resilient
The CAD Will Stay Resilient
The CAD is down 3% year-to-date. The key driver of the CAD remains the outlook for monetary policy and the path of energy prices (panel 1). In the near term, oil prices will stay volatile, but the CAD has not priced in the fact that the BoC is matching the Fed during this interest rate cycle, and/or the rise in energy prices. Together with the NOK, we are going long the CAD versus the RUB today. As we expected, the Bank of Canada raised interest rates by 50bps to 1% at the April 13 meeting. Since then, all the measures the BoC looks at to calibrate monetary policy are continuing to suggest more tightening in monetary policy. Both headline and core inflation came in strong, with headline inflation at 6.7% in March. The common, trim, and median inflation prints were at 2.8%, 4.7%, and 3.8%, respectively, well above the BoC’s target. This continues to suggest inflationary pressures in Canada are broad- based (panel 2). The employment report in April disappointed market consensus, but employment in Canada is back above pre-pandemic levels, and the unemployment rate fell to 5.2%, close to estimates of NAIRU. This suggests the BoC’s path for monetary policy will not be altered (panel 3). House price inflation seems to be moderating across many cities, which argues that monetary policy is having the intended effect, but price increases remain well above nominal income growth (panel 4). Speculators are slightly long the CAD, a risky stance over the next three months. That said, we are buyers of CAD over a 12-to-18-month horizon. New Zealand Dollar: Positive Catalysts, But Fairly Valued Chart 12Real NZ Rates Need To Stabilize
Real NZ Rates Need To Stabilize
Real NZ Rates Need To Stabilize
The NZD is down 8.7% year-to-date. The RBNZ remains the most hawkish central bank in the G10. They further raised interest rates to 1.5% on April 13. Given a strict mandate on inflation, together with house price considerations, long bond yields have accepted that the RBNZ will be steadfast in tightening policy and hit 3.8% this month. This will help stabilize real yields are rising (panel 1). Underlying data suggests that the “least regrets” approach by the RBNZ makes sense – in a nutshell, tighten policy as fast as economically possible, to get ahead of the inflation curve. CPI continues to accelerate, hitting 6.9% year-on-year in Q1, from 5.9% the previous quarter (panel 2). House price inflation is rolling over from very elevated levels (panel 3). This suggests that monetary policy is having the intended effect of dampening demand. A weak NZD could sustain imported inflation, but a hawkish central bank cushions this risk. The RBNZ is forecasting a 2.8% overnight rate for June 2023. The OIS curve suggests that market expectations are much higher. This fits with our view that the market had been overpricing higher interest rates in New Zealand, especially relative to other countries. We already took profits on our long AUD/NZD trade and continue to expect the NZD to underperform at the crosses, even if it rises versus the dollar. Australian Dollar: Our Top Pick Against The Dollar Chart 13The AUD Has A Terms Of Trade Tailwind
The AUD Has A Terms Of Trade Tailwind
The AUD Has A Terms Of Trade Tailwind
The Australian dollar is down 5.5% year-to-date. The Reserve Bank of Australia raised interest rates by 15bps on its May 3rd meeting, in line with the hawkish tone telegraphed at the prior meeting. The two critical measures that the RBA is focusing on, inflation and wages, have been improving. That said, we had expected the RBA to wait for fresh wage data, out next week, before calibrating monetary policy. The key point is that emergency monetary settings are no longer required in Australia. Home prices remain robust, the unemployment rate has fallen to a cycle low of 4% in and inflationary pressures remain persistent. Headline CPI was at 5.1% year-on-year in Q1. The trimmed-mean and weighted- median CPI print came in at 3.7% and 3.2%, respectively, above the upper bound of the RBA’s 2%-3% target range. The external environment is one area of concern for the AUD. The trade balance continues to soar, but China’s zero COVID-19 policy is a risk to Australian exports. On the flip side, many speculators are now short the Aussie, which is bullish from a contrarian perspective. We are long the AUD as of 72 cents, expecting this trade to be volatile in the near term, but to pay off over a longer horizon. Swiss Franc: The Yen Is A Better Hedge Chart 14Swiss Inflation Will Fall
Swiss Inflation Will Fall
Swiss Inflation Will Fall
Year-to-date, CHF is down 9% against USD and flat against the EUR. The Swiss economy continues to perform well and remains relatively insulated from the inflation dynamics taking place in the rest of the G10. In April, headline CPI inched higher to 2.5% and core CPI to 1.5% year-over-year (panel 2), while the unemployment rate was down to 2.3%. The KOF indicator was also above expectations at 101.7. At 62.5, the manufacturing PMI is still well in the expansionary zone. In other data, retail sales were up 0.8% month-on-month in March and the trade surplus was down to CHF 1.8bn, likely due to the elevated exchange rate versus the euro. Since then, the franc has given up all its gains against the euro. Several SNB board members have recently spoken about the beneficial role of a strong franc in helping to control inflation (panel 4). That said, it is unclear whether the SNB, known for rampant currency interventions, will be as welcoming to a highly valued franc should inflation roll over. Switzerland’s trade surplus as a share of GDP has been persistently increasing since the early 2000s. An expensive currency would not be positive for economic growth. In fact, SNB sight deposits, have been on the rise recently. Last week, these deposits posted the largest one-week increase in two years. In a world where inflation starts to roll over, the SNB will be more dovish. In this environment, EUR/CHF can see more upside. Norwegian Krone: Bullish On A 12-to-18 Month Horizon Chart 15NOK Has Upside
Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar
Month In-Review: A Hefty Safe-Haven Premium In The Dollar
The NOK is down 10.7% against the USD this year. This is a remarkable development amidst higher real rates in Norway (panel 1). The Norges Bank is one of the most predictable central banks. It is set to deliver quarterly 25bps hikes through the end of 2023 to a total of 2.5%. In April, headline CPI rose 5.4% and the measure excluding energy was up 2.6% (panel 2). Although slightly above the latest projections, these figures are unlikely to make the bank deviate from its projected rate path. Economic activity is recovering steadily since the removal of pandemic-related restrictions in February. Household consumption and retail sales grew 4.3% and 3.3% month-over-month, respectively, in March. The manufacturing PMI broke above the 60 level in April, while industrial production was up 2.2% on the month in March. Registered unemployment fell under 2% in April, below pre-pandemic levels. This is helping boost wages (panel 3). Norway’s trade balance continued to break all-time highs with a NOK 138bn surplus in March. Elevated energy prices and the transition away from Russian energy should be a significant tailwind for the Norwegian economy. Oil companies planned to increase investment even before the invasion, and recent developments will likely induce more capex. NOK has significantly underperformed in the last month largely due to broad risk-off sentiment. Once markets stabilize, the krone should strengthen over the next 12–18 months. Given the relatively “safer” nature of Norwegian oil, we are initiating a long NOK/RUB trade today, along with a long CAD leg. Swedish Krona: Into A Capitulation Phase Chart 16SEK Has Upside
SEK Has Upside
SEK Has Upside
The SEK is down 10.8% versus the dollar this year. In a major policy U-turn, the Riksbank raised rates by 25bps during its last meeting, after inflation came in above expectations at 6.1% on the year in March. The Bank also announced a faster pace of balance-sheet reduction, as well as expecting two-to-three more hikes before the end of the year. Just like the euro area, Sweden is within firing range of tensions between Russia and Ukraine (panel 1). Swedish GDP contracted 0.4% from the previous quarter. Global uncertainty and rising prices are weighing on consumer confidence, reflected in subdued retail sales and household consumption in March. The manufacturing PMI remains robust at 55 but is falling quite rapidly, as are real rates (panel 2). As a small open economy, Sweden needs external demand to recover. On a positive note, orders remain very strong and an easing of lockdowns in China should contribute to growth in manufacturing and goods exports later this year. It is also encouraging that Sweden’s trade surplus rose to 4.7bn SEK in March. The krona remains vulnerable to both a growth contraction in Europe as well as geopolitical risk, especially as Finland might join NATO, sparring retaliation from Russia. That said, the negative news is likely already priced in. SEK should benefit from growth normalization and a pick-up in the Chinese credit impulse in the second half of the year. As a way to benefit from this dynamic, we are short CHF/SEK, but short USD/SEK positions will be warranted later this year. Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Artem Sakhbiev Research Associate artem.sakhbiev@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary