Oil
Energy markets are balanced in the short run, which keeps our Brent price forecasts at $95/bbl and $105/bbl in 2024 and 2025. Structurally, we see an upward bias to inflation, as geoeconomic fragmentation fundamentally alters supply chains; higher costs follow. Military access to oil will be prioritized. Renewables are the future, but war will be fought with hydrocarbons. We remain long the COMT, XOP and PPA ETFs.
Following the release of the white paper yesterday, today we are sending you the inaugural issue of the MacroQuant Monthly, a report summarizing the output of our next-generation MacroQuant 2.0 model.
Commodity volatility will continue its rising trend since 2014. The US is on the brink of a major election, the outcome of which could reduce its willingness to engage with the outside world. So, states seeking to carve out their own spheres of influence are incentivized to raise the economic costs to the US and discourage its influence in their regions. These states can do this by interfering in key trading routes in their regions. As a result, geopolitical threats to maritime chokepoints are a structural as well as cyclical problem and will persist due to the revival of superpower competition.
Middle East conflict, extreme US policy uncertainty, Chinese economic slowdown, US-Russian proxy war, and Asian military conflicts do not create a stable investment backdrop for 2024. Our top five “black swan” risks may be highly improbable, but they stem from these underlying trends.
The risk markets will be surprised by another 1mm b/d increase in crude oil supplies this year or next from the US is low, given the depletion of the unfinished-well inventory that drove shale output higher. Demand remains strong, although growth will slow. Higher non-OPEC 2.0 production, slowing demand growth, lower upside risk and the carryforward of elevated 2023 inventories take our 2024-25 Brent forecasts to $95/bbl and $105/bbl, respectively.
In this brief Insight we examine the expanding Middle East conflict and update the situation in the Taiwan Strait on the eve of elections. The Houthis are a distraction and China is not likely to invade Taiwan in the near term, but both situations support our overweight of US equities relative to global. Global growth is likely to slow while commodities are likely to see at least minor supply shocks.
The market’s pricing of a soft landing means that geopolitical risks are becoming more, not less, relevant in 2024. US domestic divisions will invite challenges as foreign powers rightly fear that US policy will turn more hawkish after the election.