Recession-Hard/Soft Landing

Highlights Persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds on a global scale. Hence, the risk is that financial market distortions will infect the economy, not the other way round. A global mini-downturn in the first half of 2018 is now all but guaranteed. High conviction equity sector recommendation: underweight the major cyclical equity sectors: specifically, Banks, Materials and Energy; but overweight Airlines. High conviction currency recommendation: yen first; euro second; pound third; dollar fourth. Feature Stock markets ascend by walking up the stairs, but they descend by jumping out of the window. Unfortunately, investors often misinterpret the low volatility of a market ascent as a sign that equity risk has diminished. In fact, the low volatility just tells us that walking up the stairs is a slow and dull process (Chart I-2). It tells us nothing about equity risk. Chart of the WeekA Global Mini-Downturn In H1 2018 Is Now All But Guaranteed A Global Mini-Downturn In H1 2018 Is Now All But Guaranteed A Global Mini-Downturn In H1 2018 Is Now All But Guaranteed Chart I-2Stock Markets Climb Up The Stairs, And Then Jump Out Of The Window Stock Markets Climb Up The Stairs, And Then Jump Out Of The Window Stock Markets Climb Up The Stairs, And Then Jump Out Of The Window The risk of equities, as we have just seen, is that they do periodically jump out of the window. Meaning that equities have the potential to suffer much more intense short-term losses than short-term gains. This ratio of potential losses to potential gains is technically known as negative skew. For a reminder why equity returns have this unattractive asymmetry, please revisit our Special Report 'Negative Skew': A Ticking Time-Bomb.1 That said, equity returns always possess negative skew, so there is nothing new about stock markets jumping out of the window, as they have this week. Persistent QE, ZIRP And NIRP Have Created A Severe Financial Distortion The much bigger story is that persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP2 have imparted negative skew on bond returns too. Central banks accept that there is a 'lower bound' for policy interest rates - perhaps slightly negative - below which there would be an exodus of bank deposits. The limit also marks the lower bound for bond yields. Approaching this lower bound for yields, bond prices have diminishing upside with increasing downside (Chart I-3). So at low bond yields, mathematics necessarily forces bond markets also to walk up the stairs and then jump out of the window (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-3Approaching The Lower Bound For Yields, Bond Prices ##br##Have Diminishing Upside With Increasing Downside Low Vol: The Time-Bomb Explodes Low Vol: The Time-Bomb Explodes Chart I-4In A Low Yield Era, Bond Markets ##br##Also Climb Up The Stairs... In A Low Yield Era, Bond Markets Also Climb Up The Stairs... In A Low Yield Era, Bond Markets Also Climb Up The Stairs... Chart I-5... And Then Jump Out ##br##Of The Window ... And Then Jump Out Of The Window ... And Then Jump Out Of The Window As the risk of owning 10-year bonds has increased to become 'equity-like', it has removed the requirement for an excess return, a risk premium, on equities. In other words, persistently ultra-accommodative monetary policy has diminished the prospective 10-year annual return on global equities to become 'bond-like', collapsing from 9% in 2012 to 1.5% today - exactly the same rate of return that is now offered by the global 10-year bond (Chart I-6). In effect, persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds. Chart I-6Equities' Prospective Returns##br## Have Become 'Bond-Like' Equities' Prospective Returns Have Become 'Bond-Like' Equities' Prospective Returns Have Become 'Bond-Like' However, as we explained last week in Beware The Great Moderation 2.0,3 the nose-bleed valuation of the world stock market is justified only as long as bond yields stays low. Above a 2% yield, the payoffs offered by bonds gradually lose their negative skew and thereby become less risky than those offered by equities. So equities must once again compensate by offering an excess prospective return, necessitating a derating of today's elevated valuations. Specifically, we wrote that the big threat to equity valuations "comes from the global 10-year bond yield rising to 2% - broadly equivalent to the German 10-year bund yield rising to 1% or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3%." To which one client responded "markets do not respect round numbers... if the trigger-point is 3%, then you must act well before that." Wise words indeed. The U.S. 10-year T-bond yield got as far as 2.88% before triggering a reversal in equity valuations. Financial Distortions Threaten The Real Economy Chart I-7Financial Conditions 'Easiness' Is Just ##br##Tracking The Stock Market Financial Conditions 'Easiness' Is Just Tracking The Stock Market Financial Conditions 'Easiness' Is Just Tracking The Stock Market Many people naturally assume that the economy drives the financial markets. This may be true some of the time, or even most of the time. But in the last three downturns, the causality ran the other way round - financial market distortions dragged down the economy. The bursting of the dot com bubble triggered the downturn in 2001; the large-scale mispricing of U.S. mortgages caused the Great Recession in 2008; and the explosive widening of euro area sovereign credit spreads resulted in the euro area recession in 2011. Which begs the question: is there a financial distortion or mispricing that could once again drag down the economy? The answer is an emphatic yes. To repeat, six years of persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds on a global scale, compressing the prospective 10-year annual return on world equities from 9% to 1.5%.4 Thereby, equity returns which would have accrued in the future have been brought forward to the here and now in the form of elevated capital values. But if higher bond yields correct the severely distorted valuation relationship between equities and bonds, the effect will be to move these returns from the present back to the future, depressing capital values today. Now note that while world GDP is worth around $80 trillion, the combination of equities and correlated risk-assets such as corporate and EM debt is worth double that, around $160 trillion, and real estate is worth $220 trillion. If returns from these richly valued asset-classes are redistributed from the present back to the future, through lower capital values today, there is a very real risk that current spending could take a hit. Supporting this broad thesis, central bank measures of 'financial conditions easiness' just track tick for tick the level of the stock market (Chart I-7). What To Do Now The upturn in bond yields which started last summer threatens to impact activity through two separate channels. As just discussed, the first is the financial market channel via a setback to global risk-asset capital values. The second is the bank credit channel. Changes in the bond yield very clearly and reliably lead changes in credit flows, the credit impulse, by 6 months. Therefore, the rise in bond yields is only now starting to pull down the credit impulse - and thereby the global activity mini-cycle, which is the all-important driver of mainstream European investments. It follows that a global mini-downturn in the first half of 2018 is now all but guaranteed (Chart of the Week). And that the higher that bond yields go from here, the more marked this mini-downturn will be. This reinforces two high conviction investment recommendations. First, it is now appropriate to underweight cyclical equity sectors: specifically, Banks, Materials and Energy. Against this, the one cyclical sector to upgrade to overweight is Airlines, given the sector's negative correlation with the oil price. Second, the payoff profile for exchange rates is just tracking expected long-term interest rate differentials (Chart I-8). This means that when the expected interest rate is close to the lower bound, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew. In essence, for any central bank already at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy - such as the BoJ and ECB - the direction of policy rate expectations cannot go significantly lower. Conversely, tightening expectations for the Federal Reserve are approaching a magnitude that threatens either risk-asset prices and/or economic growth. So these expectations cannot go significantly higher (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Exchange Rates Are Tracking Long-Term ##br## Interest Rate Differentials Exchange Rates Are Tracking Long-Term Interest Rate Differentials Exchange Rates Are Tracking Long-Term Interest Rate Differentials Chart I-9Expected Interest Rates In The Euro Area And ##br##U.S. Will Converge One Way Or The Other Expected Interest Rates In The Euro Area And U.S. Will Converge One Way Or The Other Expected Interest Rates In The Euro Area And U.S. Will Converge One Way Or The Other On this basis, we reiterate our high conviction pecking order for currencies in 2018. Yen first; euro second; pound third; dollar fourth. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Negative Skew: A Ticking Time-Bomb', July 27 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Quantitative Easing, Zero Interest Rate Policy and Negative Interest Rate Policy. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, 'Beware The Great Moderation 2.0', February 1 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 4 This 1.5% forecast comes from regressing the world equity market to GDP multiple through 1998-2008 with subsequent 10-year returns, observing a very tight relationship, and then using the same relationship on current world equity market cap to GDP. Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommended trade is to go long utilities versus the market. The profit target is 3.5% outperformance with a symmetrical stop-loss. It was an excellent week for our other trades with short palladium hitting its 6% profit target, while underweight Japanese energy and long USD/ZAR are both in comfortable profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 World Utilities World Utilities The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights December's money and trade data releases were not positive, but they do not likely herald a more aggressive economic slowdown than our base case view would suggest. Conventional methods of gauging the tightness of China's monetary policy stance tend to ignore the fact that market-based interest rates have already increased over the past year. Meaningful increases to the benchmark lending rate are therefore unwarranted barring a significant improvement in China's growth momentum. Despite several identifiable risk factors, investors should remain overweight Chinese investable stocks versus the emerging market and global benchmarks. Feature Several highly-watched Chinese data releases are being published as we go to press, including Q4 GDP growth, and December retail sales, industrial production, and fixed asset investment. We are inclined to agree with Bloomberg's consensus expectations that these series will come in flat-to-modestly down, given our base case view of a benign, controlled economic slowdown. While we cannot rule out the potential for significantly positive surprises from this data, our November 30 Special Report noted in detail that these types of activity indicators tend to lag (or are not correlated with) the Li Keqiang index, which we have shown continues to act as an important predictor of the growth in investable EPS and nominal import growth.1 As such, the series in today's release do not rank highly on our list of important data to watch over the coming 6-12 months. Instead, we remain focused on the components of our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, as well as the evolution of the relationship between the Li Keqiang index and the growth in earnings and imports. December: A Bad Month For Money & Trade Chart 1A Non-Trivial Deceleration##br## In Money Growth A Non-Trivial Deceleration In Money Growth A Non-Trivial Deceleration In Money Growth Among the December data released in the first half of this month, the most important series in our view have been the Caixin Manufacturing PMI, imports/exports, and the money supply. The PMI was a bright spot; after having decelerated since August, the index unexpectedly increased from 50.8 in November to 51.5 in December. The Caixin Services PMI also surprised to the upside. The year-over-year (YoY) growth rate of nominal imports, however, fell sharply in December, and significantly missed expectations. In addition, supply of money (measured either as M2 or BCA-defined M3) also fell on a YoY basis, with the 3-month annualized rate of change declining meaningfully (Chart 1). Given that M2 and M3 are components of our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, and that nominal imports directly impact China's contribution to global growth, this raises the question of whether December's economic data suggest that China is slowing at a more aggressive pace than we expect. For now, our answer is no. Several points are worth considering: China's trade data is highly volatile, and a smoothed version of nominal import growth is behaving exactly as the Li Keqiang index suggests that it should (Chart 2). In addition, while import growth significantly missed the street's expectations, negative surprises of this magnitude have frequently occurred in the past (Chart 3). Chart 2Despite A Weak December, ##br##Smoothed Nominal Imports Look As They Should Despite A Weak December, Smoothed Nominal Imports Look As They Should Despite A Weak December, Smoothed Nominal Imports Look As They Should Chart 3Negative Import Surprises ##br##Are Fairly Common Negative Import Surprises Are Fairly Common Negative Import Surprises Are Fairly Common Money supply measures form just one-third of our Li Keqiang Leading Indicator, and the other factors aren't nearly as negative as these measures imply. Chart 4 illustrates that the indicator would be considerably higher if M2 and M3 were excluded, and that the overall indicator is not falling at a sharp or aggressive pace. Even though we did not include it in our composite indicator, we noted in our November 30 Special Report that the manufacturing PMI is an important signal for the Chinese economy, so it is encouraging that it ticked higher. While 51.5 may not seem like an elevated reading when compared with developed economies, it ranks in the 91st percentile of the data since mid-2011. Export growth remained buoyant, which will provide the industrial sector with some reflationary offset. We noted in a previous report that strong export growth would likely decelerate and converge to global industrial production growth over the coming year,2 but a regression-based approach to modelling Chinese export growth suggests that it may stay strong if leading indicators of global economic activity remain robust (Chart 5). Chart 4Severely Weak Money Measures ##br##Are In Contrast To Other Indicators Severely Weak Money Measures Are In Contrast To Other Indicators Severely Weak Money Measures Are In Contrast To Other Indicators Chart 5Chinese Export Growth ##br##May Stay Strong Chinese Export Growth May Stay Strong Chinese Export Growth May Stay Strong Bottom Line: December's money and trade data releases were not positive, but they do not likely herald a more aggressive economic slowdown than our base case view would suggest. Some Approaches To Gauging The Stance Of Chinese Monetary Policy While we do not regard December's economic data as a deviation from our base case view, that view does acknowledge that a gradual, controlled slowdown is occurring. There are two drivers of this ongoing economic slowdown. The first is the past imposition of "supply side" constraints on some industrial sectors, which have been part of the government's efforts to cut excess capacity and reduce pollution. For example, we noted in our October 5 Special Report that coal, base metals and cement producers have chronically underperformed in recent years, and have also hurt the overall performance of the industrial sector.3 Similarly, capital spending in the mining sector, historically highly sensitive to moves in global metals prices, have continued to contract, despite the sharp increase in metals prices since 2016 (Chart 6). The more obvious catalyst for a slowdown in the economy is, however, the tightening in monetary policy that began in late-2016. We have strongly emphasized the importance of monetary conditions in our approach to tracking the end of China's mini-cycle, and part of the tightening in these conditions can be linked to the end of material RMB depreciation. But a variety of interest rates have also increased substantially over the past year, which has been worrying to some investors. These concerns have been magnified recently by quite a bit of hawkish rhetoric from the PBOC, including an ultimately retracted statement from a leading PBOC researcher last week that stronger economic conditions have created enough room for a hike in the benchmark one-year lending rate. The current environment naturally raises the question of what would constitute tight policy in China. Chart 7 presents two conventional methods of answering this question, both of which aim to compare the benchmark 1-year policy lending rate to a fair, neutral, or equilibrium level. The first method uses a Taylor Rule approach with the IMF's output gap, headline consumer price inflation, and the IMF's assumptions of a 6% nominal equilibrium interest rate and a 3% headline inflation target.4 The second method simply compares the benchmark lending rate to that prescribed by our BCA China Interest Rate Model, which is a proprietary indicator based on China's growth momentum relative to its recent average, Chinese inflation, U.S. interest rates, and the CNY/USD exchange rate. Chart 6Policy Constraints Weigh Heavily On ##br##Some Sectors Policy Constraints Weigh Heavily On Some Sectors Policy Constraints Weigh Heavily On Some Sectors Chart 7Conventional Methods Say The Benchmark##br## Lending Rate Should Rise... Conventional Methods Say The Benchmark Lending Rate Should Rise... Conventional Methods Say The Benchmark Lending Rate Should Rise... At first blush, Chart 7 seems to imply that a significant increase in the benchmark 1-year policy lending rate is warranted. But these approaches ignore the fact that market-based interest rates have already increased over the past year, in some cases materially. A comprehensive understanding of the framework and mechanics of China's new monetary policy era is still elusive to many investors, and is an area of ongoing research at BCA. But for now, it is important to note that the benchmark lending rate merely acts as a reference point for Chinese banks when determining the actual interest rate charged on new loans. Chart 8 highlights that the percentage of loans issued above the benchmark rate correlates strongly with, and is led by, the 3-month interbank lending rate. Given the significant increase in 3-month SHIBOR over the past year, it is not surprising that China's weighted average lending rate has recently been increasing, even though the benchmark rate has remained constant. The rise in the average lending rate has so far been moderate, with our Q4 estimate showing only a 35% cumulative retracement of the 180bps decline that occurred from 2014 - 2016. But Chart 9 illustrates what would likely occur to the average lending rate if the PBOC were to hike the benchmark rate by 50bps over the coming year, based on two different scenarios: 1) an unchanged 3-month SHIBOR rate, and 2) a 50bps rise in 3-month SHIBOR (i.e. a parallel shift with the benchmark rate). The chart makes it clear that such a move would push average lending rates above the midpoint of the 2014-2016 range, which from our perspective is a reasonable estimate of the threshold between easy and tight monetary policy. Chart 8...But This Ignores The Recent Rise##br## In Market-Based Interest Rates ...But This Ignores The Recent Rise In Market-Based Interest Rates ...But This Ignores The Recent Rise In Market-Based Interest Rates Chart 9Even Modest Hikes To The Benchmark Rate ##br##Will Create Tight Policy Even Modest Hikes To The Benchmark Rate Will Create Tight Policy Even Modest Hikes To The Benchmark Rate Will Create Tight Policy A rise into tight monetary policy territory would be exacerbated even further if the 3-month SHIBOR rate rose disproportionately to any increase in the benchmark rate, which is not a trivial risk given the extent of their rise since late-2016. In short, given that China's economy is already slowing, this analysis underscores that any meaningful increases to the benchmark rate are likely unwarranted, and would be greeted negatively by global investors were they to occur. Bottom Line: Conventional methods of gauging the tightness of China's monetary policy stance tend to ignore the fact that market-based interest rates have already increased over the past year. Meaningful increases to the benchmark lending rate are therefore unwarranted barring a significant improvement in China's growth momentum. Monetary Policy And Investment Strategy We presented a "decision tree" for Chinese stocks in our January 4 Weekly Report,5 and noted that signs of significant further tightening of monetary policy should be met with a downgrade bias towards Chinese equities. We argued that the "bark" of monetary authorities would be worse than their "bite" over the coming several months, given that growth momentum and house price appreciation has already peaked. Recent market performance suggests that global investors agree with our assessment that the PBOC will refrain from any meaningful increases to the benchmark lending rate, and that any further rise in the average lending rate will be modest. Chart 10 shows that while the performance of Chinese investable ex-tech stocks versus global ex-tech did challenge its 200-day moving average in mid-December, the selloff has been completely reversed over the past month. In addition, Chart 11 shows that bottom-up 12-month forward EPS growth expectations remain solid and net earnings revisions remain close to a seven-year high, suggesting that there is no imminent fundamental basis for a major decline in Chinese investable equity prices. Chart 10Investors Aren't Worried##br## By The Specter Of Tight Policy Investors Aren't Worried By The Specter Of Tight Policy Investors Aren't Worried By The Specter Of Tight Policy Chart 11There Is Fundamental Support ##br##For Chinese Stocks There Is Fundamental Support For Chinese Stocks There Is Fundamental Support For Chinese Stocks Accordingly, while further monetary policy tightening remains a risk to be monitored over the course of the year, our "decision tree" framework continues to suggest that investors should be overweight Chinese stocks. We regard this as a recommendation to be cautiously bullish, a stance that we will be continually evaluating over the course of the year as more information about the risk factors that we have identified presents itself. Stay tuned! Bottom Line: Despite several identifiable risk factors, investors should remain overweight Chinese investable stocks versus the emerging market and global benchmark. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability of China's Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China's Economy - 2015 Vs Today (Part I): Trade", dated October 26, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "On A Higher Note", dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 IMF Country Report No. 17/247, People's Republic of China : 2017 Article IV Consultation, August 8, 2017. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The "Decision Tree" For Chinese Stocks", dated January 4, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Dear Client, This is our final publication for the year. We will be back on January 5th. On behalf of the entire Global Investment Strategy team, I would like to wish you a Merry Christmas, Happy Holidays, and a Prosperous New Year! Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Global bonds have sold off in recent days, but the spread between long-term and short-term Treasury yields remains well below where it was at the start of the year. A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the ongoing U.S. business-cycle expansion is getting long in the tooth. Nevertheless, three factors dilute the potentially bearish message from the curve. First, the yield curve has flattened largely because short-term rate expectations have risen thanks to better economic data. Second, both the 10-year/2-year and 10-year/3-month spreads are still above levels that have foreshadowed poor returns for risk assets in the past. This is particularly true for equities. Third, a structurally low term premium has distorted the signal from the yield curve. The U.S. yield curve is likely to steepen over the next six months, before flattening again in the lead-up to a recession in late-2019. We reveal the One Number that will kill bitcoin. Feature A Harbinger Of Recession? The U.S. yield curve has steepened in recent days, but is still much flatter than it was at the start of the year. The 10-year/3-month spread currently stands at 113 bps, down 84 bps year-to-date. The 10-year/2-year spread has fallen from 125 bps to 62 bps. Numerous academic studies have highlighted the importance of the yield curve as a leading indicator of recessions.1 In fact, every U.S. recession over the past 50 years has been preceded by an inverted yield curve (Chart 1). Chart 1An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession The converse has generally been true as well: Most inversions in the yield curve have coincided with a recession. The only two exceptions were in 1967 - when credit conditions tightened and industrial production decelerated, but the U.S. still managed to avoid succumbing to a recession - and in 1998, when the yield curve briefly inverted during the LTCM crisis. Considering that recessions and equity bear markets typically overlap (Chart 2), it is not surprising that investors have begun to fret about what a flatter yield curve may mean for their portfolios. Chart 2Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Don't Worry... Yet Chart 3U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher U.S. Growth Expectations Revised Higher We would not be as dismissive of a flatter yield curve as Fed Chair Yellen was during her December press conference. Policymakers and investors alike have been too quick to downplay the signal from the yield curve in the past. In 2006, they blamed the "global savings glut" for dragging down long-term yields. In 2000, they argued that the federal government's budget surplus was reducing the supply of long-term bonds. In both cases, the bond market turned out to be seeing something more ominous than they were. That said, there are three reasons why we would discount some of the more bearish interpretations of what a flatter yield curve is telling us. First, the flattening of the yield curve has occurred mainly because of an increase in short-term rate expectations, rather than a decrease in long-term bond yields. The increase in rate expectations has been largely driven by stronger growth data. The economic surprise index has surged far into positive territory and analysts are now scrambling to revise up their 2018 and 2019 U.S. GDP growth projections (Chart 3). The Fed now sees growth of 2.5% in 2018 and an unemployment rate of 3.9% by the end of next year. Back in September, the Fed expected growth of 2.1% and an unemployment rate of 4.1%. Second, our research suggests that the slope of the yield curve only becomes worrisome for the economy when it falls to extremely low levels. This conclusion is reinforced by the New York Fed's Yield Curve Recession Model, which uses the difference between 10-year and 3-month Treasury rates to estimate the probability of a U.S. recession twelve months ahead.2 The model's current recession probability stands at a modest 11% (Chart 4). The last three recessions all began when the implied probability was over 25%. Chart 4NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low NY Fed's Yield Curve Model Suggests That The Probability Of A Recession Is Still Quite Low Third, the slope of the yield curve is weighed down by a structurally low term premium. The term premium measures the additional return investors can expect to receive by locking in their money in a 10-year Treasury note instead of rolling over a short-term Treasury bill for an entire decade. Historically, the term premium has been positive. Over the past few years, however, it has often been negative - meaning that investors have been willing to pay a premium to take on duration risk. Many commentators have attributed this peculiar state of affairs to central bank asset purchases, which they claim have artificially depressed long-term bond yields. There is some truth to this, but we think there is an even more important reason: Bonds today provide a good hedge against bad economic news. When fears of an economic slowdown mount, equities tend to sell off, while bond prices rise. This differs from the circumstances that existed in the 1970s and 1980s, when bad economic news usually meant higher inflation. To the extent that long-term bonds now serve as insurance policies against recessions, investors are more willing to accept the lower yields that they offer. Empirically, one can see this in the shift of the correlation between equity returns and bond yields. It was strongly negative up until the mid-1990s. Now it is strongly positive (Chart 5). A low term premium implies that the slope of the yield curve should be structurally flatter. That is exactly what we see today. Chart 6 shows that the 10-year/3-month spread would be well above its long-term average if the term premium were removed from the picture. This implies that investors have little to fear from the shape of today's yield curve, at least over the next six-to-twelve months. Chart 5Bond Prices Now Tend To Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Bond Prices Now Tend to Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Bond Prices Now Tend to Rise When Equity Prices Go Down Chart 6Stripping Out The Term Premium,##BR##The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Stripping Out The Term Premium, The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Stripping Out The Term Premium, The Yield Curve Is Not So Flat Rising Odds Of A Recession In Late-2019 Beyond then, things start to get dicey. The Fed's end-2018 unemployment rate projection of 3.9% is 0.7 percentage points below its long-term estimate of the unemployment rate. This means that at some point in the future, the Fed will need to lift interest rates above their "neutral" level in order to push the unemployment rate up to its equilibrium level. That's a risky gambit. There has never been a case in the post-war era where the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point without a recession ensuing (Chart 7). Modern economies are subject to feedback loops. Once economic conditions begin to deteriorate, households cut back on spending. This leads to less hiring and even less spending. Bad economic news begets worse news. Chart 7Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Implications For Equities And Credit A flatter Treasury yield curve suggests that the U.S. business cycle is entering the home stretch. Nevertheless, as we pointed out two weeks ago, the 7th-to-8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the juiciest for equity investors (Table 1).3 Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 8 shows that the term spread today is still at levels that have signaled positive equity returns in the past. In fact, today's term spread is close to levels that prevailed in the second half of the 1990s, a period that coincided with the greatest bull market in American history. This message is echoed by our forthcoming MacroQuant model, which continues to flag upside risks for stocks over the next 6-to-12 months (Chart 9). Chart 8Current Term Spread Is Still Pointing##BR##To Positive Equity Returns Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 9MacroQuant Still Positive##BR##On The Stock Market Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Globally, we favor euro area and Japanese equities (in local-currency terms) in the developed market sphere due to our expectation that the euro and yen will depreciate somewhat next year. Both the euro area and Japan also have greater exposure to cyclical sectors. This fits with our bias towards owning cyclicals over defensive stocks. Today's term spread is a bit more worrying for corporate credit. As our bond strategists have noted, a flatter yield curve is consistent with lower, though still positive, monthly excess returns for high-yield bonds (Chart 10).4 Again, the second half of the 1990s provides a potentially useful template: Despite a sizzling stock market, high-yield spreads actually widened as corporations loaded up on debt (Chart 11). The deterioration in our Corporate Health Monitor over the past five years suggests that a similar dynamic may be afoot (Chart 12). Chart 10Junk Monthly Excess Returns##BR##And The Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Chart 11Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads##BR##Rose With Stock Prices Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads Rose With Stock Prices Second Half Of 1990s: When High-Yield Spreads Rose With Stock Prices Chart 12Corporate Health Has##BR##Been Deteriorating Corporate Health Has Been Deteriorating Corporate Health Has Been Deteriorating Yield Curve Should Steepen Over The Coming Months Of course, much depends on what happens to the yield curve going forward. We suspect that it will flatten again towards the end of next year. However, it is likely to steepen over the next six months. U.S. GDP growth will remain above trend next year, as wages start to rise more briskly and firms boost capital spending to meet rising demand for their products. Fiscal policy should also help. Tax cuts will lift growth by 0.2%-to-0.3% in 2018. Higher disaster relief efforts following the hurricanes and a pending agreement to raise caps on discretionary spending will also translate into increased federal government spending. Investors have largely overlooked this source of fiscal stimulus, but increased spending will contribute almost as much to growth next year as lower taxes. Unfortunately, all this additional growth, coming at a time when the output gap is all but closed, is likely to stoke inflationary pressures. Our Pipeline Inflation Pressure Index has risen sharply since early 2016, while the ISM prices paid index has shot up. The New York Fed's Underlying Inflation Gauge has accelerated to an 11-year high of 3% (Chart 13). Historically, rising inflation expectations have led to a steeper yield curve (Chart 14). The implication is that investors should favor inflation-linked securities over government bonds. Chart 13U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building U.S. Inflation Pressure Are Building Chart 14Rising Inflation Expectations Lead To A Steeper Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve The One Number That Will Kill Bitcoin In a normal world, most reasonable people would regard a flatter yield curve and continued weak inflation readings as evidence that fiat money was, if anything, doing too good a job as a store of value. However, nothing is normal or reasonable about bitcoin.5 Chart 15Governments Will Want Their Cut:##BR##U.S. Seigniorage Revenue Governments Will Want Their Cut: U.S. Seigniorage Revenue Governments Will Want Their Cut: U.S. Seigniorage Revenue No one knows when the bitcoin bubble will burst. Only a tiny fraction of the public owns the virtual currency. The value of all bitcoin in circulation represents 0.35% of global GDP. At its peak in 1996, the value of all pyramid scheme assets in Albania amounted to almost half of GDP. Never underestimate the lure of easy money. While we do not know where the price of bitcoin will be ten months from now, we do have a good guess of where it will be ten years from today. And that price is zero, or thereabouts. When the U.S. Treasury issues a $100 bill, it gains the ability to buy $100 of goods and services with it. The government's cost is whatever it pays to print the bill, which is next to nothing. This so-called "seigniorage revenue" is set to reach $100 billion this year (Chart 15). That is the number that will kill bitcoin. There is no way the U.S. government will forsake this revenue in order to make room for bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Not when there are entitlements to pay and gaping budget deficits to finance. A variety of other countries have a love-hate relationship with bitcoin, partly because of their "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" attitude towards the dollar. But that will change when they see their tax bases eroding as more commerce gets done in the anonymous world of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin's days are numbered. The only question is who will be holding the bag when the party ends. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Jonathan H. Wright, "The Yield Curve And Predicting Recessions," FEDs Working Paper No. 2006-7, May 3, 2006; Michael Owyang, "Is the Yield Curve Signaling a Recession?"Federal Reserve Bank Of St. Louis, March 24, 2016; and Arturo Estrella and Mishkin, Frederic S., "The Yield Curve as a Predictor of U.S. Recessions," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, (2:7), June 1996. 2 Please see "The Yield Curve As A Leading Indicator: Probability of U.S. Recession Charts," Federal Reserve Bank Of New York. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy, "Proactive, Reactive Or Right?" dated December 12, 2017. 5 Please see European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Bitcoins And Fractals," dated December 21, 2017; Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Cyber Currencies: Actual Currencies Or Just Speculative Assets?" dated December 12, 2017; Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "Blockchain And Cryptocurrencies," dated May 5, 2017. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Recommended Allocation Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 Highlights We are late cycle. Strong growth could turn in 2018 from a positive for risk assets into a negative. More risk-averse investors may thus want to turn cautious. But the last year of a bull run can be profitable, and we don't expect a recession until late 2019. For now, therefore, our recommendations remain pro-risk and pro-cyclical. We may turn more defensive in 2H 2018 if the Fed tightens above equilibrium. We expect inflation to pick up in 2018, which will lead the Fed to hike maybe four times. This will push long rates to 3%, and strengthen the U.S. dollar. Equities should outperform bonds in this environment. We prefer euro zone and Japanese equities over U.S., and remain underweight EM. Late-cycle sectors such as Financials and Industrials, should do well. We also favor corporate bonds and private equity. Feature Overview Fin de cycle Global economic growth in 2017 was robust for the first time since the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 1). Forecasts for 2018 put growth slightly lower, but are likely to be revised up. However, as the year rolls on, the strong economic momentum may turn from being a positive for risk assets into a negative. U.S. output is now above potential, according to IMF estimates. As Chart 2 shows, historically recessions - and consequently equity bear markets - have usually come within a year or two of the output gap turning positive. With the economy operating above capacity, inflation pressures force the Fed to tighten monetary policy, which eventually causes a slowdown. Chart 1Growth Finally On A Firm Footing Global Growth Has Accelerated Growth Finally On A Firm Footing Global Growth Has Accelerated Growth Finally On A Firm Footing Global Growth Has Accelerated Chart 2Recessions Follow Output Gap Closing Recessions Follow Output Gap Closing Recessions Follow Output Gap Closing That is exactly how BCA sees the next couple of years panning out, leading to a recession perhaps in the second half of 2019. U.S. inflation was soft in 2017, but underlying inflation pressures are picking up, with core CPI inflation having bottomed, and small companies saying they are raising prices (Chart 3). Add to that wage pressures (with unemployment heading below 4% in 2018), tax cuts (which might boost growth by 0.2-0.3% points in their first year) and a higher oil price (we expect Brent to average $67 a barrel during the year), and core PCE inflation is likely to rise to 2%, in line with the Fed's expectations. This means the market is too sanguine about the risk of monetary tightening in the U.S. It has priced in less than two rates hikes in 2018, compared to the Fed's three dots, and almost nothing after that (Chart 4). If inflation picks up as we expect, four rate hikes in 2018 could be on the cards. Chart 3Inflation Pressures Picking Up Inflation Pressures Picking Up Inflation Pressures Picking Up Chart 4Market Still Underpricing Fed Hikes Market Still Underpricing Fed Hikes Market Still Underpricing Fed Hikes The consequences of this are that bond yields are likely to rise. Despite a significant market repricing since September of Fed behavior, long-term rates have not risen much, leading to a flattening yield curve (Chart 5). The market has essentially priced in that inflation will not rebound and that, consequently, the Fed will be making a policy mistake by hiking further. If, therefore, we are correct that inflation does reach 2%, the yield curve would be likely to steepen over the next six months, with the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield reaching 3% by mid-year. Other developed economies, however, have less urgency to tighten monetary policy and we, therefore, see the U.S. dollar appreciating. The only other major economy with a positive output gap currently is Germany (Chart 6). However, the ECB will continue to set policy for the weaker members of the euro area, and output gaps in France (-1.8% of GDP), Italy (-1.6%) and Spain (-0.7%) remain significantly negative. In the absence of inflation pressures, the ECB won't raise rates until late 2019. Japan, too, continues to struggle to bring inflation up the BOJ's 2% target and the Yield Curve Control policy will therefore stay in place, meaning that a rise in global rates will weaken the yen. Chart 5Is Fed Making A Policy Mistake? Is Fed Making A Policy Mistake? Is Fed Making A Policy Mistake? Chart 6Still A Lot Of Negative Output Gaps Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 This sort of late-cycle environment is a tricky one for investors. The catalysts for strong performance in equities that we foresaw a few months ago - U.S. tax cuts and upside surprises in earnings - have now largely played out. Global earnings will probably rise next year by around 10-12%, in line with analysts' forecasts. With multiples likely to slip a little as the Fed tightens, high single-digit performance is the best that investors should expect from equities. The macro environment which we expect, would be more negative for bonds than positive for equities. That argues for the stock-to-bond ratio to continue to rise until closer to the next recession (Chart 7). And, for now, none of the recession indicators we have been consistently monitoring over the past months is flashing a warning signal (Chart 8). Chart 7Stock-To-Bond Ratio Likely To Rise Further Stock-To-Bond Ratio Likely To Rise Further Stock-To-Bond Ratio Likely To Rise Further Chart 8Recession Warning Signals Still Not Flashing Recession Warning Signals Still Not Flashing Recession Warning Signals Still Not Flashing More risk-averse investors might chose to reduce their exposure to risk assets now, given how close we are to the end of the cycle. But this would be at the risk of leaving some money on the table, since the last year of a bull run can often be the most profitable (remember 1999?). We, therefore, maintain our recommendation for pro-cyclical and pro-risk tilts: overweight equities versus bonds, overweight credit, overweight higher-beta equity markets and sectors, and a preference towards riskier alternative assets. We may move towards a more defensive stance in mid to late 2018, when we see clearer signs that the Fed has tightened above equilibrium or that the risk of recession is rising. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking What Will Be The Impact Of The U.S. Tax Cuts? It is not a done deal, but it still seems likely (notwithstanding the Democratic victory in Alabama) that the U.S. House and Senate will agree a joint tax bill to pass before the end of the year. Since the two current bills have only minor differences, it is possible to make some estimates of the macro and sector impacts of the tax reform. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the cuts will reduce government revenue by $1.4 trillion over 10 years - or $1 trillion (5% of GDP) once positive effects on growth are accounted for. The Treasury argues that tax reform (plus deregulation and infrastructure development) will push GDP growth to 2.9% and therefore government revenues will increase by $300 billion. BCA's estimate is that GDP growth will be boosted by 0.2-0.3% in 2018 and 2019.1 For businesses, the key tax changes are: 1) a reduction in the headline corporate rate from 35% to 21%; 2) immediate expensing of capital investment; 3) a limit to deduction of interest expenses to 30% of taxable income; 4) a move to a territorial tax system from a worldwide one, with a 10% tax on repatriation of past profits held overseas; 5) curbs for some deductions, such as R&D, domestic production and tax-loss carry-forwards. Corporate tax cuts will give a one-off boost to earnings, since the effective tax rate is currently over 25% (Chart 9, panel 1), with telecoms, utilities and industrials likely to be the biggest beneficiaries. This is not fully priced into stocks, since companies with high tax rates have seen their stock prices rise only moderately (Chart 9, panel 2). BCA's sector strategists expect that capex will especially be boosted: they estimate that the one-year depreciation increases net present value by 14% (Table 1).2 This should be positive for the Industrials sector (supplying the capital goods) and for Financials (which will see increased demand for loans). We are overweight both. Chart 9Tax Cuts Should Boost Earnings Tax Cuts Should Boost Earnings Tax Cuts Should Boost Earnings Table 1 Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 Is Bitcoin A Bubble, And What Happens When It Bursts? The recent surge in prices (Chart 10) of virtual currencies has pushed Bitcoin and aggregate cryptocurrency market cap to $275 billion and $500 billion respectively. The recent violent run-up certainly bears a close resemblance to classic bubbles, but the impact of a sharp correction should be minimal on the real economy and traditional capital markets. As mentioned above, the market cap of cryptocurrencies has reached $500 billion. Globally, there is about $6 trillion in currency3 outstanding, so the value of virtual currencies is now 8% that of traditional fiat currency. Additionally, an estimated 1000 people own about 40% of the world's total bitcoin, for an average of about $105 million per person. At the moment, the macro impact has been constrained by the fact that most people are buying bitcoins as a store of value (Chart 11) or vehicle for speculation, rather than as a medium of exchange. However, when the public begins to regard them as legitimate substitutes for traditional fiat currencies, their impact will be felt on the real economy. Chart 10A Classic Bubble A Classic Bubble A Classic Bubble Chart 11Bitcoin Trading Volume By Top Three Currencies Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 That would raise the issue of regulation. The U.S. government generates close to $70 billion per year as "seigniorage revenue." Governments across the world have no intention of losing this revenue, and would most likely introduce their own competitors to bitcoin. Until then, the biggest potential impact of these private currencies might be to spur inflation in the fiat currencies in which their prices are measured. That would be bad for government bonds, but potentially good for stocks. A further risk - and a similarity with the real estate bubble of 2007 - is the use of leverage. The news of a Tokyo-based exchange (BitFyler) offering up to 15x leverage for the purchase of bitcoins has spooked investors. However, the U.S. housing market is valued at $29.6 trillion, almost 60 times that of cryptocurrencies. Finally, the 19th century free banking era in the U.S., which at one point saw 8000 different currencies in circulation, experienced multiple banking crises. A world with myriad private currencies all competing with one another would be similarly unstable. Why Did The U.S. Dollar Weaken In 2017, And Where Will It Go In 2018? Chart 12Positioning And Relative Rates Supportive For USD Positioning And Relative Rates Supportive For USD Positioning And Relative Rates Supportive For USD We were wrong to be bullish on U.S. dollar at the start of 2017. We think the dollar weakness during most of the year can be attributed to the fact that investors were massively long the dollar at the end of 2016 (Chart 12, panel 2), which made the market particularly vulnerable to surprises. Several surprises did come: inflation softened in the U.S. but strengthened in the euro area. There were also positive geopolitical surprises in Europe - for example the victory of Emmanuel Macron in the French presidential election - while the failure to repeal Obamacare in the U.S. raised investors' concerns on the administration's ability to undertake fiscal stimulus. As a result, the U.S. dollar depreciated against euro despite widening interest rate differentials (Chart 12 panel 4) in 2017. Chart 13late Cycle Outperformance late Cycle Outperformance late Cycle Outperformance Since investors are now aggressively short the dollar, the hurdle for the greenback to deliver positive surprises is much lower than a year ago. Since the Senate passed the Republican tax bill in early December, we have already seen some recovery in the dollar (Chart 12, panel 1). As the labor market continues to firm, with GDP running above potential, U.S. inflation should finally start to pick up in 2018, which will allow the Fed to hike rates, possibly as many as four times during the year. This will contrast with the macro situation overseas: Japan and Europe are likely to continue loose monetary policy to maintain the momentum in their economies. All this should be supportive of the dollar. Are Convertible Bonds Attractive Over The Next 12 Months? With valuations for traditional assets expensive and investors' thirst for yield continuing, the market is in need of alternative sources of return. Convertible bonds offer a hybrid credit/equity exposure, giving investors the option to participate in rising equity markets but with less risk. An allocation to convertibles could prove attractive for the following reasons: Convertible bonds typically outperform high-yield debt in the late stages of bull markets, because of their relatively lower exposure to credit spreads. Junk spreads have a history of starting to widen before equity bear markets begin. Fifty percent of the convertibles index comprises issuance from small-cap and mid-cap firms. Although equity valuations are expensive, prices should continue to rise as long as inflation stays low. Additionally, our U.S. Investment Strategy service thinks that small-cap equities will outperform large caps in the coming months, partly because the likely cuts in U.S. corporate taxes will disproportionately benefit smaller companies. Convertible bonds do appear somewhat cheap relative to equities (Chart 13, panel 3) but, on balance, there is not a strong valuation case for the asset class. Equities appear fairly valued relative to junk bonds, and convertibles are trading at an elevated investment premium. However, valuation is not likely to be a significant headwind to the typical late-cycle outperformance of convertibles versus high yield. biggest near-term risk for convertibles relative to high yield stems from the technology sector, which makes up 35% of the convertibles index. Technology convertible bonds have strongly outperformed their high-yield counterparts in recent months (Chart 13, panel 4), and are possibly due for a period of underperformance. We recommend investors stay cautious on technology convertibles. Other Than U.S. Tips, What Other Inflation-Linked Bonds Do You Like? Our research shows that inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) are a good inflation hedge in a rising inflationary environment.4 With our house view of rising inflation in 2018, we have been overweight U.S. Tips over nominal Treasury bonds as the U.S. is the most liquid market for inflation-linked bonds, with a market cap of over US$ 1.2 trillion. Outside the U.S., we favor ILBs in Japan and Australia, while we suggest investors to avoid ILBs in the U.K. and Germany (even though the U.K. linkers' market is the second largest after the U.S.), for the following two key reasons: First, even though inflation is below target in Japan, Australia and the euro area, while above target in the U.K., in all of these markets, inflation has bottomed, as shown in Chart 14. Second, our breakeven fair-value models, which are based on trade-weighted currencies, the Brent oil price in local currencies, and stock-to-bond total-return ratios, indicate that ILBs are undervalued in Japan and Australia, while overvalued in the U.K. and Germany, as shown in Chart 15. Chart 14Inflation Dynamics Inflation Dynamics Inflation Dynamics Chart 15Where to Buy Inflation? Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 The shorter duration (in real terms) of ILBs are an added bonus which fits well with our overall underweight duration positioning in the government bond universe. Global Economy Overview: Growth in developed economies remains strong and there is little in the data to suggest it will slow. This is likely to push up inflation and interest rates, especially in the U.S., over the next six to 12 months. Prospects for emerging markets, however, are less encouraging given that China is likely to slow moderately as it pushes ahead with reforms. U.S.: U.S. growth momentum remains very strong. GDP growth in the past two quarters has come in over 3%, and NowCasts for Q4 point to 2.9-3.9%. The Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 16, panel 1) has surged since June, and the Manufacturing ISM is at 53.9 and the Non-Manufacturing at 57.4 (panel 2). The worst that can be said is that momentum will be unable to continue at this rate but, with business confidence high, wage growth likely to pick up in 2018, and some positive impacts from tax cuts, no significant slowdown is in sight. Euro Area: Given its stronger cyclicality and ties to the global trade cycle, euro zone growth has surprised on the upside even more strongly than in the U.S. The Manufacturing PMI reached 60.6 in December (its highest level since 2000), and GDP growth in Q3 accelerated to 2.6% QoQ annualized. The euro's strength in 2017 seems to have done little to dent growth, and even weaker members of the euro zone such as Italy have seen improving GDP growth (1.7% in Q3). With the ECB reining back monetary easing only slightly, and banking problems shelved for now, growth should remain resilient in early 2018. Japan: Retail sales saw some weakness in October (-0.2% YoY), probably because of bad weather, but elsewhere data looks robust. Q3 GDP came in at 1.3% QoQ annualized and export growth remains strong at 14% YoY. There are even some signs of life in the domestic economy, with wages finally picking up a little (+0.9% YoY), driven by labor shortages among part-time workers, and consumer confidence at a four-year high. Inflation has been slow to rise, but at least core core inflation (the Bank of Japan's favorite measure) is now in positive territory at +0.2%. Emerging Markets: Chinese credit and monetary series, historically good lead indicators for the real economy, continue to decline (M2 growth in October of 8.8% was the lowest since data started in 1996). But, for now, economic growth has held up, with the Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing PMIs both stably above 50 (Chart 17, panel 3). Key will be how much the government's moves to deleverage the financial system and implement structural reform in 2018 will slow growth. Elsewhere in emerging markets, economic growth remains sluggish, with GDP growth in Brazil barely rebounding to 1.4% YoY, Russia to 1.8%, and India slowing to 6.3% (down from over 9% in early 2016). Chart 16Growth Momentum Very Strong Growth Momentum Very Strong Growth Momentum Very Strong Chart 17Will China And EM Slow in 2018? Will China And EM Slow in 2018? Will China And EM Slow in 2018? Interest rates: We expect U.S. inflation to pick up in 2018, as the lagged effects of 2017's stronger growth and the weak dollar start to come through, amid higher oil prices and rising wages. We, along with the Fed, expect core PCE inflation to rise to 2% during the year. This means the Fed is likely to raise rates four times, compared to market expectations of twice. Consequently, we see the 10-year Treasury yield over 3% by mid-year. In the euro zone, the still-large output gap means inflation is less likely to surprise on the upside, allowing the ECB to keep negative rates until well into 2019. The Bank of Japan is unlikely to alter its Yield Curve Control, given the signal this would send to the market when inflation expectations are still well below its 2% target (Chart 17, panel 4). Chart 18Equities: Priced for Perfection Equities: Priced for Perfection Equities: Priced for Perfection Global Equities Still Cautiously Optimistic: Our pro-cyclical equity positioning in 2017 worked very well in terms of country allocation (overweight euro zone and Japan in the DM universe) and global sector allocation (favoring cyclicals vs defensives). The two calls that did not pan out were underweight EM equities vs. DM equities, which was partially offset by our positive stance on China within the EM universe, and the overweight of Energy, which was the worst performing sector of the year. The stellar equity performance in 2017 was largely driven by strong earnings growth. Margins improved in both DM and EM; earnings grew in all sectors, and analysts remained upbeat (Chart 18). Another important contributor to 2017 performance was the extraordinary performance of the Tech sector, especially in China: globally, tech returned 41.9%, outperforming the MSCI all country index by 18.9%. GAA's philosophy is to take risk where it is mostly likely be rewarded. In July, we took profits in our Tech overweight and used the funds to upgrade Financials to overweight from neutral. Then in October we started to reduce tracking risk by scaling down our active country bets, closing our overweight in the U.S. to reduce the underweight in EM. BCA's house view is for synchronized global growth to continue in 2018, but a possible recession in late 2019. We are a little concerned that equity markets are priced for perfection, given that our earnings model indicates a deceleration in the coming months mostly due to a base effect. As such, our combination of "close to shore" country allocation and "pro-cyclical" sector allocation is appropriate for the next 9-12 months. Country Allocation: Still Favor DM Over EM Chart 19China: From Tailwind to Headwind for EM ? China: From Tailwind to Headwind for EM ? China: From Tailwind to Headwind for EM ? Our longstanding call of underweight EM vs. DM since December 2013 was gradually reduced in scale, first in March 2016 (to -5 percentage points from -9) and then in October 2017 (further to -2 points). Going forward, investors should continue to maintain this slight underweight position in EM vs. DM. First, our positive stance on China proved to be timely as shown in Chart 19, panel 4, with China outperforming EM by 54.1% since March 2016, and by 18.8% in 2017. Back then our positive stance on China was supported by attractive valuations (bottom panel) and our view that Chinese politics would be supportive for global growth in the run up to the 19th Party Congress. Now BCA's Geopolitical Strategists think that "China politics are shifting from a tailwind to a headwind for global growth and EM assets".5 In addition, Chinese equities are no longer valued at a discount to the EM average (bottom panel). Second, BCA's currency view is for continued strength in the USD, especially against emerging market currencies. This does not bode well for EM/DM performance in US dollar terms (Chart 19, panel 1). Third, EM money growth leads profit growth by about three months (Chart 19, panel 2). The rolling over in money growth indicates that the currently strong earnings growth may lose steam going forward, while relative valuation is in the fair-value zone (Chart 19, panel 3). Sector Allocation: Stay Overweight Energy Our pro-cyclical sector positioning has worked well in aggregate as the market-cap-weighted cyclical index significantly outperformed the defensive index in 2017. This positioning is also in line with BCA's house view of synchronized global growth and higher inflation expectations, which translates into two major sector themes: capex recovery and rising interest rates. (Please see detailed sector positioning on page 24.) Within the cyclical space, however, the Energy sector did not perform as expected in 2017 (Chart 20). It returned only 3.4%, underperforming the global aggregate by 19.6%. For the next 9-12 months, we recommend investors to stay overweight this underdog of 2017. Chart 20Energy Stocks Lagging Oil Price Energy Stocks Lagging Oil Price Energy Stocks Lagging Oil Price First, the energy sector is a major beneficiary from a capex recovery. There are already signs of a recovery in basic resources investment in the U.S.6 Second, the energy sector's relative return lagged oil price performance in 2017. Given the generally close correlation between earnings and the oil price, and between analyst earnings revisions and OECD oil inventory growth, earnings in the sector should outpace the broad market. Third, based on price-to-cash earnings, the energy sector is still trading at about a 30% discount to the broad market, and offers a much higher dividend yield (about 1.2 points higher) than the broad market. Even though these discounts are in line with historical averages, they are still supportive of an overweight. Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight Duration. One important theme for 2018 will be a resumption of the cyclical uptrend in inflation.7 The implications are that both nominal bond yields and break-even inflation rates will be higher in 2018. We have been underweight duration in government bonds since July 2016. Now with the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield at 2.35%, much lower than its fair value of 2.81%, there is considerable upside risk for global bond yields from current low levels. Investors should continue to underweight duration in global government bonds Maintain Overweight Tips Vs. Treasuries. The base-case forecast from our U.S. bond strategists is that the Tips breakeven rate will rise to 2.4-2.5% as U.S. core PCE reaches the Fed's 2% target, probably sometime in the middle of 2018. Compared to the current level of 1.87%, 10-yr Tips would have upside of 33-38 bps, an important source of return in the low-return fixed-income space (Chart 21, bottom panel). In terms of relative value, Tips are now slightly cheaper than nominal bonds, also supportive of the overweight stance. Underweight Canadian Government Bonds. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy has taken profits in their short Canada vs. U.S. and U.K. tactical position, as the market has become too aggressive in pricing in more rate hikes in Canada. Strategically, however, the underweight of Canada (Chart 22) in a hedged global portfolio is still appropriate because: 1) the output gap has closed in Canada, according to Bank of Canada estimates, and so any additional growth will translate into higher inflation; and 2) the rising CAD will not deter the BoC from more rate hikes if the oil prices remain strong. Chart 21U.S. Bond Yields Have Further To Rise U.S. Bond Yields Have Further To Rise U.S. Bond Yields Have Further To Rise Chart 22Strategic Underweight Canadian Bonds Strategic Underweight Canadian Bonds Strategic Underweight Canadian Bonds Corporate Bonds Our overweights through most of 2017 on spread product worked well: U.S. investment grade (IG) bonds returned around 290 bps over Treasuries in the year to end-November, and high-yield bonds almost 600 bps. Returns over the next 12 months are unlikely to be as attractive. Spreads (Chart 24) are now close to historic lows: the U.S. IG bond spread, at 90 bps, is only about 30 bps above its all-time record. High-yield valuations look a little more attractive: based on our model of probable defaults over the next 12 months, the default-adjusted spread over U.S. Treasuries is likely to be around 240 bps (Chart 25). In both cases, however, investors should expect little further spread contraction, meaning that credit is now no more than a carry trade. However, in an environment where rates remain fairly low and investors continue to stretch for yield, that pick-up will remain attractive in the absence of a significant turn-down in the economic cycle. The key to watch is the shape of the yield curve. An inverted yield curve in history has been an excellent indictor of the end of the credit cycle. We expect the yield curve to steepen somewhat in H1 2018, before flattening again and then inverting late in the year. Spread product is likely, therefore, to produce decent returns until that point. Thereafter, however, the deterioration of U.S. corporate health over the past three years (Chart 23) could mean a sharp sell-off in corporate bonds. This might be exacerbated by the recent popularity of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs: a small widening of spreads could be magnified by a panicked sell-off in such funds. Chart 23Rising Leverage May Worsen Sell-Off Rising Leverage May Worsen Sell-Off Rising Leverage May Worsen Sell-Off Chart 24Credit Spreads Close To Record Lows Credit Spreads Close To Record Lows Credit Spreads Close To Record Lows Chart 25But Default - Adjusted, Junk Still Looks Attractive But Default - Adjusted, Junk Still Looks Attractive But Default - Adjusted, Junk Still Looks Attractive Commodities Energy: Bullish Energy prices performed strongly in H2 2017, and we expect bullish sentiment to continue. OPEC 2.0 is likely to maintain production discipline, and will maintain its promised 1.8mm b/d production cuts through the end of 2018. Our estimates for global demand growth are higher than those of other forecasters. This, along with potential unplanned production outages in Iraq, Libya and Venezuela (together accounting for 7.4mm b/d of production at present), drives our above-consensus price forecast of $67 a barrel for Brent crude during 2018. Industrial Metals: Neutral Since China accounts for more than 50% of world base-metal consumption, prices will continue to be highly dependent on developments there. (Chart 26, panel 4). Since the government is trying to accelerate environmental and supply-side reforms, domestic production capacity for base metals will shrink, which will be a positive for global metals prices. However, a focus on deleveraging in the financial sector and restructuring certain industries could slow Chinese GDP growth, reducing base-metal demand. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold has risen by 12% in 2017, supported by an uncertain geopolitical environment coupled with low interest rates. We believe that geopolitical uncertainties will persist and may even intensify, and that inflation may rise in the U.S., which would be positives for gold (Chart 26, panel 3). Based on BCA's view that stock market could be at risk from the middle of 2018,8 a moderate gold holding is warranted as a safe-haven asset. However, rising interest rate and a potentially stronger U.S. dollar are likely to limit the upside for gold. Currencies USD: The currency is down over 6% on a trade-weighted basis over the past 12 months (Chart 27). Looking into 2018, the USD is likely to perform well in the first half. U.S. inflation should gather steam in the first two to three quarters, and the Fed will be able at least to follow its dot plot - something interest rate markets are not ready for. As investors remain short the USD, upside risk to U.S. interest rates should result in a higher dollar. Chart 26Bullish Oil, Neutral Metals Bullish Oil, Neutral Metals Bullish Oil, Neutral Metals Chart 27Dollar Likely To Appreciate Dollar Likely To Appreciate Dollar Likely To Appreciate EM/JPY: Carry trades are a key mechanism for redistributing global liquidity, and they have recently begun to lose steam. A crucial reason for this has been the policy tightening in China which has been the key driver of growth in EM economies. Additionally, Japanese flows have been chasing momentum into EM assets. Further tightening in EM could reverse the flows and initiate a flight to safety, favoring the yen relative to EM currencies. CHF: The currency continues to trade at a 5% premium to its PPP fair value against the euro. However, after considering Switzerland's net international investment position at 130% of GDP, the trade-weighted CHF trades in line with fair value. The CHF will continue to behave as a risk-off currency, and so long as global volatility remains well contained, EUR/CHF will experience appreciating pressure. GBP: Sterling continues to look cheap, trading at an 18% discount to PPP against the USD. However, Brexit remains a key problem. If future immigration is limited, the U.K. will see lower trend growth relative to its neighbors, forcing its equilibrium real neutral rate downward. Consequently, it will be more difficult to finance the current account deficit of 5% of GDP. Until negotiations with the EU come closer to completion, the pound will continue to offer limited reward and plenty of volatility. Alternatives Chart 28Favor Private Equity and Farmland Favor Private Equity and Farmland Favor Private Equity and Farmland Alternative assets under management (AUM) have reached a record $7.7 trillion in 2017. Lower fees and a broader range of investment types have helped attract more capital. Private equity remains the most popular choice,9 driven by its strong performance and transparency. Many investors have also shifted part of their allocations toward potentially higher-return private debt programs. Return Enhancers: Favor Private Equity Vs. Hedge Funds In 2017 so far, private equity has returned 12.1%, whereas hedge funds have managed only a 5.9% return (Chart 28). We expect private-equity fund-raising to continue into 2018, but with a larger focus on niche strategies with more favorable valuations. Additionally, deploying capital gradually not only provides for vintage-year diversification, but also creates opportunities for investors to benefit from potential market corrections. We continue to favor private equity over hedge funds outside of recessions. During a recession, we recommend investors take shelter in hedge funds with a macro mandate. Inflation Hedges: Favor Direct Real Estate Vs. Commodity Futures In 2017 to date, direct real estate has returned 5.1%, whereas commodity futures are down over 3.7%. Direct real estate as an asset class continues to provide valuable diversification, lower volatility, steady yields and an illiquidity premium. However, a slowdown in U.S. commercial real estate (CRE) has made us more cautious on the overall asset class. With regards to the commodity complex, the long-term transition of the global economy to a more renewables-focused energy base will continue the structural decline in commodity demand. We continue to stress the structural and long-term nature of our negative recommendation on commodities. Volatility Dampeners: Favor Farmland & Timberland Vs. Structured Products In 2017 to date, farmland and timberland have returned 3.2% and 2.1% respectively, whereas structured products are up 3.7%. Farmland continues to outperform timberland. The slow U.S. housing recovery has added downward pressure to timberland returns. Investors can reduce the volatility of a traditional multi-asset portfolio with inclusion of farm and timber assets. For structured products, low spreads in an environment of tightening commercial real estate lending standards and falling CRE loan demand, warrant an underweight. Risks To Our View We think upside and downside risks to our central scenario for 2018 - slowing but robust economic growth, and continuing moderate outperformance of risk assets - are roughly evenly balanced. On the negative side, perhaps the biggest risk is China, where the slowdown already suggested in the monetary data (Chart 29) could be exacerbated if the government pushes ahead aggressively with structural reforms. Geopolitical risks, which the market over-emphasized in 2017, seem under-estimated now.10 U.S. trade policy, Italian elections, and North Korea all have potential to derail markets. Also, when the U.S. yield curve is as flat as it is currently, small risks can be blown up into big sell-offs. This is particularly so given over-stretched valuations for almost all asset classes. Chart 29China Monetary Conditions Suggest A Slowdown China Monetary Conditions Suggest A Slowdown China Monetary Conditions Suggest A Slowdown Table 2How Will Trump Try To Influence The Fed? Quarterly - December 2017 Quarterly - December 2017 The most likely positive surprise could come from a dovish Fed. New Fed chair Jay Powell is something of an unknown quantity, and the White House could use the three remaining Fed vacancies to push the Fed to keep rates low, so as not to offset the positive effect of the tax cuts. Without these new appointees, the Fed would have a slightly more hawkish bias in 2018 (Table 2). The intellectual argument for hiking only slowly would be, as Janet Yellen said last month: "It can be quite dangerous to allow inflation to drift down and not to achieve over time a central bank's inflation target." The Fed has missed its 2% target for five years. It is possible to imagine a situation where the Fed increasingly makes excuses to keep monetary policy easy (encouraged, for example, by a short-lived sell-off in markets or a slowdown in China) and this causes a late-cycle blow-out, similar to 1999. 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When To Get Out," dated December 8, 2017 available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, "Tax Cuts Are Here - Sector Implications," dated December 12, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 CBNK Survey: Monetary Base, Currency in Circulation. Source: IMF - International Financial Statistics. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Two Virtuous Dollar Circles," dated October 28, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "High-Conviction Calls," dated November 27, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated 20 November 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Outlook 2018 - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course," dated November 20, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 Source: BNY Mellon - The Race For Assets; Alternative Investments Surge Ahead. 10 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "From Overstated To Understated Risks," dated November 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. GAA Asset Allocation

Dear Client, I recorded a webcast with my colleague Caroline Miller earlier this week. Caroline and I discussed the recent tax legislation in the U.S. and other key investment topics. I hope you will find the time to listen in. I am also happy to announce that going forward, in addition to sending you my regular reports, I will be sharing my thoughts on the economy and markets through Twitter. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Some profit taking is likely over the next few weeks as U.S. equities discount a more realistic assessment of how lower tax rates will affect corporate cash flows. The cyclical picture for the U.S. and the global economy remains bright, implying that any correction will be short-lived. History suggests that the 7th and 8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the most profitable for equity investors. With another recession still at least a year away, it is too early to get bearish on stocks and other risk assets. Feature Tax Cuts Arrive Early We had expected the Republicans in Congress to deliver on their pledge to cut taxes, but thought that the legislative process would drag on for longer than it did. In the end, the Senate was able to pass a hastily negotiated bill, giving Donald Trump his first major political victory. The question is where things go from here. The Senate and House bills still need to be reconciled. We do not anticipate much drama in that regard, given the broad similarities between the two versions. The bigger issue is how the legislation will affect the economy and markets. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated in mid-November that the original Senate version of the bill would raise the level of real GDP by an average of 0.8% over the ten-year budget window.1 It is reasonable to assume that the final bill will boost GDP by a similar amount. The impact on growth is likely to be somewhat front-loaded, given that several provisions will either expire or be phased out after five years. We expect real GDP growth to be 0.2%-to-0.3% higher in 2018 and 2019 as a result of the legislation. This is not a particularly large effect, which explains why the bond market reaction has been fairly muted. The impact on corporate profits will be more pronounced, but even here, one should keep things in perspective. The final bill is likely to reduce corporate taxes by about $350 billion over the next ten years. The JCT's baseline assumes corporate tax receipts of $3.9 trillion over the next decade. Thus, the bill will probably reduce the effective corporate tax rate by a bit less than two percentage points, taking it down from 19% to 17%. This, in turn, implies an increase in after-tax corporate cash flows of about 2.5% (i.e., 83 divided by 81). The market ran up a lot more than that over the past few months. Thus, we would not be surprised to see some profit-taking over the coming weeks. Cyclical Picture Still Bright If such a stock market correction occurs, it would represent a buying opportunity. Historically, recessions and bear markets have gone hand in hand (Chart 1). Right now, none of our recession indicators are warning of an imminent downturn (Chart 2). Chart 1Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Chart 2ANo Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession No Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession No Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession Chart 2BNo Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession No Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession No Imminent Risk Of A U.S. Recession This reassuring conclusion is consistent with the signal from our forthcoming MacroQuant Model, which we will be discussing in greater detail in the months ahead. This ground-breaking model examines dozens of variables, including a number of BCA's proprietary indicators, in order to consistently and accurately project returns across the key asset classes, geographies, and time horizons. Currently, the model is flagging a somewhat elevated risk of a temporary pullback, but continues to give a highly bullish reading on the cyclical (6-to-12 month) outlook (Chart 3). Chart 3BCA's MacroQuant Model Still Likes Equities When To Get Out When To Get Out The model's auspicious assessment largely stems from the strength of recent economic data in the U.S. and around the world. Global growth estimates continue to grind higher (Chart 4). In the U.S., the new orders component of the ISM manufacturing index rose to 64 in November, while the inventory component sank to 47. We have found that the gap between the two is a powerful predictor of stock market returns (Chart 5). The current gap is in the 87th percentile of its historic range. By the same token, core durable goods orders, initial unemployment claims, capex intentions, consumer and business confidence, global PMIs, and most other leading indicators paint a fairly upbeat picture. Chart 4Global Growth Projections Are Trending Higher Global Growth Projections Are Trending Higher Global Growth Projections Are Trending Higher Chart 5ISM As A Predictor Of Market Returns When To Get Out When To Get Out The euro area and Japan also continue to grow at a robust pace (Chart 6). Somewhat worryingly, China has seen growth tick down a notch in recent months (Chart 7). However, the evidence so far suggests that growth has merely slowed from an above-trend pace back towards potential. Nominal GDP rose by 11.2% year-over-year in Q3 2017, up from 6.4% in Q4 2015. Producer price inflation has gone from as low as negative 5.9% in September 2015 to 6.9% at present. Core CPI inflation has also accelerated, rising to 2.3% in October (Chart 8). In this light, recent efforts by the authorities to expedite structural reforms are coming at an opportune time. Chart 6Positive Growth Momentum ##br##In The Euro Area And Japan Positive Growth Momentum In The Euro Area And Japan Positive Growth Momentum In The Euro Area And Japan Chart 7Growth Has Ticked Down##br## In China... Growth Has Ticked Down In China... Growth Has Ticked Down In China... Chart 8... But Merely From##br## An Above-Trend Pace ... But Merely From An Above-Trend Pace ... But Merely From An Above-Trend Pace Too Early To Bail Out Of Stocks Table 1Stocks And Recessions: Case-By-Case When To Get Out When To Get Out All good things must come to an end. As we discussed in our latest Strategy Outlook, the global economy is likely to fall into recession in late 2019.2 Markets will sniff out a recession before it happens, but in general, the lag time between when markets peak and when recessions begin does not tend to be very long. Table 1 shows that the lag has averaged seven months during the post-war era, with the past three recessions featuring an average gap of only four months. In fact, history suggests that the 7th and 8th innings of business-cycle expansions are often the most profitable for investors. The S&P 500 has delivered an average annualized real total return of 14.2% since 1950 in the 13-to-24 months prior to past U.S. recessions (Table 2). This exceeds the average return of 10.1% during business-cycle expansions. The S&P has returned 8% at an annualized pace in the 7-to-12 months prior to past recessions. While this is below the average return during past expansions, it is still well above the average return on bonds and cash during the corresponding periods. Moreover, the performance of stocks in the 7-to-12 month period preceding recessions has improved sharply over the past few business cycles. The S&P 500 generated an annualized real total return of 22.2%, 20%, and 13.6% in the 7-to-12 months prior to the beginning of the 1990-91, 2001, and 2007-09 recessions, respectively. Table 2How Have Stocks Performed Prior To Recessions? When To Get Out When To Get Out Stocks only begin to underperform in a meaningful way in the six months before the recession and continue to underperform in the initial phase of the downturn. Thus, even if one had known with complete certainty that a recession was coming, getting out of stocks more than six months in advance of the downturn would have been a mistake. Bottom line: With another recession still at least a year away, it is too early to get bearish on equities and other risk assets. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Macroeconomic Analysis Of The "Tax Cut And Jobs Act" As Ordered Reported By The Senate Committee On Finance On November 16, 2017," The Joint Committee On Taxation, U.S. Congress (November 30, 2017). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Outlook, "A Timeline For The Next Five Years," dated December 1, 2017. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Dear Client, This is the second of a two-part Special Report imagining a hypothetical timeline of key economic and financial events spanning the next five years. Last week's report covered the period from the present to the brewing crisis in October 2019. This week's report examines the subsequent three years. Broadly speaking, the events described in these two reports correspond with our view that the global economy will continue to expand into the second half of 2019, before succumbing to a recession and a decade of stagflation in the 2020s. This warrants an overweight position in risk assets for the next 6-to-12 months, but a much more cautious stance thereafter. Charts 1-4 provide a visual representation of how we see the main asset classes evolving over the coming years. In addition to this report, we are publishing our monthly Tactical Asset Allocation table and supporting indicators today. These can be accessed directly from our website. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist III. The Reckoning Continued from last week... October 25, 2019: All hell breaks loose. North Korea's state broadcaster announces that Kim Jong-un has been "incapacitated". It later turns out that the tubby tyrant was killed by a group of military officers. Having not slept for days, Kim had become increasingly erratic and paranoid. Convinced that he was surrounded by spies and that Trump had deployed a secret weapon to read his mind, he ordered the execution of many people in his inner circle. Fearing for their lives, his henchmen decided to strike first. October 31, 2019: North Korea's new military rulers signal a desire for closer relations with China and a less belligerent posture towards the South. Over the coming decades, historians will debate whether Trump's tactics were a reckless gambit that luckily paid off, or the work of a master strategist playing 3D chess while everyone else was playing backgammon. Trump himself wastes no time in taking credit for ousting the Kim dynasty. November 4, 2019: The relief investors feel from the ebbing of tensions in the Korean Peninsula does not last long. The turmoil in emerging markets intensifies. A series of high-profile defaults rock the Chinese corporate debt market. Copper and iron ore prices nosedive. Brent swoons to $39/bbl. November 5, 2019: The head of Brazil's central bank resigns after the government pressures it to increase its holdings of government bonds in an effort to ward off an imminent default. The Brazilian real falls to nearly 6 against the dollar. Other EM currencies plunge. The Turkish lira is particularly badly hurt. December 6, 2019: The pain on Wall Street finally spreads to Main Street. U.S. payrolls rise by only 19,000 in November. Subsequent revisions ultimately show a drop of 45,000 for that month. The NBER will eventually go on to declare November as the start of the recession. December 11, 2019: Having raised rates just three months earlier, the FOMC cuts rates by 25 basis points and signals that it is willing to keep easing if economic conditions deteriorate further. December 16, 2019: Markets initially cheer the prospect of lower rates, but the euphoria is quickly forgotten. Credit spreads soar as investors price in an increasingly bleak economic outlook. Commercial real estate prices fall. Banks further tighten lending standards. IV. A Global Recession December 19, 2019: The recession spreads around the world. The ECB ditches plans to raise rates. The U.K., Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all cut rates. In the emerging world, Korea, Taiwan, and Poland reduce interest rates, but a number of other countries - most notably, Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia raise rates in a desperate bid to prop up their currencies so as to keep the local-currency value of their foreign-currency obligations from spiraling out of control. December 31, 2019: The S&P 500 closes at 2194, down 21% for the year. Most other bourses fare even worse. The U.S. dollar, which peaked against the euro at $1.02 just six weeks earlier, finishes at $1.07. The 10-year Treasury yield closes at 2.37%, down 68 basis points on the year. The 10-year German bund yield falls back to 0.5%. January 11, 2020: In a surprise twist, WikiLeaks reveals that the CIA has found no credible evidence that Russia had any material influence over the 2016 elections, but that Putin has been trying to cultivate the impression that it did. The document disparagingly notes that "Putin has relished the U.S. media's characterization of him as a master political manipulator with global reach, when in fact he is just the ruler of an impoverished, demographically depleted, militarily overextended country." The Mueller probe fizzles out. January 27, 2020: Voting in the Democratic primaries begins. Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown lead a crowded field of hopefuls. Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden choose not to run. Brown enjoys the biggest lead against Trump in head-to-head polls, but his support among primary voters is weighed down by his status as a cisgendered white male. January 28, 2020: On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.K. holds another referendum - this one to ratify the separation agreement reached with the EU. The terms of the agreement are widely regarded as being highly unfavorable to the U.K. Prime Minister Corbyn, having formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP following elections in late 2018, makes it clear that a rejection of the deal is tantamount to a vote to stay in the EU. With the British economy in the doldrums, 53% of voters reject the deal. The U.K. remains in the EU. EUR/GBP falls to 0.84. January 29, 2020: The Fed cuts rates by another 25 basis points. Hiking rates once per quarter was good enough when unemployment was falling. However, now that the economy is on the rocks, the Fed reverts to a more aggressive loosening cycle, cutting rates once per meeting. Even so, a growing chorus of voices both inside and outside the Fed argue that it is not doing enough. February 17, 2020: Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren pull out ahead in the Democratic primaries. Similar to the Clinton/Sanders duel in 2016, Warren polls best among younger, whiter voters, while Harris leads among minorities and establishment Democrats. March 10, 2020: Donald Trump, seeing his poll numbers tank after the post-Korea bump, unilaterally raises trade barriers across a wide variety of industries. Foreign producers retaliate, leading to a contraction in global trade. April 26, 2020: Warren's relentless characterization of Harris as a shill for moneyed interests pays off. The Massachusetts senator secures the Democratic nomination. Hollywood celebrities line up to support Warren. Taylor Swift's silence on the matter is deafening, leading to a further increase in her album sales. June 5, 2020: The U.S. unemployment rate surges to 5.1%. Corporate America sees a wave of business closings, with the retail sector being particularly badly hit. July 21, 2020: The bellwether German IFO index falls to a multi-year low. Germany's manufacturing sector feels the pinch from the collapse in demand for capital equipment, especially from emerging markets. Merkel's popularity plummets after it is revealed that she tried to suppress data that more than half of asylum seekers classified as children were actually adults. Support for the Alternative for Deutschland Party, which by this time has greatly moderated its anti-EU rhetoric, rises sharply. August 17, 2020: The trade-weighted yen continues to strengthen, pushing Japan deeper into recession. In response, the Japanese government announces a major new stimulus package. In the clearest attempt yet to link fiscal with monetary policy, the authorities pledge to start issuing consumption vouchers to households, the value of which will be incrementally increased until long-term inflation expectations rise to the Bank of Japan's 2% target. The policy proves to be a smashing success. September 9, 2020: The U.S. presidential campaign ends up being even more divisive than the one in 2016. Unlike four years earlier, equities rally at any glimmer of hope that Trump will win. However, with unemployment rising, such moments prove few and far between. September 22, 2020: Senator Warren states on the campaign trail that she will not renominate Jay Powell in 2022 for a second term as Fed chair if she is elected president. Lael Brainard's name is floated as a likely replacement. V. The Return Of Stagflation October 13, 2020: Green shoots appear in the U.S. economy, marking the end of the recession. The unemployment rate rises for another two months, peaking at 6.8% in December. Other economies also begin to turn the corner. November 3, 2020: The tentative improvement in U.S. economic data happens too late to bail out Trump. Elizabeth Warren wins the presidential election. Warren loses Ohio but picks up Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. An influx of Democratic voters from Puerto Rico puts her over the top in Florida. The Democrats take back control of the Senate. November 4, 2020: The S&P 500 barely moves the day after the election, having already priced in the outcome months earlier. Still, at 2085, the index is 26% below its February 2019 peak. December 2, 2020: President-elect Warren pledges to introduce a major spending package after she is inaugurated. She brushes off concerns from some economists that fiscal stimulus is coming too late, noting that the unemployment rate is more than three points higher than it was one year earlier. Stocks rally on the news. January 27, 2021: The FOMC votes to keep rates on hold at 1%. Lael Brainard dissents, arguing that further monetary stimulus is necessary. March 19, 2021: The Chinese government shifts more bad loans from commercial banks into specially-designed state-owned asset management companies. The banks generally receive well above-market prices for their loans. Chinese bank shares move higher. April 2, 2021: Congress proposes to significantly raise taxes on higher-income earners and corporations with more than 500 employees and use the proceeds to fund an expansion of the Affordable Care Act. It also promises to introduces a "Tobin tax" on financial transactions. The post-election stock market rally fades. June 8, 2021: In a seminal speech, Lael Brainard argues that current inflation measures fail to adequately correct for technological improvements and other methodological issues. She suggests that this leads to an overstatement of the true level of inflation. The implication, she concludes, is that an inflation target of 2.5%-to-3% would be consistent with the Fed's existing mandate. September 24, 2021: Many Trump-era deregulation measures are rolled back. Anti-trust efforts are also ramped up. Despite an improving economy, the S&P 500 sinks to 2031, marking a five-year low. November 17, 2021: A wave of panic selling grips Wall Street. The S&P 500 crashes to 1969, down 31% from its February 2019 peak. As is often the case, this marks the bottom of the equity bear market. The subsequent recovery, however, proves to be tepid and prone to numerous setbacks. January 31, 2022: Thanks to ample fiscal stimulus, inflation in Japan rebounds from its recession lows. Aggregate income growth slows as more Japanese workers exit the labor force, but spending holds up as health care expenditures continue to climb. Japan's current account moves into a structural deficit position. February 16, 2022: Lael Brainard succeeds Jay Powell as Fed chair. The decision by Republicans in 2013 to reduce the number of senators necessary to approve appointments to the Fed board from 60 to 51 ensures smooth sailing for Brainard during congressional hearings and the confirmation of a slew of highly dovish candidates over the subsequent two years. April 6, 2022: China belatedly introduces modest financial incentives to encourage couples to have more children. The public jokingly dubs this as the new "at least one child policy". It ends up having little effect. Future Chinese scholars will end up describing China's failure to arrest the decline in its population as its greatest geopolitical blunder. July 20, 2022: The U.S. becomes the latest country to introduce strict restrictions on the use of bitcoin. Although the U.S. government never says so, fears that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will eat into the $75 billion in seigniorage revenue that the Treasury earns every year underpins the decision. The price of bitcoin falls to $550, down 95% from its all-time high. September 29, 2022: Japan officially abandons its yield-curve targeting regime. The 30-year yield rises to 2.5%. Faced with onerous long-term debt-servicing costs and stagnant tax revenues, the government starts refinancing much more of its debt through short-term borrowings. The Bank of Japan obliges, keeping short-term rates near zero. The combination of negative short-term real rates and higher inflation allows Japan to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This proves to be the modus operandi for Japan and many other fiscally-challenged governments over the coming decades. October 18, 2022: Productivity growth in most developed economies continues to disappoint. For the first time in modern history, the flow of new workers entering the labor force are no better skilled or educated than the ones leaving. With potential GDP growing at a lackluster pace, output gaps disappear, setting in motion the acceleration in inflation over the remainder of the decade. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield rises to 4%. It will be over 6% by the middle of the decade. November 22, 2022: The price of gold surpasses its previous high of $1895/oz. The 2020s turn out to be an excellent decade for bullion. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Market Outlook: Equities A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 2Market Outlook: Bonds A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 3Market Outlook: Currencies A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 4Market Outlook: Commodities A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Dear Client, In this report, we image a hypothetical timeline of key economic and financial events spanning the next five years. The events described in the report correspond with our view that the global economy will continue to expand into the second half of 2019, before succumbing to a recession and a decade of stagflation in the 2020s. This warrants an overweight position in risk assets for the next 6-to-12 months, but a much more cautious stance thereafter. Charts 1-4 provide a visual representation of how we see the main asset classes evolving over the coming years. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature I. The Blow-Off Phase December 4, 2017: U.S. stocks fall by 1.7% on reports that Mitch McConnell does not have enough votes to get the tax bill through the Senate. A sell-off in high-yield markets and a tightening of financial conditions in China aggravate the situation. December 13, 2017: The Fed hikes rates by 25 basis points, taking the Fed funds target range to 1.25%-to-1.5%. December 14, 2017: Global equities continue to weaken. The S&P 500 suffers its first 5% correction since June 2016. December 15, 2017: The correction ends on news that the Senate will consider a revised bill which trims the size of corporate tax cuts and uses the savings to finance a temporary reduction in payroll taxes. President Trump and House leaders promise to go along with the proposal. The PBoC also injects fresh liquidity into the Chinese financial system. December 29, 2017: Global equities rally into year-end. The S&P 500 hits 2571 on December 29, placing it just shy of its November high. The dollar also strengthens, with EUR/USD closing at 1.162. The 10-year Treasury yield finishes the year at 2.42%. January 10, 2018: The global cyclical bull market in stocks continues. European and Japanese indices power higher. Both the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 hit fresh record highs. EM stocks move up but lag their DM peers, weighed down by a stronger dollar. January 12, 2018: U.S. retail sales surprise on the upside. Department store stocks, having been written off for dead just a few months earlier, end up rising by an average of 40% between November 2017 and the end of January. February 14, 2018: The euro area economy continues to grow at an above-trend pace. Nevertheless, inflation stays muted due to high levels of spare capacity across most of the region and the lagged effects of a stronger euro. The 2-year OIS spread between the U.S. and the euro area widens to a multi-year high. February 26, 2018: China's construction sector cools a notch, but industrial activity remains robust, spurred on by a cheap currency, strong global growth, and rising producer prices. Chinese H-shares rise 13% year-to-date, beating out most other EM equity indices. March 14, 2018: The U.S., Canada, and Mexico reach a last-minute deal to preserve NAFTA. The Canadian dollar and Mexican peso breathe a sigh of relief. March 16, 2018: In a surprise decision, Donald Trump nominates Kevin Hassett as Fed vice-chair. Trump cites the "tremendous job" Hassett did in selling the GOP's tax cuts. A number of Fed appointments follow. Most of the picks turn out to be more hawkish than investors had expected. This gives the greenback further support. March 18, 2018: Pro-EU parties do better than anticipated in the Italian elections. Italian bond spreads compress versus the rest of Europe. March 21, 2018: The Fed raises rates again, bringing the fed funds target range up to 1.50%-to-1.75%. April 8, 2018: Bank of Japan governor Kuroda is granted another term in office. He pledges to remain single-mindedly focused on eradicating deflation. April 11, 2018: Chinese core CPI inflation reaches 2.9%. Producer price inflation stays elevated at 6%. A major market theme in 2018 turns out to be how China went from being a source of global deflationary pressures to a source of inflationary ones. April 30, 2018: U.S. core PCE inflation jumps 0.3% in March, reaching 1.7% on a year-over-year basis. Goods and service inflation both pick up, while the base effects from lower cell phone data charges in the prior year drop out of the calculations. May 17, 2018: Oil prices continue to rise on the back of ongoing discipline from OPEC and Russia, smaller-than-expected shale output growth, and production disruptions in Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela. June 13, 2018: Strong U.S. growth in the first half of the year, a larger-than-projected decline in the unemployment rate, and higher inflation keep the Fed in tightening mode. The FOMC hikes rates again. June 25, 2018: Global capital spending accelerates further. Global industrial stocks go on to have a banner year. June 27, 2018: Wage growth in the U.S. accelerates to a cycle high. Donald Trump takes credit, stating that "this wouldn't have happened" without him or his tax cuts. July 31, 2018: The Japanese labor market tightens further. The unemployment rate falls to 2.6%, 1.2 percentage points below 2007 levels, while the ratio of job vacancies-to-applicants moves further above its early-1990s bubble high. A number of high-profile companies announce plans to raise wages. August 2, 2018: A brief summer sell-off sees global equities dip temporarily, but strong global earnings growth keeps the cyclical bull market in stocks intact. August 28, 2018: The London housing market continues to weaken, with home prices falling by 9% from their peak. The rest of the U.K. economy remains fairly resilient, however. EUR/GBP closes at 0.87. August 31, 2018: The Greek bailout program ends and a new one begins. Greece's economy continues to recover, but Tsipras fails to obtain debt relief from creditors. September 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to a 49-year low of 3.7%, nearly a full percentage below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. September 26, 2018: The Fed raises rates again. By now, the market has gone from pricing in only two hikes for 2018 at the start of the year to pricing in almost four. September 27, 2018: Profit growth in the U.S. moderates somewhat as higher wage costs take a bite out of earnings. Nevertheless, stock market sentiment remains buoyant. Retail participation, which had been dormant for years, takes off. CNBC sees a surge in viewers. Micro cap stocks go wild. October 7, 2018: The outcome of Brazil's elections shows little appetite for major structural reforms. Economic populism lives on. October 31, 2018: Realized inflation and inflation expectations continue grinding higher in Japan, triggering market speculation that the BoJ will abandon its yield-curve targeting policy. The resulting rally in the yen is short-lived, however. At its monetary policy meeting, the Bank of Japan indicates that it has no near-term plans to modify its existing strategy. November 6, 2018: The Democrats narrowly regain control of the House but fail to recapture the Senate. Investors shrug off the results, figuring correctly that a Republican Senate will keep Trump's corporate tax cuts in place and that Democrats will agree to extend the expiring payroll tax cut and other tax measures that benefit the middle class. December 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to 3.5%. Donald Trump tweets "You're welcome, America". December 19, 2018: The Fed raises rates for the fourth time that year - one more hike than it had signaled in its December 2017 "dot plot" - taking the fed funds target range to 2.25%-2.5%. December 31, 2018: The MSCI All-Country Index finishes up 12% for the year (in local-currency terms), led by the euro area and Japan. U.S. stocks gain 8%. EM equities manage to rise 6%. Small caps edge out large caps, value stocks beat growth stocks, and cyclical stocks outperform defensives. December 31, 2018: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield finishes the year at 3.05%. German bund yields reach 0.82%, U.K. gilt yields rise to 1.7%, Canadian yields hit 2.3%, and Australian yields back up to 3%. Japanese 10-year yields remain broadly flat, but the 20-year yield moves up 40 basis points to nearly 1%. Credit spreads finish the year close to where they started, providing a modest carry pick-up over high-quality government bonds. December 31, 2018: The DXY index rises 4% to 98. EUR/USD closes at 1.11, USD/JPY at 123, GBP/USD at 1.31, and AUD/USD at 0.76. The Canadian dollar manages to edge up against the greenback on the year, with CAD/USD finishing at 0.81. The Chinese yuan also strengthens to 6.4 versus the dollar. December 31, 2018: Brent and WTI spot prices finish the year at $65 and $63, respectively. Copper and metal prices are broadly flat for the year, having faced the dueling forces of a stronger dollar (a negative) and above-trend global growth (a positive). Gold sinks to $1,226. II. The Clouds Darken February 22, 2019: The global economy starts to decelerate. The slowdown is led by China, where the government's crackdown on shadow banking activities begins to take a bigger toll on growth. Most measures of U.S. economic activity also soften somewhat in the first two months of the year. Investors take heart in the hope that the economy will achieve a soft landing, allowing the Fed to moderate the pace of rate hikes. February 27, 2019: In an otherwise mundane day, the S&P 500 edges up 0.3% to 2832. Little do investors know that this marks the cyclical peak in the U.S. stock market. March 13, 2019: Hopes that the Fed can take its foot off the brake are dashed when the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that inflation rose by more than expected in February. U.S. core CPI inflation increases to 2.9% while the core PCE deflator accelerates to 2.4%. Market chatter turns from whether the Fed can slow the pace of rate hikes to whether it needs to start hiking more rapidly than once-per-quarter. The S&P falls 2.1% on the day. March 20, 2019: The Fed lifts the funds rate target range to 2.5%-to-2.75% and signals a readiness to keep hiking rates. The 10-year Treasury yield rises to 3.3%. EUR/USD sinks to 1.08. The first quarter of 2019 marks a watershed of sorts. In 2018, the Fed raised rates because of stronger growth; in 2019, it kept raising them because of brewing inflation. As it turned out, risk assets were able to tolerate the former, but not the latter. March 29, 2019: The U.K. does not leave the EU two years after Britain invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU votes to prolong negotiations given growing political support within Britain for the country to remain part of the European bloc. April 5, 2019: The S&P 500 sinks further and is now 10% below its February high, returning close to where it was at the start of 2018. The increasingly sour mood on Wall Street does not appear to be hurting Main Street very much, however. The U.S. unemployment rate edges down further to 3.4%. Euro area growth remains resilient. May 31, 2019: The Brazilian government announces that the fiscal deficit will come in larger than originally expected. USD/BRL slips to 3.45. June 4, 2019: Jens Weidmann, who had gone out of his way to soften his hawkish rhetoric over the preceding months, is chosen to succeed Mario Draghi, whose term expires in October. Nevertheless, the euro still strengthens on the news. June 6, 2019: Markets temporarily regain their composure. The S&P 500 gets back to within 4% of its all-time high. The reprieve does not last long, however. June 12, 2019: The Fed hikes rates, taking the fed funds target range to 2.75%-to-3%. The FOMC cites inflation as its primary concern. July 8, 2019: Global risk assets weaken anew as a fiscal crisis grips Brazil. Turkey, South Africa, and a number of other emerging markets show increasing signs of fragility. August 20, 2019: Korean exports, a leading indicator of the global business cycle, decelerate once again. Global PMIs sag, as do most measures of business confidence. September 25, 2019: Despite a slowing U.S. economy, the Fed hikes rates again, bringing the fed funds target range to 3%-to-3.25%. The FOMC justifies the decision based on the fact that the unemployment rate is below NAIRU, core inflation is above the Fed's 2% target, and real rates are less than 1%. To assuage markets, Jay Powell suggests that the Fed could keep rates on hold in December. This turns out to be more prescient than he realizes. It will be another three years before the Fed raises rates again. By then, Powell is no longer the Fed chair. September 30, 2019: Commodity prices tumble, further adding to the pressure facing emerging markets. The U.S. yield curve inverts for the first time during this business cycle. The dollar, which previously strengthened due to a hawkish Fed, now starts strengthening on flight-to-safety flows back into the U.S. The yen appreciates even more than the greenback. October 15, 2019: The bottom falls out of the Canadian housing market. Home sales dry up and prices begin to sink. The Canadian dollar, which peaked back in February at 83 cents, falls to 74 cents against the U.S. dollar. October 19, 2019: A failed North Korean launch lands a missile 80 kilometres from Japanese shores. Prime Minister Abe pledges swift retaliation. October 21, 2019: The negative feedback loop between a rising dollar, falling commodity prices, and EM stress intensifies. Sentiment towards emerging markets deteriorates dramatically. Rumours begin to swirl that Brazil will miss a debt payment. October 23, 2019: Trump tweets "Dopey Rocketman thinks he is so smart, but we know where all his hideouts are. Sweet dreams!" October 24, 2019: News reports are abuzz about a massive buildup of troops on the North Korean side of the border. Panic grips Seoul. Asian bourses sell-off, taking global stock markets down with them. III. The Reckoning October 25, 2019: All hell breaks loose. North Korea's state broadcaster announces that Kim Jong-un has been "incapacitated". It later turns out that the tubby tyrant was killed by a group of military officers. Having not slept for days, Kim had become increasingly erratic and paranoid. Convinced that he was surrounded by spies and that Trump had deployed a secret weapon to read his mind, he ordered the execution of many people in his inner circle. Fearing for their lives, his henchmen decided to strike first. October 31, 2019: North Korea's new military rulers signal a desire for closer relations with China and a less belligerent posture towards the South. Over the coming decades, historians will debate whether Trump's tactics were a reckless gambit that luckily paid off, or the work of a master strategist playing 3D chess while everyone else was playing backgammon. Trump himself wastes no time in taking credit for ousting the Kim dynasty. November 4, 2019: The relief investors feel from the ebbing of tensions in the Korean Peninsula does not last long. The turmoil in emerging markets intensifies. A series of high-profile defaults rock the Chinese corporate debt market. Copper and iron ore prices nosedive. Brent swoons to $39/bbl. November 5, 2019: The head of Brazil's central bank resigns after the government pressures it to increase its holdings of government bonds in an effort to ward off an imminent default. The Brazilian real falls to nearly 6 against the dollar. Other EM currencies plunge. The Turkish lira is particularly badly hurt. December 6, 2019: The pain on Wall Street finally spreads to Main Street. U.S. payrolls rise by only 19,000 in November. Subsequent revisions ultimately show a drop of 45,000 for that month. The NBER will eventually go on to declare November as the start of the recession. December 11, 2019: Having raised rates just three months earlier, the FOMC cuts rates by 25 basis points and signals that it is willing to keep easing if economic conditions deteriorate further. December 16, 2019: Markets initially cheer the prospect of lower rates, but the euphoria is quickly forgotten. Credit spreads soar as investors price in an increasingly bleak economic outlook. Commercial real estate prices fall. Banks further tighten lending standards. IV. A Global Recession December 19, 2019: The recession spreads around the world. The ECB ditches plans to raise rates. The U.K., Sweden, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all cut rates. In the emerging world, Korea, Taiwan, and Poland reduce interest rates, but a number of other countries - most notably, Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia raise rates in a desperate bid to prop up their currencies so as to keep the local-currency value of their foreign-currency obligations from spiraling out of control. December 31, 2019: The S&P 500 closes at 2194, down 21% for the year. Most other bourses fare even worse. The U.S. dollar, which peaked against the euro at $1.02 just six weeks earlier, finishes at $1.07. The 10-year Treasury yield closes at 2.37%, down 68 basis points on the year. The 10-year German bund yield falls back to 0.5%. January 11, 2020: In a surprise twist, WikiLeaks reveals that the CIA has found no credible evidence that Russia had any material influence over the 2016 elections, but that Putin has been trying to cultivate the impression that it did. The document disparagingly notes that "Putin has relished the U.S. media's characterization of him as a master political manipulator with global reach, when in fact he is just the ruler of an impoverished, demographically depleted, militarily overextended country." The Mueller probe fizzles out. January 27, 2020: Voting in the Democratic primaries begins. Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown lead a crowded field of hopefuls. Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden choose not to run. Brown enjoys the biggest lead against Trump in head-to-head polls, but his support among primary voters is weighed down by his status as a cisgendered white male. January 28, 2020: On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.K. holds another referendum - this one to ratify the separation agreement reached with the EU. The terms of the agreement are widely regarded as being highly unfavorable to the U.K. Prime Minister Corbyn, having formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP following elections in late 2018, makes it clear that a rejection of the deal is tantamount to a vote to stay in the EU. With the British economy in the doldrums, 53% of voters reject the deal. The U.K. remains in the EU. EUR/GBP falls to 0.84. January 29, 2020: The Fed cuts rates by another 25 basis points. Hiking rates once per quarter was good enough when unemployment was falling. However, now that the economy is on the rocks, the Fed reverts to a more aggressive loosening cycle, cutting rates once per meeting. Even so, a growing chorus of voices both inside and outside the Fed argue that it is not doing enough. February 17, 2020: Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren pull out ahead in the Democratic primaries. Similar to the Clinton/Sanders duel in 2016, Warren polls best among younger, whiter voters, while Harris leads among minorities and establishment Democrats. March 10, 2020: Donald Trump, seeing his poll numbers tank after the post-Korea bump, unilaterally raises trade barriers across a wide variety of industries. Foreign producers retaliate, leading to a contraction in global trade. April 26, 2020: Warren's relentless characterization of Harris as a shill for moneyed interests pays off. The Massachusetts senator secures the Democratic nomination. Hollywood celebrities line up to support Warren. Taylor Swift's silence on the matter is deafening, leading to a further increase in her album sales. June 5, 2020: The U.S. unemployment rate surges to 5.1%. Corporate America sees a wave of business closings, with the retail sector being particularly badly hit. July 21, 2020: The bellwether German IFO index falls to a multi-year low. Germany's manufacturing sector feels the pinch from the collapse in demand for capital equipment, especially from emerging markets. Merkel's popularity plummets after it is revealed that she tried to suppress data that more than half of asylum seekers classified as children were actually adults. Support for the Alternative for Deutschland Party, which by this time has greatly moderated its anti-EU rhetoric, rises sharply. August 17, 2020: The trade-weighted yen continues to strengthen, pushing Japan deeper into recession. In response, the Japanese government announces a major new stimulus package. In the clearest attempt yet to link fiscal with monetary policy, the authorities pledge to start issuing consumption vouchers to households, the value of which will be incrementally increased until long-term inflation expectations rise to the Bank of Japan's 2% target. The policy proves to be a smashing success. September 9, 2020: The U.S. presidential campaign ends up being even more divisive than the one in 2016. Unlike four years earlier, equities rally at any glimmer of hope that Trump will win. However, with unemployment rising, such moments prove few and far between. September 22, 2020: Senator Warren states on the campaign trail that she will not renominate Jay Powell in 2022 for a second term as Fed chair if she is elected president. Lael Brainard's name is floated as a likely replacement. V. The Return Of Stagflation October 13, 2020: Green shoots appear in the U.S. economy, marking the end of the recession. The unemployment rate rises for another two months, peaking at 6.8% in December. Other economies also begin to turn the corner. November 3, 2020: The tentative improvement in U.S. economic data happens too late to bail out Trump. Elizabeth Warren wins the presidential election. Warren loses Ohio but picks up Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. An influx of Democratic voters from Puerto Rico puts her over the top in Florida. The Democrats take back control of the Senate. November 4, 2020: The S&P 500 barely moves the day after the election, having already priced in the outcome months earlier. Still, at 2085, the index is 26% below its February 2019 peak. December 2, 2020: President-elect Warren pledges to introduce a major spending package after she is inaugurated. She brushes off concerns from some economists that fiscal stimulus is coming too late, noting that the unemployment rate is more than three points higher than it was one year earlier. Stocks rally on the news. January 27, 2021: The FOMC votes to keep rates on hold at 1%. Lael Brainard dissents, arguing that further monetary stimulus is necessary. March 19, 2021: The Chinese government shifts more bad loans from commercial banks into specially-designed state-owned asset management companies. The banks generally receive well above-market prices for their loans. Chinese bank shares move higher. April 2, 2021: Congress proposes to significantly raise taxes on higher-income earners and corporations with more than 500 employees and use the proceeds to fund an expansion of the Affordable Care Act. It also promises to introduces a "Tobin tax" on financial transactions. The post-election stock market rally fades. June 8, 2021: In a seminal speech, Lael Brainard argues that current inflation measures fail to adequately correct for technological improvements and other methodological issues. She suggests that this leads to an overstatement of the true level of inflation. The implication, she concludes, is that an inflation target of 2.5%-to-3% would be consistent with the Fed's existing mandate. September 24, 2021: Many Trump-era deregulation measures are rolled back. Anti-trust efforts are also ramped up. Despite an improving economy, the S&P 500 sinks to 2031, marking a five-year low. November 17, 2021: A wave of panic selling grips Wall Street. The S&P 500 crashes to 1969, down 31% from its February 2019 peak. As is often the case, this marks the bottom of the equity bear market. The subsequent recovery, however, proves to be tepid and prone to numerous setbacks. January 31, 2022: Thanks to ample fiscal stimulus, inflation in Japan rebounds from its recession lows. Aggregate income growth slows as more Japanese workers exit the labor force, but spending holds up as health care expenditures continue to climb. Japan's current account moves into a structural deficit position. February 16, 2022: Lael Brainard succeeds Jay Powell as Fed chair. The decision by Republicans in 2013 to reduce the number of senators necessary to approve appointments to the Fed board from 60 to 51 ensures smooth sailing for Brainard during congressional hearings and the confirmation of a slew of highly dovish candidates over the subsequent two years. April 6, 2022: China belatedly introduces modest financial incentives to encourage couples to have more children. The public jokingly dubs this as the new "at least one child policy". It ends up having little effect. Future Chinese scholars will end up describing China's failure to arrest the decline in its population as its greatest geopolitical blunder. July 20, 2022: The U.S. becomes the latest country to introduce strict restrictions on the use of bitcoin. Although the U.S. government never says so, fears that bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will eat into the $75 billion in seigniorage revenue that the Treasury earns every year underpins the decision. The price of bitcoin falls to $550, down 95% from its all-time high. September 29, 2022: Japan officially abandons its yield-curve targeting regime. The 30-year yield rises to 2.5%. Faced with onerous long-term debt-servicing costs and stagnant tax revenues, the government starts refinancing much more of its debt through short-term borrowings. The Bank of Japan obliges, keeping short-term rates near zero. The combination of negative short-term real rates and higher inflation allows Japan to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This proves to be the modus operandi for Japan and many other fiscally-challenged governments over the coming decades. October 18, 2022: Productivity growth in most developed economies continues to disappoint. For the first time in modern history, the flow of new workers entering the labor force are no better skilled or educated than the ones leaving. With potential GDP growing at a lackluster pace, output gaps disappear, setting in motion the acceleration in inflation over the remainder of the decade. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield rises to 4%. It will be over 6% by the middle of the decade. November 22, 2022: The price of gold surpasses its previous high of $1895/oz. The 2020s turn out to be an excellent decade for bullion. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Chart 1Market Outlook: Equities A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 2Market Outlook: Bonds A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 3Market Outlook: Currencies A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Chart 4Market Outlook: Commodities A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II A Timeline For The Next Five Years: Part II Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Dear Client, This week's Global Investment Strategy Special Report is the first of a two-part series imagining a timeline of important economic and financial events spanning the next five years. This report covers the period from the present to the autumn of 2019. Next week's report will focus on the subsequent three years. We expect global growth to stay strong in 2018. Activity should slow in early 2019, culminating in a recession later that year, followed by a decade of stagflation in the 2020s. Historically, equity markets have led recessions by anywhere between three-to-twelve months. The scenario envisioned in this report sees stocks peaking in February 2019, but an earlier climax is possible. As such, we are likely to turn more cautious towards risk assets in the second half of next year. In addition to this week's report, we sent you our annual outlook on Monday, featuring a discussion between BCA editors and Mr. X, a long-standing client of the firm, as well as his daughter, Ms. X. My colleague, Caroline Miller, will be doing a webcast on the BCA 2018 outlook on Wednesday, November 29th. We hope that you will find these reports informative and stimulating. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature I. The Blow-Off Phase December 4, 2017: U.S. stocks fall by 1.7% on reports that Mitch McConnell does not have enough votes to get the tax bill through the Senate. A sell-off in high-yield markets and a tightening of financial conditions in China aggravate the situation. December 13, 2017: The Fed hikes rates by 25 basis points, taking the Fed funds target range to 1.25%-to-1.5%. December 14, 2017: Global equities continue to weaken. The S&P 500 suffers its first 5% correction since June 2016. December 15, 2017: The correction ends on news that the Senate will consider a revised bill which trims the size of corporate tax cuts and uses the savings to finance a temporary reduction in payroll taxes. President Trump and House leaders promise to go along with the proposal. The PBoC also injects fresh liquidity into the Chinese financial system. December 29, 2017: Global equities rally into year-end. The S&P 500 hits 2571 on December 29, placing it just shy of its November high. The dollar also strengthens, with EUR/USD closing at 1.162. The 10-year Treasury yield finishes the year at 2.42%. January 10, 2018: The global cyclical bull market in stocks continues. European and Japanese indices power higher. Both the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 hit fresh record highs. EM stocks move up but lag their DM peers, weighed down by a stronger dollar. January 12, 2018: U.S. retail sales surprise on the upside. Department store stocks, having been written off for dead just a few months earlier, end up rising by an average of 40% between November 2017 and the end of January. February 14, 2018: The euro area economy continues to grow at an above-trend pace. Nevertheless, inflation stays muted due to high levels of spare capacity across most of the region and the lagged effects of a stronger euro. The 2-year OIS spread between the U.S. and the euro area widens to a multi-year high. February 26, 2018: China's construction sector cools a notch, but industrial activity remains robust, spurred on by a cheap currency, strong global growth, and rising producer prices. Chinese H-shares rise 13% year-to-date, beating out most other EM equity indices. March 14, 2018: The U.S., Canada, and Mexico reach a last-minute deal to preserve NAFTA. The Canadian dollar and Mexican peso breathe a sigh of relief. March 16, 2018: In a surprise decision, Donald Trump nominates Kevin Hassett as Fed vice-chair. Trump cites the "tremendous job" Hassett did in selling the GOP's tax cuts. A number of Fed appointments follow. Most of the picks turn out to be more hawkish than investors had expected. This gives the greenback further support. March 18, 2018: Pro-EU parties do better than anticipated in the Italian elections. Italian bond spreads compress versus the rest of Europe. March 21, 2018: The Fed raises rates again, bringing the fed funds target range up to 1.50%-to-1.75%. April 8, 2018: Bank of Japan governor Kuroda is granted another term in office. He pledges to remain single-mindedly focused on eradicating deflation. April 11, 2018: Chinese core CPI inflation reaches 2.9%. Producer price inflation stays elevated at 6%. A major market theme in 2018 turns out to be how China went from being a source of global deflationary pressures to a source of inflationary ones. April 30, 2018: U.S. core PCE inflation jumps 0.3% in March, reaching 1.7% on a year-over-year basis. Goods and service inflation both pick up, while the base effects from lower cell phone data charges in the prior year drop out of the calculations. May 17, 2018: Oil prices continue to rise on the back of ongoing discipline from OPEC and Russia, smaller-than-expected shale output growth, and production disruptions in Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela. June 13, 2018: Strong U.S. growth in the first half of the year, a larger-than-projected decline in the unemployment rate, and higher inflation keep the Fed in tightening mode. The FOMC hikes rates again. June 25, 2018: Global capital spending accelerates further. Global industrial stocks go on to have a banner year. June 27, 2018: Wage growth in the U.S. accelerates to a cycle high. Donald Trump takes credit, stating that "this wouldn't have happened" without him or his tax cuts. July 31, 2018: The Japanese labor market tightens further. The unemployment rate falls to 2.6%, 1.2 percentage points below 2007 levels, while the ratio of job vacancies-to-applicants moves further above its early-1990s bubble high. A number of high-profile companies announce plans to raise wages. August 2, 2018: A brief summer sell-off sees global equities dip temporarily, but strong global earnings growth keeps the cyclical bull market in stocks intact. August 28, 2018: The London housing market continues to weaken, with home prices falling by 9% from their peak. The rest of the U.K. economy remains fairly resilient, however. EUR/GBP closes at 0.87. August 31, 2018: The Greek bailout program ends and a new one begins. Greece's economy continues to recover, but Tsipras fails to obtain debt relief from creditors. September 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to a 49-year low of 3.7%, nearly a full percentage below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. September 26, 2018: The Fed raises rates again. By now, the market has gone from pricing in only two hikes for 2018 at the start of the year to pricing in almost four. September 27, 2018: Profit growth in the U.S. moderates somewhat as higher wage costs take a bite out of earnings. Nevertheless, stock market sentiment remains buoyant. Retail participation, which had been dormant for years, takes off. CNBC sees a surge in viewers. Micro cap stocks go wild. October 7, 2018: The outcome of Brazil's elections shows little appetite for major structural reforms. Economic populism lives on. October 31, 2018: Realized inflation and inflation expectations continue grinding higher in Japan, triggering market speculation that the BoJ will abandon its yield-curve targeting policy. The resulting rally in the yen is short-lived, however. At its monetary policy meeting, the Bank of Japan indicates that it has no near-term plans to modify its existing strategy. November 6, 2018: The Democrats narrowly regain control of the House but fail to recapture the Senate. Investors shrug off the results, figuring correctly that a Republican Senate will keep Trump's corporate tax cuts in place and that Democrats will agree to extend the expiring payroll tax cut and other tax measures that benefit the middle class. December 7, 2018: The U.S. unemployment rate falls to 3.5%. Donald Trump tweets "You're welcome, America". December 19, 2018: The Fed raises rates for the fourth time that year - one more hike than it had signaled in its December 2017 "dot plot" - taking the fed funds target range to 2.25%-2.5%. December 31, 2018: The MSCI All-Country Index finishes up 12% for the year (in local-currency terms), led by the euro area and Japan. U.S. stocks gain 8%. EM equities manage to rise 6%. Small caps edge out large caps, value stocks beat growth stocks, and cyclical stocks outperform defensives. December 31, 2018: The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield finishes the year at 3.05%. German bund yields reach 0.82%, U.K. gilt yields rise to 1.7%, Canadian yields hit 2.3%, and Australian yields back up to 3%. Japanese 10-year yields remain broadly flat, but the 20-year yield moves up 40 basis points to nearly 1%. Credit spreads finish the year close to where they started, providing a modest carry pick-up over high-quality government bonds. December 31, 2018: The DXY index rises 4% to 98. EUR/USD closes at 1.11, USD/JPY at 123, GBP/USD at 1.31, and AUD/USD at 0.76. The Canadian dollar manages to edge up against the greenback on the year, with CAD/USD finishing at 0.81. The Chinese yuan also strengthens to 6.4 versus the dollar. December 31, 2018: Brent and WTI spot prices finish the year at $65 and $63, respectively. Copper and metal prices are broadly flat for the year, having faced the dueling forces of a stronger dollar (a negative) and above-trend global growth (a positive). Gold sinks to $1,226. II. The Clouds Darken February 22, 2019: The global economy starts to decelerate. The slowdown is led by China, where the government's crackdown on shadow banking activities begins to take a bigger toll on growth. Most measures of U.S. economic activity also soften somewhat in the first two months of the year. Investors take heart in the hope that the economy will achieve a soft landing, allowing the Fed to moderate the pace of rate hikes. February 27, 2019: In an otherwise mundane day, the S&P 500 edges up 0.3% to 2832. Little do investors know that this marks the cyclical peak in the U.S. stock market. March 13, 2019: Hopes that the Fed can take its foot off the brake are dashed when the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that inflation rose by more than expected in February. U.S. core CPI inflation increases to 2.9% while the core PCE deflator accelerates to 2.4%. Market chatter turns from whether the Fed can slow the pace of rate hikes to whether it needs to start hiking more rapidly than once-per-quarter. The S&P falls 2.1% on the day. March 20, 2019: The Fed lifts the funds rate target range to 2.5%-to-2.75% and signals a readiness to keep hiking rates. The 10-year Treasury yield rises to 3.3%. EUR/USD sinks to 1.08. The first quarter of 2019 marks a watershed of sorts. In 2018, the Fed raised rates because of stronger growth; in 2019, it kept raising them because of brewing inflation. As it turned out, risk assets were able to tolerate the former, but not the latter. March 29, 2019: The U.K. does not leave the EU two years after Britain invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The EU votes to prolong negotiations given growing political support within Britain for the country to remain part of the European bloc. April 5, 2019: The S&P 500 sinks further and is now 10% below its February high, returning close to where it was at the start of 2018. The increasingly sour mood on Wall Street does not appear to be hurting Main Street very much, however. The U.S. unemployment rate edges down further to 3.4%. Euro area growth remains resilient. May 31, 2019: The Brazilian government announces that the fiscal deficit will come in larger than originally expected. USD/BRL slips to 3.45. June 4, 2019: Jens Weidmann, who had gone out of his way to soften his hawkish rhetoric over the preceding months, is chosen to succeed Mario Draghi, whose term expires in October. Nevertheless, the euro still strengthens on the news. June 6, 2019: Markets temporarily regain their composure. The S&P 500 gets back to within 4% of its all-time high. The reprieve does not last long, however. June 12, 2019: The Fed hikes rates, taking the fed funds target range to 2.75%-to-3%. The FOMC cites inflation as its primary concern. July 8, 2019: Global risk assets weaken anew as a fiscal crisis grips Brazil. Turkey, South Africa, and a number of other emerging markets show increasing signs of fragility. August 20, 2019: Korean exports, a leading indicator of the global business cycle, decelerate once again. Global PMIs sag, as do most measures of business confidence. September 25, 2019: Despite a slowing U.S. economy, the Fed hikes rates again, bringing the fed funds target range to 3%-to-3.25%. The FOMC justifies the decision based on the fact that the unemployment rate is below NAIRU, core inflation is above the Fed's 2% target, and real rates are less than 1%. To assuage markets, Jay Powell suggests that the Fed could keep rates on hold in December. This turns out to be more prescient than he realizes. It will be another three years before the Fed raises rates again. By then, Powell is no longer the Fed chair. September 30, 2019: Commodity prices tumble, further adding to the pressure facing emerging markets. The U.S. yield curve inverts for the first time during this business cycle. The dollar, which previously strengthened due to a hawkish Fed, now starts strengthening on flight-to-safety flows back into the U.S. The yen appreciates even more than the greenback. October 15, 2019: The bottom falls out of the Canadian housing market. Home sales dry up and prices begin to sink. The Canadian dollar, which peaked back in February at 83 cents, falls to 74 cents against the U.S. dollar. October 19, 2019: A failed North Korean launch lands a missile 80 kilometres from Japanese shores. Prime Minister Abe pledges swift retaliation. October 21, 2019: The negative feedback loop between a rising dollar, falling commodity prices, and EM stress intensifies. Sentiment towards emerging markets deteriorates dramatically. Rumours begin to swirl that Brazil will miss a debt payment. October 23, 2019: Trump tweets "Dopey Rocketman thinks he is so smart, but we know where all his hideouts are. Sweet dreams!" October 24, 2019: News reports are abuzz about a massive buildup of troops on the North Korean side of the border. Panic grips Seoul. Asian bourses sell-off, taking global stock markets down with them. III. The Reckoning October 25, 2019: All hell breaks loose ... To be continued next week. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Mr. X is a long-time BCA client who visits our offices toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This year, Mr. X introduced us to his daughter, who we shall identify as Ms. X. She has many years of experience as a portfolio manager, initially in a wealth management firm, and subsequently in two major hedge funds. In 2017, she joined her father to help him run the family office portfolio. She took an active role in our recent discussion and this report is an edited transcript of our conversation. Mr. X: As always, it is a great pleasure to sit down with you to discuss the economic and investment outlook. And I am thrilled to bring my daughter to the meeting. She and I do not always agree on the market outlook and appropriate investment strategy, but even in her first year working with me she has added tremendous value to our decisions and performance. As you know, I have a very conservative bias in my approach and this means I sometimes miss out on opportunities. My daughter is more willing than me to take risks, so we make a good team. I am happy that our investment portfolio has performed well over the past year, but am puzzled by the high level of investor complacency. I can't understand why investors do not share my concerns about by sky-high valuations, a volatile geopolitical environment and the considerable potential for financial instability. Over the years, you have made me appreciate the power of easy money to create financial bubbles and also that market overshoots can last for a surprisingly long time. Thus, I am fully aware that we could easily have another year of strong gains, but were that to happen, I would worry about the potential for a sudden 1987-style crash. I remember that event well and it was an unpleasant experience. My inclination is to move right now to an underweight equity position. Ms. X: Let me add that I am delighted to finally attend the annual BCA meeting with my father. Over the years, he has talked to me at length about your discussions, making me very jealous that I was not there. He and I do frequently disagree about the outlook so it will be good to have BCA's independent and objective perspective. As my father noted, I do not always share his cautious bias. When I joined the family firm in early 2017, I persuaded him to raise our equity exposure and that was the right decision. I have been in the business long enough to know that it is dangerous to get more bullish as the market rises and I agree there probably is too much complacency. However, I do not see an early end to the conditions that are driving the bull market and I am inclined to stay overweight equities for a while longer. Thus, the big debate between us is whether or not we should now book profits from the past year's strong performance and move to an underweight stance in risk assets. Hopefully, this meeting will help us make the right decision. Chart 1An Impressive Bull Market An Impressive Bull Market An Impressive Bull Market BCA: First of all, we are delighted to see you both and look forward to getting to know Ms. X in the years to come. It is not a surprise that you are debating whether to cut exposure to risk assets because that question is on the mind of many of our clients. We share your surprise about complacency - investors have been seduced by the relentless upward drift of prices since early 2016. The global equity index has not suffered any setback above 2% during the past year, and that has to be close to a record (Chart 1). The conditions that have underpinned this remarkable performance are indeed still in place but we expect that to change during the coming year. Thus, if equity prices continue to rise, it would make sense to reduce exposure to risk assets to a neutral position over the next few months. A blow-off phase with a final spike in prices cannot be ruled out, but trying to catch those moves is a very high-risk strategy. We are not yet recommending underweight positions in risk assets, but if our economic and policy views pan out, we likely will shift in that direction in the second half of 2018. Ms. X: It seems that you are siding with my father in terms of wanting to scale back exposure to risk assets. That would be premature in my view and I look forward to discussing this in more detail. But first, I would be interested in reviewing your forecasts from last year. BCA: Of course. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: A number of important regime shifts will impact the economic and investment outlook over the next few years. These include the end of the era of falling inflation and interest rates, a move away from fiscal conservatism, a policy pushback against globalization, and a rise in the labor share of income at the expense of profit margins. Together with an earlier regime shift when the Debt Supercycle ended, these trends are consistent with very modest returns from financial assets over the next decade. The failure of low interest rates to trigger a vigorous rebound in private credit growth is consistent with our end-of-Debt Supercycle thesis. The end point for dealing with high debt levels may ultimately be sharply higher inflation, but only after the next downturn triggers a new deflationary scare. The potential for trade restrictions by the incoming U.S. administration poses a threat to the outlook, but the odds of a global trade war are low. Time lags in implementing policy mean that the fiscal plans of President-elect Trump will boost U.S. growth in 2018 more than 2017. This raises the risk of an overheated economy in 2018 leading to a monetary squeeze and recession in 2019. The key issue will be whether the supply side of the economy expands alongside increased demand and it will be critical to monitor business capital spending. Lingering structural problems will prevent any growth acceleration outside the U.S. The euro area and emerging economies are still in the midst of a deleveraging cycle and demographics remain a headwind for Japan. Not many countries will follow the U.S. example of fiscal stimulus. Nevertheless, for the first time since the recovery began, global growth forecasts are likely avoid a downgrade over the next couple of years. China remains an unbalanced and fragile economy but the authorities have enough policy flexibility to avoid a hard landing, at least over the year or two. The longer-run outlook is more bearish unless the government moves away from its stop-go policy approach and pursues more supply-side reforms. Inflation has bottomed in the U.S., but the upturn will be gradual in 2017 and it will stay subdued in the euro area and Japan. Divergences in monetary policy between the U.S. and other developed economies will continue to build in 2017 as the Fed tightens and other central banks stay on hold. Unlike a year ago, the Fed's rate expectations look reasonable. Bond yields in the U.S. may fall in the near run after their recent sharp rise, but the cyclical trend is up against a backdrop of monetary tightening, fiscal stimulus and rising inflation. Yields in the euro area will be held down by ongoing QE, while the 10-year yield will stay capped at zero in Japan. The secular bull market in bonds is over although yields could retest their recent lows in the next downturn. The search for yield will remain an important investment theme, but rich valuations dictate only a neutral weighting in investment-grade corporate bonds and a modest underweight in high-yielders. The U.S. equity market is modestly overvalued but the conditions are ripe for an overshoot in 2017 given optimism about a boost to profits from the new administration's policies. Earnings expectations are far too high and ignore the likelihood that rising labor costs will squeeze margins. Nevertheless, that need not preclude equity prices moving higher. There is a good chance of a sell-off in early 2017 and that would be a buying opportunity. Valuations are better in Japan and several European markets than in the U.S. and relative monetary conditions also favor these markets. We expect the U.S. to underperform in 2017. We expect emerging markets to underperform developed markets. The oil price should average around $55 a barrel over the next one or two years, with some risk to the upside. Although shale production should increase, the cutbacks in oil industry capital spending and planned production cuts by OPEC and some other producers will ensure that inventories will have to be drawn down in the second half of 2017. Non-oil commodity prices will stay in a trading range after healthy gains in 2016, but the long-run outlook is still bearish. The dollar bull market should stay intact over the coming year with the trade-weighted index rising by around 5%. Relative policy stances and economic trends should all stay supportive of the dollar. The outlook for the yen is especially gloomy. A stabilization in resource prices will keep commodity prices in a range. We remain bearish on EM currencies. The biggest geopolitical risks relate to U.S.-China relations, especially given President-elect Trump's inclination to engage in China-bashing. Meanwhile, the defeat of ISIS could create a power vacuum in the Middle East that could draw Turkey into a disastrous conflict with the Kurds and Iran/Russia. The coming year is important for elections in Europe but we do not expect any serious threat to the EU or single currency to emerge. The most important prediction that we got right was our view that conditions were ripe for an overshoot in equity prices. The MSCI all-country index has delivered an impressive total return of around 20% in dollar terms since the end of 2016, one of the best calendar year performances of the current cycle (Table 1). So it was good that your daughter persuaded you to keep a healthy equity exposure. It is all the more impressive that the market powered ahead in the face of all the concerns that you noted earlier. Our preference for European markets over the U.S. worked out well in common currency terms, but only because the dollar declined. Emerging markets did much better than we expected, with significant outperformance relative to their developed counterparts. Table 1Market Performance 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course With regard to the overall economic environment, we were correct in forecasting a modest improvement in 2017 global economic activity and that growth would not fall short of the IMF's predictions for the first time in the current expansion. However, one big surprise, not only for us, but also for policymakers, was that inflation drifted lower in the major economies. Latest data show the core inflation rate for the G7 economies is running at only 1.4%, down from 1.6% at the end of 2016. We will return to this critical issue later as the trend in inflation outlook will be a key determinant of the market outlook for the coming year and beyond. Regionally, the Euro area and Japanese economies registered the biggest upside surprises relative to our forecast and those of the IMF (Table 2). That goes a long way to explaining why the U.S. dollar was weaker than we expected. In addition, the dollar was not helped by a market downgrading of the scale and timing of U.S. fiscal stimulus. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the dollar has merely unwound the 2016 Trump rally and recently has shown some renewed strength. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course A year ago, there were major concerns about potential political turmoil from important elections in Europe, the risk of U.S.-led trade wars and a credit bust-up in China. We downplayed these issues as near-term threats to the markets and that turned out to be appropriate. Nevertheless, there are many lingering risks to the outlook and market complacency is a much bigger concern now than it was a year ago. Mr. X: As you just noted, a key theme of your Outlook last year was "Shifting Regimes" such as the end of disinflation and fiscal conservatism, a retreat from globalization, and the start of a rebalancing in income shares away from profits toward labor. And of course, you talked about the End of the Debt Supercycle a few years ago. Do you still have confidence that these regime shifts are underway? BCA: Absolutely! These are all trends that we expect to play out over a number of years and thus can't be judged by short-term developments. There have been particularly important shifts in the policy environment. The 2007-09 economic and financial meltdown led central banks to fight deflation rather than inflation and we would not bet against them in this battle. Inflation has been lower than expected, but there has been a clear turning point. On fiscal policy, governments have largely given up on austerity against a background of a disappointingly slow economic recovery in recent years and rising populist pressures (Chart 2). The U.S. budget deficit could rise particularly sharply over the next few years. In the U.S., the relative income shares going to profits and labor have started to shift direction, but there is a long way to go. Finally, the same forces driving government to loosen fiscal purse strings have also undermined support for globalization with the U.S. even threatening to abandon NAFTA. The ratio of global trade to output has trended sideways for several years and is unlikely to turn higher any time soon. All these trends are part of our Regime Shift thesis. Chart 2Regime Shifts Regime Shifts Regime Shifts The remarkable macro backdrop of low inflation, easy money and healthy profits has been incredibly positive for financial markets in recent years. You would have to be an extreme optimist to believe that such an environment will persist. Our big concern for the coming year is that we are setting up for a collision between the markets and looming changes in economic policy. The Coming Collision Between Policy And The Markets BCA: As you mentioned earlier, we attach enormous importance to the role of easy money in supporting asset prices and it is hard to imagine that we could have had a more stimulative monetary environment than has existed in recent years. Central banks have been in panic mode since the 2007-09 downturn with an unprecedented period of negative real interest rates in the advanced economies, coupled with an extraordinary expansion of central bank balance sheets (Chart 3). Initially, the fear was for another Great Depression and as that threat receded, the focus switched to getting inflation back to the 2% target favored by most developed countries. In a post-Debt Supercycle world, negative real rates have failed to trigger the typical rebound in credit demand that was so characteristic of the pre-downturn era. Central banks have expanded base money in the form of bank reserves, but this has not translated into markedly faster growth in broad money or nominal GDP. This is highlighted by the collapse in money multipliers (the ratio of broad to base money) and in velocity (the ratio of GDP to broad money). This has been a double whammy: there is less broad money generated for each dollar of base money and less GDP for every dollar of broad money (Chart 4). Chart 3An Extraordinary Period Of Easy Money An Extraordinary Period of Easy Money An Extraordinary Period of Easy Money Chart 4Monetary Policy: Pushing On A String Monetary Policy: Pushing On A String Monetary Policy: Pushing On A String Historically, monetary policy acted primarily through the credit channel with lower rates making households and companies more willing to borrow, and lenders more willing to supply funds. In the post-Debt Supercycle world, the credit channel has become partly blocked, forcing policymakers to rely more on the other channels of monetary transmission, the main one being boosting asset prices. However, there is a limit to how far this can go because the end result is massively overvalued assets and building financial excesses. The Fed and many other central banks now realize that this strategy cannot be pushed much further. The economic recovery in the U.S. and other developed economies has been the weakest of the post-WWII period. But potential growth rates also have slowed which means that spare capacity has gradually been absorbed. According to the IMF, the U.S. output gap closed in 2015 having been as high as 2% of potential GDP in 2013. The IMF estimates that the economy was operating slightly above potential in 2017 with a further rise forecast in 2018 (Chart 5). According to IMF estimates, the median output gap for 20 advanced economies will shift from -0.1% in 2017 to +0.3% in 2018 (i.e. they will be operating above potential). This makes it hard to justify the maintenance of hyper-stimulative monetary policies. Chart 5No More Output Gaps No More Output Gaps No More Output Gaps The low U.S. inflation rate is giving the Fed the luxury of moving cautiously and that is keeping the markets buoyant. Indeed, the markets don't even believe the Fed will be able to raise rates as much they expect. The most recent FOMC projections show a median federal funds rate of 2.1% by the end of 2018 but the markets are discounting a move to only 1.8%. The markets probably have this wrong because inflation is likely to wake up from its slumber in the second half of the year. Ms. X: This is another area where my father and I disagree. I view the world as essentially deflationary. We all know that technological innovations have opened up competition in a lot of markets, driving down prices. Two obvious examples are Uber and Airbnb, but these are just the tip of the iceberg. Amazon's purchase of Whole Foods is another example of how increased competitive pressures will continue to sweep through previously relatively stable industries. And such changes have an important impact on employee psychology and thus bargaining power. These days, people are glad to just keep their jobs and this means companies hold the upper hand when it comes to wage negotiations. So I don't see a pickup in inflation being a threat to the markets any time soon. Mr. X: I have a different perspective. First of all, I do not even believe the official inflation data because most of the things I buy have risen a lot in price over the past couple of years. Secondly, given the extremely stimulative stance of monetary policy in recent years, a pickup in inflation would not surprise me at all. So I am sympathetic to the BCA view. But, even if the data is correct, why have inflation forecasts proved so wrong and what underpins your view that it will increase in the coming year? BCA: There is an interesting disconnect between the official data and the inflation views of many consumers and economic/statistics experts. According to the Conference Board, U.S. consumers' one-year ahead inflation expectations have persistently exceeded the published data and the latest reading is close to 5% (Chart 6). That ties in with your perception. Consumer surveys by the New York Fed and University of Michigan have year-ahead inflation expectations at a more reasonable 2.5%. At the same time, many "experts" believe the official data is overstated because it fails to take enough account of technological changes and new lower-priced goods and services. The markets also have a moderately optimistic view with the five-year CPI swap rate at 2%. This is optimistic because it is consistent with inflation below the Fed's 2% target, if one allows for an inflation risk premium built in to the swap price. We are prepared to take the inflation data broadly at face value. Low inflation is consistent with an ongoing tough competitive environment in most sectors, boosted by the disruptive impact of technological changes that Ms. X described. The inflation rate for core goods (ex-food and energy) has been in negative territory for several years while that for services ex-shelter is at the low end of its historical range (Chart 7). Chart 6Differing Perspectives Of Inflation Differing Perspectives of Inflation Differing Perspectives of Inflation Chart 7Not Much Inflation Here Not Much Inflation Here Not Much Inflation Here There is no simple explanation of why inflation has fallen short of forecasts. Economic theory assumes that price pressures build as an economy moves closer to full employment and the U.S. is at that point. This raises several possibilities: There is more slack in the economy than suggested by the low unemployment rate. The lags are unusually long in the current cycle. Technological disruption is having a greater impact than expected. The link between economic slack and inflationary pressures is typically captured by the Phillips Curve which shows the relationship between the unemployment rate and inflation. In the U.S., the current unemployment rate of 4.1% is believed to be very close to a full-employment level. Yet, inflation recently has trended lower and while wage growth is in an uptrend, it has remained softer than expected (Chart 8). Chart 8Inflationary Pressures Are Turning Inflationary Pressures Are Turning Inflationary Pressures Are Turning We agree with Ms. X that employee bargaining power has been undermined over the years by globalization and technological change and by the impact of the 2007-09 economic downturn. That would certainly explain a weakened relationship between the unemployment rate and wage growth, but does not completely negate the theory. The historical evidence still suggests that once the labor market becomes tight, inflation eventually does accelerate. A broad range of data indicates that the U.S. labor market is indeed tight and the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker is in an uptrend, albeit modestly. Two other factors consistent with an end to disinflation are the lagged effects of dollar weakness and a firming in oil prices. Non-oil prices have now moved decisively out of deflationary territory while oil prices in 2017 have averaged more than 20% above year-ago levels. As far as the impact of technology is concerned, there is no doubt that innovations like Uber and Airbnb are deflationary. However, our analysis suggests that the growth in online spending has not had a major impact on the inflation numbers. E-commerce still represents a small fraction of total U.S. consumer spending, depressing overall consumer inflation by only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. The deceleration of inflation since the global financial crisis has been in areas largely unaffected by online sales, such as energy and rent. Moreover, today's creative destruction in the retail sector is no more deflationary than the earlier shift to 'big box' stores. We are not looking for a dramatic acceleration in either wage growth or inflation - just enough to convince the Fed that it needs to carry on with its plan to raise interest rates. And the pressure to do this will increase if the Administration is able to deliver on its planned tax cuts. Ms. X: You make it sound as if cutting taxes would be a bad thing. Surely the U.S. would benefit from the Administration's tax plan? A reduction in the corporate tax rate would be very bullish for equities. BCA: The U.S. tax system is desperately in need of reform via eliminating loopholes and distortions and using the savings to lower marginal rates. That would make it more efficient and hopefully boost the supply side of the economy without undermining revenues. However, the economy does not need stimulus from net tax giveaways given that it is operating close to potential. That would simply boost demand relative to supply, create overheating, and give the Fed more reason to get aggressive. The Republican's initial tax plan has some good elements of reform such as cutting back the personal mortgage interest deduction, eliminating some other deductions and making it less attractive for companies to shift operations overseas. However, many of these proposals are unlikely to survive the lobbying efforts of special interest groups. The net result probably will be tax giveaways without much actual reform. Importantly, there is not a strong case for personal tax cuts given that a married worker on the average wage and with two children paid an average income tax rate of only 14% in 2016, according to OECD calculations. There inevitably will be contentious negotiations in Congress but we assume that the Republicans will eventually come together to pass some tax cuts by early next year. The combination of easier fiscal policy and Fed rate hikes will be bullish for the dollar and this will contribute to tighter overall financial conditions. That is why we see a coming collision between economic policy and the markets. The narrative for the so-called Trump rally in markets was based on the assumption that the Administration's platform of increased spending, tax cuts and reduced regulations would be bullish for the economy and thus risk assets. That was always a misplaced notion. The perfect environment for markets has been moderate economic growth, low inflation and easy money. The Trump agenda would be appropriate for an economy that had a lot of spare capacity and needed a big boost in demand. It is less suited for an economy with little spare capacity. Reduced regulations and lower corporate tax rates are good for the supply side of the economy and could boost the potential growth rate. However, if a key move is large personal tax cuts then the boost to demand will dominate. Mr. X: It seems that you are making the case for a serious policy error in the U.S. in the coming year - both on fiscal and monetary policy. I can't argue against that because everything that has happened over the past few years tells me that policymakers don't have a good grip on either the economy or the implications of their actions. I never believed that printing money and creating financial bubbles was a sensible approach to an over-indebted economy. I always expected it to end badly. BCA: Major tightening cycles frequently end in recession because monetary policy is a very blunt tool. Central banks would like to raise rates by just enough to cool things down but that is hard to achieve. The problem with fiscal policy is that implementation lags mean that it often is pro-cyclical. In other words, there is pressure for fiscal stimulus in a downturn, but by the time legislation is passed, the economy typically has already recovered and does not really need a big fiscal boost. And that certainly applies to the current environment. The other area of potential policy error is on trade. Having already pulled the U.S. out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Trump Administration is taking a hardline attitude toward a renegotiation of NAFTA. This could even end up with the deal being scrapped and that would add another element of risk to the North American economies. Ms. X: Your scenario assumes that the Fed will be quite hawkish. However, everything I have read about Jerome Powell, the new Fed chair, suggests that he will err on the side of caution when it comes to raising rates. So monetary policy may not collide with markets at all over the coming year. BCA: It is certainly true that Powell does not have any particular bias when it comes to the conduct of monetary policy. That would not have been the case if either John Taylor or Kevin Warsh had been given the job - they both have a hawkish bias. Powell is not an economist so will likely follow a middle path and be heavily influenced by the Fed's staff forecasts and by the opinions of other FOMC members. There are still several vacancies on the Fed's Board so much will depend on who is appointed to those positions. The latest FOMC forecasts are for growth and inflation of only 2% in 2018 and these numbers seem too low. Meanwhile, the prediction that unemployment will still be at 4.1% at end-2018 is too high. We expect projections of growth and inflation to be revised up and unemployment to be revised down. That will embolden the Fed to keep raising rates. So, even with Powell at the helm, monetary policy is set to get tighter than the market currently expects. Ms. X: So far, we have talked mainly about the U.S. What about other central banks? I can't believe that inflation will be much of a problem in the euro area or in Japan any time soon. Does that not mean that the overall global monetary environment will stay favorable for risk assets? BCA: The Fed is at the leading edge of the shift away from extreme monetary ease by hiking interest rates and starting the process of balance sheet reduction. But the Bank of Canada also has raised rates and the ECB has announced that it will cut its asset purchases in half beginning January 2018, as a first step in normalizing policy. Even the Bank of England has raised rates despite Brexit-related downside risks for the economy. The BoJ will keep an accommodative stance for the foreseeable future. You are correct that financial conditions will be tightening more in the U.S. than in other developed economies. Moreover, equity valuations are more stretched in the U.S. than elsewhere leaving that market especially vulnerable. Yet, market correlations are such that any sell-off in U.S. risk assets is likely to become a global affair. Another key issue relates to the potential for financial shocks. Long periods of extreme monetary ease always fuel excesses and sometimes these remain hidden until they blow up. We know that companies have taken on a lot of debt, largely to fund financial transactions such as share buybacks and merger and acquisitions activity. That is unlikely to be the direct cause of a financial accident but might well become a problem in the next downturn. It typically is increased leverage within the financial sector itself that poses the greatest risk and that is very opaque. The banking system is much better capitalized than before the 2007-09 downturn so the risks lie elsewhere. As would be expected, margin debt has climbed higher with the equity market, and is at a historically high level relative to market capitalization (Chart 9). We don't have good data on the degree of leverage among non-bank financial institutions such as hedge funds but that is where leverage surprises are likely to occur. And the level of interest rates that causes financial stress is almost certainly to be a lot lower than in the past. Chart 9Financial Leverage Has Risen Financial Leverage Has Risen Financial Leverage Has Risen Mr. X: That is the perfect lead-in to my perennial concern - the high level of debt in the major economies. I realize high debt levels are not a problem when interest rates are close to zero, but that will change if your view on the Fed is correct. Ms. X: I would just add that this is one area where I share my father's concerns, but with an important caveat. I wholeheartedly agree that high debt levels pose a threat to economic and financial stability, but I see this as a long-term issue. Even with rising interest rates, debt servicing costs will stay low for at least the next year. It seems to me that rates will have to rise a lot before debt levels in the major economies pose a serious threat to the system. Even if the Fed tightens policy in line with its plans, real short rates will still stay low by historical standards. This will not only keep debt financing manageable but will also sustain the search for yield and support equity prices. BCA: We would be disappointed if you both had not raised the issue of debt. Debt levels do indeed remain very elevated among advanced and emerging economies (Chart 10). The growth in private debt remains far below pre-crisis levels in the advanced countries, but this has been offset by the continued high level of government borrowing. As a result, the total debt-to-GDP ratio has stayed close to a peak. And both private and public debt ratios have climbed to new highs in the emerging economies, with China leading the charge. Chart 10ADebt Levels Remain Elevated Debt Levels Remain Elevated Debt Levels Remain Elevated Chart 10BDebt Levels Remain Elevated 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course As we have discussed in the past, there is not an inconsistency between our End of Debt Supercycle thesis and the continued high levels of debt in most countries. As noted earlier, record-low interest rates have not triggered the kind of private credit resurgence that occurred in the pre-crisis period. For example, household borrowing has remained far below historical levels as a percent of income in the U.S., despite low borrowing costs (Chart 11). At the same time, it is not a surprise that debt-to-income ratios are high given the modest growth in nominal incomes in most countries. Chart 11Low Rates Have Not Triggered ##br##A Borrowing Surge In U.S. Low Rates Have Not Triggered A Borrowing Surge In U.S. Low Rates Have Not Triggered A Borrowing Surge In U.S. Debt growth is not benign everywhere. In the developed world, Canada's debt growth is worryingly high, both in the household and corporate sectors. As is also the case with Australia, Canada's overheated housing market has fueled rapid growth in mortgage debt. These are accidents waiting to happen when borrowing costs increase. In the emerging word, China has yet to see the end of its Debt Supercycle. Fortunately, with most banks under state control, the authorities should be able to contain any systemic risks, at least in the near run. With regard to timing, we agree that debt levels are not likely to pose an economic or financial problem in next year. It is right to point out that debt-servicing costs are very low by historical standards and it will take time for rising rates to have an impact given that a lot of debt is locked in at low rates. For example, in the U.S., the ratio of household debt-servicing to income and the non-financial business sector's ratio of interest payments to EBITD are at relatively benign levels (Chart 12). However, changes occur at the margin and the example of the Bernanke taper tantrum highlighted investor sensitivity to even modest changes in the monetary environment. You may well be right Ms. X that risk assets will continue to climb higher in the face of a tighter financial conditions. But given elevated valuations, we lean toward a cautious rather than aggressive approach to strategy. We would rather leave some money on the table than risk being caught in a sudden downdraft. Other investors, including yourself, might prefer to wait for clearer signals that a turning point is imminent. Returning to the issue of indebtedness, the end-game for high debt levels continues to be a topic of intense interest. There really are only three options: to grow out of it, to write it off, or to try and inflate it away. The first option obviously would be best - to have fast enough growth in real incomes that allowed debtors to start paying down their debt. Unfortunately, that is the least likely prospect given adverse demographic trends throughout the developed world and disappointing productivity growth (Chart 13). Chart 12Borrowing Costs Are Benign Borrowing Costs Are Benign Borrowing Costs Are Benign Chart 13It's Hard To Grow Out Of Debt ##br##With These Structural Headwinds It's Hard To Grow Out Of Debt With These Structural Headwinds It's Hard To Grow Out Of Debt With These Structural Headwinds Writing the debt off - i.e. defaulting - is a desperate measure that would be the very last resort after all other approaches had failed. In this case, we are talking mainly about government debt, because private debt always has to be written off when borrowers become bankrupt. Japan is the one developed country where government debt probably will be written off eventually. Given that the Bank of Japan owns around 45% of outstanding government debt, those holdings can be neutralized by converting them to perpetuals - securities that are never redeemed. If the first two options are not viable, then inflation becomes the preferred solution to over-indebtedness. To make a big impact, inflation would need to rise far above the 2% level currently favored by central banks, and it would have to stay elevated for quite some time. Central banks are not yet ready to allow such an environment, but that could change after the next economic downturn. Central banks have made it clear that they are prepared to pursue radical policies in order to prevent deflation. This sets the scene for increasingly aggressive actions after the next recession and the end result could be a period of significantly higher inflation. Mr. X: I don't disagree with that view which is why I always like to hold some physical gold in my portfolio. It is interesting that you are worried about a looming setback for risk assets because you are positive on the near-run economic outlook. That is contrary to the typical view that sees a decent economy as supporting higher equity prices. Let's spend a bit more time on your view of the economic outlook. Ms. X: Before we do that, I would just emphasize that it is far too early to worry about debt end games and the potential for sharply rising inflation. I don't disagree that monetary policy could be forced to embrace massive reflation during the next downturn and perhaps that will make me change my view of the inflation outlook. But the sequencing is important because we would first have to deal with a recession that could be a very deflationary episode. And before the next recession we could have period of continued decent growth, which would be positive for risk assets. So I agree that the near-term view of the economic outlook is important. The Economic Outlook BCA: This recovery cycle has been characterized by a series of shocks and headwinds that constrained growth in various regions. In no particular order, these included fiscal austerity, the euro crisis, a brief U.S. government shutdown, the Japanese earthquake, and a spike in oil prices above $100. As we discussed a year ago, in the absence of any new shocks, we expected global growth to improve and that is what occurred in 2017. A broad range of indicators shows that activity has picked up steam in most areas. Purchasing managers' indexes are in an uptrend, business and consumer confidence are at cyclical highs and leading indicators have turned up (Chart 14). This is hardly a surprise given easy monetary conditions and a more relaxed fiscal stance almost everywhere. Chart 14Global Activity On An Uptrend Global Activity On An Uptrend Global Activity On An Uptrend The outlook for 2018 is positive and the IMF's projections for growth is probably too low (see Table 2). So, for the second year in a row, the next set of updates due in the spring are likely to be revised up. Ms. X: Let's talk about the U.S. economy. You are concerned that tax cuts could contribute to overheating, tighter monetary policy and an eventual collision with the markets. But there are two alternative scenarios, both quite optimistic for risk assets. On the one hand, a cut in the corporate tax rate could trigger a further improvement in business confidence and thus acceleration in capital spending. This would boost the supply side of the economy and mean that faster growth need not lead to higher inflation. It would be the perfect world of a low inflation boom. At the other extreme, if political gridlock prevents any meaningful tax cuts, we will be left with the status quo of moderate growth and low inflation that has been very positive for markets during the past several years. Mr. X: You can always rely on my daughter to emphasize the potential for optimistic outcomes. I would suggest another entirely different scenario. The cycle is very mature and I fear it would not take much to tip the economy into recession, even if we get some tax relief. So I am more concerned with near-term downside risks to the U.S. economy. A recession in the coming year would be catastrophic for the stock market in my view. BCA: Before we get to the outlook, let's agree on where we are right now. As we already noted, the U.S. economy currently is operating very close to its potential level. The Congressional Budget Office estimates potential growth to be only 1.6% a year at present, which explains why the unemployment rate has dropped even though growth has averaged a modest 2% pace in recent years. The consumer sector has generally been a source of stability with real spending growing at a 2¾% pace over the past several years (Chart 15). And, encouragingly, business investment has recently picked up from its earlier disappointing level. On the negative side, the recovery in housing has lost steam and government spending has been a source of drag. Looking ahead, the pattern of growth may change a bit. With regard to consumer spending, the pace of employment growth is more likely to slow than accelerate given the tight market and growing lack of available skilled employees. According to the National Federation of Independent Business survey, 88% of small companies hiring or trying to hire reported "few or no qualified applicants for the positions they were trying to fill". Companies in manufacturing and construction say that the difficulty in finding qualified workers is their single biggest problem, beating taxes and regulations. In addition, we should not assume that the personal saving rate will keep falling given that it has hit a recovery low of 3.1% (Chart 16). On the other hand, wage growth should continue to firm and there is the prospect of tax cuts. Overall, this suggests that consumer spending should continue to grow by at least a 2% pace in 2018. Chart 15Trends In U.S. Growth Trends In U.S. Growth Trends In U.S. Growth Chart 16Personal Saving At A Recovery Low Personal Saving At A Recovery Low Personal Saving At A Recovery Low Survey data suggests that business investment spending should remain strong in the coming year, even without any additional boost from corporate tax cuts. Meanwhile, rebuilding and renovations in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma should provide a short-term boost to housing investment and a more lasting improvement will occur if the millennial generation finally moves out of their parents' basements. On that note, it is encouraging that the 10-year slide in the homeownership rate appears to have run its course (Chart 17). And although housing affordability is down from its peak, it remains at an attractive level from a historical perspective. Chart 17A Weak Housing Recovery A Weak Housing Recovery A Weak Housing Recovery Last, but not least, government spending will face countervailing forces. The Administration plans to increase spending on defense and infrastructure but there could be some offsetting cutbacks in other areas. Overall, government spending should make a positive contribution to 2018 after being a drag in 2017. Putting all this together, the U.S. economy should manage to sustain a growth rate of around 2.5% in 2018, putting GDP further above its potential level. And it could rise above that if tax cuts are at the higher end of the range. You suggested three alternative scenarios to our base case: a supply-side boom, continued moderate growth and a near-term recession. A supply-side revival that leads to strong growth and continued low inflation would be extremely bullish, but we are skeptical about that possibility. The revival in capital spending is good news, but this will take time to feed into faster productivity growth. Overall, any tax cuts will have a greater impact on demand than supply, putting even greater pressure on an already tight labor market. The second scenario of a continuation of the recent status quo is more possible, especially if we end up with a very watered-down tax package. However, growth would actually have to drop below 2% in order to prevent GDP from rising above potential. We will closely monitor leading indicators for signs that growth is about to lose momentum. The bearish scenario of a near-term recession cannot be completely discounted, but there currently is no compelling evidence of such a development. Recessions can arrive with little warning if there is an unanticipated shock, but that is rare. Historically, a flat or inverted yield curve has provided a warning sign ahead of most recessions and the curve currently is still positively sloped (Chart 18). Another leading indicator is when cyclical spending1 falls as a share of GDP, reflecting the increased sensitivity of those items to changes in financial conditions. Cyclical spending is still at a historically low level relative to GDP and we expect this to rise rather than fall over the coming quarters. While a near-term recession does not seem likely, the odds will change during the course of 2018. By late year, there is a good chance that the yield curve will be flat or inverted, giving a warning signal for a recession in 2019. Our base case view is for a U.S. recession to start in the second half of 2019, making the current expansion the longest on record. At this stage, it is too early to predict whether it would be a mild recession along the lines of 1990-91 and 2000-01 or a deeper downturn. Chart 18No Recession Signals For The U.S. ...Yet No Recession Signals For The U.S. ...Yet No Recession Signals For The U.S. ...Yet Mr. X: I hope that you are right that a U.S. recession is more than a year away. I am not entirely convinced but will keep an open mind, and my daughter will no doubt keep me fully informed of any positive trends. Ms. X: You can be sure of that. Although I lean toward the optimistic side on the U.S. economy, I have been rather surprised at how well the euro area economy has done in the past year. Latest data show that the euro area's real GDP increased by 2.5% in the year to 2017 Q3 compared to 2.3% for the U.S. Can that be sustained? BCA: The relative performance of the euro area economy has been even better if you allow for the fact that the region's population growth is 0.5% a year below that of the U.S. So the economic growth gap is even greater on a per capita basis. The euro area economy performed poorly during their sovereign debt crisis years of 2011-13, but the subsequent improvement has meant that the region's real per capita GDP has matched that of the U.S. over the past four years. And even Japan's GDP has not lagged much behind on a per capita basis (Chart 19). Chart 19No Clear Winner On Growth No Clear Winner On Growth No Clear Winner On Growth The recovery in the euro area has been broadly based but the big change was the end of a fiscal squeeze in the periphery countries. Between 2010 and 2013, fiscal drag (the change in the structural primary deficit) was equivalent to around 10% of GDP in Greece and Portugal and 7% of GDP in Ireland and Spain. There was little fiscal tightening in the subsequent three years, allowing those economies to recover lost ground. Meanwhile, Germany's economy has continued to power ahead, benefiting from much easier financial conditions than the economy has warranted. That has been the inevitable consequence of a one size fits all monetary policy that has had to accommodate the weakest members of the region. The French and Italian economies have disappointed, but there are hopes that the new French government will pursue pro-growth policies. And Italy should also pick up given signs that it is finally starting to deal with its fragile banking system. Both Spain and Italy faced a sharp rise in non-performing bank loans during the great recession, but Italy lagged Spain in dealing with the problem (Chart 20). That goes a long way to explaining why the Italian economic recovery has been so poor relative to Spain. With Italian banks raising capital and writing off non-performing loans more aggressively, the Italian economy should start to improve, finally catching up with the rest of the region. Overall, the euro area economy should manage to sustain growth above the 2.1% forecast by the IMF for 2018. Overall financial conditions are likely to stay favorable for at least another year and we do not anticipate any major changes in fiscal policy. If, as we fear, the U.S. moves into recession in 2019, there will be negative fallout for Europe, largely via the impact on financial markets. However, in relative terms, the euro area should outperform the U.S. during the next downturn. Mr. X: A year ago, you said that Brexit posed downside risks for the U.K. economy. For a while, that seemed too pessimistic as the economy performed quite well, but recent data show things have taken a turn for the worse. How do you see things playing out with this issue? BCA: It was apparent a year ago that the U.K. government had no concrete plans to deal with Brexit and little has changed since then. The negotiations with the EU are not going particularly well and the odds of a "hard" exit have risen. This means withdrawing from the EU without any agreement on a new regime for trade, labor movements or financial transactions. A growing number of firms are taking the precaution of shifting some operations from the U.K. to other EU countries. As you noted, there are signs that Brexit is starting to undermine the U.K. economy. For example, London house prices have turned down and the leading economic index has softened (Chart 21). The poor performance of U.K. consumer service and real estate equities relative to those of Germany suggest investors are becoming more wary of the U.K. outlook. Of course, a lot will depend on the nature of any deal between the U.K. and the EU and that remains a source of great uncertainty. Chart 20A Turning Point For Italian Banks? A Turning Point For Italian Banks? A Turning Point For Italian Banks? Chart 21U.K. Consumer Services Equities Are ##br##Underperforming Brexit Effects Show Up U.K. Consumer Services Equities Are Underperforming Brexit Effects Show Up U.K. Consumer Services Equities Are Underperforming Brexit Effects Show Up At the moment, there are no real grounds for optimism. The U.K. holds few cards in the bargaining process and the country's strong antipathy toward the free movement of people within the EU will be a big obstacle to an amicable separation agreement. Ms. X: I think the U.K. made the right decision to leave the EU and am more optimistic than you about the outlook. There may be some short-term disruption but the long-term outlook for the U.K. will be good once the country is freed from the stifling bureaucratic constraints of EU membership. The U.K. has a more dynamic economy than most EU members and it will be able to attract plenty of overseas capital if the government pursues appropriate policies toward taxes and regulations. It will take a few years to find out who is correct about this. In the meantime, given the uncertainties, I am inclined to have limited exposure to sterling and the U.K. equity market. Let's now talk about China, another country facing complex challenges. This is a topic where my father and I again have a lot of debates. As you might guess, I have been on the more optimistic side while he has sided with those who have feared a hard landing. And I know that similar debates have occurred in BCA. BCA: It is not a surprise that there are lots of debates about the China outlook. The country's impressive economic growth has been accompanied by an unprecedented build-up of debt and supply excesses in several sectors. The large imbalances would have led to a collapse by now in any other economy. However, China has benefited from the heavy state involvement in the economy and, in particular, the banking sector. The big question is whether the government has enough control over economic developments to avoid an economic and financial crisis. The good news is that China's government debt is relatively low, giving them the fiscal flexibility to write-off bad debts from zombie state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The problems of excessive leverage and over-capacity are particularly acute in SOEs that still comprise a large share of economic activity. The government is well aware of the need to reform SOEs and various measures have been announced, but progress has been relatively limited thus far. The IMF projects that the ratio of total non-financial debt to GDP will remain in an uptrend over the next several years, rising from 236% in 2016 to 298% by 2022 (Chart 22). Yet, growth is expected to slow only modestly over the period. Of course, one would not expect the IMF to build a crisis into their forecast. Some investors have been concerned that a peak in China's mini-cycle of the past two years may herald a return to the economic conditions that prevailed in 2015, when the industrial sector grew at a slower pace than during the acute phase of the global financial crisis. These conditions occurred due to the combination of excessively tight monetary conditions and weak global growth. While China's export growth may slow over the coming year, monetary policy remains accommodative. Monetary conditions appear to have peaked early this year but are still considerably easier than in mid-2015. Shifts in the monetary conditions index have done a good job of leading economic activity and they paint a reasonably positive picture (Chart 23). The industrial sector has finally moved out of deflation, with producer prices rising 6.9% in the year ended October. This has been accompanied by a solid revival in profits. Chart 22China: Debt-Fueled Growth To Continue China: Debt-Fueled Growth To Continue China: Debt-Fueled Growth To Continue Chart 23China Leaves Deflation Behind China Leaves Deflation Behind China Leaves Deflation Behind On balance, we assume that the Chinese economy will be able to muddle through for the foreseeable future. President Xi Jinping has strengthened his grip on power and he will go to great lengths to ensure that his reign is not sullied with an economic crisis. The longer-term outlook will depend on how far the government goes with reforms and deleveraging and we are keeping an open mind at this point. In sum, for the moment, we are siding with Ms. X on this issue. Mr. X: I have been too bearish on China for the past several years, but I still worry about the downside risks given the massive imbalances and excesses. I can't think of any example of a country achieving a soft landing after such a massive rise in debt. I will give you and my daughter the benefit of the doubt, but am not totally convinced that you will be right. BCA has been cautious on emerging economies in general: has that changed? BCA: The emerging world went through a tough time in 2015-16 with median growth of only 2.6% for the 23 constituent countries of the MSCI EM index (Chart 24). This recovered to 3% in 2017 according to IMF estimates, but that is still far below the average 5% pace of the period 2000-07. Chart 24Emerging Economy Growth: ##br##The Boom Years Are Over Emerging Economy Growth: The Boom Years Are Over Emerging Economy Growth: The Boom Years Are Over It is always dangerous to generalize about the emerging world because the group comprises economies with very different characteristics and growth drivers. Two of the largest countries - Brazil and Russia - went through particularly bad downturns in the past couple of years and those economies are now in a modest recovery. In contrast, India has continued to grow at a healthy albeit slowing pace, while Korea and the ASEAN region have not suffered much of a slowdown. If, as seems likely, Chinese growth holds above a 6% pace over the next year, then those countries with strong links to China should do fine. And it also points to reasonably steady commodity prices, supporting resource-dependent economies. Longer-run, there are reasons to be cautious about many emerging economies, particularly if the U.S. goes into recession 2019, as we fear. That would be associated with renewed weakness in commodity prices, and capital flight from those economies with high external debt such as Turkey and South Africa. As we stated a year ago, the heady days of emerging economy growth are in the past. Mr. X: It seems that both my daughter and I can find some areas of agreement with your views about the economic outlook. You share her expectation that the global growth outlook will stay healthy over the coming year, but you worry about a U.S.-led recession in 2019, something that I certainly sympathize with. But we differ on timing: I fear the downturn could occur even sooner and I know my daughter believes in a longer-lasting upturn. Let's now move onto what this all means for financial markets, starting with bonds. Bond Market Prospects Ms. X: I expect this to be a short discussion as I can see little attraction in bonds at current yields. Even though I expect inflation to stay muted, bonds offer no prospect of capital gains in the year ahead and even the running yield offers little advantage over the equity dividend yield. BCA: As you know, we have believed for some time that the secular bull market in bonds has ended. We expect yields to be under upward pressure in most major markets during 2018 and thus share your view that equities offer better return prospects. By late 2018, it might well be appropriate to switch back into bonds against a backdrop of higher yields and a likely bear market in equities. For the moment, we recommend underweight bond exposure. It is hard to like government bonds when the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasuries is less than 50 basis points above the dividend yield of the S&P 500 while the euro area bond yield is 260 basis points below divided yields (Chart 25). Real yields, using the 10-year CPI swap rate as a measure of inflation expectations, are less than 20 basis points in the U.S. and a negative 113 basis points in the euro area. Even if we did not expect inflation to rise, it would be difficult to recommend an overweight position in any developed country government bonds. One measure of valuation is to compare the level of real yields to their historical average, adjusted by the standard deviation of the gap. On this basis, the most overvalued markets are the core euro area countries, where real yields are 1.5 to 2 standard deviations below their historical average (Chart 26). There are only two developed bond markets where real 10-year government yields currently are above their historical average: Greece and Portugal. This is warranted in Greece where there needs to be a risk premium in case the country is forced to leave the single currency at some point. This is less of a risk for Portugal, making it a more interesting market. Real yields in New Zealand are broadly in line with their historical average, also making it one of the more attractive markets. Chart 25Bonds Yields Offer Little Appeal Bonds Yields Offer Little Appeal Bonds Yields Offer Little Appeal Chart 26Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course Mr. X: Given your expectation of higher inflation, would you recommend inflation-protected Treasuries? BCA: Yes, in the sense that they should outperform conventional Treasuries. The 10-year TIPS are discounting average inflation of 1.85% and we would expect this to be revised up during the coming year. However, the caveat is that absolute returns will still be mediocre. Ms. X: You showed earlier that corporate bonds had a reasonable year in 2017, albeit falling far short of the returns from equities. A year ago, you recommended only neutral weighting in investment-grade bonds and an underweight in high yield. But you became more optimistic toward both early in 2017, shifting to an overweight position. Are you thinking of scaling back exposure once again, given the tight level of spreads? BCA: Yes, we were cautious on U.S. corporates a year ago because valuation was insufficient to compensate for the deterioration in corporate balance sheet health. Nonetheless, value improved enough early in 2017 to warrant an upgrade to overweight given our constructive macro and default rate outlook. The cyclical sweet spot for carry trades should continue to support spread product for a while longer. Moreover, value is better than it appears at first glance. The dotted line in Chart 27 shows the expected 12-month option-adjusted spread for U.S. junk bonds after adjusting for our base case forecast for net default losses. At 260 basis points, this excess spread is in line with the historical average. In the absence of any further spread narrowing, speculative-grade bonds would return 230 basis points more than Treasurys in 2018. If high-yield spreads were to tighten by another 150 basis points, then valuations would be at a historical extreme, and that seems unwarranted. An optimistic scenario would have another 100 basis point spread tightening, delivering excess returns of 5%. Of course, if spreads widen, then corporates will underperform. If financial conditions tighten in 2018 as we expect then it will be appropriate to lower exposure to corporates. In the meantime, you should favor U.S. and U.K. corporate bonds to issues in the Eurozone because ECB tapering is likely to spark some spread widening in that market. Mr. X: What about EM hard-currency bonds? BCA: The global economic background is indeed positive for EM assets. However, EM debt is expensive relative to DM investment-grade bonds which, historically, has heralded a period of underperformance (Chart 28). We expect that relative growth dynamics will be more supportive of U.S. corporates because EM growth will lag. Any commodity price weakness and/or a stronger U.S. dollar would also weigh on EM bonds and currencies. Chart 27Not Much Value In U.S. Corporates Not Much Value In U.S. Corporates Not Much Value In U.S. Corporates Chart 28Emerging Market Bonds Are Expensive Emerging Market Bonds Are Expensive Emerging Market Bonds Are Expensive Mr. X: We have not been excited about the bond market outlook for some time and nothing you have said changes my mind. I am inclined to keep our bond exposure to the bare minimum. Ms. X: I agree. So let's talk about the stock market which is much more interesting. As I mentioned before, I am inclined to remain fully invested in equities for a while longer, while my father wants to start cutting exposure. Equity Market Outlook BCA: This is one of those times when it is important to draw a distinction between one's forecast of where markets are likely to go and the appropriate investment strategy. We fully agree that the conditions that have driven this impressive equity bull market are likely to stay in place for much of the next year. Interest rates in the U.S. and some other countries are headed higher, but they will remain at historically low levels for some time. Meanwhile, in the absence of recession, corporate earnings still have upside, albeit not as much as analysts project. However, we have a conservative streak at BCA that makes us reluctant to chase markets into the stratosphere. For long-term investors, our recommended strategy is to gradually lower equity exposure to neutral. However, those who are trying to maximize short-term returns should stay overweight and wait for clearer signs that tighter financial conditions are starting to bite on economic activity. Chart 29Reasons For Caution On U.S. Stocks Reasons For Caution On U.S. Stocks Reasons For Caution On U.S. Stocks Getting down to specifics, here are the trends that give us cause for concern and they are all highlighted in Chart 29. Valuation: Relative to both earnings and book value, the U.S. equity market is more expensive than at any time since the late 1990s tech bubble. The price-earnings ratio (PER) for the S&P 500 is around 30% above its 60-year average on the basis of both trailing operating earnings and a 10-year average of earnings. The market is not expensive on a relative yield basis because interest rates are so low, but that will change as rates inevitably move higher. Other developed markets are not as overvalued as the U.S., but neither are they cheap. Earnings expectations: The performance of corporate earnings throughout this cycle - particularly in the U.S. - has been extremely impressive give the weaker-than-normal pace of economic growth. However, current expectations are ridiculously high. According to IBES data, analysts expect long-run earnings growth of around 14% a year in both the U.S. and Europe. Even allowing for analysts' normal optimistic bias, the sharp upward revision to growth expectations over the past year makes no sense and is bound to be disappointed. Investor complacency: We all know that the VIX index is at a historical low, indicating that investors see little need to protect themselves against market turmoil. Our composite sentiment indicator for the U.S. is at a high extreme, further evidence of investor complacency. These are classic contrarian signs of a vulnerable market. Most bear markets are associated with recessions, with the stock market typically leading the economy by 6 to 12 months (Chart 30). The lead in 2007 was an unusually short three months. As discussed earlier, we do not anticipate a U.S. recession before 2019. If a recession were to start in mid-2019, it would imply the U.S. market would be at risk from the middle of 2018, but the rally could persist all year. Of course, the timing of a recession and market is uncertain. So it boils down to potential upside gains over the next year versus the downside risks, plus your confidence in being able to time the top. Chart 30Bear Markets And Recessions Usually Overlap Bear Markets And Recessions Usually Overlap Bear Markets And Recessions Usually Overlap We are not yet ready to recommend that you shift to an underweight position in equities. A prudent course of action would be to move to a broadly neutral position over the next few months, but we realize that Ms. X has a higher risk tolerance than Mr. X so we will leave you to fight over that decision. The timing of when we move to an underweight will depend on our various economic, monetary and market indicators and our assessment of the risks. It could well happen in the second half of the year. Mr. X: My daughter was more right than me regarding our equity strategy during the past year, so maybe I should give her the benefit of the doubt and wait for clearer signs of a market top. Thus far, you have focused on the U.S. market. Last year you preferred developed markets outside the U.S. on the grounds of relative valuations and relative monetary conditions. Is that still your stance? BCA: Yes it is. The economic cycle and thus the monetary cycle is far less advanced in Europe and Japan than in the U.S. This will provide extra support to these markets. At the same time, profit margins are less vulnerable outside the U.S. and, as you noted, valuations are less of a problem. In Chart 31, we show a valuation ranking of developed equity markets, based on the deviation of cyclically-adjusted PERs from their historical averages. The chart is not meant to measure the extent to which Portugal is cheap relative to the U.S., but it indicates that Portugal is trading at a PER far below its historical average while that of the U.S. is above. You can see that the "cheaper" markets tend to be outside the U.S. Japan's reading is flattered by the fact that its historical valuation was extremely high during the bubble years of the 1980s, but it still is a relatively attractive market. Chart 31Valuation Ranking Of Developed Equity Markets 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course From a cyclical standpoint, we are still recommending overweight positions in European and Japanese stocks relative to the U.S., on a currency-hedged basis. Nevertheless, market correlations are such that a sell-off in the U.S. will be transmitted around the world (Chart 32). Chart 32When the U.S. Market Sneezes, The World Catches A Cold When the U.S. Market Sneezes, The World Catches A Cold When the U.S. Market Sneezes, The World Catches A Cold Ms. X: I would like to turn the focus to emerging equity markets. You have been cautious on these for several years and that worked out extremely well until 2017. I note from your regular EM reports that you have not changed your stance. Why are you staying bearish given that you see an improvement in global growth and further potential upside in developed equity prices? BCA: The emerging world did extremely well over many years when global trade was expanding rapidly, China was booming, commodity prices were in a powerful bull market and capital inflows were strong. Those trends fostered a rapid expansion in credit-fueled growth across the EM universe and meant that there was little pressure to pursue structural reforms. However, the 2007-09 economic and financial crisis marked a major turning point in the supports to EM outperformance. As we noted earlier, the era of rapid globalization has ended, marking an important regime shift. Meanwhile, China's growth rate has moderated and the secular bull market in commodities ended several years ago. We do not view the past year's rebound in commodities as the start of a major new uptrend. Many emerging equity markets remain highly leveraged to the Chinese economy and to commodity prices (Chart 33). Although we expect the Chinese economy to hold up, growth is becoming less commodity intensive. Finally, the rise in U.S. interest rates is a problem for those countries that have taken on a marked increase in foreign currency debt. This will be made even worse if the dollar appreciates. Obviously, the very term "emerging" implies that this group of countries has a lot of upside potential. However, the key to success is pursuing market-friendly reforms, rooting out corruption and investing in productive assets. Many countries pay only lip service to these issues. India is a case in point where there is growing skepticism about the Modi government's ability to deliver on major reforms. The overall EM index does not appear expensive, with the PER trading broadly in line with its historical average (Chart 34). However, as we have noted in the past, the picture is less compelling when the PER is calculated using equally-weighted sectors. The financials and materials components are trading at historically low multiples, dragging down the overall index PER. Emerging market equities will continue to rise as long as the bull market in developed markets persists, but we expect them to underperform on a relative basis. Chart 33Drivers Of EM Performance Drivers of EM Performance Drivers of EM Performance Chart 34Emerging Markets Fundamentals Emerging Markets Fundamentals Emerging Markets Fundamentals Mr. X: One last question on equities from me: do you have any high conviction calls on sectors? BCA: A key theme of our sector view is that cyclical stocks should outperform defensives given the mature stage of the economic cycle. We are seeing the typical late-cycle improvement in capital spending and that will benefit industrials, and we recommend an overweight stance in that sector. Technology also is a beneficiary of higher capex but of course those stocks have already risen a lot, pushing valuations to extreme levels. Thus, that sector warrants only a neutral weighting. Our two other overweights are financials and energy. The former should benefit from rising rates and a steeper yield curve while the latter will benefit from firm oil prices. If, as we fear, a recession takes hold in 2019, then obviously that would warrant a major shift back into defensive stocks. For the moment, the positive growth outlook will dominate sector performance. Ms. X: I agree that the bull market in equities, particularly in the U.S., is very mature and there are worrying signs of complacency. However, the final stages of a market cycle can sometimes be very rewarding and I would hate to miss out on what could be an exciting blow-off phase in 2018. As I mentioned earlier, my inclination is to stay heavily invested in equities for a while longer and I have confidence that BCA will give me enough of a warning when risks become unacceptably high. Of course, I will have to persuade my father and that may not be easy. Mr. X: You can say that again, but we won't bother our BCA friends with that conversation now. It's time to shift the focus to commodities and currencies and I would start by commending you on your oil call. You were far out of consensus a year ago when you said the risks to crude prices were in the upside and you stuck to your guns even as the market weakened in the first half. We made a lot of money following your energy recommendations. What is your latest thinking? Commodities And Currencies BCA: We had a lot of conviction in our analysis that the oil market would tighten during 2017 against a backdrop of rising demand and OPEC production cuts, and that view turned out to be correct. As we entered the year, the big reason to be bearish on oil prices was the bloated level of inventories. We forecast that inventories would drop to their five-year average by late 2017, and although that turned out to be a bit too optimistic, the market tightened by enough to push prices higher (Chart 35). Chart 35Oil Market Trends Oil Market Trends Oil Market Trends The forces that have pushed prices up will remain in force over the next year. Specifically, our economic view implies that demand will continue to expand, and we expect OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition of OPEC and non-OPEC states, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia - to extend its 1.8 million b/d production cuts to at least end-June. On that basis, OECD inventories should fall below their five-year average by the end of 2018. We recently raised our 2018 oil price target to an average of $65 in 2018. Of course, the spot market is already close to that level, but the futures curve is backwardated and that is likely to change. We continue to see upside risks to prices, not least because of potential production shortfalls from Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and Libya. Mr. X: The big disruptor in the oil market in recent years was the dramatic expansion in U.S. shale production. Given the rise in prices, could we not see a rapid rebound in shale output that, once again, undermines prices? BCA: Our modeling indicates that U.S. shale output will increase from 5.1 mb/d to 6.0 mb/d over the next year, in response to higher prices. This is significant, but will not be enough to materially change the global oil demand/supply balance. Longer run, the expansion of U.S. shale output will certainly be enough to prevent any sustained price rise, assuming no large-scale production losses elsewhere. A recent report by the International Energy Agency projected that the U.S. is destined to become the global leader in oil and gas production for decades to come, accounting for 80% of the rise in global oil and gas supply between 2010 and 2025. Ms. X: You have suggested that China's economic growth is becoming less commodity intensive. Also, you have shown in the past that real commodity prices tend to fall over time, largely because of technological innovations. What does all this imply for base metals prices over the coming year? BCA: The base metals story will continue to be highly dependent on developments in China. While the government is attempting to engineer a shift toward less commodity-intensive growth, it also wants to reduce excess capacity in commodity-producing sectors such as coal and steel. Base metals are likely to move sideways until we get a clearer reading on the nature and speed of economic reforms. We model base metals as a function of China's PMIs and this supports our broadly neutral stance on these commodities (Chart 36). Chart 36China Drives Metals Prices 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course Mr. X: As usual, I must end our commodity discussion by asking about gold. Last year, you agreed that an uncertain geopolitical environment coupled with continued low interest rates should support bullion prices, and that was the case with a respectable 12% gain since the end of 2016. You also suggested that I should not have more than 5% of my portfolio in gold which is less than I am inclined to own. It still looks like a gold-friendly environment to me. Ms. X: Let me just add that this is one area where my father and I agree. I do not consider myself to be a gold bug, but I think bullion does provide a good hedge against shocks in a very uncertain economic and political world. I would also be inclined to hold more than 5% of our portfolio in gold. BCA: There will be opposing forces on gold during the coming year. On the positive side, it is safe to assume that geopolitical uncertainties will persist and may even intensify, and there also is the potential for an increase in inflation expectations that would support bullion. On the negative side, rising interest rates are not normally good for gold and there likely will be an added headwind from a firmer U.S. dollar. Gold appears to be at an important point from a technical perspective (Chart 37). It currently is perched just above its 200-day average and a key trend line. A decisive drop below these levels would be bearish. At the same time, there is overhead resistance at around 1350-1360 and prices would have to break above that level to indicate a bullish breakout. Traders' sentiment is at a broadly neutral level, consistent with no clear conviction about which way prices will break. There is no science behind our recommendation of keeping gold exposure below 5%. That just seems appropriate for an asset that delivers no income and where the risk/reward balance is fairly balanced. Ms. X: You referred to the likelihood of a firmer dollar as a depressant on the gold price. You also were bullish on the dollar a year ago, but that did not work out too well. How confident are you that your forecast will fare better in 2018? BCA: We did anticipate that the dollar would experience a correction at the beginning of 2017, but we underestimated how profound this move would be. A combination of factors explains this miscalculation. Chart 37Gold At A Key Level Gold At A Key Level Gold At A Key Level It first began with positioning. We should have paid more attention to that fact that investors were massively bullish and long the dollar at the end of 2016, making the market vulnerable to disappointments. And disappointment did come with U.S. inflation weakening and accelerating in the euro area. Additionally, there were positive political surprises in Europe, especially the presidential victory of Emmanuel Macron in France. In the U.S., the government's failure to repeal Obamacare forced investors to lower expectations about fiscal stimulus. As a result, while investors were able to price in an earlier first hike by the ECB, they cut down the number of rate hikes they anticipated out of the Fed over the next 24 months. In terms of the current environment, positioning could not be more different because investors are aggressively shorting the dollar (Chart 38). The hurdle for the dollar to deliver positive surprises is thus much lower than a year ago. Also, we remain confident that tax cuts will be passed in the U.S. by early 2018. As we discussed earlier, U.S. GDP will remain above potential, causing inflation pressures to build. This will give the Fed the leeway to implement its planned rate hikes, and thus beat what is currently priced in the market. This development should support the dollar in 2018. Ms. X: A bullish view on the U.S. dollar necessarily implies a negative view on the euro. However, the European economy seems to have a lot of momentum, and inflation has picked up, while U.S. prices have been decelerating. To me, this suggests that the ECB also could surprise by being more hawkish than anticipated, arguing against any major weakness in the euro. BCA: The European economy has indeed done better than generally expected in the past year. Also, geopolitical risks were overstated by market participants at the beginning of 2017, leaving less reason to hide in the dollar. However, the good news in Europe is now well known and largely discounted in the market. Investors are very long the euro, by both buying EUR/USD and shorting the dollar index (Chart 39). In that sense, the euro today is where the dollar stood at the end of 2016. Chart 38Too Much Pessimism On The Dollar Too Much Pessimism On The Dollar Too Much Pessimism On The Dollar Chart 39Positioning Risk In EUR/USD Positioning Risk In EUR/USD Positioning Risk In EUR/USD Valuations show a similar picture. The euro might appear cheap on a long-term basis, but not so much so that its purchasing power parity estimate - which only works at extremes and over long-time periods - screams a buy. Moreover, the euro has moved out of line with historical interest rate parity relationships, warning that the currency is at risk if the economy disappoints. Overall, we expect EUR/USD to trade around 1.10 in 2018. Long-run, the picture is different because a U.S. recession in 2019 would trigger renewed broad-based weakness in the dollar. Mr. X: I have been perplexed by the yen's firmness in the past year, with the currency still above its end-2016 level versus the dollar. I expected a lot more weakness with the central bank capping bond yields at zero and more or less monetizing the government deficit. A year ago you also predicted a weak yen. Will it finally drop in 2018? BCA: We were not completely wrong on the yen as it has weakened over the past year on a trade-weighted basis and currently is about 2% below its end-2016 level. But it has risen slightly against the U.S. dollar. In the past couple of years, the yen/dollar rate has been highly correlated with real bond yield differentials (Chart 40). These did not move against the yen as much as we expected because U.S. yields drifted lower and there was no major change in relative inflation expectations. Chart 40Bond Yield Differentials Drive The Yen Bond Yield Differentials Drive The Yen Bond Yield Differentials Drive The Yen The real yield gap is likely to move in the dollar's favor over the next year, putting some downward pressure on the yen. Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan will continue to pursue a hyper-easy monetary stance, in contrast to the Fed's normalization policy. However, it is not all negative: the yen is cheap on a long-term basis, and Japan is an international net creditor to the tune of more than 60% of GDP. Investors are also quite short the yen as it remains a key funding currency for carry trades. Thus, it will continue to benefit each time global markets are gripped with bouts of volatility. It remains a good portfolio hedge. Ms. X: Are any other currency views worth noting? BCA: The outlook for sterling obviously will be tied to the Brexit negotiations. Having fallen sharply after the Brexit vote, sterling looks cheap relative to its history. This has allowed it to hold in a broad trading range over the past 18 months, even though the negotiations with the EU have not been going well. At this stage, it is hard to know what kind of deal, if any, will emerge regarding Brexit so we would hedge exposure to sterling. Our optimism toward the oil price is consistent with a firm Canadian dollar, but developments in the NAFTA negotiations represent a significant risk. At the moment, we are overweight the Canadian dollar, but that could change if the NAFTA talks end badly. We still can't get enthusiastic about emerging market currencies even though some now offer reasonable value after falling sharply over the past few years. Mr. X: We can't leave currencies without talking about Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies in general. I like the idea of a currency that cannot be printed at will by governments. There are too many examples of currency debasement under a fiat money system and the actions of central banks in recent years have only served to increase my mistrust of the current monetary system. But I can't profess to fully understand how these cryptocurrencies work and that makes me nervous about investing in them. What are your thoughts? BCA: You are right to be nervous. There have been numerous cases of hackers stealing Bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies. Also, while there is a limit to the number of Bitcoins that can be issued, there is no constraint on the number of possible cryptocurrencies that can be created. Thus, currency debasement is still possible if developers continue creating currencies that are only cosmetically different from the ones already in existence. Moreover, we doubt that governments will sit idly by and allow these upstart digital currencies to become increasingly prevalent. The U.S. Treasury derives $70 billion a year in seigniorage revenue from its ability to issue currency which it can then redeem for goods and services. At some point, governments could simply criminalize the use of cryptocurrencies. This does not mean that Bitcoin prices cannot rise further, but the price trend is following the path of other manias making it a highly speculative play (Chart 41). If you want more detail about our thoughts on this complex topic then you can read the report we published last September.2 Chart 41Bitcoin Looks Like Other Bubbles Bitcoin Looks Like Other Bubbles Bitcoin Looks Like Other Bubbles Ms. X: I don't fear bubbles and manias as much as my father and have made a lot of money during such episodes in the past. But I am inclined to agree that Bitcoin is best avoided. The topic of manic events presents a nice segue into the geopolitical environment which seems as volatile as ever. Geopolitics Ms. X: Which geopolitical events do you think will have the biggest impact on the markets over the coming year? BCA: Domestic politics in the U.S. and China will be very much in focus in 2018. In the U.S., as we discussed, the Republicans will pass tax cuts but it is unclear whether this will help the GOP in the November midterm elections. At this point, all of our data and modeling suggests that Democrats have a good chance of picking up the House of Representatives, setting a stage for epic battles with President Trump about everything under the sun. In China, we are watching carefully for any sign that Beijing is willing to stomach economic pain in the pursuit of economic reforms. The two reforms that would matter the most are increased financial regulation and more aggressive purging of excess capacity in the industrial sector. The 19th Party Congress marked a serious reduction in political constraints impeding President Xi's domestic agenda. This means he could launch ambitious reforms, akin to what President Jiang Zemin did in the late 1990s. While this is a low-conviction view, and requires constant monitoring of the news and data flow out of China, it would be a considerable risk to global growth. Reforms would be good for China's long-term outlook, but could put a significant damper on short-term growth. The jury is out, but the next several months will be crucial. Three other issues that could become market-relevant are the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis, trade protectionism, and tensions between the Trump administration and Iran. The first two are connected because a calming of tensions with North Korea would give the U.S. greater maneuvering room against China. The ongoing economic détente between the U.S. and China is merely a function of President Trump needing President Xi's cooperation on pressuring North Korea. But if President Trump no longer needs China's help with Kim Jong-Un, he may be encouraged to go after China on trade. As for Iran, it is not yet clear if the administration is serious about ratcheting up tensions or whether it is playing domestic politics. We suspect it is the latter implying that the market impact of any brinkmanship will be minor. But our conviction view is low. Mr. X: We seem to be getting mixed messages regarding populist pressures in Europe. The far right did not do as well as expected in the Netherlands or France, but did well in Austria. Also, Merkel is under some pressure in Germany. BCA: We don't see much in the way of mixed messages, at least when it comes to support for European integration. In Austria, the populists learned a valuable lesson from the defeats of their peers in the Netherlands and France: stay clear of the euro. Thus the Freedom Party committed itself to calling a referendum on Austria's EU membership if Turkey was invited to join the bloc. As the probability of that is literally zero, the right-wing in Austria signaled to the wider public that it was not anti-establishment on the issue of European integration. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany only gained 12.6%, but it too focused on an anti-immigration platform. The bottom line for investors is that the European anti-establishment right is falling over itself to de-emphasize its Euroskepticism and focus instead on anti-immigration policies. For investors, the former is far more relevant than the latter, meaning that the market relevance of European politics has declined. One potential risk in 2018 is the Italian election, likely to be held by the end of the first quarter. However, as with Austria, the anti-establishment parties have all moved away from overt Euroskepticism. At some point over the next five years, Italy will be a source of market risk, but in this electoral cycle and not with economic growth improving. Ms. X: The tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, fueled by two unpredictable leaders, have me very concerned. I worry that name-calling may slide into something more serious. How serious is the threat? BCA: The U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations are a good analog for the North Korean crisis. The U.S. had to establish a "credible threat" of war in order to move Iran towards negotiations. As such, the Obama administration ramped up the war rhetoric - using Israel as a proxy - in 2011-2012. The negotiations with Iran did not end until mid-2015, almost four years later. We likely have seen the peak in "credible threat" display this summer between the U.S. and North Korea. The next two-to-three months could revisit those highs as North Korea responds to President Trump's visit to the region, as well as to the deployment of the three U.S. aircraft carriers off the coast of the Korean Peninsula. However, we believe that we have entered the period of "negotiations." It is too early to tell how the North Korean crisis will end. We do not see a full out war between either of the main actors. We also do not see North Korea ever giving up its nuclear arsenal, although limiting its ballistic technology and toning down its "fire and brimstone' rhetoric is a must. The bottom line is that this issue will remain a source of concern and uncertainty for a while longer. Conclusions Mr. X: This seems a good place to end our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground and your views have reinforced my belief that it would make good sense to start lowering the risk in our portfolio. I know that such a policy could leave money on the table as there is a reasonable chance that equity prices may rise further. But that is a risk I am prepared to take. Ms. X: I foresee some interesting discussions with my father when we get back to our office. At the risk of sounding reckless, I remain inclined to stay overweight equities for a while longer. I am sympathetic to the view that the era of hyper-easy money is ending and at some point that may cause a problem for risk assets. However, timing is important because, in my experience, the final stages of a bull market can deliver strong gains. BCA: Good luck with those discussions! We have similar debates within BCA between those who want to maximize short-run returns and those who take a longer-term view. Historically, BCA has had a conservative bias toward investment strategy and the bulk of evidence suggests that this is one of these times when long-run investors should focus on preservation of capital rather than stretching for gains. Our thinking also is influenced by our view that long-run returns will be very poor from current market levels. Our estimates indicate that a balanced portfolio will deliver average returns of only 3.3% a year over the coming decade, or 1.3% after inflation (Table 3). That is down from the 4% and 1.9% nominal and real annual returns that we estimated a year ago, reflecting the current more adverse starting point for valuations. There is a negligible equity risk premium on offer, implying that stock prices have to fall at some point to establish higher prospective returns. Table 310-Year Asset Return Projections 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course The return calculations for equities assume profit margins decline modestly over the period and that multiples mean revert to their historical average. These assumptions may turn out to be too pessimistic if there is no redistribution of income shares from the corporate sector back to labor and/or PERs stay at historically high levels. In that case, equities obviously would do better than our estimates. In terms of the outlook for the coming year, a lot will depend on the pace of economic growth. We are assuming that growth is strong enough to encourage central banks to keep moving away from hyper-easy policies, setting up for a collision with markets. If growth slows enough that recession fears spike, then that also would be bad for risk assets. Sustaining the bull market requires a goldilocks growth outcome of not too hot and not too cold. That is possible, but we would not make it our base case scenario. Ms. X: You have left us with much to think about and I am so glad to have finally attended one of these meetings. My father has always looked forward to these discussions every year and I am very happy to be joining him. Many thanks for taking the time to talk to us. Before we go, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: That will be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: The environment of easy money, low inflation and healthy profit growth that has been so bullish for risk assets will start to change during the coming year. Financial conditions, especially in the U.S., will gradually tighten as decent growth leads to building inflation pressures, encouraging central banks to withdraw stimulus. With U.S. equities at an overvalued extreme and investor sentiment overly optimistic, this will set the scene for an eventual collision between policy and the markets. The conditions underpinning the bull market will erode only slowly which means that risk asset prices should continue to rise for at least the next six months. However, long-run investors should start shifting to a neutral exposure. Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018. The U.S. economy is already operating above potential and thus does not need any boost from easier fiscal policy. Any major tax cuts risk overheating the economy, encouraging the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates and boosting the odds of a recession in 2019. This is at odds with the popular view that tax cuts will be good for the equity market. A U.S. move to scrap NAFTA would add to downside risks. For the second year in a row, the IMF forecasts of economic growth for the coming year are likely to prove too pessimistic. The end of fiscal austerity has allowed the euro area economy to gather steam and this should be sustained in 2018. However, the slow progress in negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU poses a threat to the U.K. economy. China's economy is saddled with excessive debt and excess capacity in a number of areas. Any other economy would have collapsed by now, but the government has enough control over banking and other sectors to prevent a crisis. Growth should hold above 6% in the next year or two, although much will depend on how aggressively President Xi pursues painful reforms. The market is too optimistic in assuming that the Fed will not raise interest rates by as much as indicated in their "dots" projections. There is a good chance that the U.S. yield curve will become flat or inverted by late 2018. Bonds are not an attractive investment at current yields. Only Greece and Portugal currently have 10-year government bond real yields above their historical average. Corporate bonds should outperform governments, but a tightening in financial conditions will put these at risk in the second half of 2018. The euro area and Japanese equity markets should outperform the U.S. over the next year reflecting their better valuations and more favorable financial conditions. Developed markets should outperform the emerging market index. Historically, the U.S. equity market has led recessions by between 3 and 12 months. If, as we fear, a U.S. recession starts in the second half of 2019, then the stock market would be at risk from the middle of 2018. The improving trend in capital spending should favor industrial stocks. Our other two overweight sectors are energy and financials. The oil price will be well supported by strong demand and output restraint by OPEC and Russia. The Brent price should average $65 a barrel over the coming year, with risks to the upside. We expect base metals prices to trade broadly sideways but will remain highly dependent on developments in China. Modest positions in gold are warranted. Relative economic and policy trends will favor a firm dollar in 2018. Unlike at the start of 2017, investors are significantly short the dollar which is bullish from a contrary perspective. Sterling is quite cheap but Brexit poses downside risks. The key market-relevant geopolitical events to monitor will be fiscal policy and mid-term elections in the U.S., and reform policies in China. With the former, the Democrats have a good chance of winning back control of the House of Representatives, creating a scenario of complete policy gridlock. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 3.3% a year in nominal terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 10% a year between 1982 and 2017. Let us take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 20, 2017 1 This comprises consumer spending on durables, housing and business investment in equipment and software. 2 Please see 'Bitcoin's Macro Impact', BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, September 15, 2017.

Mr. X is a long-time BCA client who visits our offices toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This year, Mr. X introduced us to his daughter, who we shall identify as Ms. X. She has many years of experience as a portfolio manager, initially in a wealth management firm, and subsequently in two major hedge funds. In 2017, she joined her father to help him run the family office portfolio. She took an active role in our recent discussion and this report is an edited transcript of our conversation. Mr. X: As always, it is a great pleasure to sit down with you to discuss the economic and investment outlook. And I am thrilled to bring my daughter to the meeting. She and I do not always agree on the market outlook and appropriate investment strategy, but even in her first year working with me she has added tremendous value to our decisions and performance. As you know, I have a very conservative bias in my approach and this means I sometimes miss out on opportunities. My daughter is more willing than me to take risks, so we make a good team. I am happy that our investment portfolio has performed well over the past year, but am puzzled by the high level of investor complacency. I can't understand why investors do not share my concerns about by sky-high valuations, a volatile geopolitical environment and the considerable potential for financial instability. Over the years, you have made me appreciate the power of easy money to create financial bubbles and also that market overshoots can last for a surprisingly long time. Thus, I am fully aware that we could easily have another year of strong gains, but were that to happen, I would worry about the potential for a sudden 1987-style crash. I remember that event well and it was an unpleasant experience. My inclination is to move right now to an underweight equity position. Ms. X: Let me add that I am delighted to finally attend the annual BCA meeting with my father. Over the years, he has talked to me at length about your discussions, making me very jealous that I was not there. He and I do frequently disagree about the outlook so it will be good to have BCA's independent and objective perspective. As my father noted, I do not always share his cautious bias. When I joined the family firm in early 2017, I persuaded him to raise our equity exposure and that was the right decision. I have been in the business long enough to know that it is dangerous to get more bullish as the market rises and I agree there probably is too much complacency. However, I do not see an early end to the conditions that are driving the bull market and I am inclined to stay overweight equities for a while longer. Thus, the big debate between us is whether or not we should now book profits from the past year's strong performance and move to an underweight stance in risk assets. Hopefully, this meeting will help us make the right decision. Chart 1An Impressive Bull Market An Impressive Bull Market An Impressive Bull Market BCA: First of all, we are delighted to see you both and look forward to getting to know Ms. X in the years to come. It is not a surprise that you are debating whether to cut exposure to risk assets because that question is on the mind of many of our clients. We share your surprise about complacency - investors have been seduced by the relentless upward drift of prices since early 2016. The global equity index has not suffered any setback above 2% during the past year, and that has to be close to a record (Chart 1). The conditions that have underpinned this remarkable performance are indeed still in place but we expect that to change during the coming year. Thus, if equity prices continue to rise, it would make sense to reduce exposure to risk assets to a neutral position over the next few months. A blow-off phase with a final spike in prices cannot be ruled out, but trying to catch those moves is a very high-risk strategy. We are not yet recommending underweight positions in risk assets, but if our economic and policy views pan out, we likely will shift in that direction in the second half of 2018. Ms. X: It seems that you are siding with my father in terms of wanting to scale back exposure to risk assets. That would be premature in my view and I look forward to discussing this in more detail. But first, I would be interested in reviewing your forecasts from last year. BCA: Of course. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: A number of important regime shifts will impact the economic and investment outlook over the next few years. These include the end of the era of falling inflation and interest rates, a move away from fiscal conservatism, a policy pushback against globalization, and a rise in the labor share of income at the expense of profit margins. Together with an earlier regime shift when the Debt Supercycle ended, these trends are consistent with very modest returns from financial assets over the next decade. The failure of low interest rates to trigger a vigorous rebound in private credit growth is consistent with our end-of-Debt Supercycle thesis. The end point for dealing with high debt levels may ultimately be sharply higher inflation, but only after the next downturn triggers a new deflationary scare. The potential for trade restrictions by the incoming U.S. administration poses a threat to the outlook, but the odds of a global trade war are low. Time lags in implementing policy mean that the fiscal plans of President-elect Trump will boost U.S. growth in 2018 more than 2017. This raises the risk of an overheated economy in 2018 leading to a monetary squeeze and recession in 2019. The key issue will be whether the supply side of the economy expands alongside increased demand and it will be critical to monitor business capital spending. Lingering structural problems will prevent any growth acceleration outside the U.S. The euro area and emerging economies are still in the midst of a deleveraging cycle and demographics remain a headwind for Japan. Not many countries will follow the U.S. example of fiscal stimulus. Nevertheless, for the first time since the recovery began, global growth forecasts are likely avoid a downgrade over the next couple of years. China remains an unbalanced and fragile economy but the authorities have enough policy flexibility to avoid a hard landing, at least over the year or two. The longer-run outlook is more bearish unless the government moves away from its stop-go policy approach and pursues more supply-side reforms. Inflation has bottomed in the U.S., but the upturn will be gradual in 2017 and it will stay subdued in the euro area and Japan. Divergences in monetary policy between the U.S. and other developed economies will continue to build in 2017 as the Fed tightens and other central banks stay on hold. Unlike a year ago, the Fed's rate expectations look reasonable. Bond yields in the U.S. may fall in the near run after their recent sharp rise, but the cyclical trend is up against a backdrop of monetary tightening, fiscal stimulus and rising inflation. Yields in the euro area will be held down by ongoing QE, while the 10-year yield will stay capped at zero in Japan. The secular bull market in bonds is over although yields could retest their recent lows in the next downturn. The search for yield will remain an important investment theme, but rich valuations dictate only a neutral weighting in investment-grade corporate bonds and a modest underweight in high-yielders. The U.S. equity market is modestly overvalued but the conditions are ripe for an overshoot in 2017 given optimism about a boost to profits from the new administration's policies. Earnings expectations are far too high and ignore the likelihood that rising labor costs will squeeze margins. Nevertheless, that need not preclude equity prices moving higher. There is a good chance of a sell-off in early 2017 and that would be a buying opportunity. Valuations are better in Japan and several European markets than in the U.S. and relative monetary conditions also favor these markets. We expect the U.S. to underperform in 2017. We expect emerging markets to underperform developed markets. The oil price should average around $55 a barrel over the next one or two years, with some risk to the upside. Although shale production should increase, the cutbacks in oil industry capital spending and planned production cuts by OPEC and some other producers will ensure that inventories will have to be drawn down in the second half of 2017. Non-oil commodity prices will stay in a trading range after healthy gains in 2016, but the long-run outlook is still bearish. The dollar bull market should stay intact over the coming year with the trade-weighted index rising by around 5%. Relative policy stances and economic trends should all stay supportive of the dollar. The outlook for the yen is especially gloomy. A stabilization in resource prices will keep commodity prices in a range. We remain bearish on EM currencies. The biggest geopolitical risks relate to U.S.-China relations, especially given President-elect Trump's inclination to engage in China-bashing. Meanwhile, the defeat of ISIS could create a power vacuum in the Middle East that could draw Turkey into a disastrous conflict with the Kurds and Iran/Russia. The coming year is important for elections in Europe but we do not expect any serious threat to the EU or single currency to emerge. The most important prediction that we got right was our view that conditions were ripe for an overshoot in equity prices. The MSCI all-country index has delivered an impressive total return of around 20% in dollar terms since the end of 2016, one of the best calendar year performances of the current cycle (Table 1). So it was good that your daughter persuaded you to keep a healthy equity exposure. It is all the more impressive that the market powered ahead in the face of all the concerns that you noted earlier. Our preference for European markets over the U.S. worked out well in common currency terms, but only because the dollar declined. Emerging markets did much better than we expected, with significant outperformance relative to their developed counterparts. Table 1Market Performance 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course With regard to the overall economic environment, we were correct in forecasting a modest improvement in 2017 global economic activity and that growth would not fall short of the IMF's predictions for the first time in the current expansion. However, one big surprise, not only for us, but also for policymakers, was that inflation drifted lower in the major economies. Latest data show the core inflation rate for the G7 economies is running at only 1.4%, down from 1.6% at the end of 2016. We will return to this critical issue later as the trend in inflation outlook will be a key determinant of the market outlook for the coming year and beyond. Regionally, the Euro area and Japanese economies registered the biggest upside surprises relative to our forecast and those of the IMF (Table 2). That goes a long way to explaining why the U.S. dollar was weaker than we expected. In addition, the dollar was not helped by a market downgrading of the scale and timing of U.S. fiscal stimulus. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the dollar has merely unwound the 2016 Trump rally and recently has shown some renewed strength. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course A year ago, there were major concerns about potential political turmoil from important elections in Europe, the risk of U.S.-led trade wars and a credit bust-up in China. We downplayed these issues as near-term threats to the markets and that turned out to be appropriate. Nevertheless, there are many lingering risks to the outlook and market complacency is a much bigger concern now than it was a year ago. Mr. X: As you just noted, a key theme of your Outlook last year was "Shifting Regimes" such as the end of disinflation and fiscal conservatism, a retreat from globalization, and the start of a rebalancing in income shares away from profits toward labor. And of course, you talked about the End of the Debt Supercycle a few years ago. Do you still have confidence that these regime shifts are underway? BCA: Absolutely! These are all trends that we expect to play out over a number of years and thus can't be judged by short-term developments. There have been particularly important shifts in the policy environment. The 2007-09 economic and financial meltdown led central banks to fight deflation rather than inflation and we would not bet against them in this battle. Inflation has been lower than expected, but there has been a clear turning point. On fiscal policy, governments have largely given up on austerity against a background of a disappointingly slow economic recovery in recent years and rising populist pressures (Chart 2). The U.S. budget deficit could rise particularly sharply over the next few years. In the U.S., the relative income shares going to profits and labor have started to shift direction, but there is a long way to go. Finally, the same forces driving government to loosen fiscal purse strings have also undermined support for globalization with the U.S. even threatening to abandon NAFTA. The ratio of global trade to output has trended sideways for several years and is unlikely to turn higher any time soon. All these trends are part of our Regime Shift thesis. Chart 2Regime Shifts Regime Shifts Regime Shifts The remarkable macro backdrop of low inflation, easy money and healthy profits has been incredibly positive for financial markets in recent years. You would have to be an extreme optimist to believe that such an environment will persist. Our big concern for the coming year is that we are setting up for a collision between the markets and looming changes in economic policy. The Coming Collision Between Policy And The Markets BCA: As you mentioned earlier, we attach enormous importance to the role of easy money in supporting asset prices and it is hard to imagine that we could have had a more stimulative monetary environment than has existed in recent years. Central banks have been in panic mode since the 2007-09 downturn with an unprecedented period of negative real interest rates in the advanced economies, coupled with an extraordinary expansion of central bank balance sheets (Chart 3). Initially, the fear was for another Great Depression and as that threat receded, the focus switched to getting inflation back to the 2% target favored by most developed countries. In a post-Debt Supercycle world, negative real rates have failed to trigger the typical rebound in credit demand that was so characteristic of the pre-downturn era. Central banks have expanded base money in the form of bank reserves, but this has not translated into markedly faster growth in broad money or nominal GDP. This is highlighted by the collapse in money multipliers (the ratio of broad to base money) and in velocity (the ratio of GDP to broad money). This has been a double whammy: there is less broad money generated for each dollar of base money and less GDP for every dollar of broad money (Chart 4). Chart 3An Extraordinary Period Of Easy Money An Extraordinary Period of Easy Money An Extraordinary Period of Easy Money Chart 4Monetary Policy: Pushing On A String Monetary Policy: Pushing On A String Monetary Policy: Pushing On A String Historically, monetary policy acted primarily through the credit channel with lower rates making households and companies more willing to borrow, and lenders more willing to supply funds. In the post-Debt Supercycle world, the credit channel has become partly blocked, forcing policymakers to rely more on the other channels of monetary transmission, the main one being boosting asset prices. However, there is a limit to how far this can go because the end result is massively overvalued assets and building financial excesses. The Fed and many other central banks now realize that this strategy cannot be pushed much further. The economic recovery in the U.S. and other developed economies has been the weakest of the post-WWII period. But potential growth rates also have slowed which means that spare capacity has gradually been absorbed. According to the IMF, the U.S. output gap closed in 2015 having been as high as 2% of potential GDP in 2013. The IMF estimates that the economy was operating slightly above potential in 2017 with a further rise forecast in 2018 (Chart 5). According to IMF estimates, the median output gap for 20 advanced economies will shift from -0.1% in 2017 to +0.3% in 2018 (i.e. they will be operating above potential). This makes it hard to justify the maintenance of hyper-stimulative monetary policies. Chart 5No More Output Gaps No More Output Gaps No More Output Gaps The low U.S. inflation rate is giving the Fed the luxury of moving cautiously and that is keeping the markets buoyant. Indeed, the markets don't even believe the Fed will be able to raise rates as much they expect. The most recent FOMC projections show a median federal funds rate of 2.1% by the end of 2018 but the markets are discounting a move to only 1.8%. The markets probably have this wrong because inflation is likely to wake up from its slumber in the second half of the year. Ms. X: This is another area where my father and I disagree. I view the world as essentially deflationary. We all know that technological innovations have opened up competition in a lot of markets, driving down prices. Two obvious examples are Uber and Airbnb, but these are just the tip of the iceberg. Amazon's purchase of Whole Foods is another example of how increased competitive pressures will continue to sweep through previously relatively stable industries. And such changes have an important impact on employee psychology and thus bargaining power. These days, people are glad to just keep their jobs and this means companies hold the upper hand when it comes to wage negotiations. So I don't see a pickup in inflation being a threat to the markets any time soon. Mr. X: I have a different perspective. First of all, I do not even believe the official inflation data because most of the things I buy have risen a lot in price over the past couple of years. Secondly, given the extremely stimulative stance of monetary policy in recent years, a pickup in inflation would not surprise me at all. So I am sympathetic to the BCA view. But, even if the data is correct, why have inflation forecasts proved so wrong and what underpins your view that it will increase in the coming year? BCA: There is an interesting disconnect between the official data and the inflation views of many consumers and economic/statistics experts. According to the Conference Board, U.S. consumers' one-year ahead inflation expectations have persistently exceeded the published data and the latest reading is close to 5% (Chart 6). That ties in with your perception. Consumer surveys by the New York Fed and University of Michigan have year-ahead inflation expectations at a more reasonable 2.5%. At the same time, many "experts" believe the official data is overstated because it fails to take enough account of technological changes and new lower-priced goods and services. The markets also have a moderately optimistic view with the five-year CPI swap rate at 2%. This is optimistic because it is consistent with inflation below the Fed's 2% target, if one allows for an inflation risk premium built in to the swap price. We are prepared to take the inflation data broadly at face value. Low inflation is consistent with an ongoing tough competitive environment in most sectors, boosted by the disruptive impact of technological changes that Ms. X described. The inflation rate for core goods (ex-food and energy) has been in negative territory for several years while that for services ex-shelter is at the low end of its historical range (Chart 7). Chart 6Differing Perspectives Of Inflation Differing Perspectives of Inflation Differing Perspectives of Inflation Chart 7Not Much Inflation Here Not Much Inflation Here Not Much Inflation Here There is no simple explanation of why inflation has fallen short of forecasts. Economic theory assumes that price pressures build as an economy moves closer to full employment and the U.S. is at that point. This raises several possibilities: There is more slack in the economy than suggested by the low unemployment rate. The lags are unusually long in the current cycle. Technological disruption is having a greater impact than expected. The link between economic slack and inflationary pressures is typically captured by the Phillips Curve which shows the relationship between the unemployment rate and inflation. In the U.S., the current unemployment rate of 4.1% is believed to be very close to a full-employment level. Yet, inflation recently has trended lower and while wage growth is in an uptrend, it has remained softer than expected (Chart 8). Chart 8Inflationary Pressures Are Turning Inflationary Pressures Are Turning Inflationary Pressures Are Turning We agree with Ms. X that employee bargaining power has been undermined over the years by globalization and technological change and by the impact of the 2007-09 economic downturn. That would certainly explain a weakened relationship between the unemployment rate and wage growth, but does not completely negate the theory. The historical evidence still suggests that once the labor market becomes tight, inflation eventually does accelerate. A broad range of data indicates that the U.S. labor market is indeed tight and the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker is in an uptrend, albeit modestly. Two other factors consistent with an end to disinflation are the lagged effects of dollar weakness and a firming in oil prices. Non-oil prices have now moved decisively out of deflationary territory while oil prices in 2017 have averaged more than 20% above year-ago levels. As far as the impact of technology is concerned, there is no doubt that innovations like Uber and Airbnb are deflationary. However, our analysis suggests that the growth in online spending has not had a major impact on the inflation numbers. E-commerce still represents a small fraction of total U.S. consumer spending, depressing overall consumer inflation by only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. The deceleration of inflation since the global financial crisis has been in areas largely unaffected by online sales, such as energy and rent. Moreover, today's creative destruction in the retail sector is no more deflationary than the earlier shift to 'big box' stores. We are not looking for a dramatic acceleration in either wage growth or inflation - just enough to convince the Fed that it needs to carry on with its plan to raise interest rates. And the pressure to do this will increase if the Administration is able to deliver on its planned tax cuts. Ms. X: You make it sound as if cutting taxes would be a bad thing. Surely the U.S. would benefit from the Administration's tax plan? A reduction in the corporate tax rate would be very bullish for equities. BCA: The U.S. tax system is desperately in need of reform via eliminating loopholes and distortions and using the savings to lower marginal rates. That would make it more efficient and hopefully boost the supply side of the economy without undermining revenues. However, the economy does not need stimulus from net tax giveaways given that it is operating close to potential. That would simply boost demand relative to supply, create overheating, and give the Fed more reason to get aggressive. The Republican's initial tax plan has some good elements of reform such as cutting back the personal mortgage interest deduction, eliminating some other deductions and making it less attractive for companies to shift operations overseas. However, many of these proposals are unlikely to survive the lobbying efforts of special interest groups. The net result probably will be tax giveaways without much actual reform. Importantly, there is not a strong case for personal tax cuts given that a married worker on the average wage and with two children paid an average income tax rate of only 14% in 2016, according to OECD calculations. There inevitably will be contentious negotiations in Congress but we assume that the Republicans will eventually come together to pass some tax cuts by early next year. The combination of easier fiscal policy and Fed rate hikes will be bullish for the dollar and this will contribute to tighter overall financial conditions. That is why we see a coming collision between economic policy and the markets. The narrative for the so-called Trump rally in markets was based on the assumption that the Administration's platform of increased spending, tax cuts and reduced regulations would be bullish for the economy and thus risk assets. That was always a misplaced notion. The perfect environment for markets has been moderate economic growth, low inflation and easy money. The Trump agenda would be appropriate for an economy that had a lot of spare capacity and needed a big boost in demand. It is less suited for an economy with little spare capacity. Reduced regulations and lower corporate tax rates are good for the supply side of the economy and could boost the potential growth rate. However, if a key move is large personal tax cuts then the boost to demand will dominate. Mr. X: It seems that you are making the case for a serious policy error in the U.S. in the coming year - both on fiscal and monetary policy. I can't argue against that because everything that has happened over the past few years tells me that policymakers don't have a good grip on either the economy or the implications of their actions. I never believed that printing money and creating financial bubbles was a sensible approach to an over-indebted economy. I always expected it to end badly. BCA: Major tightening cycles frequently end in recession because monetary policy is a very blunt tool. Central banks would like to raise rates by just enough to cool things down but that is hard to achieve. The problem with fiscal policy is that implementation lags mean that it often is pro-cyclical. In other words, there is pressure for fiscal stimulus in a downturn, but by the time legislation is passed, the economy typically has already recovered and does not really need a big fiscal boost. And that certainly applies to the current environment. The other area of potential policy error is on trade. Having already pulled the U.S. out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Trump Administration is taking a hardline attitude toward a renegotiation of NAFTA. This could even end up with the deal being scrapped and that would add another element of risk to the North American economies. Ms. X: Your scenario assumes that the Fed will be quite hawkish. However, everything I have read about Jerome Powell, the new Fed chair, suggests that he will err on the side of caution when it comes to raising rates. So monetary policy may not collide with markets at all over the coming year. BCA: It is certainly true that Powell does not have any particular bias when it comes to the conduct of monetary policy. That would not have been the case if either John Taylor or Kevin Warsh had been given the job - they both have a hawkish bias. Powell is not an economist so will likely follow a middle path and be heavily influenced by the Fed's staff forecasts and by the opinions of other FOMC members. There are still several vacancies on the Fed's Board so much will depend on who is appointed to those positions. The latest FOMC forecasts are for growth and inflation of only 2% in 2018 and these numbers seem too low. Meanwhile, the prediction that unemployment will still be at 4.1% at end-2018 is too high. We expect projections of growth and inflation to be revised up and unemployment to be revised down. That will embolden the Fed to keep raising rates. So, even with Powell at the helm, monetary policy is set to get tighter than the market currently expects. Ms. X: So far, we have talked mainly about the U.S. What about other central banks? I can't believe that inflation will be much of a problem in the euro area or in Japan any time soon. Does that not mean that the overall global monetary environment will stay favorable for risk assets? BCA: The Fed is at the leading edge of the shift away from extreme monetary ease by hiking interest rates and starting the process of balance sheet reduction. But the Bank of Canada also has raised rates and the ECB has announced that it will cut its asset purchases in half beginning January 2018, as a first step in normalizing policy. Even the Bank of England has raised rates despite Brexit-related downside risks for the economy. The BoJ will keep an accommodative stance for the foreseeable future. You are correct that financial conditions will be tightening more in the U.S. than in other developed economies. Moreover, equity valuations are more stretched in the U.S. than elsewhere leaving that market especially vulnerable. Yet, market correlations are such that any sell-off in U.S. risk assets is likely to become a global affair. Another key issue relates to the potential for financial shocks. Long periods of extreme monetary ease always fuel excesses and sometimes these remain hidden until they blow up. We know that companies have taken on a lot of debt, largely to fund financial transactions such as share buybacks and merger and acquisitions activity. That is unlikely to be the direct cause of a financial accident but might well become a problem in the next downturn. It typically is increased leverage within the financial sector itself that poses the greatest risk and that is very opaque. The banking system is much better capitalized than before the 2007-09 downturn so the risks lie elsewhere. As would be expected, margin debt has climbed higher with the equity market, and is at a historically high level relative to market capitalization (Chart 9). We don't have good data on the degree of leverage among non-bank financial institutions such as hedge funds but that is where leverage surprises are likely to occur. And the level of interest rates that causes financial stress is almost certainly to be a lot lower than in the past. Chart 9Financial Leverage Has Risen Financial Leverage Has Risen Financial Leverage Has Risen Mr. X: That is the perfect lead-in to my perennial concern - the high level of debt in the major economies. I realize high debt levels are not a problem when interest rates are close to zero, but that will change if your view on the Fed is correct. Ms. X: I would just add that this is one area where I share my father's concerns, but with an important caveat. I wholeheartedly agree that high debt levels pose a threat to economic and financial stability, but I see this as a long-term issue. Even with rising interest rates, debt servicing costs will stay low for at least the next year. It seems to me that rates will have to rise a lot before debt levels in the major economies pose a serious threat to the system. Even if the Fed tightens policy in line with its plans, real short rates will still stay low by historical standards. This will not only keep debt financing manageable but will also sustain the search for yield and support equity prices. BCA: We would be disappointed if you both had not raised the issue of debt. Debt levels do indeed remain very elevated among advanced and emerging economies (Chart 10). The growth in private debt remains far below pre-crisis levels in the advanced countries, but this has been offset by the continued high level of government borrowing. As a result, the total debt-to-GDP ratio has stayed close to a peak. And both private and public debt ratios have climbed to new highs in the emerging economies, with China leading the charge. Chart 10ADebt Levels Remain Elevated Debt Levels Remain Elevated Debt Levels Remain Elevated Chart 10BDebt Levels Remain Elevated 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course As we have discussed in the past, there is not an inconsistency between our End of Debt Supercycle thesis and the continued high levels of debt in most countries. As noted earlier, record-low interest rates have not triggered the kind of private credit resurgence that occurred in the pre-crisis period. For example, household borrowing has remained far below historical levels as a percent of income in the U.S., despite low borrowing costs (Chart 11). At the same time, it is not a surprise that debt-to-income ratios are high given the modest growth in nominal incomes in most countries. Chart 11Low Rates Have Not Triggered ##br##A Borrowing Surge In U.S. Low Rates Have Not Triggered A Borrowing Surge In U.S. Low Rates Have Not Triggered A Borrowing Surge In U.S. Debt growth is not benign everywhere. In the developed world, Canada's debt growth is worryingly high, both in the household and corporate sectors. As is also the case with Australia, Canada's overheated housing market has fueled rapid growth in mortgage debt. These are accidents waiting to happen when borrowing costs increase. In the emerging word, China has yet to see the end of its Debt Supercycle. Fortunately, with most banks under state control, the authorities should be able to contain any systemic risks, at least in the near run. With regard to timing, we agree that debt levels are not likely to pose an economic or financial problem in next year. It is right to point out that debt-servicing costs are very low by historical standards and it will take time for rising rates to have an impact given that a lot of debt is locked in at low rates. For example, in the U.S., the ratio of household debt-servicing to income and the non-financial business sector's ratio of interest payments to EBITD are at relatively benign levels (Chart 12). However, changes occur at the margin and the example of the Bernanke taper tantrum highlighted investor sensitivity to even modest changes in the monetary environment. You may well be right Ms. X that risk assets will continue to climb higher in the face of a tighter financial conditions. But given elevated valuations, we lean toward a cautious rather than aggressive approach to strategy. We would rather leave some money on the table than risk being caught in a sudden downdraft. Other investors, including yourself, might prefer to wait for clearer signals that a turning point is imminent. Returning to the issue of indebtedness, the end-game for high debt levels continues to be a topic of intense interest. There really are only three options: to grow out of it, to write it off, or to try and inflate it away. The first option obviously would be best - to have fast enough growth in real incomes that allowed debtors to start paying down their debt. Unfortunately, that is the least likely prospect given adverse demographic trends throughout the developed world and disappointing productivity growth (Chart 13). Chart 12Borrowing Costs Are Benign Borrowing Costs Are Benign Borrowing Costs Are Benign Chart 13It's Hard To Grow Out Of Debt ##br##With These Structural Headwinds It's Hard To Grow Out Of Debt With These Structural Headwinds It's Hard To Grow Out Of Debt With These Structural Headwinds Writing the debt off - i.e. defaulting - is a desperate measure that would be the very last resort after all other approaches had failed. In this case, we are talking mainly about government debt, because private debt always has to be written off when borrowers become bankrupt. Japan is the one developed country where government debt probably will be written off eventually. Given that the Bank of Japan owns around 45% of outstanding government debt, those holdings can be neutralized by converting them to perpetuals - securities that are never redeemed. If the first two options are not viable, then inflation becomes the preferred solution to over-indebtedness. To make a big impact, inflation would need to rise far above the 2% level currently favored by central banks, and it would have to stay elevated for quite some time. Central banks are not yet ready to allow such an environment, but that could change after the next economic downturn. Central banks have made it clear that they are prepared to pursue radical policies in order to prevent deflation. This sets the scene for increasingly aggressive actions after the next recession and the end result could be a period of significantly higher inflation. Mr. X: I don't disagree with that view which is why I always like to hold some physical gold in my portfolio. It is interesting that you are worried about a looming setback for risk assets because you are positive on the near-run economic outlook. That is contrary to the typical view that sees a decent economy as supporting higher equity prices. Let's spend a bit more time on your view of the economic outlook. Ms. X: Before we do that, I would just emphasize that it is far too early to worry about debt end games and the potential for sharply rising inflation. I don't disagree that monetary policy could be forced to embrace massive reflation during the next downturn and perhaps that will make me change my view of the inflation outlook. But the sequencing is important because we would first have to deal with a recession that could be a very deflationary episode. And before the next recession we could have period of continued decent growth, which would be positive for risk assets. So I agree that the near-term view of the economic outlook is important. The Economic Outlook BCA: This recovery cycle has been characterized by a series of shocks and headwinds that constrained growth in various regions. In no particular order, these included fiscal austerity, the euro crisis, a brief U.S. government shutdown, the Japanese earthquake, and a spike in oil prices above $100. As we discussed a year ago, in the absence of any new shocks, we expected global growth to improve and that is what occurred in 2017. A broad range of indicators shows that activity has picked up steam in most areas. Purchasing managers' indexes are in an uptrend, business and consumer confidence are at cyclical highs and leading indicators have turned up (Chart 14). This is hardly a surprise given easy monetary conditions and a more relaxed fiscal stance almost everywhere. Chart 14Global Activity On An Uptrend Global Activity On An Uptrend Global Activity On An Uptrend The outlook for 2018 is positive and the IMF's projections for growth is probably too low (see Table 2). So, for the second year in a row, the next set of updates due in the spring are likely to be revised up. Ms. X: Let's talk about the U.S. economy. You are concerned that tax cuts could contribute to overheating, tighter monetary policy and an eventual collision with the markets. But there are two alternative scenarios, both quite optimistic for risk assets. On the one hand, a cut in the corporate tax rate could trigger a further improvement in business confidence and thus acceleration in capital spending. This would boost the supply side of the economy and mean that faster growth need not lead to higher inflation. It would be the perfect world of a low inflation boom. At the other extreme, if political gridlock prevents any meaningful tax cuts, we will be left with the status quo of moderate growth and low inflation that has been very positive for markets during the past several years. Mr. X: You can always rely on my daughter to emphasize the potential for optimistic outcomes. I would suggest another entirely different scenario. The cycle is very mature and I fear it would not take much to tip the economy into recession, even if we get some tax relief. So I am more concerned with near-term downside risks to the U.S. economy. A recession in the coming year would be catastrophic for the stock market in my view. BCA: Before we get to the outlook, let's agree on where we are right now. As we already noted, the U.S. economy currently is operating very close to its potential level. The Congressional Budget Office estimates potential growth to be only 1.6% a year at present, which explains why the unemployment rate has dropped even though growth has averaged a modest 2% pace in recent years. The consumer sector has generally been a source of stability with real spending growing at a 2¾% pace over the past several years (Chart 15). And, encouragingly, business investment has recently picked up from its earlier disappointing level. On the negative side, the recovery in housing has lost steam and government spending has been a source of drag. Looking ahead, the pattern of growth may change a bit. With regard to consumer spending, the pace of employment growth is more likely to slow than accelerate given the tight market and growing lack of available skilled employees. According to the National Federation of Independent Business survey, 88% of small companies hiring or trying to hire reported "few or no qualified applicants for the positions they were trying to fill". Companies in manufacturing and construction say that the difficulty in finding qualified workers is their single biggest problem, beating taxes and regulations. In addition, we should not assume that the personal saving rate will keep falling given that it has hit a recovery low of 3.1% (Chart 16). On the other hand, wage growth should continue to firm and there is the prospect of tax cuts. Overall, this suggests that consumer spending should continue to grow by at least a 2% pace in 2018. Chart 15Trends In U.S. Growth Trends In U.S. Growth Trends In U.S. Growth Chart 16Personal Saving At A Recovery Low Personal Saving At A Recovery Low Personal Saving At A Recovery Low Survey data suggests that business investment spending should remain strong in the coming year, even without any additional boost from corporate tax cuts. Meanwhile, rebuilding and renovations in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma should provide a short-term boost to housing investment and a more lasting improvement will occur if the millennial generation finally moves out of their parents' basements. On that note, it is encouraging that the 10-year slide in the homeownership rate appears to have run its course (Chart 17). And although housing affordability is down from its peak, it remains at an attractive level from a historical perspective. Chart 17A Weak Housing Recovery A Weak Housing Recovery A Weak Housing Recovery Last, but not least, government spending will face countervailing forces. The Administration plans to increase spending on defense and infrastructure but there could be some offsetting cutbacks in other areas. Overall, government spending should make a positive contribution to 2018 after being a drag in 2017. Putting all this together, the U.S. economy should manage to sustain a growth rate of around 2.5% in 2018, putting GDP further above its potential level. And it could rise above that if tax cuts are at the higher end of the range. You suggested three alternative scenarios to our base case: a supply-side boom, continued moderate growth and a near-term recession. A supply-side revival that leads to strong growth and continued low inflation would be extremely bullish, but we are skeptical about that possibility. The revival in capital spending is good news, but this will take time to feed into faster productivity growth. Overall, any tax cuts will have a greater impact on demand than supply, putting even greater pressure on an already tight labor market. The second scenario of a continuation of the recent status quo is more possible, especially if we end up with a very watered-down tax package. However, growth would actually have to drop below 2% in order to prevent GDP from rising above potential. We will closely monitor leading indicators for signs that growth is about to lose momentum. The bearish scenario of a near-term recession cannot be completely discounted, but there currently is no compelling evidence of such a development. Recessions can arrive with little warning if there is an unanticipated shock, but that is rare. Historically, a flat or inverted yield curve has provided a warning sign ahead of most recessions and the curve currently is still positively sloped (Chart 18). Another leading indicator is when cyclical spending1 falls as a share of GDP, reflecting the increased sensitivity of those items to changes in financial conditions. Cyclical spending is still at a historically low level relative to GDP and we expect this to rise rather than fall over the coming quarters. While a near-term recession does not seem likely, the odds will change during the course of 2018. By late year, there is a good chance that the yield curve will be flat or inverted, giving a warning signal for a recession in 2019. Our base case view is for a U.S. recession to start in the second half of 2019, making the current expansion the longest on record. At this stage, it is too early to predict whether it would be a mild recession along the lines of 1990-91 and 2000-01 or a deeper downturn. Chart 18No Recession Signals For The U.S. ...Yet No Recession Signals For The U.S. ...Yet No Recession Signals For The U.S. ...Yet Mr. X: I hope that you are right that a U.S. recession is more than a year away. I am not entirely convinced but will keep an open mind, and my daughter will no doubt keep me fully informed of any positive trends. Ms. X: You can be sure of that. Although I lean toward the optimistic side on the U.S. economy, I have been rather surprised at how well the euro area economy has done in the past year. Latest data show that the euro area's real GDP increased by 2.5% in the year to 2017 Q3 compared to 2.3% for the U.S. Can that be sustained? BCA: The relative performance of the euro area economy has been even better if you allow for the fact that the region's population growth is 0.5% a year below that of the U.S. So the economic growth gap is even greater on a per capita basis. The euro area economy performed poorly during their sovereign debt crisis years of 2011-13, but the subsequent improvement has meant that the region's real per capita GDP has matched that of the U.S. over the past four years. And even Japan's GDP has not lagged much behind on a per capita basis (Chart 19). Chart 19No Clear Winner On Growth No Clear Winner On Growth No Clear Winner On Growth The recovery in the euro area has been broadly based but the big change was the end of a fiscal squeeze in the periphery countries. Between 2010 and 2013, fiscal drag (the change in the structural primary deficit) was equivalent to around 10% of GDP in Greece and Portugal and 7% of GDP in Ireland and Spain. There was little fiscal tightening in the subsequent three years, allowing those economies to recover lost ground. Meanwhile, Germany's economy has continued to power ahead, benefiting from much easier financial conditions than the economy has warranted. That has been the inevitable consequence of a one size fits all monetary policy that has had to accommodate the weakest members of the region. The French and Italian economies have disappointed, but there are hopes that the new French government will pursue pro-growth policies. And Italy should also pick up given signs that it is finally starting to deal with its fragile banking system. Both Spain and Italy faced a sharp rise in non-performing bank loans during the great recession, but Italy lagged Spain in dealing with the problem (Chart 20). That goes a long way to explaining why the Italian economic recovery has been so poor relative to Spain. With Italian banks raising capital and writing off non-performing loans more aggressively, the Italian economy should start to improve, finally catching up with the rest of the region. Overall, the euro area economy should manage to sustain growth above the 2.1% forecast by the IMF for 2018. Overall financial conditions are likely to stay favorable for at least another year and we do not anticipate any major changes in fiscal policy. If, as we fear, the U.S. moves into recession in 2019, there will be negative fallout for Europe, largely via the impact on financial markets. However, in relative terms, the euro area should outperform the U.S. during the next downturn. Mr. X: A year ago, you said that Brexit posed downside risks for the U.K. economy. For a while, that seemed too pessimistic as the economy performed quite well, but recent data show things have taken a turn for the worse. How do you see things playing out with this issue? BCA: It was apparent a year ago that the U.K. government had no concrete plans to deal with Brexit and little has changed since then. The negotiations with the EU are not going particularly well and the odds of a "hard" exit have risen. This means withdrawing from the EU without any agreement on a new regime for trade, labor movements or financial transactions. A growing number of firms are taking the precaution of shifting some operations from the U.K. to other EU countries. As you noted, there are signs that Brexit is starting to undermine the U.K. economy. For example, London house prices have turned down and the leading economic index has softened (Chart 21). The poor performance of U.K. consumer service and real estate equities relative to those of Germany suggest investors are becoming more wary of the U.K. outlook. Of course, a lot will depend on the nature of any deal between the U.K. and the EU and that remains a source of great uncertainty. Chart 20A Turning Point For Italian Banks? A Turning Point For Italian Banks? A Turning Point For Italian Banks? Chart 21U.K. Consumer Services Equities Are ##br##Underperforming Brexit Effects Show Up U.K. Consumer Services Equities Are Underperforming Brexit Effects Show Up U.K. Consumer Services Equities Are Underperforming Brexit Effects Show Up At the moment, there are no real grounds for optimism. The U.K. holds few cards in the bargaining process and the country's strong antipathy toward the free movement of people within the EU will be a big obstacle to an amicable separation agreement. Ms. X: I think the U.K. made the right decision to leave the EU and am more optimistic than you about the outlook. There may be some short-term disruption but the long-term outlook for the U.K. will be good once the country is freed from the stifling bureaucratic constraints of EU membership. The U.K. has a more dynamic economy than most EU members and it will be able to attract plenty of overseas capital if the government pursues appropriate policies toward taxes and regulations. It will take a few years to find out who is correct about this. In the meantime, given the uncertainties, I am inclined to have limited exposure to sterling and the U.K. equity market. Let's now talk about China, another country facing complex challenges. This is a topic where my father and I again have a lot of debates. As you might guess, I have been on the more optimistic side while he has sided with those who have feared a hard landing. And I know that similar debates have occurred in BCA. BCA: It is not a surprise that there are lots of debates about the China outlook. The country's impressive economic growth has been accompanied by an unprecedented build-up of debt and supply excesses in several sectors. The large imbalances would have led to a collapse by now in any other economy. However, China has benefited from the heavy state involvement in the economy and, in particular, the banking sector. The big question is whether the government has enough control over economic developments to avoid an economic and financial crisis. The good news is that China's government debt is relatively low, giving them the fiscal flexibility to write-off bad debts from zombie state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The problems of excessive leverage and over-capacity are particularly acute in SOEs that still comprise a large share of economic activity. The government is well aware of the need to reform SOEs and various measures have been announced, but progress has been relatively limited thus far. The IMF projects that the ratio of total non-financial debt to GDP will remain in an uptrend over the next several years, rising from 236% in 2016 to 298% by 2022 (Chart 22). Yet, growth is expected to slow only modestly over the period. Of course, one would not expect the IMF to build a crisis into their forecast. Some investors have been concerned that a peak in China's mini-cycle of the past two years may herald a return to the economic conditions that prevailed in 2015, when the industrial sector grew at a slower pace than during the acute phase of the global financial crisis. These conditions occurred due to the combination of excessively tight monetary conditions and weak global growth. While China's export growth may slow over the coming year, monetary policy remains accommodative. Monetary conditions appear to have peaked early this year but are still considerably easier than in mid-2015. Shifts in the monetary conditions index have done a good job of leading economic activity and they paint a reasonably positive picture (Chart 23). The industrial sector has finally moved out of deflation, with producer prices rising 6.9% in the year ended October. This has been accompanied by a solid revival in profits. Chart 22China: Debt-Fueled Growth To Continue China: Debt-Fueled Growth To Continue China: Debt-Fueled Growth To Continue Chart 23China Leaves Deflation Behind China Leaves Deflation Behind China Leaves Deflation Behind On balance, we assume that the Chinese economy will be able to muddle through for the foreseeable future. President Xi Jinping has strengthened his grip on power and he will go to great lengths to ensure that his reign is not sullied with an economic crisis. The longer-term outlook will depend on how far the government goes with reforms and deleveraging and we are keeping an open mind at this point. In sum, for the moment, we are siding with Ms. X on this issue. Mr. X: I have been too bearish on China for the past several years, but I still worry about the downside risks given the massive imbalances and excesses. I can't think of any example of a country achieving a soft landing after such a massive rise in debt. I will give you and my daughter the benefit of the doubt, but am not totally convinced that you will be right. BCA has been cautious on emerging economies in general: has that changed? BCA: The emerging world went through a tough time in 2015-16 with median growth of only 2.6% for the 23 constituent countries of the MSCI EM index (Chart 24). This recovered to 3% in 2017 according to IMF estimates, but that is still far below the average 5% pace of the period 2000-07. Chart 24Emerging Economy Growth: ##br##The Boom Years Are Over Emerging Economy Growth: The Boom Years Are Over Emerging Economy Growth: The Boom Years Are Over It is always dangerous to generalize about the emerging world because the group comprises economies with very different characteristics and growth drivers. Two of the largest countries - Brazil and Russia - went through particularly bad downturns in the past couple of years and those economies are now in a modest recovery. In contrast, India has continued to grow at a healthy albeit slowing pace, while Korea and the ASEAN region have not suffered much of a slowdown. If, as seems likely, Chinese growth holds above a 6% pace over the next year, then those countries with strong links to China should do fine. And it also points to reasonably steady commodity prices, supporting resource-dependent economies. Longer-run, there are reasons to be cautious about many emerging economies, particularly if the U.S. goes into recession 2019, as we fear. That would be associated with renewed weakness in commodity prices, and capital flight from those economies with high external debt such as Turkey and South Africa. As we stated a year ago, the heady days of emerging economy growth are in the past. Mr. X: It seems that both my daughter and I can find some areas of agreement with your views about the economic outlook. You share her expectation that the global growth outlook will stay healthy over the coming year, but you worry about a U.S.-led recession in 2019, something that I certainly sympathize with. But we differ on timing: I fear the downturn could occur even sooner and I know my daughter believes in a longer-lasting upturn. Let's now move onto what this all means for financial markets, starting with bonds. Bond Market Prospects Ms. X: I expect this to be a short discussion as I can see little attraction in bonds at current yields. Even though I expect inflation to stay muted, bonds offer no prospect of capital gains in the year ahead and even the running yield offers little advantage over the equity dividend yield. BCA: As you know, we have believed for some time that the secular bull market in bonds has ended. We expect yields to be under upward pressure in most major markets during 2018 and thus share your view that equities offer better return prospects. By late 2018, it might well be appropriate to switch back into bonds against a backdrop of higher yields and a likely bear market in equities. For the moment, we recommend underweight bond exposure. It is hard to like government bonds when the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasuries is less than 50 basis points above the dividend yield of the S&P 500 while the euro area bond yield is 260 basis points below divided yields (Chart 25). Real yields, using the 10-year CPI swap rate as a measure of inflation expectations, are less than 20 basis points in the U.S. and a negative 113 basis points in the euro area. Even if we did not expect inflation to rise, it would be difficult to recommend an overweight position in any developed country government bonds. One measure of valuation is to compare the level of real yields to their historical average, adjusted by the standard deviation of the gap. On this basis, the most overvalued markets are the core euro area countries, where real yields are 1.5 to 2 standard deviations below their historical average (Chart 26). There are only two developed bond markets where real 10-year government yields currently are above their historical average: Greece and Portugal. This is warranted in Greece where there needs to be a risk premium in case the country is forced to leave the single currency at some point. This is less of a risk for Portugal, making it a more interesting market. Real yields in New Zealand are broadly in line with their historical average, also making it one of the more attractive markets. Chart 25Bonds Yields Offer Little Appeal Bonds Yields Offer Little Appeal Bonds Yields Offer Little Appeal Chart 26Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course Mr. X: Given your expectation of higher inflation, would you recommend inflation-protected Treasuries? BCA: Yes, in the sense that they should outperform conventional Treasuries. The 10-year TIPS are discounting average inflation of 1.85% and we would expect this to be revised up during the coming year. However, the caveat is that absolute returns will still be mediocre. Ms. X: You showed earlier that corporate bonds had a reasonable year in 2017, albeit falling far short of the returns from equities. A year ago, you recommended only neutral weighting in investment-grade bonds and an underweight in high yield. But you became more optimistic toward both early in 2017, shifting to an overweight position. Are you thinking of scaling back exposure once again, given the tight level of spreads? BCA: Yes, we were cautious on U.S. corporates a year ago because valuation was insufficient to compensate for the deterioration in corporate balance sheet health. Nonetheless, value improved enough early in 2017 to warrant an upgrade to overweight given our constructive macro and default rate outlook. The cyclical sweet spot for carry trades should continue to support spread product for a while longer. Moreover, value is better than it appears at first glance. The dotted line in Chart 27 shows the expected 12-month option-adjusted spread for U.S. junk bonds after adjusting for our base case forecast for net default losses. At 260 basis points, this excess spread is in line with the historical average. In the absence of any further spread narrowing, speculative-grade bonds would return 230 basis points more than Treasurys in 2018. If high-yield spreads were to tighten by another 150 basis points, then valuations would be at a historical extreme, and that seems unwarranted. An optimistic scenario would have another 100 basis point spread tightening, delivering excess returns of 5%. Of course, if spreads widen, then corporates will underperform. If financial conditions tighten in 2018 as we expect then it will be appropriate to lower exposure to corporates. In the meantime, you should favor U.S. and U.K. corporate bonds to issues in the Eurozone because ECB tapering is likely to spark some spread widening in that market. Mr. X: What about EM hard-currency bonds? BCA: The global economic background is indeed positive for EM assets. However, EM debt is expensive relative to DM investment-grade bonds which, historically, has heralded a period of underperformance (Chart 28). We expect that relative growth dynamics will be more supportive of U.S. corporates because EM growth will lag. Any commodity price weakness and/or a stronger U.S. dollar would also weigh on EM bonds and currencies. Chart 27Not Much Value In U.S. Corporates Not Much Value In U.S. Corporates Not Much Value In U.S. Corporates Chart 28Emerging Market Bonds Are Expensive Emerging Market Bonds Are Expensive Emerging Market Bonds Are Expensive Mr. X: We have not been excited about the bond market outlook for some time and nothing you have said changes my mind. I am inclined to keep our bond exposure to the bare minimum. Ms. X: I agree. So let's talk about the stock market which is much more interesting. As I mentioned before, I am inclined to remain fully invested in equities for a while longer, while my father wants to start cutting exposure. Equity Market Outlook BCA: This is one of those times when it is important to draw a distinction between one's forecast of where markets are likely to go and the appropriate investment strategy. We fully agree that the conditions that have driven this impressive equity bull market are likely to stay in place for much of the next year. Interest rates in the U.S. and some other countries are headed higher, but they will remain at historically low levels for some time. Meanwhile, in the absence of recession, corporate earnings still have upside, albeit not as much as analysts project. However, we have a conservative streak at BCA that makes us reluctant to chase markets into the stratosphere. For long-term investors, our recommended strategy is to gradually lower equity exposure to neutral. However, those who are trying to maximize short-term returns should stay overweight and wait for clearer signs that tighter financial conditions are starting to bite on economic activity. Chart 29Reasons For Caution On U.S. Stocks Reasons For Caution On U.S. Stocks Reasons For Caution On U.S. Stocks Getting down to specifics, here are the trends that give us cause for concern and they are all highlighted in Chart 29. Valuation: Relative to both earnings and book value, the U.S. equity market is more expensive than at any time since the late 1990s tech bubble. The price-earnings ratio (PER) for the S&P 500 is around 30% above its 60-year average on the basis of both trailing operating earnings and a 10-year average of earnings. The market is not expensive on a relative yield basis because interest rates are so low, but that will change as rates inevitably move higher. Other developed markets are not as overvalued as the U.S., but neither are they cheap. Earnings expectations: The performance of corporate earnings throughout this cycle - particularly in the U.S. - has been extremely impressive give the weaker-than-normal pace of economic growth. However, current expectations are ridiculously high. According to IBES data, analysts expect long-run earnings growth of around 14% a year in both the U.S. and Europe. Even allowing for analysts' normal optimistic bias, the sharp upward revision to growth expectations over the past year makes no sense and is bound to be disappointed. Investor complacency: We all know that the VIX index is at a historical low, indicating that investors see little need to protect themselves against market turmoil. Our composite sentiment indicator for the U.S. is at a high extreme, further evidence of investor complacency. These are classic contrarian signs of a vulnerable market. Most bear markets are associated with recessions, with the stock market typically leading the economy by 6 to 12 months (Chart 30). The lead in 2007 was an unusually short three months. As discussed earlier, we do not anticipate a U.S. recession before 2019. If a recession were to start in mid-2019, it would imply the U.S. market would be at risk from the middle of 2018, but the rally could persist all year. Of course, the timing of a recession and market is uncertain. So it boils down to potential upside gains over the next year versus the downside risks, plus your confidence in being able to time the top. Chart 30Bear Markets And Recessions Usually Overlap Bear Markets And Recessions Usually Overlap Bear Markets And Recessions Usually Overlap We are not yet ready to recommend that you shift to an underweight position in equities. A prudent course of action would be to move to a broadly neutral position over the next few months, but we realize that Ms. X has a higher risk tolerance than Mr. X so we will leave you to fight over that decision. The timing of when we move to an underweight will depend on our various economic, monetary and market indicators and our assessment of the risks. It could well happen in the second half of the year. Mr. X: My daughter was more right than me regarding our equity strategy during the past year, so maybe I should give her the benefit of the doubt and wait for clearer signs of a market top. Thus far, you have focused on the U.S. market. Last year you preferred developed markets outside the U.S. on the grounds of relative valuations and relative monetary conditions. Is that still your stance? BCA: Yes it is. The economic cycle and thus the monetary cycle is far less advanced in Europe and Japan than in the U.S. This will provide extra support to these markets. At the same time, profit margins are less vulnerable outside the U.S. and, as you noted, valuations are less of a problem. In Chart 31, we show a valuation ranking of developed equity markets, based on the deviation of cyclically-adjusted PERs from their historical averages. The chart is not meant to measure the extent to which Portugal is cheap relative to the U.S., but it indicates that Portugal is trading at a PER far below its historical average while that of the U.S. is above. You can see that the "cheaper" markets tend to be outside the U.S. Japan's reading is flattered by the fact that its historical valuation was extremely high during the bubble years of the 1980s, but it still is a relatively attractive market. Chart 31Valuation Ranking Of Developed Equity Markets 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course From a cyclical standpoint, we are still recommending overweight positions in European and Japanese stocks relative to the U.S., on a currency-hedged basis. Nevertheless, market correlations are such that a sell-off in the U.S. will be transmitted around the world (Chart 32). Chart 32When the U.S. Market Sneezes, The World Catches A Cold When the U.S. Market Sneezes, The World Catches A Cold When the U.S. Market Sneezes, The World Catches A Cold Ms. X: I would like to turn the focus to emerging equity markets. You have been cautious on these for several years and that worked out extremely well until 2017. I note from your regular EM reports that you have not changed your stance. Why are you staying bearish given that you see an improvement in global growth and further potential upside in developed equity prices? BCA: The emerging world did extremely well over many years when global trade was expanding rapidly, China was booming, commodity prices were in a powerful bull market and capital inflows were strong. Those trends fostered a rapid expansion in credit-fueled growth across the EM universe and meant that there was little pressure to pursue structural reforms. However, the 2007-09 economic and financial crisis marked a major turning point in the supports to EM outperformance. As we noted earlier, the era of rapid globalization has ended, marking an important regime shift. Meanwhile, China's growth rate has moderated and the secular bull market in commodities ended several years ago. We do not view the past year's rebound in commodities as the start of a major new uptrend. Many emerging equity markets remain highly leveraged to the Chinese economy and to commodity prices (Chart 33). Although we expect the Chinese economy to hold up, growth is becoming less commodity intensive. Finally, the rise in U.S. interest rates is a problem for those countries that have taken on a marked increase in foreign currency debt. This will be made even worse if the dollar appreciates. Obviously, the very term "emerging" implies that this group of countries has a lot of upside potential. However, the key to success is pursuing market-friendly reforms, rooting out corruption and investing in productive assets. Many countries pay only lip service to these issues. India is a case in point where there is growing skepticism about the Modi government's ability to deliver on major reforms. The overall EM index does not appear expensive, with the PER trading broadly in line with its historical average (Chart 34). However, as we have noted in the past, the picture is less compelling when the PER is calculated using equally-weighted sectors. The financials and materials components are trading at historically low multiples, dragging down the overall index PER. Emerging market equities will continue to rise as long as the bull market in developed markets persists, but we expect them to underperform on a relative basis. Chart 33Drivers Of EM Performance Drivers of EM Performance Drivers of EM Performance Chart 34Emerging Markets Fundamentals Emerging Markets Fundamentals Emerging Markets Fundamentals Mr. X: One last question on equities from me: do you have any high conviction calls on sectors? BCA: A key theme of our sector view is that cyclical stocks should outperform defensives given the mature stage of the economic cycle. We are seeing the typical late-cycle improvement in capital spending and that will benefit industrials, and we recommend an overweight stance in that sector. Technology also is a beneficiary of higher capex but of course those stocks have already risen a lot, pushing valuations to extreme levels. Thus, that sector warrants only a neutral weighting. Our two other overweights are financials and energy. The former should benefit from rising rates and a steeper yield curve while the latter will benefit from firm oil prices. If, as we fear, a recession takes hold in 2019, then obviously that would warrant a major shift back into defensive stocks. For the moment, the positive growth outlook will dominate sector performance. Ms. X: I agree that the bull market in equities, particularly in the U.S., is very mature and there are worrying signs of complacency. However, the final stages of a market cycle can sometimes be very rewarding and I would hate to miss out on what could be an exciting blow-off phase in 2018. As I mentioned earlier, my inclination is to stay heavily invested in equities for a while longer and I have confidence that BCA will give me enough of a warning when risks become unacceptably high. Of course, I will have to persuade my father and that may not be easy. Mr. X: You can say that again, but we won't bother our BCA friends with that conversation now. It's time to shift the focus to commodities and currencies and I would start by commending you on your oil call. You were far out of consensus a year ago when you said the risks to crude prices were in the upside and you stuck to your guns even as the market weakened in the first half. We made a lot of money following your energy recommendations. What is your latest thinking? Commodities And Currencies BCA: We had a lot of conviction in our analysis that the oil market would tighten during 2017 against a backdrop of rising demand and OPEC production cuts, and that view turned out to be correct. As we entered the year, the big reason to be bearish on oil prices was the bloated level of inventories. We forecast that inventories would drop to their five-year average by late 2017, and although that turned out to be a bit too optimistic, the market tightened by enough to push prices higher (Chart 35). Chart 35Oil Market Trends Oil Market Trends Oil Market Trends The forces that have pushed prices up will remain in force over the next year. Specifically, our economic view implies that demand will continue to expand, and we expect OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition of OPEC and non-OPEC states, led by Saudi Arabia and Russia - to extend its 1.8 million b/d production cuts to at least end-June. On that basis, OECD inventories should fall below their five-year average by the end of 2018. We recently raised our 2018 oil price target to an average of $65 in 2018. Of course, the spot market is already close to that level, but the futures curve is backwardated and that is likely to change. We continue to see upside risks to prices, not least because of potential production shortfalls from Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and Libya. Mr. X: The big disruptor in the oil market in recent years was the dramatic expansion in U.S. shale production. Given the rise in prices, could we not see a rapid rebound in shale output that, once again, undermines prices? BCA: Our modeling indicates that U.S. shale output will increase from 5.1 mb/d to 6.0 mb/d over the next year, in response to higher prices. This is significant, but will not be enough to materially change the global oil demand/supply balance. Longer run, the expansion of U.S. shale output will certainly be enough to prevent any sustained price rise, assuming no large-scale production losses elsewhere. A recent report by the International Energy Agency projected that the U.S. is destined to become the global leader in oil and gas production for decades to come, accounting for 80% of the rise in global oil and gas supply between 2010 and 2025. Ms. X: You have suggested that China's economic growth is becoming less commodity intensive. Also, you have shown in the past that real commodity prices tend to fall over time, largely because of technological innovations. What does all this imply for base metals prices over the coming year? BCA: The base metals story will continue to be highly dependent on developments in China. While the government is attempting to engineer a shift toward less commodity-intensive growth, it also wants to reduce excess capacity in commodity-producing sectors such as coal and steel. Base metals are likely to move sideways until we get a clearer reading on the nature and speed of economic reforms. We model base metals as a function of China's PMIs and this supports our broadly neutral stance on these commodities (Chart 36). Chart 36China Drives Metals Prices 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course Mr. X: As usual, I must end our commodity discussion by asking about gold. Last year, you agreed that an uncertain geopolitical environment coupled with continued low interest rates should support bullion prices, and that was the case with a respectable 12% gain since the end of 2016. You also suggested that I should not have more than 5% of my portfolio in gold which is less than I am inclined to own. It still looks like a gold-friendly environment to me. Ms. X: Let me just add that this is one area where my father and I agree. I do not consider myself to be a gold bug, but I think bullion does provide a good hedge against shocks in a very uncertain economic and political world. I would also be inclined to hold more than 5% of our portfolio in gold. BCA: There will be opposing forces on gold during the coming year. On the positive side, it is safe to assume that geopolitical uncertainties will persist and may even intensify, and there also is the potential for an increase in inflation expectations that would support bullion. On the negative side, rising interest rates are not normally good for gold and there likely will be an added headwind from a firmer U.S. dollar. Gold appears to be at an important point from a technical perspective (Chart 37). It currently is perched just above its 200-day average and a key trend line. A decisive drop below these levels would be bearish. At the same time, there is overhead resistance at around 1350-1360 and prices would have to break above that level to indicate a bullish breakout. Traders' sentiment is at a broadly neutral level, consistent with no clear conviction about which way prices will break. There is no science behind our recommendation of keeping gold exposure below 5%. That just seems appropriate for an asset that delivers no income and where the risk/reward balance is fairly balanced. Ms. X: You referred to the likelihood of a firmer dollar as a depressant on the gold price. You also were bullish on the dollar a year ago, but that did not work out too well. How confident are you that your forecast will fare better in 2018? BCA: We did anticipate that the dollar would experience a correction at the beginning of 2017, but we underestimated how profound this move would be. A combination of factors explains this miscalculation. Chart 37Gold At A Key Level Gold At A Key Level Gold At A Key Level It first began with positioning. We should have paid more attention to that fact that investors were massively bullish and long the dollar at the end of 2016, making the market vulnerable to disappointments. And disappointment did come with U.S. inflation weakening and accelerating in the euro area. Additionally, there were positive political surprises in Europe, especially the presidential victory of Emmanuel Macron in France. In the U.S., the government's failure to repeal Obamacare forced investors to lower expectations about fiscal stimulus. As a result, while investors were able to price in an earlier first hike by the ECB, they cut down the number of rate hikes they anticipated out of the Fed over the next 24 months. In terms of the current environment, positioning could not be more different because investors are aggressively shorting the dollar (Chart 38). The hurdle for the dollar to deliver positive surprises is thus much lower than a year ago. Also, we remain confident that tax cuts will be passed in the U.S. by early 2018. As we discussed earlier, U.S. GDP will remain above potential, causing inflation pressures to build. This will give the Fed the leeway to implement its planned rate hikes, and thus beat what is currently priced in the market. This development should support the dollar in 2018. Ms. X: A bullish view on the U.S. dollar necessarily implies a negative view on the euro. However, the European economy seems to have a lot of momentum, and inflation has picked up, while U.S. prices have been decelerating. To me, this suggests that the ECB also could surprise by being more hawkish than anticipated, arguing against any major weakness in the euro. BCA: The European economy has indeed done better than generally expected in the past year. Also, geopolitical risks were overstated by market participants at the beginning of 2017, leaving less reason to hide in the dollar. However, the good news in Europe is now well known and largely discounted in the market. Investors are very long the euro, by both buying EUR/USD and shorting the dollar index (Chart 39). In that sense, the euro today is where the dollar stood at the end of 2016. Chart 38Too Much Pessimism On The Dollar Too Much Pessimism On The Dollar Too Much Pessimism On The Dollar Chart 39Positioning Risk In EUR/USD Positioning Risk In EUR/USD Positioning Risk In EUR/USD Valuations show a similar picture. The euro might appear cheap on a long-term basis, but not so much so that its purchasing power parity estimate - which only works at extremes and over long-time periods - screams a buy. Moreover, the euro has moved out of line with historical interest rate parity relationships, warning that the currency is at risk if the economy disappoints. Overall, we expect EUR/USD to trade around 1.10 in 2018. Long-run, the picture is different because a U.S. recession in 2019 would trigger renewed broad-based weakness in the dollar. Mr. X: I have been perplexed by the yen's firmness in the past year, with the currency still above its end-2016 level versus the dollar. I expected a lot more weakness with the central bank capping bond yields at zero and more or less monetizing the government deficit. A year ago you also predicted a weak yen. Will it finally drop in 2018? BCA: We were not completely wrong on the yen as it has weakened over the past year on a trade-weighted basis and currently is about 2% below its end-2016 level. But it has risen slightly against the U.S. dollar. In the past couple of years, the yen/dollar rate has been highly correlated with real bond yield differentials (Chart 40). These did not move against the yen as much as we expected because U.S. yields drifted lower and there was no major change in relative inflation expectations. Chart 40Bond Yield Differentials Drive The Yen Bond Yield Differentials Drive The Yen Bond Yield Differentials Drive The Yen The real yield gap is likely to move in the dollar's favor over the next year, putting some downward pressure on the yen. Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan will continue to pursue a hyper-easy monetary stance, in contrast to the Fed's normalization policy. However, it is not all negative: the yen is cheap on a long-term basis, and Japan is an international net creditor to the tune of more than 60% of GDP. Investors are also quite short the yen as it remains a key funding currency for carry trades. Thus, it will continue to benefit each time global markets are gripped with bouts of volatility. It remains a good portfolio hedge. Ms. X: Are any other currency views worth noting? BCA: The outlook for sterling obviously will be tied to the Brexit negotiations. Having fallen sharply after the Brexit vote, sterling looks cheap relative to its history. This has allowed it to hold in a broad trading range over the past 18 months, even though the negotiations with the EU have not been going well. At this stage, it is hard to know what kind of deal, if any, will emerge regarding Brexit so we would hedge exposure to sterling. Our optimism toward the oil price is consistent with a firm Canadian dollar, but developments in the NAFTA negotiations represent a significant risk. At the moment, we are overweight the Canadian dollar, but that could change if the NAFTA talks end badly. We still can't get enthusiastic about emerging market currencies even though some now offer reasonable value after falling sharply over the past few years. Mr. X: We can't leave currencies without talking about Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies in general. I like the idea of a currency that cannot be printed at will by governments. There are too many examples of currency debasement under a fiat money system and the actions of central banks in recent years have only served to increase my mistrust of the current monetary system. But I can't profess to fully understand how these cryptocurrencies work and that makes me nervous about investing in them. What are your thoughts? BCA: You are right to be nervous. There have been numerous cases of hackers stealing Bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies. Also, while there is a limit to the number of Bitcoins that can be issued, there is no constraint on the number of possible cryptocurrencies that can be created. Thus, currency debasement is still possible if developers continue creating currencies that are only cosmetically different from the ones already in existence. Moreover, we doubt that governments will sit idly by and allow these upstart digital currencies to become increasingly prevalent. The U.S. Treasury derives $70 billion a year in seigniorage revenue from its ability to issue currency which it can then redeem for goods and services. At some point, governments could simply criminalize the use of cryptocurrencies. This does not mean that Bitcoin prices cannot rise further, but the price trend is following the path of other manias making it a highly speculative play (Chart 41). If you want more detail about our thoughts on this complex topic then you can read the report we published last September.2 Chart 41Bitcoin Looks Like Other Bubbles Bitcoin Looks Like Other Bubbles Bitcoin Looks Like Other Bubbles Ms. X: I don't fear bubbles and manias as much as my father and have made a lot of money during such episodes in the past. But I am inclined to agree that Bitcoin is best avoided. The topic of manic events presents a nice segue into the geopolitical environment which seems as volatile as ever. Geopolitics Ms. X: Which geopolitical events do you think will have the biggest impact on the markets over the coming year? BCA: Domestic politics in the U.S. and China will be very much in focus in 2018. In the U.S., as we discussed, the Republicans will pass tax cuts but it is unclear whether this will help the GOP in the November midterm elections. At this point, all of our data and modeling suggests that Democrats have a good chance of picking up the House of Representatives, setting a stage for epic battles with President Trump about everything under the sun. In China, we are watching carefully for any sign that Beijing is willing to stomach economic pain in the pursuit of economic reforms. The two reforms that would matter the most are increased financial regulation and more aggressive purging of excess capacity in the industrial sector. The 19th Party Congress marked a serious reduction in political constraints impeding President Xi's domestic agenda. This means he could launch ambitious reforms, akin to what President Jiang Zemin did in the late 1990s. While this is a low-conviction view, and requires constant monitoring of the news and data flow out of China, it would be a considerable risk to global growth. Reforms would be good for China's long-term outlook, but could put a significant damper on short-term growth. The jury is out, but the next several months will be crucial. Three other issues that could become market-relevant are the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis, trade protectionism, and tensions between the Trump administration and Iran. The first two are connected because a calming of tensions with North Korea would give the U.S. greater maneuvering room against China. The ongoing economic détente between the U.S. and China is merely a function of President Trump needing President Xi's cooperation on pressuring North Korea. But if President Trump no longer needs China's help with Kim Jong-Un, he may be encouraged to go after China on trade. As for Iran, it is not yet clear if the administration is serious about ratcheting up tensions or whether it is playing domestic politics. We suspect it is the latter implying that the market impact of any brinkmanship will be minor. But our conviction view is low. Mr. X: We seem to be getting mixed messages regarding populist pressures in Europe. The far right did not do as well as expected in the Netherlands or France, but did well in Austria. Also, Merkel is under some pressure in Germany. BCA: We don't see much in the way of mixed messages, at least when it comes to support for European integration. In Austria, the populists learned a valuable lesson from the defeats of their peers in the Netherlands and France: stay clear of the euro. Thus the Freedom Party committed itself to calling a referendum on Austria's EU membership if Turkey was invited to join the bloc. As the probability of that is literally zero, the right-wing in Austria signaled to the wider public that it was not anti-establishment on the issue of European integration. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany only gained 12.6%, but it too focused on an anti-immigration platform. The bottom line for investors is that the European anti-establishment right is falling over itself to de-emphasize its Euroskepticism and focus instead on anti-immigration policies. For investors, the former is far more relevant than the latter, meaning that the market relevance of European politics has declined. One potential risk in 2018 is the Italian election, likely to be held by the end of the first quarter. However, as with Austria, the anti-establishment parties have all moved away from overt Euroskepticism. At some point over the next five years, Italy will be a source of market risk, but in this electoral cycle and not with economic growth improving. Ms. X: The tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, fueled by two unpredictable leaders, have me very concerned. I worry that name-calling may slide into something more serious. How serious is the threat? BCA: The U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations are a good analog for the North Korean crisis. The U.S. had to establish a "credible threat" of war in order to move Iran towards negotiations. As such, the Obama administration ramped up the war rhetoric - using Israel as a proxy - in 2011-2012. The negotiations with Iran did not end until mid-2015, almost four years later. We likely have seen the peak in "credible threat" display this summer between the U.S. and North Korea. The next two-to-three months could revisit those highs as North Korea responds to President Trump's visit to the region, as well as to the deployment of the three U.S. aircraft carriers off the coast of the Korean Peninsula. However, we believe that we have entered the period of "negotiations." It is too early to tell how the North Korean crisis will end. We do not see a full out war between either of the main actors. We also do not see North Korea ever giving up its nuclear arsenal, although limiting its ballistic technology and toning down its "fire and brimstone' rhetoric is a must. The bottom line is that this issue will remain a source of concern and uncertainty for a while longer. Conclusions Mr. X: This seems a good place to end our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground and your views have reinforced my belief that it would make good sense to start lowering the risk in our portfolio. I know that such a policy could leave money on the table as there is a reasonable chance that equity prices may rise further. But that is a risk I am prepared to take. Ms. X: I foresee some interesting discussions with my father when we get back to our office. At the risk of sounding reckless, I remain inclined to stay overweight equities for a while longer. I am sympathetic to the view that the era of hyper-easy money is ending and at some point that may cause a problem for risk assets. However, timing is important because, in my experience, the final stages of a bull market can deliver strong gains. BCA: Good luck with those discussions! We have similar debates within BCA between those who want to maximize short-run returns and those who take a longer-term view. Historically, BCA has had a conservative bias toward investment strategy and the bulk of evidence suggests that this is one of these times when long-run investors should focus on preservation of capital rather than stretching for gains. Our thinking also is influenced by our view that long-run returns will be very poor from current market levels. Our estimates indicate that a balanced portfolio will deliver average returns of only 3.3% a year over the coming decade, or 1.3% after inflation (Table 3). That is down from the 4% and 1.9% nominal and real annual returns that we estimated a year ago, reflecting the current more adverse starting point for valuations. There is a negligible equity risk premium on offer, implying that stock prices have to fall at some point to establish higher prospective returns. Table 310-Year Asset Return Projections 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course 2018 Outlook - Policy And The Markets: On A Collision Course The return calculations for equities assume profit margins decline modestly over the period and that multiples mean revert to their historical average. These assumptions may turn out to be too pessimistic if there is no redistribution of income shares from the corporate sector back to labor and/or PERs stay at historically high levels. In that case, equities obviously would do better than our estimates. In terms of the outlook for the coming year, a lot will depend on the pace of economic growth. We are assuming that growth is strong enough to encourage central banks to keep moving away from hyper-easy policies, setting up for a collision with markets. If growth slows enough that recession fears spike, then that also would be bad for risk assets. Sustaining the bull market requires a goldilocks growth outcome of not too hot and not too cold. That is possible, but we would not make it our base case scenario. Ms. X: You have left us with much to think about and I am so glad to have finally attended one of these meetings. My father has always looked forward to these discussions every year and I am very happy to be joining him. Many thanks for taking the time to talk to us. Before we go, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: That will be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: The environment of easy money, low inflation and healthy profit growth that has been so bullish for risk assets will start to change during the coming year. Financial conditions, especially in the U.S., will gradually tighten as decent growth leads to building inflation pressures, encouraging central banks to withdraw stimulus. With U.S. equities at an overvalued extreme and investor sentiment overly optimistic, this will set the scene for an eventual collision between policy and the markets. The conditions underpinning the bull market will erode only slowly which means that risk asset prices should continue to rise for at least the next six months. However, long-run investors should start shifting to a neutral exposure. Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018. The U.S. economy is already operating above potential and thus does not need any boost from easier fiscal policy. Any major tax cuts risk overheating the economy, encouraging the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates and boosting the odds of a recession in 2019. This is at odds with the popular view that tax cuts will be good for the equity market. A U.S. move to scrap NAFTA would add to downside risks. For the second year in a row, the IMF forecasts of economic growth for the coming year are likely to prove too pessimistic. The end of fiscal austerity has allowed the euro area economy to gather steam and this should be sustained in 2018. However, the slow progress in negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU poses a threat to the U.K. economy. China's economy is saddled with excessive debt and excess capacity in a number of areas. Any other economy would have collapsed by now, but the government has enough control over banking and other sectors to prevent a crisis. Growth should hold above 6% in the next year or two, although much will depend on how aggressively President Xi pursues painful reforms. The market is too optimistic in assuming that the Fed will not raise interest rates by as much as indicated in their "dots" projections. There is a good chance that the U.S. yield curve will become flat or inverted by late 2018. Bonds are not an attractive investment at current yields. Only Greece and Portugal currently have 10-year government bond real yields above their historical average. Corporate bonds should outperform governments, but a tightening in financial conditions will put these at risk in the second half of 2018. The euro area and Japanese equity markets should outperform the U.S. over the next year reflecting their better valuations and more favorable financial conditions. Developed markets should outperform the emerging market index. Historically, the U.S. equity market has led recessions by between 3 and 12 months. If, as we fear, a U.S. recession starts in the second half of 2019, then the stock market would be at risk from the middle of 2018. The improving trend in capital spending should favor industrial stocks. Our other two overweight sectors are energy and financials. The oil price will be well supported by strong demand and output restraint by OPEC and Russia. The Brent price should average $65 a barrel over the coming year, with risks to the upside. We expect base metals prices to trade broadly sideways but will remain highly dependent on developments in China. Modest positions in gold are warranted. Relative economic and policy trends will favor a firm dollar in 2018. Unlike at the start of 2017, investors are significantly short the dollar which is bullish from a contrary perspective. Sterling is quite cheap but Brexit poses downside risks. The key market-relevant geopolitical events to monitor will be fiscal policy and mid-term elections in the U.S., and reform policies in China. With the former, the Democrats have a good chance of winning back control of the House of Representatives, creating a scenario of complete policy gridlock. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 3.3% a year in nominal terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 10% a year between 1982 and 2017. Let us take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 20, 2017 1 This comprises consumer spending on durables, housing and business investment in equipment and software. 2 Please see 'Bitcoin's Macro Impact', BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, September 15, 2017.