Sectors

Highlights Persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds on a global scale. Hence, the risk is that financial market distortions will infect the economy, not the other way round. A global mini-downturn in the first half of 2018 is now all but guaranteed. High conviction equity sector recommendation: underweight the major cyclical equity sectors: specifically, Banks, Materials and Energy; but overweight Airlines. High conviction currency recommendation: yen first; euro second; pound third; dollar fourth. Feature Stock markets ascend by walking up the stairs, but they descend by jumping out of the window. Unfortunately, investors often misinterpret the low volatility of a market ascent as a sign that equity risk has diminished. In fact, the low volatility just tells us that walking up the stairs is a slow and dull process (Chart I-2). It tells us nothing about equity risk. Chart of the WeekA Global Mini-Downturn In H1 2018 Is Now All But Guaranteed Chart I-2Stock Markets Climb Up The Stairs, And Then Jump Out Of The Window The risk of equities, as we have just seen, is that they do periodically jump out of the window. Meaning that equities have the potential to suffer much more intense short-term losses than short-term gains. This ratio of potential losses to potential gains is technically known as negative skew. For a reminder why equity returns have this unattractive asymmetry, please revisit our Special Report 'Negative Skew': A Ticking Time-Bomb.1 That said, equity returns always possess negative skew, so there is nothing new about stock markets jumping out of the window, as they have this week. Persistent QE, ZIRP And NIRP Have Created A Severe Financial Distortion The much bigger story is that persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP2 have imparted negative skew on bond returns too. Central banks accept that there is a 'lower bound' for policy interest rates - perhaps slightly negative - below which there would be an exodus of bank deposits. The limit also marks the lower bound for bond yields. Approaching this lower bound for yields, bond prices have diminishing upside with increasing downside (Chart I-3). So at low bond yields, mathematics necessarily forces bond markets also to walk up the stairs and then jump out of the window (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Chart I-3Approaching The Lower Bound For Yields, Bond Prices ##br##Have Diminishing Upside With Increasing Downside Chart I-4In A Low Yield Era, Bond Markets ##br##Also Climb Up The Stairs... Chart I-5... And Then Jump Out ##br##Of The Window As the risk of owning 10-year bonds has increased to become 'equity-like', it has removed the requirement for an excess return, a risk premium, on equities. In other words, persistently ultra-accommodative monetary policy has diminished the prospective 10-year annual return on global equities to become 'bond-like', collapsing from 9% in 2012 to 1.5% today - exactly the same rate of return that is now offered by the global 10-year bond (Chart I-6). In effect, persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds. Chart I-6Equities' Prospective Returns##br## Have Become 'Bond-Like' However, as we explained last week in Beware The Great Moderation 2.0,3 the nose-bleed valuation of the world stock market is justified only as long as bond yields stays low. Above a 2% yield, the payoffs offered by bonds gradually lose their negative skew and thereby become less risky than those offered by equities. So equities must once again compensate by offering an excess prospective return, necessitating a derating of today's elevated valuations. Specifically, we wrote that the big threat to equity valuations "comes from the global 10-year bond yield rising to 2% - broadly equivalent to the German 10-year bund yield rising to 1% or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3%." To which one client responded "markets do not respect round numbers... if the trigger-point is 3%, then you must act well before that." Wise words indeed. The U.S. 10-year T-bond yield got as far as 2.88% before triggering a reversal in equity valuations. Financial Distortions Threaten The Real Economy Chart I-7Financial Conditions 'Easiness' Is Just ##br##Tracking The Stock Market Many people naturally assume that the economy drives the financial markets. This may be true some of the time, or even most of the time. But in the last three downturns, the causality ran the other way round - financial market distortions dragged down the economy. The bursting of the dot com bubble triggered the downturn in 2001; the large-scale mispricing of U.S. mortgages caused the Great Recession in 2008; and the explosive widening of euro area sovereign credit spreads resulted in the euro area recession in 2011. Which begs the question: is there a financial distortion or mispricing that could once again drag down the economy? The answer is an emphatic yes. To repeat, six years of persistent QE, ZIRP and NIRP have severely distorted the valuation relationship between equities and bonds on a global scale, compressing the prospective 10-year annual return on world equities from 9% to 1.5%.4 Thereby, equity returns which would have accrued in the future have been brought forward to the here and now in the form of elevated capital values. But if higher bond yields correct the severely distorted valuation relationship between equities and bonds, the effect will be to move these returns from the present back to the future, depressing capital values today. Now note that while world GDP is worth around $80 trillion, the combination of equities and correlated risk-assets such as corporate and EM debt is worth double that, around $160 trillion, and real estate is worth $220 trillion. If returns from these richly valued asset-classes are redistributed from the present back to the future, through lower capital values today, there is a very real risk that current spending could take a hit. Supporting this broad thesis, central bank measures of 'financial conditions easiness' just track tick for tick the level of the stock market (Chart I-7). What To Do Now The upturn in bond yields which started last summer threatens to impact activity through two separate channels. As just discussed, the first is the financial market channel via a setback to global risk-asset capital values. The second is the bank credit channel. Changes in the bond yield very clearly and reliably lead changes in credit flows, the credit impulse, by 6 months. Therefore, the rise in bond yields is only now starting to pull down the credit impulse - and thereby the global activity mini-cycle, which is the all-important driver of mainstream European investments. It follows that a global mini-downturn in the first half of 2018 is now all but guaranteed (Chart of the Week). And that the higher that bond yields go from here, the more marked this mini-downturn will be. This reinforces two high conviction investment recommendations. First, it is now appropriate to underweight cyclical equity sectors: specifically, Banks, Materials and Energy. Against this, the one cyclical sector to upgrade to overweight is Airlines, given the sector's negative correlation with the oil price. Second, the payoff profile for exchange rates is just tracking expected long-term interest rate differentials (Chart I-8). This means that when the expected interest rate is close to the lower bound, the currency possesses a highly attractive payoff profile called positive skew. In essence, for any central bank already at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy - such as the BoJ and ECB - the direction of policy rate expectations cannot go significantly lower. Conversely, tightening expectations for the Federal Reserve are approaching a magnitude that threatens either risk-asset prices and/or economic growth. So these expectations cannot go significantly higher (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Exchange Rates Are Tracking Long-Term ##br## Interest Rate Differentials Chart I-9Expected Interest Rates In The Euro Area And ##br##U.S. Will Converge One Way Or The Other On this basis, we reiterate our high conviction pecking order for currencies in 2018. Yen first; euro second; pound third; dollar fourth. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'Negative Skew: A Ticking Time-Bomb', July 27 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Quantitative Easing, Zero Interest Rate Policy and Negative Interest Rate Policy. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, 'Beware The Great Moderation 2.0', February 1 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 4 This 1.5% forecast comes from regressing the world equity market to GDP multiple through 1998-2008 with subsequent 10-year returns, observing a very tight relationship, and then using the same relationship on current world equity market cap to GDP. Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommended trade is to go long utilities versus the market. The profit target is 3.5% outperformance with a symmetrical stop-loss. It was an excellent week for our other trades with short palladium hitting its 6% profit target, while underweight Japanese energy and long USD/ZAR are both in comfortable profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights The recent house price weakness in Tier 1 markets likely reflects past economic "information", and does not suggest that a more pronounced slowdown is forthcoming. In fact, while it is too soon to conclude that China's housing sector is about to enter a significant upturn, there are several signs of a potential pickup in activity that should be closely monitored. These signs suggest that, at a minimum, the risk of a material housing downturn has somewhat eased. This is consistent with an overweight stance towards Chinese investable stocks within an emerging market or global equity portfolio. The enormous rise in Chinese investable real estate stocks over the past year reflects a significant improvement in fundamentals and a re-rating from deeply depressed levels. Our Sector Alpha Portfolio suggests that cutting exposure is not yet warranted, but investors should tighten their stops given now lofty earnings expectations over the coming year. Feature We presented our framework for tracking the end of China's mini-cycle in an October 2017 Weekly Report,1 and noted at that time that a weakening housing market was a trend that needed to be monitored. We argued that a moderation in house price appreciation was all but inevitable given the magnitude of the boom over the prior 2 years, and was not concerning in isolation. But we also highlighted that home sales and prices were a key bellwether of the efficacy of policymakers' reflationary efforts over the course of the recent mini-cycle, and that an eventual stabilization of the pace of decline would be an important signal confirming the benign nature of China's economic slowdown. Chart 1A Sharp Decline In Tier 1 House Prices The rate of appreciation in Chinese house prices has moderated further since we wrote our October report (Chart 1), with prices in Tier 1 markets (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) having recently decelerated to 0%. In this week's report we provide a brief update on China's housing market, and whether recent house price weakness is consistent with our benign slowdown view. We conclude that the softness in house prices, even in Tier 1 markets, has occurred due to the ongoing economic slowdown and does not likely reflect new information about the condition of the Chinese economy. In fact, while it is too soon to conclude that China's housing sector is about to enter a significant upturn, there are several signs of a potential pickup in activity that should be closely monitored. A Stylized View Of China's Housing Cycle Chart 2 presents a stylized description of the sequencing of China's housing market cycles since 2010, at the onset of China's "new normal" period of decelerating economic growth. Chart 3 presents these dynamics directly and illustrates the lag structure that has prevailed over the period. Chart 2A Stylized View Of China's Housing Market Dynamics: 2010 - Present Chart 3Residential Floor Space Sold And House Price Diffusion Indexes Lead ##br##Other Housing Market Data The charts highlight how residential floor space sold has tended to lead other major housing market data in China over the past several years, closely followed by house price diffusion indexes and the year-over-year house price index for Tier 1 markets. These series are, in turn, followed by residential floor space started, the growth rate of house prices in Tier 2 & 3 markets, and finally by land purchased for overall real estate development. Charts 2 & 3 present two noteworthy observations: While Tier 1 house prices have tended to lead prices in Tier 2 and Tier 3 markets, they themselves tend to be preceded by other important housing market series. The extent of the recent decline in Tier 1 house prices seems to simply be the mirror image of the enormous boom that occurred in late-2015 / early-2016, when prices rose over 30% year-over-year. Given the significant slowdown in floor space sold that has occurred since mid-2016, and the enormous rise in prices that preceded it, it seems reasonable to conclude that the recent price weakness in Tier 1 markets likely reflects past economic "information". The more salient question for investors is what developments are likely to occur in China's housing market over the coming year, and what investment strategy conclusions emerge from the outlook. The Cyclical Outlook For Chinese Housing While it is too soon to conclude that China's housing sector is about to enter a significant upturn, there are several signs of a potential pickup in activity that should be closely monitored: Charts 2 & 3 highlight that residential floor space sold has had the best leading properties of the overall housing market cycle in China over the past several years, and there has been a modest pickup in this series since October (Chart 4). Admittedly, there have been two false starts in this series since mid-2016, so it is too early to tell from this data alone that China's housing market activity is about to pick up significantly. However, there has also been a notable improvement in our BCA China 70-City House Price Diffusion Index (Chart 5), which measures the share of cities with accelerating year-over-year house prices. We flagged the previous sharp decline in this measure in our October report, but the recent rebound has resulted in a complete round-trip from last summer's levels. Official diffusion indexes, based on the number of cities with positive month-over-month price gains, are also well above the boom/bust line and have not deteriorated to the same extent as our index has over the past year. Chart 4A Modest Pickup##br## In Housing Sales Volume Chart 5A Notable Pickup##br## In Our House Price Diffusion Index The recent pickup in house prices may be linked to the rolling back of purchase restrictions in some cities, but the correlation is far from perfect. For example, Shijiazhuang, Xiamen, Changsha, Xi'an, and Lanzhou have all been cited in various news reports as having adjusted their housing policies, but none of these markets have experienced a pickup in house price appreciation. We will be watching for more compelling signs over the coming months that local housing market deregulation is the root cause of the recent pickup in our diffusion index. The easing in "for sale" floor space inventory to sales over the past two years has reduced some of the housing overhang, which may cause a moderate boost to new housing construction. Chart 6 highlights that the ratio of residential floor space started to sold has fallen significantly over the past few years, as inventories have been drawn down. Since most of the economic impact from housing comes through the construction process, a pickup in floor space started could shift the growth outlook for China in a positive direction. On the negative side, while survey data suggests that Chinese consumers are upbeat and are looking to buy a home (Chart 7), other indicators suggest that this pickup in interest may be occurring due to unfounded optimism about future employment and/or income. First, we have highlighted in several reports over the past months that the Li Keqiang index is falling (driven significantly by monetary tightening, including rising mortgage rates), which suggests that China's business cycle is shifting down, not up. This clearly raises the risk that income and employment growth with downshift with it. Second, Chart 8 highlights that the employment components of the official manufacturing and services PMIs have stagnated again, after having picked up in 2016 and early-2017. Third, Chart 9 illustrates that while per capita disposable income growth for urban households did pick up during the same period as the employment PMIs, it may be in the process of peaking (especially given the weak Q4 print). Chart 6An Easing In Inventories May Boost##br## New Housing Construction Chart 7Chinese Consumers ##br##Are Upbeat... Chart 8...But Employment Prospects Aren't Great... Chart 9...And Neither Is Recent Income Growth Investment Strategy Implications The first investment strategy implication is that our analysis is consistent with a benign view of the ongoing economic slowdown in China, which supports an overweight stance towards Chinese investable stocks within an emerging market or global equity portfolio. While it is too soon to conclude that housing is about to enter a significant upturn, the risk of a material housing downturn has somewhat eased. Second, a potential pickup in China's housing sector raises the question of whether construction-related sectors are poised to significantly outperform China's investable benchmark over the coming year. We recently closed our long investable building materials / short investable benchmark trade as part of a stringent trade review process, based on the view that a significant upturn in the housing market was far from guaranteed. Our analysis in this report supports that decision, as signs of a significant pickup are tentative at best. However, we will be actively looking to re-open the trade at some point over the coming months were we to observe compelling evidence that a significant acceleration in housing construction is imminent. Third, signs of a potential inflection point in China's housing market would normally be positive for the investable real estate stocks, but the outlook for this sector is clouded by its massive outperformance over the past year. We last wrote about real estate stocks in a September Weekly Report,2 and argued that a positive re-rating from extremely discounted levels had further to run. Indeed, our composite valuation indicator highlights that real estate stocks have merely become fairly valued over the past year (Chart 10), despite a 95% US$ price return in 2017. While this underscores that there has been a major fundamental improvement for Chinese investable real estate companies, Chart 11 highlights that these stocks are now priced for another year of 20-30% EPS growth, which may be a tall order unless a very substantial pickup in Chinese housing market activity materializes. Chart 10Chinese Real Estate Stocks ##br##Are Not Overvalued... Chart 11...But They Are At Risk Of ##br##An Earnings Disappointment For now, the BCA China Investable Sector Alpha Portfolio that we introduced in our January 11 Special Report continues to support an overweight stance towards the investable real estate sector (Table 1),3 and we are reluctant to recommend that investors cut their exposure to these stocks. Still, tight stops may be warranted, especially if the recent pickup in residential floor space sold proves to be fleeting. Table 1Our Investable Sector Alpha Portfolio Still Favors Real Estate Stocks Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Real Estate: Which Way Will The Wind Blow?", dated September 28, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "China: No Longer A Low-Beta Market", dated January 11, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Equities suffered a sizable setback over the past three trading sessions correcting from peak-to-trough 10% (top panel). While several reasons can be blamed for the recent drawdown, we continue to believe that sentiment went to extremes and it is now just correcting lower (please refer to our January 22nd Weekly Report for the five signposts we identified that were worth monitoring for a tactical pullback). Likely a capitulation was hit as all of the Nasdaq 100 and DOW 30 stocks were in the red and just two S&P 500 stocks were positive after Monday's plunge, trading volumes spiked, and the VIX futures curve (3rd month/front month) collapsed to a level even below the August 24th 2015 nadir. Encouragingly, the bond market reacted as one would expect, and investors sought the safety of the global risk free asset, 10-year Treasurys, pushing yields sharply lower (middle panel). Caution is still warranted in the near-term, and our strategy remains to book gains in our high-conviction list high-flyers once trailing stops get triggered. On Monday, our high-conviction underweight in the S&P utilities sector got stopped out for a gain of 18% (bottom panel), and we are thus taking profits and removing it from the high-conviction underweight list. From a risk management perspective, we are also compelled to lift the trailing stop on the high-conviction underweight S&P semi equipment index from 15% to 20% in order to protect profits. Nevertheless, from a cyclical 9-12 month perspective we remain constructive on the broad market given our view of the continuation of the business cycle expansion and our investment strategy is to "buy this dip". Stay tuned.

Equities have been rising at a dizzying speed year-to-date, as investors have extrapolated the tax reform EPS tailwind far into the future in a very short time span. The risk of a tactical, and likely short lived, 5-10% pullback is very high. Putting this potential correction in perspective is in order. A drop in the SPX to near its 50-day moving average would set the market back 6%, to near the 2,700 mark. As a reminder, the S&P 500 crossed 2,700 on January 3, 2018. A 10% drawdown would push the market below 2,600, a level first surpassed on Black Friday (top panel). While steep stock price increases are not unprecedented, at the current juncture all of our tactical indicators suggest that caution is warranted (please refer to the January 22 and January 29 Weekly Reports for more details). The equity market volatility curve has inverted and is now in backwardation, warning that the tactical pullback has yet to run its course (middle panel). The way we recommend defending against such exuberance is to book gains in high-beta pair trades, institute trailing stops to the high-conviction list high flyers and make some subsurface changes to intra-sector positioning. From a cyclical perspective we remain constructive on the broad market and given our view of no recession in the coming 9-12 months our investment strategy is to "buy the dip". Please see yesterday's report for additional details.

Highlights Chart 1Waiting For A Signal TIPS breakeven inflation rates are fast approaching our end-of-cycle targets (Chart 1). The 10-year and 5-year/5-year rates are currently 2.14% and 2.36% respectively, only slightly below our target range of 2.4% to 2.5%. If this trend continues it is highly likely that we will start to slowly reduce the credit risk in our portfolio in the coming weeks. Already, we find that some lower risk spread products (Foreign Agency bonds and Munis) are attractively valued relative to corporates. But there are also risks to exiting credit too early. First and foremost is that the recent widening in TIPS breakevens might reverse before it bleeds into higher core inflation. As we noted in last week's report, the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure is still supportive of an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (Chart 1, bottom panel) and core PCE inflation has only just risen to 1.5% year-over-year.1 Investors should maintain below-benchmark duration and an overweight allocation to corporate bonds for now, but be wary that the time to make end-of-cycle preparations is drawing nearer. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 72 basis points in January. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 7 bps on the month, and currently sits at 85 bps. Investment grade corporate bond spreads continue to tighten, and with each additional basis point the evidence of extreme overvaluation grows. As of today, the 12-month breakeven spread for an A-rated corporate bond has only been tighter 3% of the time since 1989 (Chart 2). The same measure for a Baa-rated bond has only been tighter 4% of the time (panel 3). Further, the average spread on the Foreign Agency bond index is now 3 bps greater than the average spread of an equivalent-duration corporate bond, despite having an average credit rating that is three notches higher (Aa2/Aa3 versus A3/Baa1). Even a 10-year Aaa-rated Municipal bond now offers 7 bps greater after-tax yield than a duration-equivalent corporate bond for investors in the top marginal tax bracket (see page 9). The bottom line is that with such poor value in investment grade corporate spreads, we only need to see a stronger signal from our inflation indicators before reducing exposure.2 Depending on how inflation (and TIPS breakevens) evolve, that time could come relatively soon. The Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey, released yesterday, showed that lending standards for commerical & industrial (C&I) loans eased somewhat in the fourth quarter of 2017, and also noted that banks expect to ease standards further on C&I loans to large and middle-market firms in 2018. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 149 basis points in January. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 24 bps on the month, and currently sits at 324 bps. Last week's equity sell-off and spike in the VIX suggest that some near-term junk spread widening could be in the cards (Chart 3). However, we expect it is still a bit too soon to move out of junk bonds for the cycle. That decision will be made based on whether our inflation indicators continue to rise in the coming weeks and/or months, suggesting that the monetary policy back-drop is becoming less accommodative. In terms of value, high-yield corporates offer better risk-adjusted value than their investment grade brethren. The 12-month breakeven spread for a Ba-rated high-yield bond has currently been tighter than it is today 14% of the time since 1995. The same figure comes in at 25% for a B-rated bond and 31% for a Caa-rated bond. Similar measures for investment grade corporates are significantly lower (see page 3). Further, assuming a default rate of 2.35% for the next 12 months and a recovery rate of 51%, we calculate that a position in high-yield bonds will return 209 bps in excess of Treasuries if spreads stay flat at current levels. Another 100 bps of spread tightening would imply an excess return of just over 6%, but this would bring junk spreads to all-time tight valuations and is probably too optimistic. Remain overweight high-yield for now. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in January. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread narrowed 2 bps on the month, all concentrated in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The option-adjusted spread (OAS) was flat on the month, and currently sits at 29 bps. After having widened for most of last year, the OAS for a conventional 30-year mortgage bond is now more attractive relative to an equivalent-duration investment grade corporate bond than at any time since 2014 (Chart 4). This makes MBS a reasonably attractive sector for investors looking to shift away from corporate bonds and de-risk their spread product portfolios. Further, there would appear to be very little risk of spread widening in the MBS sector. First, the schedule of run-off from the Fed's mortgage portfolio is already well known, and likely in the price. Second, mortgage refinancings are likely to stay contained in a rising interest rate environment (bottom panel). Finally, the risk of duration extension in MBS only becomes material when Treasury yields spike higher very quickly - on the order of 72 bps or more in a month - as we showed in last week's report.3 Investors should stay at neutral on MBS for now, but stand ready to increase exposure when the time comes to move out of corporate bonds for the cycle. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 42 basis points in January. Sovereign bonds outperformed by 118 bps, Local Authorities by 67 bps, Foreign Agencies by 54 bps, Domestic Agencies by 8 bps and Surpranationals by 3 bps. USD-denominated Sovereign bonds continue to look expensive compared to Baa-rated U.S. Credit (Chart 5), yet they still managed to deliver almost identical excess returns during the past 12 months because of the U.S. dollar's large depreciation. Going forward, with the dollar's rapid decline unlikely to accelerate, we would avoid Sovereign bonds in favor of U.S. corporates. Valuation is more attractive elsewhere in the Government-Related index. Foreign Agency bonds now offer greater spreads than equivalent-duration U.S. corporate bonds, despite benefitting from higher credit quality (panel 4). Local Authority spreads also look attractive compared to recent history (bottom panel). We continue to recommend overweight allocations to both sectors. We remain underweight Domestic Agency and Supranational bonds. Though both sectors offer low risk and high credit quality, they also only offer 12 bps and 16 bps of option-adjusted spread, respectively. We much prefer Agency-backed MBS and CMBS which are also relatively low risk and offer option-adjusted spreads of 29 bps and 40 bps, respectively. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 53 basis points in January (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average AAA-rated Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio was flat on the month. Two market technicals spurred Muni outperformance in January. First, supply plunged after many advance refunding issues were pulled forward in anticipation of the U.S. tax bill (Chart 6). Second, the repeal of the state and local tax deduction led to increased demand for Munis, as evidenced by the recent jump in fund inflows (panel 3). In terms of credit quality, state and local government net borrowing as a percent of GDP likely fell to 0.9% in 2017 Q4 - assuming that corporate tax revenues are held constant. This is consistent with current low yield ratios (panel 4). Meanwhile, tax revenue growth should stay strong in the coming quarters due to recent increases in property prices and retail sales. While M/T yield ratios remain low compared to history, excessive valuations in investment grade corporate bonds mean that Munis are starting to look attractive by comparison. For example, for investors in the top marginal tax bracket, we calculate that the after-tax yield on a Aaa-rated municipal bond is 7 bps higher than the duration-equivalent yield offered by the investment grade corporate bond index, even though the corporate bond index offers an average credit rating of only A3/Baa1. While the bottom panel shows that this yield differential has been higher in the past, it is nevertheless an indication that we are approaching the end of the credit cycle. Stay underweight Munis for now, though an upgrade is likely when it comes time to exit our corporate bond overweights. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear steepened out to the 10-year maturity point in January, as bond markets started to price-in a rebound in inflation. The 2/10 slope steepened 7 basis points on the month and the 5/30 slope flattened 11 bps. The 2/10 slope steepened even further in the first five days of February and currently sits at 69 bps, up from its recent low of 50 bps. More near-term curve steepening is possible if long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates continue to widen, especially since the Fed's median projected rate hike path for the next 12 months is already fully discounted (Chart 7). However, the yield curve is much more likely to be flatter by the end of the year than it is today. In large part because the upside in long-maturity yields will be limited once TIPS breakeven inflation rates reach our target fair value range of 2.4% to 2.5%. In terms of positioning, we continue to advocate a long position in the 5-year bullet versus a short position in a duration-matched 2/10 barbell. The 5-year continues to look very cheap on the curve (panel 3), or put differently, our model suggests that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is currently priced for 29 bps of 2/10 curve flattening during the next six months (panel 4).4 This seems excessive for the time being. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 75 basis points in January. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 15 bps on the month. At 2.14% and 2.36%, respectively, the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are still below our target range of 2.4% to 2.5%, but only modestly so. The big run-up in TIPS breakeven rates coincided with a jump in oil prices and, as we discussed in a recent report, this is no coincidence (Chart 8).5 The Fed has an asymmetric ability to influence inflation - it has an unlimited ability to tighten policy but its ability to ease policy is restricted by the zero-lower bound on interest rates. It is for this reason that when TIPS breakeven inflation rates become un-anchored to the downside, they also become much more sensitive to swings in commodity prices. In these environments the market sees inflation as increasingly determined by price pressures in the economy and not by the Fed's reaction function. The logical conclusion is that we should expect the tight correlation between oil prices and long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates to persist until breakevens reach our target fair value range of 2.4% to 2.5%. At that point, it is unlikely that further increases in commodity prices would filter through to long-maturity breakevens, because the market would anticipate a tightening response from the Fed. Stay overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities for now. We will reduce exposure when our fair value target of 2.4% to 2.5% is achieved. ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread (OAS) for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 2 bps on the month and now stands at 33 bps, only 6 bps above its all-time low (Chart 9). All in all, a 33 bps spread is still reasonably attractive for a sector that is Aaa rated with an average duration of 2. By way of comparison, the intermediate maturity Aaa Credit index offers an OAS of only 17 bps and has an average duration above 3. However, credit trends are clearly shifting against the Consumer ABS sector. The consumer credit delinquency rate has put in a bottom, albeit from a very healthy level, and the trend in the household debt service ratio suggests that delinquencies will continue to rise (panel 3). Further, the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that lending standards on auto loans have tightened on net in each of the past 7 quarters, while credit card lending standards have tightened for 3 consecutive quarters. Even though lending standards on both auto loans and credit cards moved slightly closer to net easing territory in the fourth quarter of 2017, the reading from lending standards is still consistent with a rising delinquency rate (bottom panel). We retain a neutral allocation to consumer ABS due to still attractive spreads for a low-duration, high credit quality sector. However, if the uptrend in consumer delinquencies is sustained then our next move will probably be to reduce allocation to this sector. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 60 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 59 bps. The spread is now only 8 bps above the lowest level seen since the inception of the index in 2000 (Chart 10). Much like in the Consumer ABS sector, historically low CMBS spreads are observed at a time when lending standards are tightening in the commercial real estate (CRE) sector. The Federal Reserve's most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey shows that lending standards for nonfarm nonresidential CRE loans have tightened for 10 consecutive quarters, though they have been tightening less aggressively of late (panel 3). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread narrowed 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 40 bps. With an average spread of 40 bps and an average duration of around 5, this sector is not quite as attractive as Consumer ABS on a spread per unit of duration basis. However, it still offers greater expected compensation than a position in Conventional 30-year residential MBS which has an option-adjusted spread of 29 bps and a similar duration. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 3.01% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model (not shown), which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 3.06%. The Global PMI actually ticked down in January, but only slightly from 54.5 to 54.4. This small decline was more than offset in our model by the large drop in dollar sentiment, which just moved into "net bearish" territory (bottom panel). Of the four major economic blocs, PMIs increased in the U.S. and Japan, ticked down from an extremely high level in the Eurozone and held steady in China. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.84%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Most Important Chart In Finance", dated January 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Most Important Chart In Finance", dated January 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Most Important Chart In Finance", dated January 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For further details on our model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "It's Still All About Inflation", dated January 16, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Overweight The U.S. defense complex has seen a solid recovery in orders over the last three years (second panel), a notable feat because of the absence of a major conflict driving domestic orders. In fact in the past decade, domestic real defense spending has contracted more than it has expanded and even when it is growing, it has not been at a pace faster than mid-single digits (third panel). That may soon change. If early reports are correct, the Trump administration will raise its defense spending target to $716 billion for the 2019 budget, an increase of 13% from this past year's level. Such largesse should sustain the valuation rerating defense stocks have been enjoying. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the BCA Defense index are: LMT, GD, RTN, NOC, LLL .

The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of January 31, 2018. The model has made large shifts in country allocations. The U.S. is upgraded to neutral from previously the largest underweight, driven largely by technical conditions. It seems dramatic, but as shown in Chart 2, the model did have similar large shifts in the past as well. Canada also has received a large increase to overweight driven by extremely attractive valuation. To fund these upgrades, the previously largest overweight in Italy is cut in half (mainly driven by liquidity and valuation) and Australia is back to underweight (trading places with Canada). As a result, the model now is overweight the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Canada and Spain, neutral on the U.S. and underweight Japan, the U.K., France, Australia and Sweden as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model outperformed its benchmark by 99 bps in January, largely driven by the Level 2 model which outperformed by 207 bps, thanks to the underweights in the U.K., Japan and Canada vs. the overweights in Italy, the Netherlands and Germany. Since going live in January 2016, the overall model has outperformed the benchmark by 190 bps, largely from the allocation among the 11 non-U.S. countries, which has outperformed its benchmark by 570 bps. The Level 1 model has performed in line with the MSCI world benchmark. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of January 31, 2018. The model continues to be bullish on global growth as seen by a 10% aggregate overweight in the cyclical sectors. The model continues to hold equal underweights in consumer staples, health care, telecom and utilities stocks. Looking forward, we believe improving global growth dynamics, and rising equity markets will help us maintain an aggregate cyclical pro-growth bias. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The German 10-year bund yield rising to 1%, or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3% would be a trigger to downgrade equities and upgrade bonds... ...especially as the blue sky expectations for global growth in H1 2018 will turn out to be overly-optimistic. On a 6-9 month horizon, upgrade Airlines to overweight. Downgrade Banks to underweight. Upgrade Germany (DAX) to neutral. Downgrade Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) to underweight. Feature Where has the equity market cycle gone? Since 2012, the stock market's 6-month returns have generated an unprecedented consistency, with only a brief breakdown - at the end of 2015 - into negative territory (Chart of the Wesk and Chart I-2). Chart of the WeekSince 2012, The Equity Market ##br##Cycle Has Disappeared Chart I-2Much Less Cyclicality In Equities ##br##Than In Commodities The disappearance of the equity market cycle brings to mind the concept of the "Great Moderation", a term coined in 2002 to describe the big drop in business cycle volatility during the 1990s. In 2004, Ben Bernanke suggested that "improvements in monetary policy, though certainly not the only factor, probably were an important source of the Great Moderation." Today's Great Moderation 2.0 refers to the equity market cycle - or rather, its disappearance. And in finding a reason for the Great Moderation 2.0, Bernanke's attribution to monetary policy might be right on the money. Stick With TINA, Or Flirt With TIA? For many years, ultra-accommodative monetary policy has provided a consistent and substantial uplift to world stock market valuations. Since 2012, our preferred measure of equity market valuation - world stock market capitalisation to GDP - has almost doubled. This inexorable and relatively trouble-free rise has even spawned its own acronym: TINA - There Is No Alternative (to owning equities.) However, the uplift to stock market valuations has happened in a less obvious way than you might realise. Based on the excellent predictive power of stock market capitalisation to GDP, the prospective 10-year annualised return from world equities has collapsed from 9% in 2012 to 1.5% now (Chart I-3). Over the same period, the global 10-year bond yield has compressed from 3% to 1.5%. Hence, the collapse in prospective equity returns is not due to the decline in bond yields per se. It has happened mostly because the excess return offered by equities over bonds - the so-called 'equity risk premium' has compressed from 6% to zero (Chart I-4). Chart I-3World Equity Market Cap To GDP Implies##br## A Feeble Prospective 10-Year Return Chart I-4Prospective Equity Returns ##br##Have Become 'Bond Like' Ultra-accommodative monetary policy has caused the disappearance of the equity risk premium. The simple reason is that at low bond yields, the risk of owning bonds becomes similar to the risk of owning equities. Chart I-5Below A 2% Yield, 10-Year Bonds Have ##br##More Negative Skew Than Equities When bond yields approach their lower bound, bond prices have little upside but they have a lot of downside. This ratio of an investment's potential losses relative to its potential gains is the risk that most frightens investors,1 and is known as negative skew. At yields below 2%, bond returns become as negatively skewed as equity returns, or even more negatively skewed than equities (Chart I-5). As the risk of bonds increases to become 'equity-like', the prospective return from equities must compress to become 'bond-like'. Which is to say, equity valuations become substantially richer. All well and good - so long as the global 10-year bond yield stays low. Above a 2% yield, the negative skew on bond returns disappears, and equities once again require an excess prospective return over bonds. More colloquially, investors would dump TINA and start flirting with TIA (There Is an Alternative). In essence, a big threat to the Great Moderation 2.0 comes the global 10-year bond yield rising to 2% - broadly equivalent to the German 10-year bund yield rising to 1%, or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3%. Any moves towards these thresholds would be a trigger to downgrade equities and upgrade bonds - especially as we now explain why the blue sky expectations for global growth in H1 2018 will turn out to be overly-optimistic. The Equity Sector Cycle Is Alive And Well For the stock market in aggregate, the cycle has been moribund. But for equity sector relative performance, the cycle is very much alive and well. In The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles 2 we showed and explained the existence of mini-cycles in economic and financial variables. To summarise, a lag between the demand for credit and its supply necessarily creates mini-cycles in both the price of credit (the bond yield) and the quantity of credit (the global credit impulse). Thereby it also creates mini-cycles in GDP growth. The useful point is that these cycles are very regular with half-cycles averaging 6-8 months. Which makes their turning points and phases predictable. Given that the global credit impulse cycle has been in a mini-upswing phase since last May, it is highly likely to turn into a mini-downswing phase through the first half of 2018. The latest data point, showing a tick down, seems to corroborate such a turning point. From an equity sector perspective, Banks versus Healthcare has closely tracked the phases of the credit impulse mini-cycle (Chart I-6). In all five of the last five mini-downswings, Banks have underperformed Healthcare, and we would expect no difference in the next mini-downswing. Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, downgrade Banks to underweight. Unsurprisingly, exactly the same pattern applies to Basic Materials (and Energy) versus Healthcare (Chart I-7). Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, stay underweight Basic Materials and Energy versus Healthcare. Also unsurprisingly, the performance of European Airlines is a mirror-image of the oil price cycle, given that aviation fuel comprises the sector's main variable cost (Chart I-8). As an aside, this also somewhat insulates the European Airlines against a strengthening euro, given that this variable cost is priced in dollars. Hence, on a 6-9 month horizon, upgrade European Airlines to overweight. Chart I-6Banks Vs. Healthcare Tracks The ##br##Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Chart I-7Materials Vs. Healthcare Tracks The##br## Credit Impulse Mini-Cycle Chart I-8European Airlines Relative Performance Is A##br## Mirror-Image of The Oil Price Cycle Country Allocation Just Drops Out Of Sector Allocation Our core philosophy of investment reductionism teaches us that for most stock markets, the sector (and dominant company) skews swamp any effect that comes from the domestic economy. For example, the defining skew for Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX is their large overweighting to banks. So unsurprisingly, MIB and IBEX relative performance reduces to: will banks outperform the market? (Chart I-9 and Chart I-10). Chart I-9Italy = Long Banks Chart I-10Spain = Long Banks Therefore, the key consideration for European equity country allocation is always: how to allocate to the vital few equity sectors that feature most often in the skews: Banks, Healthcare, Energy and Materials. To reiterate, our 6-9 month recommendation is to underweight Banks, Materials And Energy versus Healthcare, and to overweight Airlines versus the market. Then to arrive at a country allocation, combine the cyclical view on the vital few sectors with the country sector skews shown in Box I-1. Even if you disagree with our sector views, the sector-based approach is the right way to pick European equity markets. If you agree with our sector views, the result is the following updated European equity market allocation: Box I-1: The Vital Few Sector Skews That Drive Country Relative Performance For major equity indexes in the euro area, the dominant sector skews that drive relative performance are as follows: Germany (DAX) is overweight Chemicals, underweight Banks. France (CAC) is underweight Banks and Basic Materials. Italy (MIB) is overweight Banks. Spain (IBEX) is overweight Banks. Netherlands (AEX) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Ireland (ISEQ) is overweight Airlines (Ryanair) which is, in effect, underweight Energy. And for major equity indexes outside the euro area: The U.K. (FTSE100) is effectively underweight the pound. Switzerland (SMI) is overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy. Sweden (OMX) is overweight Industrials. Denmark (OMX20) is overweight Healthcare and Industrials. Norway (OBX) is overweight Energy. The U.S. (S&P500) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Overweight: France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Neutral: Germany, Netherlands. Underweight: Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway. In terms of change, it means upgrading Germany (DAX) to neutral and downgrading Italy (MIB) and Spain (IBEX) to underweight. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Are Bonds A Greater Risk Than Equities", January 28, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles", January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* There is a lot of optimism already priced into the South African rand, making it vulnerable to a countertrend reversal. Therefore, this week's recommended trade is to go long USD/ZAR with a profit-target of 6% and a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, short S&P500/long Eurostoxx50 hit its stop-loss, while short Japanese energy and short palladium moved comfortably into profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations

Neutral Prior to our midsummer upgrade to neutral, our key concern for the S&P chemicals index was that perennial overcapacity would put a ceiling on margin improvement. Since then surging global demand growth has driven producer prices sky high (second panel), in line with our expectations. More surprising is the newly-found industry discipline which has thus far refrained from splurging on new capacity (third panel), likely assisted by a wave of consolidation in the space. The upshot is that our productivity proxy has perked up to its highest level in nearly a decade, as have sell-side earnings expectations. While it remains too early for us to turn bullish, the outlook has certainly brightened for chemicals; maintain a neutral stance. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CHEM - APD, ARG, CF, DOW, EMN, ECL, DD, FMC, IFF, LYB, MON, MOS, PPG, PX, SHW.

Neutral In yesterday’s Weekly Report, we outlined that the most cyclical parts of the S&P industrials index with high foreign sales content would benefit disproportionately from our stable-to-mildly sanguine EM/China view. While the broad machinery index fits the bill, the industrial machinery sub index less so, and we recommend monetizing gains of 4% since inception and moving to the sidelines while redeploying profits into the more cyclical S&P construction machinery & heavy truck index. One key determinant of the relative move of these indexes is the U.S. dollar. The greenback troughed in 2011 and since then the more “defensive”, less globally-exposed S&P industrials machinery index left their brethren in the dust (top panel). Now that the U.S. dollar has peaked, the catch up phase in the S&P construction machinery & heavy truck index that is already underway will likely gain momentum (bottom panel). Bottom Line: Book profits of 4% in the S&P industrial machinery index and downgrade to a benchmark allocation while staying overweight construction machinery; please see yesterday’s Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INDM - ITW, IR, SWK, PH, FTV, DOV, PNR, XYL, SNA, FLS.