Sectors
Executive Summary Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Bond yields in the developed world have ticked higher recently, due to a renewed increase in oil prices and the spillover effect from more hawkish policy expectations out of Europe. The competing forces of slowing global growth momentum and geopolitical uncertainty on one side, and high inflation with tightening monetary policies on the other, will keep global government bond yields rangebound over the next several months. UK investment grade corporate bonds now offer an intriguing combination of higher yields, attractive spread valuations and strong financial health. By maturity, shorter-maturity corporates offer the best value. At the industry level, spreads look most attractive for Financials. A hawkish Bank of England, both through rate hikes and upcoming outright sales of corporate debt the central bank has purchased via quantitative easing, remains a major headwind to UK corporate bond returns. Sectors most at risk to central bank sales are Water, Consumer Cyclicals and Consumer Non-Cyclicals. Bottom Line: Stay neutral on overall duration exposure in global bond portfolios. Maintain a neutral stance on UK corporates, favoring shorter-maturity bonds and Financial names, but look to upgrade once UK inflation peaks and the Bank of England pauses on tightening. Trendless, Friendless Bond Markets Chart 1Recovering From The Ukraine War Shock... Although it may not feel like it given the ferocity of some daily price swings, many important financial markets have not moved all that much, cumulatively, since the first major shock of 2022 – the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24. For example, the S&P 500 is only down around -2% from the pre-invasion level, while the VIX index of equity option volatility is at 24, seven points below the closing level on February 23 (Chart 1). The Bloomberg US investment grade corporate bond index spread is only 12bps above its pre-invasion level, down 20bps from the peak seen in mid-May. More recently, even US bond yields have shown signs of stabilization. The 10-year US Treasury yield has traded in a 2.70-3.15% range since the start of April, while the MOVE index of US Treasury option volatility has fallen by one-quarter since its most recent peak in early May. Not all markets, however, have seen this kind of relative stability. Global oil prices are trading close to post-invasion highs, as are government bond yields in Germany and the UK. High-yield credit spreads in the US and Europe are both still around 50bps above where they were pre-invasion. The DXY US dollar index is 6% above the pre-invasion level, led by the USD/JPY currency pair that has appreciated to levels last seen in 2002. Given the mix of slowing global growth momentum and ongoing geopolitical uncertainty, but with persistent high inflation and tightening global monetary policy, it is unsurprising that financial markets are having a difficult time formulating a consistent message. This is especially true for global government bond yields. Chart 2Competing Forces On Global Bond Yields Even as market-based inflation expectations have eased a bit in recent weeks, bond yields across the developed world have been unable to decline because markets continue to discount more rate hikes (Chart 2). Yet with such a significant amount of monetary tightening now priced in across all countries, global bond yields are more likely to stay rangebound over the next 3-6 months than begin a new trend. Chart 3DM Bond Yields Discounting Tight Monetary Policy 10-year government bond yields and 2-year-ahead interest rate expectations in overnight index swap (OIS) curves are trading in lockstep in the US, Europe, UK, Canada and Australia (Chart 3). This correlation indicates that longer-term bond yields have become a pure play on future policy rate expectations, rather than a reflection of rising inflation expectations as was the case in 2021. However, both yields and rate expectations are now trading close to, or even well above, plausible estimates of neutral nominal policy rates in all regions - including estimates provided by central bankers themselves. For example, in Australia, where the RBA just delivered a 50bp rate hike this week, markets are pricing in a peak Cash Rate between 3.5-4%, even with RBA Governor Philip Lowe stating that the neutral rate is likely in the 2-3% range – a view that we agree with. The situation is even more extreme in the euro area, with the euro area OIS curve now pricing in a peak policy rate between 1.5-2%, with most of that increase coming over the next 12 months. While we expect the ECB to fully exit the negative (deposit) rate era by September, rate hikes beyond that are far less likely given slowing euro area growth momentum and still-moderate euro area inflation beyond the spillover effects from energy costs. Only in the US are markets potentially underestimating the potential peak in the fed funds rate for this tightening cycle. Estimates of the longer-run (neutral) funds rate from the latest set of FOMC projections back in March ranged from 2.0-3.0%. Thus, the current level of 10-year bond yields, and 2-year-ahead rates discounted in the US OIS curve, are only at the top end of that range. It is possible that the Fed will have to raise rates to restrictive levels (i.e. above 3%) given the size of the current US inflation overshoot. More importantly, the US neutral rate is likely higher than the Fed thinks it is, possibly as high as 4% according to BCA Research’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin. We continue to see the US as the one major government bond market where there is a risk that markets are underestimating the neutral policy rate. For that reason, we remain underweight US Treasuries in the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy model bond portfolio. Don’t Dismiss The QT Effect One other factor that has likely kept global bond yields elevated, even as global growth has softened, has been the shift away from central bank asset purchases towards quantitative tightening (QT). As policymakers have moved to slow, or even stop, the buying of government bonds, the term premium component of longer-term bond yields has risen. The moves have been quite large. Using our own in-house estimates, the term premium on 10-year government bond yields have jumped by about 100bps on average in the US, UK, Canada, Australia and Europe since the lows seen during the 2020 COVID global recession (Chart 4). The jump in term premiums is occurring at the same time as markets have moved to price in more rate hikes and a higher path for real interest rates (bottom panel). Chart 4Yields Repricing As QE Moves To QT Chart 5Stay Neutral Global Duration Exposure That combined effect of the upward repricing of term premiums – especially as more price-sensitive private investors replace the demand for bonds from price-insensitive central banks - but with less upward movement in already elevated interest rate expectations will keep longer-term bond yields in trading ranges during the “Global QT Phase” over at least the next six months and likely longer. That message is reinforced by our Global Duration Indicator, which is heralding a peak in global bond yield momentum over the latter half of 2022 (Chart 5). Bottom Line: Stay neutral on overall duration exposure in global bond portfolios, with yields in the major developed markets likely to stay rangebound over the next few months. Assessing The Value In UK Investment Grade Corporates Chart 6A Big Jump In UK Investment Grade Corporate Yields Global credit markets have had a rough time in 2022, and UK corporate debt is no exception. The Bloomberg UK Corporate index of investment grade corporate debt has delivered a year-to-date total return of -11%, as the index yield-to-maturity rose 174bps to 4% - the highest level since 2014 (Chart 6). Relative to UK Gilts, the results have also been grim as corporate credit spreads have widened, with the Bloomberg UK corporate index realizing an excess return of -3% since the start of the year. We have maintained a neutral stance on UK corporate bond exposure in our global model bond portfolio during the selloff. This was the result of a relative value opinion, as we have concentrated our more defensive view on global investment grade corporate debt with an underweight to US corporates. However, after the significant repricing of UK investment grade credit, it is now a good time to reassess our opinion on the asset class. Spread Valuation From a pure spread valuation perspective, UK investment grade now looks more attractive. Our preferred valuation metric – 12-month breakeven spreads - shows that the UK investment grade corporate index spread, on a duration-adjusted basis, is now in the 75th percentile of its history over the past 25 years (Chart 7). Chart 7UK Corporate Spreads Now Offer Some Value We find 12-month breakevens to a useful spread valuation measure, as they show how much spreads would need to widen to make the expected one-year-ahead return on a credit product equal to that of a duration-matched position in government bonds. In other words, breakevens measure the spread “cushion” against excess return losses from spread widening. What makes the current attractive reading on UK investment grade spread valuation so interesting is that the absolute level of spreads is still relatively low. The Bloomberg UK investment grade corporate index spread is currently 170bps, but during previous episodes where the 12-month breakeven as near the top quartile ranking – as is currently the case – the index spread ranged from 200-350bps. The reason for that relates to the index duration which, at 7.3 years, is down 1.5 years from the 2020 peak and at the lowest level since 2011. Some of that lower duration is related to the convexity effect from higher corporate bond yields. But there has also been a reduction in the average maturity of the UK investment grade corporate bond universe, with the index average maturity now at 10.4 years, down a full year lower over the past 12 months and the lowest average maturity since 1999. UK companies appear to have shortened up the maturity profile of their bond issuance, which helped reduce the riskiness (duration) of corporate bond returns to rising yields. Thus, the message from the 12-month breakevens is correct – UK investment grade corporate bond yields are attractive from a historical perspective, on a duration-adjusted basis. Chart 8UK Credit Curves Are Relatively Flat When looking within the UK investment grade universe, the messages on valuation are a bit more mixed. The UK credit curve is not particularly steep, when looking at the spread differences by credit rating within the benchmark index universe (Chart 8). There is a similar message when looking at 12-month breakevens broken down by credit rating, where there is little difference between the percentile rankings (Chart 9). However, the 12-month breakeven percentile rankings broken down by maturity buckets show that shorter-maturity bonds have noticeably higher percentile rankings than longer-maturity UK corporates (top panel). From a cross-country perspective, UK corporate breakeven percentile rankings are much higher than equivalent rankings for US corporates, but are lower than those of the euro area. Chart 9Shorter-Maturity UK Spreads Are More Attractive Corporate Financial Health Our top-down UK Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) - which uses data on non-financial corporate sector revenues, expenses and balance sheets taken from GDP accounts – has shown a very strong improvement in UK corporate financial health over the past few years (Chart 10). The biggest improvements are in the categories related to debt service, with interest coverage at the highest level since 2002 and debt coverage is at the highest level since 1999. Chart 10UK Corporates Can Withstand Higher Borrowing Rates Chart 11Stay Neutral UK Corporates Until The BoE Is Done The message from our top-down UK CHM is similar to the conclusions from an October 2021 BoE report that analyzed the UK corporate sector from a financial stability perspective. In that report, the BoE used a bottom-up sample of 500 UK companies and concluded that corporate borrowing rates could rise as much as 400bps before the share of companies with a “distressed” interest coverage ratio below 2.5 would rise to the past historical peak. Within our top-down UK CHM, relatively wide corporate profit margins are also contributing to the strong reading on UK corporate health. Like the interest/debt coverage ratios, those margins provide some cushion to profits in the current environment of high inflation and elevated input costs for businesses. The all-in message from our UK CHM is that financial health is a fundamental tailwind for UK corporate bond performance. Monetary Policy Attractive spread valuations and strong financial health metrics would normally justify an overweight stance on any corporate bond market. However, the monetary policy cycle is also an important factor that drives corporate bond performance. Currently, with the BoE not only hiking rates but also moving to QT on asset purchases, monetary policy is a severe headwind to UK corporate bond returns. Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyIt’s Time To Flip The Script - Upgrade UK Gilts The annual growth rate of the BoE’s balance sheet has proven to be a reliable leading indicator of UK corporate bond annual excess returns. With the growth in the balance sheet set to turn negative in the latter half of 2022 (Chart 11), it will prove difficult for UK credit spreads to narrow in a way that will boost excess returns. The BoE’s aggressive (by its standards) rate hiking cycle, in response to UK inflation that is nearing 10% alongside a very tight labor market, remains a threat to UK economic growth that is already losing some momentum. As we discussed in a recent Special Report, the UK neutral interest rate is likely no more than 1.5-2%. If the BoE were to follow current market pricing and push Bank Rate toward 2.5%, this would be a restrictive policy stance that would likely result in a sharp growth slowdown if not a full-blown recession. Importantly, our UK Central Bank Monitor is showing signs of peaking (bottom panel), due to signs of slower economic growth and tightening financial conditions. A peak in UK inflation would help reduce the Monitor even further, and would likely correspond to a pause on BoE rate hikes – a necessary condition before we would upgrade our recommended stance on UK investment grade corporates to overweight. Some Final Thoughts On Industry Sector Valuation Our UK investment grade corporate sector valuation model is a cross-sectional analysis of individual industry/sector corporate credit spreads, after controlling for differences in duration, convexity and credit rating. The model is currently signaling that there are few compelling valuation stories with positive “risk-adjusted” spreads (Chart 12). Only Financials look cheap, while Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals and Capital Goods are all trading at expensive risk-adjusted spreads. Chart 12Not Many Compelling Values Within UK Corporates By Industry An additional risk to UK corporate bond performance relates to the BoE’s decision to unwind its corporate bond portfolio. The BoE has announced that there will be outright sales from the corporate holdings accumulated over the past couple of years, with a goal of having the stock of debt fully unwound by the end of 2023. This is important for much of the UK investment grade corporate bond universe, where the BoE holds between 8-10%, on average, of outstanding debt (Chart 13).1 Chart 13The BoE Has Become An Important Corporate Bondholder When we compare our risk-adjusted spreads versus the BoE ownership share by sector, we conclude that Consumer Cyclicals, Consumer Non-Cyclicals and Other Utilities offer the most unattractive combination of expensive spreads and high BoE concentration (Chart 14). We recommended underweight allocations to those sectors within an overall neutral allocation to UK corporates. Chart 14BoE Asset Sales Are A Major Risk For Some UK Corporate Sectors Bottom Line: Maintain a neutral stance on UK corporates, given the mix of attractive valuations but tighter monetary policy. Favoring shorter-maturity bonds and Financial names, but look to upgrade once UK inflation peaks and the Bank of England pauses on tightening. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 In Chart 13, we use the market capitalization of each sector from the Bloomberg UK corporate bond index in the numerator of all ratios shown, as a proxy for outstanding debt. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)
Highlights Chart 1Wage Growth Is Cooling In a speech last week, Fed Governor Christopher Waller presented the theoretical underpinnings for how the Fed plans to achieve a soft landing for the US economy.1 The Fed’s hope is that tighter monetary policy will slow demand enough to reduce the number of job openings – of which there are currently almost two for every unemployed person – without leading to a significant increase in layoffs and the unemployment rate. A reduction in the ratio of job openings to unemployed will lead to softer wage growth and lower inflation. The May employment report – released last Friday – provides some evidence that the Fed’s plan may be working. In May, an increase in labor force participation led to strong employment gains and kept the unemployment rate flat. We also saw continued evidence of a deceleration in average hourly earnings (Chart 1). Fifty basis point rate hikes are all but assured at the June and July FOMC meetings, but softer wage growth and falling inflation make it more likely that the Fed will downshift to a pace of 25 bps per meeting starting in September. Feature Table 1 Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance Investment Grade: Underweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 79 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -215 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 5 bps on the month and it currently sits at 131 bps. Similarly, our quality-adjusted 12-month breakeven spread downshifted to its 45th percentile since 1995 (Chart 2). A recent report made the case for why investors should underweight investment grade corporate bonds on a 6-12 month horizon.2 The main rationale for this recommendation is that the slope of the Treasury curve is very flat, signaling that we are in the mid-to-late stages of the credit cycle. Corporate bond performance tends to be weak during such periods unless spreads start from very high levels. Despite our underweight 6-12 month investment stance, we see a high likelihood that spreads will narrow during the next few months as inflation falls and the Fed tightens by no more than what is already priced in the curve. That said, the persistent removal of monetary accommodation and flatness of the yield curve will limit how much spreads can compress. Last week’s report dug deeper into the corporate bond space and concluded that investment grade-rated Energy bonds offer exceptional value on a 6-12 month horizon.3 That report also concluded that long maturity investment grade corporates are attractively priced relative to short maturity bonds. Table 3A Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 35 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -316 bps. More specifically, high-yield sold off dramatically early in the month – the junk index lagged Treasuries by 368 bps between May 1 and May 20 – but then staged a rally near the end of May, outperforming Treasuries by 333 bps between May 20 and May 31. The 12-month spread-implied default rate – the default rate that is priced into the junk index assuming a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt and an excess spread of 100 bps – moved higher in May. It currently sits at 5.1% (Chart 3). Last week’s report reiterated our view that investors should favor high-yield over investment grade within an overall underweight allocation to spread product versus Treasuries.4 Our main rationale for this view is that there are historical precedents for high-yield bonds outperforming investment grade during periods when the yield curve is very flat but when corporate balance sheet health is strong. The 2006-07 period is a prime example. With that in mind, our outlook for corporate profit and debt growth is consistent with a default rate of 2.7% to 3.7% during the next 12 months, well below the 5.1% that is currently priced in the index. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 70 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -109 bps. We discussed the outlook for Agency MBS in a recent report.5 We noted that MBS’s poor performance in 2021 and early-2022 was driven by duration extension. Fewer homeowners refinanced their loans as mortgage rates rose, and the MBS index’s average duration increased (Chart 4). But now, the index’s duration extension is at its end. The average convexity of the MBS index is close to zero (panel 3), meaning that duration is now insensitive to changes in rates. This is because hardly any homeowners have the incentive to refinance at current mortgage rates (panel 4). The implication is that excess MBS returns will be stronger going forward. That said, we still don’t see enough value in MBS spreads to increase our recommended allocation. The average index spread for conventional 30-year Agency MBS remains close to its lowest level since 2000 (bottom panel). At the coupon level, we observe that low-coupon MBS have much higher duration than high-coupon MBS and that convexity is close to zero for the entire coupon stack. This makes the relative coupon trade a direct play on bond yields. Given that we see some potential for yields to fall somewhat during the next six months, we recommend favoring low-coupon MBS (1.5%-2.5%) within an overall underweight allocation to the sector.ext 12 months, well below the 5.1% that is currently priced in the index. Emerging Market Bonds (USD): Underweight Chart 5Emerging Markets Overview Emerging Market (EM) bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 29 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -565 bps. EM sovereigns outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 125 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -664 bps. The EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Index underperformed by 28 bps, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -501 bps. The EM Sovereign Index underperformed the duration-equivalent US corporate bond index by 27 bps in May. The yield differential between EM sovereigns and duration-matched US corporates remains negative (Chart 5). As such, we continue to recommend a maximum underweight allocation to EM sovereigns. The EM Corporate & Quasi-Sovereign Index underperformed duration-matched US corporates by 109 bps in May, but it continues to offer a significant yield advantage (panel 4). As such, we maintain our neutral allocation (3 out of 5) to the sector. Despite modest weakness in the trade-weighted US dollar in May, EM currencies continue to struggle (bottom panel). If the Fed tightens no more quickly than what is already priced in the curve for the next six months – as we expect – it could limit the upward pressure on the US dollar and benefit EM spreads in the near term. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 61 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -78 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We view the municipal bond sector as better placed than most to cope with the recent bout of spread product volatility. As we noted in a recent report, state & local government revenue growth has been strong and yet governments have also been slow to hire.6 The result is that net state & local government savings are incredibly high (Chart 6) and it will take some time to deplete those coffers even as economic growth slows and federal fiscal thrust turns to drag. On the valuation front, munis have cheapened up relative to both Treasuries and corporates during the past few months. The 10-year Aaa Muni/Treasury yield ratio is currently 83%, up significantly from its 2021 trough of 55%. The yield ratio between 12-17 year munis and duration-matched corporate bonds is also up significantly off its lows (panel 2). We reiterate our overweight allocation to municipal bonds within US fixed income portfolios, and we continue to have a strong preference for long-maturity munis. The yield ratio between 17-year+ General Obligation Municipal bonds and duration-matched corporates is 85%. The same measure for 17-year+ Revenue bonds stands at 92%, just below parity even without considering municipal debt’s tax advantage. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull-steepened in May. The 2-year/10-year Treasury slope steepened 13 bps on the month and the 5-year/30-year slope steepened 22 bps. The 2/10 and 5/30 slopes now stand at 30 bps and 16 bps, respectively. In a recent Special Report we noted the unusually large divergence between flat slopes at the long end of the curve and steep slopes at the front end.7 For example, the 5-year/10-year Treasury slope is currently 1 bp while the 3-month/5-year slope is 178 bps. The divergence is happening because the market has moved quicky to price-in a rapid near-term pace of rate hikes. However, so far, the Fed has only delivered 75 bps of tightening and this is holding down the very front-end of the curve. The oddly shaped curve presents us with an excellent trading opportunity. Specifically, we recommend buying the 5-year Treasury note versus a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This trade looks attractive on our model (Chart 7) and will profit if the rate hike cycle moves more slowly than what is currently priced but lasts longer. We also continue to recommend a position long the 20-year bullet versus a duration-matched 10/30 barbell as an attractive carry trade. TIPS: Underweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 144 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +237 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 25 bps last month, but it remains above the Fed’s 2.3% - 2.5% comfort zone (Chart 8). Our TIPS Breakeven Valuation Indicator shows that TIPS remain “expensive”, but not as expensive as they were a month ago (panel 2). While TIPS have become less expensive during the past month, we think TIPS breakeven inflation rates will continue to fall during the next few months as inflation moves lower. This will be particularly true at the front-end of the curve where breakevens remain disconnected from the Fed’s target (panel 4) and where breakevens exhibit a stronger correlation with the incoming inflation data. To take advantage of falling inflation between now and the end of the year, investors should position for a steeper TIPS breakeven curve (bottom panel) and/or a flatter real (TIPS) curve. We also recommend that investors hold outright short positions in 2-year TIPS. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 26 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -63 bps. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed by 26 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -59 bps. Non-Aaa ABS underperformed by 22 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -88 bps. During the past two years, substantial federal government support for household incomes caused US households to build up an extremely large buffer of excess savings. Nowhere is this more evident than in the steep drop in the amount of outstanding credit card debt that was witnessed in 2020 and 2021 (Chart 9). In 2022, consumers have started to re-lever. The personal savings rate was just 4.4% in April, the lowest print since September 2008, and the amount of outstanding credit card debt has almost recovered its pre-COVID level. But while household balance sheets are starting to deteriorate, they remain exceptionally strong in level terms. In other words, it will be some time before we see enough deterioration to cause a meaningful uptick in consumer credit delinquencies. Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum, favoring non-Aaa rated securities over Aaa-rated ones. Non-Agency CMBS: Overweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 105 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -189 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 84 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -152 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed by 165 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -290 bps. CMBS spreads remain wide compared to other similarly risky spread products. However, after several quarters of easing, commercial real estate lending standards shifted closer to ‘net tightening’ territory in Q1 (Chart 10). This trend will bear monitoring in the coming quarters. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 2 bps on the month. It currently sits at 49 bps, not that far from its average pre-COVID level (bottom panel). Agency CMBS spreads also continue to look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing We follow a two-step process to formulate recommendations for bond portfolio duration. First, we determine the change in the federal funds rate that is priced into the yield curve for the next 12 months. Second, we decide – based on our assessments of the economy and Fed policy – whether the change in the fed funds rate will exceed or fall short of what is priced into the curve. Most of the time, a correct answer to this question leads to the appropriate duration call. We call this framework the Golden Rule Of Bond Investing, and we demonstrated its effectiveness in the US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018. Chart 11 illustrates the Golden Rule’s track record by showing that the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Master Index tends to outperform cash when rate hikes fall short of 12-month expectations, and vice-versa. At present, the market is priced for 251 basis points of rate hikes during the next 12 months. Chart 11The Golden Rule's Track RecordWe can also use our Golden Rule framework to make 12-month total return and excess return forecasts for the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index under different scenarios for the fed funds rate. Excess returns are relative to the Bloomberg Barclays Cash index. To forecast total returns we first calculate the 12-month fed funds rate surprise in each scenario by comparing the assumed change in the fed funds rate to the current value of our 12-month discounter. This rate hike surprise is then mapped to an expected change in the Treasury index yield using a regression based on the historical relationship between those two variables. Finally, we apply the expected change in index yield to the current characteristics (yield, duration and convexity) of the Treasury index to estimate total returns on a 12-month horizon. The below tables present those results, along with excess returns for a front-loaded and a back-loaded rate hike scenario. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting assumed cash returns in each scenario from our total return projections. Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of May 31, 2022) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of May 31, 2022) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of -51 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope flattens by less than 51 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 12Excess Return Bond Map (As Of May 31, 2022) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/waller20220530a.htm 2 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Turning Defensive On US Corporate Bonds”, dated April 12, 2022. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Looking For Opportunities In US & European Corporates After The Recent Selloff”, dated May 31, 2022. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Looking For Opportunities In US & European Corporates After The Recent Selloff”, dated May 31, 2022. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Bond Market Implications Of A 5% Mortgage Rate”, dated April 26, 2022. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Echoes Of 2018”, dated May 24, 2022. 7 Please see US Bond Strategy / US Investment Strategy / US Equity Strategy Special Report, “The Yield Curve As An Indicator”, dated March 29, 2022. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns
Executive Summary Lower Rates Are A Tailwind For Growth Stocks We remain in the bearish camp. While the market bottom is getting closer, there are still hurdles to overcome such as elevated economic and earnings growth expectations, which need to come down to prevent new disappointments. Notably, the market focus has shifted away from inflation and has turned towards worries about growth as is evident in the falling 10-year Treasury yield. The environment of slowing growth and falling rates is a tailwind for growth stocks, warranting an upgrade of Growth to at least a benchmark weight. Technicals also signal that Growth is oversold relative to Value. The valuation differential has also moderated. However, we are wary of upgrading Growth to an outright overweight and downgrading Value to underweight as there is still plenty of economic uncertainty. We also posit that in the next several months the markets will be “fat and flat”, i.e., a bear market punctuated by rallies and pullbacks. In this environment, a balanced allocation between Growth and Value will reduce portfolio volatility and result in higher compound returns. Bottom Line: In a commentary to our chart pack report, we upgrade the Growth/Value style preference to benchmark allocation. Feature This week we provide you with a style chart pack. In this accompanying note, we will make a case for upgrading Growth and downgrading Value, bringing these style allocations to equal weight. We are booking a profit of 13% since we established the position in January 2022. We are getting closer to upgrading Growth to overweight. Performance May started as another tough month for equities, but, as they say, all’s well that ends well. After pulling back 10% since the beginning of May, and briefly touching bear market territory of -20%, the S&P 500 rebounded in the last 10 days of the month bringing the index to where it ended April. As a result, the S&P 500 was flat, and the NASDAQ was down 2.4% in May. As expected, the rally brought about a change in leadership (Chart I-1), with Consumer Discretionary and Technology leading the pack. Energy and Utilities are the only sectors that avoided rotation. Since May 20, Growth has outperformed Value by 3%. Chart I-1Recent Performance Bear Market Rally Or The Real Thing? Since the start of the May rally, investors have been debating whether it has legs. Bulls argue that we are in the early innings of a sustainable rebound in equities – after all, much of the bad news is already priced in, 45% of NYSE and 70% of NASDAQ have recently hit new 12-month lows, screaming oversold conditions, and making bottom fishing tempting (Chart I-2). Bears consider this surge in performance a garden-variety bear market rally: Growth is slowing and none of the problems that have been haunting the markets over the past five months, such as inflation, war, China, and a hawkish Fed, have yet been resolved. Our views are closer to the bearish camp: We believe that, even if the market bottom is getting closer, there are still hurdles to overcome, such as elevated economic and earnings growth expectations, which need to come down to prevent new disappointments. As we discussed in the recent “What Is Next For Equities: They Will Be Fat And Flat” report, we believe that equities are likely to be range-bound over the next several months: A turn in inflation and a downshift in growth may ignite rallies on hopes of a gentler, data-driven Fed, and a shallower trajectory for the rate-hiking cycle (Chart I-3). However, we argue that the Fed “put” is no longer in play and the Fed will stay focused on inflation, inadvertently puncturing any budding rallies. In addition to a hawkish Fed, investors will have to process what may become a sharp economic growth slowdown and an earnings recession in the US on the back of rising costs, a stronger dollar, and slowing global demand for US goods. Chart I-2Is Much Of The Bad News Already Priced In? Chart I-3Many Hope For A Shallower Hiking Cycle Growth Vs. Value: Shifting Positioning To Equal Weight When Growth Is Harder To Find, Growth Stocks Shine As we argued in the “Fat and Flat” report, there are multiple signs that economic growth is slowing, and that earnings growth will disappoint. Our Business Cycle Indicator, which is a compilation of soft and hard data across production, consumer, and credit dimensions, is also signaling a slowdown (Chart I-4). Here we would like to emphasize our view: As of now, US economic growth is strong, and it is only its second derivative, i.e. a deceleration of growth, that is the root of our concerns. In a world where growth is becoming scarcer, companies that can deliver growth will shine. These are “growth” companies, i.e. large, stable companies with strong balance sheets that are able to generate positive cash flow and churn out strong earnings even under economic duress (Chart I-5). Quality growth outperforms during slowdowns (Chart I-6). This reasoning does not apply to speculative, barely profitable, growth companies which will fight for survival in a slow-growth world. Chart I-4We Are In A Slowdown Stage Of The Business Cycle Chart I-5Large Cap Growth Is Synonymous With Quality Chart I-6Growth Outperforms During Economic Slowdowns Of course, one might argue that economic growth has been slowing for about a year, initially by returning towards the pre-pandemic trend and, lately, as a result of monetary tightening. Yet, over the past six months, Growth has underperformed Value by nearly 11%. What is different now? First, inflation, and the monetary tightening that inevitably follows it, are the mortal enemies of growth stocks: Higher discount rates deflate the present value of future cash flows. Rising inflation and sharply rising Treasury yields are behind the recent sell-off in Growth stocks. However, recently, the market focus has shifted away from inflation, and seems to finally be turning towards worries about growth. As a result, the 10-year Treasury yield decreased from 3.12% to 2.75%, and its relentless climb may now be behind us (Chart I-7). Lower rates are a tailwind for Growth stocks which rebounded at the first whiff of rate stabilization (Chart I-8). Chart I-7Investors Concerns Have Shifted From Inflation To Growth Further, our research on macroeconomic regimes suggests that a turn in inflation heralds a change in market leadership from Value to Quality and Growth (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Lower Rates Are A Tailwind For Growth Stocks Chart I-9Growth And Quality Will Lead Markets When Inflation Abates Growth Not Yet Cheap But Oversold This year’s sell-off is characterized by a multiple contraction. Growth is a poster child of this trend: Its forward multiple has decreased by 8 points, with the style currently trading at just under 20x forward earnings, which is the 61st percentile relative to its 10-year history (compare that to 28x and the 94th percentile back in January). As for Value, it also became cheaper, contracting from 16.8x in January to 14.9x (Table I-1). Table I-1Valuations And EPS Growth Expectations According to the BCA Valuations Indicator (Chart I-10), the Growth/Value valuations spread has moderated but by itself, is not an impetus for a switch. However, looking at technicals, Growth is extremely oversold relative to Value and is at levels last seen in 2006. Why Neutral, Not Overweight? We hope we made a compelling case for shifting allocation from Value to Growth. Then why not go overweight, but just neutral? Mostly because many of the macroeconomic developments we have described are tentative and are just conjecture at this point – there is still plenty of uncertainty about inflation, rates, and the Fed monetary response. Second, while Growth stocks are supposed to grow faster than Value stocks, at the moment analysts expect them to grow at 8% and 11% respectively. We expect earnings growth expectations for Value stocks to be downgraded since they are dominated by cyclicals. However, until the new numbers are in for both styles, we need to be careful. Chart I-10Growth Is Getting Cheaper Relative To Value... It Also Appears Oversold Last, if we are right, and US equities are to test their bottom this summer in a “fat and flat” manner, there will be a frequent change in leadership, with Growth and Small outperforming during the rallies, and Value outperforming during pullbacks. Portfolios need exposure to both styles to achieve the highest compound returns as diversification reduces portfolio volatility. Once macroeconomic uncertainty dissipates, we will be able to pounce and shift Growth to overweight, and Value to underweight. For now, we are going to stay neutral out of an abundance of caution. Bottom Line Macroeconomic conditions are becoming more favorable for Growth as Treasury yields stabilize and economic growth slows, making the strong fundamentals and stable earnings of large-cap growth stocks more valuable. Growth is oversold relative to Value, and the relative performance differential of Growth vs. Value over the past six months has been staggering – it is time to book profits and prepare for the next chapter. Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com S&P 500 Chart II-1Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-2Profitability Chart II-3Valuations And Technicals Chart II-4Uses Of Cash Cyclicals Vs Defensives Chart II-5Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-6Profitability Chart II-7Valuation And Technicals Chart II-8Uses Of Cash Growth Vs Value Chart II-9Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-10Profitability Chart II-11Valuations And Technicals Chart II-12Uses Of Cash Small Vs Large Chart II-13Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart II-14Profitability Chart II-15Valuations and Technicals Chart II-16Uses Of Cash Table A1Performance Table A2Valuations And Forward Earnings Growth Footnotes Recommended Allocation Recommended Allocation: Addendum
Executive Summary Investors face a dilemma. The faster that inflation comes down, the better it will be for valuations via a stronger rally in the bond price. But if a collapse in inflation requires a sharp deceleration in growth, the worse it will be for profits. Bond yields are likely in a peaking process, but the sharpest declines may come a few months down the road, after an unambiguous roll-over in food and energy inflation. The stock market’s valuation-driven sell-off is likely over, but the danger is that it morphs into a profits-driven sell-off. As such, the stock market will remain under pressure through 2022, though it is likely to be higher 12 months from now in June 2023. High conviction recommendation: Overweight healthcare versus basic resources. In other words, tilt towards sectors that benefit the most from rising bond prices and that suffer the least from contracting profits. New high conviction recommendation: Go long the Japanese yen. As bond yield differentials re-tighten, the yen will rally. Additionally, the yen will benefit from its haven status in a period of recessionary risk. Fractal trading watchlist: JPY/USD, GBP/USD, and Australian basic resources. If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Stock Market Bottom Line: The risk is that the valuation-driven sell-off morphs into a profits-driven sell-off. Feature In May, many stock markets reached the drawdown of 20 percent that defines a technical bear market. Yet what has caught many people off guard is that the bear market in stocks has happened during a bull market in profits. Since the start of 2022, US profits are up by 5 percent.1 The bear market in stocks has happened during a bull market in profits… so far. This shatters the shibboleth that bear markets only happen when there is a profits recession. The 2022 bear market has been a valuation-driven bear market. US profits rose 5 percent, but the multiple paid for those profits collapsed by 25 percent, taking the market into bear territory. None of this should come as any surprise to our regular readers. As we have pointed out many times, a stock market can be likened to a bond with a variable rather than a fixed income. So, just as with a bond, every stock market has a ‘duration’ which establishes which bond it most behaves like. It turns out that that long-duration US stock market has the same duration as a 30-year bond. This means that: The US stock market = (The 30-year T-bond price) multiplied by (US profits) It follows that if the 30-year bond price falls by more than profits rise, then the stock market will sell off. And if the 30-year bond price falls by much more than profits rise, then the stock market will enter a valuation-driven bear market. Therein lies the story of 2022 so far (Chart I-1). Chart I-1The Bear Market Is Valuation-Driven. Profits Are Up... For Now Just As In 1981-82, Will The Sell-Off Morph From Valuation-Driven To Profits-Driven? In Markets Echo 1981, When Stagflation Morphed Into Recession, we argued that a good template for what happens to the economy and the markets in 2022-23 is the experience of 1981-82. Does 2022-23 = 1981-82? Then, just as now, the world’s central banks were obsessed with ‘breaking the back’ of inflation, and piloting the economy to a ‘soft landing’. Then, just as now, the central banks were desperate to repair their badly damaged credibility in managing the economy. And then, just as now, an invasion-led war between two major commodity producers – Iran and Iraq – was disrupting commodity supplies and adding to inflationary pressures. In 1981, just as now, the equity market sell-off started as a valuation sell-off, driven by a declining 30-year T-bond price. Profits held up through most of 1981, just as they have so far in 2022. In September 1981, US core inflation finally peaked, with bond yields following soon after. In the current experience, March 2022 appears to have marked the equivalent peak in US core inflation (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Does September 1981... Chart I-3...Equal March 2022? In late 1981, when the 30-year T-bond price rebounded, the good news was that beaten-down equity valuations also reached their low point. The bad news was that just as the valuation-driven sell-off ended, profits keeled over, and the valuation-driven sell-off morphed into a profits-driven sell-off (Chart I-4). In 2022-23, could history repeat? Chart I-4In September 1981, The Sell-Off Morphed From Valuation-Driven To Profits-Driven Recession Or No Recession? That Is Not The Question History rhymes, it rarely repeats exactly. What if the 2022-23 experience can avoid the outright economic recession of the 1981-82 experience? This brings us to another shibboleth that needs to be shattered. You don’t need the economy to go into recession for profits to go into recession. To understand why, we need to visit the concept of operational leverage. Profits is a small number that comes from the difference of two large numbers: sales and the costs of generating those sales. As any company will tell you, sales can be volatile, but costs – which are dominated by wages – are sticky and much slower to change. The upshot is that if sales growth exceeds costs growth, there is a massively leveraged impact on profits growth. This is the magic of operational leverage. But if sales growth falls below sticky cost growth, the magic turns into a curse. The operational leverage goes into reverse, and profits collapse. Using US stock market profits as an example, the magic turns into a curse at real GDP growth of 1.25 percent, above which profits grow at six times the difference, and below which profits shrink at six times the difference (Chart I-5). Chart I-5A Model For US Profits Growth: (Real GDP Growth - 1.25) Times 6 Strictly speaking, we should compare US profits growth with world GDP growth because multinationals generate their sales globally rather than domestically. But to the extent that the US has both the world’s largest stock market and the world’s largest economy, it is a reasonable comparison. We should also compare both profits and sales in either nominal or real terms, rather than a mixture. But even with these tweaks, we would still find that the dominant driver of profit growth is operational leverage. ‘Recession or no recession?’ is a somewhat moot question, because even non-recessionary low growth is enough to tip profits into contraction. Therefore, the conclusion still stands – ‘recession or no recession?’ is a somewhat moot question, because even non-recessionary low growth is enough to tip profits into contraction. Such a period of low growth is now likely. If 2022-23 = 1981-82, What Happens Next? To repeat: The US stock market = (The 30-year T-bond price) multiplied by (US profits) This means that investors face a dilemma. The faster that inflation comes down, the better it will be for valuations via a stronger rally in the bond price. But if a collapse in inflation requires a sharp deceleration in growth, the worse it will be for profits. This was the precise set-up in December 1981, the equivalent of June 2022 in our historical template. In which case, what can we expect next? 1. Bond yields are likely in a peaking process, but the sharpest declines may come a few months down the road, after an unambiguous roll-over in food and energy inflation (Chart I-6). Chart I-6If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Bond Yield 2. The stock market’s valuation-driven sell-off is likely over, but the danger is that it morphs into a profits-driven sell-off. As such, the stock market will remain under pressure through 2022, though it is likely to be higher 12 months from now in June 2023 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To The Stock Market 3. Long-duration defensive sectors will outperform short-duration cyclical sectors. In other words, tilt towards sectors that benefit the most from rising bond prices and suffer the least from contracting profits. As such, a high conviction recommendation is to overweight healthcare versus basic resources (Chart I-8). Chart I-8If 2022-23 = 1981-82, Then This Is What Happens To Healthcare Versus Resources 4. In foreign exchange, the setup is very bullish for the Japanese yen through the next 12 months. The yen’s recent sell-off is explained by bond yields rising outside Japan. As these bond yield differentials re-tighten, the yen will rally. Additionally, the yen will benefit from its haven status in a period of recessionary risk. A new high conviction recommendation is to go long the Japanese yen (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Yen's Sell-Off Is Due To Bond Yields Rising Outside Japan Fractal Trading Watchlist Supporting our bullish fundamental case for the Japanese yen, the sell-off in JPY/USD has reached the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that marked previous major turning points in 2013 and 2015 (Chart 10). Hence, a first new trade is long JPY/USD, setting the trade length at 6 months, and the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 5 percent. Chart I-10The Sell-Off In JPY/USD Has Reached A Potential Turning Point Supporting our bearish fundamental case for resources stocks, the outperformance of Australian basic resources has reached the point of fragility on its 130-day fractal structure that marked previous turning points in 2013, 2015, and 2021 (Chart I-11). Hence, a second new trade is short Australian basic resources versus the world market, setting the trade length at 6 months, and the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 10 percent. Chart I-11The Australian Basic Resources Sector Is Vulnerable To Reversal Finally, we are adding GBP/USD to our watchlist, given that its 260-day fractal structure is close to the point of fragility that marked major turns in 2014, 2015, and 2016. Our full watchlist of 29 investments that are at, or approaching turning points, is available on our website: cpt.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Watchlist: New Additions GBP/USD At A Turning Point Chart 1AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 2Canada Versus Japan Is Reversing Chart 3Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 4US Healthcare Providers Vs. Software At Risk of Reversal Chart 5BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Chart 6Homebuilders Versus Healthcare Services Has Turned Chart 7CNY/USD Has Reversed Chart 8CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 9Financials Versus Industrials To Reverse Chart 10The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Biotech Has Started To Reverse Chart 11The Outperformance Of Resources Versus Healthcare Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 12FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Reversing Chart 13Netherlands Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Been Exhausted Chart 14The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 15The Sell-Off In The NASDAQ Is Approaching Fractal Fragility Chart 16Food And Beverage Outperformance Has Been Exhausted Chart 17The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 18The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 19A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 20Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 21Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 22Cotton Versus Platinum Is Reversing Chart 23Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Has Started To End Chart 24The Rally In USD/EUR Has Ended Chart 25The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 26A Potential New Entry Point Into Petcare Chart 27Czech Outperformance Near Exhaustion Chart 28US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 29GBP/USD At A Turning Point Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Defined as 12-month forward earnings per share. Fractal Trading System 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart 1 The S&P Media & Entertainment (M&E) index remains under fire due to its exposure to high beta names like GOOG(L), NFLX, FB, and DIS. These four companies dominate the industry group, comprising nearly 80% of the market cap. Initially, the group pulled back as a victim of stretched valuations, unreasonable growth expectations, and a broad ruckus within Big Tech on the back of the swift tightening of financial conditions (see chart). Notably, the M&E index’s forward P/E multiple contracted by nearly 50% moving from 30x to 16.7x in absolute terms, and now trading on par with the S&P 500. It may appear that these stocks have sold off, technicals are attractive, and valuations are no longer a concern. However, we are concerned that the M&E stocks are actually more expensive than they appear: Earnings are likely to come under more pressure. Netflix and Disney are consumer stocks, with entertainments falling under the discretionary column of a family budget. With American families struggling with rising prices and negative real wage growth, discretionary spending may be curtailed. As for the other media companies, like FB, Alphabet, and their less famous brethren, SNAP earnings have just flashed a warning sign: Advertising spending is highly economically sensitive and is often one of the first expenses companies cut back on when tightening the belt. Therefore, it appears, that the M&E industry group is not out of the woods yet and is likely to face even more challenges over the next several months. As such, we recommend using the next bear market rally to lighten the allocation. Sell the rip! Bottom Line: The sector's high exposure to discretionary spending and high economic sensitivity of advertising expenditures point to continued earnings disappointment. Today, we downgrade the S&P Media & Entertainment industry group from overweight to neutral, with an eye on eventually taking the allocation to underweight.
Executive Summary Credit Demand Collapsed Business activity data from April showed a broad-based contraction in China’s economy. Credit growth tumbled as demand collapsed. Bank loan expansion slowed by the most in nearly five years and annual change in new household loans declined to an all-time low. Exports decelerated sharply in April. China’s export sector faces headwinds from Omicron-related supply chain disruptions and weakening global demand for goods. Export growth will rebound following the resumption of business activity in China’s major cities, but is set to decelerate from 2021 as external demand for goods weakens. The PBOC lowered the 5-year loan prime rate (LPR) by 15bps last Friday, following a cut in the floor rate of first-home mortgages to 20bp below the benchmark. These moves will help to arrest the ongoing deep contraction in the property market. However, these policies alone will not generate strong recovery in housing demand, amid near-term Covid-related disruptions and dampened household income growth. Barring major lockdowns, China’s economy will likely bottom around mid-2022. We expect a muted recovery in the second half of the year, despite an acceleration in policy easing. From a cyclical perspective, we continue to recommend a neutral allocation to Chinese onshore stocks in a global portfolio. Bottom Line: China’s economy has been hit by a relapse in demand and Covid-induced production disruptions. The economy will likely bottom by mid-year, but the ensuing recovery may be subdued. A Subdued Recovery In 2H 2022 A broad-based contraction in China’s economy in April reflects hit by a combination of slumping domestic demand and Covid-related disruptions. Growth in retail sales and industrial production contracted from a year ago and home sales shrunk further. Economic activity will rebound when the current Covid wave is under control and lockdown restrictions are lifted. However, we expect a much more muted recovery in the second half of this year compared with two years ago when China’s economy staged an impressive V-shaped recovery as it emerged from the first wave of lockdowns in spring 2020. Presently, reported virus cases have steadily declined in cities in the Yangtze River region, including Shanghai which aims to lift its lockdown on June 1st. The number of regions and cities under stringent confinement also fell. However, China firmly maintains its dynamic zero-Covid policy, which means tight mobility restrictions and some forms of lockdowns will occur across the country on a rolling basis going forward. China’s leadership has stepped up its pro-growth policy measures, such as a 15bps cut in the 5-year LPR last week. Given the pace of credit expansion collapsed in April and private-sector sentiment remains in the doldrums, a recovery will not be imminent or strong despite this rate cut (Chart 1). In the near term, the poor economic outlook in China, coupled with jitters in the global equity market, will continue to depress the performance of Chinese stocks in absolute terms (Chart 1, bottom panel). From a cyclical perspective, we maintain our neutral view on China’s onshore stocks and underweight view on China’s investable stocks within a global equity portfolio. China’s economy is set to underwhelm investor expectations and stock prices probably are unlikely to outperform their global counterparts (Chart 2). Chart 1Weak Economic Fundamentals Undermine Stock Performance Chart 2Too Early To Upgrade Chinese Stocks In A Global Portfolio Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Credit Growth Slowed Notably As Loan Demand Slumps Credit expansion in April relapsed, as lockdowns exacerbated the weakness in business activity and further depressed the demand for credit. Bank loan growth plummeted to its worst level in almost five years (Chart 3). Notably, annual change in new household loans origination contracted the most since data collection began because Covid lockdowns and the property market slump sapped consumers’ willingness to borrow (Chart 4). In addition, household propensity to spend declined to an all-time low, highlighting that bleak sentiment will continue to curb demand for loans (Chart 4, bottom panel). Moreover, a rapid deceleration in corporate medium-and long-term loans versus soaring short-term bill financing indicates corporates’ weak demand for credit and investment (Chart 5). The deterioration in corporate sentiment is also reflected in business condition surveys (Chart 6). Chart 3Subdued TSF Growth Due To Collapsed Loan Demand Chart 4Annual Change In New Household Loans Contracted The Most In April Chart 5Corporate Demand For Credit Remains in The Doldrums … Chart 6... And Unlikely To Turn Around Soon Despite Accommodative Monetary Conditions Chart 7Early Signs Of Authorities Loosening Their Grip On Shadow Banking Local government bond issuance unexpectedly moderated in April after most of the front-loaded local government special purpose bonds (SPBs) was issued in Q1. In the January-April period this year, the amount of SPBs issuance was RMB 1.41 trillion. The SPBs quota for 2022 is 3.65 trillion, along with 1.1 trillion of SPB proceeds that can be carried over from last year. Given that most of the planned SPBs will be issued by the end of June, we will likely see a peak in SPB issuance in Q2.This entails about RMB 3 trillion of SPBs will be issued in May-June. The intensified SPB issuance will underpin total social financing (TSF) growth in the next two to three months. However, barring an increase in the SPB quota or an approval to issue Special Treasury bonds as occurred in 2H 2020, the support from government bonds issuance to TSF will likely decline sharply in the second half of this year. Notably, there has been stabilization in shadow bank financing growth, although it remains below zero (Chart 7). It may be an early sign that China’s leadership is allowing some shadow banking activity; a meaningful relaxation of local governments’ shadow banking activity would be positive for infrastructure investment. Exports: Weaker Than Last Year China’s exports growth softened sharply in April, led by an extensive reduction in shipments to major developed markets (Chart 8). In addition, exports by product group also indicate a wide ranging slowdown in both exports of lower-end consumer goods and tech products (Chart 9). The softness in China’s exports reflects Omicron-related supply chain and logistical disruptions along with a weakening external demand for goods. Chart 8China's Exports To Developed Markets Fell Chart 9A Broad-Based Decline Among Categories of Exported Goods Chart 10Weakening Global Demand For Goods South Korean exports, a bellwether for global trade, have also been easing in line with Chinese exports, which indicates dwindling global demand for manufacturing goods (Chart 10). In addition, the sharp underperformance of global cyclical stocks versus defensives heralds a worldwide manufacturing downturn (Chart 11). Falling US demand for consumer goods corroborates diminishing external demand (Chart 12). China’s exports will likely rebound from its April levels when manufacturing production resumes in Shanghai and supply-chain interruptions subside in the Yangtze River Delta region. Nonetheless, we expect a contraction in exports this year, as global consumer demand for goods dwindles. Chart 11Global Manufacturing Sector Is Heading Into A Downturn Chart 12External Demand For Chinese Export Goods Is Dwindling Recovery In China’s Manufacturing Sector Will Be Muted In 2H 2022 Manufacturing production growth contracted in April at the fastest rate since data collection began. The contraction was due to Covid-induced production troubles and weak demand (Chart 13). Chart 13Manufacturing Output Growth Contracted The Most Since Data Reporting Began Chart 14Mounting Product Inventory Chart 15Chinese Manufacturing Output And Capacity Utilization Face Headwinds From Weakening Exports The inventory of finished products soared to the highest point in the past 10 years due to port closures and domestic logistical issues (Chart 14). Even when the impact of the current Covid wave wanes in the second half of this year, destocking pressures will dampen manufacturing production. In addition, Chinese manufacturing output and capacity utilization face headwinds from decelerating exports (Chart 15). While upstream industries, such as the mining, resources and materials sectors, benefit from strong pricing trends, profit margins for middle-to-downstream manufacturers remain very subdued (Chart 16). The large gap between prices for producer goods and consumer goods is a reflection of the inability of manufacturers to pass on higher input costs to consumers (Chart 17). Elevated input cost pressures and, hence, disappointing corporate profits, will continue to curb manufacturing investments and production in 2H 2022. Chart 16Manufacturing Sector's Profit Margins Are Further Squeezed Chart 17Manufacturers Are Under Rising Cost Pressures Housing Market Outlook Remains Gloomy The PBOC lowered the 5-year LPR by 15bps from 4.6% to 4.45% on May 20, the largest LPR rate cut since 2019. The easing measure followed a reduction in first-home mortgages to 20bps below the benchmark announced on May 15. The national-level mortgage rate floor and benchmark rate drops are clear signals that policymakers are ramping up policy easing measures in the property sector, given the failure of previous efforts to revive housing demand. Historically, mortgage rates tend to lead household loans and home sales by two quarters, suggesting that the housing market may see some improvement by year-end (Chart 18). However, as we pointed out in previous reports, without large-scale and direct fiscal transfers to consumers to boost household income, these housing measures will unlikely generate a strong rebound in household sentiment and home purchases (Chart 19). Chart 18Mortgage Rates Tend To Lead Consumer Loans And Home Sales By Two Quarters Chart 19Housing Market Sentiment Shows Little Signs Of Revival Lockdowns in April exacerbated the slump in all housing market indicators, with the exception of a moderate improvement in floor space completed (Chart 20). Home prices, which tend to lead housing starts, decelerated even more in April following seven consecutive month-to-month declines. Moreover, our housing price diffusion index suggests that home prices on a year-on-year basis will contract in the next six to nine months, a further drop from the current 0.7% growth (Chart 21, top panel). Falling home prices will curb housing starts and construction activity (Chart 21, bottom panel). In addition, real estate developers’ financing conditions have not improved because the “three red lines” policy is still in place and home sales have collapsed (Chart 22). Chart 20A Further Deterioration In Housing Market Indicators In April Chart 21Housing Prices Are Set To Contract In 2H 2022 Chart 22Slumping Home Sales Exacerbate Real Estate Developers’ Funding Woes A Collapse In Household Consumption Due To Covid Confinement Measures City lockdowns have taken a heavy toll on China’s household consumption. Both retail sales and service sector business activity experienced their deepest contractions since March 2020 (Chart 23). Notably, the growth of online goods sales slipped under zero in April, below that recorded in early 2000 and the first contraction since data collection began. Furthermore, both core and service consumer prices (CPI) weakened again in April, reflecting lackluster consumer demand (Chart 24). Chart 23Chinese Retail Sales Contracted The Most Since March 2020 Chart 24Weak Core And Service CPIs Also Reflect Lackluster Household Demand Labor market dynamics went downhill rapidly. The nationwide urban unemployment rate rose to its highest level since mid-2020, while the unemployment rate among younger workers climbed to an all-time high (Chart 25). Meanwhile, sharply slowing wage growth since mid-2021 has contributed to a deceleration of household income (Chart 26). The gloomy sentiment on future income also impedes a household’s willingness to consume (Chart 27). Chart 25Labor Market Situation Is Dramatically Worse Chart 26Household Income Growth Has Been Falling All in all, China’s household consumption will be hindered not only by renewed threats from flareups in domestic COVID-19 cases, but also by a worsening labor market situation and depressed household sentiment in the medium term. Chart 27Poor Sentiment On Funture Income Contributes To Consumers' Unwillingness To Spend Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations