Sectors
Feature Since the end of the first quarter, the decline in Treasury yields has been the most important trend in global financial markets. It has contributed to the return of the outperformance of growth stocks relative to value stocks, the underperformance of Eurozone equities relative to the S&P 500, and the tepid results of cyclicals relative to defensive equities. This decline in yields is a temporary phenomenon, because the global economy continues to re-open and inventory levels remain so low that further restocking is in the cards. The cyclical picture is not without blemish; COVID-19 variants remain a concern. However, if these risks were to materialize into another delayed re-opening, then further reflationary efforts by both monetary and fiscal authorities would buoy financial markets. The greatest near-term worry for the global economy and markets comes from China. The Chinese credit impulse is slowing markedly and fiscal support has yet to come to the rescue. This phenomenon is the main reason why this publication maintains a cautious tactical stance on Eurozone cyclical stocks, even if we believe these sectors have ample scope to outperform over the remainder of the business cycle. As a corollary, we believe that yields will likely remain within range this summer and Eurozone benchmarks will lag behind the US. This week, we review key charts, organized by theme, highlighting some of these key concepts. As an aside, none covers inflation. Even if the balance of evidence suggests that any sharp increase in Eurozone inflation will be temporary, the proof will only become more visible by early 2022. The Opening Is On Track… The pace of vaccination across the major Eurozone economies has picked up meaningfully since the spring. Consequently, the number of doses distributed per capita is rapidly approaching that of the US, even as it still lags behind that of the UK (Chart 1). As a result of this improvement, the stringency of lockdown measures is declining, which is allowing European mobility to recover (Chart 2). While this phenomenon is evident around the world, EM still lag in terms of vaccination rates. However, the Global Health Innovation Center at Duke University expects 10 billion vaccine doses to be produced by the year’s end, which will be enough to inoculate most (if not all) the vulnerable people in the world by early 2022. Consequently, the re-opening of the economy will remain a potent tailwind behind global growth for three or four more quarters. Chart 1Vaccination Progress...
Vaccination Progress...
Vaccination Progress...
Chart 2...Leads To Greater Activity
...Leads To Greater Activity
...Leads To Greater Activity
… But Near-Term Headwinds Remain The re-opening of the global economy will allow growth to stay well above trend for the upcoming 12 months, at least. Global industrial activity could nonetheless decelerate this summer. Input costs have risen. The two most important ones, oil and interest rates, are already consistent with a peak in the US ISM manufacturing and the global PMI (Chart 3). In this context, the decelerating Chinese credit impulse is concerning (Chart 4) because it portends a hit to global trade and industrial activity. The effect of this slowdown should be most evident in the third and fourth quarters of 2021. However, it will be temporary because Beijing only wants credit to grow in line with GDP, rather than an outright deleveraging. Thus, the credit impulse will stabilize before the year’s end, which will allow the positive effect of the global re-opening to be fully experienced once again. Chart 3Rising Input Costs...
Rising Input Costs...
Rising Input Costs...
Chart 4...And China's Credit Slowdown Matter
...And China's Credit Slowdown Matter
...And China's Credit Slowdown Matter
Domestic Tailwind In Europe Despite the extreme sensitivity of the European economy to the global business cycle, Europe should continue to produce positive surprises. The supports to the domestic economy are strong. The NGEU funds means that Europe will suffer one of the smallest fiscal drag among G-10 nations next year. Moreover, the re-opening will support household income and allow the positive effect of the increase in the money supply to buoy consumption (Chart 5). Finally, rising consumer confidence, and the ebbing propensity to save will reinforce the tailwinds behind consumption (Chart 6). Chart 5Europe's Domestic Activity
Europe's Domestic Activity
Europe's Domestic Activity
Chart 6...Will Improve Further
...Will Improve Further
...Will Improve Further
Higher Bond Yields Are Coming… The environment continues to support higher yields. Our BCA Pipeline Inflation Indicator is surging, which historically translates into higher global borrowing costs (Chart 7). Most importantly, our Nominal Cyclical Spending Proxy remains very robust, which normally leads to rising yields (Chart 8). While US inflation expectations at the short end of the curve already fully reflect current inflationary pressures, the 5-year/5-year forward inflation breakeven rates will have additional upside. Moreover, the term premium and real rates remain depressed, and policy normalization will cause these variables to climb higher over time. Chart 7Higher Yields Will Come...
Higher Yields Will Come...
Higher Yields Will Come...
Chart 8...Later This Year
...Later This Year
...Later This Year
… But Not This Summer It could take some time before the bearish backdrop for bonds results in higher bond yields. First, bonds have yet to purge fully their oversold status created by the 125 basis-point surge that took place between August 2020 and March 2021 (Chart 9). This vulnerability is even more salient in an environment in which the Chinese credit impulse is decelerating. As Chart 10 illustrates, a slowing total social financing number reliably leads to bond rallies. While the chart looks dire for bond bears, it must be placed in context, in which global fiscal policy remains accommodative considering the decline in the private sector savings rate and in which Advanced Economies’ capex will stay strong. Thus, instead of betting on a large swoon in yields in the coming quarters, we expect US yields to remain stuck between 1.20% and 1.70% for a few more months before they resume their upward path once the Chinese economy stabilizes. Chart 9But Bonds Are Still Oversold...
But Bonds Are Still Oversold...
But Bonds Are Still Oversold...
Chart 10...And Fundamentals Cap Yields For Now
...And Fundamentals Cap Yields For Now
...And Fundamentals Cap Yields For Now
A Positive Cyclical Backdrop For The Euro The near-term forces suggest that the euro will remain range bound over the summer, between 1.16 and 1.23. EUR/USD is a pro-cyclical pair, and so the near-term lack of upside to global growth will act as a temporary ceiling on this currency. Nonetheless, the 18-month outlook continues to favor the common currency. Investors have shed Eurozone exposure for more than 10 years and are structurally underweight this region (Chart 11). Hence, EUR/USD should benefit from any positive reassessment of the growth path in the Euro Area compared to that of the US. Additionally, the euro benefits from a structural current account surplus compared to the USD, which translates into a positive basic balance of payments (Chart 12). In an environment in which US real interest rates are low in relation to foreign ones and in which the Fed wants to maintain accommodative monetary conditions to achieve maximum employment, the capital account balance is unlikely to come to the rescue of the dollar. In this context, EUR/USD still possesses significant cyclical upside and is likely to move back above 1.30 by the year’s end of 2022. Chart 11Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets...
Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets...
Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets...
Chart 12...And The BoP Favors The Euro
...And The BoP Favors The Euro
...And The BoP Favors The Euro
The Bull Market In Global Stocks Is Not Over The cyclical outlook for equities remains supportive. To begin with, in most years, equities eke out positive returns, as long as a recession is not around the corner; we do not expect a recession anytime soon. Moreover, while the balance of valuation risk and monetary accommodation is not as supportive of stocks as it was last year, it is not pointing to an imminent deep pullback either (Chart 13). The equity risk premium echoes this message. Our ERP measure adjusts for the expected growth rate of earnings as well as the lack of stationarity of the ERP. According to this indicator, equities are not an urgent buy, but they are not at risk of a bear market either (Chart 14). This combination does not prevent corrections, but it suggests that pullbacks of 10% are to be bought. Chart 13Equities Are Not A Screaming Buy...
Equities Are Not A Screaming Buy...
Equities Are Not A Screaming Buy...
Chart 14...Nor A Screaming Sell
...Nor A Screaming Sell
...Nor A Screaming Sell
Europe’s Structural Underperformance Is Intact… Eurozone stocks have been underperforming their US counterparts since the GFC. As Chart 15 highlights, this subpar performance reflects the decline in European EPS relative to US ones. There is very little case to be made for this underperformance to end on a structural basis. Europe remains saddled with an excessive capital stock and ageing assets. This combination is weighing on European profit margins and RoE (Chart 16). To put an end to this structural underperformance, either European firms will have to consolidate within each industry (allowing cuts to the excess capital stock, to increase concentration, and to boost profit margins) or the regulatory burden must rise in the US to curtail rates of returns in relation to European levels. Chart 15Europe's Underperformance...
Europe's Underperformance...
Europe's Underperformance...
Chart 16...Reflects Profitability Problems
...Reflects Profitability Problems
...Reflects Profitability Problems
…But The Window For A Cyclical Outperformance Remains Open Despite a challenging structural backdrop, European equities have a window to outperform US stocks, similar to the outperformance of Japan from 1999 to 2006, which only marked a pause within a prolonged relative bear market. European stocks beat their US counterparts when global yields rise (Chart 17). This is because European benchmarks underweight growth stocks relative to US markets. The effect of higher yields on the relative performance of the Euro Area is not limited to the impact of higher discount rates. Yields rise when global economic activity is above trend. As Chart 18 highlights, robust readings of our Global Growth Indicator correlate with an outperformance of the EPS of value stocks compared to growth equities. Thus, when rates rise, Europe should enjoy both a period of re-rating relative to the US and stronger profits. Chart 17Yields Drive European Stocks...
Yields Drive European Stocks...
Yields Drive European Stocks...
Chart 18...And So Does Global Growth
...And So Does Global Growth
...And So Does Global Growth
Positives For Euro Area Financials Like the broad European market, the financials’ fluctuations are linked to interest rates. Moreover, Euro Area banks also move in line with EUR/USD (Chart 19). As a result, our positive view on both yields and the euro for the next 18 months or so should translate into an outperformance of financials in Europe. Additionally, European banks are inexpensive, embedding not just depressed long-term growth expectations, but also a wide risk premium. Europe’s structural problems mean that investors are correct to expect poor earnings growth from the region’s banks. However, the risk premium is overdone. Eurozone banks are much safer than they were 10 years ago. Banks now sport significantly higher Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios and NPLs have shrunk considerably (Chart 20). Moreover, governmental supports and credit guarantees implemented during the pandemic should limit the upside to NPL in the coming quarters. Finally, the so-called doom-loop that used to bind government and bank solvency together is not as problematic as it once was, because the ECB is a willing buyer of government paper and the NGEU programs create the embryo of fiscal risk sharing that limit these dynamics. As a result, investors should overweight this sector for the next 18 months. Chart 19Financials Have A Window To Shine...
Financials Have A Window To Shine...
Financials Have A Window To Shine...
Chart 20...And Are Less Risky
...And Are Less Risky
...And Are Less Risky
A Tactical Hedge Our worries about the impact on the global economy of the Chinese credit slowdown are likely to prompt some downside in European cyclical equities relative to defensive ones. Moreover, cyclicals are still significantly overbought relative to defensives, while our relative Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator confirms the near-term threat (Chart 21). A high-octane vehicle to play this tactical underperformance of cyclicals relative to defensives is to buy Euro Area telecom stocks relative to consumer discretionary equities. Not only are the discretionary stocks massively overbought and expensive relative to telecoms (Chart 22), they also offer a lower RoE. This backdrop makes the short discretionary / long telecoms bet a great hedge for portfolios with a pro-cyclical bias over one- to two-year horizons. Chart 21Cyclicals Are Tactically Vulnerable...
Cyclicals Are Tactically Vulnerable...
Cyclicals Are Tactically Vulnerable...
Chart 22...But This Risk Can Be Hedged Away
...But This Risk Can Be Hedged Away
...But This Risk Can Be Hedged Away
Currency Performance Currency Performance
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Summer Charts
Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds
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Summer Charts
Corporate Bonds
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Summer Charts
Equity Performance Major Stock Indices
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Geographic Performance
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Sector Performance
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Summer Charts
Highlights Over the short term – 1-2 years – the pick-up in re-infection rates in Asia and LatAm states with large-scale deployments of Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery (Chart of the Week). The UAE-Saudi impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of OPEC 2.0 spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived. The UAE's official baseline production will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly. Over the medium term – 3-5 years out – the risk to the expansion of metal supplies needed for renewables and electric vehicles (EVs) will rise, as left-of-center governments increase taxes and royalties, and carbon prices move higher. Rising metals costs will redound to the benefit of oil and gas producers, and accelerate R+D in carbon- and GHG-reduction technologies. Longer-term – 5-10 years out – the active discouragement of investment in hydrocarbons will contribute to energy shortages. In anticipation of continued upside volatility in commodity prices and share values of oil, gas and metals producers, we remain long the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF, and long equities of producers and traders via the PICK ETF. Feature Our conversations with clients almost invariably leads us to considering the risks to our long-standing bullish views for energy and metals. This week, we reprise some of the highlights of these conversations. In the short term, our bullish call on oil is underpinned by the assumption of continued expansion in vaccinations, which we believe will lead to global economic re-opening and increased mobility, as the world emerges from the devastation of COVID-19. This expectation is once again under scrutiny. On the supply side, the very public negotiations undertaken by the UAE and the leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – over re-basing the UAE's production reminds investors there is substantial spare capacity from the coalition available for the market over the short term. The slow news cycle going into the US Independence Day holiday certainly was a fortuitous time to make such a point. Chart of the WeekWorrisome Uptick Of COVID-19 Cases
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
KSA-UAE Supply-Side Worries The abrupt end to this week's OPEC 2.0 meeting was unsettling to markets. Shortly after the meeting ended – without being concluded – officials from the Biden administration in the US spoke with officials from KSA and the UAE, presumably to encourage resolution of outstanding issues and to get more oil into the market to keep crude oil prices below $80/bbl (Chart 2). We're confident the KSA-UAE impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived. The UAE's official baseline production number (i.e., its October 2018 output level) will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly. Coupled with a likely return of Iranian export volumes in 4Q21, this will bring prices down into the mid- to high-$60/bbl range we are forecasting. Chart 2US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat
US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat
US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat
Longer term, markets are worried this incident is a harbinger of a breakdown in OPEC 2.0's so-far-successful production-management strategy, which has lifted oil prices 200% since their March 2020 nadir. At present, the producer coalition has ~ 6-7mm b/d of spare capacity, which resulted from its strategy to keep the level of supply below demand. A breakdown in this discipline – in extremis, another price war of the sort seen in March 2020 or from 2014-2016 – could plunge oil markets into a price collapse that re-visits sub-$40/bbl levels. In our view, economics – specifically the cold economic reality of the price elasticity of supply – continues to work for the OPEC 2.0 coalition: Higher revenues are realized by members of the group as long as relatively small production cuts produce larger revenue gains – e.g., a 5% (or less) cut in production that produces a 20% (or more) increase in price trumps a 20% increase in production that reduces prices by 50%. Besides, none of the members of the coalition possess the wherewithal to endure another shock-and-awe display from KSA similar to the one following the breakdown of the March 2020 OPEC 2.0 meeting. We also continue to expect US shale-oil producers to be disciplined by capital markets, and to retain a focus on providing competitive returns to their shareholders, which will limit supply growth to that which maintains profitability. Until we see actual evidence of a breakdown in the coalition's willingness to maintain its production-management strategy, we will continue to assume it remains operative. Worrisome COVID-19 Re-Infection Trends Reports of increased re-infection rates in Latin American and Asia-Pacific states providing Chinese Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery. Conclusive data on the efficacy of these vaccines is not available at present, based on reporting from Health Policy Watch (HPW).1 The vast majority of these vaccines were purchased in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, where ~ 80% of the 759mm doses of the two Chinese vaccines were sold, according to HPW's reporting. This will draw the attention of markets to this risk (Chart 3). Of particular concern are the increases in re-infection rates in the Seychelles and Chile, where the majority of populations in both countries were inoculated with one of the Chinese vaccines. Re-infections in Indonesia also are drawing attention, where more than 350 healthcare workers were re-infected after receiving the Sinovac vaccination.2 The risk of renewed global lockdowns remains small, but if these experiences are repeated globally with adverse health consequences, this assessment could be challenged. Chart 3COVID-19 Returning In High-Vaccination States
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Transition Risks To A Low-Carbon Economy Over the medium- to long-terms, our metals views are premised on the expectation the build-out of the global EV fleet and renewable electricity generation – including its supporting grids – will require massive increases in the supply of copper, aluminum, nickel, and tin, not to mention iron ore and steel. This surge in demand will be occurring as governments rush headlong into unplanned and unsynchronized wind-downs of investment in the hydrocarbon fuels that power modern economies.3 The big risk here is new metal supplies will not be delivered fast enough to build all of the renewable generation, EVs and their supporting grids and infrastructures to cover the loss of hydrocarbons phased out by policy, legal and boardroom challenges. Such a turn of events would re-invigorate oil and gas production. Renewable energy and electric vehicles are the sine qua non of the drive to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. However, the rising price of base metals will add to already high costs of rebuilding power grids to make them suitable for green energy. Given miners’ reluctance to invest in new mines, we do not expect metals prices to drop anytime soon. According to Wood Mackenzie, in 2019 the cost of shifting just the US power grid to renewable energy over the next 10 years will amount to $4.5 trillion.4 Given these cost and supply barriers, fossil fuels will need to be used for longer than the IEA outlined in its recent and controversial report on transitioning to a net-zero economy.5 To ensure that fossil fuels can be used while countries work to achieve their net zero goals, carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) technology will need to be developed and made cheaper. The main barrier to entry for CCUS technology is its high cost (Chart 4). However, like renewable energy, the more it is deployed and invested in, the cheaper it will become, following the trend seen in the development of renewable energy and EVs, which were aided by large-scale subsidies from governments to encourage the development of the technology. These cost reductions are already visible: In its 2019 report, the Global CCS Institute noted the cost of implementing CCS technology initially used in 2014 had fallen by 35% three years later. Chart 4CCUS Can Be Expensive
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Metals Mines' Long Lead Times In 2020 the total amount of discovered copper reserves in the world stood at ~ 870mm MT (Chart 5), according to the US Geological Service (USGS). As of 2017, the total identified and undiscovered amount of reserves was ~ 5.6 billion MT.6 The World Bank recently estimated additional demand for copper would amount to ~ 20mm MT p.a. by 2050 (Chart 6).7 Glencore’s recently retired CEO Ivan Glasenberg last month said that by 2050, miners will need to produce around 60mm MT p.a. of copper to keep up with demand for countries’ net zero initiatives.8 Even with this higher estimate, if miners focus on exploration and can tap into undiscovered reserves, supply will cover demand for the renewable energy buildout. Chart 5Copper Reserves Are Abundant
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Chart 6Call On Base Metals Supply Will Be Massive Out To 2050
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
While recent legislative developments in Chile and Peru, which together constitute ~ 34% of total discovered copper reserves, could lead to significantly higher costs as left-of-center governments re-write these states' constitutions, geological factors would not be the main constraint to copper supply for the renewables energy buildout: Even if copper mining companies were to move out of these two countries, there still is about 570 million MT in discovered copper reserves, and nearly ten times that amount in undiscovered reserves. As we have written in the past, capital expenditure restraint is the principal reason the supply side of copper markets – and base metals generally – is challenged (Chart 7). Unlike in the previous commodity boom, this time mining companies are focusing on providing returns to shareholders, instead of funding the development of new mines (Chart 8). Chart 7Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious
Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious
Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious
Chart 8Shareholder Interests Predominate Metals Agendas
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Of course, it is likely metals miners, like oil producers, are waiting to see actual demand for copper and other base metals pick up before ramping capex. Sharp increases in forecasted demand is not compelling for miners, at this point. This means metals prices could stay elevated for an extended period, given the 10-15-year lead times for copper mines (Chart 9). For example, the Kamoa-Kakula mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) now being brought on line took roughly 24 years of exploration and development work, before it started producing copper. Technological breakthroughs that increase brownfield projects’ productivity, or significant increases in the amount of recycled copper as a percent of total copper supply would address some of the price pressures arising from the long lead times associated with the development of new copper supply. Another scenario with a non-trivial probability that threatens the viability of metals investing is a breakthrough – or breakthroughs – in CCUS technology, which allows oil and gas producers to remove enough carbon from their fuels to allow firms using these fuels to achieve their net-zero carbon goals. Chart 9Long Lead Times For Mine Development
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views
Investment Implications Short-term supply-demand issues affecting the oil market at present are transitory, and do not signal a shift in the fundamentals supporting our bullish call on oil. Our thesis based on continued production discipline remains intact. That said, we will continue to subject it to rigorous scrutiny on a continual basis. Our average Brent forecast for 2021 remains $66.50/bbl, with 2H21 prices averaging $70/bbl. For 2022 and 2023 we continue to expect prices to average $74 and $81/bbl, respectively (Chart 10). WTI will trade $2-$3/bbl lower. Our metals view has become slightly more nuanced, thanks to our client conversations. One of the unintended consequences of the unplanned and uncoordinated rush to a net-zero carbon future will be an improvement in the competitive position of oil and gas as transportation fuels and electric-generation fuels going forward. This will be driven by rising costs of developing and delivering the metals supplies needed to effect the net-zero transition. We expect markets will provide incentives to CCUS technologies and efforts to decarbonize oil and gas fuels, which will contribute to the global effort to arrest rising temperatures. This suggests the rush to sell these assets – which is underway at present – could be premature.9 In the extreme, this could be a true counterbalance to the metals story, if it plays out. Chart 10Our Oil Price View Remains Intact
Our Oil Price View Remains Intact
Our Oil Price View Remains Intact
Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The monthly OPEC 2.0 meeting ended without any action to increase monthly supplies, following the UAE's bid to increase its baseline reference production – determined based on October 2018 production levels – to 3.8mm b/d, up from 3.2mm b/d. S&P Global Platts reported the UAE's Energy Minister, Suhail al-Mazrouei, advanced a proposal to raise its monthly production level under the coalition's overall output deal, while KSA's energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, insisted the UAE follow OPEC 2.0 procedures in seeking an output increase. We do not expect this issue to become a protracted standoff between these states. The disagreement between the ministers is procedural to substantive. Remarks by bin Salman last month – to wit, KSA has a role in containing inflation globally – and his earlier assertions that production policy of OPEC 2.0 would be driven by actual oil demand, as opposed to forecasted oil demand, suggest the Kingdom is not aiming for higher oil prices per se. Base Metals: Bullish Spot benchmark iron ore (62 Fe) prices traded above $222/MT this week in China on the back of stronger steel demand, according to mining.com (Chart 11). Market participants are anticipating further steel-production restrictions and appear to be trying to get out in front of them. Precious Metals: Bullish The USD rally eased this week, allowing gold prices to stabilize following the June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. In the two weeks since the FOMC, our gold composite indicator shows that gold started entering oversold territory (Chart 12). We believe gold prices will start correcting upwards, expecting investor bargain-hunting to pick up after the price drop. The mixed US jobs report, which showed the unemployment rate ticked up more than expected, implies that interest rates are not going to be raised soon. Our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy (USBS) expect rates to increase only by end-2022.10 This, along with slightly higher odds of a potential COVID-19 resurgence, will support gold prices in the near-term. Ags/Softs: Neutral The USDA's Crop Progress report for the week ended 4 July 2021 showed 64% of the US corn crop was in good to excellent condition, down from the 71% reported for the comparable 2020 date. The Department reported 59% of the bean crop was in good to excellent shape vs 71% the year earlier. Chart 11
BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI) GOING DOWN
BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI) GOING DOWN
Chart 12
Sentiment Supports Oil Prices
Sentiment Supports Oil Prices
Footnotes 1 Please see Are Chinese COVID Vaccines Underperforming? A Dearth of Real-Life Studies Leaves Unanswered Questions, published by Health Policy Watch, June 18, 2021. 2 According to HPW, the World Health Organization's Emergency Use Listing for these two vaccines "were unique in that unlike the Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Moderna, and Jonhson & Johonson vaccines that it had also approved, neither had undergone review and approval by a strict national or regional regulatory authority such as the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency. Nor have Phase 3 results of the Sinopharm and Sinovac trials been published in a peer-reviewed medical journal. More to the point, post-approval, any large-scale tracking of the efficacy of the Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccine rollouts by WHO or national authorities seems to be missing." 3 Please see A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way, which we published on June 3, 2021 for additional discussion. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please refer to The Price of a Fully Renewable US Grid: $4.5 Trillion, published by greentechmedia 28 June 2019. 5 Please refer to the IEA's Net Zero By 2050, published in May 2021. 6 Please refer to USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2021. 7 Please refer to Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition, published by the World Bank. 8 Please refer to Copper supply needs to double by 2050, Glencore CEO says, published by reuters.com on June 22, 2021. 9 Please see the FT's excellent coverage of this trend in A $140bn asset sale: the investors cashing in on Big Oil’s push to net zero published on July 6, 2021. 10 Please refer to Watch Employment, Not Inflation, published by the USBS on June 15, 2021. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades
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Underweight (Upgrade Alert) We are currently underweight US banks, but the macro environment is changing and today we put this sub-sector on an upgrade alert looking to push it to a neutral allocation. The news on the buyback and dividend fronts is encouraging as banks will be allowed to resume their shareholder friendly activities that were halted last year due to the Fed’s Stress Test. Already, financials stocks are at the front of the pack with a roughly 3% total yield that is likely to increase further. Tack on the current search for yield environment, and the allure of financials equities becomes even more tempting. Bottom Line: We are putting banks on our upgrade alert watchlist. Please see an upcoming Strategy Report where we delve deeper into the buyback and dividend topics.
Buyback Revival?
Buyback Revival?
Highlights Inflation is set to decelerate, job creation has a speed limit, and super-spreaders of new-variant Covid-19 infections will create speed bumps in the economy. This means that in the second half of the year: Bonds will rally. The US dollar will rally. Growth stocks will outperform value stocks. US stocks will outperform non-US stocks. Fractal trade shortlist: Brazilian real, Saudi Tadawul All Share, and Marine Transportation. Feature Chart of the WeekThe 60 Percent Correction In Lumber Shows What Happens When Supply Bottlenecks Ease. Are Used Cars Next?
The 60 Percent Correction In Lumber Shows What Happens When Supply Bottlenecks Ease. Are Used Cars Next?
The 60 Percent Correction In Lumber Shows What Happens When Supply Bottlenecks Ease. Are Used Cars Next?
As Supply Bottlenecks Ease, Inflation Will Cool Since mid-March, US inflation has surged to 5 percent. Yet bond yields have drifted lower, by almost 50 bps in the case of the 30-year T-bond yield, equating to a handsome return of 12 percent. The seeming contradiction between rising inflation and declining bond yields has puzzled some people, but it shouldn’t. In 2009, the same pattern occurred in reverse. Inflation collapsed, culminating in a modern era low of -2 percent in July 2009. Yet while inflation was collapsing, bond yields rose sharply (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2In 2009, Bond Yields Rose When Year-On-Year Inflation Fell
In 2009, Bond Yields Rose When Year-On-Year Inflation Fell
In 2009, Bond Yields Rose When Year-On-Year Inflation Fell
Chart I-3In 2021, Bond Yields Fell When Year-On-Year Inflation Rose
In 2021, Bond Yields Fell When Year-On-Year Inflation Rose
In 2021, Bond Yields Fell When Year-On-Year Inflation Rose
We can explain this seeming contradiction with an analogy from driving. The inflation rate is like your average speed over the past mile. But the bond market cares much more about your average speed over the next mile, or even over the next 5-10 miles. If you are driving at a constant speed, then your speed over the past mile is a good guide to your future speed. But if you have been driving unusually fast or unusually slowly, there is a more important predictor of your future speed. That important predictor is your acceleration – meaning, what is happening to your speed over successive hundred yards stretches. In the same way, during episodes of unusually low or unusually high inflation, the bond market focusses on the monthly rate of inflation, and specifically the moment that it stops decreasing, as in early-2009, or stops increasing, as in mid-2021. In 2008, after a long sequence of declining monthly rates of inflation that went deep into negative territory, the December 2008 print marked the first substantial increase. Hence, the bond yield also bottomed in December 2008 (Chart I-4), even though annual inflation did not bottom until July 2009. Chart I-4In 2009, Bond Yields Bottomed When Month-On-Month Inflation Bottomed
In 2009, Bond Yields Bottomed When Month-On-Month Inflation Bottomed
In 2009, Bond Yields Bottomed When Month-On-Month Inflation Bottomed
Similarly, in 2020-21, after a six month sequence of increasing monthly rates of inflation, the May 2021 print marked the end of the rising trend. To the extent that this was anticipated, most of the decline in the bond yield has happened since mid-May (Chart I-5). Chart I-5In 2021, Bond Yields Topped When Month-On-Month Inflation Topped
In 2021, Bond Yields Topped When Month-On-Month Inflation Topped
In 2021, Bond Yields Topped When Month-On-Month Inflation Topped
Since mid-May, the 60 percent crash in the lumber price shows what happens when supply bottlenecks ease. Other prices that are being supported by temporary supply constraints – such as used car prices – are likely to suffer the same fate (Chart of the Week). Hence, so long as the coming monthly prints confirm an ongoing deceleration in inflation, the current rally in bonds will stay intact. Jobs: The Hard Work Starts Now Staying on the theme of speed, there is a well-defined speed limit to every post-recession jobs recovery. In A Fed Rate Hike By Early 2023 Is Pie In the Sky, we pointed out the remarkable consistency in the pace of post-recession US jobs recoveries. The last five recessions had different causes, severities, durations and peak unemployment rates. Yet in the recoveries that followed each recession, the unemployment rate declined at a remarkably consistent pace of 0.4-0.5 percent per year (Table I-1). Table I-1After Every Recession, The Pace Of Recovery In The Jobs Market Is Near-Identical
H2 2021: Speed Limits, Speed Bumps, And Super-Spreaders
H2 2021: Speed Limits, Speed Bumps, And Super-Spreaders
Reassuringly at the last FOMC press conference, Jay Powell supported this thesis: Most of the act of sort of going back to one's old job – that's kind of already happened. So, this is a question of people finding a new job. And that's just a process that takes longer. There may be something of a speed limit on it. You've got to find a job where your skills match, you know, what the employer wants. It's got to be in the right area. There's just a lot that goes into the function of finding a job. Powell’s comments lead to two further points: The act of going back to one’s old job for those on ‘temporary layoff’ is relatively straightforward. For job creation, this is the low hanging fruit, most of which has already been picked. Now comes the much harder part – finding jobs for those ‘not on temporary layoff’ whose numbers have barely declined from the peak (Chart I-6). Chart I-6For Job Creation, The Low Hanging Fruit Has Already Been Picked
For Job Creation, The Low Hanging Fruit Has Already Been Picked
For Job Creation, The Low Hanging Fruit Has Already Been Picked
One way of encapsulating this is to observe that the unemployment rate – including those on temporary layoff – has already made 80 percent of the journey from its recession peak to the February 2020 trough, which makes it seem that the jobs recovery is largely done. However, the unemployment rate for those not on temporary layoff has made only 25 percent of the journey (Chart I-7). Moreover, this process is not a straight line, it is a curve. The first quarter of the journey is the easiest, then it gets harder. Chart I-7The Hard Part Is Finding Jobs For Those Unemployed 'Not On Temporary Layoff'
The Hard Part Is Finding Jobs For Those Unemployed 'Not On Temporary Layoff'
The Hard Part Is Finding Jobs For Those Unemployed 'Not On Temporary Layoff'
As we, and Jay Powell, have pointed out, the process to reduce this unemployment rate has a remarkably consistent speed limit of 0.4-0.5 percent per year. Starting at the current rate of 2.5 percent and a target of 1.5 percent, this means full employment will not be reached before the second half of 2023. And even this assumes clear blue skies for the world economy through the next two years, which is a tall order. We conclude that the market pricing of a Fed funds rate lift-off in December 2022 is much too optimistic, making the December 2022 Eurodollar contract a good buy. The End Of Pandemic Restrictions Will Unleash Super-Spreaders On July 19, the UK will remove all its domestic pandemic restrictions – meaning no more facemasks, social distancing, and limits on the size of gatherings. This doesn’t mean that the pandemic is over in the UK. Far from it. The delta variant of the virus is rampant. Rather, with a large portion of the population vaccinated, the government is replacing state-imposed laws and regulations with a libertarian onus on personal responsibility. Given that Covid-19 is not going away, the UK strategy raises a fundamental question. Other than implementing a vaccination program, what role should a government take in containing the virus? In Who’s Right On The Pandemic – Sweden Or Denmark? we revealed two important findings: First, it is a misunderstanding that state-imposed restrictions cause the collapse in social consumption. This is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is that a virulent disease focuses millions of people on self-preservation, shunning crowds and public places. But to the extent that the pandemic also leads to state-imposed restrictions, many people blame the slowdown on these correlated restrictions rather than on the underlying cause – the voluntary change in behaviour. Second, without state-imposed restrictions, the majority will voluntarily change their behaviour to avoid catching and spreading the virus, but a minority will not. When a virus is spreading, this is critical because a tiny minority of so-called ‘super-spreaders’ is responsible for most infections. Put simply, economic growth depends on the behaviour of the majority and in a pandemic the majority will voluntarily reduce their social consumption. This explains why libertarian Sweden and lockdown Denmark suffered similar contractions in their economies (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Libertarian Sweden Has Not Significantly Outperformed Lockdown Denmark...
Libertarian Sweden Has Not Significantly Outperformed Lockdown Denmark...
Libertarian Sweden Has Not Significantly Outperformed Lockdown Denmark...
In contrast, containing the virus depends on restricting the minority of super-spreaders. Which explains why libertarian Sweden suffered a much worse outbreak of the disease than lockdown Denmark (Chart I-9). Chart I-9...But Libertarian Sweden Has Suffered Many More Covid-19 Casualties
...But Libertarian Sweden Has Suffered Many More Covid-19 Casualties
...But Libertarian Sweden Has Suffered Many More Covid-19 Casualties
The worry now is that the end of state-imposed restrictions will unleash super-spreaders and super-spreading events. This will allow the virus to replicate, mutate, and create new variants which are potentially more transmissible and resistant to existing vaccines. Pulling together our three themes for the second half of the year, inflation is set to decelerate, job creation has a natural speed-limit, and super-spreaders of new-variant Covid-19 infections will create speed bumps in the economy. This means that: Bonds will rally. The US dollar will rally. Growth stocks will outperform value stocks. US stocks will outperform non-US stocks Candidates For Countertrend Reversal This week, we present three candidates for countertrend reversal. First, the Brazilian real’s recent surge has hit expected resistance at 65-day fractal fragility. A good way to play a continued reversal is to short BRL/COP (Chart I-10). Chart I-10The Brazilian Real Is Correcting
The Brazilian Real Is Correcting
The Brazilian Real Is Correcting
Second, within emerging markets, the strong rally in the Saudi equity market is vulnerable to a setback, especially versus other markets. A good way to play this is to short the Saudi Tadawul All Share index versus the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI, given that the 260-day fractal structure is at the point of fragility that marked the major top in 2014 (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Saudi Stock Market Is Vulnerable To A Setback
The Saudi Stock Market Is Vulnerable To A Setback
The Saudi Stock Market Is Vulnerable To A Setback
Finally, coming full circle to short-term supply bottlenecks, one major beneficiary has been the Marine Transportation sector which, since February, has outperformed the world market by 70 percent. As the supply bottlenecks ease, this is vulnerable to correction, especially as the 260-day fractal structure is at the point of fragility that marked the major top in 2007 (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Underweight Marine Transportation
Underweight Marine Transportation
Underweight Marine Transportation
Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to underweight Marine Transportation versus the market, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 16.5 percent. Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area
Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area
Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia
Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed
Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Barring major surprises, President Macron will be re-elected in 2022. Any dramatic reversal in the pandemic that leads to a new recession would benefit the opposition candidate. Otherwise, Macron will remain the frontrunner. A second term for President Macron would see a continuation of the structural reforms started in 2017, but with a longer process for coalition-building in the National Assembly. This is bullish for France. Reducing the size of the state will go a long way to improve France’s economic competitiveness over the long run. Tactically, favor the more defensive Spanish market over the highly cyclical French market. Underweight French consumer discretionary equities relative to their European and global peers. Longer term, overweight French industrials equities relative to German ones, and overweight French tech equities relative to European ones. Ahead of the election, buy the dip on any euro weakness and French OAT/German bund spread widening. Feature The French presidential election is nine months away, and it is already starting to catch investors’ attention as one of the main political events in Europe in 2022. In talks with clients, we’ve been asked repeatedly about the odds we assign to a Marine Le Pen victory and the market implications. Those concerns are understandable but overrated. Le Pen’s personal approval rating is on the rise, and, in most polls, the far-right candidate beats President Emmanuel Macron in the first round vote, although not the critical second round. Although the same polls see Macron being re-elected, the gap between the two has narrowed considerably since the 2017 election, which Macron won by 66 percent of the vote. Still, Macron is favored for re-election. He has several strong advantages over Le Pen, and it is unlikely she will be able to close the gap further before the election. Macron’s first term has been eventful. Neoliberal structural reforms started with drums beating in the first 18 months of his term. But the pace and breadth of reform eventually became too ambitious or painful for France to bear, and protests erupted in 2018. First came the “Yellow Vest Movement,” and then came protests against pension reform. Macron tried to compromise and continue with his agenda, but COVID-19 forced his hand. Since then, Macron has focused on crisis management, benefiting from the large state sector’s role as an automatic stabilizer amid the downturn. A second term under President Macron would see a reboot of the structural reforms started in 2017, albeit without single-party rule in the National Assembly. Reforms aimed at reducing the size of the state, and its cost, would go a long way to improve France’s economic competitiveness over the long run. Therefore, the prospect of Macron’s reelection is bullish for France, even though the reality of his second term would be more complex. 2017 All Over Again? Yes And No At first glance, the 2022 election seems to be a repeat of 2017. Le Pen and Macron are likely to face off in the second round and the latter, the Europhile centrist candidate, is likely to win once more. However, everything surrounding this election has changed. The Incumbency Effect One of the major changes is favorable for Macron: he is the incumbent running for re-election. Macron had been part of President Francois Hollande’s government since 2014, so he was still viewed in 2017 as a political neophyte and dark horse candidate. His rapid rise to power, along with that of his upstart party, La République En Marche (LREM), was astounding. Chart 1Pro-Incumbency Effect Favors Macron
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
There is a strong pro-incumbency effect in French presidential elections, especially in the first round (Chart 1). Since 1965, five incumbents have run for re-election, and all have made it to the second round. Importantly, four won first place in the first round, with a six percentage-point margin on average. The chief exception is Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012. The reason for Sarkozy’s loss, however, is well known: he attempted to pass an unpopular pension reform in the teeth of the Euro debt crisis, 12 months before facing re-election. The only other incumbent who failed at re-election was Valerie Giscard d’Estaing, who lost to Francois Mitterrand in 1981, when the whole world was in stagflation and upheaval. The incumbency effect is not as pronounced in the second round (Chart 1, bottom panel). However, when facing a far-right candidate, incumbents win by a wide margin. This was the case in 2002 and 2017. Today, Macron still has a 12-point lead on Le Pen. Macron compares well to his predecessors. Chart 2 shows the approval rating for all presidents sitting in office over the past 40 years. The number of people who intend to vote for Macron has increased, the first time this has happened for an incumbent president since 1988. Only three presidents had a higher approval rating at this stage of their term, albeit from a higher starting point. Macron’s approval rating has increased by 10% since February 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit Europe. Chart 2Macron Compares Well To His Predecessors
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
Table 1Incumbency And Recessions Under The Fifth Republic
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
The shock of the pandemic and recession is the greatest change since 2017, and the biggest challenge facing Macron. Four incumbents have made a bid for re-election that was preceded by a recession within 12-24 months (Table 1). The results are mixed, and it is hard to establish a clear anti-incumbency effect. If anything, the timing and nature of this crisis are likely to help Macron rather than hurt him, since the vaccination campaign and easing of lockdown measures will enable the economy to normalize and improve ahead of April 10-24, 2022, when voters cast their first ballots. Nonetheless, another major shock (of any kind) could undermine the incumbent advantage. Economic Recovery Is The Top Priority While the Macron administration’s handling of the pandemic was questioned, public opinion was never aggressively hostile toward his handling of the economy. Macron was instrumental in securing a major European fiscal stimulus package (and joint debt issuance) with the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. He enthusiastically adopted the crisis mentality of “whatever it takes” to wage war against COVID-19, enabling the oversized French state to deploy the most generous furlough scheme in Europe, shielding millions of workers and preventing businesses from going under. This will be one of his winning cards. Chart 3The Handling Of The Pandemic Dictates Macron's Popularity
The Handling Of The Pandemic Dictates Macron's Popularity
The Handling Of The Pandemic Dictates Macron's Popularity
His approval rating began to rebound following the end of lockdowns (Chart 3). This trend should strengthen as the French economy reopens, supported by a government that will play an accommodative and reflationary economic role until the election. Public opinion wants him to focus on the labor market and the economic recovery in the months to come, and he will be happy to oblige. Public opinion also views Macron as the most qualified candidate when it comes to economic matters (Table 2). 42% of respondents think that Le Pen is not qualified “at all” on economic matters, her Achilles’ heel, a perception that was already entrenched when Macron crushed her in a televised debate before the second round of the 2017 election. Table 2Macron Is Perceived As The Most Qualified To Oversee The Economic Recovery
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
Europhile Versus Eurosceptic? The central issue of the 2017 election was Europe and France’s role in it. Following the UK’s disruptive Brexit referendum in 2016, and a long tradition of Euroscepticism within her party, Le Pen campaigned on “Frexit” and the abandonment of the euro. Conversely, Macron embraced the EU and the monetary union as he ran for president and committed to having France play a more important role within the bloc if he won. Chart 4Le Pen And The EU: Not The Divorce We Expected
Le Pen And The EU: Not The Divorce We Expected
Le Pen And The EU: Not The Divorce We Expected
Since then, Le Pen has drastically shifted her stance on the EU. She now claims that the benefits of the common currency and single market outweigh the costs. After all, 70% of the French public support the euro and EU membership (Chart 4). Like clockwork, her personal approval ratings have steadily gone up. This strategic shift aligns her with the median voter, and combined with the Covid crisis, it is the only reason to take her candidacy remotely seriously in 2022, despite Macron’s clear advantages. Nevertheless, Le Pen has not yet risen above her 2012 peak in popular support. She failed to do so between 2014 and 2015, when the lingering European debt crisis, the Syrian refugee crisis, multiple terrorist attacks in France, and sluggish economic growth should have boosted her popularity. Her shifting perspective on the euro was therefore necessary and might be just what she needs to break through her 37% ceiling of popular support. Le Pen’s policy agenda is now focusing on protectionism, immigration, and national security. It is a Trumpian mix. However, while her new stance is more mainstream, it also differentiates her less from the other center-right politicians in France, namely Xavier Bertrand, who recently made local electoral gains in Le Pen’s northern industrial base. Macron is as strong an advocate for Europe as ever. He convinced Germany to break the taboo on joint fiscal policy during the pandemic. Now, he is also mounting a bid to become the natural leader of Europe, given that Merkel is stepping down, and her party is likely to lose standing in the German election in September. France is set to take over the rotating EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2022, under the theme “Recovery, power, belonging,” which provides Macron with a golden opportunity to pitch himself as Europe’s premier statesman and economic steward in the final months of the election campaign. One Thing Hasn’t Changed: The Outcome Of A Macron/Le Pen Duel Most opinion polls give Macron a 10-12 point lead on Le Pen in the second round of the election. This gap is wide enough to reassure investors that it is not a polling error. However, in 2017, Macron’s average lead over Le Pen was 22%, and he won the election with 66% of votes. It is the narrowing of that gap that raises eyebrows among investors. Table 3Ideological Blocs Also Favor Macron
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
Still, Le Pen’s chances at closing the gap are overrated. She is not a political “unknown” anymore and has very little ability to “surprise” voters into rallying around her next year. She will have trouble persuading those who know all about her. Grouping French voters according to ideological blocs, that is, presidential preference by party affiliation, suggests that the biggest threat to Macron is a strong center-right candidate who can beat Le Pen, especially if this should coincide with a revival of the center-left (Table 3). Otherwise, as in 2017, Macron will be able to count on voters from other parties in the second round of the election (Table 4). While both candidates appeal to right-wing constituents and would have to share their ballots, Macron can count on the green EELV party, as well as left-wing voters, to join center-right voters to elect him. Macron has made environmental issues a part of his mandate, which should help him confront a green neophyte such as Le Pen. Table 4Voting Against Le Pen Implies Voting For Macron
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
The results of the regional elections held last month confirm this analysis. The motivation to keep Le Pen and her Rassemblement National (National Rally) party out of power is still strong (see Box 1). The poor showing of the National Rally means she won’t be able to maintain her current momentum in her personal approval ratings. Box 1 2021 Regional Elections: Bad Omen For Marine Le Pen In Revival Of The Center-Right? The regional elections took place on June 20 and 27. While limited in relevance for the 2022 presidential race, the result of extremely low voter turnout, regional elections offer a gauge of how constituents feel about the political offerings from anti-establishment parties. Le Pen’s party suffered a heavy blow. It had hoped to consolidate power and build momentum ahead of the presidential election, but it failed even to win in its stronghold of Southern France. Meanwhile, Macron’s party (La République En Marche!) also disappointed. This outcome is not surprising; the local elections last year yielded similar results, highlighting the lack of presence at the local and regional levels for the four-year-old party. The surprise came from the center-right. It managed to win seven of the thirteen regions, beating far-right candidates by wide margins. Importantly, Xavier Bertand, Valérie Pécresse, and Laurent Wauquiez, all predicted to run for president next year, held onto their seats. Chart 5Strong Demographic Base In The Second Round
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
Both candidates’ demographic bases have remained the same. Macron is still popular among Millennials, white collar workers, and the elderly (Chart 5). He also has a strong base in Paris (and the suburbs) as opposed to Le Pen, and he still outperforms Le Pen among rural voters in today’s polls. Macron also scores high among the employees of the public sector—even though he is in favor of a smaller public sector. Furthermore, the unemployed mostly favor him, which reinforces the perception that he is the best candidate to improve the French economy and cut the unemployment rate. What if Le Pen fails to make it into the second round of the election? We discuss this possibility in the next section. Risks To The Base Case Scenario The greatest risks to our view are a setback in the economic recovery, an outperformance from the center-right, and the emergence of a dark horse. The latest developments in the UK and Israel, where a large share of the population is fully vaccinated, suggest that the “Delta” variant of COVID-19 remains a threat, with the potential to send economies back into lockdowns. The consequences would be dire for Macron. His chances at re-election would likely evaporate if his government imposed new lockdown measures. What about presidential candidates other than Le Pen? Our base case scenario that Macron will win is based on two assumptions: (1) the center-left Socialist Party will remain in shambles, and (2) the center-right remains scattered under different banners and will therefore lack unity. There is very little chance that the center-left will make a comeback in time, but the results from the regional elections suggest that the center-right could surprise to the upside (see Box 1), especially if it decides to rally behind a single candidate ahead of the first round. Could this candidate be a dark horse? Former Prime Minister Edouard Philippe or outsider candidate Xavier Bertrand could make formidable opponents to both Macron and Le Pen. Philippe’s personal approval rating currently stands at 50%, the highest among French politicians. He also appeals to constituents of all political leanings (Chart 6). This scenario could reshuffle the likely outcomes of both the first and second round of the election. Both Bertand and Philippe could win over voters who decided to side with Le Pen in 2017, while Philippe can compete with Macron over LREM voters. Additionally, Xavier Bertrand cuts into Le Pen’s support since he has made blue collar workers and the middle-class a priority. However, Macron and Le Pen each enjoy a strong voters’ base. It is necessary to monitor whether Valérie Pécresse (Soyons libres) and Laurent Wauquiez (Les Républicains) can be brought to endorse Xavier Bertrand ahead of the first round in 2022. Chart 6Edouard Philippe: From Ally To Outcast To Challenger?
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
Beyond The Election Aside from the presidency, the outstanding question is the makeup of the National Assembly in 2022. Macron is not likely to enjoy the strong single-party legislative majority of his first term or to gain control of the Senate. Consequently, he will be more constrained in the legislature in a second term. Nonetheless, the demand for a better economy and a healthier job market requires pro-productivity reforms, which the public knows, and Macron has made reform his banner. Other conventional parties will come under pressure to support Macron’s reform agenda, even though that agenda will be less ambitious than it was in his first term. Chart 7Strong Presence Of Right-Leaning Forces
Strong Presence Of Right-Leaning Forces
Strong Presence Of Right-Leaning Forces
Efforts at cutting back the size of the state are still likely, even though the pandemic has helped rather than hurt statism. This is because the French median voter, who never witnessed the degree of neoliberal reform that took place in the Anglo-Saxon world, has grown weary of the economy’s inefficiencies, just as the Anglo-Saxons have grown weary of laissez-faire neoliberalism. Before the pandemic, the French people understood the need to reduce the size of the state. After all, a larger state implies a larger cost burden borne by both households and corporations. When faced with the choice between paying the bill for the government’s fiscal response to COVID-19 (through higher taxes), or undertaking reforms aiming at reducing the size of the state, the French people will pick the former. Moreover, centrist forces will hold sway in the legislature (Chart 7); hence, some kind of budget normalization is expected in 2023 or thereafter. Other structural reforms If Macron wins would include pension reforms. We should also expect measures to push French companies to bring activities back to France, as well as a greater focus on leading France on the green path. Bottom Line: Barring major surprises, President Macron will be re-elected in 2022. There is a risk to our view if a center-right candidate defeats Le Pen to make it to the second round of the election. Either Macron or a center-right presidency would see a continuation of the structural reforms started in 2017, but with a longer process for coalition-building in the National Assembly. Investment Implications The French economy is currently experiencing an economic upswing. Three factors explain this pick-up: ultra-accommodative monetary conditions in Europe, fiscal largesse, and considerable pent-up demand. In 2021, GDP is projected to expand by 5.75% in annual average terms, higher than the Euro Area average of 4.6%. It should then grow by 4% in 2022 and by 2% in 2023. We remain bullish on French equities on a secular basis, as long as the elections result in further incremental structural reforms over time. As the election draws nearer, investors should treat any French OAT/German Bund spread widening as a buying opportunity and purchase the euro on any election-related dip. French Equities The CAC40 and French equities have had a good run since the beginning of the year. In absolute terms, the CAC40 is one of the best performers year-to-date, up +17%, driven by the outperformance of French consumer discretionary and financials equities, both in absolute and relative terms. However, a period of turbulence is appearing on the horizon; the shift in global growth drivers, the beginning of the global liquidity withdrawal, and lingering COVID worries are creating headwinds for the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio this summer. As such, we recently recommended investors downgrade cyclical equities tactically in Europe from overweight to neutral. With 66% in cyclicals, the French MSCI equity index will underperform in this environment, especially relative to the more defensive Spanish market (Table 5). Table 5Cyclicals Versus Defensives In European Markets
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
France: More Than Just A Déjà-Vu
Chart 8Three Trade Ideas
Three Trade Ideas
Three Trade Ideas
In fact, our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator (CMVI) shows that French consumer discretionary equities are expensive relative to both their European and global peers (Chart 8). Regarding the reform theme, we stick with our long French industrial equities / short German industrial equities on a long-term horizon (Chart 8, second and third panel). The idea is that French reforms should suppress unit labor costs and make French exports more competitive vis-à-vis their main competitor, Germany. The latter faces a leftward shift in policy in elections this September. Finally, we recommend investors go long French tech stocks relative to their European counterparts. This sector is cheap (Chart 8, bottom panel), and the French tech sector will be supported by additional government spending of EUR7 billion on digital investments over the next two years. Bond Markets & FX A dovish ECB is consistent with a continued overweight in European peripheral bonds and an underweight stance on French government bonds. Chart 9Just Buy The Dip
Just Buy The Dip
Just Buy The Dip
What is more relevant with respect to the French election is the OAT/Bund spread. In the past, unusually wide spreads between the two represented a euro breakup premium. In early 2017, spreads widened when the approval rating of Le Pen increased (Chart 9). However, since “Frexit” and the abandonment of the euro are no longer part of Le Pen’s agenda, investors should view spread widening as a buying opportunity. Similarly, investors should buy the euro on any election-related dip, particularly following the first round. “Frexit” has been removed from the equation, hence the euro should not weaken on breakup risk this time around. Bottom Line: We remain bullish on French equities within a European portfolio on a secular basis. If our views on the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio materialize in the near-term, highly cyclical French equities will temporarily underperform, unlike the more defensive Spanish market. On a 3- to 12-month horizon, investors should short French consumer discretionary equities relative to both their European and global counterparts. Current valuations suggest that betting on the booming French tech sector at the expense of its European neighbors will be profitable. Once the election draws nearer, investors should treat any French OAT/German Bund spread widening as a buying opportunity and purchase the euro on any election-related dip. Jeremie Peloso, Associate Editor JeremieP@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Three distinct forces are likely to make South Asia’s geopolitical risks increasingly relevant to global investors. First, India’s tensions with China stem from China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness and India’s shift away from traditional neutrality toward aligning with the US and its allies. This creates a security dilemma in South Asia, just as in East Asia. Second, India’s economy is sputtering in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, adding fuel to nationalism and populism in advance of a series of important elections. India will stimulate the economy but it could also become more reactive on the international scene. Third, the US is withdrawing from Afghanistan and negotiating a deal with Iran in an effort to reduce the US military presence in the Middle East and South Asia. This will create a scramble for influence across both regions and a power vacuum in Afghanistan that is highly likely to yield negative surprises for India and its neighbors. Traditionally geopolitical risks in South Asia have a limited impact on markets. India’s growth slowdown and forthcoming fiscal stimulus are more relevant for investors. However, a sharp rise in geopolitical risk would undermine India’s structural advantages as the West diversifies away from China. Stay short Indian banks. Feature Geopolitical risks in South Asia are slowly but surely rising. India-Pakistan and China-India are well-known “conflict-dyads” or pairings. Historically, these two sets have been fighting each other over their fuzzy Himalayan border with limited global financial market consequences. But now fundamental changes are afoot that are altering the geopolitical setting in the region. Specifically, the coming together of three distinct forces could trigger a significant geopolitical event in South Asia. The three forces are as follow: Force #1: Sino-Indian Tensions Get Real About a year ago, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in Ladakh, a disputed territory in the Kashmir region. Following these clashes China reduced its military presence in the Pangong Tso area but its presence in some neighboring areas remains meaningful. Besides the troop build-up along India’s eastern border, China is building more air combat infrastructure in its India-facing western theatre. China’s major air bases have historically been concentrated in China’s eastern region, away from the Indian border (Map 1). Consequently, India has historically enjoyed an advantage in airpower. But China appears to be working to mitigate this disadvantage. Map 1Most Of China’s Major Aviation Units Are Located Away From India
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
Owing to China’s increased military focus along the Sino-India border, India’s threat perception of China has undergone a fundamental change in recent years. Notably, India has diverted some of its key army units away from its western Indo-Pak border towards its eastern border with China. India could now have nearly 200,000 troops deployed along its border with China, which would mark a 40% increase from last year.1 Turning attention to the Indo-Pak border, India’s problems with Pakistan appear under control for now. This is owing to the ceasefire agreement that was renewed by the two countries in February 2021. However, this peace cannot possibly be expected to last. This is mainly because core problems between the two countries (like Pakistan’s support of militant proxies and India’s control over Kashmir) remain unaddressed. History too suggests that bouts of peace between the two warring neighbors rarely last long. These bouts usually end abruptly when a terrorist attack takes place in India. With both political turbulence and economic distress in Pakistan rising, the fragile ceasefire between India and Pakistan could be upended over the next six months. In fact, two events over the last week point to the fragility of the ceasefire: Two drones carrying explosives entered an Indian air force station located in Jammu and Kashmir (i.e. a northern territory that India recently reorganized, to Pakistan’s chagrin). Even as no casualties were reported, this attack marks a turning point for terrorist activity in India as this was the first-time terrorists used drones to enter an Indian military base. Hours later, another drone attack struck an Indian base at the Ratnuchak-Kaluchak army station, the site of a major terrorist attack in 2002. Chart 1China, Pakistan And India Cumulatively Added 41 Nuclear Warheads Over 2020
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
Given that the ceasefire was agreed recently, any further increase in terrorist activity in India over the next six months would suggest that a more substantial breakdown in relations is nigh. Distinct from these recent tensions, China’s troop deployment along India’s eastern arm and Pakistan’s presence along India’s western arm creates a strategic “pincer” that increasingly threatens India. India is naturally concerned. China and Pakistan are allies who have been working closely on projects including the strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC is a collection of infrastructure projects in Pakistan that includes the development of a port in Gwadar where a future presence of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is envisaged. Gwadar has the potential of providing China land-based access to the Indian Ocean. Trust in the South Asian region is clearly running low. Distinct from troop build-ups and drone-attacks, China, Pakistan, and India cumulatively added more than 40 nuclear warheads over the last year (Chart 1). China is reputed to be engaged in an even larger increase in its nuclear arsenal than the data show.2 From a structural perspective, too, geopolitical risks in the South Asian peninsula are bound to keep rising. When it comes to the conflicting Indo-Pak dyad, India’s geopolitical power has been rising relative to that of Pakistan in the 2000s. However, the geopolitical muscle of the Sino-Pak alliance is much greater than that of India on a standalone basis (Chart 2). Chart 2India Has Aligned With The QUAD To Counter The Sino-Pak Alliance
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
China’s active involvement in South Asia is responsible for driving India’s increasing desire to abandon its historical foreign policy stance of non-alignment. India’s membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the QUAD, whose other members include the US, Japan, and Australia) bears testimony to India’s active effort to develop closer relations with the US and its allies (Chart 2). India’s alignment with the US is deepening China’s and Pakistan’s distrust of India. Conventional and nuclear military deterrence should prevent full-scale war. But the regional balance is increasingly fluid which means geopolitical risks will slowly but surely rise in South Asia over the coming year and years. Force #2: A Growth Slowdown Alongside India’s Loaded Election Calendar The pandemic has hit the economies of South Asia particularly hard. South Asia historically maintained higher real GDP growth rates relative to Emerging Markets (EMs). But in 2021, this region’s growth rate is set to be lower than that of EM peers (Chart 3). History is replete with examples of a rise in economic distress triggering geopolitical events. South Asia is characterized by unusually low per capita incomes (Chart 4) and the latest slowdown could exacerbate the risk of both social unrest and geopolitical incidents materialising. Chart 3South Asian Economies Have Been Hit Hard By The Pandemic
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
Chart 4South Asia Is Characterized By Very Low Per Capita Incomes
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
To complicate matters a busy state elections calendar is coming up in India. Elections will be due in seven Indian states in 2022. These states account for about 25% of India’s population. State elections due in 2022 will amount to a high-stakes political battle. During state elections in 2021, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the incumbent in only one of the five states. In 2022, the BJP is the incumbent party in most of the states that are due for elections, which means it has the advantage but also has a lot to lose, especially in a post-pandemic environment. Elections kick off in the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh next February. Last time this state faced elections Prime Minister Narendra Modi was willing to go to great lengths to boost his popularity ahead of time. Specifically, he upset the nation with a large-scale and unprecedented de-monetization program. Given the busy state election calendar in 2022, we expect the BJP-led central government to focus on policy actions that can improve its support among Indian voters. Two policies in particular are likely to come through: Fiscal Stimulus Measures To Provide Economic Relief: India has refrained from administering a large post-pandemic stimulus thus far. As per budget estimates, the Indian central government’s total expenditure in FY22 is set to increase only by 1% on a year-on-year basis. But the expenditure-side restraint shown by India’s central government could change. With elections and a pandemic (which has now claimed over 400,000 lives in India), the central government could consider a meaningful increase in spending closer to February 2022. Map 2Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
South Asia: A Slowdown And A Showdown
India’s Finance Minister already announced a fiscal stimulus package of $85 billion (amounting to 2.8% of GDP) earlier this week. Whilst this stimulus entails limited fresh spending (amounting to about 0.6% of India’s GDP), we would not be surprised if the government follows it up with more spending closer to February 2022. Assertive Foreign Policy To Ward-Off Unfriendly Neighbors: India’s northern states are known to harbor unfavorable views of Pakistan (Map 2). The roots of this phenomenon can be traced to geography and the bloody civil strife of 1947 that was triggered by the partition of British-ruled India into the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan. Given the north’s unfavorable views of Pakistan and given looming elections, Indian policy makers may be forced to adopt a far more aggressive foreign policy response, to any terrorist strikes from Pakistan or territorial incursions by China. This kind of response was observed most recently ahead of the Indian General Elections in April-May 2019. An Indian military convoy was attacked by a suicide-bomber in early February 2019 and a Pakistan-based terrorist group claimed responsibility. A fortnight later the Indian air force launched unexpected airstrikes across the Line of Control which were then followed by the Pakistan air force conducting air strikes in Jammu and Kashmir. While the next round of Pakistani and Indian general elections is not due until 2023 and 2024, respectively, it is worth noting that of the seven state elections due in India in 2022, four are in the north (Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, and Himachal Pradesh). Force #3: Power Vacuum In Afghanistan The final reason to be wary of the South Asian geopolitical dynamic is the change in US policy: both the Iran nuclear deal expected in August and the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan in September. The US public has now elected three presidents on the demand that foreign wars be reduced. In the wake of Trump and populism the political establishment is now responding. Therefore Biden will ultimately implement both the Iran deal and the Afghan withdrawal regardless of delays or hang-ups. But then he will have to do damage control. In the case of Iran, a last-minute flare-up of conflict in the region is likely this summer, as the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran underscore their red lines before the US and Iran settle down to a deal. Indeed it is already happening, with recent US attacks against Iran-backed Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. A major incident would push up oil prices, which is negative for India. But the endgame, an Iranian economic opening, is positive for India, since it imports oil and has had close relations with Iran historically. In the case of Afghanistan, the US exit will activate latent terrorist forces. It will also create a scramble for influence over this landlocked country that could lead to negative surprises across the region. The first principle of the peace agreement between the US and Afghanistan states that the latter will make all efforts to ensure that Afghan soil is not used to further terrorist activity. However, the enforceability of such a guarantee is next to impossible. Notably, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will revive the Taliban’s influence in the region. This poses major risks for India, which has a long history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. The Taliban played a critical role in the release of terrorists into Pakistan following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in 1999. Furthermore, the Haqqani network, which has pledged allegiance to the Taliban, has attacked Indian assets in the past. Any attack on India deriving from the power vacuum in Afghanistan would upset the precarious regional balance. Whilst there are no immediate triggers for Afghani groups to launch a terrorist attack in India, the US withdrawal will trigger a tectonic shift in the region. Negative surprises emanating from Afghanistan should be expected. Investment Conclusions Chart 5Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives
Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives
Indian Banks Appear To Have Factored In All Positives
We reiterate the need to pare exposure to Indian assets on a tactical basis. India’s growth engine is likely to misfire over the second half of the Indian financial year. Macroeconomic headwinds pose the chief risk for investors, but major geopolitical changes could act as a negative catalyst in the current context. So we urge clients to stay short Indian Banks (Chart 5). Financials account for the lion’s share of India’s benchmark index (26% weight). India could opt for an unexpected expansion in its fiscal deficit soon. Whilst we continue to watch fiscal dynamics closely, we expect the fiscal expansion to materialize closer to February 2022 when India’s most populous state (i.e. Uttar Pradesh) will undergo elections. Over the long run, India’s sense of insecurity will escalate in the context of a more assertive China, stronger Sino-Pakistani ties, and a power vacuum in Afghanistan. For that reason, New Delhi will continue to shed its neutrality and improve relations with the US-led coalition of democratic countries, with an aim to balance China. This process will feed China’s insecurity of being surrounded and contained by a hegemonic American system. This security dilemma is a source of South Asian geopolitical risk that will become more globally relevant over time. China’s conflict with the US and western world should create incentives for India to attract trade and investment. However, its ability to do so will be contingent upon domestic political factors and regional geopolitical factors. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, ‘India Shifts 50,000 Troops to China Border in Historic Move’, Bloomberg, June 28, 2021, bloomberg.com. 2 Joby Warrick, “China is building more than 100 missile silos in its western desert, analysts say,” Washington Post, June 30, 2021, washingtonpost.com.
Underweight Housing stocks have been resilient to rising interest rates for the most part of the year, but now macro headwinds are taking over this consumer discretionary sub-sector and we recommend a below benchmark allocation. Rising mortgage rates (up 35 bps YTD), and skyrocketing housing prices (up 15% YoY), are starting to hurt housing affordability, suppressing demand, and putting downward pressure on homebuilders’ revenue. To make things worse, oriented strand board prices remain on the ascent despite the outright bear market in lumber futures. The cost of labor is on the rise, too, increasing homebuilders’ expenses. Falling revenue and rising costs are a poisonous cocktail bound to hurt homebuilders’ profitability, putting a halt to what has been a strong run and making them an excellent candidate for an underweight allocation. Looking beyond this macro soft patch, once headwinds dissipate, we will be adding to homebuilders as the industry has compelling long-term prospects: US consumers are facing a housing shortage to the tune of five million units as construction was running under the trend over the past decade. Bottom Line: We are underweight the S&P homebuilding index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME – LEN, PHM, DHI, NVR.
Cracked Foundation
Cracked Foundation
Highlights Euro Area debt loads have increased significantly during the pandemic. Debt loads are not uniform. While Germany and, to a lesser extent, Spain look best, France has a less attractive total debt profile than Italy. Government debt-service ratios are not a problem for Europe. Private sector debt service ratios do not represent an imminent risk, but the French corporate sector is an important source of long-term vulnerability for the region. As a result of this indebtedness, Euro Area bond yields will not rise much and will be capped below 1.5% over this business cycle. For now, Eurozone corporate bonds remain attractive within a European fixed-income portfolio. High-yield bonds are appealing, but investors should avoid the energy sector. Feature Like the US, the Eurozone economy has witnessed a large increase in debt following the COVID-19 crisis. This debt load will have a long legacy that will impact the ability of the European Central Bank to increase interest rates over the coming years. The French corporate sector will be a particularly vulnerable pressure point. Nonetheless, in the short-term, this uptick in indebtedness will not have a major impact on European debt markets. Disparate Debt Loads… Chart 1The Eurozone's Heavy Debt Load
The Eurozone's Heavy Debt Load
The Eurozone's Heavy Debt Load
After a period of decline in the wake of both the GFC and the European debt crisis, total nonfinancial debt rose by 29% of GDP since the COVID-19 pandemic began (Chart 1). While some of this increase reflects a declining GDP, Euro Area Households and Corporations together added EUR609 billion of debt, while governments accumulated over EUR1 trillion more to their borrowings. The aggregate European picture does not impart the more complex reality. While all countries experienced a marked rise in indebtedness, some major economies are in a much more precarious position than others. The Good Among the largest Eurozone economies, Germany sports the most favorable debt profiles and represents the smallest threat to the Eurozone. Compared with the other major Euro Area countries, Spain shows healthier trends, even if its overall debt load remains important. At 202%, Germany’s nonfinancial-debt-to-GDP ratio is still below its all-time high of 211% (Chart 2, top panel). During the crisis, household debt rose by EUR296 billion or 4% of GDP, but it still stands well below the 72% registered at the turn of the millennium. In absolute terms, nonfinancial corporate debt has increased to a record, but it remains 5% below its 2003 high (Chart 2, third panel). Despite a 9% rebound to 70% of GDP, government debt still lies nearly 12% below its 2010 summit (Chart 2, bottom panel). In Spain, total nonfinancial debt rose by 45% of GDP since the pandemic started, but remains 12% below its 2013 all-time high of 301%. However, the private sector’s borrowing is well behaved, and it has only risen to 170% of GDP, well below the 227% level recorded in 2010 (Chart 3, top panel). Both the household and corporate sectors have gone a long way toward improving their debt situation, with borrowing 23% and 33%, respectively, below their crisis peaks (Chart 3, second and third panel). Spain’s problem is government debt. The pandemic forced the public sector to borrow EUR316 billion, which pushed its debt load to 120% of GDP (Chart 3, bottom panel). Chart 2Germany Is The Best Student
Germany Is The Best Student
Germany Is The Best Student
Chart 3Spain's Previous Efforts Have Paid Off
Spain's Previous Efforts Have Paid Off
Spain's Previous Efforts Have Paid Off
The Bad Chart 4Italy Remains Problematic
Italy Remains Problematic
Italy Remains Problematic
Italian debt remains a troublesome spot for the Eurozone, which sheds some light on the higher interest rate commanded by BTPs. Burdened by tepid GDP growth, Italy’s total nonfinancial debt did not decline much in the years between the European debt crisis and the onset of the pandemic. As a result, overall nonfinancial debt jumped to an all-time high of 276% of GDP in response to COVID-19 (Chart 4, top panel). Private sector nonfinancial credit is high by Italian standards, but at 120% of GDP, it is low compared with other major European or G-10 nations. Italian household debt has hit a record high of 45% of GDP, which also compares well to other countries, while corporate debt rose to 76% of GDP, which is also well below historical highs and other nations (Chart 4, second and third panels). Italy’s perennial problem remains the public sector’s debt, which stands at 156% of GDP, the highest reading among major Eurozone nations. The Ugly The major Eurozone country with the worst debt situation is France, and we expect this country to become an increasingly large hurdle on the ability of the ECB to lift rates in the future. Next week, we will devote a Special Report to the French situation. Chart 5France's Debt Binge
France's Debt Binge
France's Debt Binge
France’s nonfinancial debt towers above 350% of GDP, and the private sector nonfinancial debt has also hit an all-time high of 240% of GDP (Chart 5, top panel). No sector is spared. French households have accumulated EUR239 billion of liabilities during the pandemic, which pushed their leverage ratio to an all-time high of nearly 70% of GDP (Chart 5, second panel). Meanwhile, after rising by 21%, nonfinancial corporate credit stands above 170% of GDP (Chart 5, third panel). Finally, at 116% of GDP, public debt may not be as high as in Italy, but it is comparable to that of Spain (Chart 5, bottom panel). Bottom Line: The Eurozone indebtedness has hit a record high, but considering this factor in isolation oversimplifies a complicated picture. Among the major economies, Germany has the cleanest balance sheet, especially in terms of its private sector. Spain continues to sport high leverage, but the private sector remains in much better shape than last decade. Italy has made little progress, but it still looks good compared with France, where both the public and private sector borrowings stand at record highs. … And Debt Servicing Costs With the exception of the French corporate sector, debt-servicing costs do not represent a great risk for Europe. Chart 6Interest Payments Are Not The Government's Problem
Interest Payments Are Not The Government's Problem
Interest Payments Are Not The Government's Problem
When it comes to governments, the picture is particularly benign. As Chart 6 illustrates, debt-servicing costs as a percentage of GDP or tax revenues are extremely low in both France and Germany. While these two variables are higher in Italy and Spain, they remain distant from the levels recorded during the European debt crisis. Beyond their low levels, a very accommodative policy environment limits the risk created by Europe’s public debt servicing costs. The ECB has purchased EUR1.3 trillion of government bonds since April 2020, which added to its already large ownership. Moreover, BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy service, as well as this publication, anticipates that the ECB will roll the stock of government paper purchased under the PEPP into the PSPP. Beyond the ECB’s actions, the NGEU funds also create the embryo of fiscal risk sharing in the EU, which limits how far yields (and thus debt servicing costs) will rise in the Italy or Spain. For the private sector, the picture is more nuanced. In Germany, household debt-servicing costs are low, both historically and compared with other nations. Meanwhile, BIS data highlights that the nonfinancial corporate debt services consume a larger share of operating cash flows than at any point over the past 20 years, but they remain low by international standards (Chart 7, top panel). Meanwhile, in Spain and Italy, both the household and nonfinancial corporate sectors sport historically low debt servicing costs (Chart 7, second and third panels), which also compare well to other OECD nations. Once again, France stands out. Its household debt servicing costs are historically elevated, even if they are not particularly demanding at a global level. However, the corporate sector spends a substantial share of its cash flow on debt, both compared with its own history and internationally (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7Debt Servicing Costs Across Europe
Debt Servicing Costs Across Europe
Debt Servicing Costs Across Europe
Bottom Line: Generally, the debt-service picture in Europe does not represent a major threat for now. While risks are particularly well contained on the government front, the French corporate sector creates danger for the private sector. Investment Implications The elevated debt load in the Euro Area, especially in the corporate sector, constitutes a crucial limiting factor for interest rates in Europe over the coming business cycle. Compared with global economies, the Eurozone corporate sector sports elevated debt ratios. As Chart 8 illustrates, the Eurozone’s net debt-to-equity ratio is higher than that of the US across most sectors, and even surpasses that of Canada, another country with a heavily indebted corporate sector, for telecommunication firms and financials. The picture is even worse when looking at the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio. Except for energy and utilities, the Eurozone carries poorer numbers than both the US and Canada (Chart 9). Chart 8Debt-To-Equity Ratio Comparison
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
Chart 9Net Debt-To-EBITDA Comparison
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
The picture for debt service payments is even more damning. Despite the very low European corporate bond rates, Eurozone corporations generally have poorer interest rate coverage ratios than both the US and Canada (Chart 10). This indicates that, unless the subpar European profitability is resolved, significantly higher interest rates will cause significant damage to the European corporate sector. Chart 10Interest Coverage Lags In Europe
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
Chart 11The French Corporate Sector And Dutch Households Will Limit The ECB
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
On this front, the French corporate sector once again stands out as the most likely place for an accident. As the top panel of Chart 11 shows, French firms are positioned especially poorly, with both their debt-to-GDP and debt-servicing costs among the highest in advanced economies. Meanwhile, in the household sectors, only the Netherlands represents a potential risk (Chart 11, bottom panel). The level of corporate debt in the Eurozone and in France in particular suggests that the current level of yields in Canada may represent a cap on European long-term rates. Thus, it will be difficult for German yields to move beyond the 1% to 1.5% zone this cycle. For now, despite the elevated debt loads of the European corporate sector, we continue to overweight corporate bonds within European fixed-income portfolios. The ECB will maintain very accommodative monetary conditions for the next 24 months, at least. Moreover, the European recovery, especially in the service sector, will improve the operating cash flows of the corporate sector, and thus, increase the tolerance of the private sector for higher yields in the near terms. Finally, the strength in the Euro anticipated by BCA’s Foreign Exchange strategists will limit the upside to Eurozone inflation, and thus, to yields in the region. Nonetheless, investors should avoid certain sectors (see next section). Market Focus: How To Play Euro Area High Yield Bonds? Chart 12Valuations Are Getting Expensive
Valuations Are Getting Expensive
Valuations Are Getting Expensive
We have argued that investors should continue to favor investment grade corporate bonds within European fixed-income portfolios over high-yield corporate bonds. Eurozone investment grade credit still offered enough value to delay a move down in quality (Chart 12). However, this value cushion is thinning and spreads are only 10 bps from their 2018 lows. BCA Research’s Global Fixed-Income strategists have recently increased their allocation to Euro Area high-yield to overweight, with a focus on the Ba-rated credit tier, while maintaining a neutral weighting in IG credit. However, European high-yield is also becoming expensive. The yield on the overall index is a meagre 44 bps away from its lows of 2018. Moreover, the breakeven spreads of European junk bonds have only been more expensive 11% of the time since 2000 (Chart 12, bottom panel). Despite these observations, high-yield credit is not a uniform block. Caa-rated debt still offers decent value, with a breakeven spread historical percentile standing at 27%. The stretched level of valuation suggests that investors should become more selective in the high-yield space, in order to avoid the industries with the worst risk profiles. To assess the sectors most at risk of experiencing significant spread widening or default occurrences in the coming quarters, we evaluate how the 10 main high-yield industry groups, as defined by Bloomberg Barclays, perform on the following credit metrics: Risk profile The share of firms rated Caa Growth in value of debt outstanding over the past 10 years Change in net debt-to-EBITDA ratio over the past 10 years Risk Profile Chart 13Risk Profile Of HY Sectors
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
We look at the duration-times-spread (DTS) ratio to determine the risk profile of each sector (Chart 13). The DTS is a simple measure that correlates closely with excess return volatility for corporate bonds. The ratio of an issue’s, or sector’s DTS, to that of the benchmark index is loosely equivalent to the beta of a stock or industry to the equity benchmark. A DTS ratio above 1.0 signals that the sector is cyclical (or “high beta”); a DTS ratio below 1.0 indicates that the sector is defensive (or “low beta”). Cyclical sectors are expected to outperform (underperform) the benchmark when spreads are narrowing (widening), while the opposite is expected of defensive sectors. In Europe, only three sectors sport a high DTS. Within these cyclical sectors, energy clearly stands out as essentially being the one most at risk of underperforming during the next episode of spread widening. Meanwhile, materials, healthcare, and utilities display the lowest DTS ratios and should trade defensively relative to the high-yield benchmark index. Share of Caa-rated debt Chart 14High Share Of Caa-Rated Debt Implies Higher Risk Of Default
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
The bulk of defaults happens in the Caa-rated space and below. Hence, evaluating sector risk starts by assessing the share of Caa-rated (and below) debt sported by each industry (Chart 14). Sectors bearing a larger share of low-rated debt should display higher spreads. Consumer non-cyclicals and healthcare have the highest instance of low-rated debt, 16% and 13% respectively, and yet their spreads do not adequately compensate investors for this threat. The energy sector also stands out: spreads are wide because, despite the low percentage of Caa-rated debt, this sector has amassed considerable debt and has seen a meaningful deterioration in net debt-to-EBITDA (see below). Meanwhile, utilities shine under this metric, as they have not issued debt rated Caa or lower. Debt Growth Chart 15Debt Growth Justify Spread Levels
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
The speed and amount of debt accumulated during economic recoveries are other important determinants of future spread volatility, because the sectors that have rapidly levered-up are more likely to experience defaults. Chart 15 shows that, if we ignore the outlying utilities, then there is a robust positive linear relationship between this metric and spreads. Utilities, energy, and the tech sectors have added the most debt, while debt accumulation in the basic materials and health care sectors has lagged over the past 10 years. Crucially, tech and communications spreads trade below what their debt growth implies. Net Debt-To-EBITDA Chart 16Only Financials Have Improved Their Net Debt-To-EBITDA
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
A rapid debt accumulation is not a concern, as long as earnings are rising more rapidly or at least at the same pace. From this case, we infer that companies are using the new debt issued efficiently, for CAPEX or to pursue projects exceeding their IRR. In this light, wide spreads are justified for the energy, consumer cyclical, and consumer non-cyclical sectors (Chart 16). Conversely, financials have seen improvement. Bottom Line: After surveying Euro area high-yield corporate sectors based on four credit metrics, it appears that the sectors most at risk are energy and consumer non-cyclical. By contrast, basic materials seem to be a good sector in which to hide. Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Associate Editor JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Currency Performance
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
Corporate Bonds
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
Equity Performance Major Stock Indices
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
Geographic Performance
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
Sector Performance
A Lot Of Debt
A Lot Of Debt
The S&P 500 raced through the seasonally strong spring months rising by more than 10% from early March. Now, there is the chance that the US equity market will find it difficult grinding higher if the proverbial “sell in May and go away” attitude kicks in. As a reminder, we also recently rotated into quality growth names and took down some of the high-octane cyclical sectors such as the S&P steel index. Both of these moves should protect our portfolio if volatility comes back this summer. Bottom Line: If history is any guide, we expect market to be range bound throughout the summer.
Brace For Summer
Brace For Summer
Work from home policies, originally designed as emergency measures in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, are likely to be “sticky” in a post-pandemic world. This will negatively impact the labor market in central business districts, via reduced spending on services by office workers. The potential impact of working from home is often cited as an example of what is likely to be a lasting and negative effect on jobs growth, but we find that it is not likely to be a barrier to the labor market returning to the Fed’s assessment of “maximum employment.” The size of the impact depends importantly on whether employee preferences or employer plans for WFH prevail, but our sense is that the latter is more likely. A weaker pace of structures investment in response to elevated office vacancy rates will likely have an even smaller impact on growth than the effect of reduced central business district services employment. The contribution to growth from structures investment has been small over the past few decades, office building construction is a small portion of overall nonresidential structures, and there are compelling arguments that the net stock of office structures will stay flat, rather than decline. Our analysis suggests that job growth over the coming year could be even stronger than the Fed and investors expect, possibly resulting in a first rate hike by the middle of next year. This would be earlier than we currently anticipate, but it underscores that fixed-income investors should remain short duration on a 6-12 month time horizon, and that equity investors should favor value over growth positions beyond the coming 3-4 months. The outlook for US monetary policy over the next 12 to 18 months depends almost entirely on the outlook for employment. Many investors are focused on the potential for elevated inflation to force the Fed to raise interest rates earlier than it currently anticipates, but it is the progress in returning to “maximum employment” that will determine the timing of the first Fed rate hike – and potentially the speed at which interest rates rise once policy begins to tighten. In this report, we estimate the extent to which the “stickiness” of working from home (WFH) policies and practices could leave a lasting negative impact on the US labor market. We noted in last month's report that a large portion of the employment gap relative to pre-pandemic levels can be traced to the leisure & hospitality and professional and business services industries, both of which – along with retail employment – stand to be permanently impaired if the office worker footprint is much lower in a post-COVID world.1 Using employee surveys and a Monte Carlo approach, we present a range of estimates for the permanent impact of WFH policies on the unemployment rate, and separately examine the potential for lower construction of office properties to weigh on growth. We find that the impact of reduced office building construction is likely to be minimal, and that WFH policies may structurally raise the unemployment rate by 0.3 to 0.4%. While non-trivial, when compared with a pre-pandemic unemployment rate of 3.5%, WFH policies alone are not likely to cause a long-term deviation from the Fed’s maximum employment objective. Relative to the Fed’s expectations of a strong, lasting impact on the labor market from the pandemic, this suggests that job growth over the coming year could be even stronger than the Fed and investors expect, possibly resulting in a first rate hike by the middle of next year. This would be earlier than we currently anticipate, but it underscores that fixed-income investors should remain short duration on a 6-12 month time horizon, and that equity investors should favor value over growth positions beyond the coming 3-4 months (a period that may see outperformance of the latter). Quantifying The Labor Market Impact Of The New Normal For Work In a January paper, Barrero, Bloom, and Davis (“BBD”) presented evidence arguing why working from home will “stick.” The authors surveyed 22,500 working-age Americans across several survey “waves” between May and December 2020, and asked about both their preferences and their employer’s plans about working from home after the pandemic. Chart II-1 highlights that the desired amount of paid work from home days (among workers who can work from home) reported by the survey respondents is to approximately 55% of a work week, suggesting that a dramatic reduction in office presence would likely occur if post-pandemic WFH policies were set fully in accordance with worker preferences. Chart II-1Employee Preferences Imply A Dramatic Reduction In Post-COVID Office Presence
July 2021
July 2021
However, Table II-1 highlights that employer plans for work from home policies are meaningfully different than those of employees. The table highlights that employers plan for employees to work from home for roughly 22% of paid days post-pandemic, which essentially translates to one day per week on average.2 BBD noted that CEOs and managers have cited the need to support innovation, employee motivation, and company culture as reasons for employees’ physical presence. Managers believe physical interactions are important for these reasons, but employees need only be on premises for about three to four days a week to achieve this. Table II-1 also shows that employers plan to allow higher-income employees more flexibility in terms of working from home, and less flexibility to employees whose earnings are between $20-50k per year. Table II-1Employer Plans, However, Imply Less Working From Home Than Employees Prefer
July 2021
July 2021
Based on the survey results, BBD forecast that expenditure in major cities such as Manhattan and San Francisco will fall on the order of 5 to 10%. In order to understand the national labor market impact of work from home policies and what implications this may have on monetary policy, we scale up BBD’s calculations using a Monte Carlo approach that incorporates estimate ranges for several factors: The percent of paid days now working from home for office workers The amount of money spent per week by office workers in central business districts (“CBDs”) The number of total jobs in CBDs The percent of CBD jobs in industries likely to be negatively impacted by reduced office worker expenditure The average weekly earnings of affected CBD workers The average share of business revenue not attributable to strictly variable expenses The percent of affected jobs likely to be recovered outside of CBDs Our approach is as follows. First, we calculate the likely reduction in nationwide CBD spending from reduced office worker presence by multiplying the likely percent of paid days now permanently working from home by the number of total jobs in CBDs and the average weekly spending of office workers. This figure is then increased due to the estimated acceleration in net move outs from principal urban centers in 2020 (Chart II-2); we assume a 5% savings rate and an average annual salary of $50k for these resident workers, and assume that all of their spending occurred within CBDs. We also assume that roughly 50% of jobs connected to this spending are recovered. Chart II-2Fewer Residents Will Also Lower Spending In Central Business Districts
July 2021
July 2021
Then, we calculate the gross number of jobs lost in leisure & hospitality, retail trade, and other services by multiplying this estimate of lost spending by an estimate of non-variable costs as a share of revenue for affected industries, and dividing the result by average weekly earnings of affected employees. For affected CBD employees in the administrative and waste services industry, we simply assume that the share of jobs lost matches the percent of paid days now permanently working from home. Finally, we adjust the number of jobs lost by multiplying by 1 minus an assumed “recovery” rate, given that some of the reduction in spending in CBDs will simply be shifted to areas near remote workers’ residences. We assume a slightly lower recovery rate for lost jobs in the administrative and waste services industry. Table II-2 highlights the range of outcomes for each variable used in our simulation, and Charts II-3 and II-4 present the results. The charts highlight that the distribution of outcomes based on employer WFH intensions suggest high odds that nationwide job losses in CBDs due to reduced office worker presence will not exceed 400k. Based on average employee preferences, that number rises to roughly 800-900k. Table II-2The Factors Affecting Permanent Central Business District Job Losses
July 2021
July 2021
Chart II-3The Probability Distribution Of CBD Jobs Lost…
July 2021
July 2021
Chart II-4…Based On Our Monte Carlo Approach
July 2021
July 2021
This raises the question of whether employer plans or employee preferences for WFH arrangements will prevail. Our sense is that it will be closer to the former, given that we noted above that employer WFH plans are the least flexible for employees whose earnings are between $20-50k per year (who are presumably employees who have less ability to influence the policy of firms). Chart II-5 re-presents the projected job losses shown in Chart II-4 as a share of the February 2020 labor force, along with a probability-weighted path that assumes a 75% chance that employer WFH plans will prevail. The chart highlights that WFH arrangements would have the effect of raising the unemployment rate by approximately 0.35%. However, relative to a pre-pandemic starting point of 3.5%, this would raise the unemployment rate to a level that would still be within the Fed’s NAIRU estimates (Chart II-6). Therefore, the “stickiness” of WFH arrangements alone do not seem to be a barrier to the labor market returning to the Fed’s assessment of “maximum employment,” suggesting that the conditions for liftoff may be met earlier than currently anticipated by investors. Chart II-5CBD Job Losses Will Not Be Trivial, But They Will Not Be Enormous
July 2021
July 2021
Chart II-6Sticky WFH Policies Will Not Prevent A Return To Maximum Employment
Sticky WFH Policies Will Not Prevent A Return To Maximum Employment
Sticky WFH Policies Will Not Prevent A Return To Maximum Employment
The Impact Of Lower Office Building Construction A permanently reduced office footprint could also conceivably impact the US economy through reduced nonresidential structures investment, as builders of commercial real estate cease to construct new office towers in response to expectations of a long-lasting glut. However, several points highlight that the negative impact on growth from US office tower construction will be even smaller than the CBD employment impact of reduced office worker presence that we noted above. First, Chart II-7 highlights the overall muted impact that nonresidential building investment has had on real GDP growth by removing the contribution to growth from nonresidential structures and for overall nonresidential investment. The chart clearly highlights that the historically positive contribution to real US output from capital expenditures over the past four decades has come from investment in equipment and intellectual property products, not from structures. Chart II-8 echoes this point, by highlighting that US real investment in nonresidential structures has in fact been flat since the early-1980s, contributing positively and negatively to growth only on a cyclical basis (not on a structural basis). Chart II-7Structures Have Not Contributed Significantly To US Growth For Some Time
Structures Have Not Contributed Significantly To US Growth For Some Time
Structures Have Not Contributed Significantly To US Growth For Some Time
Chart II-8Nonresidential Structures Investment Has Been Flat For Four Decades
Nonresidential Structures Investment Has Been Flat For Four Decades
Nonresidential Structures Investment Has Been Flat For Four Decades
Second, Table II-3 highlights that office properties make up a small portion of investment in private nonresidential structures. In 2019, nominal investment in office structures amounted to $85 billion, compared with $630 billion in overall structures investment, meaning that office properties amounted to just 13% of structures investment. Table II-3Office Structures Investment Is A Small Share Of Total Structures Investment
July 2021
July 2021
Table II-4Conceivably, Vacant Office Properties Could Be Converted To Luxury Residential Units
July 2021
July 2021
Third, it is true that investment is a flow and not a stock variable, meaning that, if the net stock of office buildings were to fall as a result from WFH policies, then the US economy would see a potentially persistently negative rate of growth from nonresidential structures (which would constitute a drag on growth). But if the net stock were instead to remain flat, then gross office property investment should equal the depreciation of those structures. The second column of Table II-3 highlights that current-cost depreciation of office structures was $53 billion in 2019 (versus nominal gross investment of $85 billion). Had office property investment been ~$30 billion lower in 2019, it would have reduced nominal GDP by a mere 14 basis points (resulting in an annual growth rate of 3.84%, rather than 3.98%). Fourth, there is good reason to believe that the net stock of office properties will stay flat, as the economics of converting offices to luxury housing units (whose demand is not substantially affected by factors such as commuting) – either fully or partially into mixed-use buildings – appear to be plausible. Table II-4 highlights that the average annual asking rent for office space per square foot in Manhattan was $73.23 in Q1 2021, and that the recent median listing home price per square foot is roughly $1,400. In a frictionless world where office space could be instantly and effortlessly sold as residential property, existing prices would imply a healthy (gross) rental yield of 5.2%. Thoughts On The Future Of Office Properties Of course, reality is far from frictionless. There are several barriers that will slow office-to-residential conversion as well as construction costs, which will meaningfully lower the net value of existing office real estate in large central business districts such as Manhattan. In a recent article in the Washington Post, Roger K. Lewis, retired architect and Professor Emeritus of Architecture at the University of Maryland, College Park, detailed several of these technical barriers (which we summarize below).3 Office buildings are typically much wider than residential buildings, the latter usually being 60 to 65 feet in width in order to enable windows and natural light in living/dining rooms and bedrooms. This suggests that office-to-residential conversion might require modifying the basic structure of office buildings, including cutting open parts of roof and floor plates on upper building levels to bring natural light into habitable and interior rooms, and other costly structural modifications to address the additional plumbing and infrastructure that will be needed. Lewis noted that floor-to-floor dimensions are typically larger in office buildings, which is beneficial for office-to-residential conversion because increased room heights augments the sense of space and openness, while allowing natural light to penetrate farther into the apartment. It also allows for extra space to place needed additional building infrastructure, such as sprinkler pipes, electrical conduits, light fixtures, and air ducts. But unique apartment layouts are often needed to use available floor space effectively in an office-to-residential conversion, which will increase design costs and raise the risk that nonstandard layouts may result in unforeseen quality-of-living problems that will necessitate additional future construction to correct. Zoning regulations and building code constraints will likely add another layer of costs to office-to-housing conversions, as these rules are written for conventional buildings, meaning that special exceptions or even regulatory changes are likely to be required. So it is clear that the process of converting office space to residential property will be a costly endeavor for office tower owners, which will likely reduce the net present value of these properties relative to pre-pandemic levels. But; this process appears to be feasible and, when faced with the alternative of persistently high vacancy rates and lost revenue, our sense is that office tower owners will choose this route – thus significantly reducing the likelihood that the growth in national gross investment in office properties will fall below the rate of depreciation. In addition, the trend in suburban and CBD office property prices suggests that there are two other possible alternatives to widespread office-to-residential conversion that would also argue against a significant and long-lasting decline in office structures investment. Chart II-9 highlights that the average asking rent has already fallen significantly in most Manhattan submarkets, and Chart II-10 highlights that suburban office prices are accelerating and rising at the strongest pace relative to CBD office prices over the past two decades, possibly in response to increased demand for workspace that is closer to home for many workers who previously commuted to CBDs. Chart II-9Working From The Office Is Getting Cheaper
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July 2021
Chart II-10Suburban Offices Are Getting More Expensive
Suburban Offices Are Getting More Expensive
Suburban Offices Are Getting More Expensive
Thus, the first alternative outcome to CBD office-to-residential conversion is that an increase in suburban office construction offsets the negative impact of outright reductions in CBD office investment if residential conversions prove to be too costly or too technically challenging. The second alternative is that owners of CBD office properties “clear the market” by dramatically cutting rental rates even further, to alter the cost/benefit calculation for firms planning permissive WFH policies. We doubt that existing rents reflect the extent of vacancies in large cities such as Manhattan, so we would expect further CBD office price declines in this scenario. But if owners of centrally-located office properties face significant conversion costs and a decline in the net present value of these buildings is unavoidable and its magnitude uncertain, owners may choose to cut prices drastically as the simpler solution. Investment Conclusions Holding all else equal, the fact that owners of CBD office properties are likely to experience some permanent decline in the value of these real estate assets is not a positive development for economic activity. But these losses will be experienced by firms, investors, and ultra-high net worth individuals with strong marginal propensities to save, suggesting that the economic impact from this shock will be minimal. And as we highlighted above, a decline in the pace of gross office building investment to the depreciation rate will have a minimal impact on the overall economy. This leaves the likely impact on CBD employment as the main channel by which WFH policies are likely to affect monetary policy. As we noted above and as discussed in Section 1 of our report, the Fed is now focused entirely on the return of the labor market to maximum employment, which we interpret as an unemployment rate within the range of the Fed’s NAIRU estimates (3.5% - 4.5%) and a return to a pre-pandemic labor force participation rate. Chart II-11On A One-Year Time Horizon, Favor Value Over Growth
On A One-Year Time Horizon, Favor Value Over Growth
On A One-Year Time Horizon, Favor Value Over Growth
Our analysis indicates that WFH policies may structurally raise the unemployment rate by 0.3 to 0.4%. While non-trivial, when compared with a pre-pandemic unemployment rate of 3.5%, this suggests that WFH policies alone are not likely to cause a long-term deviation from the Fed’s maximum employment objective. The implication is that job growth over the coming year could be even stronger than the Fed and investors expect, which could mean that the Fed may begin lifting rates by the middle of next year barring a major disruption in the ongoing transition to a post-pandemic world. This is earlier than we currently expect, but the fact that it would also be earlier than what is currently priced into the OIS curve underscores that fixed-income investors should remain short duration on a 6-12 month time horizon. In addition, as noted in Section 1 of our report, while value stocks may underperform growth stocks over the coming 3-4 months,4 rising bond yields over the coming year will ultimately favor value stocks and will likely weigh on elevated tech sector valuations. Chart II-11 highlights that the relative valuation of growth stocks remains above its pre-pandemic starting point (Chart II-11), suggesting that investors should continue to favor MSCI-benchmarked value over growth positions over a 6-12 month time horizon. Finally, as also noted in Section 1 of our report, we do not expect rising bond yields to prevent stock prices from grinding higher over the coming year, unless investor expectations for the terminal fed funds rate move sharply higher – an event that seems unlikely, although not impossible, before monetary policy actually begins to tighten. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2021," dated May 27, 2021, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Readers should note that the desired share of paid work from home days post-COVID among employees is shown to be lower in Table II-1 than what is implied by Chart II-1 on a weighted-average basis. This is due to the fact that Table II-1 excludes responses from the May 2020 survey wave, because the authors did not ask about employer intensions during that wave. This underscores that the average desired number of paid days working from home declined somewhat over time, and thus argues for the value shown in Table II-1 as the best estimate for employee preferences. 3 Roger K. Lewis, “Following pandemic, converting office buildings into housing may become new ‘normal,’ Washington Post, April 3, 2021. 4 Please see US Equity Strategy "Rotate Into Growth Stocks, Be Granular In The Selection Of Cyclicals," dated June 14, 2021, available at uses.bcaresearch.com