Trade / BOP
Highlights The direct impact of recently proposed U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum is likely to be small, both for China and the world. In isolation, this development is not very relevant for investment strategy. However, the lessons learned from studying the game of Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that investors should be legitimately concerned about an iterative "tit-for-tat" exchange of retaliation between the U.S. and its major trade partners if the Trump administration continues to pursue aggressively protectionist trade policies. Recent data releases show that the ongoing economic slowdown continues. While the Caixin manufacturing PMI is a bright spot, it is not likely heralding a major turning point for the Chinese economy. Investors should closely watch three bellwethers to judge the likelihood of a full-blown global trade war. Barring a major deterioration on this front, or a sharp further slowdown in Chinese economic growth, investors should stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks vs global. Feature The looming threat of U.S. protectionism came into full force over the past week, as President Trump stated that sweeping tariffs on all U.S. imports of steel and aluminum would soon be formalized. The tariff situation continues to evolve as we go to press, but the facts as they currently stand are the following: The proposed tariffs would be 25% on steel, and 10% on aluminum imports No exceptions are planned for any country, although statements from U.S. leadership on Monday suggested that Canada and Mexico may be exempt if NAFTA is renegotiated in the U.S.' favor Key European Union leaders threatened to retaliate against the U.S.' proposed tariffs, and the U.S. threatened to counter-retaliate China has taken a more cautious stance on the issue of retaliation, and is strongly seeking to negotiate with the Trump administration Minimal Direct Impact The developments over the past week raise two questions about China's economy that matter for investment strategy: What is the direct impact of the tariffs on China's exports likely to be? What is the implication for global growth? On the first question, the answer is fairly clear that the direct impact is likely to be small. The proposed tariffs do not disproportionately target China, and Chinese exports of steel and aluminum to the U.S. account for less than 0.2% of total exports (Chart 1). Exports of these products to all countries as a share of total exports is still quite small (panel 2). The second question is much more difficult to answer, and it has wide implications for both the Chinese economy and for investment strategy. When approaching the question, it is first important to note that the threat to the global economy from the imposition of the proposed tariffs comes from the potential for a series of retaliations from major trading partners, not the tariffs themselves. U.S. imports of steel and aluminum make up less than 1% of global goods exports, and Chart 2 presents a long-term history of average U.S. tariff rates along with our estimate of the impact of the U.S.' proposal. While the imposition of the announced tariffs would certainly change the trend that has been in place for some time, the rise is not very significant. Critically, even after the tariffs are imposed, U.S. tariffs rates will still be fractional when compared with those that prevailed during the early-1930s, when the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act materially exacerbated the Great Depression. Chart 1Chinese Steel And Aluminum Exports##br## Are Not Significant Chart 2We're A Long, Long Way Away##br## From Smoot-Hawley China's cautious stance towards retaliation is, at first blush, an encouraging development, but it may not be as hopeful of a sign as it seems. First, despite a general feeling among investors that China was the intended target of the U.S.' proposed tariffs, a global tariff on steel and aluminum is likely to disproportionately affect developed countries rather than China. It is therefore not surprising that China has signaled a somewhat conciliatory stance. In our view, the likelihood of Chinese retaliation is considerably higher if further tariffs are announced on goods that make up a larger share of their exports. In addition, as we noted above, the European Union has already highlighted some U.S. goods that may be subject to higher retaliatory tariffs in response to the news (which already elicited a threat of counter-retaliation from the U.S.), and both Canada and Mexico have also threatened retaliation if they are not granted an exemption from the proposed tariffs. In our view, these threats should be treated seriously, especially after revisiting the lessons of one of the most famous experiments in game theory. Bottom Line: The direct impact of proposed U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum is likely to be small, both for China and the world. Retaliation Risk And The Prisoner's Dilemma The dynamics of trade renegotiations can be examined, at least conceptually, through the lens of game theory. It is difficult to model these dynamics precisely because of the complexity of the relationship between trade and potential growth, but it is worth revisiting the lessons learned by the repeated playing of Prisoner's Dilemma, one of the most well-known examples of the application of game theory. To summarize, the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario describes two criminals who have been arrested, and whose statement to the authorities affects the manner in which punishment (if any) is distributed between the two of them. The standard payoff structure of the game is set up such that one prisoner is able to largely avoid punishment if (s)he accuses the other of the crime and the other prisoner remains silent, but that both prisoners receive a punishment if they both accuse each other that is greater than the punishment received if they both remain silent (Table 1). Given that tariffs and other forms of trade protectionism can only durably succeed at improving net domestic economic outcomes if they do not result in retaliation, from the perspective of trade renegotiation, accusing the other player in the game of Prisoner's Dilemma is tantamount to restricting trade, and remaining silent is equivalent to allowing existing trade relationships to persist. Table1In The Prisoner's Dilemma, It's Better To Return Defection With Defection The success of strategies employed in repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma was studied most famously by Robert Axelrod in 1980.1 The winning strategy (in both of Axelrod's tournaments) was "Tit for Tat", which follows two very simple rules: cooperate initially, and thereafter copy the other player's decision in the previous round. This strategy has three attributes that Axelrod showed to be highly successful when playing repeated games of Prisoner's Dilemma: niceness (not being the first player to accuse/defect/renege), being provocable (responding to defections with in-kind retaliation), and forgiveness (not allowing one-time defections to impact future choices beyond a one-time retaliation). Chart 3 illustrates the performance of the "Tit for Tat" strategy in the first Axelrod tournament, along with the average scores of several other strategies. The most important lesson from both tournaments is summarized nicely in the chart: the average score of a series of "nice" strategies was considerably higher than those that were not nice. But Chart 4 also highlights that niceness is only a relatively successful strategy because of its ability to produce an optimal outcome with other nice strategies: all strategies, nice or not, tend to generate poor outcomes when played against strategies that are not nice. This is because the payoff structure of Prisoner's Dilemma is such that, compared with defection, co-operation makes a player worse off if their opponent defects. Chart 3In Repeated Games Of Prisoner's Dilemma,##br## "Nice" Strategies Pay Off... Chart 4...But Only Because They Do Well Against ##br##Other "Nice" Strategies In the context of global trade, this can be seen as the likelihood of outsized job losses (or the lack of job gains in a protected industry) from a failure to retaliate. The key point for investors is that the most basic lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma suggests that market participants should be legitimately concerned about retaliation from the U.S.' trade partners (and subsequent counter-retaliation) if it continues to pursue a protectionist agenda, because it can be a rational response for an individual country even if it leads to poor outcomes for everyone involved. In addition, three assumptions of the Prisoner's Dilemma game are not valid in the real world (or the current environment), which in two of these cases further increases the risk of an iterative exchange of retaliation: Chart 5The U.S. Has A Trade Deficit ##br##With Many Trading Partners In terms of the payoffs associated with the game, Prisoner's Dilemma assumes an equal starting position (of zero "points") on both sides, which is not the case in the current environment. The U.S. has a sizeable trade deficit with the world (Chart 5), and several important trading partners with the U.S. (especially China) maintain significant non-tariffs barriers to trade. Regardless of whether this inequity has been caused by an unfair trading relationship, in the parlance of Axelrod's tournaments, this implies that the U.S. strategy is likely to be not nice due to the perception on the part of the Trump administration of an unequal starting position. The implication is that the odds of an escalation of the imposition of relatively small tariffs into a full-blown trade war are higher than would normally be the case. Prisoner's Dilemma has clear and symmetric payoffs, which is also not the case in the current environment. The Trump administration apparently feels that the payoff to the U.S. of certain trade restrictions is a net positive even assuming retaliation, which raises the possibility of a negative outcome for the global economy. Worryingly, in our view the chances are high that calculations of the net benefit of any trade restriction are being done on a political basis, rather than an economic one. Prisoner's Dilemma assumes that the participants are unable to communicate, which is a limitation that does not exist in a real-world trade negotiation scenario. This lowers the probability that the U.S. and its major trading partners will engage in a spiraling tit-for-tat trade war relative to what the game of Prisoner's Dilemma would imply, even if the recently announced tariffs on steel and aluminum stand and major partners do retaliate. Bottom Line: The lessons learned from studying the game of Prisoner's Dilemma suggest that investors should be legitimately concerned about an iterative "tit-for-tat" exchange of retaliation between the U.S. and its major trade partners if the Trump administration continues to pursue aggressively protectionist trade policies. No Help From The Domestic Economy A protectionist agenda from the U.S. is also coming at an inconvenient time for Chinese policymakers, even if they were not blindsided by the move. Policymakers already have to contend with managing the impact of renewed reforms on economy's financial and industrial sectors, and the potential addition of the external sector to this list of problems needing attention is unwelcome. While a cooling of the economy was an inevitable result from the government's deleveraging campaign and shadow banking crackdown, Table 2 highlights how broadly leading economic indicators have decelerated. The table presents recent data points for several series that we identified in November Special Report as having leading properties for the Chinese business cycle,2 as well as the most recent month-over-month change, an indication of whether the series is currently above its 12-month moving average, how long this has been the case. Table 2No Convincing Signs Of An Impending Upturn In China's Economy Among the components of the BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator (an index designed to lead turning points in the Li Keqiang index), all six series are in a downtrend and 5 out of these 6 fell in January (the growth in M2 was the exception). A similar story is borne out in the housing price data, with a variety of diffusion indexes having also fallen in January.3 The Caixin Manufacturing PMI remains the one bright spot, having recently risen above its 12-month moving average and having risen in January, in stark contrast to the official PMI (which fell a full point). But as Chart 6 highlights, following the last four episodes when the Caixin PMI exceeded the official PMI by this magnitude, the subsequent trend in the average of the two was down in every case. The implication is that the outlier nature of the current Caixin PMI shown in Table 2 is just that, and not a heralding a major upturn in China's economy. Chart 6The Caixin PMI Is Probably The Noise, Not The Signal Bottom Line: Recent data releases show that the ongoing economic slowdown continues. While the Caixin manufacturing PMI is a bright spot, it is not likely heralding a major turning point for the Chinese economy. Conclusions For Investment Strategy Chart 7 illustrates the decision tree for Chinese stocks that we presented in our first report of the year. While there has been a modest further deterioration in the industrial sector, the pace of the decline is still consistent with the controlled slowdown scenario that we outlined in an October Weekly Report.4 As such, the recent softness in the data is not significant enough to cause us to change our recommended investment strategy. The key change over the past week has been the threat posed by U.S. protectionism to the global economy, which is the very first question to answer in our decision tree. The now high-beta nature of the Chinese stock market underscores that U.S. protectionism can significantly (negatively) impact the relative performance of Chinese equities if it destabilizes the global stock market, even if Chinese exports were to emerge from the exchange relatively unscathed. For now, we judge the likelihood of a full-blown tit-for-tat trade war to be a risk, and thus not a probable event. For now, market participants seem to agree: U.S. and global equities rebounded earlier this week in response to a feeling that the negative repercussions for global growth are likely to be minimal. Nonetheless, this is a risk that needs to be monitored closely, and to facilitate this our Geopolitical Strategy service has highlighted the following three bellwethers that they will be watching in order to judge the likelihood of a major escalation:5 Chart 7The Chinese Equity "Decision Tree" Tariff exceptions for allies: Given the national security basis for the steel and aluminum tariffs, it is likely that exceptions will be made for allies such as Canada and Europe. If yes, then the measure is unlikely to be part of a truly "America First" mercantilist strategy and is instead a veiled swipe at China to satisfy Trump's base ahead of the midterm elections NAFTA: Our geopolitical team has argued that the probability of NAFTA abrogation is around 50%.6 If the administration continues the negotiations in light of tariff announcements, however, it suggests that the revealed preference of the White House is less protectionist than it appears. Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft: The Trump administration is investigating Chinese technology transfer and IP theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. If China is found to have acted unfairly, penalties would likely include a combination of tariffs and restrictions on Chinese investment in the U.S. This might include an indemnity for cumulative losses from past violations, which would be rare, if not unprecedented, and which China would reject outright. This could produce across-the-board tariffs of a sort that the U.S. has not imposed since the Nixon shock. Chart 8China Is Outperforming Global In Ex-Tech Terms In the meantime, Chart 8 highlights that investable Chinese ex-technology stocks (proxied by the MSCI China Index ex-technology) remain in an uptrend versus their global peers, which underscores that investors should have a high threshold for reducing exposure to China. This underscores that investors should have a high threshold for reducing exposure to China. While the ongoing slowdown in China's economy is likely to cause earnings growth to decelerate over the coming year, the continued likelihood of decently positive earnings growth coupled with a sizeable valuation discount relative to global signals that Chinese ex-tech stocks are remain attractive on a risk/reward basis. Investors should stay overweight. Bottom Line: Investors should closely watch three bellwethers to judge the likelihood of a full-blown global trade war. Barring a major deterioration on this front, or a sharp further slowdown in Chinese economic growth, investors should stay overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks vs global. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma" and "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma" by Robert Axelrod, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24 Nos.1 and 3, March and September 1980. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of The Chinese Business Cycle", dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 However, as discussed in our February 8 Weekly Report, we are keeping an eye on residential floor space sold given its history of leading China's housing market cycles. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Tracking The End Of China's Mini-Cycle", dated October 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War", dated March 6, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto Populism", dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights We re-examine our Yield and Protector portfolios to find out which assets will hold up best if there is a material correction. Our tactical view on gold is neutral, but the risk in gold prices will remain skewed to the upside this year. Are tariffs on aluminum and steel the start of a trade spat or a trade war? Feature Fears of a trade war and a hawkish tone from Fed Chair Jay Powell at his first Humphrey Hawkins testimony to Congress pushed the U.S. equity market lower last week. The ten-year Treasury yield barely budged however, buffeted by a more hawkish Fed on one side and a trade-induced slowdown in global growth on the other. The dollar was modestly higher last week, but oil and gold prices moved lower. The S&P 500's 4% loss in February was the worst single month since October 2016 and worst February since 2009. Both investment-grade and high-yield credit spreads widened last week, and have yet to return to their late January lows. Moreover, at 22, the VIX remained elevated relative to start of the year, consistent with our view that markets have entered a more volatile, late-cycle phase. With the 2.8% run-up in the S&P 500 since the February 8 low, investors are less concerned that the early February pullback in risk assets was a signal that the equity bull market is over and a recession is right around the corner. Nonetheless, some clients with a more strategic outlook are considering paring back risk now. Others want to know how to protect gains while still participating in the bullish tone for the market BCA expects in the next 12 months. Our Yield and Protector portfolios might provide a way for investors to protect against the downside while still participating in the S&P 500. Preparing For A Pullback BCA recommends investors stay overweight on equities and U.S. spread product, but expects that positions should be moved to neutral later this year and then to underweight sometime in 2019.1 Long-term investors should already consider paring back their exposures to both asset classes given that valuations are stretched. We have periodically recommended that a variety of investments be added as portfolio "insurance" to help guard against a material correction in equities. We recently highlighted two forms of insurance: our Yield and Protector Portfolios. We introduced the Yield Portfolio in October 20142 and first discussed the Protector Portfolio in October 2015.3 This week, we revisit the issue by comparing both portfolios with a more common form of insurance: shifting from cyclical to defensive stocks within an equity allocation. The Yield Portfolio (YP) emphasizes "high quality carry", along with some protection via TIPS (25% of the Portfolio), if inflation begins to surprise on the upside after investors are conditioned to expect only deflation shocks. The YP performs well in an environment of slow nominal growth, no recession and gradual interest-rate hikes. On the other hand, the Protector Portfolio (PP) is designed to provide insulation against both deflationary (gold and trade-weighted dollar) and inflationary (TIPS) tail risks. Therefore, the PP may underperform risk assets for a time if tail risks keep receding. Still, it has done well during the equity rally and conservative investors should consider adopting it. As discussed in the section below, our tactical view on gold is neutral, but the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy notes that the risk in gold prices will remain skewed to the upside this year. Charts 1, 2, and 3 show a breakdown of the relative performance of S&P 500 defensives along with our Yield and Protector Portfolios. Panels 2 and 3 of Charts 1, 2 and 3 present the rolling one-year beta and alpha of each strategy versus the S&P 500. Alpha is presented as the difference between the actual year-over-year excess return of the portfolio (versus short-term Treasury bills) and what would have been expected given the portfolio's beta. This measure is also referred to as "Jensen's alpha." Chart 1S&P 500 Defensives##BR##A Modestly Low Beta Option Chart 2A Lower Beta##BR##Than Defensives Chart 3A Beta Near Zero,##BR##And Positive Alpha Based on the historical beta of the three portfolios versus the S&P 500, defensive stocks are the most correlated with the overall equity market. Our PP had a negative correlation to the broad market until earlier this year, when it turned slightly positive. BCA's YP is somewhere in between, with a positive but relatively low beta. This is consistent with the equity composition of the three portfolios (shown in Table 1). Note that our protector portfolio is composed entirely of non-equity assets. Table 1A Breakdown Of Three##BR##Portfolio Insurance Options After accounting for their lower betas, all three portfolios have outperformed the S&P in risk-adjusted terms since the onset of the global economic recovery. However, the three portfolios have experienced a relative decline versus the S&P 500 since Trump's election. This has occurred due to passive rather than active underperformance. In other words, they have underperformed because they failed to keep up with the S&P 500 rather than because of losses in absolute terms. We draw two important conclusions from Charts 1, 2 and 3 for U.S. multi-asset investors. First, the lower beta of our YP and PP compared with S&P defensives means that the former represent a better insurance against a sell-off in the equity market rather than the latter. Secondly, the persistently positive volatility-adjusted returns for our insurance portfolios highlights an investor preference for these assets in the past few years. However, since late 2017 when investors began to significantly upgrade the prospects for global growth and U.S. corporate profits, all three portfolios struggled to outperform the S&P 500 on a risk-adjusted basis. BCA's forecast implies that these portfolios may continue to struggle in the next year or so. For now, our investment bias towards equities over government bonds makes us less inclined to favor a low beta position within a balanced portfolio. Our analysis suggests that clients who anticipate the need for portfolio insurance in the coming year should back our YP and PP over a defensive-sector allocation. We would likely extend this recommendation to all clients if there is any material progression towards the sell-off triggers identified in the Bank Credit Analyst's February 2018 publication.4 Bottom Line: Investors seeking protection against a potential equity market sell-off should look to our Yield and Protector Portfolios over defensive-sector positioning. We do not currently recommend these portfolios for all clients, but we may do so if our key sell-off triggers are breached. Gold Bugged Our tactical view on gold is neutral, but the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy notes that the risk in gold prices will remain skewed to the upside this year. The yellow metal is supported by increasing inflation and inflation expectations, heightened geopolitical risks and greater volatility in equity markets.5 However, the higher inflation and inflation expectations will be countered by Fed rate hikes, which will boost the U.S. dollar and lift real rates in our base case. Strategically, we expect that gold will provide a good hedge against any downturn in equities when the bull market turns bear in 2H19. Chart 4 shows that the price of gold in real terms is still very expensive. On a nominal basis, gold is at the top end of a trading channel initiated in early 2012 (Chart 5). There has been a significant gap between the model value and the actual price of gold for the past four years. The real price of gold remains elevated, although inflation has been well contained. Chart 4Model Suggests Gold Is Overvalued Chart 5Testing Top End Of A Downward Channel However, the macro environment BCA envisions for 2018 is also supportive for gold (Table 2). Gold tends to perform well when oil prices rise and as the 2/10 Treasury curve steepens. Moreover, gold prices tend to go up when the U.S. economy benefits from fiscal thrust and tax cuts. Furthermore, the soundings on the February ISM manufacturing index support higher gold prices. When the headline index is above 60 as it was in February (60.8), gold climbs by an average of 31%. Even 12 months after ISM is above 60, gold returns are over 20%. The elevated level of ISM new orders (64.2) and price (74.2) indices in February also suggest solid increases for gold. Finally, gold prices climb in the late stages of an economic expansion, such as the current one that began in 2009.6 Even so, our 6 to 12-month view on gold is that it will take its cues from Fed policy and policy expectations. The Fed is not behind the curve on inflation, and inflation expectations and measured inflation remain low. Our CPI and PCE models (Chart 6) show only a modest acceleration in inflation by year-end, which will be sufficient to keep the Fed on track this year as it continues to shrink its balance sheet and boost rates four times. Thus, there is no pressing need to hold gold as a hedge against inflation in the next year. Nonetheless, for those investors too concerned about a pullback that turns into a correction or a bear market, we note that gold has a 33% weight in our Protector Portfolio. Table 2Favorable Macro Backdrop For Gold Chart 6BCA's Inflation Models Show Only##BR##Modest Acceleration Through Year-End Bottom Line: Gold is expensive in real terms relative to a set of fundamentals that have explained its real price since 1970. However, it may have a better value on a strategic basis or as part of a portfolio designed to protect against falling equity prices. Moreover, our macro backdrop forecast for the next 12 months supports higher gold prices. Keep gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. Trade Off BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team has long argued that two sources of geopolitical risk this year are China's trade surplus and Trump's position on trade relations with China, Canada and Mexico. Specifically, the view is that weak poll numbers may lead Trump to trigger trade disputes with important trading partners such as China, Mexico and Canada. However, our geopolitical analysts also point out that investors should not confuse a trade spat with a trade war. There are very few legal or constitutional constraints on Trump over trade issues (Table 3). It will be his decision whether to adopt sweeping tariffs (trade war) as opposed to a more targeted approach (trade spat). Clearly, the former is more disruptive and raises more uncertainty, so this is the key distinction to keep in mind. Presidents Nixon, Reagan, Bush (II) and Obama all imposed temporary tariffs on items (including steel and aluminum, and including by citing national security concerns) without triggering a trade war. Late last week, Trump indicated that he would announce tariffs on steel and aluminum this week. He implied that he would go for a broad-based approach of penalizing all steel and aluminum imports, which points toward the more aggressive approach. But the details (whether he exempts U.S. allies and partners or narrows the scope of goods) will not be certain until he issues his official proclamation. Table 3Trump Faces Few Constraints On Trade Steel and aluminum get the headlines, but account for only a small share of U.S. trade and GDP7 (Chart 7). BCA is more concerned about the Administration's stance on more deeper issues, like the WTO, NAFTA, or (in China's case) intellectual property and state-owned enterprises.8 The issues here are harder to quantify, have few precedents, and have more structural and ideological issues which are at stake. The U.S. has a massive trade surplus in services and in intellectual property,9 so a prolonged disruption would pose a serious threat to the U.S. economy, at least in the short term. Trump's decision on intellectual property trade with China is due on August 12, but could occur earlier. BCA's stance on U.S.-China relations is bearish in the long run.10 We place high odds on an eventual trade war, but the timing is a tougher call. Investors should not view China's proportional retaliation on an item-by-item basis as the start of a trade war. BCA's view is that China's leadership will try to offer reforms and investment opportunities to pacify Trump. However, there is a risk either that China offers no reforms (in which case Xi Jinping's rampant Communism exacerbates trade conflicts) or that Trump may introduce broad sweeping measures that give China no choice but to respond in kind, leading to a trade war. Our Geopolitical Strategy service notes that the probability of Trump abrogating NAFTA is as high as 50%. The seventh round of NAFTA talks concludes this week; an eighth round is scheduled for late March. Negotiations could drag on right to the Mexican election on July 1, but if they are not looking more optimistic by this spring then the risk of the U.S. (or Mexico) walking away will rise. The U.S. economy has been largely unaffected by NAFTA and would likely experience no disruption if Trump abrogated the deal and began negotiations on bilateral trade agreements with Canada and Mexico (Chart 8). Chart 7Steel And Aluminum In Perspective Chart 8U.S. Economy: Largely Unaffected By NAFTA Bottom Line: Elevated trade tensions with China,11 Canada and Mexico are near-term risks to global growth. From now through April could be a decisive time for the Trump Administration with China and NAFTA. We are bearish on U.S.-China relations in the long term. If Trump abandons NAFTA, the implications for the U.S. economy would be muted, although U.S. inflation may push higher. Such a decision would also send a clear signal to other key U.S. allies. However, if Trump stands by NAFTA, then it signals that he has sided with the establishment on trade. This would be bullish for risk assets and would lower geopolitical risk premia. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Next Recession: Later But Deeper," published February 23, 2018. Available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Ice Storm", published October 20, 2014. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Tenuous Relief Rally", published on October 12, 2015. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research's Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, February 2018. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Gold Still Shines Despite Threat Of Higher Inflation", published February 1, 2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Late Cycle View", published October 16, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Aluminum Deficit Set To Ease", published March 1, 2018. Available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "America Is Roaring Back", published January 31, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Can The Service Sector Save The Day?", published June 5, 2017. Available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin", published January 18, 2017. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China", published February 28, 2018. Available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights We are shifting our U.S. recession call from late-2019 to 2020. A cheap dollar and fiscal support will give the Fed more scope to raise rates before monetary policy moves into restrictive territory. The fiscal impulse will fall sharply in 2020. By then, financial conditions will be tighter and economic imbalances will be more pronounced. As is usually the case, a downturn in the U.S. will infect the rest of the world. Emerging markets with large current account deficits and high debt levels are most vulnerable. A cyclical overweight to global equities is still appropriate, but long-term investors should begin to scale back risk exposure. Feature Records Are Meant To Be Broken The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, which contrary to popular belief does not serve as a matchmaking service for lonely-heart economists, estimates that the current economic expansion is going on nine years. If it makes it to July 2019, it will be the longest in history (Chart 1). Considering that records begin in 1854 - encompassing 33 business cycles - that will be an impressive achievement. Chart 1Nine Years And Still Going Strong There is an old adage that says "Expansions do not die of old age. They are murdered by the Fed." A year or so ago, it looked like the Fed would pull the trigger sometime in 2019. Now, however, it looks more likely that the deed will be committed in 2020. Two things have changed since the start of last year. First, the real trade-weighted dollar has fallen by 8%. According to the Fed's SIGMA macroeconomic model, this should boost growth by about 0.3% over the next two years. Chart 2U.S. Fiscal Policy Has Become##BR##Much More Stimulative Second, U.S. fiscal policy has become much more stimulative, a point very much in keeping with our Geopolitical Strategy team's long-standing view that age of austerity is giving way to a new age of populism.1 My colleague Mark McClellan estimates that the U.S. fiscal impulse will reach 0.8% of GDP in 2018 and 1.3% of GDP in 2019, up from -0.4% and 0.3%, respectively, in the IMF's October 2017 projections (Chart 2). Mark's calculations incorporate the CBO's assessment of the tax cuts, the recent Senate deal to raise the caps on defense and nondefense expenditures, and $45 billion in hurricane relief. He assumes some delay between when the bill is passed and when the spending takes place. According to the Congressional Budget Office, a little more than half of the expenditures in the 2013 and 2015 spending bills occurred in the same year the funding was authorized. These fiscal measures will cause the federal budget deficit to swell by about 2.3 percentage points to 5.6% of GDP in FY2019. Even that may be an understatement, as this does not include any additional infrastructure spending nor the possible restoration of "earmarks"- the widely criticized practice that allows members of Congress to add appropriations to unrelated bills to fund what often turn out to be politically motivated projects in their districts - which could add a further $25 billion in annual spending. Meanwhile, federal government revenue is coming in below target, which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has attributed to lower-than-expected taxable income from pass-through businesses and capital gains realizations. This problem could worsen over the next few years as creative accountants find new loopholes to exploit in the recently passed tax bill. Too Much, Too Late All this stimulus is arriving when the economy least needs it. The unemployment rate currently stands at 4.1%, 0.5 points below the level the Fed regards as consistent with full employment. It has been stuck at that number for four straight months, largely because job growth in the Household survey (which the unemployment rate is based on) has lagged the Establishment survey by a considerable margin. Given the underlying strength in GDP growth, it is likely the job gains in the Household survey will rebound strongly over the course of 2018, taking the unemployment rate down to 3.5% by year-end, well below the Fed's end-2018 projection of 3.9%. A lower-than-projected unemployment rate will permit the Fed to raise rates four times this year, one more hike than currently implied by the dots. The Fed will probably also hike rates three or four times next year. Yet, even those additional rate hikes will not come close to offsetting all the fiscal stimulus coming down the pike. In the absence of a sustained increase in productivity or labor force growth - neither of which appear forthcoming - the economy will continue to overheat. Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. It typically does not peak until well after a recession has begun and does not bottom until well after it has ended (Chart 3). The Fed knows this perfectly well, but has chosen to let the economy run hot for fear that a premature tightening will sow the seeds for a deflationary spiral. Chart 3Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator By the time the next recession rolls around, inflation will be higher and financial and economic imbalances will be greater. The fiscal impulse will also fall back towards zero in 2020 as the budget deficit stabilizes at an elevated level. It is the change in the budget balance that is correlated with GDP growth. If output is already being constrained by a lack of spare capacity going into late-2019, the subsequent decline in the fiscal impulse in 2020 could push growth below trend, leading to rising unemployment. And, as we have often noted, once unemployment starts rising, it keeps rising. There has never been a case in the post-war era where the unemployment rate has risen by more than one-third of a percentage point that was not associated with a recession (Chart 4). Chart 4Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle A recent IMF report highlighted that changes in U.S. financial conditions strongly influence growth abroad.2 As the U.S. falls into a recession, equity prices will tumble and credit spreads will widen. Financial conditions will tighten, transmitting the downturn to the rest of the world. Emerging markets with large current account deficits and high debt levels will be the most vulnerable. The only saving grace is that interest rates will be higher in 2020 than they would have been if the recession had begun in 2019. This will give the Fed a bit more scope to ease monetary policy again. As discussed last week, this will likely set the stage for a stagflationary episode following the recession.3 For Now, Leading Indicators Look A-Okay While our baseline view is that the next recession will occur in 2020, this is more of an educated guess than a firm prediction. Many things, including an overly aggressive Fed, a sharp appreciation in the dollar, and a variety of political shocks, could cause the recession to occur sooner than anticipated. As such, we continue to watch a wide swathe of data to help guide our investment recommendations. The good news is that right now, none of our favorite leading economic indicators such as the level of ISM manufacturing new orders minus inventories, capital goods orders, initial unemployment claims, and building permits are flashing red (Chart 5). Many of these indicators appear in The Conference Board's LEI, which is still rising at a healthy 5.5% y/y pace. Historically, a decisive break below zero in the year-over-year change in the LEI has been a reliable recession indicator (Chart 6). We are still far from that point. Chart 5U.S. Leading Indicators Looking A-OKAY Chart 6U.S. LEI Is Not Flashing Red The same goes for leading financial variables such as credit spreads and the yield curve. The yield curve has inverted in the lead-up to every recession over the past 50 years (Chart 7). The fact that the 10-year/3-month slope has steepened by 30 basis points since the start of the year gives us some comfort that the next recession is still some time away. Chart 7An Inverted Yield Curve Has Often Been A Harbinger Of A Recession Keep An Eye On Credit Credit spreads remained well contained during the recent bout of market turbulence but we continue to watch them closely. Credit typically starts to underperform before equities do, which makes it a good leading indicator for the stock market. This is likely to be especially the case over the next two years. If there is one area where financial imbalances have accumulated to worrying levels, it is in the corporate debt arena. This month's issue of the Bank Credit Analyst estimates that the interest coverage ratio for U.S. companies would drop from 4 to 2½ if interest rates were to increase by 100 basis points across the corporate curve.4 This would take the coverage ratio to the lowest level in the 30-year history of our sample (Chart 8). Consumer staples, tech, and health care would be the most affected. Chart 8U.S. Interest Coverage Ratio##BR##Breakdown By Sector (I) Chart 8U.S. Interest Coverage Ratio##BR##Breakdown By Sector (II) We currently maintain an overweight to equities and spread product but expect to move to neutral later this year and to underweight sometime in 2019. Long-term investors should consider paring back exposure to both asset classes already, given that valuations have become stretched. The Dollar And The Return Of "Twin Deficits" Bigger budget deficits will drain national savings. Since the current account balance is simply the difference between what a country saves and what it invests, the U.S. current account deficit is likely to increase. How the emergence of these twin deficits will affect the dollar is a tough call. Historically, there is no clear relationship between the sum of the fiscal and current account balance and the value of the trade-weighted dollar (Chart 9). In the early 1980s, the twin deficits exploded on the back of the Reagan tax cuts and the military buildup, but the dollar strengthened. In contrast, the dollar weakened in the early 2000s, a period when the twin deficits rose in response to the Bush tax cuts, the Iraq War, and a decline in the household saving rate from the booming housing market. Much depends on what happens to real interest rates. If investors come to believe that persistently large budget deficits will lead to higher inflation, long-term real yields could decline, pushing the dollar lower. In contrast, if investors conclude that the Fed will raise rates by enough to keep inflation from spiraling upwards, real yields could rise. U.S. real yields have gone up across all maturities since the start of the year. As a result, real rate differentials have widened between the U.S. and its developed market peers (Chart 10). However, some of the increase in U.S. real rates has been due to a rising term premium, with the rest reflecting an upward revision to the expected path of policy rates. The latter is good for the dollar. The former is not, because it means that investors are starting to worry about the ability of the market to absorb the increasing supply of Treasurys. Meanwhile, rising interest rates threaten to put further pressure on the U.S. current account deficit. The U.S. net international investment position has deteriorated from -10% of GDP to -40% of GDP since 2007 (Chart 11). The U.S. owes the rest of the world about 68% of GDP in debt - almost all of which is denominated in dollars - but holds only 23% of GDP in foreign debt. Thus, a synchronized increase in global bond yields would cause U.S. net interest payments to rise. If yields in the U.S. increase more than elsewhere, net payments would rise even more. Chart 9Twin Deficits And The Dollar:##BR##No Clear-Cut Relationship Chart 10Real Rate Differentials Have##BR##Widened Between The U.S. And Its DM Peers Chart 11Deterioration In U.S. Net##BR##International Investment Position America's status as a major net external debtor could also constrain the extent to which the dollar appreciates. If the greenback were to strengthen, the dollar value of U.S. external assets would decline, as would the dollar value of interest or dividend payments that the U.S. receives from abroad. This would result in a deterioration in the current account balance and in a worsening in the U.S. net international investment position. Some Positives For The Greenback While the discussion above is bearish for the dollar, it needs to be put into some context. The U.S. current account deficit stands at 2.3% of GDP, down from almost 6% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 12). Much of the improvement in the U.S. balance of payments can be traced back to the plunge of almost 70% in net oil imports, a development that is likely to be permanent given the shale boom. Furthermore, the U.S. trade balance should benefit over the coming quarters from the lagged effects of a weaker dollar. And while we estimate that the primary income balance will deteriorate by about 0.6% of GDP over the next two years, it should still remain in positive territory and above the levels from a decade ago (Chart 13). Chart 12U.S. Balance Of Payments:##BR##Improvement Due To Sinking Oil Imports Chart 13Primary Income Balance Will Decline,##BR##But Will Remain In Positive Territory On the fiscal side, the projected rise in U.S. government debt levels at a time when the economy is booming is concerning. Nevertheless, the U.S. debt profile still compares favorably to countries such as Japan and Italy, two economies with worse growth prospects than the U.S. Italian 30-year bond yields are actually lower than in the United States. If one of the two countries is going to have a debt crisis over the next decade, our guess is that it will be Italy and not the U.S. A Cresting In Global Growth Could Help The Dollar Our preferred explanation for why the dollar began to weaken in 2017 focuses on the role of global growth as well as on technical factors. Chart 14USD Is A Momentum Winner Strong global growth - especially when concentrated outside the U.S., as was the case last year - tends to hurt the dollar. There are a number of reasons for this. First, a robust global economy pushes up natural resource prices, which boosts the terms of trade for commodity-exporting economies. Second, manufacturing represents a smaller share of the U.S. economy than it does in most other countries. Since manufacturing activity is quite cyclically-sensitive, faster global growth benefits economies such as Germany, Sweden, Japan, China, and Korea more than the U.S. Third, stronger global growth tends to boost risk appetites. This has translated into large inflows into EM funds and peripheral European debt markets. The latter have also seen an ebbing of political risk, which has translated into sharply lower sovereign spreads. The acceleration in global growth came at a time when long dollar positions had reached elevated levels. As those positions were unwound, the dollar began to tumble. At that point, the strong upward momentum that fueled the dollar rally following the U.S. presidential election was replaced by downward momentum. The U.S. dollar is one of the most momentum-driven currencies out there (Chart 14). Weakness led to even more weakness. It is impossible to know when the dollar's downward momentum will exhaust itself. What can be said is that speculative positioning has become increasingly dollar bearish. This raises the odds of a short-covering dollar rally (Chart 15). Chart 15Speculative Positioning Has Gotten Increasingly Dollar Bearish Perhaps more importantly, global growth may be peaking. China's economy has slowed, as gauged by the Li Keqiang index, which combines electricity production, freight traffic, and bank lending (Chart 16). Growth in Europe and Japan has also likely reached top velocity. U.S. financial conditions have eased sharply relative to the rest of the world (Chart 17). This, in conjunction with an easier U.S. fiscal policy, suggests that the composition of global growth will shift back towards the U.S. over the coming months. If this were to happen, the dollar could recoup some its losses. Chart 16Chinese Economy##BR##Has Slowed Chart 17U.S. Financial Conditions Have##BR##Eased Sharply Relative To ROW Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016. 2 Please see "Getting The Policy Mix Right," IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2017. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Structural Bear Market In Bonds," dated February 16, 2018. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Leverage And Sensitivity To Rising Rates: The U.S. Corporate Sector," dated February 22, 2018. Available at bca.bcaresearch.com. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights The combined U.S. current account and fiscal deficits are set to rise as Trump's profligacy and higher interest rates kick in. In and of itself, this does not spell doom for the dollar. The Fed's response to the twin deficit is what will ultimately set the path for the greenback. Stimulus hitting an economy at full employment raises the likelihood that the Fed will not stand idly by. The dollar's momentum is not deteriorating anymore, global growth could hit a soft patch, and U.S. hedged yields might regain some composure versus European hedged yields. These factors are likely to precipitate a dollar rebound. The durability of this rebound remains an unknown. An opportunity to go short EUR/SEK has emerged. Feature When it comes to the U.S. dollar, the story of the day has become the twin deficits. It is now presented as the key factor that will drag the dollar lower over the course of the cycle. We do agree there are plenty of reasons to be concerned with the long-term outlook for the dollar. However, we remain unconvinced whether the twin deficits really are the much-vaunted "boogey man" that will haunt the greenback. In fact, we would argue that while they are a handicap for the dollar, the role of the Federal Reserve, global growth and hedging costs take precedence over the evil twins. The Twin Deficit Will Widen We take no offence with the assertion that the twin deficits are set to increase. According to the work of Mark McClellan, who writes The Bank Credit Analyst, the U.S. fiscal deficit is set to increase to 5.5% of GDP over the course of the next two years. U.S. President Donald Trump's tax cuts and the recent spending agreement will undeniably contribute to this.1 The current account deficit is also set to widen. Chart I-1 shows our estimate for the path of the current account. We anticipate it to move to -3.4% of GDP by late 2018 or early 2019. This is a noteworthy deterioration, but one that only brings the U.S. current account to a level last experienced in 2009. One contributor is obviously the trade balance. The Bank Credit Analyst estimates that the impact of the combined fiscal measures announced will reach 0.3% of GDP in 2018. The biggest source of deterioration will not come from trade: it will come from a fall in the net primary income balance of the U.S., which currently stands at 1.1% of GDP. Essentially, higher interest rates in the U.S. means that foreigners will receive greater income from the U.S. Based on the current level of the median long-term interest rate forecasts by the FOMC's participants, my colleague Ryan Swift estimates that a move in 10-year Treasury yields to 3.5% is likely by year end.2 Based on our estimate, this will push down the primary income balance to 0.4% of GDP. It is important to acknowledge that this forecast for the current account is likely to prove to be a worst-case scenario. To begin with, the trade balance could continue to be buffeted by the fact that U.S. energy production keeps expanding, which is slowly but surely moving the U.S. toward a positive energy trade balance (Chart I-2). Moreover, periods of weakness in the USD have been followed by improvements in the U.S. primary income balance. This is because while payments made by the U.S. to foreigners are mostly in the form of interest, 55% of U.S. income receipts are earnings on FDIs. If we add dividends received on foreign equity holdings, this share rises to 80% of U.S. gross primary income. Thus, if the dollar weakens, U.S. receipts benefit from a translation effect as corporations convert their foreign earnings back into U.S. dollars at more beneficial exchange rates. Chart I-1Higher U.S. Rates ##br##Will Hurt The Current Account Chart I-2U.S. Shale Oil Production Will Prevent Too Great A Deterioration In The Trade Balance But do twin deficits even matter? We would argue, it depends. Bottom Line: The U.S. twin deficits are set to increase. The U.S. fiscal deficit will move to 5.5% of GDP and the current account to -3.4% of GDP as interest owed to foreigners is set to increase. Twin Deficit, So What? It is one thing to anticipate a widening of the twin deficits, but does history suggest that twin deficits have an impact on the dollar? Here, the empirical evidence is rather mixed. As Chart I-3 illustrates, there has been no obvious link between twin deficits and the dollar. In fact, Arthur Budaghyan highlighted in BCA's Emerging Market Strategy service the following phases:3 1970s: no discernable relationship; First half of the 1980s: Substantial widening of twin deficits, but a massive dollar bull market materialized; 1985 to 1993: no reliable relationship between twin deficits and the dollar; 1994 to 2001: The dollar did rally as twin deficits narrowed on the back of the fiscal balance moving from roughly -4% of GDP to 2% of GDP; 2001 to 2011: dollar weakened as twin deficits grew deeper; 2011 to 2016: When twin deficits narrowed considerably, the dollar was stable, but when they stopped improving, the dollar rallied 25%. Chart I-3In My Time Of Dying? Let us focus on the growing twin deficits episodes. As it turns out, the missing link between twin deficits and the dollar is Fed policy. A widening in twin deficits is normally associated with a strong economy. Profligate government spending can boost domestic demand, and because imports have a high elasticity to domestic demand, a widening current account also tends to come alongside robust growth. The Volcker Fed played a high-wire act from 1979 to 1982, plunging the U.S. into a vicious double-dip recession in order to bring realized and expected inflation back to earth after the 1970s. Volcker was not about to let former President Ronald Reagan's stimulus boost growth to the point of lifting inflation expectations again, undoing all the Fed's previous good work. He elected to increase real rates sharply, which was the key factor behind the dollar's strength. The 2001 to 2011 experience needs to be broken down in parts. From 2001 to 2003, the twin deficits were expanding thanks to former President George Bush's wars and tax cuts. Yet the Fed did not play the same counterweight as it did in the mid-1980s. Instead, it kept cutting rates all the way until 2003 as then-Chairman Alan Greenspan was worried about deflation. U.S. real rates did not experience the necessary lift required to fight the negative impact of the twin deficits on the dollar. From 2003 to 2007, the twin deficits were in fact narrowing, real rates were trendless and the dollar was experiencing mild depreciation. During that time frame, global growth was extremely robust, China was growing at a double-digit pace and EM economies were booming. Money was flowing toward these destinations. From 2007 to mid-2008, while the twin deficits continued to narrow, the dollar plunged. The sharp fall in real rates as the Fed engaged in aggressive rate cutting explains this apparent inconsistency. From the second half of 2008 to 2009, the dollar surged, despite a further widening of the twin deficits. Real rates rebounded as inflation expectations melted, and risk aversion prompted investors to seek the safety of the global reserve asset and the global reserve currency - Treasurys and the greenback, respectively. From 2009 to the middle of 2011, the twin deficits stabilized, real rates stabilized, and the dollar stabilized as well, but nonetheless experienced wild gyrations as the global economy kept experiencing aftershocks from the great financial crisis. Neither the twin deficits nor real rates were offering a clear path forward, thus the dollar was also mixed. Bottom Line: A close look at various episodes of twin deficits in the U.S. pushes us toward one conclusion: if twin deficits are expanding but the Fed is trying to tighten policy and real rates are rising, the dollar ignores the twin deficits and, in fact, manages to rise. If, however, the twin deficits expand, and real rates do not experience enough upside to counterbalance this development, the dollar weakens. This means one thing for the coming years: Forecasting twin deficits is not sufficient to predict a dollar bear market. Instead, we also need a view on the Fed and the outlook for real rates. So Where Will The Dollar Go In 2018? We expect there could be some upward pressure on the Fed's dots as the year progresses. The reason is rather straightforward. The U.S. economy will receive a very large shot in the arm this year and next. Mark's calculations show that the fiscal thrust in 2018 and 2019 will morph from -0.4% of GDP to 0.8% of GDP, and from 0.3% of GDP to 1.3% of GDP, respectively (Chart I-4). While currently the fiscal thrust is expected to become a large negative in 2020, that year is an election year. There is a non-trivial probability that the fiscal cliff anticipated that year may in fact be postponed: it is not in the interest of the Republicans or Democrats to be blamed for a slowing economy in a year where Americans are hitting the voting booths! This stimulus is not happening in a vacuum either: it is materializing in an environment where the labor market seems to be at full employment, where capacity utilization is tight, and where financial conditions remain easy (Chart I-5). Stimulating when the economy is at full capacity is likely to lift prices more than it will boost real economic activity. The Fed is fully aware of this risk. Chart I-4Much Stimulus ##br##In The Pipeline Chart I-5Could Fiscal Stimulus Be Inflationary With This Backdrop?##br## We Think So However, it remains possible that the Fed will err on the side of caution and wait until the impact of the stimulus measures on the economy become more evident before sending a more hawkish message to the markets. Chart I-6Twin Deficits Narratives ##br##Look Like Ex-Post Explanations If the Fed elects to be proactive and adjusts its message regarding the future path of policy before the impact of the stimulus becomes evident, the dollar could rise as it would put upward pressure on U.S. real rates. If, however, the Fed elects to be reactive and wait until the economy responds to the stimulus package with higher wage growth and inflation, then the dollar could weaken as real rates experience little upside and the twin deficits exact their toll. BCA is currently conducting research to assess which path is more likely. In the meanwhile, there other factors to consider. First, as we highlighted three weeks ago, since 2011, spikes in the number of mentions of the twin deficits in media have historically been associated with temporary rebounds in the dollar following periods of USD weakness (Chart I-6).4 The twin deficits seem to come to the forefront of investors' minds as an ex-post explanation for previous weak-dollar periods. Second, our dollar capitulation index is not only at oversold levels, but the indicator has formed a positive divergence with the trade-weighted dollar's exchange rate (Chart I-7). Technically, this increases the probability of a meaningful rebound in the USD. Chart I-7A Positive Technical Development For The Greenback Third, global growth is showing signs of weakening. We have already highlighted that rollovers in the performance of EM carry trades such as the one we have been experiencing for a few months now have been very reliable leading indicators of activity slowdowns over the past 20 years.5 Korea exports are also ebbing. As Chart I-8 illustrates, when Korean exports weaken, this tends to be associated with weakness in highly pro-cyclical financial variables like EM equities, EM bonds, AUD/USD or AUD/JPY. When a slowdown in global growth materializes, especially when it does so as the U.S. economy is set to accelerate, it tends to be associated with a stronger dollar. Fourth, the super-charged strength in the euro versus the USD since the second quarter of 2017 happened as European hedged yields overtook U.S. hedged yields. Chart I-9 takes the example of a Japan-based investor. We pick Japan as an illustration because Japan is the largest creditor nation in the world, and extra-low domestic yields, Japanese investors continue to exhibit heightened yield-seeking behaviors. When the gap between European bond yields hedged into yen and U.S. bond yields hedged into yen became more negative, the euro was depreciating. Once this gap started to narrow, the euro stabilized. Once European bond yields hedged into yen became greater than U.S. bond yields hedged into yen, the euro took off. Chart I-8Growth Sensitive Assets May Be At Risk Chart I-9Are Hedged Yields The Culprit Behind The Dollar's Weakness? We expect these gaps in hedged yields to move back in the U.S.'s favor. The U.S. yield curve has some scope to begin to steepen a bit, especially as U.S. growth accelerates. Additionally, a big component of the underperformance of U.S. hedged yields has been associated with a widening of the LIBOR spread and the cross-currency basis swap spreads (Chart I-10). As we anticipated, the introduction of tax rules favoring repatriations of foreign earnings by U.S. corporations is having this effect.6 U.S. firms hold their offshore earnings in high-quality securities like bank papers or Treasurys. These securities are a vital supply of dollars in the Eurodollar market - the offshore USD market - as they are high-quality collateral that can be used to secure many transactions. As the market in December began to discount the impact of the tax changes, FRA-OIS spreads and basis swap spreads began to widen. This increased the cost of hedging U.S. bonds. Chart I-10Will The Increase In Treasurys Issuance ##br##Pull Back Down The Cost Of Hedging U.S. Assets? But here's one overlooked but potentially friendly outcome of the twin deficits. By increasing its current account deficit, the U.S. economy will begin to supply more USDs to Eurodollar markets, providing a relief valve to the collateral-starved offshore USD-funding markets. Moreover, because the fiscal deficit is set to mushroom, and because after many debt-ceiling debacles the Treasury's cash reserves are low, the Treasury is likely to start issuing a lot more T-Notes and T-Bills, which will also provide a source of high-quality collaterals in the system, especially as the Fed is not buying those bonds anymore. The stress in the funding market may begin to recede and hedged U.S. yields may begin to rise relative to the rest of the world. Bottom Line: While the twin deficit could become a negative for the USD, it is not yet clear that this will indeed be the case. Instead, we need to keep in mind that the U.S. government is injecting a large amount of stimulus in an economy running at full capacity. This could be inflationary. The Fed's response will dictate the USD's path. If the Fed is proactive, the USD will experience an upswing. If the Fed is reactive and waits to guide real rates higher, the dollar could remain weak. In the meanwhile, other forces are pointing toward a rebound in the dollar. The greenback is oversold and unloved; momentum indicators are forming positive divergences, raising the odds of a rebound; global growth is set to slow; and U.S. hedged yields are likely to move back in favor of the dollar. Will EUR/SEK Break Above 10? The recent inflation miss in Sweden has raised some concerns, with EUR/SEK hovering around the critical 10 level, and NOK/SEK breaking above the 1.03 handle. Headline consumer prices rose only 1.6% annually in January, while contracting by 0.8% in monthly terms. The official inflation measure tracked by the Riksbank - the CPIF - fell to 1.7% per annum. This move away from the inflation target has market participants questioning the Riksbank's willingness and ability to normalize policy this year. However, the underlying picture is not that negative. The most recent inflation figure was greatly impacted by the seasonality of Swedish CPI. As Chart I-11 shows, January tends to be a very weak number for Swedish inflation. The February data is likely to rebound significantly. Additionally, our model further highlights that based on both international and domestic factors, Swedish inflation should rise in the coming months, putting CPI much closer to the Riksbank's objective (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Seasonal Pattern In Swedish CPI Chart I-12Swedish Inflation Is Set To Rebound Reassuringly, Swedish inflation expectations have not subsided, suggesting market participants are fading the latest weak reading. As the bottom panel of Chart I-13 illustrates, CPI swap rates are still holding steady. On the macro front, consumers continue to be a source of durable strength. Real consumption is growing at a 3% annual rate, and Swedish consumer confidence is still elevated (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Swedish Inflation Expectations Are Stable Chart I-14The Swedish Consumer Is Still Spending Essentially, the Riksbank's extremely easy monetary policy may not have yet generated inflation in the prices of consumer goods and services, but it has generated huge debt and asset price inflation. The clearest symptom of this is Sweden's non-financial private debt, which now stands at a stunning 240% of GDP, only surpassed by Switzerland and Norway among the G10 economies. These developments imply that the positive Swedish output gap will expand further, and that inflationary pressures will only become more entrenched. Thus, we continue to anticipate a rate hike by the Riksbank this year. This is very much a consensus call. However, where we diverge from consensus is that while futures are pricing in approximately 85 basis points of interest rate hikes by March 2020, we think the scope to lift rates is greater. We also see a higher probability of hikes over that time frame than the Riksbank's own forecast. In other words, we anticipate that the Riksbank's rate forecasts will be revised to the upside. This is because inflationary pressures are growing greater and the economy is very strong. Thus, the Swedish central bank is falling behind the curve and will have to play catch up as soon as inflation moves back closer to target. This will most likely happen over the coming 12 months. As a result, selling EUR/SEK at current levels seems an interesting trade with an attractive entry point. As Chart I-15 illustrates, EUR/SEK only traded above this level during the great financial crisis. It did not manage to punch above this level during the Nordic financial crises of the early 1990s, nor did it during the 1997-'98 crisis - or directly after the September 11 attacks. Chart I-15The Line In The Sand Moreover, EUR/SEK currently trades 7.5% above its purchasing power parity equilibrium. The gap between Sweden's and the euro area's basic balance of payments is very large. While Sweden's stands at 5.1% of GDP, the euro area's is near zero. This reinforces the message that the EUR/SEK is very expensive: when the cross appreciates too much, Swedish assets become much more attractive to foreigners relative to European assets. These long-term flows end up boosting the relative basis balance in favor of Sweden. This is exactly what is happening today (Chart I-16). Chart I-16Expensive EUR/SEK Makes Swedish Assets Attractive From a tactical perspective, EUR/SEK also looks vulnerable. Various short-term momentum measures such as the 14-day RSI or the 13-week rate of change are diverging from actual prices. Additionally, EUR/SEK risk reversals - i.e. the implied volatility of calls versus the implied volatility of puts on this cross - have spiked up. This is true even after controlling for the rise in implied volatility that has affected the option market. It seems to suggest that investors that would have been buying EUR/SEK have already placed their bets. The marginal player is likely to now bet in the other direction. This trade is not without risks. First, a move above 10.1 could be mechanically followed by a sharp rally as stops are hit and momentum traders force the cross higher. Second, Swedish PMIs have been rolling over for six months, but so have the preliminary releases of Europe PMIs this week. What is more concerning is the weakness in Asian manufacturing production that is behind the sharp slowdown in Korean exports. This is worrisome because historically, the Swedish economy has been very sensitive to EM shocks. However, only 2008 was able to push EUR/SEK above 10. Even if EM slows, we are not anticipating a shock as large as what occurred in 2015, let alone in 2008. Moreover, while we anticipate Swedish inflation to surprise to the upside, we equally expect euro area inflation to exhibit much more limited gains. Bottom Line: Sweden's inflation report came in well below expectations, which prompted a sharp rally in EUR/SEK to near 10. However, this level has been an important resistance since the early 1990s, only breached during the great financial crisis. We are betting on it not being breached this time around. The Swedish economy is strong, and inflation is set to pick up again. As a result, we think the Riksbank will be forced to lift its interest rate forecast as time passes. Moreover, EUR/SEK is expensive, and flows are currently very much in favor of Sweden. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant HaarisA@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, dated February 29, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On the MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM Local Bonds and U.S. Twin Deficits", dated February 21, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Euro's Tricky Spot", dated February 2, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Reports, "Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert: EM/JPY Carry Trades", dated December 1, 2017, and "Canaries In the Coal Mine Alert 2: More on EM Carry Trades And Global Growth", dated December 15, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "It's Not My Cross To Bear", dated October 27, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar U.S. data was mixed: Markit PMIs beat expectations ; Existing home sales, however, grew by less than expected at 5.38 million, a 3.2% contraction form the previous month; Continuing jobless claims outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.875 million; Initial jobless claims also outperformed with 222,000. In the meeting's minutes, FOMC members were quite positive on growth and their rhetoric suggest they intend to follow up on the current set of dot plots. Subsequently, equities sold off, the 10-year yield climbed to 2.954%, bringing them close to BCA's fair value estimate. Due to these developments, the dollar's descent seems to be taking a breather for now, and it may even experience a rebound in the coming weeks. Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Euro The tone of European data has been deteriorating: German PMIs underperformed expectations, with services coming in at 55.3, and manufacturing, at 60.3; European PMIs also underperformed anticipations with manufacturing coming in at 58.5 and services at 56.7; The Current Situation section of the ZEW Survey was also weaker than expected; German IFO underperformed expectations, with the Business Climate measure coming in at 115.4, and the Expectations measure also dropping to 105.4. The euro weakened substantially this week on poor data and a hawkish Fed, even if it managed to eke out a rebound on Thursday. We have recently published on the risks to global growth, and the weak European PMIs seem like a consequence of these developments. We expect the euro's bull market to pause until global growth picks back up. Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 The Yen Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Imports yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 7.9%. It also declined significantly from the previous 14.9% pace . Moreover, Nikkei Manufacturing PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 54. It also declined from 54.8 in the previous month, However, exports yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 12.2%. It also increased from its 9.3% pace the previous month. USD/JPY has rallied by roughly 1.5% since last week. Overall, we expect that the current volatile environment will provide strength to the yen to the point that a level of 100 for USD/JPY is plausible. However, on a long term basis the yen is likely to be weak against the U.S. dollar, as the BoJ will fight tooth and nail to prevent a strengthening yen from hampering inflation. Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Report Links: The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 British Pound Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: The ILO Unemployment rate surprised negatively, coming in at 4.4%. It also increased form 4.3% the previous month. Moreover, retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel annual growth also underperformed, coming in at 1.6% and 1.5% respectively. However, average hourly earnings yearly growth excluding bonus outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5% GBP/USD has depreciated by nearly 1.6% this week. There are currently 45 basis points of hikes by the BoE priced into the next 12-months. We believe that there is not much more upside beyond this, given that the end of the pound's collapse will weigh on inflation. Moreover, recent data has shown that although inflation is high, the economy rests on a shaky foundation. We continue to expect the pound to fall on a trade-weighted basis as well. Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Australian Dollar Data out of Australia was mixed: The Westpac Leading Index stayed steady at -0.2%; Wage growth beat expectations, growing at a 0.6% quarterly rate, and 2.1% annual rate; Construction work done slowed down severely, contacting by -19.4%, greatly surpassing the expected 10% contraction. It should also be noted that much of the wage growth was driven by the growth in public sector wages, which grew by 2.4% as opposed to the 1.9% growth experienced by the private sector. RBA members highlighted the risks created by lower than expected wage growth: weaker household consumption as a below-target inflation. The RBA is therefore likely to stay put this year, and the AUD will underperform its G10 peers. Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 New Zealand Dollar The kiwi has fallen by roughly 1% this week, in part due to dollar rebound in the greenback. Nevertheless, AUD/NZD has declined by 0.6%, and is now down almost 3% during the year, thanks to dairy prices surging by more than 13% in 2018. Overall, we expect that the NZD will outperform the AUD, given that the consumer sector in China should outperform the industrial sector, as the Chinese authorities are cracking on overcapacity. With this being said, NZD/JPY will probably see downside, as the current volatility in markets will weigh on this cross. Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Canadian Dollar Canadian data was weak: Wholesale sales contracted by 0.5% at a monthly pace; Retail sales contracted by 0.8%, underperforming expectations; Core retail sales, excluding autos, contracted by 1.8%. The CAD weakened against all currencies this week. However, even if it may not increase much against the U.S. dollar, the case for a stronger CAD against other major currencies is still firm as the BoC is likely to hike interest rates more than most central banks year. Additionally, stronger U.S. growth should support the health of the Canadian export sector. Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swiss Franc Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: The trade balance underperformed expectation on January, coming in at CHF1.324 billion. It also declined from last month's value of CHF3.374 billion. However, industrial production yearly growth increased from last month, coming in at a stunning 19.6% pace. EUR/CHF has been relatively flat this week. Overall we believe that the franc can only rally against the euro on episodes of rising global volatility, given that the SNB will fight against any appreciation of the franc that could hurt the little progress that has been made in achieving their inflation target. Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Norwegian Krone USD/NOK has rallied by roughly 1.3% on the back of a stronger dollar. Overall, we believe that the krone should be the best performer amongst the commodity currencies, as the economic situation has improved substantially, with the Labour Survey improving last month. This will help the Norges Bank to tighten monetary policy more than the market currently expects. Investors who want to take advantage of these developments should short CAD/NOK as an oil-neutral bet. More audacious traders could short AUD/NOK or NZD/NOK as well. Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swedish Krona Swedish inflation dropped by more than expected: in monthly terms, inflation contracted by 0.8%, while in annual terms it grew by only 1.6%, less than the expected 1.8%. However, this monthly contraction was in line with the seasonal pattern historically witnessed in Swedish inflation, which also tells us that inflation is likely to pick up again in the following months. EUR/SEK hit 10, an historically very strong overhead resistance, indicating that markets may be unnerved by the Riksbank's unwillingness or inability to tighten policy. While the OIS curve is pricing in 80 bps of hikes in the next two years, we believe that the Riksbank will hike more than that, as inflation will come back to Sweden with a vengeance. Not only is the economy firing on all fronts, but the currency is also very cheap. The SEK is likely to strengthen this year. Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights The call on EM local bonds boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Forthcoming EM currency depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds. EM currencies positively correlate with commodities prices but not with domestic real interest rates. Widening U.S. twin deficits are not a reason to be long EM currencies. There has historically been no consistent relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. For investors who have to be invested in EM domestic bonds, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Feature The stampede into EM local currency bonds has persisted even amid recent jitters in global equity markets. Notably, surging U.S./DM bond yields have failed to cause a spike in EM local yields, despite past positive correlations (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Will EM Domestic Bond Yields Continue Defying Rising U.S. Treasury Yields? The main reason is the resilience of EM currencies. The latter have not sold off even during the recent correction in global share prices. In high-yielding EM domestic bond markets, total returns are substantially affected by exchange rates. Not only do U.S. dollar total returns on local bonds suffer when EM currencies depreciate, but also weaker EM exchange rates cause spikes in domestic bond yields (Chart I-2). Consequently, the call on EM local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets, boils down to the outlook for EM exchange rates. Chart I-2EM Currencies Drive EM Local Yields We are negative on EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar and the euro. The basis for our view is two-fold: Strong growth in the U.S. and higher U.S. bond yields should be supportive of the greenback vis-à-vis EM currencies; the same applies to euro area growth and the euro against EM exchange rates; Weaker growth in China should weigh on commodities prices and, in turn, on EM currencies. So far, this view has not played out. In fact, negative sentiment on the U.S. dollar has recently been amplified by concerns about America's widening fiscal and current account deficits. In fact, one might argue that EM local bonds stand to benefit from the potential widening in U.S. twin deficits and the flight out of the U.S. dollar. We address the issue of U.S. twin deficits first. Twin Deficits And The U.S. Dollar... The recent narrative that the dollar typically depreciates during periods of widening twin deficits is not supported by historical evidence. We are not suggesting that twin deficits lead to currency appreciation. Our argument is that twin deficits have historically coincided with both appreciation and depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Chart I-3 exhibits the relationship between the U.S. dollar and the fiscal and current account balances. It appears that there is no consistent relationship between the fiscal and current account balances and the exchange rate. Chart I-3No Stable Relationship Between U.S. Twin Deficits And Dollar To produce a quantitative measure of the twin deficits, we sum up both the fiscal and current account balances. Chart I-4 demonstrates the relationship between the latter measure and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar. This analysis encompasses the entire history of the floating U.S. dollar since 1971. Chart I-4Combination Of U.S. Twin Deficits And Real Bond Yields Better Explain Dollar The vertical lines denote the tax cuts under former U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and 1986, and under former U.S. President George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. As can be seen from Chart I-4, there is no stable relationship between the twin deficits and the greenback. In the 1970s, there was no consistent relationship at all; In the first half of the 1980s, the twin deficits widened substantially, but the dollar rallied dramatically. The tailwind behind the rally was tightening monetary policy and rising/high real U.S. interest rates; From 1985 through 1993, there was no consistent relationship between America's twin deficits and the currency; From 1994 until 2001, the greenback appreciated as the twin deficits narrowed, particularly the fiscal deficit; From 2001 through 2011, the dollar was in a bear market as the twin deficits expanded; From 2011 until 2016, the shrinking-to-stable twin deficits were accompanied by a U.S. dollar rally. Bottom Line: We infer from these charts that there has historically been no stable relationship between the U.S. exchange rate and America's twin deficits in general, or its fiscal balance, in particular. ... And A Missing Variable: Interest Rates Twin deficits are often associated with rising inflation. In fact, a widening current account deficit can mask hidden price pressures. In particular, an economy that over-consumes - consumes more than it produces - can satisfy its demand via imports without exerting pressure on the economy's domestic productive capacity. Booming imports will lead to a widening trade deficit rather than higher consumer price inflation. Hence, in an open economy, over-consumption can lead to a widening current account deficit, rather than rising inflation. A currency is likely to plunge amid widening twin deficits if the central bank is behind the inflation curve. In such a case, the low real interest rates would undermine the value of the exchange rate. If the central bank, however, embarks on monetary tightening that is adequate, the currency can in fact strengthen amid growing twin deficits. In this scenario, rising real interest rates would support the currency. With respect to the U.S. dollar today, its future trajectory depends on the Fed, and the market's perception of its policy stance. If the market discerns that the Fed is behind the curve, the greenback will plummet. By contrast, if the market reckons that the Fed policy response is appropriate, and U.S. real interest rates are sufficiently high/rising, the dollar could in fact appreciate amid widening twin deficits. Specifically, the U.S. dollar was in a major bull market in the early 1980s, with Reagan's tax cuts in 1981 and the ensuing widening of the country's twin deficits doing little to thwart the dollar bull market (Chart I-4). In turn, the Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003 were followed by a major dollar bear market. The main culprit between these two and other episodes was probably real interest rates. U.S. real interest rates/bond yields rose between 1981 and 1985, generating an enormous dollar rally. In the decade of the 2000s, by contrast, U.S. real interest rates fell and that coincided with a major bear market in the greenback (Chart I-4). Overall, the combination of U.S. twin deficits and real bond yields together, help better explain U.S. dollar dynamics than twin deficits alone. We agree that America's twin deficits will widen materially. That said, odds are that the Fed commits to further rate hikes and that U.S. bond yields continue to rise. In fact, not only are U.S. inflation breakeven yields climbing, but TIPS (real) yields have also spiked significantly. Rising real yields, which in our opinion have more upside, should support the U.S. dollar. As a final point, if the Fed falls behind the curve and the dollar continues to tumble, the markets could begin to fear a material rise in U.S. inflationary pressures. That scenario would actually resemble market dynamics that prevailed before the 1987 stock market crash. Although this is a negative scenario for the U.S. currency and is, by default, bullish for EM exchange rates and their local bonds, this is not ultimately an optimistic scenario for global risk assets. Bottom Line: Twin deficits are not solely sufficient to produce a currency bear market. Twin deficits accompanied by a central bank that is behind the inflation curve - i.e., combined with low/falling real interest rates - are what generate sufficient conditions for currency depreciation. EM Currencies And Commodities Many EM exchange rates - such as those in Latin America, as well as South African, Russian, Malaysian and Indonesian currencies - are primarily driven by commodities prices. Not surprisingly, the underlying currency index of the EM local bond benchmark index (the JPM GBI index) - which excludes China, India, Korea and Taiwan - positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-5). Hence, getting commodities prices right is of paramount importance to the majority of high-yielding EM local bonds. We have the following observations: First, investors' net long positions in both oil and copper are extremely elevated (Chart I-6). The last datapoint is as of February 16. Any rebound in the U.S. dollar or mounting concerns about China's growth could produce a meaningful drop in commodities prices as investors rush to close their long positions. Second, we maintain that China's intake of commodities is bound to decelerate, as decelerating credit growth and local governments' budget constraints lead to curtailment of infrastructure and property investment (Chart I-7). Chart I-5EM Currencies Positively Correlate ##br##With Commodities Prices Chart I-6Investors Are Very Long##br## Copper And Oil Chart I-7Slowdown In ##br##China's Capex Strong growth in the U.S. and EU will not offset the decline in China's intake of raw materials (excluding oil). China accounts for 50% of global demand for industrial metals. America's consumption of industrial metals is about 6-7 times smaller. For crude oil, China's share of global consumption is 14% compared with 20% and 15% for the U.S. and EU, respectively. We do not expect outright contraction in China's crude imports or consumption. The point is that when financial markets begin to price in weaker mainland growth or the U.S. dollar rebounds, oil prices will retreat as investors reduce their record high net long positions. Finally, even though EM twin deficits have ameliorated in recent years, they remain wide (Chart I-8). In turn, the majority of these countries have been financing their deficits by volatile foreign portfolio flows, as FDIs into EM remain largely depressed. If commodities prices relapse and EM currencies depreciate, there will be a period of reversal in foreign portfolio inflows into EM. While EM real local bonds yields are reasonably high, they are unlikely to prevent outflows if the U.S. dollar rallies. In the past, neither high absolute EM real yields nor their wide spreads over U.S. TIPS prevented EM currency depreciation (Chart I-9). Chart I-8AEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide Chart I-8BEM Twin Deficits Have Ameliorated ##br##But Are Still Wide Chart I-9EM Local Real Yields Do Not ##br##Drive Their Currencies EM Local Bonds: Country Allocation Strategy Chart I-10 attempts to identify pockets of value in EM domestic bonds. It exhibits the sum of current account and fiscal balances on the X axis, and domestic bond yields deflated by headline inflation on the Y axis. Chart I-10Identifying Pockets Of Value In EM Domestic Bonds Markets in the upper-right corner should be favored as they offer high real yields and maintain healthy fiscal and current account balances. Bond markets in the lower-left corner should be underweighted. They have low inflation-adjusted yields and large current account and fiscal deficits. Based on these metrics as well as fundamental analysis, our recommended country allocation for EM domestic bond portfolios has been and remains: Overweights: Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. Neutral: Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Hungary, Chile and Colombia. Underweights: Turkey, South Africa and Malaysia. The below elaborates on Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Russia Fiscal and monetary policies are extremely tight. While they are curtailing the economic recovery, they are very friendly for creditors. Interest rates deflated by both headline and core consumer price inflation are at their highest on record, government spending is lackluster, and the new fiscal rule has replenished the country's foreign currency reserves (Chart I-11). Besides, the government's budget assumption for oil prices is very conservative - in the low-$40s per barrel for this year and 2019. Commercial banks have been increasing provisions, even though the NPL ratio is falling. In fact, Russia is well advanced in terms of both corporate and household deleveraging as well as banking system adjustment. On the whole, having experienced two large recessions in the past 10 years and having pursued extremely orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, Russian markets have become much more insulated from negative external shocks than many of their peers. In brief, Russian financial markets have become low-beta markets,1 and they will outperform their EM peers in a selloff even if oil prices slide. Brazil Brazilian local bonds offer the highest inflation-adjusted yields. However, unlike Russia, Brazil has untenable public debt dynamics, and its politics remain a wild card. The public debt-to-GDP ratio is 16% in Russia and 80% in Brazil. The fiscal deficit in Brazil stands at a whopping 8% of GDP, and interest payments on public debt are equal to 6% of GDP. Without major fiscal reforms, Brazil's public debt will continue to surge and will likely reach almost 100% of GDP by the end of 2020. High real interest rates are not only holding back the recovery but are also making public debt dynamics unsustainable. Chart I-12 illustrates that nominal GDP growth is well below local government bond yields. Chart I-11Continue Favoring ##br##Russian Local Bonds Chart I-12Brazil: Borrowing Costs Are Dreadful ##br##For Public Debt Dynamics Brazil needs either much higher nominal growth or major fiscal tightening to stem the surge in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The necessary fiscal reforms - social security restructuring or primary budget surpluses - are not politically feasible right now. Meanwhile, materially higher nominal growth can be achieved only if interest rates are brought down quickly and drastically and the currency is devalued meaningfully. Hence, the primary risk to Brazilian local bonds is the exchange rate. The currency is at risk from potentially lower commodities prices on the external side, and continuous public debt deterioration, debt monetization or drastic interest rate cuts on the domestic side. Remarkably, Chart I-13 demonstrates that historically real interest rates in Brazil do not explain fluctuations in the real. The currency, rather, positively correlates with commodities prices (Chart I-14). Chart I-13Brazil: No Relationship Between##br## Real Yields And Currency Chart I-14The Brazilian Real And ##br##Commodities Prices It is possible that policymakers find an optimal balance between these adjustment paths, and financial markets continue to rally. However, with the current government lacking any political capital and great uncertainty surrounding the October presidential elections; the outlook is very risky, We recommend a neutral allocation to Brazilian local bonds for EM domestic bond portfolios. South Africa The South African rand and fixed-income markets have surged in the wake of Cyril Ramaphosa's win of the ANC leadership elections and his taking over of the presidency from Jacob Zuma. This has been devastating to our short rand and underweight local bonds positions. Chart I-15The South African Rand And Metals Prices There is no doubt that President Ramaphosa will adopt some market-friendly policies. This will constitute a major change from Zuma's handling of the economy in the past nine years. Yet the outlook for the rand is also contingent on global markets. If commodities prices do not relapse and EM risk assets generally perform well, the rand will continue strengthening, and local bond yields will decline further. However, if metals prices begin to drop and EM currencies sell off, it will be hard for the South African currency to rally further (Chart I-15). While we acknowledge the potential for positive political announcements and actions from the new political leadership, the main drivers of the rand, in our opinion, remain the trends in the U.S. dollar and commodities prices. Some investors might be tempted to compare South Africa to Brazil in terms of political headwinds turning into tailwinds. From a political vantage point, it is a fair comparison. Nevertheless, investors should put Brazil's rally into perspective. If commodities prices did not rise in 2016-2017, the Brazilian real would not have rallied. In brief, external tailwinds are as - if not more - important for EM high-yielding currencies than domestic political developments. Positive political developments are magnified amid a benign external backdrop. Conversely, in a negative external environment, positive political transformations can have limited impact on the direction of financial markets. To reflect the potential for a positive political change and forthcoming orthodox macro policies, we are closing our bet on yield curve steepening in South Africa. This position was stipulated by unorthodox macro policies of the previous government. This trade has been flat since its initiation on June 28, 2017. Weighing pros and cons, we are reluctant to upgrade the South African rand and its fixed-income market at the moment because of our negative view on metals prices and EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar. Investment Conclusions The broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is at record oversold levels (Chart I-16). Given the forthcoming U.S. fiscal stimulus, the Fed will likely lift its dots and the greenback will rebound. This is bearish for EM currencies, especially if China's growth slows and commodities prices roll over, as we expect. EM exchange rate depreciation will halt the rally in local bonds, especially in high-yielding markets. Foreign holdings of EM local bonds are elevated (Table I-1). Hence, risks of unwinding of some positions are not trivial. Chart I-16The U.S. Dollar Is Due For A Rally Table I-1Foreign Ownership Of EM Local Bonds Is High Nevertheless, as we have argued in the past, EM local bonds offer great diversification benefits to all type of portfolios, as their correlations with many asset classes are low. For domestic bond investors who have to be invested, our recommended overweights are Russia, Argentina, Poland, the Czech Republic, Korea, India and Thailand. As to the sovereign and corporate credit markets, asset allocators should compare these with U.S. corporate credit. Consistent with our negative view on EM currencies and equities vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts, we recommend favoring U.S. corporates versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Russia: Entering A Lower-Beta Paradigm," dated March 8, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The U.S.'s twin deficits do not explain the drop in the USD; Global growth is the biggest factor for the USD, and growth depends on China's economic reforms; The U.S. is turning more hawkish on China trade despite Beijing's reform-induced vulnerability; U.S. and Chinese political dynamics suggest upside risks in the former and downside in the latter; Go long DXY. Feature American policymakers scrambled to walk back Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin's "weak dollar" comments last week. Investors were left to wonder why Mnuchin broke with the long-held official position of favoring a strong dollar. Was it a "shot across the bow" of China, warning Beijing that the U.S. would engage in currency manipulation if it was not given concessions on trade? Or was it an admission that the U.S. would run large "twin deficits" - a budget deficit and a current account deficit - going forward? We don't have a good explanation for what Mnuchin said in Davos.1 But we can say with some conviction that the "twin deficit" explanation, which has been brought up in almost every client conversation so far this year, is wrong. Chart 1Twin Deficits: Why The Panic? Chart 2Because The Narrative Is Scary First, who says that the U.S. is about to widen its twin deficit (Chart 1)? The concern arises periodically in the marketplace but is often grossly off the mark in predicting the path of deficits or the dollar (Chart 2). We expect the budget deficit to hold steady in 2018, if not contract. Why? Because the fiscal deficit almost always contracts in the eight quarters before a recession, barring, in some cases, one or two quarters just before the recession hits (Chart 3). Unless investors have a high-conviction view that a recession is afoot in the next two quarters, they should ignore the dire predictions about the U.S. budget deficit. Chart 3The Deficit Is Not A Problem... Yet Chart 4Bond Market Not Sniffing Out Any Twin Deficit Crisis If the risk to the U.S. economy is to the upside, as we believe due to the tax cuts and unleashing of animal spirits, then deficits will come down regardless of additional tax or spending policy.2 In the long term, yes, the budget deficit will almost certainly expand due to entitlement spending, the impact of automatic stabilizers during a recession, and the loss of revenue from tax cuts. But long-term deficit concerns are the purview of the bond market, not currency traders. So what is the bond market telling us? Chart 4 shows that the yield curve tends to steepen as the twin deficit widens; both tend to occur during and after recessions. Today, however, the curve continues to flatten. Another fixed-income market indicator that tends to track budget deficits is the 30-year swap spread, which falls during recessions as budget deficits expand. But today the swap spread is not falling, it is increasing and doing so at the fastest pace since the 2008 recession (Chart 5). This may be a sign of resurgent animal spirits as banks throw caution - and concerns over Obama-era overregulation - to the wind. Credit demand is rising in the economy, which should increase both the velocity of money and growth. Concerns over the widening fiscal deficit are not being reflected in this indicator. Finally, our currency strategist, Mathieu Savary, has pointed out that a widening twin deficit only impacts developed economies' currencies about 50% of the time over 12 month periods. In other words, expansion of the twin deficit predicts currency moves about as well as flipping a coin. What really matters is how central banks respond to the causes and economic effects of the twin deficits. Protectionism, on the other hand, ought to be bullish for the dollar.3 As such, a potential trade war between China and the U.S. should not be the reason for the dollar's deepening doldrums. And while we are generally open to alarmism on trade protectionism - due to the fact that President Trump has few constitutional or political constraints holding him back on this issue - there is still not enough evidence to say whether the Trump administration will impose across-the-board tariffs on China. (See next section.) Could dollar weakness, conversely, be the result of a Plaza Accord 2.0 orchestrated between Chinese and American policymakers to depreciate the greenback in order to avert the need for protectionist policies? We doubt it. First, the U.S. and China economic dialogue has faltered. Second, the dollar would not have declined following the Plaza Accord had the Fed not aggressively cut rates from 1984 to 1985 by 423 basis points (Chart 6). And the Fed is obviously not cutting rates today, it is hiking them. Chart 5No Sign Of Deficit Here Chart 6The Fed Is More Important Than Politics... So, what matters for the U.S. dollar? Higher domestic inflation would matter as it would incentivize the Fed to tighten more than the market expects. Even here, however, recent history warrants caution on this view. Between 2004 and 2006, the Fed tightened 440 basis points and yet the dollar declined 11% from the start of the tightening cycle to its end (Chart 7). This is because the rest of the world's growth outpaced U.S. growth, particularly that of emerging markets, which grew at an annual 19%. We therefore come full circle to the single biggest issue on our forecasting horizon: Chinese policy. China is the most important variable for the U.S. dollar at the moment as it can single-handedly tip the global growth balance back towards the U.S., given its expected contribution to global growth (Chart 8). Chart 7...But Not More Important Than Global Growth Chart 8China Really Matters For Global Growth Our view is that Chinese policymakers are acting as an accelerant to BCA's House View that the Chinese economy will experience a benign slowdown. Risks are skewed towards the downside. We recently dedicated our monthly Crow's Nest Webcast solely to this issue and we highly encourage our clients to listen to it on replay.4 In today's weekly, we briefly assess where our Chinese view stands and then turn to U.S. politics. News Flash: Chimerica Has Been Dead Since 2012 Two critical aspects of our China view are coming together. The first is U.S. policy, which is becoming more aggressive after a year in which Trump showed restraint for the sake of North Korean negotiations.5 The second is China's renewed focus on domestic economic reforms.6 The "symbiotic" relationship between the U.S. and China is in decay, as we have argued since 2012.7 As China's economy grows, so grows its capacity for challenging the United States in the strategic sphere (Chart 9). Meanwhile the two economies have diverged markedly since U.S. households began to deleverage in 2008 (Chart 10). Chart 9China's Capabilities Are Growing Chart 10China No Longer Addicted To U.S. Demand The mainstream media is about to become more attuned to this reality now that the Trump administration has published a series of high-level reports declaring that U.S. strategy toward China is changing. Here are a few choice quotations: "China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea." (Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018) "Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department." (Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2018) "[High-level bilateral dialogues] largely have been unsuccessful - not because of failures by U.S. policymakers, but because Chinese policymakers were not interested in moving toward a true market economy." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "The United States also will take all other steps necessary to rein in harmful state-led, mercantilist policies and practices pursued by China, even when they do not fall squarely within WTO disciplines." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "The United States ... is seeking fundamental changes to China's trade regime, including the overarching industrial policies that have continued to dominate China's state-led economy." (U.S. Trade Representative, 2017 Report to Congress On China's WTO Compliance, 2018) "China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor." (President Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017) We expect to find echoes of this tough rhetoric in Trump's State of the Union Address on January 30, which will air as we go to press. Already commentators have declared that the U.S. is entering a "post-engagement" phase in the U.S.-China relationship.8 The U.S. and China will continue to engage. What is important is the Trump administration's shift toward more aggressive economic statecraft. Trump's view, made amply clear on the campaign trail, and now officially U.S. policy, holds that China is a mercantilist as well as a revisionist power and that it has initiated a trade war against the U.S. Thus the real policy change lies not in naming China a "strategic competitor" antithetical to U.S. values, but in declaring that normal "WTO consistent" remedies are no longer sufficient and the U.S. will have to resort to "all other steps necessary." The question is whether the U.S., in adopting unilateral measures, will pursue trade remedies on an item-by-item basis, as it has done so far, or break out of the mold and levy broader tariffs to try to achieve "fundamental changes" as quoted above. Trump's recent tariffs on solar panels and washing machines adhered closely to U.S. institutional procedures and penalized U.S. ally South Korea as well as China: if this is the trajectory that the U.S. intends to take, then markets can breathe a sigh of relief.9 The basic trade data show that the U.S. has continued to expand imports from China despite past incidents of presidents slapping on tariffs (Chart 11). Chart 11China And U.S.: Ships Passing In The Night However, the U.S. is likely to draw a harder line than that. The same data also show that the U.S. is not gaining much access to the Chinese market over time, while China has greatly diminished its exposure both to exports and to U.S. trade as a whole. Furthermore, the Trump administration is accusing China of trying to gain superior technology from the U.S. in a way that jeopardizes its security and sovereignty in the pursuit of a better strategic position. This is said to include coercion and corruption of U.S. firms in China, favoring the manufacturing sector by squeezing out competition, preferring domestic-sourced goods over foreign goods, and jeopardizing U.S. companies' intellectual property and network security. The key grievances are forced technology transfer, the "Made in China 2025" industrial strategy, "indigenous innovation" rules, and the new Cyber-Security Law.10 A test case for the U.S.'s harder line will be the ongoing investigation into China's intellectual property theft, which is due by August but is expected to elicit action by Trump sooner. Trump has a range of actions he can take either within or without the WTO. Going outside the WTO would give him greater flexibility, for instance, to impose a "fine," as he called it, for the cumulative "big damages" of China's intellectual property theft - but it would also enable China to claim that the U.S. itself is violating WTO trade rules.11 How will China respond to this turn in U.S. policy? It will continue to focus on rebooting its economic reforms. Reform is both necessary for its own interests, as we have outlined in the past, and expedient in that it enables China to try to deflect and delay U.S. pressure.12 This is not to say that China will not retaliate to particular U.S. moves, but simply that it will prefer to minimize conflict unless and until the Trump administration demonstrates via broad and sweeping trade measures that Beijing has no choice but to engage in open trade war. China's recent declarations that it will accelerate economic reforms aimed at trade and investment openness - particularly in financial services but also more generally - are geared toward allaying Washington. Xi Jinping's right-hand economist, Liu He, who is a key figure, made this clear at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he said that China's reform and opening up this year would "exceed international expectations." Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang made a similar point late last year, saying that the "Made in China 2025" program would not discriminate against foreign or private firms.13 Simultaneously, leading technocrats are calling attention to China's vulnerability as it attempts delicate financial reforms. Guo Shuqing of the China Banking Regulatory Commission has warned of "black swan" or "gray rhino" events as he continues with his financial regulatory crackdown, and he has been echoed by the vice-secretary general of the National Development and Reform Commission.14 These statements are prudent - as it is always risky for highly leveraged countries to tinker with financial tightening - and useful because Beijing wants to warn the U.S. against pushing too hard since it is both "making progress" and vulnerable to instability. We certainly expect the reforms to have a significant, adverse impact on China's economic growth this year. In the latest developments, the policy crackdown is spreading to local governments, where fiscal tightening could ensue (Chart 12). Local governments lack stable sources of revenue, have large hidden debts, face an intensifying debt repayment schedule over the next three years, and have recently begun to cancel infrastructure projects under central government scrutiny (in Inner Mongolia, Gansu, and other provinces, and reportedly even in Xi's favored province of Zhejiang). Furthermore, the reforms have involved a crackdown on shadow lending that has sent non-bank credit into a steep decline (Chart 13). While some market estimates suggest that bank loans could grow by 13%-15% in 2018, such estimates cut against the policy grain. Assuming that non-bank credit does not grow any faster in 2018 than it did in 2017 (9.7%), China can afford to let new bank loans grow at 9.7% and still keep its total social financing (TSF) at its five-year annual average growth rate of 14.5%. Policymakers will not be able to soften their line easily, as several key players are newly appointed and must establish their credibility from the outset. Chart 12Local Government Finances Under Scrutiny Chart 13Shadow Bank Crackdown To Weigh On Credit Growth Our view is that Trump will harden the line despite China's promises both of deeper internal reforms and greater opening up. But the timing is impossible to predict. The real fireworks may be reserved until closer to the U.S. midterm election, as campaigning heats up in the fall. That would be the time for Trump to try to rally his voters by means of a clash of economic nationalisms with China. Beyond the top U.S. grievances cited above, we would highlight the U.S. approach toward China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Preferential policies for SOEs are a structural issue that the U.S. is now criticizing. At the party congress in October, President Xi Jinping pledged not only to reform the SOEs but also to make them bigger and stronger. Hence there is a potential collision course. The precise implementation of China's reforms could determine whether the U.S. pursues the issue further. China's State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission has so far reaffirmed Xi's comments at the party congress but, in keeping with the subtlety of Xi's policies, has also suggested there may be room to intensify reforms. The combination of Trump's economic policies, and China's intensifying reforms, will result in the U.S. economy outperforming expectations relative to China while U.S. corporations will outperform their Chinese counterparts (Chart 14). China will experience higher volatility, both in general and in relation to the U.S., and Chinese companies that suffer from reforms will underperform U.S. companies that benefit most from tax cuts (Chart 15). This is ironic given the popular narrative that the U.S. is suffering from chaotic democratic politics while China's centralized authoritarian model reigns triumphant. Of course, we do think Xi has key capabilities to drive reforms further in his second term than in his first, so these U.S.-China divergences will continue for the next 6-to-12 months at least. China's slowdown and increase in equity volatility should create a policy response: more fiscal spending and credit expansion. The comparison of relative U.S. and Chinese credit impulses suggests that China extends more credit as relative volatility rises (Chart 16). Our view, however, is that China's credit impulse will continue disappointing this year as Beijing prioritizes reform over growth. The credit numbers in January are the next data set to watch, in addition to the aforementioned local government spending. Investors should brace for more uncertainty as the Lunar New Year approaches (Feb. 16). Chart 14U.S. Earnings Surprise Relative To China Chart 15Xi Adds Volatility Relative To Trump Bump Chart 16China's Credit Impulse Disappoints Bottom Line: The Trump administration has issued an ultimatum of sorts on trade. Yet China claims to be redoubling its efforts at reforming and opening up its economy - party to deflect the pressure. We are almost certain that Trump will take further punitive actions, but it is too soon to say when or if he will engage in sweeping measures that threaten to destabilize China and thus initiate a trade war. The political context heading into the U.S. midterm vote will be crucial. Is America Having A Macron Moment? It is unfortunate when one's forecast is challenged only weeks after it is conceived. But that appears to be happening to our view, articulated in late December, that investors should expect no significant legislation to come out of Congress following the passage of the tax cuts.15 Bad news for our forecast is perhaps good news for U.S. policy initiatives and the overall quality of U.S. governance. President Trump has softened his stance on immigration, stating that he would be willing to grant citizenship to roughly 1.8 million "Dreamers" - young adults who came to the U.S. as illegal immigrants.16 Clearing the immigration hurdle would mean that Congress can focus on passing a budget for FY2018 that would see both defense and discretionary spending levels significantly raised. It would also relegate the never-ending saga of the debt ceiling to the dustbin, at least for the duration of this political cycle. Trump also followed up his immigration proposal by sketching a $1.7 trillion infrastructure investment plan (albeit a vague one). Chart 17Bipartisanship = Steeper Bull Market? Could we be approaching a "Macron moment" in U.S. politics? A moment when the "silent majority" rises up and sends a message to politicians that it has had enough of polarizing extremes? Previous such moments have included President Reagan's collaboration with congressional Democrats and President Clinton's with Republicans, which underpinned that glorious stock market run between August 12, 1982 and March 24, 2000 (Chart 17). Both presidents passed significant economic and social reforms during that time. Chart 18Peak Partisanship? Chart 19Independents On The Rise Yes, polarization remains at extreme levels (Chart 18), but that could also mean that it is reaching its natural limits. Rather than dwell on the high levels of polarization, which are baked into the "expectations cake," we would point out that the percentage of Americans who identify as independents is now fast approaching the combined total who identify as either Republican or Democrat (Chart 19). Ominously for Republicans - who hold both the House and the Senate - midterm electoral sweeps have almost always occurred along with the share of independents crossing the 40% mark (Table 1). Table 1Sweep Elections Coincide With High Independent Affiliation Meanwhile, President Trump's conciliatory tone on immigration was met with howls of protest from conservative activists. This is despite the fact that his proposal essentially exchanges leniency for Dreamers for considerably tougher immigration laws in general, which would align the U.S. with its developed market peers.17 Conservative activists are, however, massively out of step with the rest of America. Polls show that immigration is not high on the list of priorities for most Americans, and that most Americans continue to believe both that immigration is a positive and that immigration intake should remain at current levels (Chart 20). Chart 20Americans Are Neither Anti-Immigrant Nor All That Concerned About Immigration Our gut call that President Trump was itching to move to the political middle appears to be correct.18 Whether this becomes investment relevant will ultimately depend on whether the Democrats reciprocate. If Democrats go by data, they will. The government shutdown imbroglio has cost them a double-digit lead in the generic congressional ballot (Chart 21). As a political strategy, the shutdown was a miserable failure. Furthermore, the 2016 election stands as clear evidence that "outrage" does not work. Clinton picked up almost a million more voters in California than President Obama yet failed to beat his performance where it mattered: the Midwest. If Democrats continue to run on a "resistance" platform in order to satisfy their activist base, they will fail to win the House. Chart 21Government Shutdown An 'Own Goal' For Dems Ironically, the best strategy for Democrats ahead of the midterm election is to cooperate with Trump. The swelling ranks of independent voters will reward them if they do so. That same strategy, however, will paradoxically boost Trump's chances in 2020. Bottom Line: The market is, of course, ideologically nihilist. But a move to the middle - which benefits everyone involved except House Republicans - would be positive for stocks and the economy. Key bellwethers going forward are how Democrats react to Trump's immigration proposal and whether Trump moves to the middle on trade deals, starting with NAFTA, whose sixth round of negotiations just ended inconclusively (although not negatively) in Montreal. Investment Implications From the perspective of global asset allocation, the most important issue today is Chinese economic and regulatory policy. Yes, U.S. inflation is important, but whether it moves the dollar - and therefore commodities and EM assets - will depend on the pace of the current Chinese slowdown. China is therefore the most "diagnostic variable" in 2018. If our House View that inflation is coming back in the U.S. is right and our Geopolitical Strategy view that risks to growth in China are to the downside is also right, then investors should go long the U.S. dollar and underweight EM and EM-leveraged assets. If, on the other hand, we are wrong, then investors should load up with EM risk assets to the hilt right now. It is that simple. For what it is worth, we are putting our moderate-conviction view to the test and opening a long DXY trade. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 But on a completely unrelated note we would like to remind our clients that, over the past 24 months, Mr. Mnuchin was the executive producer of How to Be Single, Midnight Special, Batman v. Superman: Dawn of Justice, Keanu, The Conjuring 2, Central Intelligence, The Legend of Tarzan, Lights Out, Suicide Squad, Sully, Storks, The Accountant, Rules Don't Apply, The Lego Batman Movie, Fist Fight, CHiPs, Going in Style, Unforgettable, King Arthur: Legend of the Sword, Wonder Woman, The House, Annabelle: Creation, The Lego Ninjago Movie, and The Disaster Artist. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Upside Risks In U.S., Downside Risks In China," dated January 17, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, and Weekly Reports, "Trump and Trade," December 9, 2016, and "The Elusive Gains From Globalization," dated November 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Webcasts, Geopolitical Strategy Crow's Nest, "China: How Is Our View Working Out?" dated January 25, 2018. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2017 Report Card," dated December 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, and "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Daniel H. Rosen, "A Post-Engagement US-China Relationship," Rhodium Group, January 19, 2018, available at rhg.com. 9 In fact, in the case of washing machines, the U.S.-based GE Appliances stands to gain from the tariff and has been owned by China's Haier Electronics Group since 2016. 10 Several clients have asked us about China's Cyber-Security Law, which has been in the process of implementation since July 2017 and will go fully into effect by the end of 2018. The law is meant to give the Chinese government the option of exercising control over all networks in the country. State security agencies are deeply involved in its enforcement and oversight. Foreign business interests fear that the law's new obligations will be onerous and potentially damaging - including potential violations of corporate security over intellectual property, source code, supply chain details, and data storage and transmission. 11 Please see Stephen E. Becker, Nancy Fischer, and Sahar Hafeez, "Update on US Investigation of China's IP Practices," Lexology, January 8, 2018, available at www.lexology.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech," dated October 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Wang has served as the top interlocutor with the U.S. in the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue. 14 Please see "China eyes black swans, gray rhinos as 2018 growth seen slowing to 6.5-6.8 percent: media," Reuters, January 28, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. "Gray rhinos," coined by author Michele Wucker, refer to high-probability, high-impact risks, whereas the proverbial "black swan" is a low-probability, high-impact risk. These terms have both been making the rounds more frequently in Chinese policymaking circles since last year. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 What is fascinating about Trump's statement is that he cited the 1.8 million figure. There are actually only about 800,000 people who officially participated in President Obama's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. But estimates suggest that another 1,000,000 young adults are in the U.S. illegally, yet did not register. Trump has come under criticism from conservative, anti-immigration groups for essentially moving the goalposts beyond what even the Democrats had wanted. 17 Canada, for example, has a purely merit-based immigration system that is considerably tough on family reunification. (Reunification has even been suspended because of a large backlog.) In Europe, family reunification laws are extremely strict. Even spouses are not automatically allowed residency status in several major European countries unless they fulfill various conditions. 18 Please see footnote 2 above.
Highlights The Japanese economy is booming. This is allowing the BoJ to move away from its QQE (Quantitive and Qualitative Easing) program. However, the YCC (Yield Curve Control) program will stay in place for the foreseeable future as inflation remains a direct function of financial conditions. Because yen positioning and valuations are so skewed, this could result in a yen rally, especially against the Euro. Short EUR/JPY. Like the Fed, the BoC will hike rates three times this year. However, the market already discounts more hikes in Canada than the U.S. We remain neutral USD/CAD. However, CAD will experience downside against the NOK. Short CAD/NOK. Feature Chart I-1JPY Vs. Bonds: The Divorce Something fascinating happened to USD/JPY in recent months: it began to decouple from U.S. bond yields (Chart I-1). To a large degree, this break in relationship reflected the dollar's own weakness, as the dollar index fell by 10% in 2017. But as weak as the dollar may have been last year, it has actually been flat since September 7. Another culprit behind the yen's decoupling from bond yields has been that as the European Central Bank announced the end of its own asset purchases program, the Bank of Japan has been seen as the next in line to diminish its purchases. On January 8th, the BoJ began moving in that direction, as it started to curtail its buying of long-dated JGBs. Since that day, not only have global bonds sold off, but the yen has regained vigor as well. We believe the yen bear market is not over, but a playable rally against the euro is likely to emerge. The Sun Is Rising The BoJ is justified in wanting to remove some policy stimulus. The Japanese economy is firing on all cylinders, and the improvement seems broad-based. Consumer confidence, buoyed by rising asset prices and an unemployment rate at 23-year lows, is hitting record highs (Chart I-2). This will continue to support real household spending, which is now growing at a nearly 2% pace after contracting steadily from 2015 to early 2017. Another support for household spending comes from the wage front. Contractual wages are already growing at their fastest pace since 2006, and wages excluding overtime pay are expanding at rates not seen since 1998 (Chart I-3). Moreover, the openings-to-applicant ratio is at its highest level since 1974. This increases the likelihood that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's arm-wrestling with corporate Japan to increase wages will bear fruit, and that the upcoming spring wage negotiation will generate accelerating gains. Chart I-2Japanese Households Feel Ebullient Chart I-3Wage Growth Has Picked Up Business confidence is also surging. The Japanese manufacturing PMI number is elevated by Japanese standards, currently at 54, and small business confidence points toward an acceleration in industrial production (Chart I-4). Financial markets validate this picture as well. The surge in the Nikkei has grabbed the imagination of investors, but even more impressive has been the strength in small-cap equities, which have outperformed their large-cap counterparts by 17% since 2015 (Chart I-5). This development has coincided with a pick-up in credit growth, and is also normally associated with a robust growth outlook. The GDP model developed by our sister publication, The Bank Credit Analyst, encapsulates these various phenomena, and forecasts that Japanese real GDP growth could hit an annual rate of 3% in the first half of 2018 (Chart I-6). Thus, it would seem that the Japanese economy will continue to gain momentum. Chart I-4Japanese Companies Are Also##br## Feeling The Good Vibes Chart I-5Small Caps Point To##br## A Bright Outlook Chart I-6Japanese Growth ##br##Has Momentum But what underpins these improvements? First, the fiscal thrust in Japan has changed. Fiscal policy was a drag in Japan from 2012 to 2016, creating an average brake on economic activity of 0.6% of GDP per year. However, in 2017, fiscal policy eased to add 0.2% to GDP. Second, Japan has greatly benefited from the rebound in EM growth. According to the IMF, a 1% growth shock in EM affects Japanese growth by 50 basis points - nearly five times more than the effect of the same shock on the U.S. economy. This is because 43% of Japanese exports are shipped to EM economies. Third, the impact of EM activity on Japan is amplified by the countercyclical nature of the JPY. As global and EM growth expands more vigorous, the yen weakens, which eases Japanese financial conditions. This phenomenon was in full display last year, as financial conditions eased by a full standard deviation over the past 16 months. These developments are what have laid the ground for better growth and the change in the BoJ's tone. Bottom Line: Japan is doing very well. Consumers and businesses are upbeat, spending is on the rise and GDP is forecasted to accelerate even further. Easing fiscal belt-tightening, stronger EM economies, and the softening financial conditions are the factors behind these improvements. The BoJ is taking notice. How Far Can The BoJ Go? The BoJ had been itching to move policy for a few months now. In November 2017, BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda was making noise about the concept of the "reversal rate." The reversal rate is the interest rate below which additional interest rate cuts become contractionary for economic activity. This is because below this level, lower rates hurt bank interest margins to such a degree that commercial banks start curtailing their lending to the private sector. The reason why the BoJ was getting more vocal about the reversal rate was because this rate is inversely related to the amount of securities held on commercial banks' balance sheets. If commercial banks hold plenty of government bonds, as interest rates fall to very low levels, the value of these securities increases, offsetting the negative impact of lower interest rate margins. The problem in Japan is that as the BoJ mopped up more JGBs than was issued by the government, and therefore the bond holdings of banks were dwindling at an alarming rate (Chart I-7). This meant that the reversal rate was rising, implying that the BoJ had less control over policy. When inflation surprised to the upside in December, financial markets reacted violently. While Japanese nominal yields did not budge much, Japanese inflation expectations surged, which prompted a collapse in Japanese real rates (Chart I-8). This produced a de facto easing in Japanese monetary conditions, creating the perfect cover for the BoJ to adjust its asset purchases: any negative impact from tweaking bond purchases would be mitigated and the BoJ, according to its view, would not lose control of financial conditions because of a falling reversal rate. Despite this shift in policy action and rhetoric, we do not yet foresee the end of the Yield Curve Control program. Inflation excluding food and energy only stands at a paltry 0.3%, still well below the BoJ's 2% target or even 1% - a level that is likely to result in a more real removal of easing. Additionally, the BoJ is in somewhat of a bind. It is true that the economy is doing much better, but this does not really help explain inflation dynamics. Japanese capacity utilization only explains 3% of the movements in Japanese core inflation; global utilization, only 10%; and inflation leads credit creation in Japan. Instead, the best factor to explain Japanese inflation has been financial conditions (FCIs). In no other country do FCIs explain inflation dynamics as much as they do in Japan. The recent movements in Japanese inflation are fully consistent with how Japanese FCIs have evolved since 2010. Based on this relationship, CPI excluding food and energy should likely peak at 0.7% in June 2018 (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Japanese Reversal Rate##br## Is Falling Because Of QQE Chart I-8Sudden Pick Up In##br## Inflation Expectations Chart I-9Inflation Is Picking Up Because##br## Financial Conditions Eased However, if the BoJ removes accommodation too fast, the yen would rally and financial conditions would tighten sharply. In all likelihood, inflation would weaken substantially, nullifying the very reason to tighten policy in the first place. These very dynamics point to a continuation of YCC for at least the next 12 to 18 months. Bottom Line: Japan will soon fully do away with its QQE program. However, this is not indicative of a removal of yield curve controls. This is not only because Japanese inflation is extremely far off from the BoJ's target, but also because Japan's inflation rate is hyper-sensitive to financial conditions. Therefore, any tightening in financial conditions created by a stronger yen - the likely market response of tighter policy - will cause inflation to collapse, nullifying the very need for tighter policy. Investment Implications USD/JPY is expensive, trading 16% above the fair value implied by purchasing power parity. Additionally, the yen is supported by a generous current account surplus of 4% of GDP. Moreover, global investors have been underweighting duration. This phenomenon tends to be negative for the yen. When investors are as underweight duration as they are currently, the yen becomes more likely to rally (Chart I-10). It is true that in 2014, investors were as negative on bonds as they are today, but USD/JPY sold off. This was because back then, the BoJ announced an increase to its asset purchase program. Today, the BoJ is moving toward ditching its QQE program, which is likely to prompt a short-covering rally. Now, the key question for investors is what currency should be sold against the yen. We posit the euro is an interesting alternative to the USD. EUR/JPY is exceptionally expensive at present. On a long-term basis, EUR/JPY is trading well outside its normal range on a purchasing-power-parity basis (Chart I-11). Moreover, while USD/JPY is mildly expensive according to metrics that incorporate rate differentials and risk appetite, EUR/USD is very dear based on a similar comparison. The implication is that EUR/JPY is trading at an exceptionally demanding level in terms of short-term valuations (Chart I-12). Hence, tactically, the timing is becoming increasingly ripe to short this cross Chart I-10Duration Positioning Points To Upside Risk For The Yen Chart I-11EUR/JPY Is Expensive Chart I-12Tactical Risk For EUR/JPY . Further arguing in favor of shorting EUR/JPY instead of USD/JPY are relative financial conditions. Euro area financial conditions have tightened much more than U.S. financial conditions relative to Japan's (Chart I-13). As a consequence, even when adjusting for sector biases, European stocks are currently underperforming Japanese equities by a greater margin than the underperformance of U.S. equities. This highlights that Japan's relative economic outlook burns brighter when compared to the euro area than when compared to the U.S. This also means that the yen has more room to rally against the euro than the USD. Finally, relative positioning between the euro and the yen is also exceptionally skewed. As Chart I-14 illustrates, when speculators are simultaneously long the euro and short the yen, EUR/JPY tends to experience subsequent corrections. Chart I-13Euro Area FCIs Tightened ##br##More Than U.S. Ones Chart I-14Skewed Positioning##br## In EUR The aforementioned factors point to a potentially large yen rally, but the durability of this rally is likely to be limited. The BoJ will only be dropping a QQE program that it had already only half-implemented in recent months, as bond purchases were well below its JPY80 trillion-yen objective. The BoJ is still committed to its YCC program for the foreseeable future. Only a rejection of this program will create a durable support for the yen. In the meanwhile, as any yen rally will tighten financial conditions and hurt inflation, any yen rally is to be rented rather than owned, as terminal policy rates in Japan still have little scope to rise. Bottom Line: Ditching QQE is likely to result in a yen rally. Such a rally is likely to be most pronounced against the euro as valuations, positioning, and financial conditions are especially exacerbated when compared to the European currency. To be clear, the yen rally is likely to be a countertrend move, as a strong yen will exert serious deflationary pressures on Japan, which means the BoJ's YCC program will remain firmly in place. We are shorting EUR/JPY at 133.79. CAD: Stuck Between The BoC And NAFTA Chart I-15Canada Will Experience Rising Wages Canada:##br## Inflationary Conditions Emerging The Bank of Canada (BoC) is meeting next week and the odds are rising that it will lift policy rates this month. The Canadian economy is very strong too, led by the domestic sector. Real consumer spending is growing at its fastest pace in nearly 10 years, the unemployment rate is at 40-year lows, and capex is recovering after having been decimated by the collapse in oil prices from 2014 to 2016. Thanks to this backdrop, the Canadian economy is hitting its own capacity constraints. The BoC estimates that the Canadian output gap has closed. Moreover, the recent Business Outlook Survey confirms this message: A record proportion of Canadian firms are having difficulty meeting demand because of capacity constraints, and the growing number and intensity of labor shortages points to a tight labor market (Chart I-15). Tight capacity and higher wages will support the already-visible rebound in core inflation, which has already reached 1.8%. As a result, we expect the BoC to tighten rates as much as the Federal Reserve this year. However, the impact of this development on the CAD might be limited. Investors are already pricing in more hikes in Canada than in the U.S. over the next 12 months - 82 basis points versus 60 basis points, respectively. Moreover, speculators are once again very long the loonie, implying an elevated hurdle for strong economic data to actually lift CAD further. Moreover, NAFTA remains a major risk for Canada. As Marko Papic, our Chief Geopolitical Strategist, wrote in a November Special Report, President Trump does have uninhibited power when it comes to abrogating NAFTA (Table I-I).1 If NAFTA were to collapse, Canada would most likely ultimately revert to the still-preferential Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Thus, the impact on Canada-U.S. trade would likely be temporary. However, the brunt of the pain should be felt in Canadian capex spending. The high degree of uncertainty associated with unwinding NAFTA would cause companies to abandon expansion plans in Canada, and prompt them to expand their North American capacity directly in the U.S., thereby bypassing the regulatory risk created in the supply chain. This would dampen the future growth profile of Canada. Table I-1Trump Faces Few Constraints On Trade Oil is unlikely to fill the void for CAD. At near US$70/bbl, Brent has hit our Commodity and Energy strategists' target. OPEC 2.0 will be unwilling to accommodate much higher prices, as this would incentivize shale producers to expand capacity, recreating the supply glut dynamics that existed prior to the 2014 crash. Additionally, the West Canada Select benchmark, the oil price most relevant for Canada, remains at a substantial discount to WTI and Brent. This is because there is not enough pipeline capacity to ship oil outside of Alberta. Canada is drowning in its own oil. This situation is not about to change. Chart I-16CAD/NOK Is Stretched Based on this combination, we are neutral USD/CAD on a 12-month basis, even if a move back to 1.29 is likely over the coming weeks. However, while Canadian oil is trading at a discount, the CAD has performed better than the NOK, the other petrocurrency in the G10 space. This suggests that shorting CAD/NOK may be a cleaner way to play the risks inherent to the Canadian dollar. First, the Canadian dollar is very expensive relative to the Norwegian krone right now, trading 11% above its purchasing-power-parity rate (Chart I-16). Even when adjusting for other factors like productivity and commodity prices, CAD is trading at its largest premium to the NOK since 1994. This represents a risk for CAD/NOK as the loonie is exposed to trade policy risks, while the nokkie is not. Second, the balance-of-payments picture remains highly favorable for the NOK. Norway runs a current account surplus of 5.5% while Canada runs a deficit of 2.8%. Additionally, Norway sports a Net International Investment position (NIIPs) of 210% of GDP, the largest in the G10. Strong NIIPs are associated with rising real effective exchange rates. Third, while the Canadian economy's momentum is well known by investors - this is the reason why they are so long the CAD and expecting so many hikes from the BoC - the positives in Norway are being ignored. Norway's leading economic indicator is still rising, and Norwegian industrial production and real GDP growth are accelerating. Fourth, the Norges Bank is responding to weakness in the NOK. At its December meeting, it adjusted its tone, as the NOK is easing monetary conditions too much in the eyes of the Norwegian central bank. This suggests the 25-basis-point hike currently expected out of Norway could be too low. It also highlights that the exceptional 60-basis-point gap between Canada and Norway in terms of expected 12-month rate hikes is also likely to normalize. Finally, CAD/NOK is trading toward the top of both its long-term and near-term historical trading ranges. While positioning on the CAD is now quite extended on the long side, speculators are short the NOK, according to Norges Bank data. Thus, with NAFTA in question, a fully priced BoC outlook, and the unlikelihood that the WCS-Brent discount narrows, risks are skewed toward a lower CAD/NOK going forward. Bottom Line: The Canadian economy is booming. This means the BoC will keep pace with the Fed and increase rates at least thrice this year. However, markets are already discounting more hikes in Canada than they are in the U.S. Moreover, oil prices have limited upside from here, and the WCS benchmark will continue to trade at a deep discount to Brent. Thus, while USD/CAD has limited upside, it has limited downside as well. However, CAD/NOK faces plenty of downside risks from current levels. We are shorting this cross this week, with an entry point at 6.398. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism" dated November 10, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: Nonfarm payrolls surprised to the downside, coming in at 148 thousand. Moreover, labor force participation rate surprised to the downside, coming in at 62.7%. ISM non-manufacturing PMI also underperformed expectations, coming in at 55.9. However, consumer credit change outperformed expectations, coming in at 27.95 billion dollars. The dollar began the week on a strong, which ultimately dissipated, on relatively hawkish ECB minutes and policy tweaks in Japan. Overall, we expect the market to continue to price the fed dot plot, putting upward pressure on the dollar. Report Links: A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the Euro area has been positive: Core inflation outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.1%. Moreover, the economic sentiment indicator also outperformed expectations, coming in at 116. Retail sale yearly growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at 2.8%. Finally, the unemployment rate declined from 8.8% to 8.7% In spite of the positive data the euro has fallen this weekThe Euro begun the week on the weak side but surged in the wake of the ECB's hawkish minutes. This has happened due to the surge in rate expectations in the U.S., as the market has continued to price in the fed. Overall, we expect to see downside in EUR/JPY as the BoJ has more room to back off its ultra-dovish policy than the ECB. Report Links: A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Labor Cash earnings yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.9%. They also increased relative to October. However consumer confidence surprised to the downside, coming in at 44.7 and declining from the previous month. The yen has been surging this week, with USD/JPY falling by 1.7%. This was caused because the BoJ signaled that they would reduce their buying of long dated bonds. The market interpret this as a signal that the BoJ will start exiting from its ultra-dovish monetary policy. These developments should continue to provide upside to the JPY, particularly against the Euro. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Riding The Wave: Momentum Strategies In Foreign Exchange Markets - December 8, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Industrial Production yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. Moreover, manufacturing production yearly growth also surprised to the upside, coming in at 3.5%. However, Halifax House Prices yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.7% as the month-on-month growth contracted by 0.6%. The pound has been flat, this week against the dollar, while it has lost about 1% against the euro. Overall, the BoE is limited in the capacity to raise rates meaningfully. Moreover, inflation should start to ease following the rate hike and the rise in the pound. This will put downward pressure on the pound. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: Building permits yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 17.2%. However, the trade balance in November surprised to the downside, coming in at -628 million. It also decreased from -302 million one month earlier. AUD/USD has been flat this week, however AUD/NZD has fallen by roughly 1%. While it is true that global growth continues to be strong, key indicators like Korean and Taiwanese export growth have rolled over. Moreover money supply growth in China continues to decrease. All of this points to a temporary slowdown in Chinese industrial activity, which would lead to weakness in AUD/USD. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 The kiwi has rallied by nearly 5% since the start of the year, as global growth continues to stay robust. Overall, we expect that the NZD will continue to outperform the AUD this year, as New Zealand is less sensitive to a tightening in financial conditions than Australia. However on a longer time horizon, the upside for the Kiwi is limited, as the new populist government has not only vowed to decrease immigration into the country, but also for the RBNZ to have a dual mandate. Both of these policies will depress the neutral rate in New Zealand, and consequently put downward pressure on the kiwi. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Reverse Alchemy: How To Transform Gold Into Lead - November 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mostly positive: The unemployment rate surprised positively, as it declined to 5.7% from 5.9% Moreover, net change in employment also outperformed expectations, coming in at 78.6 thousand. Housing starts yearly growth also outperformed expectations, coming in at 217 thousand. However, the Ivey Purchasing Manager Index underperformed, coming in at 60.4. USD/CAD jumped on Tuesday following reports that Trump will exit the NAFTA accord. Overall we believe that the Canadian dollar will have limited upside from here on out, as the market is now pricing in more hikes in Canada than in the U.S. This weakness could be taken advantage of by shorting CAD/NOK, as this cross is much overvalued according to multiple metrics. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Market Update - October 27, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been positive: Headline inflation came in line with expectations, at 0.8%, meanwhile month on month inflation surprised to the upside, coming in at 0%. The unemployment rate also came in line with expectations, at a very low level, coming in at 3%. Finally, retail sales yearly growth surprised to the upside substantially, coming in at -0.2%, compared to 2.6% last month. EUR/CHF has stayed relatively flat since last week. Overall, we expect limited upside in the franc. As the SNB will stay active in the foreign exchange market. In order for the SNB to change its policy, inflation in Switzerland will have to stay at a high level for a considerable amount of time. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Headline inflation outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.6%. Moreover core inflation also surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.4% However, manufacturing output growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 0.3% USD/NOK is down by roughly 0.7%, as oil prices continue to approach the 70 dollar mark. Nevertheless, we believe that the upside for USD/NOK is limited from here, as the market will start pricing in more rate hikes from the Fed. That being said, investors willing to bet on more oil strength could short EUR/NOK. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 After falling precipitously at the end of 2017, USD/SEK has been relatively flat this year. Overall, while Stefan Ingves continues to be very dovish, he conceded in the latest minutes that a change in monetary policy is getting closer. Meanwhile, Deputy Governor Jansson stated that while he supports to continue with asset purchases, to keep the repo rate unchanged would be "difficult to digest". Investors willing to bet on a slowdown in the Euro area caused by tightening financial conditions could short EUR/SEK. Report Links: 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights An increase in the "synthetic" supply of bitcoins via financial derivatives, along with the launch of bitcoin-like alternatives by large established tech companies, will cause the cryptocurrency market to collapse under its own weight. Other areas that could see supply-induced pressures over the coming years include oil, high-yield debt, global real estate, and low-volatility trades. In contrast, the U.S. stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. Investors should consider going long U.S. equities relative to high-yield credit, while positioning for higher volatility. Such an outcome would be similar to what happened in the late 1990s, a period when the VIX and credit spreads were trending higher, while stocks continued to hit new highs. A breakdown in NAFTA talks remains the key risk for the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso. Feature Bubbles Burst By Too Much Supply The "cure" for higher prices is higher prices. The dotcom and housing bubbles did not die fully of their own accord. Their demise was expedited by a wave of new supply hitting the market. In the case of the dotcom bubble, a flood of shares from initial and secondary public offerings inundated investors in 2000 (Chart 1). This put significant downward pressure on the prices of internet stocks. The housing boom was similarly subverted by a slew of new construction - residential investment rose to a 55-year high of 6.6% of GDP in 2006 (Chart 2). Chart 1Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 1 Chart 2Burst By Too Much Supply: Example 2 Is bitcoin about to experience a similar fate? On the surface, the answer may seem to be "no." As more bitcoins are "mined," the computational cost of additional production rises exponentially. In theory, this should limit the number of bitcoins that can ever circulate to 21 million, about 80% of which have already been created (Chart 3). Yet if one looks beneath the surface, bitcoin may also be vulnerable to a variety of "supply-side" factors. Chart 3Bitcoin: Most Of It Has Been Mined First, the expansion of financial derivatives tied to the value of bitcoin threatens to create a "synthetic" supply of the cryptocurrency. When someone writes a call option on a stock, the seller of the option is effectively taking a bearish bet while the buyer is taking a bullish bet. The very act of writing the option creates an additional long position, which is exactly offset by an additional short position. Moreover, to the extent that a decision to sell a particular call option will depress the price of similar call options, it will also depress the underlying price of the stock. This is simply because one can have long exposure to a stock either by owning it outright or owning a call option on it. Anything that hurts the price of the latter will also hurt the price of the former. As bitcoin futures begin to trade, investors who are bearish on bitcoin will be able to create short positions that cause the effective number of bitcoins in circulation to rise. This will happen even if the official number of bitcoins outstanding remains the same. Imitation Is The Sincerest Form Of Flattery An increase in synthetic forms of bitcoin supply is one worry for bitcoin investors. Another is the prospect of increased competition from bitcoin-like alternatives. There are now hundreds of cryptocurrencies, most of which use a slight variant of the same blockchain technology that underpins bitcoin. Chart 4Governments Will Want Their Cut So far, the proliferation of new currencies has been largely driven by technologically savvy entrepreneurs working out of their bedrooms or garages. But now companies are getting in on the act. The stock price of Kodak, which apparently is still in business, tripled earlier this week when it announced the launch of its own cryptocurrency. That's just a small taste of what's to come. What exactly is stopping giants such as Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, and Google from issuing their own cryptocurrencies? After all, they already have secure, global networks. Amazon could start giving out a few coins with every sale, and allow shoppers to purchase goods from the online retailer using its new currency. It's simple.1 The only plausible restriction is a legal one: The threat that governments will quash upstart cryptocurrencies for fear that will drive down demand for their own fiat monies. As we noted several weeks ago, the U.S. government derives $100 billion per year in seigniorage revenue from its ability to print currency and use that money to buy goods and services (Chart 4).2 As large companies get into the cryptocurrency arena, governments are likely to respond harshly - sooner rather than later. This week's news that the South Korean government will consider banning the trading of cryptocurrencies on exchanges is a sign of what's to come. Who Else? What other areas are vulnerable to an eventual tsunami of new supply? Four come to mind: Oil: BCA's bullish oil call has paid off in spades. Brent has climbed from $44 last June to $69 currently. Further gains may not be as easily attainable, however. Our energy strategists estimate that the breakeven cost of oil for U.S. shale producers is in the low-$50 range.3 We are now well above this number, which means that shale supply will accelerate. This does not mean that prices cannot go up further in the near term, but it does limit the long-term potential for crude. Real estate: Ultra-low interest rates across much of the world have fueled sharp rallies in home prices. Inflation-adjusted home prices in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and parts of Europe are well above their pre-Great Recession levels (Chart 5). U.S. real residential home prices are still below their 2006 peak, but commercial real estate (CRE) prices have galloped to new highs (Chart 6). Rent growth within the U.S. CRE sector is starting to slow, suggesting that supply is slowly catching up with demand (Chart 7). Chart 5Where Low Rates Have ##br##Fueled House Prices Chart 6Commercial Real Estate Prices Have ##br##Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Chart 7Rent Growth Is Cooling Corporate debt: Low rates have also encouraged companies to feast on credit. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP in the U.S. and many other countries is close to record-high levels (Chart 8A and Chart 8B). Credit spreads remain extremely tight, but that may change as more corporate bonds reach the market. Chart 8ACorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Chart 8BCorporate Debt-To-GDP ##br##Is Close To Record Highs Low-volatility trades: A recent Bloomberg headline screamed "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash."4 The number of volatility contracts traded on the Cboe has increased more than tenfold since 2012. Net short speculative positions now stand at record-high levels (Chart 9). Traders have been able to reap huge gains over the past few years by betting that volatility will decline. The problem is that if volatility starts to rise, those same traders could start to unload their positions, leading to even higher volatility. In contrast to the aforementioned areas, the stock market has seen an erosion in the supply of shares due to buybacks and voluntary delistings. The S&P divisor is down by over 8% since 2005. The number of U.S. publicly-listed companies has nearly halved since the late 1990s (Chart 10). This trend is unlikely to reverse any time soon, given the elevated level of profit margins and the temptation that many companies will have to use corporate tax cuts to step up the pace of share repurchases. Chart 9Low Volatility Is In High Demand Chart 10Erosion Of Supply In The Stock Market Bet On Higher Equity Prices, But Also Higher Volatility And Higher Credit Spreads The discussion above suggests that the relationship between equity prices and both volatility and credit spreads may shift over the coming months. This would not be the first time. Chart 11 shows that the VIX and credit spreads began to trend higher in the late 1990s, even as the S&P 500 continued to hit new record highs. We may be entering a similar phase now. Continued above-trend growth in the U.S. and rising inflation will push up Treasury yields. We declared "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" on July 5, 2016 - the exact same day that the 10-year Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%.5 Higher interest rates will punish financially-strapped borrowers, leading to wider credit spreads. Equity volatility is also likely to rise as corporate health deteriorates and the timing of the next downturn draws closer. Our baseline expectation is that the U.S. and the rest of the world will fall into a recession in late 2019. Financial markets will sniff out a recession before it happens. However, if history is any guide, this will only happen about six months before the start of the recession (Table 1). This suggests that global equities can continue to rally for the next 12 months. With this in mind, we are opening a new trade going long the S&P 500 versus high-yield credit. Chart 11Volatility Can Increase And Spreads ##br##Can Widen As Stock Prices Rise Table 1Too Soon To Get Out Four Currency Quick Hits Four items buffeted currency and fixed-income markets this week. The first was a news story suggesting that China will slow or stop its purchases of U.S. Treasury debt. China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) decried the report as "fake news." Lost in the commotion was the fact that China's holdings of Treasurys have been largely flat since 2011 (Chart 12). China still has a highly managed currency. Now that capital is no longer pouring out of the country, the PBoC will start rebuilding its foreign reserves. Given that the U.S. Treasury market remains the world's largest and most liquid, it is hard to see how China can avoid having to park much of its excess foreign capital in the United States. The second item this week was the Bank of Japan's announcement that it will reduce its target for how many government bonds it buys. This just formalizes something that has already been happening for over a year. The BoJ's purchases of JGBs have plunged over the past twelve months, mainly because its ¥80 trillion target is more than double the ¥30-35 trillion annual net issuance of JGBs (Chart 13). Chart 12China's Holdings Of Treasurys: ##br##Largely Flat Since 2011 Chart 13BoJ Has Been Reducing ##br##Its Bond Purchases Ultimately, none of this should matter that much. The Bank of Japan can target prices (the yield on JGBs) or it can target quantities (the number of bonds it owns), but it cannot target both. The fact that the BoJ is already doing the former makes the latter irrelevant. And with long-term inflation expectations still nowhere near the BoJ's target, the former is unlikely to change. What does this mean for the yen? The Japanese currency is cheap and its current account surplus has swollen to 4% of GDP (Chart 14). Speculators are also very short the currency (Chart 15). This increases the likelihood of a near-term rally, as my colleague Mathieu Savary flagged this week.6 Nevertheless, if global bond yields continue to rise while Japanese yields stay put, it is hard to see the yen moving up and staying up a lot. On balance, we expect USD/JPY to strengthen somewhat this year. Chart 14Yen Is Already Cheap... Chart 15...And Unloved The third item was the revelation in the ECB's December meeting minutes that the central bank will be revisiting its communication stance in early 2018. The speculation is that the ECB will renormalize monetary policy more quickly than what the market is currently discounting. If that were to happen, EUR/USD would strengthen further. All this is possible, of course, but it would likely require that euro area growth surprise on the upside. That is far from a done deal. The euro area economic surprise index has begun to edge lower, and in relative terms, has plunged against the U.S. (Chart 16). Unlike in the U.S., the euro area credit impulse is now negative (Chart 17). Euro area financial conditions have also tightened significantly relative to the U.S. (Chart 18). Chart 16Euro Area Economic ##br##Surprises Edging Lower Chart 17Negative Credit Impulse In The Euro ##br##Area Will Weigh On Growth Chart 18Diverging Financial Conditions ##br##Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Meanwhile, EUR/USD has appreciated more since 2016 than what one would expect based on changes in interest rate differentials (Chart 19). Speculative positioning towards the euro has also gone from being heavily short at the start of 2017 to heavily long today (Chart 20). Reasonably cheap valuations and a healthy current account surplus continue to work in the euro's favor, but our best bet is that EUR/USD will give up some of its gains over the coming months. Chart 19The Euro Has Strengthened More Than ##br##Justified By Interest Rate Differentials Chart 20Euro Positioning: From Deeply ##br##Short To Record Long Lastly, the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso came under pressure this week on news reports that the U.S. will be pulling out of NAFTA negotiations. Of the four items discussed in this section, this is the one that worries us most. The global supply chain has become highly integrated. Anything that sabotages it would be greatly disruptive. At some level, Trump realizes this, but he also knows that his base wants him to get tough on trade, and unless he does so, his chances of reelection will be even slimmer than they are now. Ultimately, we expect a new NAFTA deal to be reached, but the path from here to there will be a bumpy one. Housekeeping Notes Our long global industrials/short utilities trade is up 12.4% since we initiated it on September 29. We are raising the stop to 10% to protect gains. We are also letting our long 2-year USD/Saudi Riyal forward contract trade expire for a loss of 2.9%. Given the recent improvement in Saudi Arabia's finances, we are not reinstating the trade. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 My thanks to Igor Vasserman, President of SHIG Partners LLC, for his valuable insights on this topic. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Bitcoin's Macro Impact," dated September 15, 2017; and Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Don't Fear A Flatter Yield Curve," dated December 22, 2017. 3 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017. 4 Dani Burger, "Short-Volatility Funds Are Being Flooded With Cash," Bloomberg, November 6, 2017. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Alert, "End Of The 35-year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016. 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy, "Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC!" dated January 12, 2018. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades