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Highlights Treasury yields have slumped since early March, helping to push down the dollar. Slower U.S. growth in the first quarter of the year, weak inflation readings, uncertainty on tax reform, the prospect of a government shutdown, and rising political risks in Europe have all contributed to the Treasury rally. Looking out, U.S. growth should accelerate while growth abroad will stay reasonably firm. The market is pricing in only 34 basis points in rate hikes over the next 12 months. This seems too low to us. Go short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract. Feature What Explains The Treasury Rally? Global bond yields have swooned since early March. The 10-year Treasury yield fell to as low as 2.18% this week, down from a closing high of 2.62% on March 13th. A number of fundamental factors have contributed to the Treasury rally: Recent "hard data" on the U.S. growth picture has been somewhat disappointing. The Atlanta Fed's model suggests that real GDP expanded by only 0.5% in Q1 (Chart 1). So far this month, hard data on payrolls, housing starts, and auto sales have fallen short of consensus expectations. Credit growth has also decelerated sharply (Chart 2). The prospect of tax cuts this year have faded. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin told the Financial Times on Monday that getting a tax bill through Congress by August was "highly aggressive to not realistic at this point."1 Meanwhile, worries about a government shutdown - possibly coming as early as next week - have escalated. Recent inflation readings have been on the soft side. Core CPI dropped by 0.12% month-over-month in March, the first outright decline since 2010. China's growth outlook remains cloudy. Government officials warned this week that recent measures undertaken to cool the housing sector will begin to bite later this month.2 Concerns that the French election will feature a runoff between the "Alt-Right" candidate, Marine Le Pen, and the "Ctrl-Left" candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, have intensified (Chart 3). Euroskeptic parties also continue to make gains in Italy (Chart 4). Chart 1A Disappointing First Quarter Chart 2Credit Growth Slowdown While none of the things listed above can be easily dismissed, the key question for fixed-income investors is whether bond yields are already adequately discounting these risks. Keep in mind that markets are pricing in only 34 basis points in Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months (Chart 5). This is substantially less than the median "dot" in the Summary of Economic Projections, which implies three more hikes between now and next April. Chart 3French Elections: A Many-Way Race? Chart 4Euroskepticism Is On The Rise In Italy Chart 5Markets Are Too Sanguine About The Fed's Rate Hike Intentions U.S. Economy Still In Reasonably Good Shape Our view on rates for the next year is closer to the Fed's than the market's. Yes, the "hard data" on U.S. growth has been lackluster. However, as we discussed last week, the hard data may be biased down by seasonal adjustment problems.3 Moreover, the hard data tend to lag the soft data, and the latter remain reasonably perky. Reflecting the strength of the soft data, our newly-released Beige Book Monitor points to an improving growth picture across the Fed's 12 districts (Chart 6). Worries about plunging credit growth are also overstated. While the increase in interest rates since last year has likely curbed credit demand, some of the recent deceleration in business lending appears to be due to the improving financial health of energy companies. Higher profits have permitted these firms to pay back old bank loans, while also enabling them to finance new capital expenditures using internally-generated funds. In addition, the rising appetite for corporate debt has also allowed more companies to access the bond market. According to Bloomberg, the U.S. leveraged-loan market saw $434 billion in issuance in Q1, the highest level on record (Chart 7). Chart 6Fed Districts See Things Improving Chart 7More And More Leveraged Loans Looking out, business lending should pick up. The Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey indicates that banks stopped tightening lending standards to businesses in Q1. This should help boost the supply of credit over the coming months (Chart 8). Meanwhile, the recovery in the manufacturing sector will bolster credit demand. Chart 9 shows that an increase in the ISM manufacturing index leads business lending by 6-to-12 months. Chart 8Bank Lending Standards: Stable For Businesses, Tighter For Consumers Chart 9Manufacturing ISM Points To A Pick Up In Business Lending As far as household credit is concerned, higher interest rates and tighter lending standards for consumer loans (especially auto loans) are both headwinds. Nevertheless, overall household leverage has fallen back to 2003 levels and the household debt-service ratio is at multi-decade lows (Chart 10). And while delinquencies have edged higher, they are still well below their historic average (Chart 11). Chart 10Lower Household Leverage Chart 11Despite Slight Uptick, Delinquency Rates Remain Well Contained A reasonably solid growth picture should help lift inflation over the coming months. Chart 12 shows that inflation tends to accelerate once unemployment falls below its full employment level. The U.S. headline unemployment rate currently stands at 4.5%, below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. Other measures of labor market slack also point to an economy that is quickly running out of surplus labor (Chart 13). As such, it is not surprising that the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker continues to trend higher, as has the NFIB's labor compensation gauge and most other measures of labor compensation (Chart 14). Chart 12The Phillips Curve Appears To Be Non-Linear Chart 13Disappearing Labor Market Slack Chart 14U.S.: Broad Measures Pointing To Rising Wage Pressures Wage Growth Trending Higher U.S. Political Risks Will Diminish... The political risks which have pushed down Treasury yields since early March should also subside over the coming weeks. Concerns that the Trump administration will be unable to pass tax cuts are overblown. Unlike in the case of health care, there is virtual unanimity among Republicans in favor of cutting taxes.4 Congressional hearings on tax reform are scheduled to begin next week. We expect Trump to move quickly to get a deal done. He needs a political victory and this is his best shot. We are also not especially worried about the prospect of a government shutdown. Congress needs to agree on a bill to extend government funding beyond April 28 when congressional appropriations are set to expire. So far, Republican leaders are pursuing a sensible strategy of keeping controversial items - including funding for a border wall and cuts to Obamacare subsidies - out of the bill in the hopes of attracting enough Democrat support to avoid a filibuster in the Senate. Without the inclusion of these contentious measures, it would be politically difficult for the Democrats to take any action that triggers a government shutdown, as they would be blamed for the outcome. ...As Will Risks In Europe... Chart 15The French Are Not Euroskeptic In the U.K., Prime Minister Theresa May's decision to hold a snap election reduces the risk of a "hard Brexit." The current slim 17-seat majority that the Conservatives hold in Parliament has made May highly dependent on a small band of hardline Tories. These uncompromising MPs would rather see negotiations break down than acquiesce to any of the EU's demands, including that the U.K. pay the remaining £60 billion portion of its contribution to the EU's 2014-20 budget. If the Conservative Party is able to increase its control over Parliament - as current opinion polls suggest is likely - May will have greater flexibility in reaching an agreement with Brussels and will face less of a risk that Parliament shoots down the final deal. Worries about the outcome of French elections should also diminish. Opinion polls continue to signal that Emmanuel Macron will make it to the second round of the presidential contest. If that happens, he would be a shoo-in to win against either Marine Le Pen or the far-left challenger Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Even in the unlikely event that Le Pen or Mélenchon ends up prevailing, their ability to push through their agendas would be severely constrained. Neither candidate is likely to secure a majority in the National Assembly when legislative elections are held in June. French presidents have a lot of leeway over foreign affairs, but need the support of parliament to change taxes, government spending, regulations, or most other aspects of domestic policy.5 Also, keep in mind that France's place in the EU is enshrined in the French constitution. Any modifications to the constitution would require that a referendum be called. Considering that French voters are highly pessimistic of their future outside of the EU, it would require a seismic shift in voter preferences for France to end up following the U.K.'s example (Chart 15). ...And In China Lastly, the risks of a trade war between the U.S. and China have eased following President Trump's summit with President Xi. This should help stem Chinese capital outflows. On the domestic front, the government's efforts to clamp down on property speculation will cool the economy. However, as our China team has pointed out, this may not be such a bad thing, given that recent activity has been strong and parts of the economy are showing signs of overheating. Investment Conclusions Chart 16Bet On The Fed The reflation trade will eventually fizzle out, but our sense is that this will be more of a story for late next year than for 2017. For now, underlying global growth is still strong and the sort of imbalances that usually precipitate recessions are not severe enough. If there is going to be one big surprise in the U.S. fixed-income market this year, it is that the Fed sticks to its guns and keeps raising rates at a pace of roughly once per quarter. With that in mind, we recommend that clients go short the January 2018 fed funds futures contract as a tactical trade (Chart 16). A rebound in U.S. rate expectations will lead to a widening in interest rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners. This will produce a stronger dollar. The yen is likely to suffer the most in a rising rate environment, given the Bank of Japan's policy of keeping the 10-year JGB yield pinned close to zero. On the equity side, we continue to recommend a modestly overweight position in global stocks. Investors should favor Japan and the euro area over the U.S. in local-currency terms. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Sam Fleming, Demetri Savastopulo, and Shawn Donnan, "Interview With Steven Mnuchin: Transcript," Financial Times, Monday April 17, 2017. 2 Li Xiang, "Real Estate Investment Likely To Slow Down," Chinadaily.com.cn, April 18, 2017. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Talk Is Cheap: EUR/USD Is Heading Towards Parity," dated April 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Questions On Europe," dated March 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights The July 2016 to January 2017 doubling of the global bond yield was possibly the sharpest ever 6-month spike in modern economic history. Its toll is a global growth pause - evidenced by the post February 2017 synchronized retracement of bond yields, commodity prices, steel production, and cyclical equity prices. Until bank credit flows stabilize, stay cyclically overweight bonds - especially T-bonds... ...and stay underweight bank equities, but overweight real estate equities. Fade any knee-jerk move in the CAC40 after the French Presidential Election first round result. Feature Since February, world bond yields have edged down in synchronized fashion; commodity prices - including the global bellwether Dr. Copper - have fallen together (Chart I-2); global steel production has suffered an abrupt reversal; and cyclical sectors in the stock market have rolled over (Chart I-3). Chart of the WeekSharpest Proportionate Change In Bond Yields... Ever? Chart I-2Compelling Evidence Of A Global Growth Pause: ##br##Bond Yields And Commodity Prices Have Rolled Over Chart I-3Steel Production And Cyclical Equity##br## Sectors Have Rolled Over Too For us, the synchronized decline in the four separate indicators - bond yields, commodity prices, steel production, and cyclical equity prices - can mean only one thing: a global growth pause. The Largest Proportionate Increase In Bond Yields Ever... To make sense of what is happening, let's ask a simple but crucial question. If interest rates go up, from say 1% to 2%, is it the absolute increase - of 1% - that matters more for the economy, or is it the proportionate increase - a doubling - that matters more? We ask this simple question because the 0.75% absolute increase in the global government bond yield through July 2016 to January 2017 amounted to one of the sharpest rises in the past decade (Chart I-4). But when it comes to the proportionate increase, the doubling of the global yield in 6 months was the sharpest spike in at least 70 years, and quite possibly the sharpest 6-month spike ever in economic history! (Chart I-5 and Chart of the Week). Chart I-4A Sharp Absolute Spike In ##br##Global Bond Yields... Chart I-5...But An Extremely Sharp ##br##Proportionate Spike Anybody with a mortgage knows that it is not the absolute change in the mortgage rate that matters for your budget; it is the proportionate change that matters. A 1% rise in rates hurts much less when rates start high than when they start low. One way to see this is that to note that a 1% spike in U.K. bond yields over six months was extremely common in the 1970s and 80s - when the level of yields was already high. But outside this era of high nominal numbers, a 1% yield spike over six months is almost unheard of (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). Chart I-6A 1% Rise In Bond Yields Over Six Months Was Very Common In The 70s And 80s Chart I-7But Today A 1% Rise Equates To An Extreme Proportionate Increase Some people might counter that interest payments are just a transfer from borrowers to savers. For every borrower who complains at a doubling of his interest outlays, there is a mirror-image saver who rejoices at a doubling of his interest income. But understand that higher interest rates do not just redistribute spending power from borrowers to savers. The much more important economic effect almost always comes from the impact on bank lending. Fractional reserve banking allows banks to create money out of thin air. When a bank issues a new loan, the borrower's spending power instantaneously goes up, but there is no equal and opposite saver whose spending power goes down. ...Takes Its Toll On Bank Lending Our thesis is that the change in bank lending depends on the proportionate change in long-term interest rates. If long-term rates rise by, say, 1% then a certain proportion of investment projects will suddenly become unprofitable. Firms (and households) would stop borrowing for such projects, and the drop in borrowing would equal the proportion of projects impacted. It should be clear that the distribution of investment project returns is much wider in an era of high nominal numbers when interest rates are, say, 10% than in an era of low nominal numbers when interest rates are, say, 1%. So the impact on borrowing of a 1% rise in rates is much less when rates are high - as they were in the 1970s and 80s - than when rates are low - as they are today. In other words, the impact depends on the proportionate increase in interest rates. And this explains why a 1% spike in U.K. bond yields over six months was extremely common in the 1970s and 80s, but is almost unheard of now. Some commentators point out that working in the other direction are so-called "animal spirits" - increased optimism about the future and the returns that all investment projects will generate. But as we explained in Credit Slumps While Animal Spirits Soar, Why? 1 the greatest proportionate 6-month increase in global bond yields for at least 70 years has understandably trumped these putative animal spirits. Bank credit flows have slumped. In practice, changes in borrowing can take 3-6 months to impact spending. For this reason, we tend to monitor the change in the credit flow in the last 6 months versus the preceding 6 months. Recently, this global 6-month credit impulse has headed sharply lower (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Global 6-Month Credit Impulse Has Headed Sharply Lower Putting this all together, the sharpest spike in global bond yields in living memory has taken an understandable toll on bank credit creation and the global 6-month credit impulse. In turn, the slump in the credit impulse is now weighing on the global growth mini-cycle - as signaled by the synchronized retracement in bond yields, commodity prices, steel production and cyclical equity performance. The evidence compellingly suggests that we are two months into a global growth pause. But mini down-cycles tend to last, on average, about six months. So for the time being, and at least until bank credit flows stabilize, own bonds - especially T-bonds - and avoid cyclical equity exposure. Furthermore, as we presciently argued in our February 16 report The Contrarian Case For Bonds, when bond yields decline, bank equities are losers and real estate equities are winners. These arguments still hold. A Brief Comment On Upcoming Elections: France And The U.K. Ahead of the French Presidential Election first round on April 23, we would like to remind readers of two facts. First, the CAC40, like most mainstream European equity indexes, is a collection of large multinational companies. As such, it is not a play on French economics or politics. Indeed, compared to other European indexes, the CAC40 underexposure to banks actually makes it one of the more defensive European equity indexes. Given the loose connection between the index and domestic economics and politics, fade any knee-jerk move that happens after the first round result: sell any relative rally; buy any relative dip. Second, euro area sovereign credit spreads must ultimately relate to the relative competitiveness of their national economies, as this is what would determine the size and direction of redenomination were the euro to break up. In this regard, there is now no difference in competitiveness between France and Spain (Chart I-9), yet Bonos still yield more than OATs. So for long-term investors, it is still right to be long Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-9France And Spain Have Converged On Competitiveness We will wait until the more important second round vote on May 7 to present a more detailed assessment of the impact of French politics on the European economic and investment landscape. Lastly, a quick comment on the likely snap U.K. General Election on June 8: the conventional wisdom states that U.K. politics will drive the type of Brexit; and the type of Brexit will drive the long-term destiny of the U.K. economy. But for us, the causality runs the other way round. The U.K. economy will drive the type of Brexit - the weaker the economy gets, the softer that Brexit will get (and vice-versa); and the type of Brexit will drive the long-term destiny of U.K. politics. Therefore, for us, the General Election does not appear to be a game changer - unless it delivers a shock result. I am on holiday right now, so I will cover this topic in more depth on my return next week. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Published on March 30, 207 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model There are no new trades this week, but all three open positions are now in profit, having produced classic liquidity-triggered trend reversals. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Global political risks are overstated, at least in 2017; Global rally in risk assets hinges on hard data, not politics; But Trump and the GOP can still pass tax reforms or cuts this year; The EU's guidelines on Brexit are benign, risks have peaked; The French presidential election remains harmless to markets. Feature Investors have a love/hate relationship with populism. On one hand, we fear what anti-establishment movements will mean for the twentieth-century institutions that have underpinned post-Cold War stability.1 On the other, markets have cheered populism and its ability to jolt policymakers out of their torpor, particularly on fiscal policy.2 This dichotomy of outcomes informs our investment theme for 2017, which holds that markets are navigating a "Fat-Tails World."3 The failure to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA, "Obamacare") - which took us by surprise - reminded investors that President Trump will not have smooth sailing through the murky waters of congressional politics. Opposition to him has put into doubt the consensus view that populism is a political defibrillator that will shock policymakers into action. Instead of right-tail outcomes, markets are again fretting about left-tail risks: namely gridlock and obstructionism, but also protectionism, trade war, and competing nationalisms. In the long term, we are pessimists. We do not see how China and the U.S. will escape the dreaded "Thucydides Trap." We remain concerned that President Trump will grow frustrated with America's trade imbalances and strike out at friends and foes alike. But these are concerns for 2018 and beyond. In 2017, we believe that political risks remain overstated. In this weekly, we explain why. It's The Economy, Stupid! The global macro backdrop remains positive for the time being. Despite a very high global policy uncertainty index print, the market is responding to strong economic data (Chart 1), with the sum of the Citibank global economic- and inflation-surprise indexes rising to the highest level in the 14-year history of the survey.4 Chart 1Is Political Risk Overstated? Chart 2The Apex Of Globalization... Delayed? The global economic improvements are real. Chart 2 shows that PMI indexes in the developed world have reached their highest level since 2011, with global export volumes recovering from their multi-year doldrums. The Baltic dry index has gone vertical. Several other positive developments have caught our eye: Global Earnings: The global growth story has started to funnel down to company earnings, with a recovery in the net earnings-revisions ratio (Chart 3), which had been negative since 2011. Chart 3Strong Global Earnings Chart 4Godot Is Here! Return Of Capex U.S. Capex: The long-awaited capex recovery may finally be coming to the U.S., with real non-residential investment bottoming in 2016 (Chart 4). Manufacturing Renaissance: Global industrial production should have a solid year, at least judging by the strong leading economic-indicator print (Chart 5). Chart 5Industrial Renaissance Chart 6Consumers Are Elated Consumer Confidence: U.S. consumer confidence is at its highest level in 16 years (Chart 6), and should firm up from here, according to the BCA disposable-income indicator (Chart 7), and our expectation that Trump and the Republicans pass tax cuts.5 Chart 7Income Growth To Follow Chart 8Euro Area Is Doing Great European Renaissance: Data from the Euro Area remains bullish, despite the focus on political risk (Chart 8). BCA's real GDP growth models, introduced by The Bank Credit Analyst in their March report, corroborate the bullish view (Chart 9).6 Chart 9BCA's GDP Models Are Bullish The broad-based recovery in the data strongly suggest that the market's performance since the U.S. election is based on more than just a bet on Trump and his policies. Markets are responding to genuine improvements in the global economic outlook. Certainly there is something of a bet on the populists "getting it right," but hard data should continue to back up the optimism. How long can the party last? Our colleagues Martin Barnes and Peter Berezin have both recently warned of heightened recession risks in 2019.7 We are perhaps even less sanguine, observing dark clouds gathering for 2018. However, we will save that story for next week's missive. This week, we will provide our reasons for optimism about the remainder of this year. U.S.: Fade The Trumpocalypse S&P 500 fell 1.2% on March 21, the day that apparently sealed the fate of the Republicans' seven-year pledge to repeal and replace Obamacare. In our view, investors are overstating the conditional relationship between "repeal and replace" and the GOP's forthcoming tax bill. The most important political question for investors this year is simple: will the GOP blow out the budget deficit or focus on austerity? Getting the answer to this question right will go a long way in determining whether the impact on nominal GDP growth, inflation expectations, and thus the Fed's reaction-function is bullish for the S&P 500 and the U.S. dollar. This is the Trump trade: the idea that overarching reflation policy is swinging from monetary to fiscal. We still believe in Trump! That said, we acknowledge that comprehensive tax reform is tough - otherwise it would have occurred more recently than 1986.8 It is also true that the failure to repeal Obamacare will leave a few hundred billion dollars in the federal deficit that would have otherwise been available for tax cuts. Table 1 shows that the average time it takes to pass tax reform - from introduction of the bill to its signing by the president - is around five months. It is therefore not impossible, though assuredly difficult, for Congress to return from August recess this year and squeeze through a bill by Christmas Eve. TableMajor Tax Legislation And The Congressional Balance Of Power Chart 10Intra-Party GOP Polarization Falls##br## In Line With Last 80 Years Plus, Trump could always pivot away from tax reform and go after tax cuts, which are what Presidents Reagan and Bush did in 1981 and 2001. Both of these efforts took only one month to pass.9 From an economic perspective, the less ambitious option of tax cuts would be more flammable than tax reform, as it would merely increase the deficit and thus act as a more significant short-term stimulus. We see five reasons why the GOP will pass some form of tax legislation this year that will (1) add to the budget deficit, (2) lower household and probably corporate tax rates, and (3) likely include some provisions for infrastructure spending: Polarization is overstated: Intraparty ideological polarization is rising within the Republican Party, whereas it appears to be significantly declining in the Democratic Party (Chart 10).10 However, the move is not as significant as the media suggests. The average level of polarization within the GOP is well within the range of the past century. In fact, the GOP remains considerably less polarized than the Democrats were for most of the post-Second World War era. The data therefore suggests that while the GOP is indeed becoming more conservative (Chart 11), it is doing so uniformly. The measurable differences between the "Tea Party," represented in the House of Representatives by the Freedom Caucus, and the rest of the party are overstated. Chart 11Polarization Increasing Between, Not Within, The Two Parties Trump still has political capital: Despite a slump in national opinion polls, the president retains support among Republican voters (Chart 12). This means that he can threaten to campaign against Freedom Caucus representatives in the 2018 mid-term elections, as he did recently in an ominous tweet.11 Data suggest that voters would indeed follow Trump and dump the Freedom Caucus. Trump is very popular among Tea Party voters, even in Texas when put up against the state's Tea Party champion Senator Ted Cruz (Chart 13). Given that voter turnout in primary races in a mid-term election is below 10% for Republicans, a series of Trump rallies in Freedom Caucus districts could be sufficient to change the course of the election. Chart 12Republican Voters Support Trump Chart 13Trump Is A Threat To The Tea Party Chart 14Budget Deficits: Not As Hot Of A Priority Budget deficits are less relevant: Given the first two points, why did the Freedom Caucus oppose President Trump on health care? Because Obamacare and its replacement were both "big government programs," whereas these are "small government" Republicans. It was not because Freedom Caucus constituencies are laser-focused on lowering budget deficits! In fact, 22% fewer Republicans see reducing the budget deficit as the top policy priority as did in 2012, when the Tea Party was in full stride (Chart 14). Tax cuts are popular among Republican voters. Expanded budget deficits can be sold to them as a way to "starve the beast" of government.12 Institutional constraints to reform are overstated: "God put the Republican Party on earth to cut taxes." The famous quip from Washington Post columnist Robert Novak is a good guide for investors on tax reform. Many of our colleagues and clients tend to over-complicate their political analysis. Opposing tax reform and/or cuts will be political suicide for Republican legislators. And if budget deficits grow too much, the GOP can rely on two time-tested strategies to find "offsets" for tax cuts: Revenue Offsets: Republicans still have a handful of possibilities to raise revenues to offset the loss from cuts in tax rates even if they abandon the border adjustment tax (which they have not yet done). First, they can require companies to repatriate their offshore earnings, whose taxes are deferred. Second, they could engage in limited reform by closing some loopholes in the tax code. Third, they could let certain "tax extenders" expire at the end of the year as they are technically scheduled to do. Fourth, they could reduce the size of the tax cuts from the very ambitious plans outlined in their now outdated 2016 proposals. These decisions would be politically difficult, but that does not mean that all of them will fail. Crucially, the leader of the Freedom Caucus, Representative Mark Meadows (R-N.C.), now claims he would support tax cuts that are not fully offset by revenues. The Freedom Caucus appears to have expended most of its political capital on opposing the Obamacare replacement and is now tucking its tail between its legs! Dynamic Scoring: Republicans have emphasized macroeconomic feedback, i.e. the fact that tax cuts generate growth, which in turn generates tax revenues, defraying the initial revenue losses of the cuts. The Republicans will argue that static accounting methods make tax cuts seem more costly than they will be in reality. For instance, while it is true that President Bush's White House vastly overestimated the U.S.'s long-term revenue when it oversaw major cuts in 2001-3, nevertheless revenues did ultimately go up over the ten-year period - contrary to the Congressional Budget Office's estimates at the time (Chart 15). Various studies suggest that Republicans could use a variety of growth models to write off about 10% of the cost of their tax cuts (Chart 16). Chart 15Bush Was Right, ##br##CBO Was Wrong! Chart 16Dynamic Scoring Will Offset About##br## 10% Of Revenues Lost To Tax Cuts Timing is flexible: The GOP have the option of making tax cuts retroactive and thus avoiding a huge market disappointment if tax cuts come later in the year. It is even legally possible for tax laws passed in 2018 to take effect on January 1, 2017 - though it is admittedly more of a stretch than doing it this year.13 Chart 17Republicans Are Not Deficit-Neutral Our high-conviction view remains that tax reform - or less ambitious tax cuts - is still coming this year. It is empirically false that Republicans care more about balancing the budget than about reducing the tax burden on individuals and corporates (Chart 17). Arguments to the contrary rely on the time-tested (and failed) analytical strategy of "this time is different." Of course, the timing and legislative process lack clarity (Diagram 1). Republicans still plan to use "budget reconciliation" to sneak through tax reform or cuts. This allows them to approve tax policy with a simple majority, i.e. to bypass any "points of order" or filibusters in the Senate that would raise the bar to a 60-vote supermajority. The rules of reconciliation require a bill to be deficit-neutral beyond the five- or ten-year window mapped out in Congress's preceding budget resolution (the latter, for FY2018, has not yet passed). But this means that a bill that blows out the budget deficit can still be passed as long as it has a "sunset clause" at the end of the 10-year period, as was the case with President Bush's tax cuts.14 We are also sanguine on the more immediate question of government funding. Congress has to agree to fund the government by April 28 - the expiration date of December's continuing resolution - in order to avoid a government shutdown. Democrats are threatening to sink the appropriations bills (or omnibus bill) if Republicans attach noxious "riders" to it, such as defunding Planned Parenthood or building Trump's border wall. We think the Democrats are bluffing. Furthermore, leading Republicans are already signaling that they will postpone their moves on the most toxic issues to avoid a shutdown that would make them look incompetent. Diagram 1U.S. Congressional Budget Timeline 2017 What about the upcoming vote to confirm President Trump's pick for the Supreme Court, Judge Neil M. Gorsuch? Is there any investment relevance of the pick? We do not think so. Judge Gorsuch will replace Judge Antonin Scalia and thereby protect the slightly conservative tilt of the court. Investors should watch to see if enough Democrats in fact filibuster the nomination and if Republicans change Senate rules to override filibusters for Supreme Court nominations (the so-called "nuclear option"). If Democrats insist on goading Republicans into this rule change, then the odds of bipartisan compromise on legislative initiatives (such as an infrastructure package) will fall, relative to a situation where some Democrats endorse Gorsuch and Republicans uphold Senate norms. Bottom Line: The market no longer believes that corporate tax reform will happen. High tax-rate companies have given back all of their post-election equity gains (Chart 18). We think this selloff is a mistake. As our report this week attests, we base our view on a study of political, legislative, and constitutional constraints to tax reforms and cuts. We are highly skeptical of "this time is different" narratives that overstate the power of the Freedom Caucus. As a direct bet on our high conviction view, we recommend that investors go long the high tax-rate basket relative to the S&P 500. Chart 18How To Profit From Tax Reform Chart 19Brexit Political Risk Bottomed In January Brexit: Much Ado About Nothing? The market has ignored both the invocation of Article 50 by London on March 29 and the publication of the EU's negotiation "guidelines" on March 31.15 As we discussed in January, political tensions between the EU and the U.K. likely peaked before January 16. This was the day when the market fully priced in the rumors that the U.K. would seek to withdraw from the EU Common Market. Prime Minister Theresa May confirmed the rumors on January 17 with a key speech. We have been long the GBP since.16 Investors continue to fret that there are more risks to come, but the market agrees with our assessment. The GBP bottomed against the EUR on October 11 (just after the Conservative Party conference where PM May affirmed the government's commitment to the referendum result) and bottomed against the USD on January 16. It has rallied against both currencies since the latter date (Chart 19). Why? First, the EU guidelines on the Brexit negotiations do not appear to be aggressive. The EU has offered the U.K. a "transition period," for an indefinite time between the U.K.'s technical withdrawal (March 29, 2019) and the new cross-channel status quo (for example, a free trade agreement, FTA). This is significant given that financial media doubted whether any transitional deal would be on offer as recently as a week ago. Second, the EU has implied that it will at least begin talks on an FTA with the U.K. while the negotiations on withdrawal are still ongoing. This is not exactly what London asked for but it is close.17 This means that the EU will hold the U.K.'s liabilities to the bloc for ransom before it begins negotiating a post-membership deal, but it also means that the EU does not want to threaten a "status cliff" where the U.K. and EU fail to forge any deal and hence revert back to basic WTO tariffs. Third, a leaked copy of an EU parliamentary resolution on Brexit also suggests that a "transition period," in this case limited to three years, is in the offing.18 It also hints at what we have long argued, that the EU would treat the U.K.'s notice of withdrawal (triggering Article 50) as revocable, i.e. reversible. That said, some negatives are obvious from both documents: The EU parliamentary resolution insists that the City of London does not get special access to the EU's common market; Spain will get a veto on whether the final agreement applies to the territory of Gibraltar; The U.K. will have to settle its financial commitments to the EU; No "cherry picking" of common-market benefits will be allowed. These points do not surprise us. We have been pessimists on London's ability to retain access to the EU common market well before Brexit. And May's own speech on January 17 cited that London would not seek to "cherry pick" benefits from the common market. Our assessment remains that the EU is not out for blood. Or, as we put it in our January 25 note: Now that the U.K. has chosen to depart from the common market, the EU no longer needs to take as hostile of a negotiating position as before. The EU member states were not going to let the U.K. dictate its own terms of membership. That would have set a precedent for future Euroskeptic governments looking for an alternative relationship with the bloc, i.e. the so-called "Europe à la carte" that European policymakers dread. But now that the U.K. is asking for a clean exit, with a free trade agreement to be negotiated in lieu of common market membership, the EU has less reason to punish London. May's January 17 speech was therefore a classic "sell the rumor, buy the news" moment. Of course, we expect further risks and crises, especially with the British press laser-focused on the issue. But much of the hysterics will be irrelevant. Take the issue of the dreaded "exit fee." The media has focused on the fee as if the EU is seeking to impose a blood tax on the U.K. Instead, the roughly €60 billion "fee" is merely the remaining portion of U.K.'s contribution to the 2014-2020 EU budget, plus other liabilities. The EU sets its budgets on a seven-year horizon and the U.K. is going to remain a member state until March 2019. Some British newspapers think that the U.K. can continue to live in an EU apartment for the remainder of its lease without paying rent! The fact of the matter is that the EU is a trading power focused on expanding its markets. It is not in the interest of core member states, especially the export-oriented powerhouses such as Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, to lose the U.K. as a trading partner. And it is certainly not in their interest to impose such painful retribution as to risk harming their own economies. What about the message that the EU would want to send to other member states? This is only important if the likelihood of exit by another EU member state is high. As we discussed immediately after the referendum, the risks of EU dissolution are grossly overstated.19 Recent elections in Austria and the Netherlands confirm our analysis, and we expect that French elections will as well. Yes, Italy is a risk to the EU, given that Euroskepticism is on the rise there. However, the EU has ample tools with which to dissuade the Italians from exiting - starting with a market riot that the ECB can induce at any time by reversing its offer to buy Italian debt. And it is doubtful that the EU can change Italian sentiment through punitive Brexit negotiations. What kind of a post-Brexit relationship should investors expect between the U.K. and the EU? There are three options: Customs union: The U.K. is not likely to accept a Turkish arrangement in which it belongs to the customs union but not the common market. That is because the customs union forces Turkey to apply the common EU tariff on all imports, while its exports do not benefit from other countries' trade deals with the EU. The U.K. wants more autonomy over trade, so this is unlikely to be the solution. The Turkish deal also excludes trade in services, which the U.K. will want to promote. Common market lite: The U.K. has a low-probability option of accepting the Norwegian or Swiss options of membership in the common market despite non-membership in the customs union. These options would allow only a few limits to the EU's demand of free movement of goods, services, people, and capital; they are currently non-starters because the U.K. is prioritizing curbs on immigration. It is possible that the U.K. could come around to something similar later, but it would require a shift in domestic politics, of which there is little evidence yet. Chart 20British Public Remains Divided On Brexit FTA: The U.K. is more likely to have an FTA arrangement, comparable to the just-signed EU deal with Canada. This would give the U.K. more autonomy on trade deals with third parties, while keeping tariffs to a minimum and incurring no obligation of free movement of people. It would also likely be more robust than the Canadian deal because of the much higher level of existing integration. Still, the U.K.'s prized service sector would suffer, as FTAs rarely cover services adequately. In fact, one of London's long-standing problems with the EU itself was lack of implementation of the 2006 EU Services Directive, which was supposed to harmonize trade in services and reduce non-tariff barriers to trade. We place the probability of the U.K. reverting back to WTO rules on trade with the EU - the most adverse scenario - to zero. Why such a high-conviction view? The EU has a customs agreement with Turkey, a country that threatens Europe with a Biblical exodus of refugees once every fortnight. In comparison, the U.K. and the EU are geopolitical allies that cooperate on national security, foreign policy, climate change, and other issues. There is no way that investors will wake up in 2019 and find that the U.K. has a worse trade agreement with the EU than Turkey.20 It is not all smooth sailing for the U.K., however. Brexit is not an optimal outcome for the U.K. economy.21 Leaving the EU means a deep cut in its labor-force growth rate, service exports, and inward FDI flows, reducing the U.K.'s growth potential. That said, given that the transitional deal will likely extend the horizon of "final Brexit" to around 2022 - or even beyond - and that there is still a small chance of a total reversal of Brexit, it is very difficult to predict the final impact on the U.K. economy now. There is another option that investors should consider. With Scottish independence gaining steam,22 and political risks rising in Northern Ireland, perhaps the EU is trying to kill Brexit with kindness. Polls on the Brexit referendum remain tight (Chart 20), which suggests that the "Remain" camp could eventually regain the upper hand - particularly if the shock to household income from inflation persists (Chart 21). With the U.K.'s own union at risk, perhaps the Tory leadership will alter its exit strategy over the course of negotiations. Meanwhile, investors should remember that: Chart 21Bremain May Regain Popularity ##br##When Brexit Bites Chart 22British Public Not Divided On ##br##Current Leadership Article 50 is almost certainly revocable. This is a political issue, not a legal one, as we have long stressed, and as the EU parliament leak suggests. Theresa May has promised that the final deal with the EU will be put to a vote in parliament. The bearish view has assumed that a failure of the vote would cast the U.K. into the abyss of no trade relationship other than the WTO's general agreement on tariffs. But failure could also follow from a shift in politics in the U.K. that seeks to act on the revocability of Article 50 and rejoin the EU. We see no sign of such a shift at the moment (Chart 22), but two to five years is time enough for one to develop. The next U.K. election will take place by May 2020, unless the government engineers a special early election. That is only a year after Article 50's two-year withdrawal period ends. If political winds are changing direction, the EU's allowance of a transition period could widen the window for a relatively smooth reverse-Brexit. In other words, "Brexit still means Brexit," but there are various escape hatches if the public demurs. The Scottish referendum has put a new constraint on the Tories and the EU may have figured out that the best way to encourage the Brits to change their mind is to smother them with kindness. What indications would suggest that the U.K. is changing strategies or the EU turning aggressive? In the U.K., a move to hold early elections could suggest that Prime Minister May wants a mandate of her own. This could enable her to pursue her current strategy more resolutely, but it could also give her the flexibility to reverse it. A sudden loss of support for the Tories, or a surge in the polling in favor of "Bremain," could also trigger a change in the government's approach. A significant public concession by the government in the negotiations could also mark a pivot point. In the EU, the following actions would suggest that the Brexit strategy will become less benign (and that our sanguine view is wrong): stonewalling in the exit negotiations, a reversal of the "Barroso doctrine" in order to encourage Scottish independence, a decision to shorten or deny the transition period, a lack of seriousness in trade negotiations, a downgrading of security and defense relations, or a move to pry away Gibraltar, among others. Bottom Line: We maintain our view that the pound bottomed along with the political risk on January 16. Yes, Brexit is not an optimal outcome, but the EU appears to be willing to push off the final date of the break with the U.K. into the future. At some point, we expect the U.K.'s inward FDI to suffer as companies - especially banks - grapple with the reality of Brexit. However, given the negotiations and potential transitional deal of up to three years, that date could be anywhere from two to five years into the future. Update On France: Can We Worry Now? We have spent much ink this year explaining why populist Marine Le Pen is not going to win the two-round French election on April 23 and May 7.23 Polls continue to support our view, with Le Pen trailing Emmanuel Macron by 26% with 33 days to go to their likely second-round matchup (Chart 23). At this point in the U.S. election, candidate Trump trailed Secretary Hillary Clinton by only 5%. Even Francois Fillon appears to be rallying against Le Pen. Despite ongoing corruption allegations against him, Fillon is leading Le Pen in a hypothetical second-round matchup by 16%. Chart 23Le Pen Lags Both Her Rivals##br## In Key Second Round Chart 24Is American Midwest A Path To##br## Le Pen Presidency? Chart 25No Comparison Between ##br##Le Pen And Trump A sophisticated New York client challenged our comparison of Trump's national polling against Clinton to that of Le Pen and her rivals. Instead, the client asked us to focus on the massive underperformance of the polls in the Midwest, where Trump surprised to the upside and beat long odds to win in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin (Chart 24). We agree that it is all about voter turnout, but again the numbers bear out Le Pen's weakness. She would have to perform six times better than Trump did in the Midwest to win the election (Chart 25). Chart 26Italy's Euroskeptics Much ##br##Stronger Than France's Chart 27The Market Is Missing ##br##The Italian Risks Chart 28Long French Bonds, Short Italian We are not dogmatic on the subject, we just refuse to agree with the lazy conventional wisdom that "polls are wrong." They are not. National polls got the U.S. election almost perfectly (the polls predicted a 3.2% Clinton victory and she won the popular vote by 2.1%). It is not our problem that pundits overestimated Clinton's strength, especially in the rustbelt states. Our own quantitative model gave Trump a 40% chance of winning the election on the night of the vote, roughly double the consensus view.24 We will therefore upgrade Le Pen's chances of winning when she starts making serious improvement in her second-round, head-to-head polling. Meanwhile, in Italy, the establishment continues to lose support to Euroskeptic parties (Chart 26). The media have not caught on to this risk, perhaps because they are feasting on negative news from France (Chart 27). The bond market has begun to price higher risks in Italy, with spreads between French and Italian bonds having risen 76 bps since January 2016 (Chart 28). However, they remain 296 bps away from their highs in 2012. We suspect that Italian bonds will see further underperformance relative to French bonds. Bottom Line: We continue to monitor risks in France due to the presidential elections. However, Le Pen remains behind both of her likely opponents by double digits in the second round. We remain long French industrial equities relative to their German counterparts as a play on expected structural reforms post-election. In addition, we are initiating a long French bonds / short Italian bonds recommendation due to our fear that Italy is the one and only risk to European integration in the short and medium term. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Jim Mylonas, Vice President Client Advisory & BCA Academy jim@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Editor Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Upside To Populism," dated August 19, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "A Fat-Tails World," dated February 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Second Quarter 2017: A Three-Act Play," dated March 31, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S. Households Remain In The Driver's Seat," dated March 31, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "March 2017," dated February 23, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," dated March 7, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax," dated February 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Data for polarization analysis uses "nominate" (nominal three-step estimation), a multidimensional scaling method developed to analyze preference and choice. Researchers use the bulk of roll call voting in the U.S. Congress over its entire history. Our Chart 10 measures intra-party polarization along the "primary dimension," which is the liberal-conservative spectrum on the basic role of the government in the economy. 11 "The Freedom Caucus will hurt the entire Republican agenda if they don't get on the team, & fast. We must fight them, & Dems, in 2018!" @realDonaldTrump 12 The quote "starve the beast" is a proverbial phrase that has applied to taxes at least since the 1970s. Nowadays it refers to cutting taxes and revenue in an effort to force cuts in expenditures. While the quote is attributed to President Ronald Reagan, he never used it. Instead, he used the analogy of a child's allowance during his campaign in 1980: "If you've got a kid that's extravagant, you can lecture him all you want to about his extravagance. Or you can cut his allowance and achieve the same end much quicker." Subsequent Republican administrations have used similar rhetoric to justify tax cuts, including that of George W. Bush. 13 Congress, after the sweeping 1986 tax reforms, corrected certain oversights in that law by passing subsequent measures in 1987. These were made to be retroactive back to the previous calendar year, i.e. January 1, 1986, and courts upheld the legislation. Hence there is precedent for Republicans to pass tax reform in 2018 that takes effect January 1, 2017, though admittedly the circumstances would matter. Courts have even upheld retroactive tax legislation back to two calendar years. Please see Erika K. Lunder, Robert Meltz, and Kenneth R. Thomas, "Constitutionality of Retroactive Tax Legislation," Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2012, available at fas.org. 14 Please see Megan S. Lynch, "The Budget Reconciliation Process: Timing Of Legislative Action," Congressional Research Service, October 24, 2013, available at digital.library.unt.edu, and Tax Policy Center, "What Is Reconciliation," Briefing Book, available at www.taxpolicycenter.org. See also David Reich and Richard Kogan, "Introduction to Budget 'Reconciliation,'" Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 9, 2016, available at www.cbpp.org. 15 Please see Council of the European Union, "Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under Article 50 TEU," dated March 31, 2017, available at bbc.co.uk. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 The exact wording from the EU guidelines: "While an agreement on a future relationship between the Union and the United Kingdom as such can only be concluded once the United Kingdom has become a third country, Article 50 TEU requires to take account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union in the arrangements for withdrawal. To this end, an overall understanding on the framework for the future relationship could be identified during a second phase of the negotiations under Article 50. The Union and its Member States stand ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory discussions to this end in the context of negotiations under Article 50 TEU, as soon as sufficient progress has been made in the first phase towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on the arrangements for an orderly withdrawal." 18 Please see Daniel Boffey, "First EU response to article 50 takes tough line on transitional deal," The Guardian, March 29, 2017, available at www.theguardian.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 20 No way. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Scotland Scotch Brexit?" dated March 29, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, Special Report, "The French Revolution," dated February 3, 2017, Special Report, "Climbing The Wall Of Worry In Europe," dated February 15, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Trump's Arrested Development," dated November 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Highlights Dusting Off The BCA Bond Model: As central bankers moving away from the hyper-easy monetary policies of the post-crisis era, reverting back to more traditional bond investing tools, like our BCA Bond Model - which focuses on cyclical economic pressures, valuation and momentum - can be useful. GFIS Composite Bond Indicators: After adding a new element to our classic Bond Model, carry, we come up with a new measure to assess government bond markets - the GFIS Composite Bond Indicators. Current Signals: Our new indicators point to Australia, Canada and the U.K. as looking more attractive on a relative basis than Germany or France. Feature For global fixed income investors, four key questions matter most in selecting which government bond markets to prioritize at the country level: Where each country stands in its economic cycle? Which bonds offer the best value? Which bonds exhibit the strongest price momentum? Which bonds benefit from the best carry? To answer those questions, BCA has built specific macro indicators over the years. The ones related to the cycle, value and momentum form the building blocks of the BCA Bond Model. We have not spent as much time discussing these indicators in recent years. This is because the performance of bond markets has been dominated by extraordinarily easy monetary policies (quantitative easing, negative interest rates) in the major economies since the Great Recession. As more central banks start to question the need for maintaining those crisis-era policy settings, however, the utility of referring back to our classic bond indicators is growing. In this Special Report, we re-examine our bond indicators, explain briefly how they were built, evaluate quantitatively if they still provide a consistent signal and elaborate on the best way to utilize them. To enhance the existing model, we add a "carry" component to it, which is a vital part of bond investing. Since the cyclical, value, momentum and carry indicators often give different asset allocation signals at any given point in time, we propose a way to aggregate the information into one single indicator for each country, i.e. the BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) Bond Composite Indicators. We then test these indicators to see if they help bond portfolio managers outperform. The report concludes by comparing the latest message from the GFIS Bond Composite Indicators versus our current recommended portfolio positioning. Specifically, we explain why we are choosing to deviate from our indicators and assess how we could shift our tilts in the future. Evaluating The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators The most important aspect of bond investing is to understand where each country stands in its current economic cycle. As a way to quickly assess this, we developed our Cyclical Bond Indicators many years ago. Tailored for each country, the Indicators are composed of economic data such as: the unemployment rate private sector credit growth the slope of the government bond yield curve commodity prices denominated in local currency terms realized inflation rates Since economies do not always exhibit the same sensitivity to common macro drivers, we created country-specific Cyclical Bond Indicators that each use a different set of variables. After transforming the data, using de-trending and standardizing techniques, the variables are aggregated to form a single indicator for each country.1 Although Developed Market (DM) countries typically appear to be in the same phase of their economic cycle simultaneously, there are always some slight differences between them. These are crucial to identify and can make a huge difference in the government bond asset allocation process. First and foremost, knowing where a country is in its business cycle should impact expected returns on fixed income. Theoretically, bonds should underperform as the economic cycle becomes more advanced and outperform as the economic cycle deteriorates. Statistical Observations To verify that last statement, we separated the cycle for each country in our DM bond universe into seven distinct phases for the economic cycle: Euphoria End of upturn Upturn Downturn End of downturn Crisis Mega Crisis The phases of the cycle are defined by how much the Cyclical Bond Indicator diverges from its mean, which is always zero since the Indicators are standardized (i.e. removing the mean and dividing by the standard deviation). Chart 1 illustrates how our four core countries (U.S., Germany, Japan, U.K.) have gone through those cycles since 1967. At the positive end of the spectrum, the Euphoria state represents instances where economic variables have been especially upbeat (i.e. the Cyclical Bond Indicator is more than two standard deviations above the mean). At the negative end, the Crisis and Mega Crisis periods are when the Cyclical Bond Indicator is more than two and three standard deviations below the mean, respectively. Chart 1The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators For The 'Core Four' Markets To evaluate the usefulness of the Cyclical Bond Indicator as an investment tool, we have calculated the average monthly return during each phase of the cycle for the major DM countries with a one-month lag (i.e. the March 2017 returns are based on the signals given by the February 2017 readings of the Indicators - this is done throughout the rest of this report when testing other bond indicators). The results are shown in Table 1. Table 1Bond Market Performance, Seen Through Our Cyclical Bond Indicator As expected, the average monthly performance tends to increase as an economy enters a downturn. Conversely, as an economic upturn gathers momentum, the performance of the bond market tends to decline.2 In Table 1, we highlighted the current phase for each country. Australia and U.K. are the only countries in Downturn territory right now; compared to their peers, those two countries would have the largest expected return3 of this group. On the other hand, the U.S. economy might be at the End of Upturn phase, when Treasuries should be expected to post the worst return, if history is any guide. In Table 2, we broke out the monthly results into 10-year periods to test the consistency of the indicator performance over time. Unsurprisingly, the End of Upturn phase has been quite detrimental for the DM bond markets during all eras, while the End of Downturn episodes have been good for bond investors in every decade. Table 2Bond Market Returns During ##br##The Various Stages Of Our Cyclical Bond Indicator Are Consistent Across Time Chart 2The Gains From Bond Investing##br## According To The Economic Cycle Finally, we looked into the usefulness of the Cyclical Bond Indicators in helping construct simple bond portfolios by using them as a ranking tool using the steps described in Box 1. The big picture takeaway is this: the countries with the three highest ranking Cyclical Bond Indicators (i.e. those with the slowest economic growth) outperform by roughly +6 basis points (bps) per month, on average. Similarly, the countries with the lowest-ranked cyclical indicators would underperform by -6bps, on average (Chart 2). Box 1 Ranking Bond Returns Using The BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators We calculated the average monthly excess return by buckets using the following steps: We ranked the ten countries in our bond universe by the level of their Cyclical Bond Indicators, from lowest (ranked #1) to highest (ranked #10). We then calculated the monthly currency-hedged excess return of each country versus the average of all the countries in our DM bond universe We then aggregated all the monthly results to have an average excess return for all ten of our ranking buckets We then separated them further into three buckets (the top three, middle four and bottom three ranks) and averaged the monthly excess returns for those groupings. Comments There is nothing particularly out of the ordinary with those findings - the countries with the weakest economies have the best performing government bond markets. However, the results of these statistical exercises confirm that the BCA Cyclical Bond Indicators are reliable and can confidently be used to support our qualitative analysis for each country. Importantly, following those indicators brings a dose of discipline to our bond allocation framework. For example, if our initial qualitative macro analysis diverges markedly from what the Cyclical Bond Indicator is telling us, this would represent a red flag that prompts us to question our initial conclusions. We will highlight situations like this later in this report. Evaluating The BCA Bond Value Indicators To assess the richness or cheapness of DM government bonds, BCA developed a Bond Value Indicator for each country. It is composed of several measures that have a fundamental macroeconomic relationship to bond yields, such as: Central bank policy rate expectations Trend inflation The deviation of the exchange rate from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield (as a proxy for the global bond yield) The variables are transformed using regressions, then combined to form a single measure of how far bond yields are from a theoretical fair value. Similar to other components of the BCA Bond Model, the power of these country indicators arises when comparing them amongst each other. Bond markets with yields below fair value should outperform those with yields above fair value. Just like all other asset classes, valuation is a poor tactical timing tool for fixed income. Our Bond Value Indicator is more useful in the long term; value can remain cheap/expensive for an extended period of time. For example, Germany has been the most, or second-most, expensive bond market in our bond universe since June 2013. Due to this shortcoming, the Bond Value Indicator will be given a smaller weighting in our composite indicator laid out later in this report. Statistical Observations To test this indicator, we looked at the hedged excess monthly returns generated using the same ranking procedure laid out in Box 1. The results show that investors can expect to earn about +12bps per month in excess hedged return from countries with the three cheapest valuations according to the Bond Value Indicators, and can expect to lose -6bps/month in countries that are ranked most expensive (Chart 3). Moreover, betting on countries with the cheapest ranked valuations skews favorably the odds of outperforming, from about 46% to 53% (Chart 4). Chart 3The Gains From Bond Investing ##br##According To Value Chart 4Favor The Cheaper Bond Markets Comments Currently, the U.S. bond market offers the best value (Chart 5). This contrasts unfavorably with our recommended underweight exposure to U.S. Treasuries. Nonetheless, we remain comfortable with this exposure since the U.S. economy is currently in the strongest economic cycle, and its bond market is technically less oversold than its peers (see the next section). Chart 5Bunds Look Rich, Treasuries Look A Bit Cheap Also, note that German and Japanese yields look quite expensive, although this is no surprise given the extremely easy monetary policy settings (negative rates, central bank asset purchases) in place from the European Central Bank (ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ). As we have discussed in recent Weekly Reports, we see far greater risks for the ECB moving to a less accommodative monetary bias in the months ahead than the BoJ, and we shifted our country allocations to reflect that view (moving to overweight Japan and cutting Germany to neutral).4 In other words, Japanese bonds will likely stay expensive for longer, unlike German debt. As we mentioned earlier, the value component warrants lesser importance in our tactical and strategic bond allocation framework since it is more long term in nature. In a nutshell, value is something good to have on your side when the macro backdrop shifts, but is not absolutely crucial to generate returns on a month-to-month basis. Evaluating The BCA Bond Momentum Indicator So far, the BCA Bond Cyclical Indicator informed us where the macroeconomic forces were the strongest and the BCA Bond Value Indicator helped us find bargains. This is all great, but bond investors could still underperform if their timing is off. The BCA Bond Momentum Indicator helps in finding the appropriate short-term timing. It has been built simply by looking at how far bond yields are relative to their primary medium-term trend. In theory, bond markets where yields are too stretched to the upside (oversold) should outperform versus countries where yields are too stretched to the downside (overbought). Statistical Observations Using the same ranking methodology explained in Box 1, investors can expect to earn roughly +11bps/month in excess return versus DM peers where conditions are the most oversold and should expect to lose -6bps/month from bond markets with the most overbought conditions (Chart 6). Comments While we do consider technical analysis as part of the tactical component in our bond allocation framework, we put less emphasis on it relative to other more fundamental factors that sustainably drive bond returns over time. Nonetheless, our ranked findings show that choosing markets based on price/yield momentum does generate fairly reliable outperformance. What About Carry? As seen so far, our traditional bond indicators encompass typical variables that would be expected to influence bond returns. Our framework would be incomplete, however, without incorporating the notion of "carry" - the investment return generated by the interest income on bonds. Having instruments that earn too little carry can be very harmful to the returns of a bond portfolio over prolonged periods. A simple observation of the long-term performance of higher-yielding credit markets (i.e. corporate debt or Emerging Market sovereigns) proves that point (Chart 7), especially in the current era where investors continue to stretch for yield given puny risk-free interest rates in so many countries. Chart 6The Gains From Bond Investing ##br##According To Momentum Chart 7Carry Plays A Huge Role ##br##For Long-Run Bond Returns Of course, most of the major carry gaps between DM sovereign bond yields disappear after currency hedging. However, even on a hedged basis, the carry differentials remain important. Currently, Italian debt carries the highest hedged yield in our DM bond universe, at 3.95%, versus 1.54% for Japan. The 241bp differential between the two is significant, especially in the current global low yield environment. However, some of that additional yield is compensation for the greater riskiness of Italian debt, given the many structural problems in that country (high debt levels, low productivity, political instability, fragile banks). In other words, a better way to evaluate carry is on a risk-adjusted basis. In Chart 8, we show the hedged 10-year government bond yields of the ten DM countries shown throughout this report, both in absolute terms (top panel) and adjusted for volatility (bottom panel). Note that Italy's ranking moves down two notches after accounting for the greater return volatility of Italian debt, while Spain offers the most attractive yield on a risk-adjusted basis. At the other end of the spectrum, Australia and Canada have less attractive yields relative to their volatilities than Japan - home of the 0% bond yield. Of course, as the old investment saying goes, "you can't eat risk-adjusted returns." As a general rule, bond markets with higher yields should be expected to outperform markets with lower yields over time. Statistical Observations An historical analysis of our DM universe using the methodology laid out in Box 1 confirms that observation. The bond markets with better ranked carry have a tendency to generate positive excess returns (on a currency-hedged basis) and, on average, produce more winning months than losing ones (Chart 9). This is true even though the higher-yielding markets are often those with higher inflation, or greater government debt levels, or more active central banks that create interest rate volatility. Chart 8Peripheral European Carry##br## Is Still The Most Attractive Chart 9The Gains From Bond Investing##br## According To Carry Comments Currently, the carry factor would favor overweighting Italy, Spain and France, while underweighting Japan, Australia and the U.K. Those relative rankings still generally hold up even after adjusting for volatility. Pulling It All Together: Introducing The GFIS Bond Composite Indicators Now that we have outlined the four elements of our proposed composite bond indicator, the question becomes: how do we aggregate those pieces? The components of our original BCA Bond Model rarely give the same message simultaneously, even after adding a new factor (carry) to the mix. Moreover, as discussed above, some elements (Cyclical and Carry) are more important than others (Value and Momentum) in delivering consistent outperformance of bond returns. Hence, to build a new composite indicator, we need to make a judgment call as to which component should be given more weight. Cyclical (50%). Here at BCA, we spend a fair amount of time trying to deeply understand economic cycles, which are a major driver of financial markets. Bonds are no exception, with changes in growth and inflation expectations forming the fundamental building blocks of yields. As such, we allocate a substantial 50% weight to the cyclical component of our GFIS Bond Composite Indicators. Value (15%). Value moves much more slowly than the other indicators and yields often diverge from fair value for long periods of time. As such, we are giving a smaller weighting of 15% to the value piece of the GFIS Bond Composite Indicators that we are designing to provide a timely signal for country allocation. Momentum (15%). Although technical analysis should be a meaningful part of any investment process, markets can often trend for extended periods before any consolidation, or even reversal, takes place. To reflect that, our momentum indicator will also carry only a 15% weighting in our composite indicator, the same as the weight given to value. Carry (20%). Carry should play an important part in a bond allocation framework. To use a sporting analogy - favoring higher-yielding bonds means starting the game with the score already in your favor. For that reason, we will give carry a 20% weight in our overall bond indicators. After combining our individual bond indicator rankings (from 1 to 10) using the weightings described above, we come up with an overall score for each country which becomes the GFIS Composite Bond Indicator (Table 3). Ranking the countries according to their respective scores gives a new indication as to which bond markets we might want to overweight or underweight. Table 3Combining The BCA Bond Indicators Statistical Observations Chart 10Our Composite Bond Indicator ##br##Adds Value At The Extremes To test the investment performance of our new GFIS Composite Bond Indicators, we created an equally-weighted index using the monthly hedged returns of the ten countries in our DM bond universe. We then created two portfolios: One composed of the countries with the three best composite scores; The other composed of the countries with the three worst composite scores. In both cases, those sample portfolios out-/under-performed the equally-weighted index as expected, proving that value can be extracted by following the recommendations of the GFIS Composite Indicators (Chart 10). Comments This automatic/quantitative ranking of the countries is designed as a guideline only. The goal here is to quickly find what could be the most appealing bond markets on a relative basis. Judgment on whether to apply the findings should and will always take precedence when we make our investment recommendations. Also note, in attributing weightings across the components, we have not used any optimization techniques to find the perfect balance. We simply relied on our judgment for a simple reason: optimization gives the best fit according to a set of historical market volatilities and correlations. During periods when volatilities change, or correlations become less stable, the historically-optimal weightings may produce sub-optimal investment results. We prefer to use a constant set of weights across our individual indicators, derived from our own investment intuition and preferences. What Could Be Our Next Portfolio Tweaks? We compare the latest rankings from our GFIS Composite Bond Indicators to our current fixed income country allocations in Table 4. Deviations between the two can provide some ideas for possible changes to our recommendations. Table 4The GFIS Composite Bond Indicator##br## Vs. Our Current Recommendations From this table, two observations arise: The three countries that rank the highest, Australia, Canada and U.K. are at neutral in our recommended portfolio (Chart 11). Should we move them to overweight? Among the three countries that rank the worst, we are still only at neutral Germany and France (Chart 12). Should we move to an underweight stance given the signal from our new Composite Bond Indicator? On the first point, we have turned decidedly less negative on Australia and U.K. bonds of late.5 In the next few months, if more signs of cyclical deterioration emerge, we will be tempted to align ourselves with our composite indicators and overweight those markets. Although as we discussed in a recent Special Report, another set of our in-house indicators, the Central Bank Monitors, are pointing to pressures to tighten monetary policy in Australia, Canada and the U.K., perhaps providing some justification for only being neutral on those markets.6 On the second point, we recently downgraded core Europe to neutral from overweight, given our growing concern that the ECB will be forced to announce a tapering of its asset purchases, likely starting in early 2018.7 We anticipate that our next move will be to a full-blown underweight position on both Germany and France, although we prefer to wait until after the upcoming French elections before making that shift. Given our view that the populist Marine Le Pen will not win the presidency, we expect to be cutting Germany before France, as there is still a wide political uncertainty premium built into French-German bond spreads.8 Chart 11Bond Upgrade Candidates Chart 12Bond Downgrade Candidates Going forward, we will continue to monitor our GFIS's Composite Bond Indicators to supplement/confirm our macro analyses and to discover some potential portfolio moves/trades. Additionally, we will look to further test and refine the Composite Bond Indicators by looking at different weighting schemes among the component indicators, how the correlations between the components shift over time (and if there is any information from those changes), and other considerations. Now that we've "dusted off" our classic bond indicators, there is plenty of additional research that can be done to build on the initial results shown in this report. Jean-Laurent Gagnon, Editor/Strategist jeang@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 We have built the Cyclical Bond Indicators using data going back to 1967 for most DM countries, allowing for a robust historical analysis across the different bond markets. 2 Since global bonds have experienced a powerful secular bull market over the past 35 years, the majority of monthly returns in the history of the Cyclical Bond Indicator have been positive. As such, shorting bonds in absolute terms has seldom proved to be a value-added proposition. The only exceptions are when the macro landscape has entered the Euphoria state, which has been quite rare. 3 In local currency terms 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Staying Behind The Curve, For Now", dated March 21, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Reports, "Will The Hawks Walk The Talk?", dated March 7, 2017 (on the U.K.), and "It's Real Growth, Not Fake News", dated February 21, 2017 (on Australia), both available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook", dated March 28, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "March Madness", dated March 14, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "Our Views On French Government Bonds", dated February 7, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com
Highlights Economic Outlook: The global economy is in a reflationary window that will stay open until mid-2018. Growth will then slow, culminating in a recession in 2019. While the recession is likely to be mild, the policy response will be dramatic. This will set the stage for a period of stagflation beginning in the early 2020s. Overall Strategy: Investors should overweight equities and high-yield credit during the next 12 months, while underweighting safe-haven government bonds and cash. However, be prepared to scale back risk next spring. Fixed Income: For now, stay underweight U.S. Treasurys within a global fixed-income portfolio; remain neutral on the euro area and the U.K.; and overweight Japan. Bonds will rally in the second half of 2018 as growth begins to slow, but then begin a protracted bear market. Equities: Favor higher-beta developed markets such as Europe and Japan relative to the U.S. in local-currency terms over the next 12 months. Emerging markets will benefit from the reflationary tailwind, but deep structural problems will drag down returns. Currencies: The broad trade-weighted dollar will appreciate by 10% before peaking in mid-2018. The yen still has considerable downside against the dollar. The euro will grind lower, as will the Chinese yuan. The pound is close to a bottom. Commodities: Favor energy over metals. Gold will move higher once the dollar peaks in the middle of next year. Feature Reflation, Recession, And Then Stagflation The investment outlook over the next five years can be best described as a three-act play: First Act: "Reflation" (The present until mid-2018) Second Act: "Recession" (2019) Third Act: "Stagflation" (2021 onwards) Investors who remain a few steps ahead of the herd will prosper. All others will struggle to stay afloat. Let us lift the curtain and begin the play. Act 1: Reflation Reflation Continues If there is one chart that best encapsulates the reflation theme, Chart 1 is it. It shows the sum of the Citibank global economic and inflation surprise indices. The combined series currently stands at the highest level in the 14-year history of the survey. Consistent with the surprise indices, Goldman's global Current Activity Indicator (CAI) has risen to the strongest level in three years. The 3-month average for developed markets stands at a 6-year high (Chart 2). Chart 1The Reflation Trade In One Chart Chart 2Current Activity Indicators Have Perked Up What accounts for the acceleration in economic growth that began in earnest in mid-2016? A number of factors stand out: The drag on global growth from the plunge in commodity sector investment finally ran its course. U.S. energy sector capex, for example, tumbled by 70% between Q2 of 2014 and Q3 of 2016, knocking 0.7% off the level of U.S. real GDP. The fallout for commodity-exporting EMs such as Brazil and Russia was considerably more severe. The global economy emerged from a protracted inventory destocking cycle (Chart 3). In the U.S., inventories made a negative contribution to growth for five straight quarters starting in Q2 of 2015, the longest streak since the 1950s. The U.K., Germany, and Japan also saw notable inventory corrections. Fears of a hard landing in China and a disorderly devaluation of the RMB subsided as the Chinese government ramped up fiscal stimulus. The era of fiscal austerity ended. Chart 4 shows that the fiscal thrust in developed economies turned positive in 2016 for the first time since 2010. Financial conditions eased in most economies, delivering an impulse to growth that is still being felt. In the U.S., for example, junk bond yields dropped from a peak of 10.2% in February 2016 to 6.3% at present (Chart 5). A surging stock market and rising home prices also helped buoy consumer and business sentiment. Chart 3Inventory Destocking Was A Drag On Growth Chart 4The End Of Fiscal Austerity? Chart 5Corporate Borrowing Costs Have Fallen Fine For Now... Looking out, global growth should stay reasonably firm over the next 12 months. Our global Leading Economic Indicator remains in a solid uptrend. Burgeoning animal spirits are powering a recovery in business spending, as evidenced by the jump in factory orders and capex intentions (Chart 6). The lagged effects from the easing in financial conditions over the past 12 months should help support activity. Chart 7 shows that the 12-month change in our U.S. Financial Conditions Index leads the business cycle by 6-to-9 months. The current message from the index is that U.S. growth will remain sturdy for the remainder of 2017. Chart 6Global Growth Will Stay Strong In The Near Term Chart 7Easing Financial Conditions Will Support Activity ... But Storm Clouds Are Forming Home prices cannot rise faster than rents or incomes indefinitely; nor can equity prices rise faster than earnings. Corporate spreads also cannot keep falling. As the equity and housing markets cool, and borrowing costs start climbing on the back of higher government bond yields, the tailwind from easier financial conditions will dissipate. When that happens - most likely, sometime next year - GDP growth will slow. In and of itself, somewhat weaker growth would not be much of a problem. After all, the economy is currently expanding at an above-trend pace and the Fed wants to tighten financial conditions to some extent - it would not be raising rates if it didn't! The problem is that trend growth is much lower now than in the past - only 1.8% according to the Fed's Summary of Economic Projections. Living in a world of slow trend growth could prove to be challenging. The U.S. corporate sector has been feasting on credit for the past four years (Chart 8). Household balance sheets are still in reasonably good shape, but even here, there are areas of concern. Student debt is going through the roof and auto loans are nearly back to pre-recession levels as a share of disposable income (Chart 9). Together, these two categories account for over two-thirds of non-housing related consumer liabilities. Chart 8U.S. Corporate Sector Has Been Feasting On Credit Chart 9U.S. Household Balance Sheets Are In Good Shape, But Auto And Student Loans Are A Potential Problem The risk is that defaults will rise if GDP growth falls below 2%, a pace that has often been described as "stall speed." This could set in motion a vicious cycle where slower growth causes firms to pare back debt, leading to even slower growth and greater pressure on corporate balance sheets - in other words, a recipe for recession. Act 2: Recession Redefining "Tight Money" "Expansions do not die of old age," Rudi Dornbusch once remarked, "They are killed by the Fed." On the face of it, this may not seem like much of a concern. If the Fed raises rates in line with the median "dot" in the Summary of Economic Projections, the funds rate will only be about 2.5% by mid-2019 (Chart 10). That may not sound like much, but keep in mind that the so-called neutral rate - the rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation - may be a lot lower now than in the past. Also keep in mind that it can take up to 18 months before the impact of tighter financial conditions take their full effect on the economy. Thus, by the time the Fed has realized that it has tightened monetary policy by too much, it may be too late. As we have argued in the past, a variety of forces have pushed down the neutral rate over time.1 For example, the amount of investment that firms need to undertake in a slow-growing economy has fallen by nearly 2% of GDP since the late-1990s (Chart 11). And getting firms to take on even this meager amount of investment may require a lower interest rate since modern production techniques rely more on human capital than physical capital. Chart 10Will The Fed's 'Gradual' Rate Hikes End Up Being Too Much? Chart 11Less Investment Required Rising inequality has also reduced aggregate demand by shifting income towards households with high marginal propensities to save (Chart 12). This has forced central banks to lower interest rates in order to prop up spending. From this perspective, it is not too surprising that income inequality and debt levels have been positively correlated over time (Chart 13). Chart 12Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Chart 13U.S.: Positive Correlation Between Income Inequality And Debt-To-GDP Then there is the issue of the dollar. The broad real trade-weighted dollar has appreciated by 19% since mid-2014 (Chart 14). According to the New York Fed's trade model, this has reduced the level of real GDP by nearly 2% relative to what it would have otherwise been. Standard "Taylor Rule" equations suggest that interest rates would need to fall by around 1%-to-2% in order to offset a loss of demand of this magnitude. This means that if the economy could withstand interest rates of 4% when the dollar was cheap, it can only withstand interest rates of 2%-to-3% today. And even that may be too high. Consider the message from Chart 15. It shows that real rates have been trending lower since 1980. The real funds rate averaged only 1% during the 2001-2007 business cycle, a period when demand was being buoyed by a massive, debt-fueled housing bubble; fiscal stimulus in the form of the two Bush tax cuts and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; a weakening dollar; and by a very benign global backdrop where emerging markets were recovering and Europe was doing well. Chart 14The Dollar Is In The Midst Of Its Third Great Bull Market Chart 15The Neutral Rate Has Fallen Today, the external backdrop is fragile, the dollar has been strengthening rather than weakening, and households have become more frugal (Chart 16). And while President Trump has promised plenty of fiscal largess, the reality may turn out to be a lot more sobering than the rhetoric. Chart 16Return To Thrift End Of The Trump Trade? Not Yet The failure to replace the Affordable Care Act has cast doubt in the eyes of many observers about the ability of Congress to pass other parts of Trump's agenda. As a consequence, the "Trump Trade" has gone into reverse over the past few weeks, pushing down the dollar and Treasury yields in the process. We agree that the "Trump Trade" will eventually fizzle out. However, this is likely to be more of a story for 2018 than this year. If anything, last week's fiasco may turn out to be a blessing in disguise for the Republicans. Opinion polls suggest that the GOP would have gone down in flames if the American Health Care Act had been signed into law (Table 1). Table 1Passing The American Health Care Act Could Have Cost The Republicans Dearly The GOP's proposed legislation would have reduced federal government spending on health care by $1.2 trillion over ten years. Sixty-four year-olds with incomes of $26,500 would have seen their annual premiums soar from $1,700 to $14,600. Even if one includes the tax cuts in the proposed bill, the net effect would have been a major tightening in fiscal policy. That would have warranted lower bond yields and a weaker dollar. The failure to pass an Obamacare replacement serves as a reminder that comprehensive tax reform will be more difficult to achieve than many had hoped. However, even if Republicans are unable to overhaul the tax code, this will not prevent them from simply cutting corporate and personal taxes. Worries that tax cuts will lead to larger budget deficits will be brushed aside on the grounds that they will "pay for themselves" through faster growth (dynamic scoring!). Throw some infrastructure spending into the mix, and it will not take much for the "Trump Trade" to return with a vengeance. Trump's Fiscal Fantasy Where the disappointment will appear is not during the legislative process, but afterwards. The highly profitable companies that will benefit the most from corporate tax cuts are the ones who least need them. In many cases, these companies have plenty of cash and easy access to external financing. As a consequence, much of the corporate tax cuts may simply be hoarded or used to finance equity buybacks or dividend payments. A large share of personal tax cuts will also be saved, given that they will mostly accrue to higher income earners. Chart 17From Unrealistic To Even More Unrealistic The amount of infrastructure spending that actually takes place will likely be a tiny fraction of the headline amount. This is not just because of the dearth of "shovel ready" projects. It is also because the public-private partnership structure the GOP is touting will severely limit the universe of projects that can be considered. Most of America's infrastructure needs consist of basic maintenance, rather than the sort of marquee projects that the private sector would be keen to invest in. Indeed, the bill could turn out to be little more than a boondoggle for privatizing existing public infrastructure projects, rather than investing in new ones. Chart 18Euro Area Credit Impulse Will Fade In The Second Half Of 2018 Meanwhile, the Trump administration is proposing large cuts to nondefense discretionary expenditures that go above and beyond the draconian ones that are already enshrined into current law (Chart 17). As such, the risk to the economy beyond the next 12 months is that markets push up the dollar and long-term interest rates in anticipation of continued strong growth and lavish fiscal stimulus only to get neither. Euro Area: A 12-Month Window For Growth The outlook for the euro area over the next 12 months is reasonably bright, but just as in the U.S., the picture could darken later next year. Euro area private sector credit growth reached 2.5% earlier this year. This may not sound like a lot, but that is the fastest pace of growth since July 2009. A further acceleration is probable over the coming months, given rising business confidence, firm loan demand, and declining nonperforming loans. Conceptually, it is the change in credit growth that drives GDP growth. Thus, as credit growth levels off next year, the euro area's credit impulse will fall back towards zero, setting the stage for a period of slower GDP growth (Chart 18). In contrast to the U.S., the ECB is likely to resist the urge to raise the repo rate before growth slows. That's the good news. The bad news is that the market could price in some tightening in monetary policy anyway, leading to a "bund tantrum" later this year. As in the past, the ECB will be able to defuse the situation. Unfortunately, what Draghi cannot do much about is the low level of the neutral rate in the euro area. If the neutral rate is low in the U.S., it is probably even lower in the euro area, reflecting the region's worse demographics and higher debt burdens. The anti-growth features of the common currency - namely, the inability to devalue one's currency in response to an adverse economic shock, as well as the austerity bias that comes from not having a central bank that can act as a lender of last resort to solvent but illiquid governments - also imply a lower neutral rate. Chart 19Anti-Euro Sentiment Is High In Italy Indeed, it is entirely possible that the neutral rate is negative in the euro area, even in nominal terms. If that's the case, the ECB will find it difficult to keep inflation from falling once the economy begins to slow late next year. The U.K.: And Now The Hard Part The U.K. fared better than most pundits expected in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that the Brexit vote has not cast a pall over the economy. The pound has depreciated by 11% against the euro and 16% against the dollar since that fateful day, while gilt yields have fallen across the board. Had it not been for this easing in financial conditions, the economic outcome would have been far worse. As the tailwind from the pound's devaluation begins to recede next year, the U.K. economy could suffer. Slower growth in continental Europe and the rest of the world could also exacerbate matters. The severity of the slowdown will hinge on the outcome of Brexit negotiations. On the one hand, the EU has an interest in taking a hardline stance to discourage separatist forces elsewhere, particularly in Italy where pro-euro sentiment is tumbling (Chart 19). On the other hand, the EU still needs the U.K. as both a trade partner and a geopolitical ally. Investors may therefore be surprised by the relatively muted negotiations that transpire over the coming months. In fact, news reports indicate that Brussels has already offered the U.K. a three year transitional deal that will give London plenty of time to conclude a free trade agreement with the EU. In addition, the EU has dangled the carrot of revocability, suggesting that the U.K. would be welcomed back with open arms if enough British voters were to change their minds. Whatever the path, our geopolitical service believes that political risk actually bottomed with the January 17 Theresa May speech.2 If that turns out to be the case, the pound is unlikely to weaken much from current levels. China And EM: The Calm Before The Storm? The Chinese economy should continue to perform well over the coming months. The Purchasing Manager Index for manufacturing remains in expansionary territory and BCA's China Leading Economic Indicator is in a clear uptrend (Charts 20 and 21). Chart 20Bright Spots In The Chinese Economy Chart 21Improving LEI Points To Further Growth Acceleration Moreover, there has been a dramatic increase in the sales of construction equipment such as heavy trucks and excavators, with growth rates matching levels last seen during the boom years before the global financial crisis. Historically, construction machinery sales have been tightly correlated with real estate development (Chart 22). Reflecting this reflationary trend, the producer price index rose by nearly 8% year-over-year in February, a 14-point swing from the decline of 6% experienced in late-2015. Historically, rising producer prices have resulted in higher corporate profits and increased capital expenditures, especially among private enterprises (Chart 23). Chart 22An Upturn In Housing Construction? Chart 23Higher Producer Prices Boosting Profits The key question is how long the good news will last. As in the rest of the world, our guess is that the Chinese economy will slow late next year, setting the stage for a major growth disappointment in 2019. Weaker growth abroad will be partly to blame, but domestic factors will also play a role. The Chinese housing market has been on a tear. The authorities are increasingly worried about a property bubble and have begun to tighten the screws on the sector. The full effect of these measures should become apparent sometime next year. Fiscal policy is also likely to be tightened at the margin. The IMF estimates that China benefited from a positive fiscal thrust of 2.2% of GDP between 2014 and 2016. The fiscal thrust is likely to be close to zero in 2017 and turn negative to the tune of nearly 1% of GDP in 2018 and 2019. The growth outlook for other emerging markets is likely to mirror China's. The IMF expects real GDP in emerging and developing economies to rise by 5.1% in Q4 of 2017 relative to the same quarter a year earlier, up from 4.2% in 2016 (Table 2). The biggest acceleration is expected to occur in Brazil, where the economy is projected to grow by 1.4% in 2017 after having contracted by 1.9% in 2016. Russia and India should also see better growth numbers. Table 2World Economic Outlook: Global Growth Projections We do not see any major reason to challenge these numbers for this year, but think the IMF's projections will turn out to be too rosy for 2018, and especially, 2019. As BCA's Emerging Market Strategy service has documented, the lack of structural reforms in EMs over the past few years has depressed productivity growth. High debt levels also cloud the picture. Chart 24 shows that debt levels have continued to grow as a share of GDP in most emerging markets. In EMs such as China, where banks benefit from a fiscal backstop, the likelihood of a financial crisis is low. In others such as Brazil, where government finances are in precarious shape, the chances of another major crisis remains uncomfortable high. Japan: The End Of Deflation? If there is one thing investors are certain about it is that deflationary forces in Japan are here to stay. Despite a modest increase in inflation expectations since July 2016, CPI swaps are still pricing in inflation of only 0.6% over the next two decades, nowhere close to the Bank of Japan's 2% target. But could the market be wrong? We think so. Many of the forces that have exacerbated deflation in Japan, such as corporate deleveraging and falling property prices, have run their course (Chart 25). The population continues to age, but the impact that this is having on inflation may have reached an inflection point. Over the past quarter century, slow population growth depressed aggregate demand by reducing the incentive for companies to build out new capacity. This generated a surfeit of savings relative to investment, helping to fuel deflation. Now, however, as an ever-rising share of the population enters retirement, the overabundance of savings is disappearing. The household saving rate currently stands at only 2.8% - down from 14% in the early 1990s - while the ratio of job openings-to-applicants has soared to a 25-year high (Chart 26). Chart 24What EM Deleveraging? Chart 25Japan: Easing Deflationary Forces Chart 26Japan: Low Household Saving Rate And A Tightening Labor Market Government policy is finally doing its part to slay the deflationary dragon. The Abe government shot itself in the foot by tightening fiscal policy by 3% of GDP between 2013 and 2015. It won't make the same mistake again. The Bank of Japan's efforts to pin the 10-year yield to zero also seems to be bearing fruit. As bond yields in other economies have trended higher, this has made Japanese bonds less attractive. That, in turn, has pushed down the yen, ushering in a virtuous cycle where a falling yen props up economic activity, leading to higher inflation expectations, lower real yields, and an even weaker yen. Unfortunately, external events could conspire to sabotage Japan's escape from deflation. If the global economy slows in late-2018 - leading to a recession in 2019 - Japan will be hard hit, given the highly cyclical nature of its economy. And this could cause Japanese policymakers to throw the proverbial kitchen sink at the problem, including doing something that they have so far resisted: introducing a "helicopter money" financed fiscal stimulus program. Against the backdrop of weak potential GDP growth and a shrinking reservoir of domestic savings, the government may get a lot more inflation than it bargained for. Act 3: Stagflation Who Remembers The 70s Anymore? By historical standards, the 2019 recession will be a mild one for most countries, especially in the developed world. This is simply because the excesses that preceded the subprime crisis in 2007 and, to a lesser extent the tech bust in 2000, are likely to be less severe going into the next global downturn than they were back then. The policy response may turn out to be anything but mild, however. Memories of the Great Recession are still very much vivid in most peoples' minds. No one wants to live through that again. In contrast, memories of the inflationary 1970s are fading. A recent NBER paper documented that age plays a big role in determining whether central bankers turn out to be dovish or hawkish.3 Those who experienced stagflation in the 1970s as adults are much more likely to express a hawkish bias than those who were still in their diapers back then. The implication is the future generation of central bankers is likely to see the world through more dovish eyes than their predecessors. Even if one takes the generational mix out of the equation, there are good reasons to aim for higher inflation in today's environment. For one thing, debt is high. The simplest way to reduce real debt burdens is by letting inflation accelerate. In addition, the zero bound is less likely to be a problem if inflation were higher. After all, if inflation were running at 1% going into a recession, real rates would not be able to fall much below -1%. But if inflation were running at 3%, real rates could fall to as low as -3%. The Politics Of Inflation Political developments will also facilitate the transition to higher inflation. In the U.S., the presidential election campaign will start coming into focus in 2019. If the economy enters a recession then, Donald Trump will go ballistic. The infrastructure program that Republicans in Congress are downplaying now will be greatly expanded. Gold-plated hotels and casinos will be built across the country. Of course, several years could pass between when an infrastructure bill is passed and when most new projects break ground. By that time, the economy will already be recovering. This will help fuel inflation. As the economy turns down in 2019, the Fed will also be forced to play ball. The market's current obsession over whether President Trump wants a "dove" or a "hawk" as Fed chair misses the point. He wants neither. He wants someone who will do what they are told. This means that the next Fed chair will likely be a "really smart" business executive with little-to-no-experience in central banking and even less interest in maintaining the Federal Reserve's institutional independence. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that inflation tends to be higher in countries that lack independent central banks (Chart 27). This may be the fate of the U.S. Chart 27Inflation Higher In Countries Lacking Independent Central Banks Europe's Populists: Down But Not Out Whether something similar happens in Europe will also depend on political developments. For the next 18 months at least, the populists will be held at bay (Chart 28). Le Pen currently trails Macron by 24 percentage points in a head-to-head contest. It is highly unlikely that she will be able to close this gap between now and May 7th, the date of the second round of the Presidential contest. In Germany, support for the europhile Social Democratic Party is soaring, as is support for the common currency itself. For the time being, euro area risk assets will be able to climb the proverbial political "wall of worry." However, if the European economy turns down in 2019, all this may change. Chart 29 shows the strong correlation between unemployment rates in various French départements and support for Marine Le Pen's National Front. Should French unemployment rise, her support will rise as well. The same goes for other European countries. Chart 28France And Germany: Populists Held At Bay For Now Chart 29Higher Unemployment Would Benefit Le Pen Meanwhile, there is a high probability that the migrant crisis will intensify at some point over the next few years. Several large states neighboring Europe are barely holding together - Egypt being a prime example - and could erupt at any time. Furthermore, demographic trends in Africa portend that the supply of migrants will only increase. In 2005, the United Nations estimated that sub-Saharan Africa's population will increase to 2 billion by the end of the century, up from one billion at present. In its 2015 revision, the UN doubled its estimate to 4 billion. And even that may be too conservative because it assumes that the average number of births per woman falls from 5.1 to 2.2 over this period (Chart 30). Chart 30Population Pressures In Africa The existing European political order is not well equipped to deal with large-scale migration, as the hapless reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis demonstrates. This implies that an increasing share of the public may seek out a "new order" that is more attuned to their preferences. European history is fraught with regime shifts, and we may see yet another one in the 2020s. The eventual success of anti-establishment politicians on both sides of the Atlantic suggests that open border immigration policies and free trade - the two central features of globalization - will come under attack. Consequently, an inherently deflationary force, globalization, will give way to an inherently inflationary one: populism. The Productivity Curse Just as the "flation" part of stagflation will become more noticeable as the global economy emerges from the 2019 recession, so will the "stag." Chart 31 shows that productivity growth has fallen across almost all countries and regions. There is little compelling evidence that measurement error explains the productivity slowdown.4 Cyclical factors have played some role. Weak investment spending has curtailed the growth in the capital stock. This means that today's workers have not benefited from the same improvement in the quality and quantity of capital as they did in previous generations. However, the timing of the productivity slowdown - it began in 2004-05 in most countries, well before the financial crisis struck - suggests that structural factors have been key. Most prominently, the gains from the IT revolution have leveled off. Recent innovations have focused more on consumers than on businesses. As nice as Facebook and Instagram are, they do little to boost business productivity - in fact, they probably detract from it, given how much time people waste on social media these days. Human capital accumulation has also decelerated, dragging productivity growth down with it. Globally, the fraction of adults with a secondary degree or higher is increasing at half the pace it did in the 1990s (Chart 32). Educational achievement, as measured by standardized test scores in mathematics, is edging lower in the OECD, and is showing very limited gains in most emerging markets (Chart 33).5 Given that test scores are extremely low in most countries with rapidly growing populations, the average level of global mathematical proficiency is now declining for the first time in modern history. Chart 31Productivity Growth Has Slowed In Most Major Economies Chart 32The Contribution To Growth From Rising Human Capital Is Falling Chart 33Math Skills Around The World Productivity And Inflation The slowdown in potential GDP growth tends to be deflationary at the outset, but becomes inflationary later on (Chart 34). Initially, lower productivity growth reduces investment, pushing down aggregate demand. Lower productivity growth also curtails consumption, as households react to the prospect of smaller real wage gains. Chart 34A Decline In Productivity Growth Is Deflationary In The Short Run, But Inflationary In The Long Run Eventually, however, economies that suffer from chronically weak productivity growth tend to find themselves rubbing up against supply-side constraints. This leads to higher inflation.6 One only needs to look at the history of low-productivity economies in Africa and Latin America to see this point - or, for that matter, the U.S. in the 1970s, a decade during which productivity growth slowed and inflation accelerated. Financial Markets Overall Strategy Risk assets have enjoyed a strong rally since late last year, and a modest correction is long overdue. Still, as long as the global economy continues to grow at a robust pace, the cyclical outlook for risk assets will remain bullish. As such, investors with a 12-month horizon should stay overweight global equities and high-yield credit at the expense of government bonds and cash. Global growth is likely to slow in the second half of 2018, with the deceleration intensifying into 2019, possibly culminating in a recession in a number of countries. To what extent markets "sniff out" an economic slowdown before it happens is a matter of debate. U.S. equities did not peak until October 2007, only slightly before the Great Recession began. Commodity prices did not top out until the summer of 2008. Thus, the market's track record for predicting recessions is far from an envious one. Nevertheless, investors should err on the side of safety and start scaling back risk exposure next spring. The 2019 recession will last 6-to-12 months, followed by a gradual recovery that sees the restoration of full employment in most countries by 2021. At that point, inflation will take off, rising to over 4% by the middle of the decade. The 2020s will be remembered as a decade of intense pain for bond investors. In relative terms, equities will fare better than bonds, but in absolute terms they will struggle to generate a positive real return. As in the 1970s, gold will be the standout winner. Chart 35 presents a visual representation of how the main asset markets are likely to evolve over the next seven years. Chart 35Market Outlook For Major Asset Classes Equities Cyclically Favor The Euro Area And Japan Over The U.S. Stronger global growth is powering an acceleration in corporate earnings. Global EPS is expected to expand by 12% over the next 12 months. Analysts are usually too bullish when it comes to making earnings forecasts. This time around they may be too bearish. Chart 36 shows that the global earnings revision ratio has turned positive for the first time in six years, implying that analysts have been behind the curve in revising up profit projections. We prefer euro area and Japanese stocks relative to U.S. equities over a 12-month horizon. We would only buy Japanese stocks on a currency-hedged basis, as the prospect of a weaker yen is the main reason for being overweight Japan. In contrast, we would still buy euro area equities on a U.S. dollar basis, even though our central forecast is for the euro to weaken against the dollar over the next 12 months. Our cyclically bullish view on euro area equities reflects several considerations. For starters, they are cheap. Euro area stocks currently trade at a Shiller PE ratio of only 17, compared with 29 for the U.S. (Chart 37). Some of this valuation gap can be explained by different sector weights across the two regions. However, even if one controls for this factor, as well as the fact that euro area stocks have historically traded at a discount to the U.S., the euro area still comes out as being roughly one standard deviation cheap compared with the U.S. (Chart 38). Chart 36Global Earnings Picture Looking Brighter Chart 37Euro Area Stocks Are A Bargain... Chart 38...No Matter How You Look At It European Banks Are In A Cyclical Sweet Spot Of course, if euro area banks flounder over the next 12 months as they have for much of the past decade, none of this will matter. However, we think that the region's banks have finally turned the corner. The ECB is slowly unwinding its emergency measures and core European bond yields have risen since last summer. This has led to a steeper yield curve, helping to flatter net interest margins. Chart 39 shows that the relative performance of European banks is almost perfectly correlated with the level of German bund yields. Our European Corporate Health Monitor remains in improving territory, in contrast to the U.S., where it has been deteriorating since 2013 (Chart 40). Profit margins in Europe have room to expand, whereas in the U.S. they have already maxed out. The capital positions of European banks have also improved greatly since the euro crisis. Not all banks are out of the woods, but with nonperforming loans trending lower, the need for costly equity dilution has dissipated (Chart 41). Meanwhile, euro area credit growth is accelerating and loan demand continues to expand. Chart 39Performance Of European Banks And Bond Yields: A Good Fit Chart 40Corporations Healthier In The Euro Area Chart 41Cyclical Background Positive For Bank Stocks Beyond a 12-month horizon, the outlook for euro area banks and the broader stock market look less enticing. The region will suffer along with the rest of the world in 2019. The eventual triumph of populist governments could even lead to the dissolution of the common currency. This means that euro area stocks should be rented, not owned. The same goes for U.K. equities. EM: Uphill Climb Emerging market equities tend to perform well when global growth is strong. Thus, it would not be surprising if EM equities continue to march higher over the next 12 months. However, the structural problems plaguing emerging markets that we discussed earlier in this report will continue to cast a pall over the sector. Our EM strategists favor China, Taiwan, Korea, India, Thailand, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Russia. They are neutral on Singapore, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and South Africa; and are underweight Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Peru, and Turkey. Fixed Income Global Bond Yields To Rise Further We put out a note on July 5th entitled "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" recommending that clients go structurally underweight safe-haven government bonds.7 As luck would have it, we penned this report on the very same day that the 10-year Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%. We continue to think that asset allocators should maintain an underweight position in global bonds over the next 12 months. In relative terms, we favor Japan over the U.S. and have a neutral recommendation on the euro area and the U.K. Chart 42The Market Expects 50 Basis Points Of Tightening Over The Next 12 Months Underweight The U.S. For Now We expect the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield to rise to around 3.2% over the next 12 months. The Fed is likely to raise rates by a further 100 basis points over this period, about 50 bps more than the 12-month discounter is currently pricing in (Chart 42). In addition, the Fed will announce later this year or in early 2018 that it will allow the assets on its balance sheet to run off as they mature. This could push up the term premium, giving long Treasury yields a further boost. Thus, for now, investors should underweight Treasurys on a currency-hedged basis within a fixed-income portfolio. The cyclical peak for both Treasury yields and the dollar should occur in mid-2018. Slowing growth in the second half of that year and a recession in 2019 will push the 10-year Treasury yield back towards 2%. After that, bond yields will grind higher again, with the pace accelerating in the early 2020s as the stagflationary forces described above gather steam. Neutral On Europe, Overweight Japan Yields in the euro area will follow the general contours of the U.S., but with several important qualifications. The ECB is likely to roll back some of its emergency measures over the next 12 months, including suspending the Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations, or TLTROs. It could also raise the deposit rate slightly, which is currently stuck in negative territory. However, in contrast to the Fed, the ECB is unlikely to hike its key policy rate, the repo rate. And while the ECB will "taper" asset purchases, it will not take any steps to shrink the size of its balance sheet. As such, fixed-income investors should maintain a benchmark allocation to euro area bonds. Chart 43A Bit More Juice Left A benchmark weighting to gilts is also warranted. With the Brexit negotiations hanging in the air, it is doubtful that the Bank of England would want to hike rates anytime soon. On the flipside, rising inflation - though largely a function of a weak currency - will make it difficult for the BoE to increase asset purchases or take other steps to ease monetary policy. We would recommend a currency-hedged overweight position in JGBs. The Bank of Japan is committed to keeping the 10-year yield pinned to zero. Given that neither actual inflation nor inflation expectations are anywhere close to that level, it is highly unlikely that the BoJ will jettison its yield-targeting regime anytime soon. With government bond yields elsewhere likely to grind higher, this makes JGBs the winner by default. High-Yield Credit: Still A Bit Of Juice Left The fact that the world's most attractive government bond market by our rankings - Japan - is offering a yield of zero speaks volumes. As long as global growth stays strong and corporate default risk remains subdued, investors will maintain their love affair with high-yield credit. Thus, while credit spreads have fallen dramatically, they could still fall further (Chart 43). Only when corporate stress begins to boil over in late 2018 will things change. Nevertheless, investors will continue to face headwinds from rising risk-free yields in most economies even in the near term. This implies that the return from junk bonds in absolute terms will fall short of what is delivered by equities over the next 12 months. Currencies And Commodities Chart 44Real Rate Differentials Are Driving Up The Dollar Real Rate Differentials Will Support The Greenback We expect the real trade-weighted dollar to appreciate by about 10% over the next 12 months. Historically, changes in real interest rate differentials have been the dominant driver of currency movements in developed economies. The past few years have been no different. Chart 44 shows that the ascent of the trade-weighted dollar since mid-2014 has been almost perfectly matched by an increase in U.S. real rates relative to those abroad. Interest rate differentials between the U.S. and its trading partners are likely to widen further through to the middle of 2018 as the Fed raises rates more quickly than current market expectations imply, while other central banks continue to stand pat. Accordingly, we would fade the recent dollar weakness. As we discussed in "The Fed's Unhike," the March FOMC statement was not as dovish as it might have appeared at first glance.8 Given that monetary conditions eased in the aftermath of the Fed meeting - exactly the opposite of what the Fed was trying to achieve - it is likely that the FOMC's rhetoric will turn more hawkish in the coming weeks. The Yen Has The Most Downside, The Pound The Least Among the major dollar crosses, we see the most downside for the yen over the next 12 months. The Bank of Japan will continue to keep JGB yields anchored at zero. As yields elsewhere rise, investors will shift their money out of Japan, causing the yen to weaken. Only once the global economy begins to teeter into recession late next year will the yen - traditionally, a "risk off" currency - begin to rebound. The euro will also weaken against the dollar over the next 12 months, although not as much as the yen. The ECB's "months to hike" has plummeted from nearly 60 last summer to 26 today (Chart 45). That seems too extreme. Core inflation in the euro area is well below U.S. levels, even if one adjusts for measurement differences between the two regions (Chart 46). The neutral rate is also lower in the euro area, as discussed previously. This sharply limits the ability of the ECB to raise rates. Chart 45Market's Hawkish View Of The ECB Is Too Extreme Chart 46Core Inflation In The U.S. Is Still Higher, Even Excluding Housing Unlike most currencies, sterling should be able to hold its ground against the dollar over the next 12 months. The pound is very cheap by most metrics (Chart 47). The prospect of contentious negotiations over Brexit with the EU is already in the price. What may not be in the price is the possibility that the U.K. will move quickly to reach a deal with the EU. If such a deal fails to live up to the promises made by the Brexit campaign - a near certainty in our view - a new referendum may need to be scheduled. A new vote could yield a much different result than the first one. If the market begins to sniff out such an outcome, the pound could strengthen well before the dust settles. EM And Commodity Currencies The RMB will weaken modestly against the dollar over the coming year. As we have discussed in the past, China's high saving rate will keep the pressure on the government to try to export excess production abroad by running a large current account surplus. This requires a weak currency.9 Nevertheless, a major devaluation of the RMB is not in the cards. Much of the capital flight that China has experienced recently has been driven by an unwinding of the hot money flows that entered the country over the preceding years. Despite all the talk about a credit bubble, Chinese external debt has fallen by around $400 billion since its peak in mid-2014 - a decline of over 50% (Chart 48). At this point, most of the hot money has fled the country. This suggests that the pace of capital outflows will subside. Chart 47Pound: Cheap By All Accounts Chart 48Hot Money In, Hot Money Out A somewhat weaker RMB could dampen demand for base and bulk metals. A slowdown in Chinese construction activity next year could also put added pressure on metals prices. Our EM strategists are especially bearish on the South African rand, Brazilian real, Colombian peso, Turkish lira, Malaysian ringgit, and Indonesian rupiah. Crude should outperform metals over the next 12 months. This will benefit the Canadian dollar and other oil-sensitive currencies. However, Canada's housing bubble is getting out of hand and could boil over if domestic borrowing costs climb in line with rising long-term global bond yields. A sagging property sector will limit the ability of the Bank of Canada to raise short-term rates. On balance, we see modest downside for the CAD/USD over the coming year. The Aussie dollar will suffer even more, given the country's own housing excesses and its export sector's high sensitivity to metal prices. Finally, a few words on the most of ancient of all currencies: gold. We do not expect bullion to fare well over the next 12 months. A stronger dollar and rising bond yields are both bad news for the yellow metal. However, once central banks start slashing rates in 2019 and stagflationary forces begin to gather steam in the early 2020s, gold will finally have its day in the sun. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Seven Structural Reasons For A Lower Neutral Rate In The U.S.," dated March 13, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The "What Can You Do For Me" World?" dated January 25, 2017, and Special Report, "Will Scotland Scotch Brexit?" dated March 29, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Ulrike Malmendier, Stefan Nagel, and Zhen Yan, "The Making Of Hawks And Doves: Inflation Experiences On The FOMC," NBER Working Paper No. 23228 (March 2017). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Weak Productivity Growth: Don't Blame The Statisticians," dated March 25, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Taking Off The Rose-Colored Glasses: Education And Growth In The 21st Century," dated February 24, 2011, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Note to economists: We can think of this relationship within the context of the Solow growth model. The model says that the neutral real rate, r, is equal to (a/s) (n + g + d), where a is the capital share of income, s is the saving rate, n is labor force growth, g is total factor productivity growth, and d is the depreciation rate of capital. In the standard setup where the saving rate is fixed, slower population and productivity growth will always result in a lower equilibrium real interest rate. However, consider a more realistic setup where: 1) the saving rate rises initially as the population ages, but then begins to decline as a larger share of the workforce enters retirement; and 2) habit persistence affects consumer spending, so that households react to slower real wage growth by saving less rather than cutting back on consumption. In that sort of environment, the neutral rate could initially fall, but then begin to rise. If the central bank reacts slowly to changes in the neutral rate, or monetary policy is otherwise constrained by the zero bound on interest rates and/or political considerations, the initial effect of slower trend GDP growth will be deflationary while the longer-term outcome will be inflationary. 7 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Unhike," dated March 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Does China Have A Debt Problem Or A Savings Problem?" dated February 24, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report This month's Special Report, on Scotland's role in Brexit negotiations, was penned by our colleagues Matt Gertken, Marko Papic, and Jesse Kurri of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Scottish secessionist sentiment has increased in response to First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's decision to push for a second popular referendum on Scottish independence, tentatively set for late 2018 or early 2019, though likely to be denied for some time by Westminster. The outcome of a referendum on leaving the U.K., which eventually will occur, is too close to call at this point. The possibility will influence the U.K.'s negotiations with the EU, and vice versa. The risk of a U.K. break-up adds an important constraint to Prime Minister Theresa May's government in the Brexit talks. Since the EU also has an interest in avoiding a devastating outcome for the U.K., our geopolitical team believes that the worst version of a "hard Brexit" will be avoided. That said, independence for Scotland cannot be ruled out, particularly in the context of any adverse economic shock stemming from the U.K.'s divorce proceedings. I trust that you will find the report as insightful as I did. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President A second Scottish referendum will be "too close to call"; There is upside potential to the 45% independence vote of 2014; Scots may vote with their hearts instead of their heads; But the EU will not seek to dismember the U.K. ... ...And that may keep the kingdom united. "No sooner did Scots Men appear inclined to set Matters upon a better footing, than the Union of the two Kingdoms was projected, as an effectual measure to perpetuate their Chains and Misery." - George Lockhart, Memoirs Concerning The Affairs Of Scotland, 1714. British Prime Minister Theresa May has had a busy week. On Monday she met with Scotland's First Minister Nicola Sturgeon as part of a tour of the United Kingdom to drum up national unity. On Wednesday she communicated with European Council President Donald Tusk and formally invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, initiating the process of the U.K.'s withdrawal from the European Union. And on that day and Thursday, she turns to the parliamentary battle over the "Great Repeal Bill" that will replace the 1972 European Communities Act, which until now translated European law into British law. Brexit is finally getting under way. As our colleague Dhaval Joshi puts it, the "Phoney War" has ended, and now the real battle begins.1 Indeed, the dynamic has truly shifted in recent weeks. Not because PM May invoked Article 50, which was expected, but rather because Scottish secessionist sentiment has ticked up in reaction to Sturgeon's decision to hold a second popular referendum on Scottish independence (Chart II-1), tentatively set for late 2018 or early 2019. Scottish voters are still generally opposed to holding a second referendum, but the gap is narrowing (Chart II-2). A sequel to the September 2014 referendum was always in the cards in the event of a Brexit vote. Financial markets called it, by punishing equities domiciled in Scotland following the U.K.'s EU referendum (Chart II-3). The timing of the move toward a second referendum is significant for two reasons. First, the odds of Scotland actually voting to leave have increased relative to 2014, even as the economic case for secession has worsened. Second, Scotland's threat of leaving will impact the U.K.'s negotiations with the EU, slated to end in March 2019.2 Chart II-1A Second Independence Referendum... Chart II-2...Is Looking More Likely Chart II-3Scottish Stocks Have Underperformed BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service believes that a second Scottish referendum will eventually take place. And as with the Brexit referendum, the outcome will be "too close to call," at least judging by the data available at present. In what follows we discuss why, and how Scotland could influence the Brexit negotiations, and vice versa. While the U.K. can avoid the worst version of a "hard Brexit," the high risk of a break-up of the U.K. will add urgency to negotiations with the EU. Why Scotland Rejected "Freedom" In 2014 In a Special Report on "Secession In Europe," in May 14, 2014, we argued that the incentives for separatism in Europe had weakened and that this trend specifically applied to Scotland:3 The world is a scary place: Whereas the market-friendly 1990s fueled regional aspirations to independence by suggesting that the world was fundamentally secure and that "the End of History" was nigh, the multipolar twenty-first century discourages those aspirations, with nation-states fighting to maintain their integrity. For Scotland, the Great Recession drove home the dangers of socio-economic instability. EU and NATO membership is difficult to obtain: Scotland could not be assured to find easy accession to the EU as it faced opposition from states like Spain, which wanted to discourage Catalan independence. Enlargement of the EU and NATO have both become increasingly difficult and Scotland would need a special dispensation. The United States and the European Union vociferously discouraged Scotland from striking out on its own ahead of the 2014 referendum. Domestic politics: The Great Recession revived old fissures in every country, including the old Anglo-Scots divide. The U.K. imposed budgetary austerity while Scotland opposed it. Left-leaning Scotland resented the rightward shift in the U.K., ruled by the Conservative Party after 2010. We also highlighted some of Scotland's particular impediments to independence: Energy: Scotland's domestic sources of energy are in structural decline. This would weigh on the fiscal balance and domestic private demand. The referendum actually signaled a top in the oil market, with oil prices collapsing by 58% in 2014. Deficits and debt: Scotland's public finances would get worse if it left the U.K. If that had happened in 2014, it was estimated that the country's fiscal deficit would have been 5.9% of GDP and that its national debt would have been 109% of GDP. (Today those numbers are 8% and 84% of GDP respectively) (Table II-1). A newborn Scotland would have to adopt austerity quickly. Table II-1Scotland Would Be A High-Debt Economy Central banking: If Scotland walked away from its share of the U.K.'s national debt, yet retained the pound unilaterally and without the blessing of the BoE, it would lose access to the English central bank as lender of last resort. And if it walked away from its U.K. debt obligation and the pound, then it would also lose its financial sector and much of its wealth, which would be newly redenominated into a Scots national currency. Scotland is every bit as reliant on the financial sector as the U.K. as a whole (Chart II-4), making for a major constraint on any political rupture that threatens to force it to change currencies or lose control of monetary policy. Chart II-4Highly Financialized Societies Politics: We also posited that domestic political changes in the U.K. could provide inducements to keep Scotland in the union, particularly if the Conservatives suffered in the 2015 elections. The opposite, in fact, occurred, sowing the seeds for today's confrontation. For all these reasons, we argued that the risks of Scottish secession were overstated. The September 2014 referendum confirmed our forecast. The economic prospects were simply too daunting outside the U.K. But the 45% pro-independence tally also left open the possibility for another referendum down the line. Bottom Line: Scottish independence did not make sense in 2014 for a range of geopolitical, political, and economic reasons. But note that while independence still does not make economic sense, the political winds have shifted. Scottish antagonism toward the Conservative leadership in England has only intensified, while it remains to be seen how the European Union will respond to Scotland in a post-Brexit world. The Three Kingdoms Chart II-5Three Cheers For Brexit And The Tories In our Strategic Outlook for 2017, we argued that the British public not only did not regret the Brexit referendum outcome, but positively rallied around the flag because of it. This helped set up an environment in which the ruling party could charge forward aggressively and pursue the outcome confirmed by the vote (Chart II-5). Brexit does indeed mean Brexit. We have since seen that the Tories have forced parliament's hand in approving the bill authorizing the government to initiate exit proceedings. It stood to reason that the crux of tensions would shift to the domestic sphere, i.e. to the troubling constitutional problems that Brexit would provoke between what were once called "the Three Kingdoms," England (and Wales), Scotland, and Northern Ireland.4 While 52% of the U.K. public voted to leave the EU, the subdivision reveals the stark regional differences: England and Wales voted to leave (53.4% and 52.5% respectively), while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to stay (62% and 55.8% respectively). Scotland and the London metropolitan area were the clear outliers. The Scottish parliament is a devolved parliament subordinate to the U.K. parliament in Westminster, and it cannot hold a legally binding referendum on independence without the latter's permission.5 The May government is insisting that it will not allow a referendum to go forward until the Brexit negotiations are completed. This is an obvious strategic need. Although the Scottish National Party (SNP), the dominant party in Edinburgh, could hold a non-binding referendum at any time to apply pressure on London (reminder: the Brexit vote was also non-binding), it has an interest in waiting to see whether public opinion of Brexit will shift in England and what kind of deal the U.K. might get from the EU in the exit negotiations. Eventually, however, Scotland is likely to push for a new vote. The SNP is a party whose raison d'être is independence sooner or later. It faces a once-in-a-generation opportunity, with the 2014 referendum producing an encouraging result and Brexit adding new impetus. The party manifesto made clear in 2016 that a new independence vote would be justified in case of "a significant and material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against our will." Why have the odds of Scottish independence increased? First, Brexit removes a domestic political constraint on independence. After the Brexit vote, the SNP and other pro-independence groups can say that England changed the status quo, not Scotland. It is worth remembering that the Anglo-Scots union was forged in 1707 at a time of severe Scottish economic hardship, in which a common market was the primary motivation to merge governments. Today, Scotland's comparable interest lies in maintaining access to the European single market, which is now under threat from Westminster. In particular, as with the U.K. as a whole, Scotland stands to suffer from a decline in immigration and hence workforce growth (Chart II-6). Second, Brexit removes an external constraint. The EU's official opposition to Scottish independence, particularly European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso's threat that Scottish accession would be "extremely difficult, if not impossible," likely affected the outcome of the 2014 referendum. Of course, many Scots rejected all such warnings as the vote approached, with polls showing a rally just before the referendum date toward the 45% outcome (Chart II-7). But if the EU's warnings even had a temporary effect, what happens if the EU gives a nod and wink this time around? While EU officials have recently reiterated the so-called "Barroso doctrine," we suspect that they are less likely to play an interventionist role under the new circumstances. Spain - which is still concerned about Scotland fanning Catalan ambitions - might be less vocal this time, since Madrid could plausibly argue that Brexit makes a material difference from its own case. Catalonians could not argue, like the Scots, that their parent country attempted to deprive them of access to the European Single Market. Chart II-6Immigration Curbs Threaten Scots Growth Chart II-7Scottish Patriots Only Temporarily Deterred To put this into context, remember that it is not historically unusual for continental Europe to act as a patron to Scotland to keep England in check. There is ample record of this behavior, namely French and Spanish patronage of the exiled Stuart kings after 1688. The situation is very different today, but the analogy is not absurd: insofar as Brexit undermines the integrity of the EU, the EU can be expected to reciprocate by not doing everything in its power to defend the integrity of the U.K. All is fair in love and war. Nevertheless, the economic constraints to Scottish secession are even clearer than they were in 2014: The North Sea is drying up: Scotland's North Sea energy revenues have essentially collapsed to zero (Chart II-8). Meanwhile the long-term prospects for the North Sea oil production remain as bleak as they were in 2014, especially since oil prices halved. Reserves of oil and gas are limited, hovering at around five to eight years' worth of supply - i.e. not a good basis for long-term independence (Chart II-9). Decommissioning costs are also expected to be high as the sector is wound down. Chart II-8No Golden Goose In The North Sea Chart II-9Limited Domestic Energy Supplies England still foots many bills: Total government expenditures in Scotland exceed the total revenue raised in Scotland by about £15 billion or 28% of Scotland's government revenue (Chart II-10). Scottish finances stand at risk: Scotland's fiscal, foreign exchange, and monetary policy dilemmas are as discouraging as they were in 2014 (Chart II-11). Judging by the value of financial assets (which come under risk if Scotland loses the BoE's support or changes currencies), Scotland is incredibly exposed to financial risk (Chart II-12). Chart II-10The U.K. Pays For Scotland's Allegiance Chart II-11Scotland's Deficits Getting Worse Thus, while key domestic political and foreign policy impediments may be removed, the country's internal economic impediments remain gigantic. Moreover, Scotland already has most of the characteristics of a nation state. It has its own legal and education system, prints its own banknotes, and has some powers of taxation (about 40% of revenue). It lacks a standing army and full fiscal control, but in these cases it clearly benefits from partnering with England. It also has a strong sense of national identity, regardless of whether it is technically independent. Chart II-12Scottish Financial Assets Need Currency Stability Why, then, do we believe Scottish independence is too close to call? Because Brexit has shown that "math" is insufficient! The Scots may go with their hearts against their heads, just as many English voters did in favor of Brexit. Nationalism and political polarization are a two-way street. History also shows that strictly materialist or quantitative assessments cannot anticipate paradigm shifts or national leaps into the unknown. Compare Ireland in 1922, the year of its independence from the U.K. Ireland was far less prepared to strike out on its own than Scotland is today. It comprised a smaller share of the U.K.'s population, workforce, and GDP than Scotland today (Charts II-13 and II-14). It was less educated and less developed relative to its neighbors, and it faced unemployment rates above 30%. Yet it chose independence anyway - out of political will and sheer Celtic grit. Ireland's case was very different than Scotland's today, but there is an interesting parallel. The U.K. was absorbed with continental affairs, the Americans played the role of external economic patron, and the Irish were ready to seize their once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Today the U.K. is similarly distracted with Europe, and the SNP leadership is ready to seize the moment, having revealed its preference in 2014. But foreign support (in this case the EU's) will be a critical factor, even though the EU's common market is much less valuable to Scotland than the U.K.'s (Chart II-15). Chart II-13Irish Independence: Poverty Not An Obstacle Chart II-14Scotland: If The Irish Can Do It So Can We Chart II-15EU Market No Substitute For British Market Will the SNP be able to get enough votes? We know that more Scots voted to stay in the EU (62%) than voted to stay in the U.K. (55%), which in a crude sense implies that there is upside potential to the first referendum outcome. However, looking at the referendum results on the local level, it becomes clear that there is no correlation between Scottish secessionists and Europhiles, or unionists and Euroskeptics (Chart II-16). Nor is there any marked correlation between level of education and the desire for independence, as was the case in Brexit. Yet there is evidence that love of the Union Jack is correlated with age (Chart II-17). Youngsters are willing to take risks for the thrill of freedom, while their elders better understand the benefits from economic links and transfer payments. In the short and medium run, this suggests that demographics will continue to work against independence - reinforcing the fact that the SNP can wait to see what kind of deal the U.K. gets first.6 Chart II-16No Relationship Between IndyRef And Brexit Chart II-17Old Folks Loyal To The Union Jack The most striking indicator of Scottish secessionism is unemployment (Chart II-18). Thus an economic downturn that impacts Scotland, for example as result of uncertainty over Brexit, poses a critical risk to the union. The SNP will be quick to blame even a shred of economic pain on Tory-dominated Westminster. The British government and BoE have shown a commitment to use accommodative monetary and fiscal policy to smooth over the transition period, and they have fiscal room for maneuver (Chart II-19), but much will depend on what kind of a deal London gets from the EU and whether the markets remain calm. Chart II-18Joblessness Boosts Independence Vote Chart II-19The U.K. Has Room To Maneuver Bottom Line: Economics is an argument against Scottish independence, but history and politics are unclear. We simply note that independence cannot be ruled out, particularly in the context of any adverse economic shock stemming from the U.K.'s actual divorce proceedings. Will Scotland Scotch Brexit? From the beginning of the Brexit saga, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has argued that Britain, of all EU members, was uniquely predisposed and positioned to leave the union. Hence the referendum was "too close to call."7 This did not mean that the U.K. could do so without consequences. Leaving would be detrimental (albeit not apocalyptic) to the U.K.'s economy, particularly by harming service exports to the EU and reducing labor force growth via stricter immigration controls. In the event, upside economic surprises have occurred, though of course Brexit has not happened yet.8 How does the Scottish referendum threat affect the Brexit negotiations? This is much less clear and will require constant monitoring over the coming two years, and perhaps longer if the European Council agrees to extend the negotiating period (which would require a unanimous vote). Still, we can draw a few conclusions from the above. First, London is a price taker not a price maker. It cannot afford not to agree to a trade deal or transition deal of some sort upon leaving in 2019. Even if England were willing to walk away from the EU's offers, a total rupture (reversion to minimal WTO trade rules) would be unacceptable to Scotland after being denied a say in the negotiation process. Therefore Scotland is now a moderating force on the Tory leadership that is otherwise unconstrained by domestic politics due to the high level of support for May's government (see Chart II-5, page 24). To save the United Kingdom, the Tories may simply have to accept what Europe is willing to give. This supports our view that the risk of a total diplomatic war between Europe and the U.K. is unlikely and that expectations of cross-channel fireworks may be overdone. Second, Scotland is twice the price taker, because it can only afford independence from the U.K. if the EU is willing to grant it a special arrangement. This is possible, but difficult to see happen early in the negotiations process. It will be important to monitor Brussels' statements on Scottish independence carefully for signs that the EU is taking a tough stance on Brexit negotiations. Sturgeon has to play it safe and see what kind of a deal May brings back from Brussels. By waiting, she can profit from Scottish indignation over both May's use of prerogative to block the referendum in the first place and then over the Brexit deal itself, when it takes place. Third, the saving grace for both countries is that it is not in Europe's interest to dismantle the U.K., or to force it into a debilitating economic crisis. We have long differed from the view that the EU will be remorseless in its negotiations over Brexit. The EU seeks extensive trade engagements with every European country, from Norway and Switzerland to Iceland and Turkey, because its interest lies in expanding markets and forging alliances. Europe is not Russia, seeking to impose punitive economic embargoes on Ukraine and Belarus for failure to conform to its market standards. While free trade agreements usually take longer than two years to negotiate, and while the CETA agreement between the EU and Canada is a recent and relevant example of the risks for the U.K., the U.K. and EU are already highly integrated, unlike the two parties in most other bilateral trade negotiations. In addition, the U.K. is a military and geopolitical ally of key European states. The U.K.-EU negotiations are not being conducted in a ceteris paribus economic laboratory, but are occurring in 2017, a year in which Russian assertiveness, transnational terrorism and migration, and global multipolarity are all shared risks to both the U.K. and EU. Investment Implications Since January 17 - the date of Theresa May's speech calling for the exit from the common market - we have argued that the worst is probably over for the U.K.9 Yes, the EU negotiations will be tough and the British press - surprisingly lacking the stiff upper lip of its readers - will make mountains out of molehills. However, by saying no to the common market, Theresa May plays the role of a spouse who does not want to fight over the custody of the children, thus defusing the divorce proceedings. Our Geopolitical Strategy service has been short EUR/GBP since mid-January and the trade is down 2%. This suggests that the market has been in "wait and see mode" since the speech. We are comfortable with this trade regardless of our analysis on the rising probability of the Scottish referendum for two reasons: Hard Brexit is less likely: Many Tory MPs have had a tough time getting behind the "hard Brexit" policy, but until now they have had a tough time expressing their displeasure. However, the threat of Scottish independence and the dissolution of the U.K. will give the members of the Conservative and Unionist Party (as it is officially known) plenty of ammunition to push May towards a softer Brexit outcome. This should be bullish GBP in ceteris paribus terms. It's not the seventeenth century: We do not expect the EU to act like seventeenth-century France and subvert U.K. unity, at least not this early in the negotiations. For clients who expect the "knives to come out," we offer Scottish independence as a critical test of the thesis. Let's see if the EU is ready to play dirty and if it decides to alter the "Barroso doctrine" for Scotland. If they do, then our sanguine thesis is truly wrong. To be clear, we do not have high conviction that the pound will outperform either the euro or the U.S. dollar. Instead, we offer this currency trade as a way to gauge our political thesis that the U.K.-EU negotiations will likely go more smoothly than the market expects. Matt Gertken Associate Editor Geopolitical Strategy Marko Papic Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Jesse Anak Kuri Research Analyst Geopolitical Strategy 1 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Phoney War Ends. Battle Begins," dated March 16, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Article 50 allows for a two-year negotiation period, after which the departing party may have an exit deal but is not guaranteed a trade deal for the future. The negotiation period can be extended with a unanimous vote in the European Council. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Secession In Europe: Scotland And Catalonia," dated May 14, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Brexit: The Three Kingdoms," in Strategic Outlook, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 The union of the kingdoms of Scotland and England is a power "reserved" to parliament and the crown in Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act of 1998. Altering the union would therefore require the U.K. and Scottish parliaments to agree to devolve the power to Scotland using Section 30(2) of the same act, which the monarch would then endorse. This was the case in 2012 when the 2014 referendum was initiated. 6 On the other hand, demographics also may work against Brexit in the long run, given that - as our colleague Peter Berezin has said in the past - many who voted to leave the EU will eventually pass away. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, and "BREXIT Update: Brexit Means Brexit, Until Brexit," dated September 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Highlights A second Scottish referendum will be "too close to call"; There is upside potential to the 45% independence vote of 2014; Scots may vote with their hearts instead of their heads; But the EU will not seek to dismember the U.K. ... ...And that may keep the kingdom united. We are tactically short EUR/GBP and USD/GBP. Feature "For who is it that would not prefer the greatest Hardships attended with Liberty, to a State that deprived him of all means to defend himself against the Oppressions that must inevitably follow [the Union of the two Crowns]." "No sooner did Scots Men appear inclined to set Matters upon a better footing, than the Union of the two Kingdoms was projected, as an effectual measure to perpetuate their Chains and Misery." - George Lockhart, Memoirs Concerning The Affairs Of Scotland, 1714. British Prime Minister Theresa May has had a busy week. On Monday she met with Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon as part of a tour of the United Kingdom to drum up national unity. On Wednesday she communicated with European Council President Donald Tusk and formally invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, initiating the process of the U.K.’s withdrawal from the European Union. And on that day and Thursday, she turns to the parliamentary battle over the “Great Repeal Bill” that will replace the 1972 European Communities Act, which until now translated European law into British law. Brexit is finally getting under way. As our colleague Dhaval Joshi puts it, the “Phoney War” has ended, and now the real battle begins.1 Indeed, the dynamic has truly shifted in recent weeks. Not because PM May invoked Article 50, which was expected, but rather because Scottish secessionist sentiment has ticked up in reaction to Sturgeon's decision to hold a second popular referendum on Scottish independence (Chart 1), tentatively set for late 2018 or early 2019. Scottish voters are still generally opposed to holding a second referendum, but the gap is narrowing (Chart 2). A sequel to the September 2014 referendum was always in the cards in the event of a Brexit vote. Financial markets pretty much called it, by punishing equities domiciled in Scotland following the U.K.'s EU referendum (Chart 3). The timing of the move toward a second referendum is significant for two reasons. First, the odds of Scotland actually voting to leave have increased relative to 2014, even as the economic case for secession has worsened. Second, Scotland's threat of leaving will impact the U.K.'s negotiations with the EU, slated to end in March 2019.2 Chart 1A Second Independence Referendum... Chart 2...Is Looking More Likely Chart 3Scottish Stocks Have Underperformed BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service believes that a second Scottish referendum will eventually take place. And as with the Brexit referendum, it is "too close to call," at least judging by the data available at present. In what follows we discuss the ways in which Scotland could influence the Brexit negotiations, and vice versa. While the U.K. can avoid the worst version of a "hard Brexit," the high risk of a break-up of the U.K. will add urgency to negotiations with the EU. Why Scotland Rejected "Freedom" In 2014 In a Special Report on "Secession In Europe," in May 14, 2014, we argued that the incentives for separatism in Europe had weakened and that this trend specifically applied to Scotland:3 The world is a scary place: Whereas the market-friendly 1990s fueled regional aspirations to independence by suggesting that the world was fundamentally secure and that "The End of History" was nigh, the multipolar twenty-first century discourages those aspirations, with nation-states fighting to maintain their integrity. For Scotland, the Great Recession especially drove home the dangers of socio-economic instability. EU and NATO membership is difficult to obtain: Scotland could not be assured to find easy accession to the EU as it faced opposition from states like Spain, which wanted to discourage Catalan independence. Enlargement of the EU and NATO have both become increasingly difficult and Scotland would need a special dispensation. The United States and the European Union vociferously discouraged Scotland from striking out on its own ahead of the 2014 referendum. Domestic politics: The Great Recession revived old fissures in every country, including the old Anglo-Scots divide. The U.K. imposed budgetary austerity while Scotland opposed it. Left-leaning Scotland opposed the rightward shift in the U.K., ruled by the Conservative Party after 2010. We also highlighted some of Scotland's particular impediments to independence: Energy: Scotland's domestic sources of energy are in structural decline. This would weigh on the fiscal balance and domestic private demand. The referendum actually signaled a top in the oil market, with oil prices collapsing by 58% in 2014. Deficits and debt: Scotland's public finances would get worse if it left the U.K. The fiscal deficit, in 2014, would have been 5.9% of GDP and the national debt would have been 109% of GDP - now those numbers are 8% and 84% of GDP respectively (Table 1). A newborn Scotland would have to adopt austerity quickly. Central banking: If Scotland walked away from its share of the U.K.'s national debt, yet retained the pound unilaterally and without the blessing of the BoE, it would lose access to the English central bank as lender of last resort. And if it walked away from its U.K. debt obligation and the pound, then it would also lose its financial sector and much of its wealth, which would be newly redenominated into a Scots national currency. Scotland is every bit as reliant on the financial sector as the U.K. as a whole (Chart 4), making for a major constraint on any political rupture that threatens to force it to change currencies or lose control of monetary policy. Politics: We also posited that domestic political changes in the U.K. could provide inducements to keep Scotland in the union, particularly if the Conservatives suffered in the 2015 elections. The opposite, in fact, occurred, sowing the seeds for today's confrontation. Table 1Scotland Would Be A High-Debt Economy Chart 4Highly Financialized Societies For all these reasons, we argued that the risks of Scottish secession were overstated. The September 2014 referendum confirmed our forecast. The economic prospects were simply too daunting outside the U.K. But the 45% pro-independence tally also left open the possibility for another referendum down the line. Bottom Line: Scottish independence did not make sense in 2014 for a range of geopolitical, political, and economic reasons. But note that while independence still does not make economic sense, the political winds have shifted. Scottish antagonism toward the Conservative leadership in England has only intensified, while it remains to be seen how the European Union will respond to Scotland in a post-Brexit world. The Three Kingdoms In our Strategic Outlook for 2017, we argued that the British public not only did not regret the Brexit referendum outcome, but positively rallied around the flag because of it. This helped set up an environment in which the ruling party could charge forward aggressively and pursue the outcome confirmed by the vote (Chart 5). Brexit indeed does mean Brexit. We have since seen that the Tories have forced parliament's hand in approving the bill authorizing the government to initiate exit proceedings. Chart 5Three Cheers For Brexit & The Tories It stood to reason that the crux of tensions would shift to the domestic sphere, i.e. to the troubling constitutional problems that Brexit would provoke between what were once called "the Three Kingdoms," England (and Wales), Scotland, and Northern Ireland.4 While 52% of the U.K. public voted to leave the EU, the subdivision reveals the stark regional differences: England and Wales voted to leave (53.4% and 52.5% respectively), while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to stay (62% and 55.8% respectively). Scotland and the London metropolitan area were the clear outliers. The Scottish parliament is a devolved parliament subordinate to the U.K. parliament in Westminster, and it cannot hold a legally binding referendum on independence without the latter's permission.5 The May government is insisting that it will not allow a referendum to go forward until the Brexit negotiations are completed. This is an obvious strategic need. Although the Scottish National Party (SNP), the dominant party in Edinburgh, could hold a non-binding referendum at any time to apply pressure on London (reminder: the Brexit vote was also non-binding), it has an interest in waiting to see whether public opinion of Brexit will shift in England and what kind of deal the U.K. might get from the EU in the exit negotiations. Eventually, however, Scotland is likely to push for a new vote. The SNP is a party whose raison d'être is independence sooner or later. It faces a once-in-a-generation opportunity, with the 2014 referendum producing an encouraging result and Brexit adding new impetus. The party manifesto made clear in 2016 that it would call for a new independence vote in case of "a significant or material change" in Scotland's constitutional circumstances - a clear hint at Brexit. Why have the odds of Scottish independence increased? First, Brexit removes a domestic political constraint on independence. After the Brexit vote, the SNP and other pro-independence groups can say that England changed the status quo, not Scotland. It is worth remembering that the Anglo-Scots union was forged in 1707 at a time of severe Scottish economic hardship, in which a common market was the primary motivation to merge governments. Today, Scotland's comparable interest lies in maintaining access to the European single market, which is now under threat from Westminster. In particular, as with the U.K. as a whole, Scotland stands to suffer from a decline in immigration and hence workforce growth (Chart 6). Second, Brexit removes an external constraint. The EU's official opposition to Scottish independence, particularly European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso's threat that Scottish accession would be "extremely difficult, if not impossible," likely affected the outcome of the 2014 referendum. Of course, many Scots rejected all such warnings as the vote approached, with polls showing a rally just before the referendum date toward the 45% outcome (Chart 7). But if the EU's warnings even had a temporary effect, what happens if the EU gives a nod and wink this time around? While EU officials have recently reiterated the so-called "Barroso doctrine," we suspect that they are less likely to play an interventionist role under the new circumstances. Spain - which is still concerned about Scotland fanning Catalan ambitions - might be less vocal this time, since Madrid could plausibly argue that Brexit makes a material difference from its own case. Catalonians could not argue, like the Scots, that their parent country attempted to deprive them of access to the European Single Market. Chart 6Immigration Curbs Threaten Scots Growth Chart 7Scottish Patriots Only Temporarily Deterred To put this into context, remember that it is not historically unusual for continental Europe to act as a patron to Scotland to keep England in check. There is ample record of this behavior, namely French and Spanish patronage of the exiled Stuart kings after 1688. The situation is very different today, but the analogy is not absurd: insofar as Brexit undermines the integrity of the EU, the EU can be expected to reciprocate by not doing everything in its power to defend the integrity of the U.K. All is fair in love and war. Nevertheless, the economic constraints to Scottish secession are even clearer than they were in 2014: The North Sea is drying up: Scotland's North Sea energy revenues have essentially collapsed to zero (Chart 8). Meanwhile the long-term prospects for the North Sea oil production remain as bleak as they were in 2014, especially since oil prices halved. Reserves of oil and gas are limited, hovering at around five to eight years' worth of supply - i.e. not a good basis for long-term independence (Chart 9). Decommissioning costs are also expected to be high as the sector is wound down. Chart 8No Golden Goose In The North Sea Chart 9Limited Domestic Energy Supplies England still foots many bills: Total government expenditures in Scotland exceed the total revenue raised in Scotland by about £15 billion or 28% of Scotland's government revenue (Chart 10). Chart 10The U.K. Pays For Scotland's Allegiance Chart 11Scotland's Deficits Getting Worse Scottish finances stand at risk: Scotland's fiscal, foreign exchange, and monetary policy dilemmas are as discouraging as they were in 2014 (Chart 11). Judging by the value of financial assets (which come under risk if Scotland loses the BoE's support or changes currencies), Scotland is incredibly exposed to financial risk (Chart 12). Chart 12Scottish Financial Assets Need Currency Stability Thus, while key domestic political and foreign policy impediments may be removed, the country's internal economic impediments remain gigantic. Moreover, Scotland already has most of the characteristics of a nation state. It has its own legal and education system, prints its own banknotes, and has some powers of taxation (about 40% of revenue). It lacks a standing army and full fiscal control, but in these cases it clearly benefits from partnering with England. It also has a strong sense of national identity, regardless of whether it is technically independent. Why, then, do we believe Scottish independence is too close to call? Because Brexit has shown that "math" is insufficient! The Scots may go with their hearts against their heads, just as many English voters did in favor of Brexit. Nationalism and political polarization are a two-way street. History also shows that strictly materialist or quantitative assessments cannot anticipate paradigm shifts or national leaps into the unknown. Compare Ireland in 1922, the year of its independence from the U.K. Ireland was far less prepared to strike out on its own than Scotland is today. It comprised a smaller share of the U.K.'s population, workforce, and GDP than Scotland today (Charts 13 and 14). It was less educated and less developed relative to its neighbors, and it faced unemployment rates above 30%. Yet it chose independence anyway - out of political will and sheer Celtic grit. Chart 13Irish Independence: Poverty Not An Obstacle Chart 14Scotland: If The Irish Can Do It So Can We Ireland's case was very different than Scotland's today, but there is an interesting parallel. The U.K. was absorbed with continental affairs, the Americans played the role of external economic patron, and the Irish were ready to seize their once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Today the U.K. is similarly distracted with Europe, and the SNP leadership is ready to seize the moment, having revealed its preference in 2014. But foreign support (in this case the EU's) will be a critical factor, even though the EU's common market is much less valuable to Scotland than the U.K.'s (Chart 15). Will the SNP be able to get enough votes? We know that more Scots voted to stay in the EU (62%) than voted to stay in the U.K. (55%), which in a crude sense implies that there is upside potential to the first referendum outcome. However, looking at the referendum results on the local level, it becomes clear that there is no correlation between Scottish secessionists and Europhiles, or unionists and Euroskeptics (Chart 16). Nor is there any marked correlation between level of education and the desire for independence, as was the case in Brexit. Yet there is evidence that love of the Union Jack is correlated with age (Chart 17). Youngsters are willing to take risks for the thrill of freedom, while the elders better understand the benefits from economic links and transfer payments. In the short and medium run, this suggests that demographics will continue to work against independence - reinforcing the fact that the SNP can wait to see what kind of deal the U.K. gets first.6 Chart 15EU Market No Substitute For British Market Chart 16No Relationship Between IndyRef And Brexit Chart 17Old Folks Loyal To The Union Jack The most striking indicator of Scottish secessionism is unemployment (Chart 18). Thus an economic downturn that impacts Scotland, for example as result of uncertainty over Brexit, poses a critical risk to the union. The SNP will be quick to blame even a shred of economic pain on Tory-dominated Westminster. The British government and BoE have shown a commitment to use accommodative monetary and fiscal policy to smooth over the transition period, and they have fiscal room for maneuver (Chart 19), but much will depend on what kind of a deal London gets from the EU and whether the markets remain calm. Chart 18Joblessness Boosts Independence Vote Chart 19The U.K. Has Room To Maneuver Bottom Line: Economics is an argument against Scottish independence, but history and politics are unclear. We simply note that independence cannot be ruled out, particularly in the context of any adverse economic shock stemming from the U.K.'s actual divorce proceedings. Will Scotland Scotch Brexit? From the beginning of the Brexit saga, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has argued that Britain, of all EU members, was uniquely predisposed and positioned to leave the union. Hence the referendum was "too close to call."7 This did not mean that the U.K. could do so without consequences. Leaving would be detrimental (albeit not apocalyptic) to the U.K.'s economy, particularly by harming service exports to the EU and reducing labor force growth via stricter immigration controls. In the event, upside economic surprises have occurred, but Brexit has not happened yet.8 How does the Scottish referendum threat affect the Brexit negotiations? This is much less clear and will require constant monitoring over the coming two years, and perhaps longer if the European Council agrees to extend the negotiating period (which would require a unanimous vote). Still, we can draw a few conclusions from the above. First, London is a price taker not a price maker. It cannot afford not to agree to a trade deal or transition deal of some sort upon leaving in 2019. Even if England were willing to walk away from the EU's offers, a total rupture (reversion to minimal WTO trade rules) would be unacceptable to Scotland after being denied a say in the negotiation process. Therefore Scotland is now a moderating force on the Tory leadership that is otherwise unconstrained by domestic politics due to the high level of support for May's government (see Chart 5, page 5). To save the United Kingdom, the Tories may simply have to accept what Europe is willing to give. This supports our view that the risk of a total diplomatic war between Europe and the U.K. is unlikely and that expectations of cross-channel fireworks may be overdone. Second, Scotland is twice the price taker, because it can only afford independence from the U.K. if the EU is willing to grant it a special arrangement. This is possible, but difficult to see happen early in the negotiations process. It will be important to monitor Brussels' statements on Scottish independence carefully for signs that the EU is taking a tough stance on Brexit negotiations. Sturgeon has to play it safe and see what kind of a deal May brings back from Brussels. By waiting, she can profit from Scottish indignation over both May's use of prerogative to block the referendum in the first place and then over the Brexit deal itself, when it takes place. Third, the saving grace for both countries is that it is not in Europe's interest to dismantle the U.K., or to force it into a debilitating economic crisis. We have long differed from the view that the EU will be remorseless in its negotiations over Brexit. The EU seeks extensive trade engagements with every European country, from Norway and Switzerland to Iceland and Turkey, because its interest lies in expanding markets and forging alliances. Europe is not Russia, seeking to impose punitive economic embargoes on Ukraine and Belarus for failure to conform to its market standards. While free trade agreements usually take longer than two years to negotiate, and while the CETA agreement between the EU and Canada is a recent and relevant example of the risks for the U.K., the U.K. and EU are already highly integrated, unlike the two parties in most other bilateral trade negotiations. In addition, the U.K. is a military and geopolitical ally of key European states. The U.K.-EU negotiations are not being conducted in a ceteris paribus economic laboratory, but are occurring in 2017, a year in which Russian assertiveness, transnational terrorism, and global multipolarity are all shared risks to both the U.K. and EU. Investment Implications Since January 17 - the date of Theresa May's speech calling for the exit from the Common Market - we have argued that the worst is probably over for the U.K.9 Yes, the EU negotiations will be tough and the British press - surprisingly lacking the stiff upper lip of its readers - will make mountains out of molehills. However, by saying no to the Common Market, Theresa May plays the role of a spouse who does not want to fight over the custody of the children, thus defusing the divorce proceedings. We have been short EUR/GBP since mid-January and the trade is down only 1.96%, suggesting that the market has been in "wait and see mode" since the speech. We are comfortable with this trade regardless of our analysis on the rising probability of the Scottish referendum for two reasons: Hard Brexit is less likely: Many Tory MPs have had a tough time getting behind the "hard Brexit" policy, but until now they have had a tough time expressing their displeasure. However, the threat of Scottish independence and the dissolution of the U.K. will give the members of the Conservative and Unionist Party (as it is officially known) plenty of ammunition to push May towards a softer Brexit outcome. This should be bullish GBP in ceteris paribus terms. It's not the seventeenth century: We do not expect the EU to act like seventeenth-century France and subvert U.K. unity, at least not this early in the negotiations. For clients who expect the "knives to come out," we offer Scottish independence as a critical test of the thesis. Let's see if the EU is ready to play dirty and if it decides to alter the "Barroso doctrine" for Scotland. If they do, then our sanguine thesis is truly wrong. On the other hand, our short EUR/GBP trade may be threatened by a potential surge in bullish euro sentiment as French election risks abate and the ECB threatens hawkish rhetoric. We have just gone long EUR/USD on a three-to-six month basis for these reasons. As such, we would suggest that clients go short USD/GBP instead. To be clear, we do not have high conviction that the pound will outperform either the euro or the U.S. dollar. Instead, we offer these currency trades as a way to gauge our political thesis that the U.K.-EU negotiations will likely go more smoothly than the market expects. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Phoney War Ends. Battle Begins," dated March 16, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Article 50 allows for a two-year negotiation period, after which the departing party may have an exit deal but is not guaranteed a trade deal for the future. The negotiation period can be extended with a unanimous vote in the European Council. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Secession In Europe: Scotland And Catalonia," dated May 14, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Brexit: The Three Kingdoms," in Strategic Outlook, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 The union of the kingdoms of Scotland and England is a power "reserved" to parliament and the crown in Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act of 1998. Altering the union would therefore require the U.K. and Scottish parliaments to agree to devolve the power to Scotland using Section 30(2) of the same act, which the monarch would then endorse. This was the case in 2012 when the 2014 referendum was initiated. 6 On the other hand, demographics also works against Brexit in the long run, given that - as our colleague Peter Berezin has said in the past - many who voted to leave the EU will eventually pass away. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, and "BREXIT Update: Brexit Means Brexit, Until Brexit," dated September 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The 'What Can You Do For Me' World?" dated January 25, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar
Special Report Highlights The years since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis have been dominated by the major central banks emptying their toolkits to fight off deflationary pressures and sustain even modest nominal growth rates. Extraordinary policy measues like quantitative easing, negative interest rates and "forward guidance" were all intended to be signals to expect nothing but stimulative monetary policy, even if there were brief pickups in growth or realized inflation rates. This helped suppress both bond yields and volatility, forcing investors to take on more risk to generate acceptable returns in fixed income markets. Now, however, there are signs that the world economy may finally be becoming a bit more "normal" after the years of malaise. While growth can hardly be described as booming, there are a growing number of countries that appear to have passed the worst phase of the excess capacity/deflation pressures that dominated the post-crisis era. This is creating more two-way risk with regards to central bank decisions than we have seen for some time. In this Special Report, we update one of our favorite tools to assess the potential for monetary policy changes, the BCA Central Bank Monitors. We present them in a chartbook format with a focus on the relationship to government bond yields. Feature An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators that are designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future central bank policy decisions. We created Monitors for the major developed economies: the U.S., Euro Area, Japan, the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The list of data series used to construct the Monitors is not the same for each country, but the components generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand pressures, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc) Right now, the Monitors are rising in a coordinated fashion for the first time since 2011 (Chart 1 on Page 1). What is different in 2017 is that there is much less spare capacity in the developed economies than there was six years ago. For central bankers who still adhere to the Phillips curve tradeoff of unemployment versus inflation, tight labor markets alongside highly accommodative policy settings pose a problem. In the rest of this report, we show the individual Central Bank Monitors, along with measures of spare capacity and inflation for each country. We also show the correlations between the Monitors and changes in government bond yields, both before and after the 2008 Crisis. Correlations have shifted in the post-crisis era, but there are still some reliable relationships that can provide signals for bond investors. The broad conclusions: Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) are the ideal country overweight in a world where all other developed economy central banks are witnessing rising cyclical pressures, while bonds in the U.K., Australia and New Zealand are likely to struggle as central banks in those regions become increasingly hawkish (Chart 2). Chart 1More Central Banks Are Under Pressure To Tighten Chart 2Tightening Pressures (Ex-Japan) ##br##Can Push Bond Yields Higher The Fed Monitor Is Pointing To Additional U.S. Rate Hikes Our Fed Monitor has just recently pushed above the zero line, indicating the need for the Fed to tighten policy (Chart 3A). The Fed already began raising the funds rate back in late 2015, but this was the beginning of normalizing the crisis-era policy settings rather than a move to offset improving U.S. cyclical conditions. The latter is now indeed happening, and it is perhaps no surprise that the Fed has just delivered 50bps of rate hikes in a span of three months. Chart 3AU.S.: Fed Monitor Chart 3BNo Spare Capacity In The U.S. Chart 3CThe Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To ##br##Shorter Maturity U.S. Treasuries We still see the Fed pursuing a relatively gradual process of raising rates further in 2017, but in line with the current FOMC projections of another 50bps of tightening before year-end. Measures like the output gap and the unemployment gap (unemployment relative to the level consistent with stable inflation) show no spare capacity in the U.S. economy (Chart 3B). At the same time, core inflation continues to only grind higher and inflation expectations are also drifting up towards the Fed's 2% target. This can hardly be qualified as an "overheating" economy that needs a sharp tightening of monetary conditions, particularly with the still-expensive U.S. dollar not providing any stimulus. The correlations between our Fed Monitor and the year-over-year changes in U.S. Treasury yields (Chart 3C) have been extremely low since the 2008 Crisis - unsurprising with the Fed keeping the funds rate near zero for most of that period while also buying large amounts of Treasuries. While the correlations appear to be shifting on the margin, we still see the Treasury curve steepening first (via rising inflation expectations), then flattening later (through tighter monetary conditions). BoE Monitor Calling For Tighter U.K. Policy Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor is at very elevated levels (Chart 4A), driven by a combination of improving production data and high inflation. There is much more bubbling beneath the surface, however. The more domestically-focused components of the Monitor are losing some upward momentum, while the inflation elements are also starting to top out as the big post-Brexit depreciation of the Pound is losing momentum. Chart 4AU.K.: BoE Monitor Chart 4BTight Capacity In The U.K. Chart 4CGilts Are At Risk From A More Hawkish Turn From The BoE This is creating a dilemma for the BoE - respond to high U.K. inflation with tighter monetary policy, or focus on the slowdown in domestic demand and do nothing? The BoE signaled in February that the biggest concern for policy was a slump in consumer spending led by lower real income growth on the back of rising inflation. Yet at the March policy meeting, one BoE member even voted to raise rates and others raised concerns about the elevated level of U.K inflation. With even policymakers unsure about their next move, the marginal swings in U.K. growth should have an even greater impact on Gilt yields. The U.K. economy is running around full capacity and both headline and core inflation are rising (Chart 4B). Somewhat surprisingly, the correlations between changes in Gilt yields and our BoE Monitor have actually increased since the 2008 Crisis (Chart 4C). This raises a potential risk for the Gilt market if the BoE decides that the U.K. economy is not slowing as much as it is expecting. For now, we continue to recommend a neutral stance on Gilts until there is greater clarity on the state of the economy. ECB Monitor Reflects A Less Deflationary Backdrop In Europe Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor has recently crept above the zero line for the first time in three years (Chart 5A). This is driven mostly by the current uptrend in headline inflation in the Euro Area, but also by the steady improvement in economic growth. Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BExcess Capacity in Europe Dwindling Fast Chart 5CStable Correlations Between The ECB Monitor & The Front End Of The Yield Curve The Euro Area is the one economy presented in this report where no indicator (either the output gap or unemployment gap) is pointing to a lack of spare capacity (Chart 5B). All of the rise in headline Euro Area inflation can be attributable to base effects related to last year's rise in oil prices and decline in the euro. The latest ECB projections call for core inflation to return to just under 2% in 2019, suggesting that there is no hurry to begin tightening monetary policy. Yet the ECB remains in an asset purchase program which is set to expire at the end of this year, so a policy decision must be made in the next 3-6 months. We expect the ECB to begin tapering its bond buying in the first quarter of 2018, with interest rate hikes to follow after the tapering has been completed. The ECB could raise rates before tapering to try and minimize the impact on Peripheral sovereign and corporate bond yields (it is buying both), although that would likely create a greater degree of tightening than the ECB would like before full employment is reached. Given the strong correlations between our ECB Monitor and much of the Euro Area yield curve (Chart 5C), however, we anticipate moving soon to an underweight stance on Euro Area bonds after our recent downgrade to neutral. BoJ Monitor: Nothing To See Here Our BoJ Monitor has been in the "easier policy required" zone for most of the past 25 years, barring a brief blip above the zero line that heralded the rate hikes in 2006/07 (Chart 6A). Inadequate growth and excess capacity remain the biggest problem with Japan's economy, preventing any meaningful upturn in inflation beyond that caused by higher commodity prices or a weaker yen. Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BTight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Chart 6CLonger-Maturity JGB Yields Have No Correlation To The BoJ Monitor Even with Japan operating at full employment, with an unemployment rate at 3%, there has barely been any acceleration in wages or core inflation (Chart 6B). The only way out of this for Japan is to keep monetary policy settings as easy as possible to ensure that there is enough growth to eat away at the remaining spare capacity in the Japanese economy. That means keeping both policy rates and the yen as low as possible, and hoping that this will cause enough of a rise in inflation expectations to lower real interest rates and boost domestic demand. As an added "kicker", the BoJ is even anchoring the long end of the Japan yield curve by targeting a 0% yield level on 10-year government debt - a policy that we do not expect to change anytime soon. We see Japan as a low-beta "safe haven" government bond market in an environment where other central banks are seeing some tightening pressures and Japanese bonds have virtually no correlation to the BoJ Monitor (Chart 6C). We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Japan within an overall defensively positioned government bond portfolio with below-benchmark duration exposure. BoC Monitor: No Big Need To Tighten In Canada Our Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has recently moved into positive territory (Chart 7A) , primarily due to some improvement in growth and higher commodity prices. Given the close linkages between the U.S. and Canadian economies, we include some U.S. growth variables in our BoC Monitor and these are also helping boost the indicator. However, there are no signs that the Canadian economy is overheating - unless you are trying to buy a home in Toronto - with both the output gap and unemployment gap not yet in positive territory (Chart 7B). Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BStill Not Much Inflation In Canada Chart 7CThe BoC Monitor Is Highly Correlated To Shorter-Maturity Canadian Bonds The BoC is maintaining a dovish bias at the moment. Some of that has to do with the uncertainty over the U.S. economic outlook, especially with regards to the fiscal and trade policies of the Trump administration. While a boost to U.S. growth via a fiscal easing could help support Canadian exports to the U.S., any move to renegotiate trade agreements involving the two countries could end up hurting the Canadian economy. Add to that the concerns over the bubbly valuations of Canadian real estate that could be pricked by even modest rate increases, and the BoC will likely not want to contemplate any early tightening of monetary policy. The higher correlations between our BoC Monitor and the front end of the Canadian yield curve (Chart 7C) suggest that a bear flattener would be the appropriate trade if and when the BoC does contemplate a rate hike. For now, however, we see that as a low-probability event and we are maintaining a neutral stance on Canadian bonds until there is greater clarity on U.S. growth and Trump's policy agenda. RBA Monitor: Higher Because Of Growth, Not Inflation Our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Monitor has surged into the "tighter policy required" territory in recent months (Chart 8A), driven by higher commodity prices and stronger Asian export demand. Survey-based measures of inflation expectations are also part of the Monitor, and those have also been rising despite a lack of realized inflation in Australia (Chart 8B). The low inflation readings have been causing a bit of a problem for the RBA, given the tight labor market and that boost to Aussie demand from better Asian growth. This is especially true given the surprisingly soft readings on employment growth, consumer confidence and spending, all occurring against a persistent deceleration in core inflation. The RBA was focusing on the inflation story last year when it delivered some surprise rate cuts, and we still suspect that a lack of inflation pressure will keep the RBA on hold for at least the next few months. We are currently at a neutral stance on Australian government bonds, given these conflicting forces of better export growth but weakening domestic demand. The lack of an inflation threat could make Australia an outperformer in a world of rising bond yields. Given the surge in our RBA Monitor, however, we see some risk in looking at Aussie bonds as a potential safe haven market given upward pressures on yields in the U.S. and Europe. The correlations between Australian yields and the RBA Monitor are extremely high (Chart 8C), and have actually gone up in the post-crisis era. Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BNo Inflation Pressures On The RBA Chart 8CAussie Bonds Across The Curve Are Highly Correlated To The RBA Monitor RBNZ Monitor: A Strong Case For A Rate Hike Our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor is strongly in positive territory (Chart 9A), led by the components focused on commodity prices and global growth. However, there is a fairly solid structural case for an RBNZ rate hike, given the lack of any spare capacity in New Zealand and inflation on the rise (Chart 9B). Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BFull Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Chart 9ANZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Pressures The RBNZ has been maintaining a dovish bias of late, although it has chosen to sight more "international" risks related to geopolitics, rather than domestic economic conditions. Perhaps this is nothing more than a fear of a potential shock outcome in the upcoming French elections, although it could also be worries that tensions between the Trump White House and China (or, worse yet, North Korea) could trigger a hit to demand for New Zealand exports to Asia. In the end, we think the RBNZ will be forced to a hike off the current record low interest rates as the next policy move. While we do not include New Zealand government bonds as part of our model fixed income portfolio, we do currently have a bearish rates trade on in our list of Tactical Overlay Trades, choosing to pay 12-month NZD OIS rates. We will maintain that recommendation, but we may look to add some bearish New Zealand bond trades, as well, given the strong correlation between our RBNZ Monitor and bond yields (Chart 9C). Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Once the Brexit starting gun is fired, the EU27's high-level guidelines and red lines will create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. The BoE will be more boxed in than the ECB. Brexit trades have more legs. We describe four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets (on page 6). Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Feature "Many in Great Britain expected a major calamity... but what happened was near enough nothing ." The citation above perfectly describes the 9 months that have elapsed since the U.K.'s June 23 2016 vote to exit the EU. In fact, it refers to the 9 months that elapsed after Britain declared war on Germany on September 3 1939 - a period of calm, militarily speaking, which became known as the 'Phoney War'.1 But outside the military sphere a lot did happen in the Phoney War. Most notably, a propaganda war ensued. On the night of September 3 1939 alone, the Royal Air Force dropped 6 million leaflets over Germany titled 'Note to the German People'. Chart of the WeekOne Big Correlated Trade: Pound/Euro And Eurostoxx600 Vs. FTSE100 Brexit Phoney War And The Markets Fast forward 77 years. The 9 months since the Brexit vote has also been a period of calm, economically speaking. Indeed, the U.K. economy has sailed along remarkably smoothly. And this has fuelled a propaganda war for those who believe that Brexit's economic impact will be near enough nothing. But outside the economic sphere, a lot has happened in the Brexit Phoney War: The pound has slumped 12% versus the euro and 17% versus the dollar. The FTSE100 has surged 16%, substantially outperforming the 8% gain in the Eurostoxx600 The U.K. 10-year gilt yield is down 40 bps when the equivalent German bund yield is up 40 bps and the equivalent U.S. Treasury yield is up 90 bps. These relative moves appear to reflect different asset class stories, but it is crucial to realise that: All of these relative moves are just one big correlated trade. The relative moves in bond yields have just tracked the expected differences in central bank policy rates two years ahead (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). This is exactly in line with the theory that a bond yield just equals the expected average interest rate over the bond's lifetime. Chart I-2Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. Bund Yields Chart I-3Difficult Brexit = Gilt Yields Fall Vs. T-Bond Yields Likewise, the moves in pound/dollar and pound/euro have also closely tracked the same expected differences in central bank policy rates (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). Again, this is exactly in line with theory. Over short horizons, the biggest driver of exchange rates is fixed income cross-border portfolio flows - which always seek out the highest yield adjusted for hedging costs. Chart I-4Difficult Brexit = Pound/Euro Falls Chart I-5Difficult Brexit = Pound/Dollar Falls In turn, FTSE100 performance versus the Eurostoxx600 has near-perfectly tracked the inverse direction of pound/euro. Once more, this is exactly as theory would suggest. The FTSE100 and Eurostoxx600 are just a collection of multinational dollar-earning companies quoted in pounds and euros respectively. So when pound/euro weakens, the dollar earnings increase more in FTSE100 index terms than in Eurostoxx600 index terms, resulting in Eurostoxx600 underperformance (Chart of the Week). Now that the Brexit battle is about to begin in earnest, what will happen to these Brexit trades? Brexit Battle Begins It is not our intention here to forecast all the twists and turns of the Brexit battle. We will leave that to a later report. Instead, we just want to list the likely opening salvos. With Parliamentary approval now sealed, Theresa May is due to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in the week commencing March 27 and thereby formally begin the Brexit battle. Expect the first EU27 response within 48 hours, probably through the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In this response, Tusk may also give the date for the first European Council 'Brexit' summit. This EU27 Brexit summit will take place within 8 weeks of the Article 50 trigger, and likely after the two-round French Presidential Election in April/May. At the Brexit summit, the EU27 will establish its strategy, high-level guidelines and red lines for the Brexit negotiations. The European Council will present these negotiating guidelines to the European Commission. Drawing upon its own legal and policy expertise, the Commission will then draft a mandate which sets out more technical details of each area of negotiation. Next, the Council of the EU2 must approve this draft mandate by qualified majority vote (obviously excluding the U.K.) Once approved, the European Commission can begin the detailed negotiations with the U.K., keeping within the final mandate's guidelines. But what does all this mean for investors? The preceding analysis showed that the dominant driver for all Brexit trades is the expected difference in central bank policy interest rates two years ahead. Recall that not long ago the BoE was vying with the Fed to be the first to hike rates in this cycle, while the ECB was likely to ease further. But after the Brexit vote and the resulting uncertainty about the U.K.'s position in the world, the tables have turned. The EU27's high-level negotiating guidelines and red lines are likely to create more vulnerabilities and uncertainties for the U.K. than for the euro area. And now, these vulnerabilities and uncertainties are amplified by Scotland First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, calling for a second referendum on Scottish Independence. For central bank policy, this means that the BoE will be hamstrung; whereas, absent any tail-events, the ECB can continue to back away from its extreme dovishness - a process that Draghi verbally started at the ECB Press Conference last week. Therefore, at least into the early summer, stay: Overweight U.K. gilts versus German bunds. Long euro/pound. Long FTSE100 versus Eurostoxx600 (or Eurostoxx50). Long U.K. Clothes and Apparel equities versus the market (Chart I-6). Short U.K. Real Estate equities versus the market (Chart I-7). But a word of warning for risk control. Remember that all five positions are in effect just one big correlated trade. So they will all work together, or they will all not work together! Chart I-6Difficult Brexit = U.K. Clothes And Apparel Outperforms Chart I-7Difficult Brexit = U.K. Real Estate Equities Underperform Four Disruptors The final section this week takes a wider-angle view of the world, and briefly highlights four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets in the coming years. Disruptor 1: Protectionism. Since the Great Recession, an extremely polarised distribution of economic growth has left most people's standard of living stagnant - despite seemingly decent headline economic growth and job creation (Chart I-8). Looking to find a scapegoat, economic nationalism and protectionism have resonated very strongly with voters in the U.K. and U.S. - resulting in Brexit and President Donald Trump. Other voters could follow in the same vein. But history teaches us that protectionism ends up hurting many more people than it helps. Disruptor 2: Technology. The bigger danger is that people are misdiagnosing the illness. The vast majority of middle-income job losses are not due to globalization, but due to technology. Specifically, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is replacing secure middle-income jobs and displacing workers into insecure low-income manual jobs - like bartending and waitressing - which AI cannot (yet) replace (Table I-1). And AI's impact on middle-income jobs is only in its infancy.3 The worry is that by misdiagnosing the illness as globalization and wrongly taking a protectionist medicine, the illness will intensify, rather than improve. Chart I-8Disruptor 1: Protectionism Table I-1Disruptor 2: Technology Disruptor 3: Debt super-cycles have reached exhaustion. The protectionist medicine carries a further danger. Major emerging market economies are coming to the end of structural credit booms and need to wean themselves off their credit addictions (Chart I-9). At this point of vulnerability, aggressive protectionism risks tipping these emerging economies into a sharp slowdown. Chart I-9Disruptor 3: Debt Super-Cycles Have Reached Exhaustion Disruptor 4: Equities are overvalued. Disruptors one, two and three come at a time when equities are valued to generate feeble total nominal returns over the next decade (Chart I-10). Risk premiums are extremely compressed. And if investors suddenly demand that risk premiums rise to average historical levels, it necessarily requires equity prices to adjust downwards. Chart I-10Disruptor 4: Equities Are Overvalued The long-term investment message is crystal clear. With the four disruptors in play, we strongly advise long-term investors not to follow passive (equity) index-tracking strategies. Instead, we advise long-term investors to stick to bespoke structural investment themes. Our favourite structural investment themes are Personal Product equities, euro/yuan, and real estate in Spain, Ireland and Germany. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 C N Trueman 'The Phoney War'. 2 The Council of the EU should not be confused with the European Council. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Superstar Economy: Part 2," dated January 19, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model This week's trade is to short Netherlands equities, but wait until after the election result. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 boils down to a simple choice: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google? Right now, we would rather own the three tech stocks than the three banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Right now, we expect euro/pound to strengthen - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. Stay overweight Spanish Bonos versus French OATs as a structural position. Feature Which would you rather own: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google?1 Surprising as it may seem, the all-important allocation decision between the Eurostoxx50 and the S&P500 boils down to this simple choice. The Chart of the Week should leave no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 = Santander, BNP & ING Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Right now, we would rather own the top three U.S. tech stocks rather than the top three euro area banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. The Fallacy Of Division For Equities The fallacy of division is a logical fallacy. It occurs when somebody falsely infers that what is true for the whole is also true for the parts that make up the whole. As a simple example, somebody might infer that because their computer screen appears purple, the pixels that make up the screen are also purple. In fact, the pixels are not purple. They are either red or blue. The fallacy of division is that the property of the whole - purpleness - does not translate to the property of the constituent parts - redness or blueness. As investment strategists, we hear a common fallacy of division. Since global equities are a play on the global economy, it might seem that national equity markets - like Ireland's ISEQ or Denmark's OMX - are plays on their national economies. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The property of the equity market as a global aggregate does not translate to the property of equity markets as national parts. The equity markets in Ireland and Denmark are each dominated by one stock which accounts for almost a quarter of national market capitalization - in Ireland, Ryanair, the pan-European budget airline, and in Denmark, Novo Nordisk, the global pharmaceutical company. Therefore, the relative performance of Ireland's ISEQ has almost no connection with Ireland's economy; rather, it is a just a play on airlines. And given budget airlines' sensitivity to fuel costs, Ireland's ISEQ is counterintuitively an inverse play on the oil price (Chart I-2). Likewise, the relative performance of Denmark's OMX has no connection with Denmark's economy; it is just a strong play on global pharma (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Ireland = Short Oil Chart I-3Denmark = Long Pharma In a similar vein, the relative performance of Switzerland's SME is also a play on global pharma - via Novartis and Roche (Chart I-4); Norway's OBX is a play on global energy - via Statoil (Chart I-5); and Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX are plays on banks (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). We could continue, but you get our drift... Chart I-4Switzerland = Long Pharma / Short Oil Chart I-5Norway = Long Oil Chart I-6Italy = Long Banks Chart I-7Spain = Long Banks But what about a regional index like the Eurostoxx50 or Eurostoxx600: surely, with the broader exposure, there must be a strong connection with the euro area economy? Unfortunately not - at least, not when it comes to relative performance. Consider that for the past few years, the euro area economy has actually outperformed the U.S. economy2 (Chart I-8). Yet the Eurostoxx50 has substantially underperformed the S&P500 (Chart I-9). What's going on? The answer is that the Eurostoxx50 has a major 15% weighting to banks and a minor 7% weighting to tech. The S&P500 is the mirror image; a minor 7% weighting to banks and a major 22% weighting to tech. Chart I-8The Euro Area Economy ##br##Has Outperformed... Chart I-9...But The Eurostoxx50##br## Has Underperformed For the Eurostoxx50 the distinguishing property is 'bank'; for the S&P500 it is 'tech'. And as we saw earlier, these distinguishing properties are captured by just three large euro area banks and three large U.S tech stocks. So index relative performance simply boils down to whether the three euro area banks outperform the three U.S. tech stocks, or vice-versa. Everything else is largely irrelevant. Equities' Connection With Economies Is Often Counterintuitive When it comes to the FTSE100, it turns out that it is not more bank or tech than the Eurostoxx50. Major sector weightings across the two indexes are broadly similar. Hence, relative performance is more connected to relative economic performance. But there is a catch - the connection is not as intuitive as you might first think. You see, both major indexes are made up of dollar-earning multinational companies. Yet the index value and earnings are quoted in pounds and euros respectively. If the home currency appreciates, index earnings - translated from dollars into home currency - go down, depressing index relative performance with it. And the opposite happens if the home currency depreciates. So the counterintuitive thing is that a relatively strengthening home economy does not result in index outperformance. Quite the opposite, it normally means a relatively more hawkish central bank, and an appreciating currency (Chart I-10). Thereby it causes index underperformance. Hence, Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Once again, Chart I-11 should leave readers in no doubt. Chart I-10A Relatively More Hawkish Central Bank =##br## A Stronger Currency Chart I-11A Stronger Currency = ##br##Equity Index Underperformance Which neatly brings us to today's ECB meeting. The ECB is a tunnel-vision 2% inflation-targeting central bank. Any upgrade to its inflation forecast, as seems likely, would imply less need for its extreme and experimental monetary easing. Once digested by the market, this would support the euro. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Channel, the U.K. Government is preparing to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and start its formal divorce from the EU within a couple of weeks. Expect the EU's immediate response to cast long shadows across Theresa May's vision of a future in sunlit uplands. Once digested by the market, this would further weigh down the pound. A stronger euro/pound necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. The Fallacy Of Division For Bonds The fallacy of division also applies to euro area sovereign bonds. The aggregate euro area sovereign yield just equals the average ECB policy rate anticipated over the lifetime of the bond (Chart I-12). This is directly analogous to the relationship between the U.K. gilt yield and the anticipated path of the BoE base rate, and the relationship between the U.S. T-bond yield and the anticipated path of the Fed funds rate (Chart I-13). Chart I-12The Aggregate Euro Area Bond Yield = ##br##The Average ECB Policy Rate Expected Chart I-13The U.S. T-Bond Yield = ##br##The Average Fed Funds Rate Expected But what is true for the whole is not necessarily true for the parts that make up the whole. Individual euro area sovereign bond yields carry a second component which can override everything else. This second component is a redenomination premium as compensation for the expected loss if the bond redenominates out of euros. For example, the redenomination premium on a Spanish Bono versus a French OAT equals: The annual probability of euro breakup Multiplied by The expected undervaluation of a new peseta versus a new franc. However, the ECB's own analysis shows that Spain is now as competitive as France (Chart I-14), meaning that a new peseta ultimately should not lose value versus a new franc. So irrespective of the probability of euro breakup, the second item of the multiplication should be zero. Meaning that the redenomination premium should also be zero, rather than today's 75 bps (on 10-year Bonos over OATs). Bear in mind that Spain's housing bust and subsequent recapitalisation of its banks has followed Ireland's template - just with a two year lag. And observe that the redenomination premium on Irish 10-year bonds over OATs, which once stood at a remarkable 1100 bps, has now completely vanished. We expect Spain to continue following in the footsteps of Ireland (Chart I-15). As a structural position, stay long Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-14Spain Has Dramatically Improved##br## Its Competitiveness Chart I-15Spain Is Following In The##br## Footsteps Of Ireland Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Listed as Alphabet. 2 On a per capita basis. Fractal Trading Model* Long tin / short copper hit its 5% profit target, while short MSCI AC World hit its 2.5% stop-loss. This week's recommendation is to short ruble / dollar. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-16 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations