United States

The yields continue being range bound, creating an environment more favorable for companies which derive majority of their earnings further in the future. In addition, earnings growth has peaked and is slowing down, making growth stocks more attractive at times when earnings growth is becoming a little harder to find. These two factors support our thesis that it’s time to revisit growth stocks. Looking at growth names in the context of the business cycle is also instructive. The chart below shows relative performance of different S&P 500 styles during various stages of the business cycle. Historically, growth shines best during periods of slowdown, as it is one of the safer styles. Bottom Line: Investors should add growth exposure to their portfolio.

Highlights The Fed’s independence from politics is illusory. President Biden has the potential to reshape the Fed’s Board of Governors through three personnel picks, two of which are due by January 2022. While monetary policy could only get marginally more dovish, the Democratic Party’s goals would be furthered by new appointments. If Biden retains Powell then he is convinced that Powell is fully committed to today’s ultra-dovish monetary policy strategy. If he does not, then the new Fed chair will be still more dovish. Nevertheless the excessive expansion of the US money supply is reminiscent of the Arthur Burns era and suggests that any Fed chair faces a sea of troubles from 2022-26. For now stay long TIPS, infrastructure plays, cyclicals, and value stocks. Feature I do not recall a single instance where somebody in the political realm said, “We need to raise rates, they’re too low.”                         -Alan Greenspan, CNBC, October 18, 2018 Just before the 2020 election I held a call with a client in New York and the question arose of whether the expected winner, then candidate Joe Biden, would reappoint Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell when his term expired on January 31, 2022. I argued that the odds of Biden keeping Powell in place were higher than one might think. After all, Powell reversed his stance on rate hikes in the winter of 2018-19 and then oversaw the Fed’s adoption of a new monetary policy strategy that deliberately targets an inflation overshoot. Powell would be a reliable dove for a president who would seek economic recovery above all things. The client drily responded, “There is no way that is going to happen.”   We still do not know what President Biden will decide with seven months before the decision is due. Personnel appointments are a matter of information and intelligence, not political or macroeconomic analysis. From a macro point of view all that can be said is that Biden does not face the situation President Trump faced: Biden has entered early in the business cycle, under a new, ultra-easy average inflation targeting regime at the Fed. Trump entered in the middle of a business cycle, while the Fed was hiking rates (Chart 1). Chart 1Biden's and Powell's Context Almost any new Fed chair will be largely constrained by the policy consensus on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Biden is an establishment player whose appointments so far suggest that he is unlikely to nominate a maverick capable of bucking the entire FOMC. But personalities can still make a difference at critical junctures. Nobody should be surprised if Biden opts to replace Powell with a candidate who is marginally more committed to keeping rates lower for longer.   Investors should bet on dovish surprises for three reasons. First, the Fed as an institution has reached a consensus on its current policy framework, which is geared toward an inflation overshoot. Second, Powell may wish to retain his job. Third, the aforementioned client could be right and Biden may replace Powell with a more fervent proponent of ultra-easy policy. The takeaway is bullish for the time being. The Dependency Of Central Banks Central banks are part of the political bureaucracy of the nation state. Insofar as they achieve policy autonomy, or independence, it is at the forbearance of the executive or legislative branch. The ability to contain personal influences shows institutional maturity but institutions can never be fully independent. Fiscal policy is controlled by the ruling party, which will legislate in its interest. The “political business cycle” is an empirical phenomenon in which policymakers attempt to manipulate fiscal policy ahead of elections either to help or hurt the incumbent. A “political monetary cycle” also exists but its prevalence is debatable. It is more widely observed in developing countries.1 Politics in the developed world are more democratic and institutionalized so central banks have achieved considerable autonomy. In many cases their independence is enshrined in law, although the legal basis is often questionable and exaggerated.2  Not only are there checks and balances but they are reinforced by asynchronous cycles between the institutions. Term limits constrict politicians as much as or more so than monetary policymakers. Federal Reserve chairmen William McChesney Martin, Arthur F. Burns, and Jerome H. Powell were not immune to political influence but were able in their own ways to “wait out” the tenure of manipulative presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, and Donald J. Trump. Still, the latter examples highlight that developed markets cannot claim to be purely rationalist in their conduct of monetary policy. President Trump publicly asked, “Who is our bigger enemy, Jay Powell or Chairman Xi?” Yet this was mild compared to the treatment that Nixon gave Burns and especially that Johnson gave Martin. Johnson physically shoved Martin around a private room demanding policy easing and accused him of not caring about the lives of young American soldiers dying in Vietnam. Martin held his ground and hiked rates in 1966 despite the war.3 Arthur Burns was subjected to a relentless campaign of public and private verbal abuse by Nixon and his staffers. Nixon was convinced that he lost the 1960 election because of overly tight Fed policies and was determined not to let it happen again in 1972. Greenspan kept rates low during the Iraq war and inflated the housing bubble. Plenty of unsavory examples of political influence and interference can be drawn from other developed markets.4 All governments and monetary systems are built and run by humans and therefore fallible. Even aside from individuals and anecdotes, structural forms of central bank manipulation within the developed world include: (1)  Debt accommodation: Central banks face an inexorable pressure to provide liquidity to governments running irresponsible fiscal deficits. The consequences if they refused could be devastating (Chart 2). Chart 2The Fed's Biggest Political Constraint: Debt (2)  Appointments: Presidents and executives appoint and remove leaders. In the US, the tendency for members of the Board of Governors to resign often gives the president substantial influence even aside from picking the Fed chairman, who can indeed be removed at will.5 (3)  Bureaucracy: Administrative structures exert a powerful influence over the personnel, policy frameworks, and behavior of central bank leadership and staff. The candidates for top positions are heavily filtered – and once they achieve high office, their options are constrained.6 Today’s Federal Reserve supports these three points: it is highly accommodative toward the US’s soaring federal debt and its leadership consists of a tight coterie of experts and academics who share a robust consensus regarding the appropriate theory and practice of monetary policy. The outstanding question stems from item number two, appointments, where President Biden has the opportunity to influence the Fed’s board. But the third point mostly controls the available personnel. Still, the choice of the Fed chair could prove decisive under unforeseen circumstances. Historical accounts of the Fed show that the chairman exerts substantial influence over monetary policy decisions.7 Most investors know from experience that individuals and leaders can still exert an outsized influence at critical junctures. For example, premature monetary tightening occurred with negative consequences in the US in 1937, Japan in 2000, and Europe in 2011. Investors are safest to bet on institutions rather than individuals. But the choice of the Fed chair can hardly be ignored. The current context features an extraordinary expansion of the money supply, and “excess money supply,” comparable only to the inflationary 1970s (Chart 3). The Fed chair in the coming years faces an unstable and difficult sea of troubles to navigate.  Chart 3Excess Money Supply Unseen In Modern Memory Fed Chairs Care About Their Careers But Not Midterm Elections Political influence over monetary policy is measurable. A substantial body of academic literature reveals not only the above structural political factors but also that ideological affiliation – i.e. the political party whose president appointed the Fed chair – influences interest rates. So do elections and the career interests of Fed chairmen. Consider the following findings:  Abrams and Iossifov show evidence of abnormally expansionary monetary policy if the president and the chair are affiliated with the same political party.8 Gamber and Hakes show evidence of a lowered federal funds rate if the Fed chair stands for reappointment in the two years following a national election – i.e. Fed chairmen accommodate political pressures in the latter part of term to increase odds of reappointment.9 Dentler shows that while the Fed funds rate does not fall in advance of elections to help presidents in general, it is found to fall when the Fed chair and president have the same partisan affiliation, especially when the Fed chair’s reappointment is looming. Also the Fed funds rate is abnormally high before elections if the Fed chair hails from the opposite party of the incumbent president.10 Dentler shows specifically that Fed chair career motivations matter. If you omit career considerations, then it is not so much partisan affiliation as partisan opposition that can influence monetary policy. In effect, there is a potential increase in policy rate before elections. Dentler calls this a “reverse political monetary policy cycle.”11 In essence, a Fed chair is more likely to lean into his partisan affiliation as an incumbent president seeks reelection. It is hard to prove this behavior is partisan because it conforms with the idea of a staunchly independent central bank. Now let us look at the data first hand. In the following analysis we focus on the nominal Fed funds rate alongside (1) the headline consumer price index and (2) an implied policy rate following a simple Taylor Rule using potential GDP, the core PCE deflator, and the unemployment rate.12 We chose the nominal Fed funds rate and headline consumer price index because they should provide an indication of how the US president and public perceived interest rates and inflation. These factors are critical for the president’s decisions as to whether to reappoint or replace sitting Fed chairmen. However, we also use the Taylor Rule as a proxy for the correct or appropriate policy rate at the time, recognizing that headline CPI is insufficient. We observe the following: Burns worked closely with President Nixon and his tenure has always been controversial. The simple evidence shown here suggests that he accommodated Nixon in 1972 but did not accommodate President Ford’s bid for the presidency in 1976. He might have stayed easy a bit longer than necessary in 1977 ahead of President Carter’s decision on whether to reappoint him (Chart  4).  Chart 4AArthur Burns As Fed Chair Chart 4BArthur Burns As Fed Chair Miller’s tenure was marred by stagflation. He did not accommodate the Democrats during the 1978 midterm election and probably could not have done so. Carter promoted him to Treasury Secretary as a way of removing him from the Fed chair. The episode is a reminder that the president can remove the Fed chair – as the best constitutional studies show – but he may need to get creative about how to do it to avoid a political storm (Chart 5). Volcker may have accommodated Carter somewhat but not entirely in 1980. His actions are debatable around Reagan’s election in 1984. But Volcker laid inflation low and his reappointment by Reagan in 1983 makes sense in the context of that triumph (Chart 6).  Chart 5William Miller As Fed Chair Chart 6Paul Volcker As Fed Chair Greenspan cannot really be said to have accommodated Bush in 1992 though rates fell. He cracked down on inflation regardless of the 1994 midterm election, which turned out badly for President Clinton and the Democrats. But Clinton did not hold it against him – inflation had been brought down without a recession. Greenspan was tame during Clinton’s reelection bid in 1996 despite rising inflation – he hiked rates immediately thereafter. Clinton reappointed him in the midst of a rate-hike cycle justified by rising inflation, regardless of any risk to the Democratic bid in the 2000 election (Chart 7).   Chart 7AAlan Greenspan As Fed Chair Chart 7BAlan Greenspan As Fed Chair Bernanke’s tenure was dominated by the subprime mortgage crisis and Great Recession. He cannot be said to have accommodated the Republicans in 2008, though they were doomed anyway. President Obama’s decision to reappoint him in 2009 was a clear example of an urgent need to maintain policy continuity. Obama announced his replacement in 2013, after the crisis had passed (Chart 8). Chart 8ABen Bernanke As Fed Chair Chart 8BBen Bernanke As Fed Chair Yellen’s decision to pause hiking interest rates in 2016 is debatable and can be said to have accommodated the Democratic Party that year. She was replaced by President Trump in the midst of a rate-hike cycle justified by conditions (Chart 9). Powell hiked rates four times in 2018 despite the onset of a trade war with China. Powell cannot be said to have accommodated the Republicans in the 2018 midterm election. His behavior in 2020 was dominated by the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 10). Chart 9Janet Yellen As Fed Chair Chart 10Jerome Powell As Fed Chair The point is not to claim that politics is the driving factor behind monetary policy but rather to observe the cruxes in which personal and political motivations are at least mixed with technocratic and institutional decisions. Incidentally our observations largely corroborate the relevant academic literature.  If there is one solid rule that emerges from this analysis, it is that Fed chairmen and chairwomen do not accommodate midterm elections. There are no exceptions in the data shown here. If anything they are more hawkish. At the same time, it is true (though sometimes exaggerated) that rate hikes tend to be put on pause during presidential election years. And this tendency is observable not only during times in which a crisis makes rate hikes impossible. Furthermore a close examination of these charts supports the contention that Fed chairs tend to avoid or delay rate hikes prior to the president’s decision whether to reappoint them. There are exceptions but the charts do not disconfirm the hypothesis, which is intuitive because it fits with the central banker’s self-interest.  Biden Faces Zero Risk From A New Chair Or Some Risk From Powell A flat application of the rules of thumb in the previous section would suggest that Powell will push for easier policy than necessary ahead of Biden’s decision whether to reappoint him. It would also suggest that, if reappointed, Powell will not make any special accommodation for the Democrats in the critical 2022 midterms or in 2023. Obviously the reality might work out differently this time. But it is legitimate to suggest that retaining Powell poses a risk to the Democrats’ control of the economy ahead of the 2024 elections, even though we know we will get hate mail for saying it. Investors should not assume that there is a powerful norm in favor of the president’s retaining the sitting Fed chair in the name of continuity and “doing no harm.” The modern period of the Federal Reserve begins with the Fed-Treasury Accord in 1951. There have been seven changes of the Fed chair since that time and three of them occurred because of a change of political party in the White House (Martin to Burns, Burns to Miller/Volcker, and Yellen to Powell). While President Obama retained Bernanke, the reappointment came in early 2009, in the midst of a historic crisis. Biden has much greater flexibility than that today. And while Clinton retained Greenspan, the above analysis suggests that Democrats may warn Biden against doing the same. Most importantly Biden is president at a period of peak polarization in the US, when most of his Democratic Party and the US political establishment believe that democracy itself is at risk of dying at the hands of the Trumpist populism that is overtaking the Republican Party. If this is the view then even marginal risks to Democratic election prospects over the next four years should not be willingly taken. Biden’s dilemma can be illustrated easily by game theory. If he retains Powell he runs some risk of a hawkish surprise, however small, whereas if he replaces Powell he can avoid that risk. Powell regains some individual discretion if he is reappointed and therefore a hawkish surprise cannot be ruled out. The game theory implies that Biden will opt to remove Powell, but obviously that is up to Biden. Note that there is no stable equilibrium as Powell’s decision is shown as data-dependent and indifferent to the outcome (which may not truly be the case) (Diagram 1).   Diagram 1Game Theory: Will The President Reappoint The Fed Chair? Biden must also choose a replacement for Vice Chair Richard Clarida, whose term expires in January 2022. Later, in June 2023, John Williams’s tenure on the board will expire (Diagram 2). With three new appointments Biden would be able to remake the board both slightly more dovish and considerably more diverse. Diversity and inclusiveness in top government positions are key aspects of Biden’s and the Democrats’ overall agenda.  Diagram 2Biden Could Replace At Least Three Fed Governors The history of the Fed shows that leaders tend to be captured by the institution. Powell is fully absorbed into the new Fed consensus and his personal legacy depends on executing the new ultra-dovish monetary policy strategy that he himself ushered into being. While Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) has made great strides, it is not easy for Biden to get a true believer confirmed in the Senate. In this sense, it does not matter whether Biden replaces Powell – the result will be largely the same and in line with the Fed’s current policy framework. We have a lot of sympathy with this argument. It emphasizes the checks and balances on the individual policymaker, which is the method we use to analyze US politics. The Fed has given very explicit criteria for lifting rates off the zero lower bound that are tied to specific economic outcomes. They have removed a lot of the discretion from that decision. Anyone qualified to take up the Fed chair would understand that it would be very risky to deviate from that specific guidance: the Fed would lose a lot of credibility. It would have to be a very non-mainstream pick to do that. That is not likely to happen. But again – personalities can matter at inflection points. Some would argue that Biden will not be able to find any credible candidates who can pass Senate confirmation and still be significantly more dovish than Powell (the Senate being divided equally between the two parties). However, Lael Brainard, Raphael Bostic, and Neel Kashkari are all Fed insiders who would be likely to pass the Senate and marginally more dovish than Powell, albeit supporters of the current policy framework. They would also advance the diversity agenda in different ways. They are more likely nominees than other potential candidates (Table 1).   Table 1Potential Successors To Powell As Fed Chair Note that the focus on inclusiveness is not only about personnel but also about the inclusiveness of the economy and hence it could affect monetary policy decisions. Inclusiveness as well as climate change and inequality are concerns outside of the Fed’s official mandate, where monetary policy will have a limited effect, but any influence of these issues whatsoever would point to dovish surprises. Biden can advance this agenda without legislative change through appointments.   Investment Takeaways The Fed chair appointment is a misleading win-win situation for markets. If Biden retains Powell, it is because Powell has proved thoroughly committed to the Fed’s new ultra-dovish monetary policy strategy, whereas if Biden replaces him, the replacement will be ultra-dovish. However, this win-win is misleading because beyond the near term the Fed will have to normalize policy. The Fed will ultimately remain data-dependent and the rapid closing of the output gap combined with a historic increase in excess money supply will push up inflation and require Fed responses regardless of the future chairman or chairwoman (Chart 11). Our US Bond Strategist Ryan Swift emphasizes that the Fed’s policy framework is very explicit. In order to normalize policy it needs to see inflation above the 2% target, the economy at maximum employment, and a convincing inflation overshoot (Table 2). The first goal is already met, with 12-month PCE inflation above target. An inflation overshoot will necessarily follow from the first goal combined with the second goal. Therefore the focal point for investors should be the second goal, “maximum employment,” i.e. the unemployment rate and labor participation rate (Chart 12). Positive data surprises on the employment front will accelerate the time frame. Chart 11Output Gap To Close Rapidly Table 2Checklist For Fed Liftoff Chart 12Charting The Checklist For Fed Liftoff For now we remain long TIPS relative to duration-matched nominal Treasuries in expectation of dovish policy surprises. We may modify this trade in the near future. The upside is limited now that ten-year breakevens and five-year/five-year forward breakevens have reached the point where they are consistent with the Fed’s goal of well-anchored inflation expectations. But the above analysis supports this trade. Of course, the Fed’s actions should be taken into context with fiscal policy as well as external events and the US dollar. In the near term we continue to advise a cautious approach given that the US dollar is resting at a critical juncture, around 90 on the DXY. If the dollar breaks down beneath this level then it could fall substantially further. From a macro perspective this is what we would expect given the standing of budget deficit and real interest rates. Today’s historic combination of loose fiscal, loose monetary policy is dollar-bearish (Chart 13). The implication is positive for equities, especially cyclical and value sectors, so we maintain our current positioning.  Chart 13Loose Monetary, Loose Fiscal Policy Threaten The Dollar Our sister Geopolitical Strategy highlights China among other foreign policy challenges to the bearish dollar view and global risk appetite. This summer should provide some clarity on whether global policy uncertainty will rise and reinforce the dollar’s floor (Chart 14).     Chart 14Geopolitical Risk And Policy Uncertainty Put Floor Under Dollar? Biden is still highly likely to pass an infrastructure bill this year (80% subjective odds). Any failure of bipartisan talks with Republicans will simply result in an all-Democratic bill via budget reconciliation. West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin will not prevent the passage of a bipartisan infrastructure bill and/or Biden’s next reconciliation bill (the American Jobs Plan). Manchin’s current tensions with the Democratic caucus center on the so-called “For The People” voting rights bill and the Senate filibuster, not the question of infrastructure and corporate tax hikes. Indeed Manchin may be forced to accept a higher corporate tax rate than his preferred 25% if he wants to make peace with his party. It is not inconceivable that he could defect from his party – the Republicans lost a 50-seat majority in the Senate this way as recently as 2001. But we have long argued that Manchin will support Biden’s signature legislative achievement. The market may be temporarily disappointed by stimulus hiccups but we view the infrastructure bill as a “buy the rumor, sell the news” dynamic for US cyclicals. While a fiscal policy weak spot will develop late in 2021 and early 2022, after the American Rescue Plan Act’s provisions expire but before new funds arrive from the American Jobs Plan, nevertheless the recovery of the private economy both at home and abroad should provide a bridge. The implication of the above analysis is to stay invested in the stock market and maintain a constructive outlook over the cyclical (12-month) time horizon while exercising near-term caution due to the dollar and geopolitical risk.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Table A1USPS Trade Table Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3Political Capital Index Table A4APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A4BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A4CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets   Footnotes 1     For political monetary cycles see Edward N. Gamber and David R. Hakes, “The Federal Reserve’s response to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks: Evidence of a partisan political cycle,” Southern Economic Journal 63:3 (1997), 680-91. For developed versus developing market political monetary cycles, see S. Alpanda and A. Honig, “The impact of central bank independence on political monetary cycles in advanced and developing nations,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41:7 (2009), 1365-1389. 2     In the US, the Fed’s independence rests on dubious constitutional and legal supports but is nevertheless well-established in legal and political practice. See Peter Conti-Brown, “The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence,” Yale Journal on Regulation 32 (2015), 257-310. 3    Lawrence Bauer and Alex Faseruk, “Understanding Political Pressures, Monetary Policy, and the Independence of the Federal Reserve in the United States from 1960-2019,” Journal of Management Policy and Practice 21:3 (2020), 41-63. 4    Kuttner and Posen (2007) demonstrate that financial markets respond to newsworthy developments with central bankers across the developed world. See footnote 7 below. 5    See Conti-Brown, footnote 2 above. See also Kelly H. Chang, Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2003). 6    See Alexander W. Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of Fed policy under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 71 (2019), 1-13. 7     See Dentler, 241. See also Ellen E. Mead, “The FOMC: Preferences, Voting, and Consensus,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Reivew 87:2 (2005), 93-101; Kenneth N. Kuttner and Adam S. Posen, “Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13101 (May 2007), nber.org.  8    B. A. Abrams and P. Iossifov, “Does the Fed contribute to a political business cycle?” Public Choice 129 (2006), 249-62. 9    Gamber and Hakes, “The Taylor rule and the appointment cycle of the chairperson of the Federal Reserve,” Journal of Economics and Business 58 (2006), 55-66. 10   Alexander Dentler, “Did the Fed raise interest rates before elections?” Public Choice 181 (2019), 239-73. 11    Dentler, 259, characterizes the Fed chairs as follows: “We believe that Martin was more susceptible to political infuences than his colleagues, but he never worked in opposition to a president in our sample period. Neither did Arthur Burns; however, we find him to be a moderating force with respect to ideological biases, though he appears to have been vulnerable to threats regarding his career. We find Volcker to respond more strongly than most other chairs to ideological motives and career incentives. Greenspan, on the other hand, did not fall prey to biased behavior that characterizes the other chairs. Bernanke’s tenure is probably the most difficult to interpret.” 12    Real Potential GDP Growth + Core PCE Deflator + 0.5 * (Core PCE Deflator – 2% Target) - 0.5 * (Unemployment Rate – NAIRU). We prefer real potential GDP to estimates of the real neutral rate because it is simpler and more transparent.  

Highlights Bond Market Performance: Government bonds in the developed economies are currently trapped in ranges, consolidating the sharp upward moves seen in the first quarter of 2021. This is only a pause in the broader cyclical uptrend, however, with central banks under increasing pressure to turn less dovish amid surging inflation and tightening labor markets. Oversold USTs: Technical indicators of yield/price momentum and investor sentiment/positioning suggest that US Treasuries are oversold. Working off this condition can take another 2-3 months, based on an analysis of past oversold episodes. Beyond that, higher yields loom with the Fed starting to prepare the markets for a taper in 2022. Stay underweight Treasuries in global bond portfolios on a cyclical basis. RBA Checklist: Only one of the five components of our “RBA Checklist” – designed to measure the pressures that would force the Reserve Bank of Australia to turn less dovish – is flashing such a signal. We are upgrading our recommended allocation for Australian government bonds to overweight on a tactical (0-6 months) investment horizon. Feature Dear Client, Next week, in lieu of our regularly weekly report, I will be hosting a webcast on Tuesday, June 15 where I will discuss the outlook for global fixed income markets in the second half of 2021. Following that, we will be jointly publishing our bi-annual Global Central Bank Monitor Chartbook with our colleagues at BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy on Friday, June 18th. We will return to our regular publishing schedule on Tuesday, June 29th. Best Regards, Rob Robis Chart of the WeekA Tale Of Two Quarters The performance of government bond markets in the developed world so far in 2021 has been a tale of two quarters. In Q1, yields were rising steadily on the back of upside surprises in global growth and emerging signs of the biggest inflation upturn seen in nearly a generation. The Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index delivered a total return of -2.7% (hedged into US dollars) during the quarter, with no country escaping losses (Chart of the Week). The biggest declines were seen in the UK (-7.5%) the US (-4.3%), with the smallest losses occurring in Japan (-0.3%) and Italy (-0.7%). Chart 2Lower Vol Means High Yielders Outperform Low Yielders Q2 has been a different story, however. Yields have retreated somewhat from the year-to-date peaks seen at the end of Q1, leading to positive returns so far in Q2 in the UK (+0.8), the US (+1.2%) and Australia (+1.1%). The laggards are the low yielding euro area markets, most notably Italy (-0.7%) and France (-0.9%), that have seen yields move higher on the back of accelerating European growth. The Q2 returns look very much like a carry-driven market, with higher-yielding markets outperforming lower-yielding ones. That trend can persist if the current backdrop of low market volatility persists (Chart 2), although this calm will eventually be broken by a shift towards less dovish monetary policies. Some countries will make that shift at a faster pace than others, leading to relative value opportunities for bond investors in the latter half of 2021. This week, we discuss one such opportunity – Australia versus the US. US Treasuries: Oversold & Trendless – For Now After reaching a 2021 intraday high of 1.77% back on March 30, the benchmark 10-year US Treasury yield has traded in a narrow 15bp range between 1.55% and 1.70%. From a fundamental perspective, US yields are lacking direction because inflation expectations have already made a major upward adjustment to the more inflationary backdrop, but real yields have remained depressed by the continued dovish messaging from the Fed – for now - with regards to the timing of tapering or future rate hikes. From a technical perspective, however, the sideways pattern for US Treasury yields is also consistent for a market that trying to work off an oversold condition. Most of the technical indicators for the US Treasury market that we monitor regularly were at or close to the most bearish/oversold extremes seen since 2000 (Chart 3): Chart 3US Treasuries Are Working Off An Oversold Condition The 10-year Treasury yield is 39bps above its 200-day moving average, but that gap was as high as 84bps on March 19; The 26-week total return of the 10-year Treasury is -4.7%, after reaching a low of -8.8% on March 19; The JP Morgan client survey of bond managers and traders shows some of the largest underweight duration positioning in the 19-year history of the series; The Market Vane index of sentiment for Treasuries is in the bottom half of the range that has prevailed since 2000; The CFTC data on positioning in 10-year Treasury futures is the only one of our indicators that is not signaling an oversold market, with a small net long position of +3% (scaled by open interest). The overall message of these indicators suggests that price momentum and positioning reached such a bearish extreme by mid-March that some pullback in Treasury yields was inevitable. However, a look back at past periods when Treasuries became heavily oversold since the turn of the century shows that the duration and magnitude of such a pullback is highly variable – anywhere from two months to ten months. The main determining factors are the trends in economic growth and inflation in the US, and the Fed’s expected policy response to both. To show this, we conducted a simple study, updating work we first presented in a 2018 report.1 We looked at “oversold episodes” since 2000, which began when the 10-year Treasury yield was trading at least 50bps above its 200-day moving average. We then defined the end of the oversold episode as simply the point when the 10-year Treasury yield subsequently converged back to its 200-day moving average. We then looked at the length of the episode (in days), and the change in bond yields, for each oversold episode. There were nine such episodes since the year 2000, not counting the current one which has not yet ended. In Table 1, we rank the episodes by the number of days it took to complete each one, based on our simple moving average rule. We also show the change in both the 10-year Treasury yield and its 200-day moving average during each episode, to show how the convergence between the two unfolds. Table 1A Look At Prior Episodes Of An Oversold Treasury Market To describe the US economic backdrop during each episode, we looked at the change in the ISM manufacturing index and core PCE inflation during those oversold periods. We also show changes in two important determinants of the level of Treasury yields: inflation expectations using 10-year TIPS breakeven rates, and Fed rate hike expectations using our 12-month Fed discounter which measures the expected change in interest rates - one year ahead - priced into the US overnight index swap (OIS) curve. At the bottom of the table, we show the average for all nine oversold episodes, as well as the averages for the episodes were the ISM was rising and where core PCE inflation was rising. Chart 4US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2003-2007 There are a few messages gleaned from the results in Table 1: The longest correction of an oversold Treasury market since 2000 took place between February 2018 and December 2018, when 305 days passed before the 10-year yield fell back to its 200-day moving average; The shortest correction was between June 2007 and August 2007, where only 52 days elapsed; Treasury yields typically decline during oversold periods, with two notable exceptions: 2018 and 2013/14, which were also the two longest episodes; During all of the oversold periods, markets reduced the amount of expected Fed tightening by an average of 26bps. However, that was entirely concentrated in four of the nine episodes - including three of the four shortest episodes – and is typically associated with a decline in inflation expectations. Growth momentum appears to be a bigger factor than inflation momentum in determining the length of an oversold episode, with longer episodes typically occurring alongside a rising ISM index, and vice versa. The notable exception was the longest episode in 2018, where the ISM declined by six points, although the bulk of that decline occurred in a single month at the end of the period (November 2018). For the more visually oriented, we present the time series for all the data in Table 1, shaded for the oversold periods, in Chart 4 (for the 2003-2007 period), Chart 5 (2008-2012), Chart 6 (2013-2017) and Chart 7 (2018 to today). We’ve added one additional variable – our Fed Monitor, designed to signal the need for tighter or looser US monetary policy – in the bottom panel of each of those charts. Chart 5US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2008-2012 Chart 6US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2013-2017 Chart 7US Treasury Market Oversold Episodes: 2018 To Today What does this look back tell us about looking ahead? The current episode, at only 105 days old, is still 62 days “younger” than the average oversold period, and 76 days “younger” than the average period where core inflation was rising. This would put the end of the current episode sometime in August. The ISM is essentially unchanged over the current episode so far, making it difficult to draw conclusions based on growth momentum – although the longest episode in 2018 shows that yields can trade sideways for a long time, even in the absence of a big slowing of growth, if the Fed is in a rate hiking cycle. However, the current episode differs dramatically from others in this analysis on two critical fronts. Core inflation has surged 1.6 percentage points since the oversold period began in February, far more than any other episode, while the gap between a rapidly increasing Fed Monitor and a flat 12-month Fed Discounter is also unique among post-2000 oversold periods. In other words, the Treasury market is still vulnerable to a repricing of Fed tightening expectations, especially with positioning and sentiment measures like the Market Vane survey and net futures positioning not yet at fully bearish extremes. Bottom Line: The current oversold condition in the US Treasury market can take another 2-3 months to unwind, based on an analysis of past oversold episodes. Beyond that, higher yields loom with the Fed starting to prepare the markets for a taper in 2022. Stay underweight Treasuries in global bond portfolios on a cyclical basis. RBA Checklist Update: No Case For A Hawkish Turn Yet Australia has been one of the top performing government bond markets within the developed economies, as discussed earlier. This performance has occurred even with strong acceleration of both Australian economic momentum and market-based inflation expectations (Chart 8). Despite our RBA Monitor flashing pressure on the RBA to tighten, and the Australian OIS curve already discounting 48bps of rate hikes over the next two years, Australian bond yields have remained very well behaved during the “calm” second quarter for global fixed income. Chart 8RBA Policies Limiting Rise In Bond Yields Chart 9RBA Stimulus Takes Many Forms The continued dovish messaging from the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) is the main reason for the solid Australia bond performance. The central bank is signaling no imminent shift in its combination of 0.1% nominal policy rates, deeply negative real rates, yield curve control on 3-year bonds and quantitative easing on longer-maturity bonds (Chart 9). Other central banks are starting to inch towards reining in the massive monetary accommodation of the past year. Could the RBA be next? In a Special Report published back in January of this year, we outlined a list of variables to watch to determine when the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) could be expected to turn less dovish.2 This checklist would also inform our country allocation view on Australian government bonds, which has remained neutral. A quick update on the latest readings from the RBA Checklist shows little pressure on the RBA to begin preparing markets for tighter monetary policy. 1. The vaccination process goes quickly and smoothly We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Australia has weathered COVID-19 far better than most other Western countries in terms of actual cases and deaths, but the vaccine rollout Down Under has been underwhelming. Only 16% of the population has received at least one vaccine jab, while a mere 2% is fully vaccinated. These are numbers that are more comparable to pandemic-ravaged emerging market countries like India and Brazil where access to vaccines is an issue (Chart 10). Chart 10A Slow Vaccine Rollout Down Under The slow vaccine rollout is less worrisome in light of the Australian government having secured enough vaccine doses to inoculate the entire population, and with the domestic economy facing limited remaining COVID-19 restrictions. The issue has been distribution and that is now occurring at a quickening pace. Until a much greater share of the population is vaccinated, however, Australia will continue to maintain aggressive COVID-related international travel restrictions – the government just announced that borders will remain shut until mid-2022 - that will be a major drag on the economically-important tourism sector. 2. Private sector demand accelerates alongside fiscal stimulus (✔) We ARE placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Australia’s fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic was one of the largest in the developed world. The stimulus was heavily focused on wage subsidies and income support measures like the JobSeeker program, which expired back in March. As the expensive stimulus programs are unwound, it is critical that the domestic economy can stand on its own without support. On that front, the news is good. Australia’s economy grew by 1.8% during Q1/2021, lifting the level of real GDP above the pre-pandemic peak (Chart 11). Both consumer spending and business investment posted solid growth during the quarter, fueled by surging confidence with the NAB business outlook measure hitting a record high in May (bottom panel). As a sign that the domestic economy is benefitting from a return to pre-pandemic habits, Q1 saw a 15% increase in spending in hotels, cafes and restaurants. That strength looked to extend into the Q2, with retail sales rising 1.1% in April, suggesting that Australian domestic demand is enjoying strong upward momentum. Chart 11A Confidence-Led Recovery In Domestic Demand Chart 12China Is A Drag On Australian Exports 3. China reins in policy stimulus by less than expected We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. China is by far Australia’s largest trading partner, so Chinese demand is always an important contributor to Australian economic growth. This is why we included a China element in our RBA Checklist. Specifically, we deemed the outcome that would potentially turn the RBA more hawkish would be Chinese policymakers pulling back monetary and fiscal stimulus by less than expected in 2021 after the big policy support in 2020. The combined fiscal and credit impulse for China has already slowed by 9% of GDP since December 2020, signaling a meaningful cooling of Chinese growth in the latter half of 2021 that should weigh on demand for imports from Australia (Chart 12). However, Chinese import demand has already been severely impacted because of worsening China-Australia political tensions, which has led Beijing to impose restrictions on Australian imports for a variety of products, include coal, wine, beef, barley and cotton. The result is that there has been no growth in Australian total exports to China over the past year – an outcome that was flattered by the surge in iron ore prices - which has weighed on overall Australian export growth. Given this weak starting point for Chinese demand for Australian goods, the sharp reduction in the China stimulus is, on the margin, a factor that will not force the RBA to turn less dovish sooner than expected. 4. Inflation, both realized and expected, returns to the RBA’s 2-3% target We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Australian inflation remains well below the RBA’s 2-3% target range, with the headline CPI and the less volatile trimmed mean CPI both expanding at only a 1.1% annual rate in Q1/2021 (Chart 13). The RBA is forecasting a brief boost to both measures in Q2, before settling back below 2% to the end of 2022. Chart 13No Bond-Bearish RBA Policy Shift Without More Inflation Chart 14Diminishing Financial Stability Risks From Housing The RBA’s message on the inflation outlook has been very consistent. A sustainable move of realized inflation back to the 2-3% target range – that would prompt a normalization of monetary policy – cannot occur without a significant tightening of labor markets that drives wage growth back to 3% from the Q1/2021 reading of 1.5%. The RBA currently does not expect that outcome to occur before 2024. The RBA believes that the full employment NAIRU is between 4-4.5%, well below the OECD’s latest estimate of 5.4%. Given the sharp drop in Australian unemployment already seen over the past few quarters, there is the potential for an upside surprise in the wage data that could lead the RBA to change its policy bias. The central bank would need to see a few quarters of such wage surprises, however, before altering its forward guidance on the timing of future rate hikes. 5. House price inflation begins to accelerate We are NOT placing a checkmark next to this part of our RBA Checklist. Given Australia’s past history with periods of surging home values, signs that housing markets were overheating could prompt the RBA to consider tighten monetary policy. The annual growth of median house prices has dipped from +8% in Q1 2020 to +4% in Q4 2020, despite robust housing demand as evidenced by the 40% growth in building approvals. At the same time, housing valuations have become less stretched with the ratio of median home prices to median household incomes falling -9% from the 2017 peak according to data from the OECD (Chart 14). The RBA remains sensitive to the potential financial stability risks from overvalued housing. The latest trends in the house price data, however, suggest that the central bank does not yet to have the use the blunt tool of tighter monetary policy to cool off an overheated housing market. Chart 15Upgrade Australia To Overweight (Vs. USTs) In sum, the majority of items in our RBA Checklist are signaling no immediate pressure on the central bank to tighten policy. The first 25bp rate hike is not discounted in the Australian OIS curve until April 2023, a little ahead of RBA guidance but still consistent with a very dovish policy bias. The inflation data, in our view, will be the critical factor that could prompt the markets to pull forward expected monetary tightening, leading to a surge in Australian bond yields. With the RBA already expecting a surge in inflation in the Q2/2020 data, the central bank would likely want to see at least a couple of more quarterly inflation prints – both for the CPI and wage price index - before signaling a more hawkish policy shift. Thus, the RBA will likely stay dovish over the latter half of 2021 Therefore, we are moving to an overweight recommended stance on Australian government bonds on a tactical (0-6 months) basis. In our model bond portfolio on pages 16-17, we are “funding” that shift to an above-benchmark weighting in Australia out of US Treasury exposure. Given our view that the Fed will soon begin to signal a 2022 taper of its asset purchases, relative policy dovishness should lead Australian government bonds to outperform US Treasuries in the latter half of this year. In addition, Australian bonds have a lower yield beta to changes in US Treasury yields, relative to the high beta to changes in non-US developed market yields (Chart 15), making allocations out of the US into Australia attractive from a risk management perspective in a global bond portfolio. Bottom Line: Only one of the five components of our “RBA Checklist” – designed to measure the pressures that would force the Reserve Bank of Australia to turn less dovish – is flashing such a signal. We are upgrading our recommended allocation to Australian government bonds to overweight on a tactical investment horizon.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 See BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Report, "Bond Markets Are Suffering Withdrawal Symptoms", dated March 20, 2018. 2 See BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy/Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency?", dated January 20, 2021. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Our hedging techniques proved profitable this year with the previous long VIX futures trade  bringing in gains just shy of 20%, on top of our two synthetic SPY long options trades that added 676% ($5.41/contract) and 2850% ($8.86/contract) in returns to the portfolio. Our reinstated and currently active June 2021 VIX futures hedge is about to expire for a loss of 27% as the market has proven to be resilient. Alas, wrong and early look the same! Indeed, we had a chance to crystalize some gains on May 12, but we believed, and still do, that a more pronounced correction is imminent, especially given the divergence between high-yield corporate spreads and the SPX (see chart) along with many other reasons, such as expensive valuations and an expected gradual growth slowdown. The VIX curve has also shifted higher over the past several months making it more expensive to roll the hedge, but a 5-10% SPX correction will make this trade profitable. Bottom Line: Roll the June 2021 VIX hedge into the September 2021 contract.    

Highlights Chart 1Tracking Nonfarm Payrolls With 12-month PCE inflation already above the Fed’s 2% target, it is progress toward the Fed’s “maximum employment” goal that will determine both the timing of Fed liftoff and whether bond yields rise or fall. On that note, the bond market is currently priced for Fed liftoff in early 2023. We also calculate that average monthly nonfarm payroll growth of between 378k and 462k is required to meet the Fed’s “maximum employment” goal by the end of 2022, in time for an early-2023 rate hike. It follows from this analysis that any monthly employment print above +462k should be considered bond-bearish and any print below +378k should be considered bond-bullish (Chart 1). In that light, May’s +559k print is bond-bearish, and we anticipate further bond-bearish employment reports in the coming months as COVID fears fade and people return to a labor market that is already awash with demand. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration in US bond portfolios and also continue to favor spread product over duration-matched Treasuries. Feature Table 1Recommended Portfolio Specification Table 2Fixed Income Sector Performance Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 47 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +159 bps. The combination of above-trend economic growth and accommodative monetary policy supports positive excess returns for spread product versus Treasuries. At 142 bps, the 2/10 Treasury slope is very steep and the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate sits at 2.27% - almost, but not quite, within the 2.3% to 2.5% range that the Fed considers “well anchored”.1 The message from these two indicators is that the Fed is not yet ready for monetary conditions to turn restrictive. Despite the positive macro back-drop, investment grade corporate valuations are extremely tight. The investment grade corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread is almost at its lowest since 1995 (Chart 2). Though we retain a positive view of spread product as a whole, tight valuations cause us to recommend only a neutral allocation to investment grade corporates. We prefer high-yield corporates, municipal bonds and USD-denominated Emerging Market Sovereigns. Last week, the Fed announced that it will wind down its corporate bond portfolio over the coming months. The corporate bond purchase facility has not been operational since December 2020, meaning that the corporate bond market has been functioning without an explicit Fed back-stop for all of 2021. The portfolio itself is also quite small compared to the size of the corporate bond market. As a result, we anticipate no material impact on spreads. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 8 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +343 bps. In a recent report, we looked at the default expectations that are currently priced into the junk index and considered whether they are likely to be met.2 If we demand an excess spread of 100 bps and assume a 40% recovery rate on defaulted debt, then the High-Yield index embeds an expected default rate of 3.3% (Chart 3). Using a model of the speculative grade default rate that is based on gross corporate leverage (pre-tax profits over total debt) and C&I lending standards, we can estimate a likely default rate for the next 12 months using assumptions for profit and debt growth. The median FOMC forecast of 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021 is consistent with 31% corporate profit growth. We also assume that last year’s corporate debt binge will moderate in 2021. According to our model, 30% profit growth and 2% debt growth is consistent with a default rate of 3.4%, very close to what is priced into junk spreads. Given that the large amount of fiscal stimulus coming down the pike makes the Fed’s 6.5% real GDP growth forecast look conservative, and the fact that the combination of strong economic growth and accommodative monetary policy could easily cause valuations to overshoot in the near-term, we are inclined to maintain an overweight allocation to High-Yield bonds. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 36 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -9 bps. The nominal spread between conventional 30-year MBS and equivalent-duration Treasuries widened 7 bps in May. The spread remains wide compared to recent history, but it is still tight compared to the pace of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4). The conventional 30-year MBS option-adjusted spread (OAS) currently sits at 24 bps. This is considerably below the 51 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds and the 27 bps offered by Agency CMBS. It is only slightly more than the 18 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. All in all, value in MBS is not appealing compared to other similarly risky sectors. In a recent report, we looked at MBS performance and valuation across the coupon stack.3 We noted that the higher convexity of high-coupon MBS makes them likely to outperform lower-coupon MBS in a rising yield environment. Higher coupon MBS also have greater OAS than lower coupons. This makes the high-coupon MBS more likely to outperform in a flat bond yield environment as well. Given our view that bond yields will be flat-to-higher during the next 6-12 months, we recommend favoring high coupons over low coupons within an overall underweight allocation to Agency MBS. Government-Related: Neutral Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +87 bps (Chart 5). Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 32 bps in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +53 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 2 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +37 bps. Local Authority bonds outperformed by 30 bps in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +360 bps. Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals both outperformed by 8 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +27 bps and +24 bps, respectively. We recently took a detailed look at USD-denominated Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign valuation.4 We found that, on an equivalent-duration basis, EM Sovereigns offer a spread advantage over investment grade US corporates. Attractive countries include: Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Colombia. We prefer US corporates over EM Sovereigns in the high-yield space where there is still some value left in US corporate spreads and where the EM space is dominated by distressed credits like Turkey and Argentina. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in May, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +286 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We took a detailed look at municipal bond performance and valuation in a recent report and came to the following conclusions.5 First, the economic and policy back-drop is favorable for municipal bond performance. The recently enacted American Rescue Plan includes $350 billion of funding for state & local governments, a bailout that comes after state & local government revenues already exceeded expenditures in 2020 (Chart 6). President Biden has also proposed increasing income tax rates. However, there may not be time to pass these tax hikes before the 2022 midterm elections. Second, Aaa-rated municipal bonds look expensive relative to Treasuries (top panel). Muni investors should move down in quality to pick up additional yield. Third, General Obligation (GO) and Revenue munis offer better value than investment grade corporates with the same credit rating and duration, particularly at the long-end of the curve. Revenue munis in the 12-17 year maturity bucket offer a before-tax yield pick-up versus corporates. GO munis offer a breakeven tax rate of just 7% (panel 2). Fourth, taxable munis offer a yield advantage over investment grade corporates that investors should take advantage of (panel 3). Finally, high-yield muni spreads are reasonably attractive relative to high-yield corporates, offering a breakeven tax rate of 22% (panel 4). But despite the attractive spread, we recommend only a neutral allocation to high-yield munis versus high-yield corporates as the deep negative convexity of high-yield munis makes them prone to extension risk if bond yields gap higher. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/30 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury yields fell in May, with the 5-10 year part of the curve benefiting the most. The 7-year yield fell 8 bps in May while the 5-year and 10-year yields both fell 7 bps. Yield declines were smaller for shorter (< 5-year) and longer (> 10-year) maturities. The 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 5 bps to end the month at 144 bps. The 5/30 Treasury slope steepened 3 bps to end the month at 147 bps (Chart 7). We recently changed our recommended yield curve position from a 5 over 2/10 butterfly to a 5 over 2/30 butterfly.6 In making the switch we noted that the slope of the Treasury curve has behaved differently since bond yields peaked in early April. Prior to April, the rise in bond yields was concentrated at the very long-end (10-year +) of the curve. During the past two months, the belly of the curve (5-7 years) has seen more volatility. We conclude that we are now close enough to an expected Fed liftoff date that further significant increases in yields will be met with a flatter curve beyond the 5-year maturity point and that the 5-year and 7-year notes are likely to benefit the most if bond yields dip. We also observe an exceptional yield pick-up of +33 bps in the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/30 barbell. Given our view that bond yields will be flat-to-higher during the next 6-12 months, we recommend buying the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/30 barbell to take advantage of the strong positive carry in a flat yield environment, and as a hedge against our below-benchmark portfolio duration stance. TIPS: Neutral Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 86 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +484 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 1 bp and 2 bps on the month, respectively. At 2.42%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is near the top-end of the 2.3% to 2.5% range that is consistent with inflation expectations being well anchored around the Fed’s target (Chart 8). Meanwhile, at 2.27%, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is just below the target band (panel 3). With long-maturity breakevens already consistent (or close to consistent) with the Fed’s target, they have limited upside going forward. The Fed has so far welcomed rising TIPS breakeven inflation rates, but it will have an increasing incentive to lean against them if they continue to move up. We also think that the market has priced-in an overly aggressive inflation outlook at the front-end of the curve. The 1-year and 2-year CPI swap rates stand at 3.76% and 3.12%, respectively. There is a good chance that these lofty inflation expectations will not be confirmed by the actual data. With all that in mind, investors should maintain a neutral allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and also a neutral posture towards the inflation curve (panel 4). The inflation curve could steepen somewhat in the near-term if short-maturity inflation expectations moderate, but we expect the curve to remain inverted for a long time yet. An inverted inflation curve is more consistent with the Fed’s Average Inflation Target than a positively sloped one, and it should be considered the natural state of affairs moving forward. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +33 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed by 13 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +26 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 12 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +70 bps. The stimulus from last year’s CARES act led to a significant increase in household savings when individual checks were mailed in April 2020. This excess savings has still not been spent and, already, the most recent round of stimulus checks is pushing the savings rate higher again (Chart 9). The extraordinarily large stock of household savings means that the collateral quality of consumer ABS is also extraordinarily high. Indeed, many households have been using their windfalls to pay down consumer debt (bottom panel). Investors should remain overweight consumer ABS and should also take advantage of the high quality of household balance sheets by moving down the quality spectrum.     Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 41 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +163 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 27 bps in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +78 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 84 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +453 bps (Chart 10). Though returns have been strong and spreads remain attractive, particularly for lower-rated CMBS, we continue to recommend only a neutral allocation to the sector because of the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate. Even with the economic recovery well underway, commercial real estate loan demand continues to weaken and banks are not making lending standards more accommodative (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 37 basis points in May, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +125 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread tightened 7 bps on the month and it currently sits at 27 bps (bottom panel). Though Agency CMBS spreads have completely recovered their pre-COVID levels, they still look attractive compared to other similarly risky spread products. Stay overweight. Appendix A: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of May 28TH, 2021) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of May 28TH, 2021) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 57 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 57 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix B: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of May 28TH, 2021) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For further discussion of how we assess the state of monetary policy vis-à-vis spread product please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Lower For Longer, Then Faster Than You Think”, dated May 25, 2021. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “That Uneasy Feeling”, dated March 30, 2021. 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A New Conundrum”, dated April 20, 2021. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Searching For Value In Spread Product”, dated January 26, 2021. 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Making Money In Municipal Bonds”, dated April 27, 2021. 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Entering A New Yield Curve Regime”, dated May 11, 2021.