Yield Curve
Highlights Rates: The Democratic sweep of the election has caused the uptrend in bond yields to accelerate and has benefited our recommended rates positions (below-benchmark duration, nominal and real curve steepeners, inflation curve flatteners). We aren’t yet ready to exit any of these positions, and our medium-term target of 2% - 2.25% for the 5-year/5-year forward nominal Treasury yield remains unchanged. Municipal Bonds: Though valuation has become more expensive, we continue to recommend a maximum overweight allocation to municipal bonds. In particular, investors should favor municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with equivalent credit rating and duration. Economy: December’s employment report showed the first monthly contraction in nonfarm payrolls since April. However, this negative headline reflects the transitory impact of the latest COVID wave. It does not signal renewed weakness in the pace of economic recovery. Feature A Politically Driven Bond Rout In a Special Report last October, we argued that the bond market was vulnerable in a scenario where the November 3rd election resulted in the Democratic party winning the House, Senate and White House.1 It took some time, but after Democrats won both of Georgia’s Senate seats in last week’s special election, we are finally seeing the impact on the bond market. Nominal Treasury Yields First, the 10-year nominal Treasury yield moved above 1% for the first time since March. It currently sits at 1.13% (Chart 1). Meanwhile, the front-end of the Treasury curve held steady as the Fed continued to signal that liftoff is unlikely to occur within the next two years. The result has been a persistent steepening of the nominal curve (Chart 1, bottom panel). The 10-year nominal Treasury yield moved above 1% for the first time since March. We are positioned for a bear-steepening of the nominal Treasury curve, but the speed of this most recent move raises the question of how much further the bond sell-off can run. As we wrote in our year-end Special Report, we see yields continuing to rise until the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield reaches levels consistent with survey estimates of the long-run equilibrium fed funds rate (Chart 2).2 This would be in line with where yields peaked during the prior two global growth recoveries (2013/14 and 2017/18). At present, survey responses put our target for the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield at roughly 2% to 2.25%, still 18 to 43 bps above current levels. Chart 1Nominal Curve Bear-Steepening Chart 2How Much Upside For Yields? The prospect of greater fiscal stimulus under a Democratic government doesn’t necessarily translate into a higher ceiling for Treasury yields, but it does increase the speed with which yields will reach our target. All in all, we remain positioned for a bear-steepening of the nominal Treasury curve but will re-consider this stance if the 5-year/5-year forward yield reaches a range of 2% to 2.25%. Inflation Compensation Chart 3Stay Overweight TIPS For Now The recent 20 bps jump in the 10-year nominal Treasury yield was driven by a 15 bps increase in the 10-year TIPS yield and a 5 bps increase in the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate. Notably, the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates have both pushed above 2% and are sitting at 2.08% and 2.06%, respectively. While these long-maturity TIPS breakevens have recovered nicely, the Fed won’t be tempted to adopt a more hawkish policy stance until they reach a range of 2.3 – 2.5 percent, a range that has been consistent with “well-anchored” inflation expectations in the past (Chart 3).. While TIPS breakeven inflation rates aren’t yet high enough to worry the Fed, they are starting to look elevated compared to actual inflation. At 2.08%, the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is 27 bps above the fair value reading from our Adaptive Expectations Model (Chart 3, panel 3).3 Given this expensive valuation, we are currently looking for an opportunity to tactically reduce our allocation to TIPS. We expect that opportunity will come when the 12-month core and trimmed mean inflation rates re-converge (Chart 3, bottom panel). The low level of core CPI inflation relative to the trimmed mean suggests that inflation has near-term upside as some downtrodden sectors that are excluded from the trimmed mean recover from the pandemic. But inflation will moderate once that “snapback phase” is over, and we should get an opportunity to reduce our TIPS allocation.4 Along with an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, we also recommend owning inflation curve flatteners. The inflation curve tends to flatten when the cost of inflation protection rises, and this has indeed been the case during the past few weeks (Chart 4). It will make sense to exit this flattener when we tactically reduce our TIPS allocation, but this will only be a temporary move. In the long run, the inflation curve will eventually invert and then remain in negative territory for an extended period. This is the result of the Fed’s plan to engineer an overshoot of its 2% inflation target. If the Fed is successful, it means that it will be attacking its inflation target from above for the first time since the 1980s. In such an environment, it makes sense for the inflation curve to be inverted. Chart 4Inflation Curve Flattening Real Yield Curve Chart 5Real Curve Steepening Our final rates curve recommendation is a real yield curve steepener. This position has also performed well during the recent bond rout, as a 14 bps increase in the 10-year real yield occurred alongside a 13 bps drop in the 2-year real yield (Chart 5). As with our other rates positions, we are inclined to stay the course. A 2/10 real yield curve steepener can be thought of as the combination of a 2/10 nominal curve steepener and a 2/10 inflation curve flattener. During the recent bond sell-off, the 2/10 real curve has steepened by 27 bps, split between 17 bps of nominal curve steepening and 10 bps of inflation curve flattening. We will likely maintain our real yield curve steepener as a core portfolio position even if we eventually close our inflation curve flattener. Gradual progress toward fed funds liftoff and the resulting steepening of the nominal curve should be sufficient to steepen the real yield curve, even if inflation takes a pause. Corporate Credit Chart 6Move Down In Quality Corporate spreads have reacted well to the news of a Democratic sweep, even though it means that a corporate tax hike is coming in 2021. All else equal, the one-time hit to profits from a tax hike is negative for corporate balance sheets, but this is a minor consideration when the macro back-drop remains so positive for spread product. The combination of above-trend economic growth and highly accommodative monetary policy will encourage investors to keep adding credit risk, and the average investment grade and high-yield index spreads have still not quite recovered to their pre-COVID tights (Chart 6). We continue to view the Ba credit tier as the most attractive from a risk/reward perspective, as the incremental spread pick-up in Ba compared to Baa is elevated compared to what we’ve seen in recent years (Chart 6, panel 3). Bottom Line: The Democratic sweep of the election has caused the uptrend in bond yields to accelerate and has benefited our recommended rates positions (below-benchmark duration, nominal and real curve steepeners, inflation curve flatteners). We aren’t yet ready to exit any of these positions, and our medium-term target of 2% - 2.25% for the 5-year/5-year forward nominal Treasury yield remains unchanged. Fiscal Policy In 2021 Chart 7Organic Household Income Has Recovered Our US Political Strategy service debuted last week with a report that considers the outlook for fiscal policy in 2021 given that Democrats now have control of the House, Senate and White House.5 In short, the Democrats now have complete control of the government but their majorities in the House and Senate are thin. This means that the most radical parts of the Democratic agenda, like the Green New Deal, will be hard to pass. However, the Democrats will be able to deliver two reconciliation bills in 2021. The first bill could come soon and will likely focus on additional COVID relief and social support, such as $2000 checks to individuals instead of $600 ones. After that, the Democrats will focus on expanding and entrenching the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). They will partially repeal the Trump tax cuts to help finance these priorities. On the issue of COVID relief, we are no longer concerned about the US economy receiving enough stimulus to avoid a double-dip recession. We had previously estimated that a further $600 billion to $1 trillion of income support for households would be required to support consumer spending at reasonable levels.6 This estimate now looks too high because non-CARES act household income has recovered much more quickly than we had anticipated. Non-CARES act household income is already back to pre-COVID levels (Chart 7). In our prior research, we assumed this wouldn’t happen until July 2021. In any event, another round of $2000 checks will provide more than enough income support to sustain a recovery in consumer spending. A Democratic sweep suggests big fiscal thrust in 2021 and less contraction in 2022. More generally, our US Political Strategy team has estimated the medium-term path for the US deficit under a “Democratic Status Quo” scenario that assumes another round of $2000 checks and that the remaining $2.5 trillion of the proposed HEROES Act will be enacted. It also considers a “Democratic High” scenario that adds Joe Biden’s $5.6 trillion policy agenda on top of the Democratic Status Quo (Chart 8). Biden will not achieve all of his agenda, so the reality will lie somewhere between the Democratic Status Quo and Democratic High scenarios. In either case, we will see considerably more fiscal thrust compared to the Republican Status Quo and Baseline scenarios. Chart 8Democratic Sweep Suggests Big Fiscal Thrust In FY2021 And Less Contraction FY2022 Municipal Bonds The prospect of federal government aid for challenged state & local governments is a crucial issue for municipal bond investors. Fortunately, the Democratic party’s HEROES act contains more than $1 trillion of aid to state & local governments and this will likely form the basis of the next COVID relief package. On top of that, further support for household incomes will also help support state & local tax revenues that are already recovering (Chart 9). Chart 9State & Local Austerity Will Continue That said, we are likely still in for a considerable period of state & local austerity given the large budget gaps that have opened during the past nine months. However, the expectation of help from the federal government makes us even more confident that state & local governments will muddle through without a spate of muni downgrades or defaults. We maintain our “maximum overweight” recommendation for tax-exempt municipal bonds, though valuation is turning more expensive by the day. Muni yield spreads versus Treasuries are contracting, particularly at the long end of the curve (Chart 10A) and valuations appear more expensive if we look at yield ratios instead of spreads (Chart 10B). In both cases, value looks better at the front end of the curve than at the long end. Chart 10AMuni / Treasury Yield Ratios Chart 10BMuni / Treasury Yield Ratios Bottom Line: The new Democratic government will deliver more than enough income support to sustain the recovery in consumer spending. Aid for state & local governments is also forthcoming and it will help sustain municipal bond outperformance versus both Treasuries and investment grade corporates. Though valuation has become more expensive, we continue to recommend a maximum overweight allocation to municipal bonds. In particular, investors should favor municipal bonds over investment grade corporate bonds with equivalent credit rating and duration. December Payrolls Only A Temporary Setback At first blush, last week’s December employment report looks disastrous. Nonfarm payrolls fell by 140 thousand, the first monthly contraction since April. The contraction looks especially worrying when you consider that payrolls remain almost 10 million below pre-COVID levels and should be rising quickly at this stage of the economic recovery (Chart 11). Chart 11Payrolls Contracted In December Chart 12Permanent Unemployment Fell In December The grim headline numbers, however, severely overstate the magnitude of the problem. Rather than implying underlying economic weakness, the drop in payrolls reflects the transitory impact of the pandemic’s latest violent wave. December’s job losses came from the Leisure and Hospitality sector (-498k), the sector most impacted by the virus. Job gains remained solid elsewhere in the economy (+358k). The unemployment rate held flat at 6.7% in December, but encouragingly, this stable number masks both an increase in the number of temporarily unemployed (or furloughed) workers and a drop in the number of permanently unemployed workers (Chart 12). Those furloughed workers will return to work once the virus is better contained. Meanwhile, the drop in the number of permanently unemployed suggests that the economic recovery is taking hold. It will only gain momentum as the COVID vaccine is rolled out and additional fiscal stimulus is delivered in 2021. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Beware The Bond-Bearish Blue Sweep”, dated October 20, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For more details on inflation’s “snapback phase” please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Political Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Reflation Plays On Georgia’s Blue Sweep”, dated January 6, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Chart 12020 Returns After a tumultuous start to the year, corporate bonds rallied in 2020 H2, managing to eke out small annual gains versus Treasuries. Specifically, investment grade corporates outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 4 basis points in 2020 and high-yield outperformed by 185 bps (Chart 1). Treasuries, for their part, bested cash by 7% on the year but returns have been trending down since August. As we look forward to 2021, the economic cycle is in what we call a sweet spot for spread product returns. Economic growth is above trend, but inflation is low and monetary conditions are highly accommodative. This macro back-drop will lead to positive spread product returns versus Treasuries and a moderate bear-steepening of the Treasury curve in 2021. However, stretched valuations for investment grade corporates mean that investors must be selective within spread product. We think the Ba credit tier offers the best risk-adjusted opportunity in the corporate bond space, and also recommend favoring tax-exempt municipal bonds over equivalent-quality investment grade corporates. Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-matched Treasury index by 79 basis points in December and by 4 bps in 2020. The investment grade corporate index eked out a small gain relative to the duration-matched Treasury index in 2020. Corporates underperformed Treasuries by 18% from the beginning of the year until March 23, the day that the Fed stopped the bleeding in credit markets by unveiling its suite of emergency lending facilities. With the Fed’s backstops in place, the corporate index went on to outperform Treasuries by 22% between March 23 and the end of the year (Appendix A). As we noted in our 2021 Key Views Special Report, the corporate bond index option-adjusted spread is not quite back to its pre-COVID low.1 However, valuation is close to all-time expensive after adjusting for changes in the index’s average credit rating and duration. The 12-month breakeven spread for the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index (adjusted to keep the average credit rating constant) has only been tighter 4% of the time since 1995 (Chart 2). The same figure for the Baa-rated credit tier is 5%. As noted, the macro environment of above-trend growth and accommodative Fed policy is very positive for spread product returns. However, better value exists outside of the investment grade corporate space. In particular, we advise investors to look at Ba-rated high-yield corporates and tax-exempt municipal bonds. High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 190 basis points in December and by 185 basis points in 2020. Ba-rated junk bonds outperformed duration-matched Treasuries by 431 bps in 2020, while B-rated and Caa-rated bonds lagged by 13 bps and 238 bps, respectively. Since the March 23 peak in spreads, Ba-rated bonds outperformed Treasuries by 33%, B-rated bonds outperformed by 30% and Caa-rated bonds outperformed by 36% (Appendix A). We view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We noted in our 2021 Key Views Special Report that the additional spread earned from moving down in quality below Ba is in line with historical averages.2 Assuming a 25% recovery rate on defaulted debt and a minimum required risk premium of 150 bps, we calculate that the junk index is priced for a default rate of 2.8% for the next 12 months (panel 3). This represents a steep drop from the 8.4% default rate observed during the most recent 12-month period. However, only seven defaults occurred in November, down from a peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, are also falling rapidly (bottom panel). Overall, we see room for spread compression across all junk credit tiers in 2021 but believe that Ba-rated bonds offer the best opportunity in risk-adjusted terms. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation*Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in December but underperformed by 17 bps in 2020. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 10 bps on the month to reach 61 bps (Chart 4). This is higher than the 58 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 49 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 24 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the relatively attractive OAS, we continue to view the elevated primary mortgage spread as a material risk for MBS investors. The elevated spread suggests that mortgage rates need not rise alongside Treasury yields in the near-term, meaning that mortgage refinancings can continue at their current rapid pace (panel 3). Our view is that expected prepayment losses embedded in MBS spreads (aka the option cost) are too low relative to this pace of refinancing. Last year’s spike in the mortgage delinquency rate was driven by households that were granted forbearance by the federal government’s CARES act (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders is that these households will not be able to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period ends this spring. While the situation bears close monitoring, our sense is that excess savings built up during the past nine months will be sufficient to prevent a surge of bankruptcies when the forbearance period ends. The recent stimulus package provides households with even more assistance. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in December but underperformed by 161 bps in 2020. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 176 bps in December but underperformed by 98 bps in 2020. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 7 bps in December but underperformed by 640 bps in 2020. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 146 bps in December but underperformed by 86 bps in 2020. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 14 bps in December but underperformed by 9 bps in 2020. Supranationals outperformed by 2 bps in December and by 3 bps in 2020. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, 2020’s dollar weakness was mostly relative to other Developed Market currencies (Chart 5). Value has improved somewhat for EM Sovereigns during the past few weeks, but the index continues to offer less spread than the Baa-rated US Credit index (panel 4). At the country level, Turkey, Colombia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Indonesia are the only countries that offer a spread pick-up relative to duration and quality-matched US corporates. Of those, only Mexico looks attractive on a risk/reward basis. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 56 basis points in December but underperformed by 286 bps in 2020 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). We upgraded municipal bonds to “maximum overweight” in our recent 2021 Key Views Special Report.3 Attractive valuations are the main reason for this move. First, spreads between Aaa-rated municipal bonds and equivalent-maturity Treasuries are elevated compared to history across the entire yield curve (Chart 6). Second, municipal bonds look even more attractive relative to duration and quality-matched credit. The Bloomberg Barclays Revenue Bond index offers a greater yield than the quality-matched Credit index across the entire maturity spectrum (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The same is true for the Bloomberg Barclays General Obligation index beyond the 12-year maturity point (panel 3). While the failure to include state & local government aid in the recent relief bill is a big blow to municipal budgets that are already stretched, we think municipal bond spreads offer more-than-adequate compensation for default/downgrade risk. State & local governments are already engaging in austerity measures that will help protect bondholders (bottom panel) and State Rainy Day Fund balances were at all-time highs heading into the COVID downturn. Both of these things should help stave off a wave of municipal downgrades. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-steepened in December. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 13 bps to 81 bps. The 5/30 Treasury slope steepened 7 bps to 129 bps. Our expectation is that continued economic recovery will cause investors to price-in eventual monetary tightening at the long-end of the Treasury curve. With the Fed maintaining a firm grip on the front end, this will lead to Treasury curve bear steepening. A timely vaccine roll-out and the recently passed fiscal relief bill will serve to speed this process along. We recommend positioning for a steeper curve by owning the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening. Valuation is a concern with our recommended steepener, as the 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7). However, the 5-year looked much more expensive during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom 2 panels). We anticipate a return to similar levels. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 141 basis points in December and by 117 bps in 2020. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 22 bps and 18 bps on the month. They currently sit at 2.01% and 2.07%, respectively. Core CPI rose 0.22% in November, pushing the year-over-year rate from 1.63% to 1.65%. Meanwhile, 12-month trimmed mean CPI fell from 2.22% to 2.09%, narrowing the gap between trimmed mean and core (Chart 8). We anticipate further narrowing in 2021 Q1 and therefore expect core CPI to print relatively hot. For this reason, we recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being, even though the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate looks somewhat elevated on our Adaptive Expectations Model (panel 2).4 Inflation pressures may moderate once the core and trimmed mean inflation measures converge, and this could give us an opportunity to tactically reduce TIPS exposure in the first half of this year. We also recommend holding real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also exerting more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, we expect short-maturity real yields to come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in December and by 98 bps in 2020. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 12 bps in December and by 81 bps in 2020. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 33 bps in December and by 207 bps in 2020 (Chart 9). On paper, the Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of 2020 is quite negative for ABS. However, as we explained in a recent report, we don’t anticipate a material impact on spreads.5 For one thing, Aaa ABS spreads are already well below the borrowing cost offered by TALF. But more importantly, consumer credit quality is strong. As we first explained last June, the stimulus received from the CARES act led to a significant increase in disposable income and a jump in the savings rate (panel 4).6 Faced with an income boost and few spending opportunities, many households paid down consumer debt. Given the recently passed additional fiscal support and the substantial savings that have already accrued, we see household balance sheets as being in a good place. As such, we advise moving down-in-quality to pick up extra spread in non-Aaa ABS. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 113 basis points in December but underperformed by 57 bps in 2020. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 58 bps in December and by 56 bps in 2020. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 277 bps in December but underperformed by 360 bps in 2020 (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus will not be negatively impacted.7 Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 50 basis points in December and by 105 bps in 2020. The average index spread tightened 7 bps in December to reach 49 bps (bottom panel). At its September meeting, the Fed decided to slow its pace of Agency CMBS purchases. It is no longer looking to increase its Agency CMBS holdings, but rather, will only purchase what is “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. This is nonetheless a backstop of the market, and it does not change our overweight recommendation. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of December 31ST, 2020) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of December 31ST, 2020) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 85 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 85 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of December 31ST, 2020) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2021 Key Views: US Fixed Income”, dated December 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Highlights Chart 1Bond Yields & The CRB/Gold Ratio In our last report of November, we noted that the rising COVID case count was likely to lead to a challenging few months for the US economy, but we also questioned whether financial markets would pay attention or whether they would stay focused on the vaccine roll-out and eventual economic recovery. We now have our answer. November’s employment report was the worst since April, but the Treasury curve has bear-steepened, credit spreads have come in and TIPS have outperformed nominals. What’s more, the jump in the CRB Raw Industrials / Gold ratio suggests that the 10-year Treasury yield has even more near-term upside (Chart 1). With a vaccine on the horizon and Congress closing in on a fiscal relief package, investors should stay positioned for the reflation trade on a 6-12 month horizon: below-benchmark portfolio duration, nominal and real yield curve steepeners, inflation curve flatteners, overweight TIPS versus nominals and overweight corporate bonds rated Ba and higher. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 233 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -74 bps. The strong rally in corporate bonds since March has culminated in extremely tight valuations for investment grade corporates. The 12-month breakeven spread for the Bloomberg Barclays Corporate Index (adjusted to keep the average credit rating constant) has only been tighter 4% of the time since 1995 (Chart 2). The same figure for the Baa-rated credit tier is 5%. We retain a positive outlook on corporate credit despite these stretched valuations. In our view, an environment where the economy is recovering and where the Fed will be very cautious about scaling back accommodation is the exact sort of environment where we should expect a lot of enthusiasm for spread product and, as a result, extremely tight spreads. We will not be surprised if our 12-month breakeven spread percentile rank valuation measure reaches its all-time expensive level within the next couple of months. While the macro environment makes it difficult to turn negative on investment grade corporates, we acknowledge that other sectors may offer better opportunities, particularly in the higher credit tiers. Specifically, we find better value in tax-exempt municipal bonds than in corporates and recommend that investors favor the former over the latter. At the sector level, we continue to recommend overweight allocations to subordinate Bank bonds, Healthcare and Energy bonds. We also advise underweight allocations to Technology and Pharmaceutical bonds. Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 382 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -5 bps. After last month’s strong outperformance, Ba-rated junk bonds are now beating duration-equivalent Treasuries by 267 bps, year-to-date. The B and Caa credit tiers are lagging by 179 bps and 548 bps, respectively. We still view Ba-rated junk bonds as the sweet spot within the corporate credit space. The sector is relatively insulated from default risk and yet still offers a sizeable spread pick-up over investment grade corporates (Chart 3). We remain underweight B-rated and lower junk bonds for now as those securities are pricing-in a relatively optimistic outlook for the default rate. But, an imminent vaccine roll-out makes that outlook appear more realistic and we could soon upgrade the lower-rated junk credit tiers when we think the value is exhausted in the Ba-rated and higher securities. Looking at value for the junk index as a whole, we see that the index is pricing-in a default rate of 3% for the next 12 months, significantly below the 8.3% that was observed during the most recent 12-month period (panel 3). However, only four corporate issuers defaulted in October down from a monthly peak of 22 in July. Job cut announcements, an excellent indicator of the default rate, are also falling rapidly (bottom panel). At the sector level, we advise overweight allocations to high-yield Technology and Energy bonds. We are underweight the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sectors. Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview MBS: Underweight Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by one basis point in November, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -39 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 1 bp on the month, and it currently sits at 64 bps (Chart 4). This is significantly higher than the 59 bps offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds, the 53 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 25 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the relatively attractive OAS, we continue to view the elevated primary mortgage spread as a risk for MBS investors. It suggests that mortgage rates need not rise alongside Treasury yields in the near-term, meaning that mortgage refinancings can continue at their current rapid pace (panel 3). All else equal, this elevated refinancing activity will pressure MBS spreads wider. The recent spike in the mortgage delinquency rate does not pose a near-term risk to spreads as it is being driven by households that have been granted forbearance from the federal government (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders only comes into play if many households are unable to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period expires early next year. But even in that case, further government intervention to either support household incomes or extend the forbearance period would mitigate the risk. Chart 4MBS Market Overview Government-Related: Underweight The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 64 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -222 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 157 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -269 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 46 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -647 bps. Local Authority debt outperformed Treasuries by 139 bps in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -228 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 10 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 9 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +2 bps. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, this year’s dollar weakness has occurred mostly relative to other Developed Market currencies (Chart 5). Value has improved somewhat for EM Sovereigns during the past few weeks, but the index continues to offer less spread than the Baa-rated US Credit index (panel 4). At the country level, Turkey, Colombia, Mexico, Russia and South Africa are the only countries that offer a spread pick-up relative to duration and quality-matched US corporates. Of those, only Mexico looks attractive on a risk/reward basis. Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Municipal Bonds: Overweight Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 130 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -340 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads tightened sharply relative to both Treasuries and Corporates in November, but they remain exceptionally attractive relative to history (Chart 6). In fact, as we showed in a recent report, the Bloomberg Barclays Revenue Bond index offers a greater yield than the quality-matched Credit index across the entire maturity spectrum (before adjusting for the tax advantage).1 This is also true for the Bloomberg Barclays General Obligation (GO) index beyond the 12-year maturity point. Eight-to-twelve-year maturity GO bonds trade only 1 basis point through the Credit index, implying a breakeven effective tax rate of 4%. Six-to-eight-year maturities trade 11 bps through the Credit index, implying a breakeven effective tax rate of 16%. Extraordinary valuation is the main reason for our recommendation to overweight municipal bonds. The severe ongoing state & local government credit crunch is a concern, but it is a risk we are willing to take. It now looks possible that a relief package containing some federal funds for state & local governments will be passed before the end of the year. This would alleviate a lot of the concern. But even in the absence of federal assistance, the combination of austerity measures (bottom panel) and all-time high State Rainy Day Fund balances should help stave off a wave of municipal downgrades. Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell The Treasury curve bull-flattened in November, but then bear-steepened sharply during the first week of December. All told, the 2/10 Treasury slope is currently 81 bps, 7 bps steeper than at the end of October. The 5/30 Treasury slope is 131 bps, 4 bps steeper than at the end of October. Our expectation is that continued economic recovery will cause investors to price-in eventual monetary tightening at the long-end of the Treasury curve. With the Fed maintaining a firm grip on the front end, this will lead to Treasury curve bear steepening. A timely vaccine roll-out and/or further fiscal stimulus will speed this process up. We recommend positioning for a steeper curve by owning the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year note and 10-year notes. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening. Valuation is a concern with our recommended steepener, as the 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7). However, the 5-year looked much more expensive during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom 2 panels). We anticipate a return to similar levels. Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview TIPS: Overweight TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 70 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -23 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 8 bps and 5 bps on the month. They currently sit at 1.91% and 1.96%, respectively. Core CPI was flat in October and the year-over-year rate dropped from 1.73% to 1.63%. The 12-month trimmed mean CPI fell even more – from 2.37% to 2.22% – so the gap between core and trimmed mean inflation continued to narrow (Chart 8). We expect further narrowing in the months ahead, and therefore expect core CPI to come in relatively hot. For this reason, we recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being, even though the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is now somewhat expensive according to our Adaptive Expectations Model (panel 2).2 Inflation pressures may moderate once core and trimmed mean inflation measures converge, and this could give us an opportunity to tactically reduce TIPS exposure sometime next year. We also recommend holding real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we would expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also exerting more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, we expect that short-maturity real yields will come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). Chart 8TIPS Market Overview ABS: Overweight Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +82 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +68 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 17 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +174 bps (Chart 9). On paper, the Treasury department’s decision to let the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) expire at the end of the year is quite negative for ABS. However, as we explained in a recent report, we don’t expect a material impact on spreads.3 For one thing, Aaa ABS spreads are already well below the borrowing cost offered by TALF. But more importantly, consumer credit quality remains quite robust. As we first explained back in June, the stimulus received from the CARES act led to a significant increase in disposable income and a jump in the savings rate (panel 4).4 Faced with an income boost and few spending opportunities, many households took the opportunity to pay down consumer debt. Granted, further income support from Congress is needed now that the CARES act’s enhanced unemployment benefits have expired. But given the substantial boost to savings that has already occurred, we are confident that more stimulus will arrive in time to prevent a wave of consumer bankruptcies. Chart 9ABS Market Overview Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 85 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -168 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed Treasuries by 71 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -2 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 127 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -620 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa-rated Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Even with the imminent expiry of TALF, Aaa CMBS spreads are already well below the cost of borrowing through TALF and thus will not be negatively impacted.5 Meanwhile, the structurally challenging environment for commercial real estate could lead to problems for lower-rated CMBS (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 38 basis points in November, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +55 bps. The average index spread tightened 6 bps on the month. It currently sits at 53 bps, above typical historical levels (bottom panel). At its September meeting, the Fed decided to slow its pace of Agency CMBS purchases. It is no longer looking to increase its Agency CMBS holdings, but rather, it is only purchasing what is “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. This is nonetheless a Fed back-stop of the market, and it does not change our overweight recommendation. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 70 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 70 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of December 4TH, 2020) Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Political Risk Will Dominate In A Pivotal Month For The Bond Market”, dated October 13, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Preparing For A Dark Winter … But Do Markets Care?”, dated November 24, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation
Highlights Inflation Breakeven Trades: We are taking profits on our recommended inflation breakeven widening trades in Italy and Canada, as breakevens in both countries are no longer below the fair values implied by our models. We are initiating a new trade this week, going long French 10-year inflation-linked bonds versus French nominal OATs, as French breakevens remain below fair value. Yield Curve Butterfly Trades: We are closing three of our four outstanding government bond yield curve trade recommendations, taking profits in France and Italy and realizing a loss in the UK. We are maintaining our US 5/7/10 butterfly trade, which is the cheapest way to position for an expected steepening of the Treasury curve based on our valuation models. Cross-Country Spread Trades: We are cutting our losses in our New Zealand-UK government bond spread trade, with the odds of the RBNZ shifting to a negative interest rate policy severely curtailed by political pressure over surging New Zealand house prices. We are maintaining our US-Germany spread widening trade, as the spread is too narrow based on our fair value model and we see more scope for US Treasury yields to drift higher in the coming months. Feature Dear Client, Next week, we will be jointly publishing our semi-annual Central Bank Monitor Chartbook along with our colleagues at BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy. You will receive that report a few days later than usual on Friday, December 11. We will return to our regular publishing schedule on Tuesday, December 15 with our 2021 Key Views report outlining our main investment themes and ideas for the upcoming year. Best Regards, Rob Robis As we enter the final weeks of an incredibly eventful and (unfortunately) all too memorable 2020, our attention now turns to investment ideas for the coming New Year. This week, all BCA Research clients will receive the 2021 Outlook report, detailing the key themes and recommendations from all our strategists. We will follow that up with our own 2021 Global Fixed Income Strategy outlook report later this month. The waning days of the year also offer a good time to review our more short-term trade recommendations currently in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. In addition, the waning days of the year also offer a good time to review our more short-term trade recommendations currently in our Tactical Overlay portfolio (Table 1). Several of our suggested trades have generated a solid profit (like inflation breakeven wideners) but have now outlived their original rationale. Others, like some of our yield curve trades in Europe, have not gone as we expected and should therefore be closed out. Table 1Changes To Our Tactical Overlay Portfolio As a reminder to our regular readers, our Tactical Overlay is a portfolio of individual trade ideas within the global fixed income space with an investment horizon of six months or less. These differ from our more typical strategic (6-12 month) recommendations that also populate our model bond portfolio. Ideas for our Tactical Overlay trades often stem from our fair value models, but can also be plays on events that we expect will be market relevant on a near-term basis, like central bank meetings. All recommended trades are implemented using specific securities, rather than generic Bloomberg tickers or bond indices. This allows for a more transparent process where clients can follow along with the performance of our trades. Evaluating Our Tactical Inflation-Linked Breakeven Trades We currently have two open tactical trade recommendations involving inflation-linked bonds: Long 10-year Italian inflation-linked bonds vs short 10-year Italian bond futures Long 10-year Canadian inflation-linked bonds vs short 10-year Canadian bond futures We initiated both of these trades back in June of this year, as well as an additional trade involving US TIPS, based on the output of our inflation breakeven fair value framework. In our models, we regress 10-year inflation breakevens on the annual rate of change of oil prices in local currency terms and a multi-year moving average of realized headline inflation.1 At the time of our mid-year report, inflation breakevens were too low on our models in the majority of developed market countries with inflation-linked bonds – a lingering after-effect of the COVID-19 shock to global growth in the second quarter of 2020 (Chart 1). Since then, 10-year inflation breakevens have caught up to fair value in the US, Germany, Italy and Canada, and have even moved above fair value in the UK and Australia. Chart 1A Big Shift In Inflation Breakeven Valuations In June, we also entered into a US 10-year TIPS breakeven widening trade, but we took profits on the trade once US breakevens returned back to our model fair value estimate in September. We now see a similar situation in Canada (Chart 2) and Italy (Chart 3) where breakevens have converged to our model-implied fair value. Chart 2Canadian 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model A move above fair value is possible, but could be harder to achieve with the Canadian dollar and euro steadily trending higher which could weigh on the market’s view on future inflation in Canada and Italy. We are taking profits on our Canada and Italy 10-year breakeven trades, realizing profits of 4.7% and 5.6% respectively. Thus, we are taking profits on our Canada and Italy 10-year breakeven trades, realizing profits of 4.7% and 5.6% respectively. The Italian returns were boosted considerably by the long side of this trade, as we entered the position when the 10-year real yield was +1.05% and which has since collapsed to -0.05% on the back of the massive rally in Italian bonds. One place where breakevens still look attractively cheap, trading close to one standard deviation below our model fair value, is in France (Chart 4). This contrasts with the breakevens in Italy and Germany that have fully converged to fair value. Thus, we are entering a new trade this week, going long the on-the-run 10yr French inflation-linked bond (OATi) and shorting French bond futures (Euro-OATs). The hedge ratio used for this trade to keep both legs duration matched, given the much shorter duration of the OATi relative to nominal French bonds, is 0.49 (see the Tactical Overlay table on page 17 for specific details on the securities used in the trade). Chart 3Italian 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Chart 4French 10-Year Inflation Breakeven Model Bottom Line: We are taking profits on our recommended inflation breakeven widening trades in Italy and Canada, while initiating a new breakeven widening position in France, based on the output of our breakeven fair value models. Evaluating Our Yield Curve/Butterfly Spread Trades Back in July, we initiated a series of yield curve butterfly spread trades in the US, UK, Italy and France.2 Butterfly spreads compare the yield of a single bond (bullets) to that of a duration-neutral combination of bonds with shorter and longer maturities relative to the bullet (barbells). Our valuation models produce fair value estimates of various butterfly combinations based on the relation of the butterfly spreads to the slope of the yield curve. We then combine those valuations with our own macro views on the future slope of yield curves to come up with potential value-based curve trades.3 We now evaluate our four existing curve trades in turn. Long UK 3/20 Barbell vs. 10-Year Bullet Our original rationale for entering this trade was two-fold. Firstly, this position was the most attractive butterfly combination in terms of the standardized deviation of the spread from its model-implied fair value. Secondly, there was a relatively low correlation between nominal UK bond yields and inflation breakevens--meaning that we could see a rise in long-dated inflation expectations that did not also push up nominal bond yields by a proportional amount. This made the trade consistent with our overall macro view back in July that the Gilt curve would flatten (the same rationale applies to the other two long barbell versus short bullet trades, or “flatteners”, in France and Italy that we discuss below). Unfortunately, our rationale did not play out as expected (Chart 5). Instead of reverting to fair value, the butterfly spread was mostly flat while the bullet grew more expensive relative to the barbell, driven by a rise in the model fair value. This in turn was due to significant steepening in the underlying 3/20 curve, contrary to our expectations. We also saw a significant overall upward shift in the overall UK Gilt curve, which generated losses on our long barbell position (which has a higher interest rate convexity) that overwhelmed the profits on our short bullet position. Going forward, there are good technical and strategic reasons to exit this trade. The butterfly spread is not yet at levels where it tends to mean-revert (second panel). In addition, Joe Biden’s US election victory has also increased the odds of a Brexit deal, which would put bear-steepening pressure on the UK Gilt curve. With that in mind, we are closing our Long UK 3/20 Barbell vs. 10-Year Bullet for a loss of -0.17%. Long France 2/30 Barbell vs. 5-Year Bullet Our rationale for entering this flattener was the same as in the UK. However, we fared quite a bit better here. The underlying 2/30 curve did flatten, as we expected, however, the butterfly spread itself moved further away from fair value, with the bullet component becoming relatively more expensive (Chart 6). So, as with the UK, the returns on this trade can be largely explained by the relative outperformance of the barbell component due to its higher convexity. In France, however, the effect worked to our favor as the yield curve shifted downwards significantly. The positive returns on the long French 30-year OAT component, where yields have been nearly slashed in half since July, dominated the other parts of the trade - even with the 30-year bond only being a small piece (11%) of the duration-weighted barbell Chart 5UK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 6France 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Although we did make profits on the flattener, it turned into a convexity bet that was not our original intention. Seeing as our underlying logic did not work out as expected, we are not comfortable remaining in this position. Thus, we are closing our France butterfly trade for a profit of 0.56%. Long Italy 5/30 Barbell vs. 10-Year Bullet As with the UK and France, we entered this trade based on its attractive model-based valuation and the relatively low correlation between inflation breakevens and nominal yields in France. Our expectation of flattening in the underlying 5/30 curve did not bear out as it remained mostly flat (Chart 7). We did see some reversion in the butterfly spread towards our model-implied fair value, which helped us make profits on our trade. Again, we cannot ignore the effect of convexity when looking at the outperformance of the barbell component. Yields fell dramatically across the Italian curve in one of the clearest examples of the yield-chasing behavior we have been describing this year.4 As Italian yields continue their race to the bottom, supported by ECB asset purchases and perceptions of more fiscal co-operation between the countries of Europe, there is a chance that this trade will continue to perform by virtue of its exposure to the long end of the Italian curve. However, as our original bias towards curve flattening did not play out, we prefer to maintain our exposure to Italian government debt via an overweight allocation in our model bond portfolio instead. We therefore close our Long Italy 5/30 Barbell vs. 10-Year Bullet for a profit of 0.83% Long US 7-Year Bullet vs. 5/10 Barbell The US was the only region where we initiated a “steepener” trade, with a long bullet versus short barbell combination that does well when the yield curve steepens. We chose this particular 5/7/10 butterfly as it was the most attractive steepener available based on our model-implied valuation that also fit our fundamental macro bias back in July towards US Treasury curve steepening – a view that we still hold today. With signs pointing towards further bear steepening of the Treasury curve, we feel comfortable keeping this US 5/7/10 butterfly spread trade open. Our rationale for initiating the trade was borne out, with the underlying 5/10 Treasury curve steepening and the butterfly spread tightening towards fair value (Chart 8). Our trade was supported by a continued rebound in long-dated US inflation expectations as well as the US election result, the most bond-bearish event of the year. Chart 7Italy 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 8US 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Going forward, we see good reasons to maintain this trade. The butterfly spread, after briefly reaching expensive levels, is back to being attractively valued. Even if the residual were to dip back below zero, it would still have room to become more expensive, shoring up our trade. This trade also remains the most attractive of all the steepener trades on a model-implied valuation basis, removing any incentive to rotate towards another part of the curve. The odds favor more reflationary Treasury curve steepening after the US election. President-elect Biden has a stated goal of more fiscal stimulus, while his selection of Janet Yellen as Treasury Secretary signaling increased cooperation between monetary and fiscal authorities. With signs pointing towards further bear steepening of the Treasury curve, we feel comfortable keeping this US 5/7/10 butterfly spread trade open. Bottom Line: We are closing three of our four outstanding government bond yield curve trade recommendations, taking profits in France and Italy and realizing a loss in the UK. We are maintaining our US 5/7/10 butterfly trade, which is the cheapest way to position for an expected steepening of the Treasury curve based on our valuation models. Evaluating Our Cross-Country Yield Spread Trades We currently have two recommended trades involving plays on the spread between government bonds: Long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus short 5-year UK Gilts, currency-hedged into GBP We initiated this trade on August 25, and to date the trade is severely underwater with a total return of -1.8%.5 That loss comes from the long New Zealand leg of the trade, as the 5-year NZ bond yield has increased by 34bps from our entry level. Chart 9A Rapid Shift Upward In NZ Rate Expectations The rationale for this trade was based on our assessment of the relative probability of the Bank of England (BoE) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) moving to a negative interest rate policy. Both central banks hinted strongly at such a move throughout the summer months as part of their efforts to support pandemic-stricken economies. Our view back in late August was that it was more likely that the RBNZ would choose negative rates, as New Zealand had far lower inflation expectations than the UK and, unlike the British pound, the New Zealand dollar was not undervalued. This trade was initially profitable, but all that changed rapidly during the month of November. The RBNZ disappointed investor expectations on a move to negative rates at the November 11 monetary policy meeting. The central bank elected instead to increase the size of its existing quantitative easing program, while giving no hint that negative rates were coming soon. The response was a sharp move higher in both New Zealand bond yields and the New Zealand dollar (Chart 9). There was an even more violent adjustment in yields and the currency last week, after New Zealand Finance Minister Grant Robertson wrote a letter to RBNZ Governor Adrian Orr asking the central bank to change its policy remit to include controlling New Zealand house price inflation. Markets interpreted this blatant political pressure on the central bank as the end of any hopes of negative rates in New Zealand, with bond yields and the currency spiking higher once again. House prices have surged after the RBNZ aggressively cut interest rates earlier this year, with a rapidly rising share of new mortgages having higher loan-to-value ratios (Chart 10). House price inflation is now running at 19.8%, and Finance Minister Robertson did cite deteriorating housing affordability and inequality as the basis for his letter to the RBNZ. It is clear that a move to negative interest rates – which could further fuel the explosion in house prices – is now very difficult for the RBNZ to pull off without facing intense criticism. It is clear that a move to negative interest rates – which could further fuel the explosion in house prices – is now very difficult for the RBNZ to pull off without facing intense criticism. This shatters the underlying rationale for our long New Zealand/short UK yield spread trade (Chart 11). Chart 10RBNZ-Fueled Boom In House Prices Thus, we are choosing to cut our losses and close out our recommended trade. Long 10-year German Bunds versus short 10-year US Treasuries Chart 11Time To Cut Our Losses On The NZ-UK Trade We initiated this recommendation on October 27, and to date the trade is running a small loss of -0.17%.6 The rationale behind the trade was two-fold: Our valuation model for the 10-year UST-Bund yield spread showed that the spread was far below fair value; We turned more bearish on US Treasuries just before the US presidential election, downgrading our recommended allocation to underweight while also upgrading more defensive Germany – with its low yield-beta to US Treasuries - to overweight. The trade initially performed well, driven by faster growth and inflation in the US versus the euro area (Chart 12). The Treasury selloff has stalled of late, but we view this as more a consolidative pause than a near-term peak in yields. Chart 12Fundamentals Justify A Wider UST-Bund Spread With our Treasury-Bund valuation model still showing that the spread is too tight, and with the spread not looking overly stretched versus its 200-day moving average (Chart 13), we are keeping our US versus Germany trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio. Chart 13Valuation & Momentum Point To A Wider UST-Bund Spread Bottom Line: We are cutting our losses in our New Zealand-UK government bond spread trade, with the odds of the RBNZ shifting to a negative interest rate policy severely curtailed by political pressure over surging New Zealand house prices. We are maintaining our US-Germany spread widening trade, as the spread is too narrow based on our fair value model and we see more scope for US Treasury yields to drift higher in the coming months Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, " How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies", dated July 7, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Readers looking for more detailed background on butterfly trades and our yield curve modelling framework should refer to the July 7, 2020 Strategy Report where we initiated these trades. 4 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "We’re All Yield Chasers Now", dated August 11, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Assessing The Leading Candidates To Join The Negative Rates Club", dated August 26, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "The Global Bond Implications Of Rising Treasury Yields", dated October 27, 2020 available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Please note that there will be no US Bond Strategy report next week. We will publish December’s Portfolio Allocation Summary on December 8th, followed by our Key Views For 2021 on December 15th and a Special Report titled “The Fed In 2021” on December 22nd. Highlights Duration: Weaker Q4 economic growth could cause Treasury yields to fall in the near-term, but knowledge of a vaccine coming in 2021 will limit the downside. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month horizon. Fed: The Treasury’s decision to let the Fed’s emergency lending facilities expire is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on credit spreads, and it may even increase the odds of getting another fiscal stimulus bill through Congress. Spread Product: Value is quickly disappearing from high-rated corporate bonds, and municipal bonds look like an attractive alternative. Stay overweight municipal bonds and corporate bonds rated Ba and higher. Avoid junk bonds rated B and lower. Feature Increasingly, financial markets look caught in a tug-of-war between two competing economic outlooks. On the one hand, the US sits on the precipice of what is likely to be a dark winter. COVID hospitalizations are breaking through prior peaks and deaths are following closely behind (Chart 1). On the other hand, excellent results from vaccine trials offer a ray of light in the not-too-distant future. Focusing on the next 1-to-2 months, economic activity is poised to slow. This is partly because many states will respond to the surging case count by enacting stricter lock-down measures (Chart 2). In fact, New York shuttered schools just last week. But even in the absence of stricter quarantine laws, consumers will certainly exercise greater caution this holiday season. Already, consumer sentiment looks to be waning at a time when more than 700 thousand people are filing new unemployment claims each week (Chart 2, bottom 2 panels). Chart 1A Dark Winter Chart 2Look For Slower Growth In Q4 With consumer sentiment souring at a time when the household income support from the CARES act has expired, it is only a matter of time before consumer spending dips. Added to that, last week’s decision by the Treasury Department to call in the funds used to back-stop the Fed’s emergency lending facilities demonstrates that Donald Trump’s administration will be increasingly erratic during the next two months.1 Chart 3Treasury & Corporate Excess Returns Heightened political uncertainty during a period of slowing economic growth should point to lower bond yields and wider credit spreads in the near term. But, at least so far, the market reaction has been muted (Chart 3). Treasuries have strengthened somewhat during the past week. Treasury returns in excess of cash are running at +735 bps, year-to-date. This is up from +617 bps on November 10th. However, year-to-date investment grade corporate returns in excess of duration-matched Treasuries just hit -121 bps, the highest since February. Year-to-date High-Yield excess returns have dipped to -72 bps, after peaking at -39 bps on November 9th. It’s possible that investors need more evidence of weakening economic growth before the market impact is really felt. Or, it could simply be that forward-looking markets are much more focused on news about the COVID vaccine, and that investors are willing to tolerate a couple months of poor growth if they are confident that better times lie ahead. It’s also conceivable that financial markets would look through a spate of poor economic data if investors believed that more fiscal stimulus is on the way. Given the protracted nature of fiscal negotiations so far, it’s fair to be skeptical that a deal can be struck. But with the election now over, the House Democrats and Senate Republicans may have a greater incentive to compromise on a small relief bill, on the order of $1 trillion or less. According to surveys, a compromise deal would curry favor with voters of all political stripes. Most Republicans, Democrats and Independents support further fiscal aid (Table 1). What’s more, having a timeline for vaccine distribution could make negotiations less contentious, since any stimulus can be sold as the final COVID relief bill before a vaccine is available. Finally, it’s possible that Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin’s gambit will pay off, and that policymakers will view the funds being returned by the Fed as “free money” that should be re-deployed in the form of fiscal support. All in all, we are optimistic that a moderately-sized relief bill will be passed, if not this year then early next year. Table 1The Public Supports Another Round Of Stimulus Investment Implications Chart 4Better Value In Munis Than IG Corporates With regards to our outlook for Treasury yields, we could see yields dip during the next month or two as the economic data weaken. However, we expect the knowledge that a vaccine is on the horizon will prevent yields from falling that much. We also could see progress made on a fiscal stimulus package, which would offset any downward pressure on yields. With that in mind, we advise investors to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month horizon. On spread product, our investment conclusion is similarly colored by the tug of war between a negative near-term economic outlook and the positive news of a COVID vaccine. We recommend maintaining our current positioning: overweight investment grade corporates and Ba-rated junk, underweight junk bonds rated B and lower. If we do get some spread widening during the next month or two, driven by negative economic news or the expiry of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities, we would view that as an opportunity to get more aggressive by upgrading the lower-rated junk credit tiers. One caveat to our positive view on corporate credit is that value has deteriorated markedly in recent months, particularly for higher-rated investment grade corporates (Chart 4). At the same time, tax-exempt municipal bonds offer an exceptional spread pick-up relative to both Treasuries and equivalently-rated corporate bonds (Chart 4, bottom panel). We recommend that investors favor municipal bonds over corporate credit, particularly at the upper-end of the credit spectrum. The value in high-rated investment grade corporates has deteriorated markedly. Bottom Line: Maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on a 6-12 month horizon. Stay overweight investment grade corporates and Ba-rated junk, while avoiding high-yield bonds rated B and below. Stand ready to upgrade low-rated junk bonds if spreads widen significantly during the next two months. Favor municipal bonds over equivalently-rated corporate credit, particularly at the upper-end of the credit spectrum. Treasury – Fed Disaccord As mentioned above, last week’s big news was that Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin sent a letter to the Federal Reserve saying that he would (a) not authorize an extension of some of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities beyond December 31st and (b) would like the Fed to return the unused funds that the Treasury Department had allocated to serve as the equity back-stop for those facilities. Though the Fed issued a statement saying that it would prefer to extend the facilities, Chair Powell eventually acceded to both requests. This means that the Secondary and Primary Market Corporate Credit Facilities (SMCCF & PMCCF), the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF), the Main Street Lending Facilities (MSLF) and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) will all cease operations at the end of the year.2 Gone For Good? Given the Fed’s stated desire for the facilities to continue and the fact that a new Treasury Secretary – presumably one that will show greater deference to the Fed – will take over in January. It’s conceivable that the facilities could be quickly re-started. If the Treasury had simply not authorized an extension of the facilities without taking its money back, this would be as simple as flicking a switch. The fact that the Fed will return the money makes the process slightly more complicated, but by no means impossible. The facilities in question are all structured as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to which the Treasury Department supplies some amount of equity financing. The Fed then loans money to the SPVs, levering them up dramatically in the process. Crucially, there is no statutory limit on the amount of leverage the Fed can provide to the SPVs. This means that the Fed could ramp them back up, even if it gets only a small injection of capital from the Treasury. A new Treasury Department could easily find enough money in the Exchange Stabilization Fund for the Fed to re-start the facilities in January, without seeking Congressional approval. While the Fed and Treasury will be able to re-start the facilities in January, we aren’t sure they will feel the need to do so. While the Fed and Treasury will be able to re-start the facilities in January, we aren’t sure they will feel the need to do so. In our view, Secretary Mnuchin has a point when he writes that markets are functioning well enough on their own. Simply look at how little the emergency facilities have been used (Table 2). The Fed has purchased only $13 billion of corporate bonds in the SMCCF. TALF has only been tapped for $3.75 billion and both the MSLF and MLF are operating at less than 1% of their maximum capacities. The PMCCF, which the Fed can use to purchase new issuance in the corporate bond market, has never been accessed! Table 2Usage Of The 2020 Federal Reserve Emergency Lending Facilities Even the SMCCF, the facility through which the Fed buys corporate bonds and corporate bond ETFs in the secondary market, has significantly scaled back its purchases during the past few months. It also hasn’t purchased an ETF since August (Chart 5). Chart 5The Fed Is Not Very Active In The Corporate Bond Market At a certain point, if the facilities aren’t being used, it is entirely reasonable to ask whether they are still necessary. They would no doubt prove useful if we hit another crisis – like in March – where spreads widen sharply and primary markets shut down. But that seems like a relatively low-risk tail event at this stage of the recovery. Finally, Secretary Mnuchin made the case in his letter that the returned funds from the Fed could be re-deployed as fiscal stimulus by Congress. This argument doesn’t make a lot of sense economically. When it scored the CARES act, the Congressional Budget Office assumed that the Treasury would take no losses on the money used to finance the Fed’s emergency lending facilities, so clawing those funds back has no impact on the deficit. But this may not matter. What matters is whether Senate Republicans can use the Treasury’s maneuver as political cover to justify voting for more fiscal relief. We think they might be able to do so, and we therefore see the Treasury’s move as increasing the odds of getting another fiscal relief bill through Congress. Investment Implications Chart 6MLF And TALF Aren't Pushing Yields Lower This development does not immediately influence our recommended investment strategy. On corporate bonds, we can’t definitively rule out the possibility that the expiry of the facilities will cause spreads to widen in the near-term. But if that does occur, we will view it as an opportunity to quickly increase exposure. For municipal bonds, the MLF allows municipal governments to place new debt with the Fed at a rate that varies depending on the municipality’s credit rating. At present, that MLF rate is well above municipal bond yields for all credit ratings (Chart 6), meaning that it would only become important in the event of a crisis that caused municipal yields to rise sharply. Similarly, TALF allows participants to take out loans from the Fed using Aaa-rated securitizations as collateral. But the current yields on Aaa-rated consumer ABS and Aaa-rated non-agency CMBS are 91 bps and 33 bps below this rate, respectively (Chart 6, bottom panel). In other words, spreads would need to widen fairly sharply for TALF to be relevant for investors. The expiry of TALF is more concerning for CMBS than consumer ABS. Commercial real estate is structurally challenged by the current crisis, while consumer balance sheets are in good shape. We recommend overweighting consumer ABS across the entire credit spectrum but would limit non-agency CMBS exposure to the Aaa credit tier. Appendix: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The second section of this report (titled “Treasury – Fed Disaccord”) examines the specific market implications of the Treasury Department’s decision to not authorize an extension of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities. 2 For details on how these facilities are structured and what they are designed to do please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup: A Summary Of The Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures”, dated April 14, 2020 and US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup Part 2: Shocked And Awed”, dated July 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Economy: The Democrats did not sweep the US election, but the Democratic House and Republican Senate will likely find some middle ground on a stimulus deal. This will keep the economic recovery on track. A highly effective COVID vaccine that becomes widely available would supercharge it. Rates: Investors should continue to position for a bear-steepening nominal Treasury curve on a 6-12 month horizon. They should also overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries, favor inflation curve flatteners and real yield curve steepeners. Treasury Supply & Fed Demand: The Treasury department will continue to increase coupon issuance at the expense of bills. If current policy remains in place, Fed purchases will decline as a percent of coupon issuance in the coming quarters. But the Fed could take steps to modify its asset purchase strategy during the next few months. Feature We’ve seen enough. After a week of checking and re-checking the numbers, BCA’s US Bond Strategy service has concluded that a moderate bear-steepening of the Treasury curve remains the most likely outcome for the next 6-to-12 months. Of course, the dust has not completely settled on the US election. President Trump has issued several legal challenges and control of the Senate won’t be decided until early January when two run-off elections take place in Georgia. However, it now looks safe to assume that Joe Biden will take over as President next year. We also expect, with slightly less conviction, that the Republican party will keep control of the Senate, as Democrats need to win both Georgia races in order to secure a majority. In this week’s report, we assess the fall-out from the election on different sectors of the US bond market. We also consider how the election result impacts the outlook for fiscal stimulus and provide an update on supply and demand trends in the Treasury market. The Election Fall-Out In Bond Markets Nominal Yields Chart 1A Moderate Bear-Steepening The 10-year Treasury yield got as high as 0.90% in advance of election day, as the market was pricing-in a Democratic sweep that would have led to a substantial increase in government spending. This outcome is still technically possible, but it now looks unlikely. The 10-year Treasury yield fell back to 0.78% as the election results came in but returned to 0.90% yesterday morning on news that Pfizer’s COVID vaccine was 90% effective in phase 3 trials. This market action affirms our recommended positioning. The Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index has been underperforming cash since August, the uptrend in the 10-year Treasury yield remains intact and the yield curve continues to steepen (Chart 1). All these trends will remain in place as long as the economic recovery continues, and timely distribution of an effective COVID vaccine will certainly speed that process up. The biggest risk to our view is that a Democrat-controlled House and Republican-controlled Senate are unable to agree on a follow-up fiscal stimulus package during the next few months, and that the economic recovery stalls as a result. This is possible, but our base case scenario is that a compromise will be easier to reach now that the election is over. We expect a moderately-sized relief bill to be delivered relatively soon, possibly even before the end of the year. The Inflation Curve Chart 2Own Inflation Curve Flatteners... The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 8 bps immediately after the election, but unlike with nominal yields, the trend in the cost of inflation compensation had been relatively flat heading into election day (Chart 2). It’s not hard to see why. Inflationary pressures in the economy have clearly moderated compared to the summer. The oil price has taken a step down (Chart 2, panel 3) and month-over-month CPI growth has been trending lower (Chart 2, bottom panel). We don’t expect this deceleration in inflation to continue. Global economic recovery will keep commodities well bid, and core inflation will slowly recover back to target. This argues for staying overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. We also recommend owning inflation curve flatteners. The inflation curve has been steepening since August, as the short-dated cost of inflation compensation has fallen by more than the long-dated cost (Chart 2, panel 2). This steepening is typical for periods when TIPS breakeven rates are falling, and it will reverse when breakevens start rising again. Looking further out, the Fed’s commitment to allow a temporary overshoot of its 2% inflation target means that we should expect the inflation curve to invert. This means that inflation curve flatteners have a lot of room to run. Real Yields With almost no volatility in short-maturity nominal yields, short-maturity real yields are simply the mirror image of short-maturity inflation expectations. For this reason, the 2-year real yield has been moving up since August as the 2-year cost of inflation compensation has declined (Chart 3). This dynamic doesn’t hold for long maturities, where nominal yields have been rising as markets price-in eventual Fed tightening (Chart 3, top panel). Inflationary pressures in the economy have clearly moderated compared to the summer. The different behavior of long- and short-maturity real yields gives us high conviction in recommending a real yield curve steepener (Chart 3, bottom panel). A recovery in inflation expectations will push short-maturity real yields lower but will not have the same impact at the long-end where nominal yields will also rise. Chart 3…And Real Yield Curve Steepeners Corporate Credit Chart 4Credit Spreads Welcomed The Election Results Interestingly, the election result of a Biden presidency and divided House and Senate was viewed positively by both the “risk-free” Treasury market and risky credit spreads (Chart 4). Treasury yields fell on expectations of less fiscal stimulus, but credit spreads also tightened because a Republican Senate will keep corporate tax hikes at bay and a Biden presidency will ratchet down trade tensions with China. We maintain our positive outlook on credit and continue to recommend overweight allocations to corporate bonds rated Ba and higher. We remain underweight low-rated junk bonds (B & below) for now, because those spreads are pricing-in a rapid drop in the default rate. We may soon shift into low-rated junk as well, depending on how quickly an effective vaccine can be distributed. One less discussed risk for corporate spreads is the expiration of the Fed’s emergency lending facilities at the end of the year. The facilities are currently scheduled to expire on December 31st, though Fed Chair Powell seemed to imply last week that he would like to extend them. The one hitch could be that the Treasury department will also have to sign-on to an extension. It is currently unclear whether it is interested in doing so. Municipal Bonds Chart 5Munis Still Very Attractive The strong relative performance of municipal bonds since election day has been the most confounding market move (Chart 5). All logic tells us that Municipal / Treasury yield spreads should have widened as it became clear that the Republicans will likely keep control of the Senate. A Republican Senate will prevent Joe Biden from raising income taxes, which would have made tax-advantaged munis look more attractive on a relative basis. A Republican Senate has also been staunchly opposed to providing federal aid to cash-strapped state & local governments. But munis have outperformed Treasuries despite these obvious negative catalysts, possibly in part due to Mitch McConnell’s post-election comments that suggested he is open to compromise on a fiscal relief bill and would even be open to including some funds for state & local governments. Despite McConnell’s comments, the prospect of federal funds for state & local governments is uncertain at best. But we nonetheless maintain an overweight allocation to municipal bonds due to continued extraordinary valuations relative to both Treasuries (Chart 5, panel 2) and corporates (Chart 5, bottom panel). The Stimulus Risk As we alluded to above, the biggest risk to our bond-bearish view is that the failure to pass a follow-up to the CARES act results in a spate of negative economic data that spooks investors. This negative data would likely first show up in consumer spending, which so far continues to recover (Chart 6). However, we think the odds are that, in the absence of stimulus, we will see a disappointing consumer spending report within the next few months. How markets react to that news will depend on the status of stimulus talks at that time, as well as news about a potential vaccine roll-out. Disposable personal income was still above pre-COVID levels in September, but it continues to be buttressed by income support from the federal government. Notice that non-transfer income remains below pre-COVID levels (Chart 6, panel 3). Further, the drop in the savings rate during the past few months has outpaced the improvement in consumer sentiment (Chart 6, bottom panel). This suggests that any excess savings that households may have accumulated in the spring are now close to being exhausted. In the absence of stimulus, we will see a disappointing consumer spending report within the next few months. Elsewhere, the labor market continues to make steady improvements, but it could also use some help from policymakers. Excluding temporary census employment, nonfarm payrolls rose 786k in October, slightly above September’s pace but below the rapid gains seen in May and June (Chart 7). Further, initial jobless claims remain above 700k per week and real-time employment data from Homebase has been steady at a low level. All this to say that the labor market is making only modest gains and there remains a gap of 10 million jobs between current nonfarm payrolls and those from February (Chart 7, top panel). Chart 6Keep Monitoring Consumer Spending Chart 7A Slow Recovery In Employment The bottom line is that, without further fiscal stimulus, the odds are high that the economic data will disappoint at some point during the next few months. This will cause bond yields to fall and credit spreads to widen, unless it looks like Congress is close to a deal or like a vaccine will be available in a timely manner. Fortunately, we do think the odds are relatively high that a Republican Senate and Democratic House will be able to reach a compromise stimulus deal, albeit a modest one in the range of $700 billion to $1 trillion. The political incentives against compromise have faded now that the election is over, and we expect a deal either this year or early next year. Treasury Supply And Fed Demand The Treasury department recently released its financing estimates for the next two quarters. A few trends are worth mentioning. First, the Treasury will continue to increase coupon issuance as it seeks to extend the average maturity of the outstanding debt (Chart 8, top panel). Chart 8The Path For Treasury Supply And Fed Demand Second, the Treasury will continue to operate with an historically elevated cash balance, but it will seek to reduce its cash holdings to $800 billion from $1.6 trillion currently (Chart 9). Chart 9Treasury Will Deploy Some Cash Third, the Treasury assumed in its projections that Congress will deliver another $1 trillion of stimulus. The combination of (i) increased coupon issuance, (ii) a falling cash balance and (iii) stimulus projections that may be too high, points to a continued drop in T-bill issuance (Chart 10). In fact, the Treasury acknowledged that bill issuance will likely fall going forward and said that it would be comfortable with a distribution where bills account for 15%-20% of the outstanding debt (Chart 11). Chart 10Expect T-Bill Issuance To ##br##Keep Falling… Chart 11…And To Settle At Around 15-20% Of Outstanding Debt Fed Chairman Powell also addressed the media last week, after the conclusion of the November FOMC meeting, and announced that the Fed made no changes to its asset purchases. For the time being, the Fed will continue to purchase “at least” $80 billion of Treasuries and $40 billion of MBS per month. However, Powell did indicate that FOMC participants discussed different ways in which they might modify the asset purchase program in the future. Presumably this means that if the Committee feels the need to deliver further monetary stimulus it will do so by either shifting its Treasury purchases to the long-end of the curve – in order to remove more duration risk from the market – or by increasing the outright pace of purchases. Powell made it clear that he sees these sorts of balance sheet moves as viable forms of monetary stimulus, though the tone of the questions he received during the press conference suggests that the consensus increasingly senses that the Fed might be out of ammo. Several questioners noted Powell’s repeated calls for fiscal stimulus and asked directly whether the Fed has done all it can. In conclusion, if the Fed maintains the current pace and distribution of Treasury purchases (Chart 8, panel 2), its asset purchases will continue to trend down compared to gross Treasury issuance (Chart 8, bottom panel). However, we could see the Fed taking a step to mitigate that decline at the long-end of the curve by shifting the maturity distribution of its asset purchases towards longer maturities. This move could occur as early as next month. The Treasury will continue to operate with an historically elevated cash balance, but it will seek to reduce its cash holdings to $800 billion from $1.6 trillion currently. The bar for actually increasing the monthly pace of purchases is likely much higher, and it would require a significant tightening of financial conditions or drop in economic activity to push the Fed into action. The bigger question, however, is whether the market even cares anymore about tweaks to the Fed’s asset purchase program. The tone of questions at last week’s press conference suggests it might not. Appendix: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Chart 1Bond Yields Have Upside In A Blue Sweep Today’s US election has important implications for the near-term path of bond yields. In particular, a “blue sweep” outcome where the Democrats win control of the House, Senate and White House will probably cause yields to jump (Chart 1), as such an outcome virtually guarantees a large fiscal relief package early next year. Fiscal negotiations will be more contentious if the Republicans maintain control of the Senate, and yields could decline this evening if that occurs. However, no matter the election outcome, our 6-12 month below-benchmark portfolio duration recommendation will not change tomorrow. The economic recovery appears to be on track and some further fiscal stimulus is likely next year no matter who prevails tonight. The stimulus will just be smaller if a divided government necessitates compromise. In any case, bond investors should keep portfolio duration below-benchmark and stay overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. They should also maintain positions in nominal and real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 99 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -300 bps. Corporate bonds are certainly not as cheap as they were back in March, but we still see acceptable value in the sector. The corporate index’s 12-month breakeven spread is at its 20th percentile since 1995 and the equivalent Baa spread is at its 28th percentile (Chart 2). Both levels appear somewhat expensive at first blush. However, considering the strong tailwinds from the Fed’s extraordinarily accommodative interest rate policy and emergency lending facilities, we see a lot of room for further tightening. Corporate bond issuance increased in September, though it remains well below the extreme levels seen in the spring (panel 4). The fact that the Financing Gap – the difference between capital expenditures and retained earnings – turned negative in the second quarter suggests that firms have enough cash to cover their investment needs (bottom panel). This will keep issuance low in the coming months. At the sector level, we continue to recommend overweight allocations to subordinate bank bonds,1 Healthcare and Energy bonds.2 We also advise underweight allocations to Technology3 and Pharmaceutical bonds.4 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 86 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -373 bps. Ba-rated bonds outperformed lower-rated credits in October, and they remain the best performing corporate credit tier since the March 23 peak in spreads (See Appendix A). In terms of value, if we assume a 25% recovery rate on defaulted debt and a minimum required spread of 150 bps in excess of default losses, then the High-Yield index is priced for a default rate of 4.8% during the next 12 months (Chart 3). Such a large drop in the default rate cannot be ruled out completely, but it would necessitate a rapid pace of economic recovery. We are not yet confident enough in the recovery to position for such a fast drop-off in defaults, especially with Job Cut Announcements still well above pre-COVID levels (bottom panel). We therefore continue to recommend an overweight allocation to the Ba-rated credit tier – where access to the Fed’s emergency lending facilities is broadly available – and an underweight allocation to bonds rated B and below. At the sector level, we advise overweight allocations to high-yield Technology5 and Energy bonds.6 We are underweight the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sectors.7 MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -39 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS index option-adjusted spread (OAS) tightened 11 bps on the month to land at 72 bps. This is now slightly below the 76 basis point spread offered by Aa-rated corporate bonds but well above the 62 bps offered by Agency CMBS and the 29 bps offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS. Despite the relatively attractive OAS, we remain concerned that the elevated primary mortgage spread is a warning that refinancing risk is greater than what is currently being priced in the market (Chart 4). Yes, the mortgage spread has tightened during the past few months, but it remains 35 bps above its average 2019 level. This suggests that the mortgage rate could fall another 35 bps due to spread compression alone, even if Treasury yields are unchanged. Such a move would lead to a significant increase in prepayment losses. The recent spike in the mortgage delinquency rate does not pose a near-term risk to spreads as it is being driven by households that have been granted forbearance from the federal government (panel 4). The risk for MBS holders only comes into play if many households are unable to resume their regular mortgage payments when the forbearance period expires early next year. But even in that case, further government intervention to either support household incomes or extend the forbearance period would mitigate the risk. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 30 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -284 bps. Sovereign debt outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 151 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -420 bps. Foreign Agencies outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 18 bps in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -690 bps. Local Authority debt underperformed Treasuries by 21 bps in October, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -362 bps. Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 7 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -33 bps. Supranationals outperformed by 5 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -7 bps. US dollar weakness is usually a boon for Emerging Market (EM) Sovereign and Foreign Agency returns. However, this year’s dollar weakness has been relative to other Developed Market currencies. In recent months, the dollar has actually strengthened versus EM currencies (Chart 5). Value also remains poor for EM Sovereigns, which continue to offer a lower spread than Baa-rated corporate debt (panel 4). We looked at EM Sovereign valuation on a country-by-country basis in a recent report.8 We concluded that Mexican and Russian bonds offer the most compelling risk/reward trade-offs relative to the US corporate sector. Of those two countries, Mexican debt offers the best opportunity as US politics remain a concern for the Russian currency. Municipal Bonds: Overweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 41 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -464 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Municipal bond spreads versus Treasuries tightened in October, but value remains exceptional with most maturities trading at a positive before-tax spread. As we showed in a recent report, municipal bonds are also attractively priced relative to corporate bonds across the entire investment grade credit spectrum.9 On a duration-matched basis, the Bloomberg Barclays General Obligation and Revenue Bond indexes trade at before-tax premiums relative to corporate bonds of the same credit rating, an extremely rare occurrence (Chart 6). Extraordinary valuation is the main reason for our recommendation to overweight municipal bonds. The severe ongoing state & local government credit crunch is a concern, but it is a risk we are willing to take. If the Democrats win the House, Senate and White House this evening – a fairly likely scenario – federal aid for state & local governments will be delivered in January. This would alleviate a lot of concern. But even in the absence of federal assistance, the combination of austerity measures (bottom panel) and all-time high State Rainy Day Fund balances should help stave off a wave of municipal downgrades. Treasury Curve: Buy 5-Year Bullet Versus 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bear-steepened in October, largely due to rising expectations of a “blue sweep” election outcome. The 2/10 and 5/30 Treasury slopes steepened 18 bps and 9 bps, respectively, to reach 74 bps and 127 bps. Our expectation is that continued economic recovery will cause investors to price-in eventual monetary tightening at the long-end of the Treasury curve. With the Fed maintaining a firm grip on the front end, this will lead to Treasury curve bear steepening. More bear steepening is likely if the Democrats win the House, Senate and White House tonight, as this would mean that a large amount of fiscal stimulus is coming early next year. But we will stick with our curve steepening recommendation regardless of the election outcome. No matter who wins the election, some further fiscal stimulus is likely on a 6-12 month horizon. We recommend positioning for a steeper curve by owning the 5-year Treasury note and shorting a duration-matched barbell consisting of the 2-year and 10-year notes. This position is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening. Valuation is a concern with our recommended steepener, as the 5-year yield is below the yield on the duration-matched 2/10 barbell (Chart 7). However, the 5-year looked much more expensive during the last zero-lower-bound period between 2010 and 2013 (bottom 2 panels). We anticipate a return to similar valuation levels. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 38 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -93 bps. The 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates rose 7 bps and 5 bps on the month. They currently sit at 1.71% and 1.82%, respectively. Core CPI rose 0.19% in September and the year-over-year rate held steady at 1.73%. The 12-month trimmed mean CPI ticked down from 2.48% to 2.37%, so the gap between core and trimmed mean continued to narrow (Chart 8). We anticipate further narrowing in the months ahead, and therefore expect core CPI to come in relatively hot. For this reason, we recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasuries for the time being, even though the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate is no longer cheap according to our Adaptive Expectations Model (panel 2).10 Inflation pressures may moderate once core and trimmed mean inflation measures converge, and this could give us an opportunity to tactically reduce TIPS exposure sometime next year. We also recommend holding real yield curve steepeners and inflation curve flatteners. With the Fed now officially targeting an overshoot of its 2% inflation goal, we would expect the cost of 2-year inflation protection to rise above the cost of 10-year inflation protection (panel 4). With the Fed also exerting more control over short-dated nominal yields than over long-term ones, we expect that short-maturity real yields will come under downward pressure relative to the long end (bottom panel). ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +72 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 6 bps on the month, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +59 bps. Non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 29 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +157 bps. Aaa ABS are a high conviction overweight, given that spreads remain elevated compared to historical levels and that the sector benefits from Fed support through the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF). However, spreads are even more attractive in non-Aaa ABS (Chart 9) and we recommend owning those securities as well. This is despite the fact that only Aaa-rated bonds are eligible for TALF. We explained our rationale for owning non-Aaa consumer ABS in a June report.11 We noted that stimulus received from the CARES act caused disposable income to increase significantly since February. Then, faced with fewer spending opportunities, households used much of that windfall to pay down consumer debt (panel 4). Granted, further income support from fiscal policymakers is needed now that the CARES act’s enhanced unemployment benefits have expired. But given the substantial boost to savings that has already occurred, we are confident that more stimulus will arrive in time to prevent a wave of consumer bankruptcies. Non-Agency CMBS: Neutral Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 9 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -250 bps. Aaa Non-Agency CMBS underperformed Treasuries by 10 bps on the month, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -73 bps. Non-Aaa Non-Agency CMBS outperformed by 72 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to -738 bps (Chart 10). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to Aaa Non-Agency CMBS and an underweight allocation to non-Aaa CMBS. Our reasoning is simple. Aaa CMBS are eligible for TALF, meaning that spreads can still tighten even as the hardship in commercial real estate (CRE) continues. Without Fed support, non-Aaa CMBS will struggle to deal with tightening CRE lending standards and falling demand (panels 3 & 4). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 29 basis points in October, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +17 bps. The average index spread tightened 6 bps on the month. It currently sits at 62 bps, well above typical historical levels (bottom panel). At its last meeting, the Fed decided to slow its pace of Agency CMBS purchases. It will no longer seek to increase its Agency CMBS holdings, but will instead purchase only what is “needed to sustain smooth market functioning”. This is nonetheless a Fed back-stop of the market, and it does not change our overweight recommendation. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. TablePerformance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Appendix B: Butterfly Strategy Valuations The following tables present the current read-outs from our butterfly spread models. We use these models to identify opportunities to take duration-neutral positions across the Treasury curve. The following two Special Reports explain the models in more detail: US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com US Bond Strategy Special Report, “More Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies”, dated May 15, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Table 4 shows the raw residuals from each model. A positive value indicates that the bullet is cheap relative to the duration-matched barbell. A negative value indicates that the barbell is cheap relative to the bullet. Table 4Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Raw Residuals In Basis Points (As Of October 30TH, 2020) Table 5 scales the raw residuals in Table 4 by their historical means and standard deviations. This facilitates comparison between the different butterfly spreads. Table 5Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals (As Of October 30TH, 2020) Table 6 flips the models on their heads. It shows the change in the slope between the two barbell maturities that must be realized during the next six months to make returns between the bullet and barbell equal. For example, a reading of 63 bps in the 5 over 2/10 cell means that we would only expect the 5-year to outperform the 2/10 if the 2/10 slope steepens by more than 63 bps during the next six months. Otherwise, we would expect the 2/10 barbell to outperform the 5-year bullet. Table 6Discounted Slope Change During Next 6 Months (BPs) Appendix C: Excess Return Bond Map The Excess Return Bond Map is used to assess the relative risk/reward trade-off between different sectors of the US bond market. It is a purely computational exercise and does not impose any macroeconomic view. The Map’s vertical axis shows 12-month expected excess returns. These are proxied by each sector’s option-adjusted spread. Sectors plotting further toward the top of the Map have higher expected returns and vice-versa. Our novel risk measure called the “Risk Of Losing 100 bps” is shown on the Map’s horizontal axis. To calculate it, we first compute the spread widening required on a 12-month horizon for each sector to lose 100 bps or more relative to a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. Then, we divide that amount of spread widening by each sector’s historical spread volatility. The end result is the number of standard deviations of 12-month spread widening required for each sector to lose 100 bps or more versus a position in Treasuries. Lower risk sectors plot further to the right of the Map, and higher risk sectors plot further to the left. Chart 11Excess Return Bond Map (As Of October 30TH, 2020) Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Case Against The Money Supply”, dated June 30, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020 and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds”, dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 1: A Model Of Energy Bond Excess Returns”, dated July 14, 2020 and US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Outlook For Energy Bonds Part 2: Buy The Dip In High-Yield Energy”, dated July 21, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Assessing Healthcare & Pharma Bonds In A Pandemic”, dated June 9, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Trading Bonds In A Dollar Bear Market”, dated September 22, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Political Risk Will Dominate In A Pivotal Month For The Bond Market”, dated October 13, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 For more details on our model please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “How Are Inflation Expectations Adapting?”, dated February 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “No Holding Back”, dated June 16, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation