Europe

Special Report

Executive Summary Is Factor Investing Dead? After decades of outperformance, in the past few years equity factors have started to underperform the broad indexes. But this may just be because US-centric factor research and US-dominated global factor indexes have masked an underlying divergence in the behavior of factor premiums in major countries/regions. In this report, we identify differences in smart beta strategies in the US, euro area (EMU), UK, Japan, Canada, Australia, and emerging markets (EM). Quality and Minimum Volatility factors are the most consistent across all markets. However, the magnitude of the factor premiums varies significantly among certain countries/regions. These variations can be attributed to a factor’s differing exposure to the same sector in specific countries, as well as the diverse performance of the same sector in specific countries. Value/Growth is an inferior framework to sector positioning. Quality remains a better factor than Growth.   Bottom Line: Factor investing is still a viable investing approach, but investors should consider that factor premiums have diverged among major countries/regions. Factor strategies may be less profitable in the US, Japan, and Australia. We suggest that global investors implement smart beta strategies on an individual country basis to better capture the factor premium in each country/region. Feature Chart 1Diverging Factor Performance Late last year, quant hedge fund AQR announced it would cut back resources because poor performance had induced significant investor outflows.1 Based on MSCI’s diversified multi-factor (DMF) index, which is a bottom-up 4-factor-index (value, momentum, quality and size) optimized using Barra equity models,2 the global DMF index underperformed the MSCI ACWI by 21% between March 2018 (when the relative performance peaked) and the end of January 2022, even though it had outperformed by 373% over the previous 20 years (Chart 1, top panel). Many clients have asked: Is factor investing dead? As shown in Chart 1, however, MSCI Global DMF’s recent poor relative performance was driven largely by a 23.6% underperformance from the developed markets (DM), especially the US (33% underperformance) and Japan (23.6% underperformance), while the DMF index in the emerging markets (EM) lagged its benchmark by only about 1% in the same period. We have advocated a simple approach to factor allocation to smooth out the cyclicality of individual factors by equally weighting five time-tested factors: Quality, Momentum, Minimum Volatility (Min Vol), Value and Equal Weight. Our equally-weighted-5-factor aggregate (EW5) index is less volatile than the more sophisticatedly optimized DMF; it therefore suffered less underperformance in the same period. However, even with this approach, the regional divergence is still notable, with the EW5 factor index in the developing markets underperforming its benchmark by 9%, while the EM EW5 factor index outperformed its benchmark by about 5.5% (Chart 1, panels 2 and 3). Interestingly, the EW5 index for Japan looks more like that for the US than it looks like the Japanese DMF (Chart 1, panels 4 and 5). This highlights the importance of factor allocation methodology. Table 1US Dominance In Global Markets US equities dominate the global equity index by market capitalization. Momentum and Quality, the two best performing factors globally, have even higher weightings in US companies than the broad benchmark, as shown in Table 1. An academic paper published in 2019 based on studies of the US and 38 international stock markets indicates that the US is the only country with a statistically significant, economically meaningful and robust post-publication decline of long-short equity factor returns.3 This is because the US is the most researched market and large mispriced anomalies are arbitraged away quickly after they are identified in academic publications, which results in lower strategy returns. Most quant funds are US-focused, which may explain the ill fortunes of some quant funds. Smart beta strategies are long-only factor strategies, instead of long-short strategies. At the aggregate level, the MSCI factor indexes in developed markets and emerging markets performed much better than in the US, in line with the academic findings (Chart 1, panels 2, 3, and 4). Yet, the Japanese DMF index’s relative performance peaked in October 2012 and has been in a consistent down trend since that time (Chart 1, panel 5). Our research shows that Japan is not an anomaly. Factor divergence among countries exists not only at the aggregate level, but also at the individual factor level. Factor Performances Diverge Among Countries/Regions Factor returns in the US, UK, EMU, Japan, Canada, Australia, and EM, both in absolute and relative terms, have had notable divergences in the past 20 years, as shown in Table 2.4 Several observations from Table 2: Quality and Min Vol are two factors with positive premiums in all countries. In terms of magnitude, however, Min Vol premiums in the US, Japan and Australia are the closest to zero, while the EM scores the highest. Quality premium in Australia is also close to zero while the UK stands out. Momentum is the best performing factor in all countries/regions except in Japan where it has a slightly negative premium. The ineffectiveness of Momentum in Japan may be due to its cultural biases. Momentum tends to fare better in countries that promote individuality (unlike Japan) and where self-attribution and overconfidence are more pervasive. EM is the only market where our five preferred factors (Momentum, Quality, Min Vol, Value and Equal Weight) have had positive premiums, even though the Value premium is not statistically different from zero, while the Growth premium is negative. Despite the well-telegraphed underperformance of Value versus Growth in the US and global markets, this has not been the case in Japan, Canada, and the EM. Momentum, Quality, Min Vol and Value in the EM and Canada have much higher absolute returns than in the US. This aspect cannot be fully explained by the overall index performance difference between these countries and the US. Even though Momentum, Quality, Min Vol and Value in the UK and euro area have returned much less than their US counterparts, the magnitude of the underperformance of each factor is much smaller than what the overall index performance divergence would imply. Table 2Factor Performance Divergence* The widely quoted explanation for the impressive factor performance in the EM, especially in the Chinese A-share market, is that emerging markets have higher trading costs such that it’s harder to arbitrage away the mispriced anomalies. It’s true that trading cost is higher in the EM than in the US, which explains why there are fewer EM-dedicated quant funds than US-focused quant funds. Trading cost alone, however, cannot fully explain the exceptionally large premiums in EM Momentum, Quality and Min Vol compared with the US. In fact, the market with the best factor relative performance since the end of 2001 has been the UK (Chart 2) where trading costs are comparable to the US. The EM is the second in terms of relative returns even though it is more volatile than the euro area. Canada has also performed better than the US, while Australia has been the least favorable market to harvest any factor premium. Japan behaves more like the US, yet with higher volatility. The risk-adjusted active return, defined as the average of the return difference (between EW5 and benchmark) divided by the volatility of the return difference, on an annualized basis using monthly returns, is illustrated in Chart 3. The chart shows both the full-period (from December 2001 to January 2022) risk-adjusted active return (RAAR) and four-year moving RAAR to demonstrate how factors have evolved in each market. Several observations can be made from Chart 3: In the past 20 years, factor premiums (aka active factor returns) in the US have gone through three stages: High premium, low positive premium and then sharply declining premium to negative territory. The last stage started about four years ago. The US factor premium is at its lowest level in the past 20 years and is also the lowest among the seven countries/regions (Chart 3, panel 5). This supports the argument that too many quant funds trade with each other in the US equity market, resulting in lower and lower factor returns. Japan shares a similar pattern with the US, but on a much smaller scale (Chart 3, panel 4). Canada and Australia are similar because their indexes are dominated by financials and commodities. The four-year RAAR trends oscillate in a similar fashion in both countries, but the Canadian cycle seems to lead the Australian cycle by about 2-1/2 years. Canada has a meaningfully positive average factor premium and its four-year RAAR is near a historical low. In contrast, Australia’s average premium is close to zero and its four-year RAAR is still above previous lows (Chart 3, panels 6 and 7). The EMU is the only market with a positive four-year moving RAAR, currently at the well-established lower bound (Chart 3, panel 2). The UK has the highest average premium. It is the only market in which the four-year RAAR has had large cyclical swings and only two brief periods in negative territory (Chart 3, panel 1). EM is the only market where the four-year RAAR has improved since the Covid-19 pandemic started in March 2020 (Chart 3, panel 3). Chart 2Factor Relative Return Performance* Chart 3Risk-Adjusted Active Performance Bottom Line: US-centric factor research and the US-dominated global factor indexes have masked different behaviors of factors in various countries/regions. Thus, it is important to analyze each market instead of drawing investment conclusions from US-based research. What Drives The Divergence In Quality Premium? The Quality factor has been consistently rewarded, but the magnitude of the Quality premium varies significantly among countries/regions, and non-US countries have low correlations with the US, as shown in Table 2 (on page 4) and Charts 4 and 5. Chart 4Quality Performance Divergence* Chart 5Quality Premium* Country Correlation MSCI Quality is defined by three accounting measures: Return on equity (ROE), debt-to-equity and five-year volatility of EPS YoY growth. Earnings may be affected by accounting standards. Countries have different accounting standards, which may explain part of the country divergence in Quality. Our research focuses on an important aspect of Quality, which is persistence, i.e., a Quality stock today will be a Quality stock in the future. The implication is that the Quality factor index has a low turnover and its sector composition does not change much over time. As such, we can take a snapshot and see the relationship between Quality and sector exposure. The sector weights of the broad benchmark in each market are shown in Table 3. Notably, the US and EM have the highest exposure to the Tech sector while both the UK and Australia have little. Although Australia and Canada are both regarded as commodity-driven markets, they have dissimilar exposures to non-Financials: Australia is concentrated in Materials and Healthcare, while Canada has a more even exposure in Energy, Industrial, Materials and Tech. Table 3Broad Market Sector Compositions Given that Quality is measured on profitability, capital structure and earnings stability, does Quality show universal sector preference? The answer is both Yes and No. Yes, because Quality is universally underweight Financials, Energy and Utilities (Table 4). It is also overweight Tech and underweight Real Estate in all markets, except Australia. Tech has outperformed Financials, Utilities and Energy in general (except for Canada), therefore, these three sector tilts may explain the universal existence of Quality premium (Chart 6). Table 4Quality Index Sector Deviations Chart 6What Drives Quality Premium? However, the commonality ends here. Canadian Tech has underperformed Financials by a very large margin (Chart 6, panel 3), which would have caused a huge underperformance in Quality; Quality indexes in the UK and EMU have benchmark exposures to Tech. So what else have contributed to Quality’s outperformance in these three countries/regions? A look at their exposures to other sectors reveals the answers. In the UK, EMU and Canada, Quality indexes have also overweight tilts in Industrials, Consumer Discretionary and Consumer Staples (Table 4). These three sectors have all outperformed their respective benchmarks in the past 20 years, as shown in Table 5. The table also shows that Consumer Staples is the only sector that has outperformed in all markets, yet both US and Australian Quality indexes underweight this sector. Table 5Sector Performance* In addition, in both the UK and Canada, Quality overweights Materials, which is a top outperforming sector in the UK, but an underperforming sector in Canada. Materials also outperforms in the EMU, yet EMU Quality underweights it. Despite the impressive overall outperformance since 2001, the Quality factor in DM has suffered in the past few years, especially since the Covid 19-induced selloff in March 2020. Quality relative performance in EM peaked long before DM but has stood out as the only significant outperformer since March 2020. This is because profitability in Quality has improved in EM but deteriorated in the US and other DM countries as shown in Charts 7 and 8. Chart 7Quality Premium Driver: ROE* Chart 8Quality Premium Driver: EPS* Chart 9Quality Premium Driver: Valuation* Valuation-wise, Quality indexes in the UK and Canada are at their cheapest levels since 2013, while Japan has become more expensive. Meanwhile, Quality valuation in the US, EMU and Australia is in line with their respective historical average5 (Chart 9). Bottom Line: Quality premium is driven by profitability and has strong sector preferences. The divergence of Quality premium among countries indicates that the same sector in different countries does not necessarily share the same behavior relative to its own benchmark. Sector behaviors in each market have not been as consistent as globalization would have implied, even though “global sectors” have become a well-accepted concept. What Drives The Min Vol Premium Divergence? Beside Quality, Min Vol has consistently outperformed in all the countries/regions in the past 20 years, even though the premiums in the US and Japan are close to zero, as shown in Table 2 on page 4. Over time, however, Min Vol’s relative performance is very cyclical. At the global aggregate level, this cyclicality is determined by its defensive nature given its positive correlation with the relative equity return ratio of Defensives/Cyclicals and negative correlation with bond yields. It is no surprise that the strong recovery in global equities and the rise in bond yields have caused Min Vol to underperform the broad market since March 2020. What is surprising, however, is the magnitude of the underperformance, which cannot be explained by historical relationships (Chart 10). Chart 10What Drives Global Min Vol Premium? Looking at the global aggregate only, however, can provide misguided information, because Global Min Vol is dominated by the US (56.81%) and Japan (9.88%), where Min Vol has performed the worst. In the most recent cycle since March 2020, the US is the only country where Min Vol has deviated sharply from the historical relationship with the relative performance of defensives/cyclicals and with bond yields, incurring the largest relative performance drawdown ever, erasing all the relative gains achieved in the previous two decades (Chart 11A). Japanese Min Vol also suffered large drawdown, but was in line with the defensives/cyclicals, albeit undershooting what implied by the bond yield (Chart 11B). The relative performance of Min Vol in the UK, Canada, EM, and Australia all behaved in line with what is implied by the historical relationships with bond yields and defensives/cyclicals, while Min Vol in EMU does not have a close correlation with defensives/cyclicals (Charts 11 C-G). Chart 11AUS Min Vol Premium Chart 11BJapan Min Vol Premium Chart 11CUK Min Vol Premium Chart 11DEMU Min Vol Premium Chart 11ECanada Min Vol Premium Chart 11FAustralia Min Vol Premium   Chart 11GEM Min Vol Premium Min Vol has become the worst performing factor since March 2020, led by the US, Japan, and EMU, while the UK has been almost flat, as shown in Table 6. This is in stark contrast to its historical track record (Table 2 on page 4) but can be explained by its defensive tilt in a strong equity market. Currently, Min Vol’s general defensive nature is reflected by its overweight in Consumer Staples and underweight in Consumer Discretionary, overweight in Communication Services and underweight in Energy in all markets. In interest-rate-sensitive sectors, Min Vol overweighs Utilities in all markets except Japan and underweights Financials in all markets, except EM (Table 7). Table 6Min Vol Was The Worst Performer Since The Covid-Induced Recovery* Table 7Min Vol Index Sector Deviations Communication Services in the UK and Australia bucked the trend, outperforming the broad market. UK Financial also opposed the trend but did not outperform. In addition, the UK is overweight in Real Estate, which did much better than the broad market (Table 8). Table 8Sector Performance Since March 2020 Chart 12Min Vol Premium Divergence: Valuation* Min Vol in EM has an overweight in Financials, which also outperformed. In addition, EM Consumer Discretionary resisted the general trend, coming in under its benchmark by 17% annualized; an underweight in this sector contributed to EM’s Min Vol’s performance. Why has US Min Vol performed so badly? According to a GAA Special Report published in January 2020, extreme overvaluation of Min Vol relative to the broad market could induce poor subsequent performance in near future. US Min Vol reached peak valuation relative to the market in 2019, and the subsequent underperformance was accompanied by sharp multiple contraction. Currently, Min Vol’s relative valuation is in line with historical average in the US, implying the turnaround since November 2021 may have further staying power (Chart 12). Bottom Line: Global Min Vol’s defensive tilts explain its underperformance since March 2020. However, divergences in the magnitude of underperformance among countries is explained by different sector exposures and the varying performance of some sectors in different countries, in addition to relative valuation. Chart 13Value Vs. Growth: Is This Time Different? Is It Time To Overweight Value Versus Growth? This is one of the most frequently asked questions over the past few years, especially after the turnaround in AQR last year hit the newswire. The impressive performance of AQR so far this year has prompted more heated debate on the sustainability of the “Revenge of Value” after Value's longest streak of underperformance).6 The recent rebound in the relative performance of Value versus Growth has been driven by extremely oversold conditions, very cheap valuation and faster EPS growth led by the rise in global bond yields. Even though sector exposures change over time for Value and Growth, sector exposures to Financials and Tech have been stable since 2010 at the global aggregate level (Chart 13). The large bets in Financial, Utilities and Tech are universal, as shown in Table 9. Other sector exposures in specific countries vary significantly. For example, the US Value/Growth split is basically between Tech, Communication Services and Consumer Discretionary versus the other eight sectors. These three sectors are dominated by a few mega-cap stocks. The other eight sectors are a mixed bag of cyclicals, defensives, and interest rate sensitives, which have different macro drivers. It does not make sense to overweight them together. It is important to note that Consumer Staples and Healthcare are overweight in Growth outside the US and EMU. Table 9Sector Tilts In Value And Growth In addition, Growth has similar sector preferences as Quality (Table 4 and Table 9), which explains the high correlation between the two factor premiums (Chart 14A), However, Quality has been a much better factor than Growth outside the US and Australia. In the US, Quality and Growth are almost the same with a stable correlation, but Quality has been inferior to Growth in Australia (Chart 14B). Chart 14AClose Correlation* Between Quality And Growth Chart 14BQuality Is Superior To Growth Outside US And Australia Finally, Value and Growth behave very differently in various market-cap segments, as shown in Table 10. Despite the well-telegraphed underperformance of Value versus Growth by the media, Value has consistently outperformed Growth in Canada, EM and Japan. Furthermore, mid-cap Value has also outperformed mid-cap Growth universally. Bottom Line: Value is extremely cheap and the rebound from an extremely oversold condition has been supported by the relative earnings trend and a rise in interest rates. Yet the mixed bag of sector exposure makes the Value/Growth allocation inferior to sector allocation. Investors who want to focus on Growth are advised to look for Quality outside of the US and Australia. Conclusions Related Report  Global Asset AllocationValue? Growth? It Really Depends! The US-centric factor research and media coverage have masked an underlying divergence of factor premiums in specific countries/regions. Factor premiums in the UK, EMU, Canada, and EM have been stronger than in the US, while Japan and Australia have been weaker. This divergence can be explained by different sector exposures of the same factor, along with varying behaviors of the same sector in specific countries/regions. While factor investing is not dead, it may be less profitable to utilize in the US, Japan, and Australia. We suggest that global investors implement smart beta strategies on an individual country basis to better capture the factor premium in each country. Even though Quality, Min Vol and Momentum have been outperformers in the past 20 years, all factors have embedded cyclicality. We do not advocate factor timing and reiterate our long-standing approach of equally weighting the five factors to smooth out the cyclicality of individual factors. Value/Growth is a popular style split; however, it is an inferior framework to sector positioning. In addition, Quality is a better factor than Growth, which is already included in our five-factor approach.   Xiaoli Tang Associate Vice President xiaolit@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see "Quant Hedge Fund Icon AQR Cuts Back as Investors Exit," Chief Investment Officer, dated November 15, 2021. 2     Please see "MSCI Diversified Multiple-Factorindexes Methodology," MSCI.com, dated May 2018. 3     Please see "Anomalies across the globe: Once public, no longer existent?" Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 135, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 213-230. 4    Historical data for all MSCI factor indexes in major markets is available for this period 5    Since Jan 2013 based on MSCI data availability. 6     Jessica Hamlin, "AQR Posts Record Performance in January," Institutional Investor, dated February 9, 2022.

Special Report

Executive Summary Tight Inventories Spike Metals Russia's war against Ukraine is a watershed moment, which will realign production, distribution and consumption of commodities globally. The development of new sources of the critical metals desperately needed to build out renewable energy grids and the drive to secure access to oil, gas and coal will intensify along political lines. China, reinforced by Russia, will lead the East, while the US and its allies will lead the West, in a redux of the Cold War. Local politics will intrude on this process, as left-of-center governments in important commodity-producing states secure their electoral victories and claim greater shares of commodity revenues. The rebuilding of defense systems, particularly in Europe, will compete with the renewable-energy transition. This will stress already-tight metals markets, where low inventories will predispose markets to higher volatility a la this week's oil, natgas and nickel price spikes. This will retard economic growth. In the short term, CO2 emissions will surge. Longer term, the transition to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 will be pushed back years, as states compete for access to commodities. East-West trade restrictions and hoarding of commodities secured via trade within these respective blocs, as is occurring presently, will increase. Bottom Line: Russia's war against Ukraine is a watershed moment.  The development of new sources of the critical metals desperately needed to build out renewable energy grids, and the drive to secure access to oil, gas and coal will intensify. China, reinforced by Russia, will lead the East, while the US and its allies will lead the West, in a redux of the Cold War. Feature Russia's war with Ukraine provoked a watershed moment for Europe: Leaders suddenly realized they had to reverse decades of energy dependence on Russia, rebuild their militaries, and sustain a massive buildout of the continent's renewable-energy generation and grid. This occurred as inventories of the basic commodities required to achieve all of these objectives were stretched so tight that the mere threat of the cutoff of pipeline natural gas was enough to send benchmark EU natgas prices to a record $113/MMBtu, up nearly 80% from the previous day's close before it settled back to still-elevated levels (Chart 1). Oil inventories also were stretched extremely thin even before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine 24 February (Chart 2). The situation is not improving, since, in the wake of the Ukraine war, numerous refiners and trading companies now are observing self-imposed sanctions against taking any Russian oil or refined products. It is worthwhile remembering this began before the US and UK announced they would ban all imports of Russian material this week.1 This will stretch supply chains by unknow durations – the movement of crude from Russia to a refiner could take months instead of weeks, until new trade patterns are established. Chart 1Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories Chart 2Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories   Global economic and policy uncertainty is massively elevated, with percent changes in oil and gas prices swinging on a double-digit basis daily. This makes it extremely difficult to bid or offer oil cargoes in the physical market or make markets (i.e., bid or offer) in the futures markets, which has the effect of compounding uncertainty and volatility. Fundamentals – supply, demand and inventories – take a back seat to fear and uncertainty in such markets. This makes it virtually impossible to assign a probability to any price outcomes based on supply and demand – the true definition of uncertainty in the Frank Knight sense – and to make long-term capex decisions over the long term.2 We raised our 2022 and 2023 Brent forecasts on the back of the massive uncertainty in the markets to $90/bbl and $85/bbl, respectively, right after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. We assume 1Q22 Brent will average $100/bbl. We expect core OPEC 2.0 producers – Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait – will increase production beginning in 2Q22; US shale-oil output will rise, and ~ 1.2mm b/d of Iranian production will return to market in 2H22. Among the risks to our forecasts are a failure by core OPEC 2.0 to lift output (we expect an announcement at the end of this month when the producer coalition meets); lower-than-expected US shale output, and a failure to resolve the Iran nuclear deal with the US. Our modeling indicated these outcomes could lift Brent to between $120/bbl and $140/bbl by 2023 (Chart 3). We will be updating our forecasts next week.3 Chart 3Brent Forwards Lift EU's Watershed Metals Moment EU leadership is setting out to reverse decades of energy dependence on Russia, rebuild their militaries, and sustain a massive buildout of the continent's renewable-energy grid, all a result of the Ukraine war. This will require massive investment in metals mining and refining, along with steel-making capacity. Already, Germany is pledging to increase LNG import capacity and measures to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas by 75% this year.4 The EU is looking to restore its natgas inventories to 90% of capacity before next winter, and has pledged to double down on renewables, in order to remove member-state dependence on Russian energy exports.5 These ambitious goals are up against the hard reality of scarce base metals supply globally. This will be exacerbated going forward by actions taken by and against Russia. The Russia-Ukraine crisis will destabilize metal markets, given supply uncertainty from Russia and its contribution to global supply. The commodities heavyweight constitutes 6%, 5% and 4% of global primary aluminum, refined nickel and copper production. Against the backdrop of very low global inventories in these metals (Chart 4), the prices of all three hit record highs over the last few days due to uncertain supply (Chart 5). LME nickel prices more than quadrupled on Tuesday as traders rushed to cover short positions and margin calls. Chart 4Low Inventories... Chart 5...Lead To Price Volatility Uncertainty has engulfed metal markets, with a Western ban on Russian metal imports still a possibility. Putin’s announcement regarding raw material export restrictions will further fuel supply uncertainty.6 As in the case of oil, private entities’ self-sanctioning, sanctions on the Russian financial system, and war-related supply chain disruptions are causing current Russian metal export disruptions.7 So far, Western sanctions on commodities have not directly interfered with metal flows from Russia. But markets are taking it day to day. Supply disruptions and sanctions force the formation of new trade patterns, as private entities aim to maximize arbitrage opportunities. For example, high European aluminum price spreads incentivized shipments from China, the world’s largest producer and consumer of refined aluminum. Normally, Europe relies on Russia for aluminum supplies. Rising European physical premiums for delivered metal, caused by Russian export disruptions, will see trading companies take advantage of arbitrage opportunities in other commodities as well. Europe's Risk Profile Rising Since the Ukraine war began, rising European physical premiums in commodities ranging from metals to natgas indicate the continent – more so than others – is particularly vulnerable to Russian export disruptions. Europe’s reliance on Russian energy and its supply disruptions will raise operating costs for smelters and refiners on the continent, threatening smelter shutdowns similar to those we saw this past winter. Markets were expecting power price relief over the warmer months and higher smelting activity. Elevated fuel and power prices, however, will constrain metals refining in Europe, and could shut or close even more smelters, keeping refined metals supply scarce and prices high. Rebuilding Europe's Defenses EU leaders are scheduled to take up a new energy and defense funding proposal today, which media reports are describing as "massive" (no detail provided ahead of the meeting, of course). This program reportedly will be akin to the EU's $2 trillion COVID-relief fund.8 The EU's fast response to defense shortfalls comes against the backdrop discussed above regarding super-tight metals markets, which now face a further complication of unpredictable local politics in metals-producing states. Some of these states have voted left-of-center governments into office, which now appear to be intent on nationalizing mining operations.9 Chile, e.g., accounts for ~ 30% of global copper ore output, and is in the process of re-writing its constitution, which will change tax and royalty law, and could pave the way for nationalization of copper and lithium mines. This political risk compounds any long-term planning operations by consumers like the EU and producers. Investment Implications Energy markets – broadly defined to include oil, gas and coal along with the base metals required for renewables and their supporting grids and electric vehicles – are being rocked by Russia's war with Ukraine. Base metals, in particular, will have to find price levels that destroy demand among competing uses, if the EU's dual-track plan to build out its renewables generation and restore a military capability is approved. A "massive" funding effort in Europe, coupled with equally massive efforts in the US and China – both intent on building out their renewable generation and grids, as well as expanding their defensive capabilities – will be extremely difficult to pull off. Critical base metals inventories remain low, and prices are high because demand exceeds supply for the foreseeable future (Chart 6). Chart 6Tight Inventories Spike Metals The EU will join a world in which the other two great economic centers – the US and China – will engage in a geopolitical competition over access to and control of scarce base metals, oil, gas and coal resources. Russia will remain aggressive toward the West, at least until the Putin regime falls, and will play an ancillary role to China. Fossil fuels and base metals have been starved for capex for more than a decade. Governmental pronouncements will not reverse this. These markets will remain tight, and will get tighter in order to allocate increasingly scarce supply with rapidly growing demand. As such, we remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF, and the XME and PICK ETFs to retain exposure to base metals and bulks producers and traders.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see Russian tankers at sea despite ‘big unknown’ over who will buy oil, published by ft.com on March 7, 2022. 2     Please see Explained: Knightian uncertainty, published by mit.edu for discussion. 3    Please see Oil Risk Premium Abates, But Still Remains, which we published on February 25, 2022. 4    Please see Germany Revives LNG Import Plans to Cut Reliance on Russian Natural Gas in Marked Policy Shift, published by naturalgasintel.com on March 1, 2022. 5    Please see Climate change: EU unveils plan to end reliance on Russian gas, published by bbc.co.uk on March 8, 2022, and The EU plan to drastically ramp renewables to replace Russian gas, published by pv-magazine.com on March 9, 2022. 6    Please see Russia to Omit Raw Material Exports but Omits Details, published by Bloomberg on March 9, 2022. 7     Please see here for Which companies have stopped doing business with Russia? 8    Please see Ukraine: ECB governing council to meet as crisis intensifies, published on March 8, 2022 by greencentralbanking.com. 9    Please see Chile a step closer to nationalizing copper and lithium, published by mining.com on March 7, 2022, and Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published on November 25, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations

Executive Summary On a tactical (3-month) horizon, the inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices combined with the choke on growth from sanctions will weigh on both the global economy and the global stock market. As such, bond yields could nudge higher, the global stock market has yet to reach its crisis bottom, and the US dollar will rally. But on a cyclical (12-month) horizon, the short-term inflationary impulse combined with sanctions will be massively demand-destructive, at which point the cavalry of lower bond yields will charge to the rescue. Therefore: Overweight the 30-year T-bond and the 30-year Chinese bond, both in absolute terms and relative to other 30-year sovereign bonds. Overweight equities. Overweight long-duration US equities versus short-duration non-US equities. Fractal trading watchlist: Brent crude oil, and oil equities versus banks equities. The DAX Has Sold Off ##br##Because It Expects Profits To Plunge… …But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off ##br##Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off   Bottom Line: In the Ukraine crisis, the protection from lower bond yields and fiscal loosening will not come as quickly and as powerfully as it did during the pandemic. If anything, the fixation on inflation and sanctions may increase short-term pain for both the economy and the stock market, before the cavalry of lower bond yields ultimately charges to the rescue. Feature Given the onset of the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War, with the potential to escalate to nuclear conflict, you would have thought that the global stock market would have crashed. Yet since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 to the time of writing, the world stock market is down a modest 4 percent, while the US stock market is barely down at all. Is this the stock market’s ‘Wile E Coyote’ moment, in which it pedals hopelessly in thin air before plunging down the chasm? Is this the stock market’s ‘Wile E Coyote’ moment, in which it pedals hopelessly in thin air before plunging down the chasm? Admittedly, since the invasion, European bourses have fallen – for example, Germany’s DAX by 10 percent. And stock markets were already falling before the invasion, meaning that this year the DAX is down 20 percent while the S&P 500 is down 12 percent. But there is a crucial difference. While the DAX year-to-date plunge is due to an expected full-blooded profits recession that the Ukraine crisis will unleash, the S&P 500 year-to-date decline is due to the sell-off in the long-duration bond (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). This difference in drivers will also explain the fate of these markets as the crisis evolves, just as in the pandemic.   Chart I-1The DAX Has Sold Off Because It Expects Profits To Plunge...   Chart I-2...But The S&P 500 Has Sold Off Because The Long Bond Has Sold Off During The Pandemic, Central Banks And Governments Saved The Day… We can think of a stock market as a real-time calculator of the profits ‘run-rate.’ In this regard, the real-time stock market is several weeks ahead of analysts, whose profits estimates take time to collect, collate, and record. For example, during the pandemic, the stock market had already discounted a collapse in profits six weeks before analysts’ official estimates (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3The German Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead Of Analysts Chart I-4The US Stock Market Is Several Weeks Ahead ##br##Of Analysts We can also think of a stock market as a bond with a variable rather than a fixed income. Just as with a bond, every stock market has a ‘duration’ which establishes which bond it most behaves like when bond yields change. It turns out that the long-duration US stock market has the same duration as a 30-year bond, while the shorter-duration German stock market has the same duration as a 7-year bond. Pulling this together, and assuming no change to the very long-term structural growth story, we can say that: The US stock market = US profits multiplied by the 30-year bond price (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). The German stock market = German profits multiplied by the 7-year bond price (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-5US Profits Multiplied By The 30-Year Bond Price... Chart I-6...Equals The US Stock Market Chart I-7German Profits Multiplied By The 7-Year Bond Price... Chart I-8...Equals The German Stock Market When bond yields rise – as happened through December and January – the greater scope for a price decline in the long-duration 30-year bond will hurt the US stock market both absolutely and relatively. But when bond yields decline – as happened at the start of the pandemic – this same high leverage to the 30-year bond price can protect the US stock market. When bond yields decline, the high leverage to the 30-year bond price can protect the US stock market. During the pandemic, the 30-year T-bond price surged by 35 percent, which more than neutralised the decline in US profits. Supported by this surge in the 30-year bond price combined with massive fiscal stimulus that underpinned demand, the pandemic bear market lasted barely a month. What’s more, the US stock market was back at an all-time high just four months later, much quicker than the German stock market. …But This Time The Cavalry May Take Longer To Arrive Unfortunately, this time the rescue act may take longer. One important difference is that during the pandemic, governments quickly unleashed tax cuts and stimulus payments to shore up demand. Whereas now, they are unleashing sanctions on Russia. This will choke Russia, but will also choke demand in the sanctioning economy. Another crucial difference is that as the pandemic took hold in March 2020, the Federal Reserve slashed the Fed funds rate by 1.5 percent. But at its March 2022 meeting, the Fed will almost certainly raise the interest rate (Chart I-9). Chart I-9As The Pandemic Took Hold, The Fed Could Slash Rates. Not Now. As the pandemic was unequivocally a deflationary shock at its outset, it was countered with a massive stimulatory response from both central banks and governments. In contrast, the Ukraine crisis has unleashed a new inflationary shock from soaring energy and food prices. And this on top of the pandemic’s second-round inflationary effects which have already dislocated inflation into uncomfortable territory. Our high conviction view is that this inflationary impulse combined with sanctions will be massively demand-destructive, and thereby ultimately morph into a deflationary shock. Yet the danger is that myopic policymakers and markets are not chess players who think several moves ahead. Instead, by fixating on the immediate inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices, they will make the wrong move. In the Ukraine crisis, the big risk is that the protection from lower bond yields and fiscal loosening will not come as quickly and as powerfully as it did during the pandemic. If anything, the fixation on inflation and sanctions may increase short-term pain for both the economy and the stock market. Compared with the pandemic, both the sell-off and the recovery will take longer to play out. In the Ukraine crisis, the big risk is that the protection from lower bond yields and fiscal loosening will not come as quickly and as powerfully as it did during the pandemic. One further thought. The Ukraine crisis has ‘cancelled’ Covid from the news and our fears, as if it were just a bad dream. Yet the virus has not disappeared and will continue to replicate and mutate freely. Probably even more so, now that we have dismissed it, and Europe’s largest refugee crisis in decades has given it a happy hunting ground. Hence, do not dismiss another wave of infections later this year. The Investment Conclusions Continuing our chess metaphor, a tactical investment should consider only the next one or two moves, a cyclical investment should be based on the next five moves, while a long-term structural investment (which we will not cover in this report) should visualise the board after twenty moves. All of which leads to several investment conclusions: On a tactical (3-month) horizon, the inflationary impulse from soaring energy and food prices combined with the choke on growth from sanctions will weigh on both the global economy and the global stock market. As such, bond yields could nudge higher, the global stock market has yet to reach its crisis bottom, and the US dollar will rally (Chart I-10). Chart I-10When Stock Markets Sell Off, The Dollar Rallies But on a cyclical (12-month) horizon, the short-term inflationary impulse combined with sanctions will be massively demand-destructive, at which point the cavalry of lower bond yields will charge to the rescue. Therefore: Overweight the 30-year T-bond and the 30-year Chinese bond, both in absolute terms and relative to other 30-year sovereign bonds. Overweight equities. Overweight long-duration US equities versus short-duration non-US equities. How Can Fractal Analysis Help In A Crisis? When prices are being driven by fundamentals, events and catalysts, as they are now, how can fractal analysis help investors? The answer is that it can identify when a small event or catalyst can have a massive effect in reversing a trend. In this regard, the extreme rally in crude oil has reached fragility on both its 65-day and 130-day fractal structures. Meaning that any event or catalyst that reduces fears of a supply constraint will cause an outsized reversal (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Extreme Rally In Crude Oil Is Fractally Fragile Equally interesting, the huge outperformance of oil equities versus bank equities is reaching the point of fragility on its 260-day fractal structure that has reliably signalled major switching points between the sectors (Chart I-12). Given the fast-moving developments in the crisis, we are not initiating any new trades this week, but stay tuned. Chart I-12The Huge Outperformance Of Oil Equities Versus Banks Equities Is Approaching A Reversal Fractal Trading Watchlist Biotech To Rebound US Healthcare Vs. Software Approaching A Reversal Norway's Outperformance Could End Greece’s Brief Outperformance To End Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Executive Summary Euro Natgas Soars; LME Nickel Squeezed Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak's threat to halt shipmentsof natgas on Nord Stream 1 to Europe lifted European gas prices 25% overnight, and will reverberate for years. We make the odds of a cut-off of Russian natgas exports to the EU low but not extremely low. Russia’s war is about the status of Ukraine. Russia needs the EU markets, and the EU needs Russia's gas. However, if Russia follows through on Novak's threat, it would be a major disruption for gas markets in the short term. Over the medium to long term, US shale gas producers, LNG terminal operators and exporters will benefit from new demand. On the import side, China likely benefits most from Russia's need to re-route gas. But this will require substantial infrastructure investment to monetize Russia's gas supplies and as such will take years to realize. Separately, the LME has shut down its nickel markets following an explosive 250% rally over two days that took prices above $100,000/MT. Nickel settled at ~ $80,000/MT before the LME closed the market today for margin calls on shorts squeezed by the surge in prices to make margin calls. Bottom Line: We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF. We also remain long the XME and PICK ETFs to retain exposure to base metals and bulks.

Executive Summary Will The War Stall The Expected Downturn In Inflation This Year? The Russia/Ukraine conflict is impacting financial markets across numerous channels – uncertainty, risk aversion, growth expectations & inflation expectations – but all have a common link through soaring commodity prices, most notably for oil. For global bond investors, allocations to inflation-linked bonds are a necessary hedge to the war and the associated commodity shock, particularly with breakevens in most countries re-establishing the link to oil prices. We recommend investors maintain neutral allocations to inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government bonds across the developed world until there is greater clarity on future global oil production. Markets are discounting a peak in interest rates at the low end of the Bank of Canada’s neutral range, which is reasonable given high household debt levels in Canada. This creates an opportunity for bond investors to go long Canadian government bonds versus US Treasuries. Bottom Line: The supply premium on global oil prices will persist until there are signs of more global oil production or less chaos in the Ukraine – neither of which is imminent. Maintain neutral allocations to inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt across the developed markets. Feature Chart 1A Broad-Based Surge In Commodity Prices The Russia/Ukraine war has sent an inflationary shock though the world through a very traditional source – rising commodity prices. Energy prices are getting most of the attention, with oil prices back to levels last seen in 2008 and US gasoline prices now above $4 per gallon. The commodity rally is not just in energy, though. Industrial metals prices have also gone up substantially, with the spot prices for copper and aluminum hitting an all-time-high and 16-year-high, respectively (Chart 1). Agricultural commodities have seen even larger increases, with the price of wheat up 22% and the price of corn up 11% since the Russian invasion began on February 24th. Europe is acutely exposed to the war-driven spike in energy prices given its reliance on Russia for natural gas supplies. Natural gas prices in Europe have spiked a staggering 117% since the invasion started, exacerbating a sharp demand/supply imbalance dating back to the reopening of Europe’s economy from COVID lockdowns one year ago (Chart 2). To date, booming energy prices have fueled a huge rise in headline inflation rates in the euro area – producer prices were up 31% on a year-over-year basis in January – but with little trickle down to core inflation which was only up 2.3% in January. High energy prices are not only a problem for global growth and inflation, but also for the future policy moves by central banks. Inflation rates boosted over the past year by commodity supply squeezes and supply chain disruptions were set to decline this year, but the Ukraine shock has thrown that into question. If the benchmark Brent oil price were to hit $150/bbl, this would end the decelerating trend for energy price inflation momentum, on a year-over-year basis, that has been in place since mid-2021 (Chart 3). That means a higher floor for the energy component of inflation indices, and thus overall headline inflation rates, throughout the major economies in the coming months. Chart 2Europe's Reliance On Russian Natural Gas Is A Big Problem​​​​​ Chart 3Will The War Stall The Expected Downturn In Inflation This Year?​​​​​ Chart 4The Oil Price Spike Makes Life More Difficult for CBs How will bond markets respond to higher-than-expected inflation? Rate hike expectations have been highly correlated to the trend of headline inflation in the US, Europe, UK, Canada and Australia over the past year (Chart 4). Currently, overnight index swap (OIS) curves are still discounting between 5-6 rate hikes from the Fed, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of Australia before the end of 2022. A single rate hike is still priced into the European OIS curve, even with the Ukraine shock. Global bond yields have been volatile, but surprisingly resilient despite the worries about war and commodity inflation. The 10-year Treasury yield has been trading in a range between 1.7% and 2% since the Russian offensive began, while the 10-year German Bund yield has hovered around 0%. Bond markets are pricing in a stagflation-type outcome of slowing growth and rising inflation, as multiple rate hikes are still discounted despite the geopolitical risks from the war. That reduces the value of using increased duration exposure to position for risk-off moves in a bond portfolio. At the same time, real bond yields are falling and breakeven rates are rising for global inflation-linked bonds – a part of the fixed income universe that looks to offer good protection against the uncertainties of war. Inflation-Linked Bonds – A Good Hedge Against War Risks Since the Russian invasion began, breakeven inflation rates on 10-year inflation-linked bonds have moved higher in the US (+13bps), Canada (+19bps), Australia (+15bps) and even Japan (+15bps). The moves have been even more significant on the European continent – 10-year breakevens have shot up in the UK (+23bps), Germany (+45bps), France (+31bps) and Italy (+36bps). Chart 5Inflation Breakevens Are Rising, Especially In Europe The absolute levels of breakevens in Europe are high in the context of recent history (Chart 5). However, breakevens also look a bit stretched in other countries like the US. Our preferred metric to evaluate the upside potential for inflation-linked bonds is our Comprehensive Breakeven Indicators (CBI). The CBI for each country is comprised of three components: the deviation of 10-year breakevens from our model-implied fair value, the spread between 10-year breakevens and longer-term survey-based inflation expectations (the “inflation risk premium”) and the gap between actual inflation and the central bank inflation target. Those three components are all standardized and added together with equal weights to come up with the CBI. A higher CBI reading suggests less potential for inflation breakevens to widen, and vice versa. Currently, the CBIs for the eight countries in our Model Bond Portfolio universe are close to or above zero, suggesting more limited scope for breakevens to widen further (Chart 6). Only in Canada is the CBI below zero, and only slightly so as high realized Canadian inflation is offset by breakevens trading below both fair value and survey-based measures of inflation (Chart 7). Chart 6Global Inflation Breakeven Valuations Are Not That Cheap In the US, the CBI is above zero mostly because of high realized US inflation. In Europe, the CBIs of the UK, Germany and Italy all are well above zero, while in France the CBI is close to zero. The UK has the highest CBI in our eight-country universe, with all three components contributing roughly equally (Chart 8). The Japanese CBI is also just above the zero line. Chart 7Some Mixed Signals On Inflation Breakeven Valuations​​​​​​ Chart 8European Breakevens Have Adjusted Sharply To The Energy Shock​​​​​​ We have been recommending a relative cautious allocation to global breakeven bonds in recent months. We saw the upside potential on breakevens as capped given the dearth of “cheap” signals on breakevens from our CBIs, especially with central banks moving towards monetary tightening in response to elevated inflation – moves intended to restore inflation-fighting credibility with bond markets. Yet the Ukraine commodity shock has boosted inflation breakevens even in countries with modest underlying (non-commodity) inflation like Japan and the euro area. We now see greater value in owning inflation-linked bonds in global bond portfolios as a hedge against the inflation risks stemming from the Ukraine and the worsening geopolitical tensions between the West and Russia. This is true even without the typical positive signal for breakevens from having CBIs below zero. We recommend that fixed income investors maintain a neutral allocation to inflation-linked bonds in dedicated government bond portfolios across the entire developed market “linker” universe. In our model bond portfolio, we had been allocating to linkers based off the signal from the CBIs, but in the current stagflationary war environment, we see country allocations as secondary to having neutral exposure to linkers in all countries. The new weightings to inflation-linked bonds are shown in the model bond portfolio tables on pages 12-14.1 Bottom Line: For global fixed income investors, allocations to inflation-linked bonds are a necessary hedge to the war and the associated commodity shock, particularly with breakevens in most countries re-establishing the link to oil prices. Canada Update: BoC Liftoff At Last The Bank of Canada (BoC) raised its policy interest rate by 25bps to 0.5% last week, commencing the start of the first rate hike cycle since 2018. The move was no surprise after BoC Governor Tiff Macklem signaled at the January monetary policy meeting that the start of a rate hiking cycle was imminent. The Canadian Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve is discounting another 171bps of hikes in 2022, with a peak rate of 1.98% reached by March 2023 - near the low-end of the BoC’s range of neutral rate estimates between 1.75% and 2.75% (Chart 9). Chart 9Markets Discounting A Shallow BoC Rate Hiking Cycle, Even With High Inflation The BoC noted that the Canadian economy was recovering faster than expected from the effects of the Omicron variant and the associated restrictions on activity, coming off a robust 6.7% annualized real GDP growth rate in Q4/2021. The BoC now estimates that economic slack created by the pandemic shock has been fully absorbed, with the unemployment rate at 6.5%. Canadian headline inflation reached a 32-year high of 5.1% in January (Chart 10) – a level that Governor Macklem bluntly called “too high” in a speech the day following the rate hike. The BoC’s CPI-trim measure that excludes the most volatile components is also at an elevated reading of 4%, suggesting that the higher inflation is broad based. The BoC sees persistent high inflation as a risk to the stability of medium-term inflation expectations, thus justifying tighter monetary policy. According the latest BoC Survey of Consumer Expectations, Canadians expect inflation to be 4.1% over the next two years and 3.5% over the next five years, both of which are above the BoC’s 1-3% inflation target band. So with a robust economy, tight labor market, inflation well above the BoC target and elevated consumer inflation expectations showing no signs of settling, why is the OIS curve discounting such a relatively low peak in the BoC policy rate? The answer lies with Canada’s housing bubble and the associated high household debt levels. In a recent Special Report, our colleagues at The Bank Credit Analyst estimated that the neutral rate in Canada was no higher than 1.75%- the previous peak in rates during the 2017-2018 tightening cycle. A big reason for that was the high level of Canadian household debt, which now sits at 180% of disposable income. This compares to the equivalent measure in the US of 124%, showing that unlike their southern neighbors, Canadian households had little appetite for deleveraging after the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 11). Chart 10Good Reasons For A More Aggressive BoC​​​​​​ Chart 11A Big Reason For A Less Aggressive BoC​​​​​​ Chart 12Position For Narrower Canada-US Bond Spreads The Bank Credit Analyst report estimated that if the BoC hiked rates to 2.5% over the next two years – just below the high end of the BoC neutral range – the Canadian household debt service ratio would climb to a new high of 15.5% (bottom panel). This would greatly restrict Canadian consumer spending and likely trigger a sharp pullback in both housing demand and real estate prices. The conclusion: the neutral interest rate in Canada is likely closer to the peak seen during the previous 2018/19 hiking cycle around 1.75%. We have been recommending an underweight stance on Canadian government bonds in global fixed income portfolios dating back to the spring of 2021. However, with markets now discounting a peak in rates within plausible estimates of neutral, the window for additional underperformance of Canadian government bonds may be closing - but not equally versus all developed economies. We have found that a useful leading indicator of 10-year cross-country government bond yield spreads is the differential between our 24-month discounters. The discounters measure the cumulative amount of short-term interest rate increases over the next two years priced into OIS curves. Currently the “discounter gaps” are signaling room for Canadian spread widening versus the UK and Japan and, to a lesser extent, core Europe (Chart 12). However, the discounter gap is pointing to significant potential for narrowing of the Canada-US 10-year spread over the next year (top panel). This would occur even if the BoC follows the Fed with rate hikes in 2022, as the Fed is likely to deliver more increases in 2023/24 than the BoC. This week, we are introducing two new recommended positions to benefit from narrower Canada-US government bond spreads: We are reducing the size of our underweight position in our model bond portfolio in half, offset by a reduction in the allocation to US Treasuries (see the table on page 13). We are introducing a new trade in our Tactical Overlay, going long Canadian 10-year government bond futures versus selling 10-year US Treasury futures on a duration-matched basis (the specific details of the trade can be found in the table on page 15) We are maintaining our cyclical underweight recommendation on Canada, in a global bond portfolio context, given the potential for Canadian yield spreads to widen versus core Europe, Japan and the UK. That underweight recommendation will be more concentrated versus countries relative to the US. Bottom Line: Markets are discounting a peak in interest rates at the low end of the Bank of Canada’s neutral range, which is reasonable given high household debt levels in Canada. This creates an opportunity for bond investors to go long Canadian government bonds versus US Treasuries.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The allocations to inflation-linked bonds shown in the model bond portfolio reflect both the recommended country weights and the recommended weighting of linkers versus nominal bonds within each country.  For example, we are neutral US TIPS versus nominal bonds within the US Treasury component of the portfolio, but since we are also underweight the US as a country allocation, the TIPS allocation is below the custom benchmark index weight. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Tactical Overlay Trades